STA TE/TERRORISM: DISCOURSES OF TERRORISM AND
STATE IDENTITY-FORMATION
By
Priya Dixit
Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
In
International Relations Chair: 7 Dr. Patrick T. J kson . _ ·} ;J ~ ~ fl_ tfj_ ~% r. fames H. Mittelman ~~M~ Dean of the School of International Service J \)e ~ ~ ?,,()-o 1 Date
2009
American University
Washington, D.C. 20016
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by
Priya Dixit
2009
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores how commonsensical identities of states and terrorists
are produced within representational practices and how they shift through time. By
analyzing the official rhetoric of terrorism, this dissertation extends previous work of
critical security scholars by applying poststructural discourse analysis to the study of
terrorism. At the same time, this dissertation contributes to the subfield of terrorism
studies by utilizing a relatively less-used methodology, that of poststructural discourse
analysis, to question commonsensical narratives of states and terrorist relations as always
reactive and antagonistic. While the initial focus is on the use of the language of
"terrorism" in Nepal's official security discourses, this dissertation adopts a Foucauldian
genealogical approach to compare representational strategies in Nepal with those of the
British state in its relations with the Irish Republican Army (IRA).
In the following pages, this dissertation examines the strategies (mechanisms)
through which identities of states and terrorists are constituted, focusing on linguistic
representations. Using a concept of identity as relational, official accounts of danger
especially those relating to the Maoists in Nepal and the IRA in Britain are studied and
the subsequent changes in identity outlined. This dissertation adopts the view that identity
does not exist without representations. Three issues are of concern here: one, the
counterterrorist state produced in both Northern Ireland and Nepal was not a self-evident
identity but was produced during social interactions, especially in the process of representing others as "terrorist". Two, this counterterrorist identity was aiways in
11 contention with other representations present at the time. Three, commonsensical
narratives about terrorism, such as states always act to counter terrorist violence and that
states do not talk to terrorists, if unpacked, allow for illustrating the contingent,
contextual nature of such claims. As both the IRA and the Maoists relations with states
indicates, states often do talk to so-called "terrorists'', even if "terrorist" groups have not
renounced violence.
Overall, this dissertation argues strategies of representing such as managing stake
and establishing authority recur in more than one context. How these strategies play out
in the construction of state/terrorist identities in Nepal and Britain is the focus of my
study. Examining these strategies helps explain how state relations with "terrorists" were
legitimated, but also how stakes and authorization were open to question. The use of
"terrorism" to label acts and groups was inconsistent and difficult to stabilize. Official representations of groups as "terrorist" did not always "stick'', once again questioning the
inevitable counterterrorist identity of states as posited in much of mainstream terrorism
studies. Thus, this dissertation examines how state and terrorist identities are produced and how relations among them shift. It studies the politics of representing selves and others.
lll ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
There are more people than I can acknowledge here who contributed to the making of this dissertation. First, my dissertation committee, especially Dr. Patrick
Thaddeus Jackson, my chair, Dr. James H. Mittelman and Dr. Carole Gallaher all offered me enormous guidance with ideas for my dissertation and encouraged me when I faltered.
At various points during this PhD process, each of them employed me as well, thus assisting not only in my intellectual development (such as it is) but financially in the completion of my PhD. I am comfortable in the academic milieu today due to their continued assistance and advice and I will always remain extremely grateful to them.
On a personal note, my family and friends were central to this dissertation process and they will have my gratitude for listening to me and encouraging me throughout. Of my family, I am thankful to my mum and dad and my grandparents, especially my granddad, without whose help much of my higher education would never have occurred.
They are well-pleased I'm the first woman in my clan to have begun and completed a
PhD, despite remaining certain that it should not have me taken this long! Then, my friends, including but not limited to university colleagues, who aided in different ways ranging from academic discussions, provision of foods and generally being around for discussion. In this, Dr. Peter Howard deserves special mention for listening to my wrestling with theoretical conundrums, encouraging me and providing employment over the summers.
The School for Postgraduate Interdisciplinary Research on Intercuituraiism and
IV Transnationality (SPIRIT) at Aalborg University in Denmark and, especially, Dr. Ulf
Hedetoft there guided me towards the critical security scholarship of the Copenhagen
School and thus informed a significant part of my dissertation. The organizers of the
Summer Workshop on Teaching about Terrorism, which I attended in 2006, can be credited for their willingness to discuss the many and varied ways in which terrorism is studied, especially here in the United States. Finally, I am extremely grateful to the
School of International Service at American University, without whose financial and intellectual assistance there would have been little opportunity for me to begin and complete a PhD.
v TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ...... ii
ACKN" 0 WLEDGMENTS ...... iv
LIST OF TABLES ...... vii
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION: STUDYING THE STATE AND TERRORISM IN NEPAL AND NORTHERN IRELAND ...... 1
2. THE STATE AND TERRORISM: A LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 12
3. LANGUAGE OF TERRORISM AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE: A DISCOURSE ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO STATE/TERRORISM ...... 80
4. DANGEROUS "TERRORISTS" TO PARTNERS IN PEACE: STATE/IRA RELATIONS ...... 143
5. STATE/MAOIST IDENTITIES IN NEPALESE SECURITY DISCOURSES ...... 222
6. TERRORISM AS DISCOURSE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM TODAY ...... 323
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 345
Vl LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Representing 'Terrorists' in Official Discourses ...... 135
2. Major Rhetorical (Linguistic) Commonplaces Used to Describe (IRA) 'Terrorism' Within Official British Discourses ...... 158
3. Descriptions of the Brighton Bombing in Official British Accounts Immediately Following the Bombing ...... 195
4. Self/Other Representations in Official British Accounts Immediately Following the Docklands Bombing ...... 212
5. Major Events During April 2006 in Nepal...... 292
6. State/Other(s) Identities in Nepalese Official Discourses 2001-2006 ...... 307
7. Common Discourses and Stakes for the State ...... 315
Vil CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: STUDYING THE STATE AND TERRORISM1
IN NEPAL AND NORTHERN IRELAND
It was the winter of 1999 in Australia -- summer in Nepal -- when I left Sydney,
Australia for Nepal to do research on Nepal's community-based forestry programs.
Community forestry in Nepal had been hailed as a success in international development circles for its transition from hands-off conservation techniques to hands-on methods which encouraged the involvement of local people. I wanted to understand how this change was understood in local communities and by government officials. During the course of my research, I found out that the official government view was of the people involved as being enterprising and self-sufficient and as excellent managers of forests.
Local peoples' self-reliance and self-sufficiency were described as tied to traditional
Nepali ways of surviving in a harsh geographical environment in a country situated between two leading regional (and global) powers -- India and China. The villagers in question, mostly people from Southern and Southwestern Nepal but also from villages neighboring Kathmandu valley, were praised as raising the status (or, ijjat, a term which has closer connections to "honor" or "reputation") of Nepal in the international community. The successful management of forests by these communities was often given
1For this Introduction and for the rest of the project, "terrorism" is used to mean a label which is open to question, 'terrorism' refers to the subject positioning of a particular actor(s) within discourse, terrorism is when the concept is used in an objective sense (for example, as used by traditional terrorism researchers).
1 2
as reason for Nepal's increasingly favorable reputation in regional and international development circles.
Let us now move forward a few years to December 2001. By now, the Maoist
Peoples' War"2 had been going on for five years and official views of the "local people", as reported in local media, had changed. These people were not seen as good managers of wildlife and forestry or as the source of Nepalese pride. Instead, they were troublemakers, even "terrorists", intent on harming the Nepalese state and destroying its reputation among the international community. The media had stories about extortion, families being harassed, kidnapped and killed by both the Maoists and by the Army. The government officials, on the other hand, had two main narratives -- the necessity of using force to safeguard the people while, at the same time, describing people as "Maoist terrorists", especially after the introduction of Nepal's first anti-terrorism legislation in
November 2001. Indeed, official accounts debated whether local people were "Maobadi"
(supporters of Maoists) or not, with the added implication that most people were either
Maoist terrorists or their potential victims.
So, how did official views of the local people change in these two years and what were the implications of this shift for the study of terrorism and the state? To put it simply, how did the rhetoric of terrorism become commonplace such that Nepal's counterterrorism practices post-2001 were relatively unquestioned in regional and international arenas? There was no drastic increase in the number of people who were killed in the conflict between 1999 and 2001 so it could be said that it was not a sudden
2 Here (and for the rest of my projeci) "Maoist" refers io ihe Communist Party ofNepai (Maoist). 3
escalation of the conflict that accounted for this change in the descriptions of people as
"terrorist". Looking at the actions of the Maoists during this time period and even afterwards is, therefore, not enough to account for this change in labeling of the people from sources of ijjat to terrorists and victims. Instead, it makes sense to study this identity shift, looking at the shift in representations of Maoists. In this, I have chosen to focus on official representations. The question then becomes how was the dangerous, "terrorist" identity of the Maoists constituted when, for the years prior to 2001, they had been described as people dissatisfied with the state? It can be argued that such an identity was not natural or based on state interests since the state continued to receive criticism for its actions against the Maoists and many scholars who have written about the conflict in
Nepal refuse to use the term "terrorism" when describing the Maoists' actions. 3 Neither was it based on Maoist actions (since the Maoists had been using violence since 1996).
So how did the usage of the language of terrorism become authorized and commonplace such that state/other relations in Nepal became state/terrorist relations? In this, my project follows David Campbell's view that "danger is an effect of interpretation"4 and that active interpretation of actions and events is needed to describe groups as dangerous, as
"terrorist". As such, specifically tracing out the language used by the government to describe local people as "terrorists" and the attendant identity-formation of the state itself is one of the ways in which this development of state and others relations in Nepal can be
3However, the Maoist-as-terrorist formulation was generally accepted in regional and international circles as various countries including India and the United States provided military aid and training to Nepal to counter "terrorists''. The Maoists were also on the United States government's list of proscribed terrorist organizations. Since my research is concerned with official representations, this identity formation will be my main focus.
4David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, revised ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 2. 4
understood.
Of course, representations are not just official -- media, popular, everyday
representations can also be the focus of study. However, for this study, official
representations of threats, the shift in such and the implications of this process for "state"
and "terrorist" identities are the main focus. My dissertation rests upon the view that state
identity is tied to representations of danger in that what states do and even what they are,
are intricately linked with who (and what) is described as dangerous. Quoting Campbell
once again, "the constant articulation of danger through its foreign policy is thus not a
threat to the state's identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility."5 In my project,
I take this view as foundational -- that states' identity is constituted from processes within
which peoples or groups are described as dangerous.
It is in this process of constructing dangerous subjects that particular actors --
counterterrorist states, evil terrorists, collaborative local people (or "suspect
communities'', a term commonly used with respect to Northern Ireland) -- come into
being, form and continue relationships with each other. In Nepal, this constitution of
specific groups of people as "Maoist terrorists" and the official use of the rhetoric of terrorism is an intriguing period to focus upon when questioning seemingly
commonsensical identities of 'state' and 'terrorist'. This is, therefore, a "how-possible"
6 question -- one that asks how did representations of Maoists shift from being disregarded in 1999 to "terrorists" in the early 2000s and then to potential and actual political partners
51bid., 13.
6Roxanne L. Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgem:y Policy in the Philippines," International Studies Quarterly 37, no.3 (September 1993): 298-99. 5
of the state after 2006? The implications of representing are an important aspect of terrorism to focus upon since conventional understanding is of states as countering (i.e. reacting to) terrorist actions and use of violence. As the example of Nepal shows, this is not always the case as Maoist violence was ongoing in 1999 when there was little mention of it as "terrorist" violence.
But, it is not just this change in representations that is intriguing. In Nepal, not only were local people identified as or contrasted from "terrorists", but there was also a concurrent identification of the issues within Nepal with those of other "terrorists" and
"terrorist" activities elsewhere in the world. For example, in 2004, some Nepalese officials visited the Institute for Conflict Resolution (INCORE) to learn from "the
Northern Ireland experience of peacebuilding."7 It was assumed lessons could be drawn for Nepal from Britain's successful (as it was framed) counter-terrorism efforts against the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and other paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland.
Thus, there was not just a local, domestic shift in representations of people and communities as Maoist "terrorists" and their victims but there was also an identification of events and peoples in Nepal with better-known "terrorists" in other parts of the world.
This leads to questions about space and time, how representations of danger draw upon past practices and the common strategies of such representational practices. Campbell writes, "while the objects of concern [the IRA, the Maoists] change over time, the techniques and exclusions by which these objects are constituted as dangers persist."8 It is
7Intemational Conflict Research (Incore). Policy and Evaluation, Local International Learning Project (LILP) Nepalese Study Tour January 2004,http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/policy/lilp/nst.html. (accessed November 7, 2008).
8Campbell, Writing, 13 (parentheses added). 6
these "techniques and exclusions" or strategies as I shall call them of representations that my research is interested in explicating. Additionally, Northern Ireland and the Irish
Republican Army are both considered seminal cases in terrorism studies. In my dissertation, I will argue that events and identities conventionally considered "terrorist" in official accounts had to be constituted as such in the first place. They were the result of public negotiations in which official representations continually contended with other possible meanings.
In examining these processes of constitution in Nepal, two things become key: one, official representations drew upon global discourse of terrorism present in the post
September 11, 2001 period but had to contend with local and other meanings also available. Two, the linguistic strategies that constituted state and terrorist identities can be noted in other contexts, such as in depictions of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as
"terrorist". While my interest is in the constitution and legitimation of the Maoists as
"terrorists" in Nepal, my dissertation compares state practices oflabeling in Nepal with those in Northern Ireland in the past in order to note how similar strategies (or mechanisms) which help constitute identities of states and terrorists play out in these two seemingly-dissimilar contexts. Since my focus is on official representations, my dissertation rests on the view that the state itself becomes involved in and a product of this representational process, the process within which specific groups are described as
"terrorist". 7
The Language of (Counter)terrorism
For studying identity-constitution, an analysis of language -- noting how officials in Britain and Nepal have used the language of "terrorism" and "terrorist" -- is appropriate. In this my research will draw upon the poststructuralist discourse analytical methodology of critical security scholars such as Lene Hansen who have studied the links between identity and foreign policy. Here, my concern is with identity and (counter or otherwise) terrorist policy. The Nepali government which referred to people involved in community forestry as exemplary and as the pride of Nepal shifted to referring to groups of people as "terrorists" and victims of Maoist "terrorism" but later entered into negotiations with the Maoist "terrorists". The British government which deployed troops to Northern Ireland support civil rights protesters in 1969 fought a long-drawn war against "terrorists" throughout the 1970's, 1980's and much of the 1990's before entering into negotiations with many of these same people. In both examples, violence did not cease while negotiations between states and so-called terrorists commenced. What do actions like these say about our conventional understanding of "terrorists" as violent actors, with whom states do not negotiate (or even talk to)?
Examining if (and how) the language of"terrorism" is used (or not used) leads to a discussion of who is considered terrorist and the practices and policies facilitated to manage them. At the same time, the state cannot merely label various groups of people as
"terrorist" without contending with and responding to other representations. For example, the possibility of a united Ireland was repeatedly brought up in UK parliamentary debates following "Bloody Sunday" and the official accounts of the IRA hunger strikers as
"terrorist" were questioned by concurrent representations of them as non-violent 8
protesters. By empirically delineating these arguments within and against official representations, my dissertation argues the identity of terrorists was always a product of continuous negotiation and not just a feature of specific groups or acts.
This type of poststructural discourse analytical approach to studying the use of
"terrorism" and state identity-formation is dialogical and perspectival.9 Taking each of these in tum, such an approach is dialogical since official accounts, especially dealing with "terrorism" within the state's political boundaries, have to respond to those considered "terrorist" in order to establish authority and while managing stake. Unlike the current global war on terror constructions, for example, when "the enemy" is usually external and there is no need to engage with or respond to "terrorist" views (after all, it is not often the United States or Britain comments on what al-Qaeda says), both Britain in
Northern Ireland and the Nepalese state did have to respond to those labeled "terrorist" in order to gain and maintain public support. Thus there was a rhetorical struggle within official accounts and also with other representations in the processes of establishing stake and authority, in the process of establishing meanings of security, peace and democracy.
