1370_A28-A31.qxd 12/7/07 7:56 AM Page 368 320-672/B428-S/40001 Opening Negotiations, December 1972–July 1973 120. Editorial Note On December 2, 1972, Secretary of State Rogers sent a memoran- dum to President Nixon regarding the Secretary’s objectives at the up- coming NATO Ministerial meeting, December 7–8, in Brussels. With regard to mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) and the Con- ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) he wrote: “On MBFR I will urge our Allies to support us in confining Janu- ary’s preparatory meeting to agreements on a firm date early next fall for convening the conference, on the agenda, and on procedures, avoid- ing discussion of the substantive issues which some of our Allies have wanted to open up. On CSCE, finally, I hope to generate a positive at- titude about what the conference may be able to accomplish in open- ing up relations with eastern Europe. To that end I will stress the im- portance of maintaining a separate agenda item covering freedom of movement of people and ideas. I will also support the objective, al- ready generally agreed among our Allies, of ensuring that any confer- ence statement of principles will include a specific provision making it applicable to states within the same social system as well as among states in different systems. As you have probably noted, the Romani- ans have themselves already raised this issue in Helsinki. The nature of the opening and closing sessions of the conference—in particular whether it should open with a Ministerial session and close with a Min- isterial or other high level session—will probably also be a matter of discussion; my objective will be to defer any decisions until we can make a better judgment as to how well our objectives are likely to progress in the conference.” On December 5, President’s Deputy As- sistant for National Security Affairs Haig communicated the President’s approval of Rogers’s proposed objectives in a memorandum to Eliot. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 262, Agency Files, NATO, Vol. XII) In the final communiqué of the NAC Ministerial meeting, De- cember 8, the NATO Ministers stated with regard to CSCE “that their Governments would work constructively to establish necessary agree- ments in the multilateral preparatory talks” and “confirmed that it is the goal of their Governments to increase the security of all Europe through negotiations concerning such questions as principles guiding relations between the participants and through appropriate measures, including military ones, aimed at strengthening confidence and in- creasing stability so as to contribute to the process of reducing the dan- gers of military confrontation; to improve cooperation in all fields; to 368 1370_A28-A31.qxd 12/7/07 7:56 AM Page 369 320-672/B428-S/40001 December 1972–July 1973 369 bring about closer, more open and freer relationships between all peo- ple in Europe; and to stimulate a wider flow of information and ideas.” With regard to MBFR, the final communiqué reads: “The Ministers representing countries which participate in NATO’s integrated defense program noted with approval that the Governments of Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway and Turkey have proposed that the Governments of Czechoslovakia, the German De- mocratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union join them in exploratory talks on 31st January, 1973, on the question of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe.... Ministers hoped that these talks would make it possible to commence negotiations on this subject in the autumn of 1973.... Recalling the Declaration of the Council in Rome in May 1970, these Ministers confirmed their position that Mutual and Bal- anced Force Reductions in Europe should not operate to the military dis- advantage of any side and should enhance stability and security in Eu- rope as a whole. Their position is based on the conviction that the security of the Alliance is indivisible and that reductions in Central Europe should not diminish security in other areas.” With regard to the relationship be- tween CSCE and MBFR, the communiqué reads: “While considering it inappropriate to establish formal and specific links, these Ministers reaf- firmed their view that progress in each set of the different negotiations would have a favorable effect on the others.” The full text of the com- muniqué is in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO: Final Commu- niqués, 1949–1974, pages 282–287. 121. Editorial Note On December 18, 1972, President Nixon suggested in a letter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev that Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin’s return to Moscow was an opportunity for a “full and frank exchange of views in the private channel.” Nixon wrote: “In European affairs, as you have pointed out, there are now new prospects for dealing with matters of security and cooperation and the reduction of armed forces. The initial contacts in Helsinki suggest that we can accelerate the prepa- rations and define an agenda that will allow a full conference to be convened in June. We are also preparing for the initial talks on mutual reductions of armed forces. While the talks in January, as we have agreed, will be preliminary, we hope that some discussions can take place that will point up the issues that will be negotiated next autumn. Our Allies, as well as countries allied to the Soviet Union are deeply 1370_A28-A31.qxd 12/7/07 7:56 AM Page 370 320-672/B428-S/40001 370 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIX involved in both of these negotiations, and I am not suggesting that the United States and the Soviet Union can or should arrange the outcome without their participation or against their interests. Nevertheless, our two countries can facilitate the course of these talks and help ensure their success, and to this end we are prepared to remain in contact through this channel.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 495, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, Vol. 14) The full text of the letter is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974. On December 21, Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff wrote in a memorandum to President’s Assistant for Na- tional Security Affairs Kissinger: “While the Helsinki CSCE prepara- tory talks are in recess (until January 15), the Soviets are badgering our representative about their concern that we will not honor our com- mitment to convene the Conference in June and restrict the prepara- tory talks to procedure.” Sonnenfeldt assured Kissinger that “the Pres- ident’s letter to Brezhnev will take care of this. It mentioned June as the date and stated we could accelerate preparations for defining an agenda. The Soviets are going too far, however, in claiming that we agreed to discuss procedures only. And we should not abandon the ef- fort to define more precisely what each committee will take up under main agenda headings when the talks resume. If this matter of our commitment to a date arises in normal channels, we will have to stick with our official line in our note of reply to the note given you last Sep- tember, i.e., that June is a ‘reasonable target’ for convening the confer- ence, if preparations justify it. If we don’t, we will have a major prob- lem with the Allies.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 247, Agency Files, MBFR and CSCE, 1972) 122. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon1 Washington, December 20, 1972. SUBJECT CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 248, Agency Files, CSCE and MBFR. Confidential. Hyland wrote on an attached correspond- ence profile: “No action necessary.” 1370_A28-A31.qxd 12/7/07 7:56 AM Page 371 320-672/B428-S/40001 December 1972–July 1973 371 Initial preparatory talks for CSCE, which opened November 22 at Helsinki, adjourned December 15. Progress was limited largely to proce- dural questions. The central issue of current East-West disagreement— the extent to which substantive issues will be tackled in the preparatory phase—will be addressed when talks resume January 15. The atmosphere of the talks thus far has been cordial and devoid of acrimony. The representatives of the 34 participating states have proceeded at a deliberate pace, reaching agreement prior to the December 15 re- cess only on rules of procedure for the talks and—as a working hy- pothesis—on a three-stage format for CSCE (initial meeting of foreign ministers; detailed preparations in committees; concluding high-level meeting). The Soviets pressed unsuccessfully for rapid agreement on “prac- tical matters” like the agenda, organization, date and venue of the con- ference. However, a majority, including all the NATO Allies, held that CSCE must be carefully prepared through consideration of substantive questions at the Helsinki talks. Similarly, the Soviet preference for no holiday recess, or only a very short one, found no support outside the Warsaw Pact delegations. In conformity with our positive approach to CSCE, I have in- structed our delegation to make every effort to avoid polemical ex- changes at Helsinki. It has developed good working relations with the Soviet delegation, while side-stepping several Soviet suggestions for stage-managing the proceedings through private understandings with us. I am encouraged that the NATO Allies have approached the issues in a firm, businesslike manner, while holding frequent informal con- sultations in which the French usually participated. These inter-Allied discussions at Helsinki have meshed smoothly with the parallel con- sultations among the EC Nine.