The knowledge generated by such an approach is perspectival since it draws attention to the standpoint of official accounts (and of the researcher). For example,
Nepal's identity as a land of 'peace' was used by both the state and the opposition parties when articulating their positions. For Northern Ireland, "Irish" identity and the "Irish" propensity to side with "terrorists", be rowdy and fond of fighting, was brought up during
UK Parliamentary discussions. "Irish terrorism" was used synonymously with
9 These are adapted from Iver Neumann, Uses of the Other: "The East" in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 9
"terrorism", thus linking IRA with (general) terrorism while excluding other acts which could have been called "Irish terrorism" (actions by Loyalist paramilitaries, for example) from either "Irish" or "terrorism". 10 These formulations are not universal since there was no similar reference to ethnicity in Nepal. Making Nepal's usage of "terrorism" and
"terrorist" central and noting similar strategies in Northern Ireland draws attention to the genealogy of terrorism and its spread in places considered at the fringe of mainstream
International Relations.
Therefore, mine is a critical project, critical in the sense Karin Fierke laid out more than a decade ago: 11
... the analysis is not primarily critical because it includes a range of practices that in the past have been ignored. There is not necessarily anything critical about the mere descriptions of a change, even it if includes dissident voices. This volume is first and foremost critical because it makes is look again, in a fresh way, at that which we assume about the world because it have become overly familiar. In this way, new spaces are opened for thinking about the meaning of the past and the present and, therefore, how we construct the future. 12
Thus, my project hopes to "look again, in a fresh way" at British-IRA relations in
10 Loyalist paramilitaries were not labeled "terrorist" until much later in the conflict.
11 There is a difference between the "small c" critical approach of Fierke and other critical security scholars who will be referred to in the next chapter, and the "large c" Critical claims of Critical discourse analysts and Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) scholars. A colleague Jacob Stump and I elaborate upon these differences, and the implications for CTS scholars of not clarifying such differences in their own work. Our views on this will be presented at the International Studies Association 2010 Convention. In short, the discourse analysis and "Critical" approach ofCTS has affinities with Critical discourse analysis (CDA), an overview of which can be found in Ruth Wodak's work. See Ruth Wodak, "What is Critical Discourse Analysis?" http://www.ling.lancs.ac. uk/staff/wodak/interview.pdf and Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, eds. Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, revised edition (London: Sage Publications, 2009). "Small c" critical security scholarship, on the other hand, is based on poststructural (and similar) discourse analytical methodology. This dissertation has "small c" critical aims and draws upon poststructuralist discourse analysis and on discursive psychology. This is detailed further in Chapter 3.
12 Karin Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies: Critical Investigations in Security (New York: St Ma1tin's Press, 1998), 13. 10
Northern Ireland, a topic upon which extensive literature is present as well as at the
labeling of Maoists as "terrorists" in Nepal. While my dissertation's main focus is on the
constitution of the 'terrorist' and the counterterrorist state in Nepal, it draws upon past
interactions of 'state' and 'terrorist' in Northern Ireland in order to understand shifting
identities and their implications. In my dissertation, I argue that the "taboo" of talking to
"terrorists" has not always been followed by states themselves. Neither has the commonplace of "terrorists use violence; states respond" been practiced. On the whole, I
see my dissertation as a project influenced (and inspired) by Michel Foucault's views on
genealogy13 and the "insurrection of subjugated knowledges". According to Foucault,
"subjugated knowledges" mean "historical contents that have been buried or disguised in
functionalist coherence or formal systemization."14 Such knowledge, in Foucault's view,
also means, "something which in a sense is altogether different, namely a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated." 15
It is my argument that taking these two claims seriously will lead to a different mode of studying and understanding terrorism. A critical approach to terrorism in Nepal would usually remain at the boundaries of mainstream or traditional terrorism studies, both in terms of content (Nepal hardly being at the forefront of much research in
International Relations, unless it is within the subfield of international development) and
13 Please see Chapter 3 for further elaboration of this dissertation as a genealogical study of terrorism and the state.
14 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 81-82.
15 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 82. 11
methodology (as poststructural discourse analysis is not a prominent methodological approach in terrorism studies). At the same time, such approach allows for elaborating how a counterterrorist state was always in contest with other representations present at the time, even within official accounts. How the use of the language of "terrorism" by states and the identities produced therein -- even in what is usually considered the
16 exemplary case of terrorism of the IRA in Northern Ireland -- was never as straightforward or uncontested as it seems to us today. In this dissertation, I argue that re- reading representations of the IRA in Britain and the Maoists in Nepal allows for re- reading and questioning commonsensical narratives that counterterrorist states always respond to "terrorist" violence and states do not talk to "terrorists".
16 For a more detailed explanation of why the IRA and Northern Ireland are considered "exemplary" in terrorism studies, please see Chapter 3. CHAPTER2
THE STATE AND TERRORISM: A LITERATURE REVIEW
In 2006, I participated in the Summer Workshop on Teaching about Terrorism
(SWOTT). 17 Held at the William and Mary College in Williamsburg, Virginia, it was a week-long workshop on how to teach the topic of terrorism. Session leaders during the week included terrorism scholars such as Bruce Hoffman, Cindy Combs and Brigitte
Nacos along with current and former United States government personnel involved in counterterrorism. The participants were a mixture of postgraduate (mainly PhD) students, junior academics from larger universities, senior academics (and department chairs) from smaller colleges and practitioners, including people working for various arms of the
United States government. A typical day would have a lecture on "the history of terrorism" in the morning, followed by sessions on "the psychology of terrorism",
"strategic framework for studying terrorism" and the day would end with a discussion of
"terrorism textbooks". 18
Our discussions, as is probably usual for people studying terrorism, were overwhelmingly about how to eliminate the threat of terrorism. That terrorism was a major, if not the most important, threat facing the United States and the world today was taken as commonsensical. During these discussions and in the formal Workshop sessions,
17 This was a Workshop partly organized by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and by the College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA. It was held during June 10-June 18, 2006.
18 These were already identified for us through the SWOTT 2006 syllabus.
12 13
common theme emerged -- that while there is a lack of consensus on how terrorism and terrorists are defined, the focus is squarely on designing and implementing efficient counterterrorism strategies, usually by states. Discussions proceeded on the assumption that counterterrorism was the reason we were all interested in the topic. The structure of the Workshop, too, had this assumption and focused on the subjects of terrorism, the
"terrorists" themselves and presumed that "terrorist" identities were automatically recognizable (and knowable) due to their actions. "Terrorist" motivations, psychologies, reasons for joining terrorist groups and their future actions were central to discussions.
The focus was on actors and reasons --structural, individual, ideological -- why they became "terrorists" and how "we" could best get rid of them. This understanding of states and terrorists ignores that events and actions often have to be interpreted as dangerous, as threatening before identification as (or not as) "terrorist" can occur. In other words, that certain actors are "terrorist" and specific actions are "terrorism" is not self evident. This focus on the actors -- why do "they" become terrorist? -- ignores the continous representational process. In fact, it closes off any possibility for asking questions about how particular state and terrorist relations whether antagonistic or negotiations are made meaningful or about how identities -- of state and terrorist -- are constituted in the first place. It also ignores that the state itself is often the main actor which describes various acts as "terrorism" (or not) and actors as "terrorists". For example, take the example of the (Provisional) Irish Republican Army (referred hereafter as "IRA"). They were involved in violent activities before they were represented as "terrorist" and after the label was dropped, showing research based on groups' involvement in and use of violence may be inadequate for understanding the processes of terrorism and 14
counterterrorism.
In traditional terrorism studies, 19 similar to discussions and the format of SWOTT
2006, the effects of labeling practices -- what happens when various groups are described as "terrorist" threats -- is mainly left unquestioned. Since the starting point is an already- existing state seeking to improve counterterrorist measures, questions of identity, especially the identity of both "terrorist" and the "state", falls outside much of traditional terrorism studies. Traditional research focuses on individual or group motivations for terrorism, rather than how representations of people as "terrorist" occur. The interesting thing here is, ignoring labeling practices including and especially those by states means this shift in groups' "terrorist" identity is normally left up to changes in their behavior or natures of states and "terrorists". For example, Daniel Byman, writes, "states reduce or end their support for terrorist groups due to changes in their own goals, because of outside pressure, or (more rarely) because the terrorist group itself changes."20
Here, the focus of change is on the behavior of the group -- whether state or terrorist -- in question. This means that processes wherein states talk to so-called terrorists or continue negotiations despite ongoing violence are deemed outside the norm
(and thus outside much of traditional terrorism studies). For "terrorist" groups, the general understanding is that groups stop being "terrorist" once they stop using violence.
Yet, there are examples which show that the use of violence by individuals or groups alone is not enough to categorize them as "terrorists" and, often, groups and individuals
19 Traditional terrorism studies is also referred to as "Conventional". It is the body of literature that has become mainstream and which formed SWOTT 2006's entire syllabus.
20 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 6. 15
are not described as "terrorist" despite their continued use of violence. Additionally, there are examples (the British and the IRA, for instance) where states have engaged in negotiations with groups labeled "terrorist" even the group continued to be involved with violence. So, looking at the behavior or motivations of "terrorists" alone is not enough when trying to explain processes of terrorism and counterterrorism. Another drawback of this emphasis on the nature of "terrorists" and on counterterrorism is that it assumes terrorists are easily-recognizable in all contexts, a viewpoint that even traditional terrorism scholars have acknowledged is not the case.
Instead, foregrounding questions of meanings and identity-formation and analyzing representational practices might be a useful approach to studying how state and
"terrorist" relations are not always antagonistic and how they shift. This is the view my own study is based on. For this literature review, I shall examine four types of state and terrorist relationships: (i) the state which produce terrorists by funding or training them;
(ii) states which are formed out of representational processes in which particular groups or individuals are labeled "terrorist"; (iii) states which counter 'terrorists' and (iv) states which are "invisible", in the sense that the research focus is on the "terrorist" actor's motivations and behavior. Three main subfields of security studies will be examined - terrorism studies (traditional and Critical) and critical security studies (mainly researchers using poststructural discourse analysis to study security). I argue that traditional terrorism studies concentrates on terrorism as an objective phenomenon, thus leading to "invisible" states -- research that focuses just on the "terrorists", states that are against "terrorists", or counterterrorist states. Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) calls for both a reduction in the state-centricity of traditional terrorism studies while also asking for the state to be 16
"brought back" into terrorism studies.21 Thus, it confuses "terrorism" as a social construction with an essentialist understanding of terrorism, leading to methodological confusion.22 Finally, critical security studies (CSS) foregrounds constitution of identity and calls for studying representations of danger in their role in constituting 'state' and
'terrorist' identities. A significant part of CSS utilizes poststructural discourse analysis, a methodology that this dissertation will also adopt. However, so far, CSS has mostly ignored terrorism as a topic of study and that is where my own work will contribute to the overall critical security literature. I shall draw upon the works of critical security scholars, especially those who study discourses of danger such as David Campbell, Jutta
W eldes and the Copenhagen School's Lene Hansen, to study how events and actors are represented as "terrorist". Thus, my work will use the methodological tools of these critical security scholars and apply them to the study of terrorism and the related state identity-formation.
With its focus on pre-existing states which counter terror and on actors which perform acts of terrorism, traditional terrorism studies remains uninterested in how meanings are produced and unable to ask questions about the constitution of identities and interests. For example, that the IRA was a terrorist organization is a commonsensical notion in much of terrorism studies which then seek to learn counterterrorist lessons from the actions of the British state. Even if accepting this separation of "state" and
"terrorism" and that terrorism is a real form of violence, this understanding of "terrorist"
21 Richard Jackson, "The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies," European Political Science 6, no. 3 (2007): 244-51; Ruth Blakeley, "Bringing the State Back into Terrorism Studies," European Political Science 6, no. 3 (2007): 228-35
22 I am grateful to my colleague Jacob Stump for this formulation ofCTS' drawback. 17
ignores social meaning-making practices. It ignores questions of constitution of identity and change: how do state/other relations shift to state/terrorist relations in Nepal? how was it possible for the British state to continue negotiations with the IRA despite the IRA being labeled "terrorist"? Such questions are not part of a framework which assumes a group's "terrorist" identity prior to analysis. My research, instead, questions commonsensical assumptions about the state and terrorist relationship by examining the language used by actors -- especially states -- when describing groups and events as
"terrorist".
This emphasis on the importance of public rhetoric of states in labeling groups and acts as "terrorism" and "terrorist" does three things: one, it questions the commonsensical understanding of state and terrorist identities, two, it focuses attention on power and knowledge and how power relations are interlinked with the production of knowledge, of anti-terrorism practices and of negotiations with "terrorists". Three, it draws attention to the processes of representation and categorization, processes that traditional terrorism scholars take for granted in their understanding of terrorism. In a similar way, Roxanne Lynn Doty's Imperial Encounters: The Politics ofRepresentation in North-South Relations (1996) questioned representation in various foreign policy practices, especially counterterrorism. Doty writes that the way we "know" the world and its inhabitants and the classifications we perform have enabled certain practices and policies, based on specific representations. 23 It is a similar concern that looking at the state and terrorist relationship will allow us to investigate. What happens when the
23 Roxanne L. Doty, Imperial Encounters: the Politics of Representation in North-South Relations, Minneapolis (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 3. 18
language of "terrorism" and "terrorist" is used and these labels are applied to particular actors is the concern of my research, as are subjects and objects thus produced and the practices and policies authorized.
With this understanding, this chapter will review some of the major literature on the state and terrorism. It is my argument that traditional terrorism studies ignores analyzing language and practices of terrorism in favor of why terrorism occurs and how better counterterrorism measures can be implemented. Critical terrorism studies, while looking at language use also maintains a distinction between terrorism and the state, looking at each as separate. It also calls for the "rump materialism" of terrorist violence, thus getting bogged down in debates about what is or what is not "terrorism". Critical security studies addresses both these gaps in terrorism studies but mostly ignores terrorism as a topic of study, thus ignoring what has been a major national and global security concern for the past few decades. By focusing on the question of representation, how do specific groups become known as "terrorist" and what happens when identities change, my research aims to fill this gap in the literature on states and terrorism by analyzing the nexus of state/terrorism24 instead of studying them separately. In doing so, my research focuses on identity and legitimation -- how do practices against 'terrorist' groups -- whether they are counterterrorism or negotiation -- become authorized? Or, to put it simply, how do events and actors get constituted as "terrorist" and
"counterterrorist" and relations amongst them authorized in the first place?
In the first part of this chapter, I shall discuss the three types of states evident in
24 This concept of state/terrorism will be explored further in the following chapter. 19
traditional terrorism literature: counterterrorist state, state "sponsors" of terrorism and
what I have called the invisible state. All these have weaknesses in that "terrorism" is
described as separate to and unrelated to states' practices and, as such, unrelated to the
constitution of state identity. There is also a predominant focus on the actors' behavior -- terrorists in this case -- to the exclusion of how threats are actually constituted in practice.
This ignores that states and other "counterterrorist" actors do not automatically respond
to threats but that threats need to be described as such in the first place. This requires
language for the meaning of threats to be communicated. 25 In the second part of the chapter, I shall refer to the works of the newly-emerging self-identified subfield of
Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) to examine its understanding of state and terrorism.
CTS' reflexive approach focuses on methodology, specifically on analyzing discourses of terrorism. Some of the weaknesses of traditional terrorism studies -- a lack ofreflexivity, ignorance of the practices by which the counterterrorist state is produced, a lack of concern for "state terrorism" and limited attention paid to identity-formation -- are concerns that CTS scholars have addressed. However, CTS also has weaknesses, mainly its lack of methodological clarity and its emphasis that liberal democratic states can also be "terrorist", a claim that does not get away from the separation of "state" and
"terrorism" as two distinct and unrelated entities. CTS research too then gets caught up in discussions about what is (and is not) "terrorism" and whether all states are (or are not)
"terrorists", thus remaining stuck in traditional conceptualizations of terrorism as separate
25 For a similar claim see Ranier Hulsse and Alexander Spencer, "The Metaphor of Terror: Terrorism Studies and the Constructivist Tum," Security Dialogue 39, no. 6 (2008): 571-92. 20
to the actions of the state. 26 In such conceptualizations, both states and "terrorist" groups exist prior to analysis, with pre-formed identities. This, my study argues, ignores that states' 'counterterrorist' identity and various groups' 'terrorist' identity have to be constructed as such in the first place.
In the section on critical security studies (CSS), I respond to these drawbacks of
Critical terrorism studies by referring to the works critical security scholars, especially those who study representations of danger rather than starting with pre-formed state or terrorist identities. Such research emphasizes examining the environment or the field of practices where "state" and "terrorist" interactions take place and within which their identities are produced. This moves the emphasis of research away from unitary actors and their behavior to processes wherein identities of such actors are produced, redefined and maintained. By focusing on social practices of how danger is represented, critical security studies emphasizes the constitution and maintenance of identities and interests as main concerns for research. It also draws attention to the links between power and knowledge. Thus CSS provides methodological tools which can prove useful in understanding how state and terrorist relations change and the impacts of such changes.
CSS has mostly ignored terrorism to, I argue, its detriment since the methodological tools of CSS, especially poststructural discourse analysis, can be useful in studying the practices of states against and alongside groups labeled "terrorists".
My research will fill this gap by studying the use of the language of "terrorist"
26 Additionally, CTS' normative and emancipatory agenda disregards concerns of standpoint (most, if not all, CTS scholars are based in Western Europe/North America/Australia) and opens the fledgling field to questions of "whose emancipation?'', "how does this emancipation occur?" and "what IS emancipation?." Such questions which require either an a priori definition of emancipation (thus contradicting the poststructuraVdiscourse analytical methodology) or which can only be answered using an interpretive methodology which explains how communities understand the concept of emancipation. 21
and "terrorism" to note how particular state and terrorist identities are produced through such usage. A related concern is what types of policies and practices are facilitated as groups are labeled "terrorist" and when these labels change? Representations of groups as terrorist and the change in such representations will be traced out27 to note the related state identity-formation. The focus is on how precisely stakes are managed and authority established within official discourses and on the representational strategies (mechanisms) that constitute particular state/other identities. Traditional terrorism research, of the type extensively studied and discussed during my experiences at SWOTT 2006, is unable to ask or answer questions of constitution and change of relations among actors and their identities without resorting to individual or systemic-level explanations28 More commonly, they take for granted that "terrorists" have an out there-ness that is easily recognizable and not open to question. The study ofrepresentational processes is missing from traditional terrorism studies since traditional studies assume terrorists are self- evidently recognizable by their (violent) actions despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, evidence that points out how there are many and often contradictory understandings of"terrorism". A focus on representations would move away from having to know "terrorism" or "terrorist" motivations to examining representations as
27 By "trace" I mean the analytical task in which the linking and differentiation of various rhetorical (linguistic) commonplaces from each other and from the self (the state) and others (Maoists, IRA, the people, other actors) will be described. Therefore, tracing is not process-tracing but is delineating a field ofrhetorical commonplaces and noting their discursive formation. Tracing is useful in illustrating the processes of representing while examining the strategies by which meanings and identities are socially-constructed. This dissertation uses "trace" and "delineate" interchangeably.
28 See Charles Tilly, "Mechanisms in Political Processes," Annual Review of Political Science 4 (June 2001): 21-41, http://arjoumals.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.21 (accessed January 12, 2008) for why such individual and systemic-level explanations are inadequate for understanding social processes. 22
constitutive of state and terrorist identities. This leads to the final section of this chapter, which proposes a relational and poststructural discourse analytical approach to the study of terrorism and states.
On that note, a poststructural discourse analytical approach examines the language of terrorism and how it is used in public.29 It is thus based on how identities -- of terrorists and of the counterterrorist state, among other actors -- are constituted in relation to one another and dependent on each other. In that way, it moves away from assuming counterterrorism is the main goal of all states as is the case in traditional terrorism studies, draws upon critical approaches to terrorism and security and provides an alterative way of understanding terrorism. A genealogy30 of the state/terrorist nexus draws attention to the question of power, which Foucault summarizes as follows: "what are these various contrivances of power, whose operations extend to such differing levels and sectors of society and are possessed of such manifold ramifications? What are their mechanisms, their effects and their relations?"31 Thus, looking at the constitution -- of identities of states and threats during the process of representing groups as "terrorist" -- and at the strategies or mechanisms which facilitate understanding this constitution moves attention away from traditional terrorism studies' focus on unitary identity
29 For more on the type of discourse analysis used in this dissertation, please see Chapter 3. For a detailed overview ofpoststructural discourse analysis in International Relations, see Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London and New York: Routledge, 2006) .
3°Foucault defines genealogy as follows: "Let us give the term genealogy to the union of erudite knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today" in Michel Foucault, Power/knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. and trans. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 83. Further explication of my study as a genealogical project on state/terrorism will be further detailed in the following chapter.
31 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 88 23
formulations and questions the conventional narrative of good states respond to evil terrorists. The following sections will outline these positions of the state in traditional and
Critical terrorism studies before situating my research among critical security scholars who have provided methodological tools to question commonsensical understandings of
'state' and 'terrorist' identities.
The State in Traditional Terrorism Studies
There are three types of state and terrorist relations in traditional terrorism studies: states that counter terrorism, states that sponsor terrorism and what I call "hidden" or
"invisible" states. In all these relationships, identities of "terrorism" and the state are separate to each other and both retain an essentialist, pre-given identity. In traditional terrorism literature, terrorism is objectively knowable and its identity exists outside of social relations. The state is the entity that has to be secured from "terrorism" and
"terrorist" threats. These pre-given state identities, of course, limit questions about terrorism to who are "terrorists"? What causes "terrorism"? How can better counterterrorist policies be formulated? Let me briefly describe each of the state and terrorist identities that are found in traditional terrorism studies.
Hidden States: the Invisibility of "State Terrorism" in Traditional Terrorism Studies
Looking through the SWOTT 2006 reading list32 as a foundation, traditional
32 As the Workshop involved a wide range of input from academics, government officials and students, I have chosen its reading list as a suitable entry point into the literature on terrorism, especially the types of works that are recommended readings for both scholars and practitioners. The readings were heavily oriented to what I (and others) have called "traditional" terrorism studies. 24
terrorism studies focuses on the terrorist actor or the act of terrorism with states' identity as counterterrorist implied and unquestioned. It is assumed there is no need to make states' counterterrorist identity obvious. Much of the research is on why people become terrorist and the social, organizational, psychological, cultural causes of terrorism. This reading list, specifically written for current and future teachers on terrorism, makes it clear that much of the work on "terrorism" is about categorizing who is a terrorist and what the causes and origins of terrorism are. Categorization is a key practice with terrorists classified as political, socioeconomic, religious, radicalized (usually Muslim youth in the post 9/11 world), women, psychological or with historical grievances. 33 Yet, the implications of such practices of categorization -- who gets to do the categorizing and who gets categorized as "terrorist"-- are left unquestioned. Terrorism is assumed to be everywhere and is described as a historical problem as terrorism scholar Walter Lacqueur writes, "in its long history terrorism has appeared in many guises; today society faces not one terrorism but many terrorisms."34 This assumes that terrorism is an objective fact that
33 See, for example, Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism : Fanaticism and the Arms ofMass Destruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) for discussions on definitions of terrorism; Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise ofReligious Violence (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003); Magnus Ranstrop, "Terrorism in the Name of Religion," Journal ofInternational Affairs (September, 1996): 41-63 for religious terrorism; Mia Bloom, "Mother, Daughter, Sister, Bomber," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Nov/Dec 2005): 54-62; Karla Cunningham, "Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (May/June 2003): 171-95; Jessica Stem, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Ecco, 2004) on women and terrorism; John Horgan, Psychology of Terrorism (London and New York: Routledge, 2005); Jerrold Post, "Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces," in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States ofMind, ed. Walter Reich, 25-40, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Press, 1998) for psychologies of terrorism; Mia Bloom Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century," Political Psychology (June 2000): 405-420; See Stem, 2004 for "new terrorism".
34 Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern terrorism: New rules for an old game," Foreign Affairs (September/October 1996), http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/laqueur.htm (accessed June 3, 2009). 25
can be recognized and classified and being "terroristic" is an intrinsic characteristic of peoples and groups. Common questions then are how can these intrinsic terroristic natures of others be understood and what causes people to become terrorist. Concerns about labeling practices -- what happens when the label of "terrorism" is used -- are not part of this research framework. That the many terrorism databases show disagreement on what is considered "terrorism" is taken to be a regrettable but unavoidable problem. 35
States are often missing from this literature. For example, Cindy Combs writes that her focus is on terrorist acts when defining terrorism, so there would be less prejudice in the usage of the term. 36 She adds," .. .it is only the act that can accurately be labeled as terrorist, not the individual or the group, and certainly not the cause for which the tactic is employed."37 However, the term is then only applied to the acts of non-state actors even though a consistent use of her definition would logically mean state actions could also be considered "terrorist". Arce and Sandler begin by defining "terrorism" as
"the premeditated use of threat of violence by individuals or subnational groups .... "38 In the definition itself, "terrorism" is limited to the use of violence by non-state actors, thus making states' use of violence not terrorism. 39 In a recent book on "the political economy
35 See Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass, Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables, and Faces of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 1996) for why this -- inconsistent figures on terrorism-- is a problem for traditional terrorism studies.
36 Cindy Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), xi
37 Ibid., 17.
38 Daniel Arce and Todd Sandler, "Counterterrorism: A Game-theoretical Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution (April 2005), 183.
39 For another similar definition of"te1Torism" which leaves out the state, see Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge 26
of terrorism", Enders and Sandler outline their book as, "unlike other books, this book identifies rational explanations for observed behavior -- for example, why terrorist groups cooperate and form networks with one another, while targeted governments are slow to cooperate?'"'0 Here, the separation of 'state' and 'terrorist' identities prior to analysis is clear as states (in this formulation) can only be targeted by terrorists, they have no role in labeling actions and actors as threats. Such categorization naturalizes the state as the actor defending against "terrorism". Similarly, Byman' s discussion of "the logic of ethnic terrorism" does not include the state and instead notes that "ethnic terrorism" is a difficult problem for the state. 41 Recent discussions of "new terrorism'', too, focus on why actors become "terrorist" and the structure of "terrorist" organizations, with such identities being pre-given prior to analysis. Here, the state's role does not have to be made explicit or even brought into the discussion (which focuses on "terrorist" motivations) because it is assumed the actor being secured and doing the securing is the state. This, of course, constructs and reifies (good) states counter (evil) terrorists narrative found in conventional understandings of terrorism.
Another growing area of interest in traditional terrorism studies is on studying the psychology of "terrorists". This, too, leaves out the state. There are some terrorism
University Press, 2005), 3. For a short yet comprehensive overview of the difficulties of defining "terrorism", see Philip Herbst, Talking Terrorism: A Dictionary of the Loaded Language ofPolitical Violence (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003). 163-170. Another resource on definitions is Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, Political Terrorism (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 28 which ends its first chapter with a lengthy definition of terrorism, one that does include the state.
40 Enders and Sandler, 2005, xi-xii.
41 Daniel Byman, "The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21, no. 2 (April-June 1998): 149-170. 27
scholars who doubt whether an overall psychological profile of a terrorist can ever be
designed. For example, John Horgan points out,
... the profile of the terrorist as crazed fanatic, hell-bent on mindless destruction for its own sake still exists .. Jn fact, reality suggests that organized terrorist-directed political violence is usually part of a much more complex set of activities related to the attainment of an identifiable social or political goal.. .. 42
Despite such caution, much of the literature on the psychology of terrorism
assumes psychologically profiling a "terrorist" is possible and that somehow divining
their true intentions is an achievable goal. For example, during SWOTT 2006, Cindy
Combs' presentation was titled "Causes of Terrorism" and started with a slide called
"understanding the terrorist mindset". 43 This effort to profile people as "terrorist" can
also be noted in the works of Jerrold Post who writes terrorist behavior is a product of
psychological forces. He adds, "political terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence
as a consequence of psychological forces" and terrorists' "psycho-logic" is constructed to rationalize acts they were psychologically compelled to commit.44 fudividual or group psychology becomes both a motivator (cause) of the problem as well as an essential characteristic of the ("terrorist") actors. States are, once again, invisible in this process, which concentrates on discovering the inner workings of the "terrorist" mindset. The state, if it appears, is only relevant to counter this terroristic mindset. In traditional terrorism studies, therefore, what is to be secured is always the state (or, "global order") so it is assumed this need not be made explicit. This, again, separates states and
"terrorist" actors and ignores processes of representation of various groups as "terrorist"
42 Horgan, 2005, 24.
43 Cindy Combs, Presentation during SWOTT 2006.
44 Post, 1998. 28
(and, relatedly, others as "counterterrorist"). As such, it limits questions to why certain
actors are "terrorist" and what makes peoples or states "terrorist" with explanations then
based on individual/group/social attributes that are unrelated to the actions of the state
itself.
States That Counter Terrorism: The Counterterrorist State in Traditional Terrorism Studies
Implicitly or explicitly, this is the most common form of the state found in
traditional terrorism studies. Traditional terrorism scholars take for granted that the role
of the state is to counter terror. Their approaches then are based on the presupposition
that the outcome ofresearch is to lead to policy recommendations on how to deal with
"terrorists". The state's counterterrorist identity is not open to question, with the
assumption that the state is the main (and perhaps only) actor capable of dealing with
terrorism. Traditional terrorism studies, in other words, persists in regarding the state as a
"black box" and searches for better and more efficient ways of countering "terrorist
threats" rather than destabilizing or opening up this "black box".
The history of traditional terrorism studies and the links of its researchers with the
government have facilitated this type of emphasis on pre-given "state" and "terrorist"
identities. Richard Jackson draws attention to the origins of terrorism studies in
(orthodox) security studies and strategic studies, including counterinsurgency studies. 45
He refers to Schmid and Jongman46 who wrote much of early terrorism studies was
45 Richard Jackson, "The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies," European Political Science 6, no. 3 (2007): 244-251.
46 R. Jackson refers to Alex Schmid and A. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature (North Holland: Oxford, 1988), 182 for the quote. I 29
"counterinsurgency masquerading as political science."47 Jackson himself adds, "as a
consequence, much terrorism research adopts state-centric priorities and perspectives and
tends to reproduce a limited set of assumptions and narratives about the nature, causes
and responses to terrorism."48 In such literature, the goal of the state -- to counter
insurgents or "terrorists" -- was taken for granted. Additionally, Jackson points out that
the embedded nature of terrorism "experts" is another drawback in traditional terrorism
studies since these scholars are allied to institutions which are part of or funded by
governments or have close links to government funding. In other words, "problem-
49 solving" theory -- where the problem is "terrorism" and the problem solver is (usually)
the state -- dominates traditional research on terrorism. 50 The terrorism "expert" is part of
the processes by which the counterterrorist state as the self-evident state (so much so that
it does not even need to be explained or identified) is present in much of this traditional
terrorism literature.
For example, in a book titled When Terrorism and Counterterrorism Clash, 51 the
author defines counterterrorism as reaction to (others') "terrorist" practices. Despite this
relational aspect of "terrorism" and "counterterrorism" in the definition itself, that the
have consulted a more recent (2006) edition of Schmid and Jongman and that is the edition which is cited earlier in this chapter.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 For more on the differences between problem-solving theory and Critical theory, see Robert Cox (with Timothy Sinclair), Approaches to World Order (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
50 R. Jackson, Core Commitments.
51 Ian Sascha Sheehan, When Terrorism and Counterterrorism Clash: The War on Terror and the Transformation of Terrorist Activity (Youngstown, NY: Cambria Press, 2007). 30
two might be linked (at least via representational practices) is hardly ever mentioned.
Instead, both are separate -- "terrorism" is either a crime or a war 52 and
"counterterrorism" is the response to this "terrorism".53 Contrary to the book's title,
"terrorism" and "counterterrorism" never "clash" since the author's interest is how the
global war on terror affects transnational terrorism.54 These two entities, "the global war
on terror" and "transnational terrorism", are pre-given prior to analysis and assumed to be
outside representational practices. That acts and actors have to be described and
represented as "terrorism" and "terrorist" is not taken into account. This means concerns
about change can only be answered by resorting to essentialist characteristics of the
actors themselves -- change occurs when "terrorists" give up on violence or when state
"interests" change. Examples from state and terrorist relations where states have
negotiated with so-called terrorist groups even when such groups are using violence (for
example, British-IRA relations in the 1980s) contradict this view that it is the intrinsic
"terrorist" nature of groups that should be the concern of our research.
Similarly, a text used in many terrorism studies classes, Terrorism and
Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, 55 also describes
"counterterrorism" as reactionary. Here, too, the state is once again deemed the main (if
52 Sheehan, 49.
53 Ibid., 50.
54 Ibid., 11.
55 Russell D Howard and Reid L Sawyer, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, Readings and Interpretations, 2"ct ed. (Dubuque, Iowa: McGraw-Hill, 2006). This book (or sections from it) was assigned reading for more than half of the syllabi I examined for 2007- 2009 courses on political violence/terrorism. The syllabi were all from United States-based academic institutions and available online. 31
not the only) actor capable of counterterrorism. Indeed, the book reads as a prescription
to the United States and its allies on how to respond to "terrorists". The authors write,
"terrorism, at its very roots, centers on fear and targets our liberal democratic values. The
fear generated by terrorism speaks to our vulnerabilities and the government's apparent
lack of ability to stop further attacks. "56 The United States then becomes the target of
terrorists and research is conducted to prevent it being attacked. Making this clear, the
authors add, "clearly the United States and its citizens are the favored targets of the new
terrorists. Many wonder why."57 Once again, despite the title claiming the book is about
"understanding the new security environment'', it is actually about how the United States
can protect itself from (external) "terrorist" threats.
Such accounts ignore that representations of "terrorism" and "terrorist" is an
ongoing process in everyday life. In other words, states communicate information about
acts and actors as "terrorist" and "terrorism", and are thus related to those they target in
their counterterrorist practices. This acknowledgment is missing from the majority of
works in traditional terrorism studies. The link of terrorism researchers to the state is also
exemplified in Terrorism and Counterterrorism as one of the book's editors states, "I
agree with President Bush that the United States must identify and destroy the terrorist
threat before it reaches our borders and, if necessary, act alone and use preemptive
force."58 This view that the counterterrorism is only a response to "terrorism" and not related to it through representational practices is even clearer in the brief introduction to
56 Ibid., xi (emphasis added).
57 Ibid., xii.
58 Ibid., xix. 32
the second part of the book. This second part, titled, "Countering the Terrorist Threat", claims it "deals with past, present, and future national and international responses to terrorism and defenses against it."59 However, as the essays clearly show, those doing the
"responding" are the United States (and, in one essay, Israel) while the "terrorists" are
(mostly) al-Qaeda. These presuppositions and evaluative aspects are rarely clarified in traditional terrorism studies literature on the state and terrorism.
To sum up, even if we were to study terrorism as something outside of practices ofrepresentation, as traditional terrorism scholars do, there are two main limitations:
One, daily representational practices of "terrorism" -- by states and other actors -- are ignored. States talk about terrorism on a regular basis and ignoring this weakens our understanding of terrorism in general. Two, where are the states in traditional terrorism studies? It is assumed that states are counterterrorist so much so that there is no need to make this explicit. This is especially problematic since it ignores that applying the definition of "terrorism" provided by the majority of traditional terrorism scholars would mean states could be defined as "terrorist" too. 60 Therefore, even working within the traditional terrorism framework, these questions are ignored. What this type of traditional terrorism research does is it leads to research for better and more efficient anti-
"terrorism" measures, often on the part of the state, without acknowledging that the state itself might be part of the processes through and which threats are publicly
59 Ibid., xvii.
60 This is a critique that Critical terrorism scholars, especially R. Jackson and R. Blakeley, have made. 33
communicated.61 In traditional terrorism studies, there is an inconsistency between the lack of acknowledgment of the role of the state in the practices of demarcating and communicating information about "terrorists" and "terrorism", and the extensive ongoing task of categorizing and classifying "terrorism" as separate to state activities. In much of the literature on terrorism, the state's role is as a guardian against terror and not as a producer of threats. This is the case even though, in terms of interpreting acts and actors as "terrorist" and "terrorism", the state is one of the (if not the) main actors doing the communication. Traditional terrorism scholars, however, do link some states with terrorism and that is what the next section will examine.
States That Support and Fund Terrorism: State Sponsors of Terrorism in Traditional Terrorism Studies
In traditional terrorism studies literature on states which fund and support terrorism is one of the very few times that "state" and "terrorism" are linked together.
The terms "state sponsors of terror" or "state-sponsored terrorism" is almost always used
61 Making a similar claim, R. Jackson writes, "CTS is openly normative in orientation for the simple reason that through the identification of who the 'terrorist other' actually is -- deciding and affirming which individuals and groups may be rightly called 'terrorists' is a routine practice in the field - terrorism studies actually provides an authoritative judgment about who may legitimately be killed, tortured, rendered or incarcerated by the state in the name of counter-terrorism. In this sense, there is no escaping the ethico-political content of the subject [of studying terrorism]"( Core Commitments, 249). My research, while acknowledging this, rests on the foundation that the state itself is produced out of particular representational practices, those which have to engage with and are challenged by alternative representations present at that time. It is not just a simple matter of states "labeling" particular individuals, groups or other states as "terrorist" and then being able to get rid of them. But, rather, what the use of the language of "terrorism" allows (and does not allow) both states, terrorists and other actors to do. In other words, the language of terrorism produces specific "state" and "terrorist" identities, identities which (may) change through time and which have to be legitimated. This is not to say that CTS' normative commitments of"emancipation" and "positive social change" (R. Jackson, Core Commitments, 249) are wrong but to point out such understandings are often contextual and intersubjective and meanings of "emancipation" differ. Also, terrorism discourse is one of many that are usually available and explicating how other identities were possible is part of questioning the commonsensical understanding of state terrorist relations. CTS' view on labeling as a one-way practice of states about specific groups ignores these complex related practices. I shall explicate further on practices of representing in the following chapters. 34
to refer to states that are separated from liberal, democratic (often Northern) states by space and time. The longevity of state sponsorship of terrorism is pointed out by Laqueur who writes, "state-sponsored terrorism, warfare by proxy, is as old as the history of military conflict. "62 Yet, the identity of the state that is involved in state terrorism and produces terrorism has remained remarkably consistent through time. Such a state is depicted as separate from the United States or its allies. There is thus a recurring theme in discussions about state terror -- the separation of state violence by space and time from today's liberal democratic states. This distancing is also evident in another aspect of the connection made between the state and terrorism, that of "state-sponsored terrorism".
Each year, the United States government classifies specific states as "state sponsors of terrorism". In 2007, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria were all on record as being state sponsors of terrorism. Scholars have not been far behind in this type of categorization of states. Walter Laqueur' s The New Terrorism has a chapter on "state terrorism" in which Laqueur writes that the former Soviet Union was a main sponsor of terrorism and that it and other communist countries were heavily involved in international terrorism. 63
However, all these examples show how, in traditional terrorism studies, "state terrorism" is distanced from the counterterrorist activities of a liberal democratic state.
Relatedly, this externalizes "terrorism" as a form of violence that others (not the liberal democratic state) use. Also, while it is acknowledged that state-led actions have led to mass casualties, there is often a simultaneous task on the part of writers on terrorism to
62 Laqueur, New Terrorism, 156
63 Ibid., 158 35
distinguish violent actions by the state from actions of terrorist groups. This is seen in the definition itself -- terrorism studies has referred to non-state or sub-state political violence as "terrorism" and to state-led or state-sponsored violence as state "terror" rather than state "terrorism".64 Acts of state terrorism are usually described as having occurred in the past, thus distancing these violent acts from regular or normal (non-state) terrorism. The definition includes implicit evaluation as "state terrorists" are usually states of the past or separated from liberal democratic (good) states by space i.e. geographical area. Under the traditional classification of "state terror", are historical events such as the Nazi regime in
Germany, the Soviet Union under Stalin and the Pol Pot years of Cambodia. Similarly,
Cindy Combs lists four types of "terrorism by the state": internal, external, state sponsored and state-supported. 65
Overall, "state terror" in traditional terrorism studies implies that what states do is separate from regular or normalized "terrorism", an act of individuals or groups. Bad states produce or support terrorism, good states counter it. This formulation is normalized in traditional terrorism studies. On a related note, especially looking at how these states producing terror are positioned in the international system, the countries described as state-sponsors of terrorism are not the countries doing the defining. This is seen in the recurrence of countries like Syria, Iran and Cuba as state sponsors of terror in the United
States' annual classification Patterns of Global Terrorism as well as in mainstream terrorism literature, much of which is produced in North America and Western Europe.
64 Assaf Moghadam, Presentation during SWOTT, 2006.
65 Cindy Combs, Terrorism in the 21'1 Century, 2"d ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000) 36
Literature about state terror or state-sponsored terrorism ultimately leads to discussions about what to do with such states in the international system. The "doers" -- those that are to manage and control state sponsors of terrorism -- are other states, those that supposedly do not support terror. 66
Along these lines, Paul Wilkinson in a review article titled, "Can a state be
'terrorist'?" wrote,
A particularly thorny problem in all the major contributions to the literature on terrorism has been the relationship between terrorism by factions and state acts of terror. It is interesting to note that most of the recent academic literature has sought to avoid getting bogged down in this aspect: in general all the authors of the works reviewed below accept that it is unreasonable to insist on encompassing analyses of the complex processes and implications of both regimes of terror and factional terrorism as a mode of struggle within the same covers. There is a rich and growing literature on what most authors now term state terror, but the term terrorism is now widely used to denote the systematic use of terror by non governmental actors. 67
However, Wilkinson does not explain why it is "unreasonable" to analyze state terror and (nonstate) terrorism together or the limitations of such separation in terms of the types of questions that can be asked under a traditional terrorism approach. That definitions of terrorism could encompass state actions as well as that of nonstate actors is ignored. Instead, Wilkinson adds,
66 This is seen in recent literature on counterterrorism. For example, Howard and Sawyer, 2006 focus on defining and countering the terrorist threat; Laura Donohue, The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics and Liberty (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) looks at the costs of counterterrorism; Sheehan, 2007 on domestic and international efforts by security forces; Yonah Alexander and Michael Craft, eds. Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, vol 1-3 (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008) on the US counterterrorism policies; James Forest, ed., Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21'1 Century: International Perspectives (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007) has three volumes, one of which Concentrates on strategies for defeating terrorism and counterterrorism in a liberal democracy. Counterterrorism research is a rapidly-growing research area.
67Paul Wilkinson, "Can a State be 'Terrorist'?," International Affairs 57, no. 3 (Summer 1981), 467. 37
nevertheless we should not lose sight of the fundamental truth that one cannot adequately understand terrorist movements without paying some attention to the effects of the use of force and violence by states. Indeed some of the best historical case studies of the use of factional terrorism as a weapon vividly demonstrate how state violence often helps to provoke and fuel the violence of terrorist movements. 68
Furthermore, he proceeds to describe actions that occurred in the past (Hitler and
Stalin) or by non Northern states (France in Algeria, Iran) as examples of "state terror".
The usual narrative of state "terrorists" being separated from liberal, democratic states by
space and time is reiterated. Wilkinson then goes on to categorize different types of
terrorism-based research at the time, moving away from the question in the title of his
essay. He ends thus:
Despite Western governments' improved effectiveness and co-operation in combating terrorism they are still a long way from victory. They are likely to experience continuing terrorist attacks from extremists of all kinds-red, fascist, racist, ethnic, separatist, and even religious. What governments can and must do is to act quickly to prevent new and more lethal generations of weapons, and particularly nuclear weapons and the materials required to manufacture them, from falling into the hands of terrorists. Otherwise 'crazy groups' could become just as much of a hazard as 'crazy states'.69
States which sponsor terrorism are therefore "crazy states" and are a problem that
Western governments have to be wary of. To repeat, even if accepting that terrorism is an
objective, self-identifiable issue or an intrinsic factor of certain individuals or groups (or
states), literature on state terror selectively applies this label with some states exempt
from being defined as "state terrorist". This, as Critical terrorism scholars have pointed out, 70 is a glaring weakness in traditional terrorism studies.
68 Ibid., 467.
69 Ibid., 472 (emphasis added).
70 That "terrorism" is a label often applied by Northern governments (and elites) to others has 38
State terrorism or, more precisely, how to define state terror is also the focus of
David Claridge's 1996 essay. 71 In it, Claridge proposes a seven point "model" of state terrorism. These posit state terrorism is systematic, political and used to generate fear. 72
When applying the model to Indonesia's actions in East Timor, Claridge concludes
Indonesia's actions do not fit all aspects of his model and concludes this shows the difficulties of categorizing a state as "terrorist". Claridge makes the point that the Reagan administration's definition of "terrorism" could be applicable to its own actions73 but he does not follow this up by asking what this link between the counterterrorist state (as he writes Reagan's United States was) and "terrorism" implies for the constitution of the identities of both "states" and "terrorists". Instead, Claridge, too, presupposes that "state" and "terrorist" are clearly distinct from each other and ontologically prior to analysis.
This is detrimental to his analysis because he then proceeds to list features of "state terrorism" and then applies it to an empirical example to see if these features can be noticed therein (or not). Other states -- the United States, for example -- and their involvement in funding and assisting groups which could be called "terrorist" are, once again, ignored despite his own admission that the Reagan administration's definition of been noted by, among others, Ruth Blakeley, "Bringing the State Back into Terrorism Studies," European Political Science 6, no. 3 (2007): 228-235. However, Blakeley assumes the labeling practice is one-directional and (often) unchallenged while my research traces out how representations are always competing with other, concurrent representations in the processes of managing stake and establishing authority. This will be further explicated in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. For more on this practice of selective labeling, see, also R. Jackson, "The Ghosts of State Terror: Knowledge, Politics and Terrorism Studies," Critical Studies on Terrorism 1 no. 3 (2008): 377-392; R. Jackson, Core Commitments.
71 David Claridge, "State Terrorism? Applying a Definitional Mode," Terrorism and Political Violence 8, no. 3 (Autumn 1996): 47-63. It is one of the few traditional terrorism research dealing explicitly with the state and terrorism.
72 Ibid., 52.
73 Ibid., 49-50. 39
terrorism could apply to US actions as well.
Daniel Byman in his Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism adopts a similar approach in which "terrorism" has a separate, objective existence separate to the state (which counters it). He begins by saying, "states and terrorist groups have long had a deadly relationship"74 but the states he lists include Iran, India, Libya, Sudan, and the
Soviet Union -- the usual suspects in the literature on state terrorism. He defines "state sponsorship of terrorism" as "a government's intentional assistance to a terrorist group to help it use violence, bolster its political activities, or sustain the organization."75 Again, however, these "terrorist groups" are already pre-given and do not include groups which the United States (and other "counterterrorist" states) may have assisted (e.g. US assistance to groups considered terrorist in Central and South America and in
Afghanistan). For Byman, the meaning of specific groups as "terrorist" is taken for granted, despite his acknowledgement that US support oflsrael is usually denounced in
"Arab media" as "terrorist".76 Similar to Claridge, Byman does not further examine what such inconsistent representations of "terrorism" mean for the study of terrorism. Indeed,
"states that sponsor terrorism" are positioned in contrast to counterterrorist states so that state sponsors of terrorism are hindering the anti-terrorist activities of (good) counterterrorist states. Instead, "state support" of "terrorist" groups, according to Byman,
"complicates all these [counterterrorist] techniques. "77 Furthermore, in a chapter titled,
74 Byman, Deadly, l.
75 Ibid., 10.
76 Ibid., 7.
77 Ibid., 67. 40
"Halting support for terrorism,"78 Byman's viewpoint is that of the United States and its allies as those doing the halting of support for terrorism.
Within the traditional terrorism studies framework, therefore, "terrorism" is separate to the state and is objectively identifiable. However, even adopting this framework, specific actions of the state and particular types of state are exempted from being linked with "terrorism". Usually, states that fund or support "terrorism" are separated from Northern states by space (geographically different from the North) and time (history). Additionally, the intrinsic character of "terrorism" that is foundational to traditional terrorism studies ignores the role of language and representational practices, especially that various actors (including states) communicate information about "terrorist threats" on a daily basis. In doing so, traditional terrorism limits possible questions to why there is terrorism, how to improve counterterrorism policies, why individuals/groups/states join "terrorist" groups. Looking at the state and terrorism as entirely separate and at violent activities of the state as different to terrorism allows only specific types of questions -- those that ask who "terrorists" are, why they become
"terrorists'', and how to define "terrorism" -- and leave alone questions about labeling and communication of ("terrorist") threats and the implications to state identity in when representing specific groups as "terrorist". Traditional terrorism scholars ignore how specific groups and peoples are represented as "terrorist" in the first place, along with the related formation of the counterterrorist state.
Such limitations mean concerns about the meaning of "terrorism" and identity-
78 Ibid., 273-311. 41
constitution of states are not part of traditional terrorism studies. Additionally, this also means change can only be explained by intrinsic characteristics of states or "terrorists".
As examples of states' negotiations with groups considered "terrorist" shows, (such as the British state's interactions with the IRA and the Nepalese opposition's alliance with the Maoists even when both the IRA and the Maoists were still involved in violent acts)
"terrorist" groups' use of (or denunciation of) violence is not the only reason for change in state and "terrorist" relations. In these examples of Britain and Nepal, the reduction (or renunciation) of violence by "terrorists" did not precede change in relations between states and "terrorists". Therefore, looking at representations and at representational practices is likely to be a better avenue for exploring questions of identity-formation (of states and "terrorists") and change rather than examining "terrorist" behavior or use of violence.
As is seen in the news daily, specific acts and actions are depicted as (or not as)
"terrorism" on a daily basis -- how to deal with terrorists and terrorism is a major part of states' security practices and form the bulk of their public communications about threats in today's world. By ignoring this, traditional terrorism studies leaves a large gap between its stated aim of understanding terrorism and its actual research program which does not take into account ongoing representational practices of groups and events as
"terrorist". By not problematizing states' and terrorists' identity-formation and assigning roles -- counterterrorist for states, violent for terrorists -- traditional terrorism studies is unable to account for today's concerns where representations of terrorism and of threats shift rapidly in the context of rapid communication and exchange of information through 42
the media and new technologies. 79 This separation of terrorism from other actors such as the state also ignores common knowledge that the communication of what counts as terrorism and the labelings of terror are interlinked with the daily language and practices of these actors, including states.
Thus, traditional terrorism studies mostly ignore labeling and representational practices. This ignoring is not just an empirical problem since studying "state terrorism" from a Critical terrorism standpoint also does not necessarily go beyond attempts to classify various (Northern) states as terrorist. This does not resolve the issue that states and "terrorists" are seen as separate to each other, each pre-existing the other before research can be conducted. By not questioning this commonsensical understanding of terrorists and states, traditional terrorism studies is unable to investigate processes where
"terrorist" groups continue to use violence but state and "terrorist" negotiations are ongoing. It is unable to explain what practices (and how) are facilitated by the descriptions of "terrorism" and "terrorists" as existential threats. This requires a focus on past practices and the field of meanings within which both states and terrorists operate, a focus that traditional terrorism studies eschews by making pre-given "state" and
"terrorist" identities foundational to analysis.
Critical theorist James der Derian, writing at a time many years before the "global war on terror" and the subsequent increase of interest in terrorism as a topic of study, wrote that there were epistemological, ideological and ontological obstacles blocking an
79 See, for example, James Der Derian, Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) for a detailed examination of the problems of traditional methods of studying terrorism (among other issues) in today's "late modem" world. 43
inquiry into terrorism. 80 Writing in 1992, der Derian claimed,
During the 1980s terrorist studies became a fortress-haven at the edge of the social sciences, a positivist's armory of definitions, typologies, and databases to be wielded as much against the methodological critic as the actual terrorist who might call into question the sovereign reason and borders of the nation-state. 81
Der Derian here pinpoints some of the major drawbacks of traditional terrorism studies -- especially its dismissal of non-positivist methodologies and the subsequent silencing of particular questions and avenues ofresearch. Der Derian's comments are elaborated upon by Critical terrorism scholars who study the state and terrorism and argue there are ideological and political reasons why state terrorism is not central to analysis in traditional terrorism studies.82 In the next section, I examine efforts of these scholars to study terrorism, focusing especially on how they study the state's relationship with "terrorists".
Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) and the State
Critical terrorism scholars make two main claims about states' role in terrorism: one, state and terrorist identities are discursively constructed. Thus, there is a focus on representations --language use and practices -- that was absent in traditional terrorism studies as well as a focus on constitution of identities. However, their second claim -- that liberal democratic states can also be "terrorist"-- relies upon an ontology in which the objective nature of terrorist violence is presumed. This separation of "state" and
80 Ibid., 93-94.
81 Ibid., 93.
82 See, for example, Blakeley, Bringing; Ruth Blakeley, "The Elephant in the Room: A Response to John Horgan and Michael J. Boyle," Critical Studies on Terrorism, 1, no. 2 (2008): 151-165. 44
"terrorism" in which both are presumed to pre-exist prior to analysis (a formulation
critiqued in the previous section on traditional terrorism studies), ignores processes by
which "state" and "terrorist" identities are constituted in favor of applying the label of
"terrorism" to Northern states as well. In other words, these claims are based on two
different (and incompatible) philosophical foundations as the latter claim presumes an
objectively recognizable terrorist and state identity while the former focuses on social
construction of meanings and identities. 83 Let me elaborate these two claims about the
state and terrorism in CTS and especially look at the implications of each for studying
terrorism and the state.
The Discursively Constructed Counterterrorist State inCTS
CTS argues discourses of terrorism are constitutive of identities and interests,
including but not limited to that of states. As Richard Jackson writes, " .... it is crucial to our understanding of the 'war on terrorism' to examine and explain how the discourse of counter-terrorism constructs the practice of counter-terrorism."84 In this way, language
and practices of "terrorism" are implicated in the formation of what is considered
"terrorism" and the practices put in place to counter such terrorism. This view of the state
and terrorist as discursively constructed is what my own research will draw upon. CTS85
83 Additionally, it is not clear whether the "Critical" in CTS is critical, in the "critical security studies" sense or Critical, in the Marxian sense. Thus, a clearer statement of CTS' methodological commitments is necessary.
84 Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counterterrorism (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 2005), 24.
85 For more information on the self-identified subfield ofCTS, please see European Political Science 6, no. 3 (2007) and its "Symposium: The Case for Critical Terrorism Studies". R. Jackson's introduction to the symposium, "Introduction: The Case for Critical Terrorism Studies" (225-227) and 45
studies discourses of counterterrorism, 86expands levels of analysis to the experience of terrorism by people87 and, especially relevant to my research, focuses on "state terrorism". 88 CTS claims the problem with much of mainstream terrorism studies is that it ignores the changing applications of the label of "terrorism" and its inherent instability.
R. Jackson notes,
A pertinent illustration of the ontological instability of the terrorist label and the potentialities for political metamorphosis is the observation that there are no less than four recognized 'terrorists' who have gone on to win the Nobel Peace Prize: Menachim Begin, Sean McBride, Nelson Mandela and Yassir Arafat. In other words: 'Once a terrorist, is not always a terrorist'.89
Thus, by focusing on how representations of "terrorist" shift through time, CTS diverges from mainstream traditional terrorism studies to focus on the actual practices of labeling and the use of the rhetoric of "terrorism" in public settings.
Instead of "terrorism" as a problem that needs to be solved by better categorization or definition, the ontological instability of the label of "terrorism" is his article "The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies" (244-251) lays out the research goals of CTS while Jeroen Gunning's "Babies and Bathwaters: Reflecting on the Pitfalls of Critical Terrorism Studies" (236-243) addresses some potential weaknesses of CTS. A collection of articles in the symposium on "Bridge Building and Terrorism," International Relations 23, no. 1, (2009) builds upon CTS. Some articles especially those by Jonathan Joseph, "Critical of What? Terrorism and Its Study," International Relations 23, no. 1 (March 2009): 93-98 and Doug Stokes, "Ideas and Avocados: Ontologising Critical Terrorism Studies," International Relations 23, no. I (March 2009): 85-92 are critical of CTS' lack of methodological clarity.
86 R. Jackson, Wrting; R. Jackson, Core Commitments; R. Jackson, "An Analysis of EU Counterterrorism Discourse Post-September 11," Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20, no. 2 (2007); 233-24 7.
87 Jeffrey Sluka, ed., Death Squad: The Anthropology ofState Terror (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000); Zulaika and Douglass.
88 See R. Jackson, "The Ghosts of State Terror: Knowledge, Politics and Terrorism Studies," Critical Studies on Terrorism 1 no. 3 (2008): 377-392, fn 3 for a more detailed list of works which point out this neglect of state terrorism in traditional terrorism studies.
89 Zulaika and Douglass, x as quoted in R. Jackson, Core Commitments, 248. This also indicates the limited pool of non-positivist/traditional terrorism research for CTS scholars to draw upon. 46
focused on as a topic for investigation and critique. Thus, terrorism is not separate to the state or to counterterrorist practices but is, instead, an "essentially contested concept". 90
As such, its local and contextual applications have to be noted, including the usage of the language of terrorism by states. Thus, change in this formulation does not depend on the nature of "terrorists" or "states" but can be traced out through past and present representational practices in which both state and terrorist are enmeshed. This is a presupposition that my research will also be based on. How "terrorism" (as a concept) is used in practice and how it is linked to and differentiated from other concepts is opened up to research. Explicitly foregrounding the social constructionist role of knowledge- production, CTS claims, it "rests firstly upon an understanding of knowledge as a social process constructed through language, discourse and inter-subjective practices."91
Focusing specifically on the state, CTS scholars have drawn attention to the invisibility of "state terrorism" in traditional terrorism literature. For example, R. Jackson analyzed over 100 texts on terrorism to conclude "state terrorism" is mostly absent from the literature on terrorism.92 He writes, "in the vast majority of the more than 100 texts I examined, the terms 'state terrorism' or 'state terror' did not even appear .... "93 In
Jackson's view, this omission of state terrorism from traditional terrorism studies is
90 "Essentially contested concepts are said to be so value-laden that no amount of argument or evidence can ever lead to agreement on a single version as the correct or standard use." Gallie, quoted in David Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," Review of International Studies 23 (January 1997): 10. Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2"d ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1991), 8 also uses the term to describe "security".
91 R. Jackson, Core Commitments, 246.
92 R. Jackson, Ghosts.
93 Ibid., 7. 47
because of the "illogical, actor-focused definition" of terrorism itself, allied to politically- biased research programs and a failure to recognize evidence of Western state terrorism.
Terrorism, here, is externalized- it is something others do, not something (good, counterterrorist) states are involved in. Thus, CTS critiques traditional terrorism studies for maintaining that terrorist and terrorism are separate to representational practices of the state itself. Such an approach (that of traditional terrorism studies) thus "generally take as unproblematic the possibility that a particular decision or course of action could happen."94 This is a problem since state identity then becomes closed off to questioning within the traditional terrorism framework and shifts in identity can only be explained by resorting to explanations about the inherent characteristics of so-called terrorists or terrorist reduction in violence.
CTS points this out and draws attention to relational processes of identity formation -- that "terrorist" is one of many ways that actors can be represented.
Therefore, how representing of groups as terrorist occurs and how this changes become important areas of study. As Philip Jenkins 95 writes, a social constructionist approach:
... denies the obviousness of the obvious. By tracing the long-term development of a given problem, we see that perceptions that at one time enjoy the status of absolute social orthodoxy have not always occupied that privileged position. Understanding how problems develop in this way forces us to ask why we regard a particular issue as such a grave social threat at a given time, when other themes appear to be just as potentially harmful.96
94 Doty, Foreign, 298.
95 Philip Jenkins, Images of Terror: What We Can and Can't Know about Terrorism, (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2003). Jenkins is not one of the self-identified CTS scholars but his work uses similar assumptions as CTS does.
96 Jenkins, 189. 48
In this way, terrorism is not something that is automatically identifiable and separate to the state, as traditional terrorism studies takes it to be, but is one of many concepts which states (and other actors) use to understand events and issues. Thus, relations between states and terrorists which contradict the "central tenet" in terrorism
97 studies -- that interaction with the terrorist other is taboo -- can be better explained under this framework than under traditional terrorism studies.
Not directly within the CTS school but related to it is Stuart Croft's Culture,
Crisis and America's War on Terror. In this, cultural theorist Croft writes how the meaning of the September 11, 2001 attacks and responses to them were "produced and reproduced by political elites and by the producers of popular culture."98 His emphasis is on discourses of terrorism as he proposes analyzing discourses that emerged from this event, especially how the military response was seen as the right thing to do. 99 Croft views language as constructive: "language as discursive is not simply about representing the world; it is concerned with treating it as a form of social action .... " 100 Here, language does something and is a tool from which meanings and identities can be traced out. In addition, Croft examines "sites ofresistance" where other discourses -- those that gave
Iraq's oil reserves as an explanation for the war on terror, for example, -- emerged but were displaced by the global war on terror discourse, which then became embedded in social institutions. Both these -- language as action-oriented and the emergence and
97 Zulaika and Douglass, x.
98 Stuart Croft, Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1.
99 Ibid., 2.
100 Ibid., 43. 49
contestation of discourses at specific sites -- are themes this dissertation will expand upon.
These works move away from traditional terrorism studies' emphasis on assuming the state as the object to be secured. For CTS, knowledge of terrorism is socially- produced. But then CTS claims:
Ontologically, CTS is characterized by a general scepticism towards, and often a reticence to employ, the 'terrorism' label because it is recognized that in practice it has always been a pejorative rather than analytical term and that to use the term is a powerful form of labeling that implies a political judgment about the legitimacy of actors and their actions. Terrorism is fundamentally a social fact rather than a brute fact; while extreme physical violence is experienced as a brute fact, its wider cultural-political meaning is decided by social agreement and intersubjective practices. 101
This view ignores the understanding that not using the "terrorism" label does not mean that other people -- whether media, citizens, states--stop using it in everyday life.
Labels (and their acceptance and use in everyday language) are intersubjectively used as is the meaning that is then produced. Instead, examining the language of terrorism and analyzing how "terrorism" and "terrorist" are used by various social actors to form their
(and others') identities fits in better with CTS' claimed epistemological and ontological commitments. This is where my research plans to extend CTS -- by examining the shift in representations of groups as or not as "terrorist".
By doing so, instead of getting mired in details about what is (or is not)
"terrorism", the language of "terrorism" and its use become centralized. How actors use
"terrorism" and "terrorist" as labels in the processes of identity formation becomes central to analysis. R. Jackson writes," ... there is no terrorism as such, just the
101 R. Jackson, Core Commitments, 247. 50
instrumental use of terror by actors" 102 but this presumes "terror" is a self-evident tactic or strategy that is (objectively) recognizable when used. Once again, this contradicts the social nature of knowledge-production that CTS itself points towards and posits an objective form of "terror" which is outside ofrepresentations. This is a weakness because
CTS can then get caught up in arguments about whether a certain form of political violence is or is not "terrorism". By shifting the focus from pre-given actors (whether states or not) using "real" terror to how the language of "terrorism" is used, questions about whether there really is a form of violence called "terrorism" can be set aside. It is meaning-making practices of social actors -- whether states or individuals -- that then become central to analysis. What does the use (or lack of use) of "terrorism" and
"terrorist" do when applied to specific groups? How does this relate to state identity? In other words, contrary to CTS' calls for distinguishing between a brute and social facts and maintaining terrorism as a form of brute fact, it is best to leave aside the focus on facts and examine what the use of the concept of "terrorism" does. Who uses it, how is it used and what are the implications when it is used are questions that then become centralized.
This dissertation does not make claims about the reality (or otherwise) of certain forms of political violence as "terrorism". Indeed, it argues questions about whether there is a real form of political violence called "terrorism" are irrelevant when studying processes by which actors and acts are constituted as "terrorist" and the identities of
"states" and "terrorists" thus produced. Potter writes, " ... I am certainly not trying to answer ontological questions about what sorts of things exist. The focus is on the way
102 Ibid., 248 . 51
people construct descriptions as factual, and how others undermine these constructions.
This does not require an answer to the philosophical question of what factuality is."103 He
goes on to add that this type of work impacts ongoing debates about realism and
relativism in the social sciences and claims, "constructionist arguments are not aimed at
denying the existence of tables (a very realist idea!) but in exploring the various ways in which their reality is constructed and undermined."104 In my own research, therefore, I would substitute "tables" for "terrorists", or more specifically, the IRA and the Maoists
as "terrorists", and note how the social construction of these groups as "terrorists" has
occurred and changed, along with the attendant implications for state identity-
formation. 105
Liberal Democratic States Can be Terrorist too: "Northern State Terrorism" in CTS
On the whole, CTS' views on the role of the state in terrorism studies are thus rather confusing. On the one hand, CTS criticizes the excessive state-centric focus of traditional terrorism studies. Criticizing the state-centric nature of traditional terrorism
studies, Jackson writes,
analytically, the state-centric orientation of the field functions to narrow the potential range ofresearch subjects, encourage conformity in outlook and method and obstruct vigorous, wide-ranging debate, particularly regarding the causes of non-state terrorism and the use of terrorism by liberal democratic states and their allies. 106
103 Jonathan Potter. Representing Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction (New York: Sage Publications, 1996), 6.
104 Ibid., 7.
105 Chapter 3 will expand upon this methodological approach.
106 R. Jackson, Core Commitments, 245-246. 52
On the other hand, CTS calls for studying the practices of Northern states as
"terrorist" while, at the same time, asking for a reduction in the use of "terrorism". Once again, this does not fit in with CTS' own call for studying representations and the social production of knowledge of terrorism. If this call is to be taken seriously, then states, as those who communicate knowledge of what is (or is not) "terrorism" should still be studied. In other words, critiquing traditional terrorism studies' state-centricity does not automatically lead to a "core commitment" of "a skeptical attitude towards state-centric understandings of terrorism."107 Instead, my dissertation's focus on representational practices provides a different way of looking at state and terrorist relations, one that does not automatically assume the separation of "state" and "terrorist" but examines the representational processes within which identities of states and terrorists are constituted.
This is especially relevant in the case of state terrorism. CTS has repeatedly called for the state to be "brought back" to terrorism studies and provided empirical evidence of the neglect of state terrorism within traditional terrorism studies. 108 In terms of its understanding of the state, CTS moves beyond the "good" counterterrorist state and
"bad" terrorism-producing state of traditional terrorism literature by pointing out that liberal democratic or "Northern" states themselves are also involved in terrorism. In addition to R. Jackson, Ruth Blakeley criticizes traditional terrorism studies for excluding state terrorism as an object of analysis. She claims this is due to the institutional affiliations of terrorism scholars (who are often linked to government offices), the
107 Ibid.
108See R. Jackson, Ghosts, 5, fn 14 for a detailed list of scholars who have done research on "state terrorism". 53
repressive practices of liberal democratic states and the limited theoretical frameworks employed by mainstream terrorism scholars. 109 In Blakeley's view, state terrorism also includes activities conducted by Northern states in the Global South. She describes
United States involvement in South and Central America during the Cold War as evidence of the spread of state terror with the United States as the perpetrator of violence and adds, "state terrorism along with other forms of repression, has been an ongoing feature of the foreign policies of democratic great powers from the North and the United
States (US) in particular." 110
While Blakeley's research draws attention to the state and terrorism, which traditional terrorism studies does not, it is inadequate as it sees terrorism as an identifiable act perpetuated also by states. The focus remains on the actor, instead of the processes via which identities are constituted and meanings communicated as the label of
"terrorist" is defined and employed in practice. The state is now added as another user of
"terrorist" violence. This has the effect of merely adding another layer -- the state -- to those who participate in or use a particular form of violence called "terrorism".
Terrorism, here, still possesses an "out-thereness" and can be objectively identified, which are not consistent with the call to study the representations of terrorism that CTS itself made and which was discussed earlier. Additionally, and especially problematic for my dissertation, is that arguing whether states are "terrorist" too, as CTS has done, draws attention away from actual practices of states (and how they use the language of
109 Blakeley, Bringing, 4.
110 Ibid., 228. 54
"terrorism") to discussions about their "terrorist" nature.
Thus, despite calling for a recognition of the ontological instability of the terrorism label, CTS suffers from the weakness of not moving beyond the attempt to apply it to different (Western and non-Western) states. R. Jackson asks why "such obvious cases of terrorism" of states (including Western democratic states) using terrorism are "so rarely studied by terrorism scholars."111 In that, it is merely expanding the definition of "terrorism" by claiming states (albeit Western states and not just rogue, non-Western states) can also be "terrorist", a practice similar to the early work done by critical security scholars. 112 This is problematic because it ignores one of the foundational aspects of CTS -- its emphasis on the social practices in the production of knowledge, especially the constructive and constitutive nature of language used. In other words, by focusing on defining and applying the label of "state terrorism" to specific states, CTS provides less attention to how precisely groups are represented as 'terrorist' and what this representation facilitates in terms of producing state identity. CTS would benefit from concentrating on practices of representation because such a focus brackets off questions of whether X group is "terrorist" or Y state is a "state terrorist" to study processes by which such actors are constituted as specific types of states and terrorists, and the linguistic strategies that facilitate these identity-formations.
Representation is also a social act and as such maintains focus on the social nature of identity-formation, both of states and terrorists. Indeed, CTS itself has called for a
111 R. Jackson, Ghosts.
112 See Buzan, People. Discussions about "human security" and "societal security" can be considered as examples of critical security research that merely expanded the definition of"security". 55
focus on representation to be centralized in the study of terrorism, 113 a call that arguing
Northern states are also "terrorist" obscures. Blakeley writes, "critically oriented scholars
need to reclaim the term 'terrorism' and use it as an analytical tool, rather than a political
tool in the service of elite power."114 But if "terrorism" is to be used as an analytical tool,
then examining "terrorism" as a linguistic commonplace which actors -- no matter where
they are located in the international system -- use to make sense of actions and identities
would be appropriate rather than seeing it as a form of violence that is separate to
practices of representation.
Studying the state and terrorism from an anthropological perspective, Jeffrey
Sluka's edited volume Death Squad: the Anthropology of State Terror115 includes
ethnographic analyses of "state terror". Sluka and his co-writers maintain a focus on how
state terror has been experienced and understood in different situations, ranging from
Spain, Kashmir, Philippines to East Timor. However, the focus is not on how people use the language of "terrorism" or "terrorist" but how violence is experienced at the non-state
level. Sluka writes that anthropological understandings of state terror can be useful in
writing against terror, decolonizing anthropology and in leading to an ethnography of
state terror. By shifting the focus from the state to people experiencing the effects of various actions of the state, the writers in this book examine how "state terror" is
understood in different contexts. This does not get away from the notion that there is a
113 R. Jackson, Core Commitments, 248.
114 Blakeley, Bringing, 233.
115 Jeffrey Sluka, ed., Death Squad: The Anthropology ofState Terror (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000). 56
specific type of violence "terrorism", with the state being involved in such practices. As
such, it is similar to CTS' views on state terrorism. In addition, many of the essays in
Sluka's volume take as foundational that the voices of the local people, however "local"
is defined, as being more authentic than official version of events and, hence, more
suitable to be heard from. Other research using ethnographic methods to study differing
groups' understandings of terrorism include Zulaika and Douglass' Terror and Taboo
(1996) and Kay B. Warren's The Violence Within (1993). 116 While these
ethnographically-informed works shift the focus of analysis from state or terrorist levels
to that of the local population, the assumptions of there being a uniquely different type of
state, one that becomes involved in a recognizable objective activity called "terrorism",
remains. As does, once again, the separation of the state and terrorism, with each actor's
identity being pre-given prior to their actions.
Another weakness of CTS is its call for a "second order critique". This calls for a
standpoint wherein the researcher adopts a Critical standpoint from, as R. Jackson said,
"outside of the discourse"117 alongside a continued focus on "rump materialism" and a
"minimal foundationalism". 118 R. Jackson writes,
it is argued that the absence of state terrorism from academic discourse functions
116 Kay B. Warren, ed., The Violence Within: Cultural and Political Opposition in Divided Nations (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993).
117 R. Jackson, Ghosts, 13. Calling for a standpoint outside discourse also ignores that such standpoints themselves are situated within specific ideological and contextual viewpoints and that human beings do not stand outside social life.
118 Richard Jackson's comments at a panel on Critical Terrorism Studies during ISA 2009. The concept "rump materialism" is used by Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Wendt uses "rump materialism" to question whether explanations can be "ideas all the way down" (1999, 96). For a more detailed definition of "rump materialism", see Wendt, 109-13 and 130-35). 57
to promote particular kinds of state hegemonic projects, construct a legitimizing public discourse for foreign and domestic policy, and deflect attention from the terroristic practices by Western states and their allies. 119
These calls could have the effect ofreifying traditional notions of unitary state and terrorist identities and also providing "ideology" as explanation. These views of terrorism scholars Zulaika and Douglass can be used in response to R. Jackson's call for maintaining a focus on ideology: " ... ideology and politics per se are not our main concerns ... When we examine the epistemic status of the category [of terrorism] itself and the shifting meanings that it holds for various audiences, we realize the radical extent to which terrorism discourse constitutes its object." 120 They add that calls for Washington to be included as "terrorist" actually "further recreates and reifies the terrorist paradigm instead of undermining its fictions." 121 In other words, calls for Northern states to be considered "state terrorist" and for a standpoint outside of the [terrorist] discourse do not actually question the foundational view of traditional terrorism studies that state and terrorist identities are pre-given and exist prior to analysis. If one is to take representations and labeling as constitutive, then a "minimal foundationalism" detracts from analysis. What is placed in this "minimal foundationalism" category? Specific types of political violence (despite the acknowledgement of terrorism's ontological instability)?
Certain groups of people and their actions? a generalized ideology? CTS scholars would then have to spend time justifying what (and who) falls under this "rump materialist"
119 R. Jackson, Ghosts, 1.
120 Zulaika and Douglass, 16. Zulaika and Douglass seem to separate terrorist behavior from the label of "terrorist'', thus assuming a "terroristic" form of behavior exists. However, this is not relevant to the point I'm making here.
121 Ibid. 58
category (and who does not), an action that does not question commonsensical understandings of "state" and "terrorism". This dissertation is not concerned with why states are excluded from terrorism studies but in how labeling particular groups as
"terrorist" allows a particular type of state identity (whether counterterrorist or a state that talks to terrorists) to be produced.
Before turning to another subfield of security studies that has questioned pre- given, commonsensical identities of threats and of the state, let me briefly summarize a newspaper article which draws attention to this debate between pre-given and socially- constructed identities, between traditional and poststructural approaches to terrorism.
Perhaps in no other subfield in International Relations is there as much intermingling among practitioners and academics, as in the field of terrorism studies. At the same time, there is a concurrent distance among problem-solving theorists and critical theorists analyzing terrorism. 122 In the context of the global war on terror, everyday discussion about academics who study terrorism not understanding "real world" issues is a common critique from law enforcement and government officials who are working with issues related to terrorism.
For example, a November 2006 edition of The Washington Post Book World carried a book review of two books on Al-Qaeda, one written by a journalist and the other by an academic. 123 The reviewer, "the founding head of the CIA's bin Laden unit",
122 By "critical" here, I mean research that critiques assumptions of traditional terrorism studies. Differences between "problem-solving theory" and "Critical theory" were raised by Robert Cox. See Cox, 88. By "Critical'', Cox means big "C" critical.
123 Michael Scheuer, "The Plotters Against America," Washington Post Book World, November 26, 2006, 4. 59
lauds the journalist for his "excellent, very personal book" and commends him for his warning about how bin Laden is "the latest in a line of figureheads .. .in keeping with
Muslim tradition."124 On the other hand, the academic is given short shrift as the reviewer hopes her book "will prove to be the last shriek from the academy's antiquated terrorism
experts."125 The academic's account of tracing out histories of various violent groups is
summarily dismissed as "erudite if irrelevant" though not much discussion occurs of why
a warning about the links between the (Muslim) religion and violence is laudatory and a tracing out of the (different) histories of violent groups is irrelevant. Perhaps because the
former seems commonsensical and familiar while the latter alludes to potentially
uncomfortable questions about how current ways of representing and dealing with threats may have had connections to how "we" have managed threats in the past? It is this type
of use of the rhetoric of terrorism -- that of terrorists as being self-evidently
Muslim/Catholic/young men/etc -- as commonplace, along with a concurrent production of the counterterrorist state also as commonsensical -- that I find problematic and want to question through my research.
The point I am trying to make here is not just about the book review itself. As an article in a widely-read newspaper, this review (and its views) had the potential to reach more people than a book written by a university scholar (or a new PhD!) does and yet its critique is rooted in methodological assumptions about there being an authentic type of political violence that counts as terrorism, one that academics and scholars are unlikely to understand. It also equates identities with essentialist traits, that of Muslims being
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid. 60
inherently prone to violence. In terms of discourses, it reproduces discourses about terrorism being an existential threat which requires state-based responses and ties the
'terrorist' identity to a particular characteristic of a major religion. And, at the same time, it ignores the role of the actor in labeling what counts as a threat and what is threatening, as in the case of Britain with respect to the IRA or the Nepalese state and the Maoists, for example. This then ignores the social nature of knowledge-production where reviews like this (and its characterization of one way of doing research as commonsensical and the other as "academic", meaning useless) 126 become commonplace. It is such commonplace identities and ways of understanding "security" that critical approaches to security have critiqued and it is to those critical security scholars -- especially those who study the language of security -- that I tum to next.
"Invisible" Terrorists: Terrorism and Critical Security Studies127
Critical security studies (CSS) 128 responds to these drawbacks of traditional and critical terrorism studies in three main ways: i) CSS denaturalizes pre-given interests and
126 To defend "academic" practice, I shall quote this from Jonathan Potter: "In everyday parlance, 'academic' implies pointless, empty, inconsequential. But we are academics, for whom it is proper, essential even, to care about the epistemic and ontological status of claims to knowledge. And it is far from inconsequential. If even ostensibly bottom-line instances of brute reality are demonstrably social accomplishments, then academics are dealing with some powerful machinery; the possibility of critique, denial, deconstruction, argument, for any kind of truth, fact, assumption, regime or philosophy - for anything at all."(Potter, Representing, 37; emphasis in the original)
127 In International Relations there are many other subfields especially postcolonial studies, which have examined the relationship between state and terror. While remaining indebted to their research, this literature review concentrates on the subfield of "security studies" and specifically on the studies of terrorism. Further research could include postcolonial or feminist analyses of terrorism but that is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
128 While there are many schools within critical security studies (e.g. Copenhagen School, Paris School, Welsh School), my brief overview mainly focuses on those CSS scholars who analyze language and representations. 61
identities, thus leading to a different starting point for research than traditional terrorism studies. This helps in asking (and answering) questions which are out of bounds of traditional terrorism studies; ii) CSS emphasizes the co-constitution of states and threats, especially the constitutive nature of discursive practices such as language-use and representations. As such, it does not take state and terrorist identities as pre-given and unchanging prior to analysis; and iii) CSS is methodologically consistent and rigorous.
Thus, CSS leaves aside questions about what "security" (or "terrorism") really is and focuses, instead, on how language is used to construct particular identities and explain actions. 129 It questions the state's role as foundational to analysis but it does so not by ignoring the state or calling for a non state-centric perspective. Instead, it shifts the focus to various practices (representational) which constitute the state's identity in the first place. 130
CSS also draws attention to how the state itself is an important actor in representing danger and, in the process, CSS focuses attention on the type of state that is produced and legitimated during the processes of representing threats. Thus, by foregrounding identity-construction and meaning-making, CSS provides the tools to question the commonsensical understanding of a pre-given, unitary counterterrorist state.
In traditional security studies, an atomistic constitution of the subject (usually the state) meant the subject was the presupposition upon which theory was built so the subject could not be questioned and since it could not be questioned, it could not be properly
29 t Adapted and added to from Jutta W el des, et al, Cultures ofInsecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger (Minneapolois, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 13-21.
130 See Campbell, Writing; Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1999); Weldes, et al, Cultures. 62
investigated. 131 By shifting the focus to representations of danger and to their constitutive
role (instead of starting with pre-given state and terrorist identities), CSS (and CTS, too,
as described earlier) questions the traditional understanding of the state (and threats) in
International Relations. By looking at the public use of the language of "terrorism" by
state officials and the attendant representations of danger (along with the related state
identity-formation), this is where my research fits in. In the following few paragraphs, I
shall further outline some of the benefits of adopting tools from CSS to study the state
and terrorism.
(i) CSS Denaturalizes Identities and Interests
For CSS, state identity is not something that is pre-given prior to analysis. Threats
are not self-evident but have to be interpreted as such by actors, including but not limited
to the state. Also, what is to be secured is not always the state -- instead, the state as
needing to be secured is one of many possible identities of states that are produced out of
particular representations of danger. As such, CSS provides tools to question the
commonsensical understanding of states in terrorism studies, especially in traditional
terrorism studies, which takes the state's counterterrorism role for granted. Weldes, et al
state this problem as, "Security studies, then, treats insecurities as unavoidable facts
while problematizing, and consequently focusing its attention on, the acquisition of
security for pregiven entities-usually the state."132 CSS advocates the analysis of representations of threats and how identities are produced within such representational
131 Erik Ringmar, Identity, Interest, and Action : a Cultural Explanation ofSweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 59.
132 Weldes, et al, Cultures, 10. 63
practices. For example, traditional research about "new terrorism" allows for asking what
counts as "new terrorism"; what "new" methods and weapons "terrorist" have available;
why did "new terrorism" arise, and how to get rid of "new terrorism". It does not allow
for questions such as: what does the use of "new terrorism" discourse allow social actors
to do? What type of state is produced to deal with "new terrorists" and what other
discourses are available at the time? Here, the concern is not whether particular groups
may access weapons of mass destruction or how to combat "new terrorism" but what
become prioritized by the "new terrorism" discourse -- for example, "terrorism" prior to
September 11, 2001 automatically gets categorized as "old", techniques which were used
in the past (including talking to "terrorist" groups as in the case of Britain/IRA) become
irrelevant; "Islamic terrorism" and "cyberterrorism" become prioritized in state responses
to "new terrorism".
In this way, denaturalization has the effect of facilitating questions which remain
unasked (and unexplored) within the framework of traditional terrorism studies.
Traditional terrorism studies begin with the assumption that states and terrorists are pre-
given entities, positing a natural-ness to terrorism that its own subsequent investigations -
- on the many and diverse definitions of "terrorism" and on the impossibility of having a
133 psychological profile of "terrorists" -- contradicts. Additionally, such an assumption is unable to account for occasions where the use of violence by the terrorist group continued, while state-terrorist negotiations were ongoing. CSS, by denaturalizing the identities and actions of states and terrorists, questions traditional modes of studying
133 See, for example, the works of John Horgan who claims a psychological profile of a "terrorist" is not possible. 64
threats. It draws attention on the field of meanings surrounding the production of actors
(states and terrorists) and interests (states that counter or negotiate with terrorists; terrorists who join the political process). It looks at processes by which subjects and objects of analysis are co-constituted and practices legitimated. It thus allows for asking questions about shifting identities and interests and the politics of the process of representation, questions which are out of bounds of the narrow confines of traditional
(and, to a certain extent, Critical) terrorism studies. Instead of asking why did (non violent) political parties in Nepal ally themselves with "terrorist" Maoists despite ongoing violence on the part of the Maoists, a CSS-influenced question would ask how such identities (non violent political parties; anti-terrorist state; "terrorist" Maoists) came about in the first place, how they were authorized and how they shift.
Numerous studies in critical security studies have drawn attention to the drawbacks of traditional modes of studying security and questioned seeming naturalness provided to states and threats. The conventional narrative in International Relations, especially in terrorism studies, of the role of a (good) state being to counter terrorism assumes the state is a monolithic institution which is able to perform its tasks in a clearly- mandated manner. It is accepted that good states arrange for the security of their citizens and cooperate with each other to counter threats. The goal of researchers then becomes to find ways for the state to perform this task better, leaving aside questions about how threats are understood and communicated in the first place.
Weldes, at al further describe traditional approaches to security as:
The structure of knowledge in security studies stereotypically takes the form of positing the existence of certain entities -- often but not always states -- within an environment in which they experience threat(s). The nature of these entities is 65
assumed to be both given and fixed ... and security is thus understood to mean securing these fixed entities against objective and external threats. These foundational assumptions naturalize those actors and their insecurities while rendering contingent and problematic their actions and strategies for coping with the insecurities. 134
Even within the traditional security framework, traditional security (and terrorism)
studies ignores that threats are not always "objective and external" but are often within geographically delimited state boundaries, needing to be engaged with and responded to.
A brief glance at the traditional (and predominant) literature, described earlier in this chapter, shows these "foundational assumptions" about security still ground the literature on terrorism especially that on states and terrorism, despite this critique being levied a decade ago in 1999. Terrorism is always separate to the state and not part of the state.
The state either produces or supports terrorists or is against terrorism. Instead of this, CSS questions the pre-given nature of these states and urges studying what the use of the rhetoric of "terrorism" does. CSS draws attention to public articulations of danger, including but not limited to that by states, and relates it to the identity-formation of actors. 135
On the whole, CSS opens up the field to new questions on identity-formation and legitimation strategies, questions that are silenced in traditional terrorism studies.
Foregrounding representations and identity-constitution thus allows CSS to question the commonsensical identity of the counterterrorist state (or the invisible state) in traditional terrorism studies. In doing so, they allow for a focus specifically on identity-formation of
134 Weldes, et al, Cultures, 9.
135 The work on the Copenhagen School is exemplary of this focus on language -- "speech acts" in their words. 66
the state and how the language of terrorism is used to make sense of selve(s) and other(s).
Thus, questions on how commonsensical identities of states and terrorists (states that do not negotiate with terrorists; anti-terrorist state) are socially produced and communicated can be asked and explored.
W eldes, et al explain the practical impacts of this opening up and denaturalization
as:
Because we seek to challenge conventional understandings of actors and their security problematics, the focus of all the analyses presented in this volume is always and expressly on insecurity and its cultural production .. .in doing so, they seek to denaturalize the state, other communities, and their insecurities in particular by demonstrating how both insecurities and actors such as states and communities are culturally produced ... how the cultural production of insecurities implicates and is implicated in the cultural production of the identities of actors. 136
Critical Security Studies thus shifts the focus to the constitution of insecurities, looking at processes by which threats are described and dealt with as related to identity- formation -- both of states and threats -- and not separate to them. CSS posits that
"insecurities, rather than being natural facts, are social and cultural productions". 137 Thus, the language of "terrorism" and "terrorist", who it is used by, who the labels are applied to and what happens to state and others identities during such usage is key.
This is what CTS scholars, too, have emphasized and in this both CTS and CSS are similar. R. Jackson writes,
In addition, given the central role that labeling plays within the terrorism studies field, CTS is committed to questioning the nature and politics of representation - why, when, how and for what purpose do groups and individuals come to be named as 'terrorist' and what consequences does this have?. 138
136 Weldes, et al, Cultures, 10 (emphasis in the original).
137 Weldes, et al, Cultures, 10. 67
It is exactly these consequences -- in the sense of the state identity-formation and
its shift -- that this dissertation will analyze. This approach to studying insecurity
(terrorism, in my case) would then preclude having to understand or predict what "they"
(terrorists) will do, a presumption upon which the majority of current research on terrorism rests, to looking at how threats are described, what the implications of particular representations of groups as 'terrorist' are and how practices (for example, state and terrorist relations, both antagonistic and conciliatory) are legitimated. 139
(ii) Emphasizes Social Construction and Meaning-making Practices that Constitute Self/other Identities of States and Terrorists140
Unlike traditional approaches to studying terrorism, critical security studies emphasizes the socially-constructed nature of reality and draws attention to how meanings are made and communicated in public. Roxanne Doty makes this point as she writes, " .. .I examine how meanings are produced and attached to various social subjects/objects, thus constituting particular interpretive dispositions which create certain possibilities and preclude others. What is explained is not why a particular outcome obtained (which is what traditional analyses do) but rather how the subjects, objects, and interpretive dispositions were socially constructed such that certain practices were made
138 R. Jackson, Core Commitments, 248.
139 See Doty, Foreign, 298-99 for further discussion about the difference between "why" and "how" questions.
140 These will be further explicated in the following chapter. For now, the focus is on the types of questions which can be asked when adopting CSS' social constructionist approach, questions which were left unasked within the traditional terrorism studies' framework. 68
possible." 141
In doing so, CSS centralizes the task of interpretation, a task that is silenced in
traditional modes of understanding terrorism. Interpretation, in traditional terrorism
studies, is seen as a problem rather than the everyday social practice that CSS takes it to
be. By ignoring interpretation, traditional terrorism studies leaves out how acts and actors
have to be described as terrorist and terrorism, respectively, and do not become self
evident as such. Instead, traditional terrorism scholars fall into the trap which Krause and
Latham lay out (and criticize) -- that of confusing interpretations (what or who is
dangerous) with some form of objective reality. This then closes off the possibility for
explaining how seemingly non-commonsensical acts such as states' negotiating with
"terrorists" occurs. Krause and Latham explain this as:
... since the mid-1990s, Western policymakers have possessed a way ofreading the global security order that has transformed essentially contestable interpretations of danger ("how serious is the global proliferation threat, relative to other threats?") into "objective" and uncontestable facts regarding the sources of threat and insecurity in the international system (rogue states possessing WMDs constitute a clear and present danger to the West). 142
By studying representations of danger and the constitutive nature of social
interactions, CSS looks at how things are put together and at the practices which facilitate
(or disallow) particular outcomes. The point here is to look at how groups are constructed
as dangerous, as "terrorist" and at the implications of such identities for state-other
relations, instead of getting involved in debates about whether "terrorism" is a real threat
141 Doty, Foreign, 298 (parentheses added).
142 Keith Krause and Andrew Latham, "Cross-cultural Dimensions of Multilateral Non Proliferation and Arms Control Dialogues: An Overview," in Culture and Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building, ed. Keith Krause, 23-55 (London and Portland, OR: F. Cass, 1999), 38 (parentheses in the original). 69
or not. As Lene Hansen puts it, "the question isn't whether 'terrorism' is a threat or not,
but how the 'terrorist subject' is formed, how certain activities are defined as 'terrorist'
and what the use of the 'terrorist' terms does to provide 'us' with the rights to fight
'terrorism'."143 This concern with constitution of identities of states and terrorists is what
my dissertation will rest upon.
A social constructionist approach thus allows for a focus on social meaning-
making, a focus which is lacking from traditional modes of studying terrorism which
ignore that acts and actors have to be interpreted and linked with and differentiated from
other acts and actors in order for them to make sense. For example, the representation of
"Bloody Sunday" as an "illegal riot" in official British documents about the event linked
it with other actions called "riots" and drew attention to how it was against the law. This
allowed for a representation of the marchers of "Bloody Sunday" as having broken the
law and as prone to violence, thus helping constitute the identities of marchers as dangerous but also of the state as needing to use violence to maintain peace and security.
A social constructionist approach would not deny that terrorism (or other forms of violence) exist but claim that interpretation of such violence is needed before it can make sense. It thus looks at how "meanings are moulded in discourse."144 In this view, danger is an effect ofrepresentations and is not self-evident or natural 145 and actors' identities are produced within these processes of representation.
143 Lene Hansen, "Matrix Comments by Lene Hansen," Global Security Matrix, The Watson Institute for International Studies December 11, 2006, http://www.watsonblogs.org/matrix/2006/12/comments on the global securit.html (accessed May 30, 2008).
144 Weldes, et al, Cultures, 12.
145 Campbell, Writing, 2. 70
In security studies, early examples of this process of examining (in)security and
language are seen in the works of the Copenhagen School. The Copenhagen School -- a
loosely connected group of scholars -- sought to denaturalize pre-given state and threat
identities while emphasizing "security" can be studied as a "speech act". Instead of
looking at language as incidental or supplementary to the main issue of security, these
scholars posited language and social relations as foundational to analysis and as
constitutive of issues and identities. This move from what threats are to how they are
represented, with language being the means through which this representation is done,
was key to questioning traditional ways of studying security. The Copenhagen School's
theory of "securitization" centralizes language-use as foundational to analysis. Describing
securitization, Waever writes, "with the help oflanguage, we can regard security as a
speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more
real; the utterance itselfis the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a
promise, naming a ship)." 146 Successful securitization has three steps: the identification of
existential threats, the proposing of emergency action and the breaking free of regular
rules of security. For these scholars, security is understood as "the move that takes
politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics."147 This approach to security does not seek to define
security (and, relatedly, insecurity) but details what the use of the language of "security" does in terms of forming self-other identities and policies. While there have been
146 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework For Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1998), 26.
147 Ibid., 23. 71
critiques of the Copenhagen School including for its excessive emphasis on the state as the actor who securitizes, its ignoring of the politics behind what is considered regular politics and so on, these concerns do not mitigate that the School focused on studying how states define threats and linked the tasks of defining threats and responding to them, tasks which were often studied separately. In other words, the type of state produced in the Copenhagen School can be traced out through analyzing "speech acts" of "security".
It is a similar outlook that my research adopts using "terrorism".
A branch of CSS, one that has studied terrorism as a topic, is the Paris School, led by Didier Bigo. The Paris School draws attention to the field of meanings from which insecurity is produced and on defining (and understanding) practices of exclusion. 148
However, their concern is not to centralize terrorism as "we disagree with both narratives
[that "we" are in a global war on terror and that 11 September 2001 has led to an erosion of democracy and a rise on govemmentality] as they put terror as 'the' form of insecurity which is under discussion .... " 149 Instead, they are interested in the "mimetic relation" between "transnational clandestine organizations using violence, the coalition of governments of the 'global war on terror', and a complex web of vested local interests."150 It is these transnational networks -- of criminals, "local interests'', states -- that Bigo, et al focus upon. Additionally, their overall interest is mostly how "liberal" states with their pregiven "liberal" identities deal with insecurity and what that means for
148 Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala, "Understanding Insecurity," in Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices ofLiberal Regimes After 9111, eds., Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 2-3.
149 Ibid., 3.
150 Ibid .. 72
freedom and for defining one's "enemy". 151 This, too, closes off possibilities for investigating the linguistic strategies which produce state identities in favor of a concern with "the politics of unease" and the role of "security professionals" therein. 152 To put it more simply, that the liberal democratic state is one of many possible discourses available for meaning-making purposes (and not an attribute of particular states) and that state officials continually interpret acts and actions as "dangerous" is given less relevance in this literature which focuses on societal (and professional) representations of insecurity. For example, under this framework, Britain's relations with the IRA would be investigated as "a liberal democratic state's" response to "terrorism" or how British security officials (or related personnel) constructed insecurity. What repressive security practices do to the state's liberal democratic identity would be the focus. States here still respond to danger, whether representing them as "bare life" or creating zones of exception. 153 This dissertation does not take the liberal democratic nature of states for granted and examines 'democracy' as one of a series ofrhetorical commonplaces that states use when representing threats. The Paris School, thus, does not denaturalize commonsensical identities of (liberal democratic) states and "terrorists" to the same extent as this dissertation hopes to do.
For CSS as a whole, danger and those responding to danger are co-constituted in
151 See also the Challenge: Liberty and Security web site at http://www.libertysecurity.org/ (accessed March 24, 2009) ..
152 Bigo and Tsoukala, 4.
153 These terms are borrowed from Giorgio Agamben and have formed the basis ofrecent research (including Bigo and Tsoukala) on state practices. Please see Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005) and Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). 73
the process of making sense of events and actions. Looking at events and actors' identities and interests as socially-constructed and centralizing interpretation means CSS can focus on how particular identities and outcomes were made possible (e.g., linking the
Maoists in Nepal with global terrorist movements) and, importantly, how they were legitimated. It questions state/threat identities by pointing out how a range of possibilities for action are always possible and how the outcome produced was one of many possible available at the time. Most of CSS, especially those looking at language, thus adopts a non-causal epistemology and a relational ontology. 154 This is not to say language-use cannot be causal since how concepts are used, as it were, is causal in terms of constituting identities and interests of states and terrorists. 155 This is very different to traditional terrorism studies, which assumes terrorists act within their own motivations, often provided by their historical, religious, sociocultural or gender attributes.
(iii) Methodological Reflexivity and Consistency
Unlike traditional terrorism studies, which usually ignores methodological reflection or adopts positivist, mostly quantitative, methodology for studying terrorism,
CSS centralizes methodology, taking the constitutive role of social practices (such as
154 See Hansen, Security for more on the significance of adopting such a position.
155 Thus, language-use itself has a causal role in producing specific 'state' and 'terrorist' identities and legitimating relations amongst them. Of course, words are not linked (or differentiated) in the same way on all occasions, as my chapters on British-IRA relations and Nepal-Maoist relations will describe. Hence, this is a contextual view of causation, one that is less common in International Relations. See Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 35-45, for an overview of this different understanding of causality than that oflinear causation (Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994)) or co-constitution (much ofCSS, exemplified by Hansen, Security). In sociology, Charles Tilly's works on relational mechanisms as causal are relevant to this. See, for example, Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001) and Charles Tilly, Mechanisms can be considered as precursors to P. Jackson. 74
language-use) as foundational to analysis. CSS scholars make the point that methodology
is implicated in the types of questions and concerns which are deemed legitimate (and of
use) in studying security, an observation which is also true ofresearch on terrorism.
Reflexivity means attention is paid to historical patterns of constituting and
understanding threats as well as to the difficulty of questioning commonplace
understandings. James der Derian writing after the September 11, 2001 events in the
United States said,
... there is very little about 9-11 that is safe to say. Unless one is firmly situated in a patriotic, ideological, or religious position (which at home and abroad are increasingly one and the same), it is intellectually difficult and even politically dangerous to assess the meaning of a conflict that phase-shifts with every news cycle ... " (emphasis added). 156
Der Derian, here, points out that such a viewpoint ignores that knowledge,
including knowledge about terrorism, is socially-produced.
This is where CSS is useful. CSS draws attention to how the position of the researcher is tied to questions of and modes of doing research. It urges researchers to be clear and consistent about their ontological and epistemological commitments, even when this is a difficult and unpopular task. Der Derian, describing core commitments of critically studying terrorism argued "method matters"157 since methodological reflection and clarification are ignored in much of current research on terrorism. In contrast, critical security scholars clearly define their methodological commitments and what their
156 James Der Derian, "9/11: Before, After and In Between," Social Science Research Council, June 5, 2007, http://www.ssrc.org/septl 1/essays/der derian text only.htm (accessed March 22, 2009).
157 James Der Derian, 1992, 96. However, der Derian, too, is working under the assumption of an objective form of terrorism since he claims representations obscure the reality of terrorism. On the contrary, my research draws upon the works of Jonathan Potter that sees representations as constitutive of reality. This will be further detailed in the next chapter. 75
approach will contribute to the study of security. For example, Lene Hansen's 2006 book contains extensive discussions of her methodology and its usefulness in terms of
denaturalizing commonsensical understandings of the Bosnian War. She clarifies her
commitment up front as: " .. .identity is not something that states, or other collectivities, have independently of the discursive practices mobilized in presenting and implementing
foreign policy."158 Similar commitments are made by David Campbell, Jutta Weldes, and
Karin Fierke. 159
The majority of critical security scholars view language as constitutive of interests
and identities. Such a view is missing from traditional terrorism studies and, while present in Critical terrorism studies, is limited therein because of the methodological
ambiguity alluded to above. Existing research on terrorism takes language as reflecting ideas and interests of actors, a view which is very limited based on the many uses social actors put language to. Instead, by emphasizing the constitutive nature of language use in the process ofrepresenting terrorist threats, 16°CSS maintains a focus on how actions are legitimated and how identities are produced. Overall, CSS draws attention to the process of identity-construction within representational practices, thus avoiding the need to predict "terrorist" actions or access their mindsets. This fills in the existing gap in traditional terrorism studies which ignores language or sees it merely as reflective of
"terrorists"" motives.
158 Hansen, Security, l.
159 Campbell, Writing; David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Fierke; Weldes, Constructing; Weldes, et al, Cultures.
16°Further details on this will be provided in the next chapter. 76
Instead, following on from the Copenhagen School, language is important
because it constitutes identities and interests. Analyzing concepts is thus useful in
describing how different conditions of possibility apart from the conventional narrative of
(good) states countering (evil) terrorists may be possible. There are practical
consequences of looking at language and at the discursive space within which both states
and groups labeled as "terrorists" operate. By ignoring language or seeing it merely as a
conduit to people's (terrorists' and states', for instance) minds, traditional terrorism
studies is unable to ask and answer questions of the political and practical consequences
of what happens when the labels of "terrorism" and "terrorist" are applied and when such
labeling is dropped. In his The Politics of Security, Michael Dillon writes,
.. .language is not simply a tool, no matter how much we seek to instrumentalize it. It is something to which we are handed over, something in which we are caught up ....we are played out in language and may experience existence differently as we come to experience the play oflanguage differently. 161
Dillon adds," ... words show how, in fact, security and insecurity require one
another." 162
Thus, CSS maintains agency of social actors -- states and terrorists in my case-- by looking at what language used by them does, in terms of constituting particular
subjects and objects and legitimating specific outcomes. Representational practices are thus key -- it is the usage of "terrorism" and "terrorist" labels that are relevant to analysis.
This obviates the need to have (or base research on) an authentic form of political violence. Instead, this research looks at how public rhetoric and justifications are part of
161 Michael Dillon, Politics ofSecurity: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 116.
162 Ibid., 126. 77
categorizing others as 'terrorist'. As such, CSS is a critical enterprise in the sense of re reading or re-learning knowledge about terrorism by destabilizing commonsensical understandings of terror, emphasizing the social productions of knowledge through analyzing representations and bringing language and culture into the study of terrorism.
What Next? Proposing a Relational Study of Terrorism
To sum up, in traditional terrorism studies, states are either counterterrorist, sponsors of terrorism or invisible with the assumption that "we" study terrorism in order to provide recommendations for the state. This means state and terrorist identities are pre given, disallowing questions about how particular identities (that of the counterterrorist state, for example) came about in the first place or what happens when labelings of groups as "terrorist" changes. Critical terrorism studies responds to this by asking for an emphasis on the state and calling for a study of terrorism discourse as constitutive of state
(and terrorist) identities. However, CTS too has its weaknesses as it gets bogged down in discussions about whether particular states are also "terrorist" and calling for the maintenance of a "minimal foundationalism", without explaining why this is necessary to analysis or what precisely is to be included in this "minimal foundationalism". So, two types of state are noted in the CTS literature -- one, states which are produced during representations of terrorists and terrorism. Two, states which use objective or real
"terrorist" strategies. These two forms of the state contradict each other. In its call to study liberal democratic states as (potential) "terrorist", CTS thus retains the methodological confusion of traditional terrorism studies, that of presuming there is an actual terroristic nature or psychology or tactic, one that states too can be or use. This 78
does not get away from the main weakness of traditional terrorism studies of the state- terrorist distinction being prior to analysis. These weaknesses are responded to by critical security studies scholars, especially those who analyze discourse and study processes by and within which insecurity is produced. CSS focuses squarely on social interactions as constitutive of actors' identities, including those of states. However, much of CSS has ignored terrorism as a topic of study. This is where this dissertation fits in as it studies official representations of groups as "terrorist" and the related constitution of state and terrorist identities.
To do so, my research will follow from the CSS scholars described here in adopting a relational ontology, one that looks at social relations, especially language-use, as constitutive of identities and interests. A relational methodology moves away from a focus on unitary actors to relations which produce actors' identities. It assumes social relations are foundational, with structures and agency (the interpretive repertoire within which state and terrorist identities are produced and the actions by them understood) being co-constituted. The emphasis is on processes, on the field of meanings or interpretive (specifically, linguistic) repertoires from which identities of states and terrorists are produced, relations between them described and actions legitimated. Finally, looking at state and terrorist as relational means analyzing how the subject of terrorism is produced, rather than taking it for granted. The emphasis is on tracing out linguistic strategies which are used representing terrorists and states 163 rather than taking the state's counterterrorist role as commonsensical.
163 This is drawn from Potter, Representing from whom a significant proportion of this project's understanding of discourse analysis is drawn. This will be further outlined in Chapter 3. 79
Adopting this methodology, my research takes representations of groups as
"terrorist" as foundational to identity-formation. How are seemingly commonsensical
identities (states that counter terrorists) as well as taboo interactions (states that negotiate with violent terrorists) produced? How have state/other relations become normalized as
state/terrorist relations in various contexts? Croft writes, " ... analysis is not concerned with the validity of what is said; but rather with what is done through particular
accounts,"164 a claim that does not require the state-terrorist distinction to pre-exist
analysis. This is where this dissertation fits in as it attempts to look at states' usage of
"terrorism" and "terrorists" to see what identities and policies are facilitated through the representation of various actors (and actions) as dangerous and threatening, as "terrorist".
In other words, I plan to investigate how representations of terrorism occur, how a counterterrorist state comes into being and how this is affected when the representations of terrorism shift so that 'terrorists' become people states can talk with, as seen with the
IRA in Northern Ireland and the Maoists in Nepal. The next chapter will further detail a relational, poststructural discourse analytical approach to studying terrorism.
164 Croft, Culture. CHAPTER3
LANGUAGE OF TERRORISM AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE: A
DISCOURSE ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO STATE/TERRORISM
In Summer 2004, I was in Nepal attempting preliminary data collection for my dissertation. This was to be, in my view, a follow-up of my Masters thesis on community- based development practices. Nepal had been considered a regional leader in community management of natural resources and I wanted to see if and how things had changed in the past few years. Most of the documents for my Masters research had commended the people for their natural resource management practices. While there had been some mention of the Maoists in the news when I was in Nepal in 1999, the state did not often refer to them in its public pronouncements. This was despite the fact that the Maoist janayuddha or "People's War" had begun in 1996. From their main base in Nepal's mid- western hills, by 1999-2000, the Maoists had expanded their operations to much of the western and far eastern parts of the country. Their goal was to begin a "People's War", with uprisings in all parts of the country. 165 However, writing about Maoism in the
1990s, Burghart notes that the Maoists were deemed "private interest groups" by the
Nepalese state. He adds, "This meant that, despite the public claims advanced by
[Maoists], their motivations were deemed by the government to be founded
165 An interview with Pushpa Kumar Dahal, then leader of the Maoists is quoted in Ali Riaz and Subho Basu, Paradise Lost: State Failure in Nepal (Lanham, MD and Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2007), 132-33. In this, Dahal claims the "People's War" has to be started from various parts of the country.
80 81
in self-interest."166 Hence, groups such as the Maoists and their claims could be (and were) mostly ignored in official accounts, especially in accounts of security and foreign policy.
Once I was in Kathmandu in 2004, I realized that much of the official and unofficial discussion was now not about development but about terrorism. The media quoted government officials talking about "terrorist" challenges facing the country and how Nepal was now an ally of the United States in the global war on terror. 167 In addition, areas outside of Kathmandu valley where much of the better-known examples of community participation were from, were considered too dangerous and infiltrated by
Maobadi168 to visit. Over half the country was under Maoist control at this time. The discussion about the Maoists had shifted from them not being part of official discussions
(for example, the role of the Maoists was given little attention during 1999) to their role as destabilizing the country because of their "terrorist" activities. Overall, official discourses had shifted from talks about development and how to improve Nepal's socioeconomic growth to discussions about the Maoists as security threats and as anti-
166 Richard Burghart, "The Political Culture of Panchayat Democracy," in Nepal in the Nineties: Versions of the Past, Visions ofthe Future, ed. Michael Hutt, 1-14 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 8. For a brief history of the major political parties in Nepal, please see John Whelpton, "The General Elections of May 1991," in Nepal in the Nineties: Versions ofthe Past, Visions of the Future, ed. Michael Hutt, 48-82 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 50-62. For a view of the formation of the Maoist political party and the early days of the Maoist-led rebellion, see Chapter 4 "Maoist Insurgency and the Militarization of the Nepali Polity and Society," in Ali Riaz and Subho Basu, Paradise Lost: State Failure in Nepal (Lanham, MD and Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2007).
167 Chapter 5 includes further analysis of state/Maoist relations since the beginnings of "the People's War".
168 In Nepali, Maobadi has a meaning close to "fans of Mao" or "followers of Mao". Maobadi can be a noun or an adjective. It was commonplace to hear about parts of the country as being "Maobadi pidit'', meaning "suffering from Maobadi". Other uses of ''pidit" include allied to floods, hunger and other natural disasters. For example, "baadi pidit" means (people/areas) "suffering from (or who have suffered from) flooding". 82
democratic "terrorists".
Two things are of note here: one, the people considered to be Maoists and those
who joined the Maoists included people from regions where, previously, they had been
considered excellent natural resource managers. Two, and more importantly, it was not
just the use of violence by the group in question -- the Maoists -- which led to their
designation as dangerous "terrorists" since the Maoists "People's War" started in 1996, at
a time when the Maoists were hardly mentioned in official descriptions of danger. If, as is
claimed in the majority of definitions of terrorism, non states actors' use of violence as a
political tool is "terrorism", then the Maoists would have been considered terrorists as
soon as they began using violence. Additionally, in traditional terms, the continued use of
violence by "terrorists" should have meant that states could not talk to "terrorists",
another practice that was not the case in the contexts of British and Nepali government
interactions with the IRA and the Maoists respectively. In 2006 in Nepal, despite
continuing violence, the label of "terrorist" was dropped as the Maoists allied themselves
with various political parties in opposition to the monarchist counterterrorist state. In
April 2006, for example, the Maoists continued bombing areas outside of Kathmandu
even while there was a ceasefire in Kathmandu and the Maoist-political parties' alliance
was holding pro-democracy protests against the King. Similarly, in the case of the IRA in
1996, while discussions about the peace process were ongoing, the IRA broke its then 17-
month long ceasefire and bombed central London. This, however, did not immediately
end the peace process which, if non-state actors' use of violence was the main factor making them "terrorist", should have. During the 1996 Docklands bombing in London, while the bombing was condemned as "terrorism", the British government continued to 83
leave open the possibility of continued negotiations with Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA.
These examples mean studying states and terrorists as pre-existing actions and representations is not going to be able to ask (and explore) questions about change and identity, as in the examples described above. In other words, traditional terrorism research which assumes states and terrorists are separate to each other with both ontologically prior to possible actions ignore that identities and practices are, as described above, interlinked. Adopting a relational, discourse-oriented methodology in which relations are prior to (specific) identity-formation addresses this issue as it examines processes and relations which constitute particular identities -- of "safe" and "dangerous" actors, for example. It also focuses on actors make sense of issues and how their own identities are produced in this process of representation. Such a methodology directs attention to how "making foreign" occurs, as groups of people previously considered to be harmless and even allies of the state's development project are labeled as "terrorist" as in Nepal. At the same time, it also directs attention to change as "making foreign" turns to "making normal" (it being normal to continue negotiating with Sinn Fein, despite a bombing in Central London by the IRA). More specifically, analyzing representations of groups as (or not as) "terrorist" draws attention to how terrorism is understood in different contexts and how practices against or alongside "terrorist" groups are legitimated. A language-oriented approach draws attention to the linguistic strategies that produce actors -- the counterterrorist state, the community-oriented locals, the terrorist supporting locals, the state that is willing to negotiate with terrorist groups -- in different times and places. It helps examine interactions and representations that coalesce to make 84
"terrorist" and "terrorism" meaningful and the related (official, in my case) actions thus authorized. Such an approach also questions commonsensical understandings by indicating how actors' identities -- whether the counterterrorist state or "terrorist" groups
-- are not homogenous and monolithic but always contingently produced and continuously stabilized while, at the same time, contending with other contemporary representations.
In this chapter, first, I shall briefly describe why a relational approach is suited to study state and terrorist identity constitution. Second, this will be followed by a section on discourse analysis. Third is a section on language and rhetoric and their role as tools for analyzing identity formation. The fourth and final section discusses representation, more specifically, the process ofrepresenting, drawing upon the works of Jonathan Potter and discursive psychology to outline a plan for analyzing official representations of
'terrorism' and 'terrorists'.
A Relational Study of the State and Terrorism
Discussing relationalism, specifically "relational realism", the sociologist Charles
Tilly wrote, "Relational realism, the doctrine that transactions, interactions, social ties, and conversations constitute the central stuff of social life, once predominated in social science, if not in history."169 Tilly's view was that relational research has been supplanted, and not always to the benefit of better explanations, by individualistic or holistic explanations. In contrast to much of the traditional terrorism literature which
169 Charles Tilly, "Micro, Macro, or Megrim?," (August 1997), http://www.asu.edu/clas/polisci/cgrm/papers/Tilly/TillyMicromacro.pdf (accessed May 22, 2008), 4. This is also Chapter 6 of Charles Tilly, Stories, Identities and Political Change (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). 85
concentrates on individual or systemic reasons for behavior, relational explanations look at ties -- social networks, the continuance of practice and habitus or discourses -- as explanations for actions. 170 Relationalists argue that ties and connections between actors are the "building blocks of social analysis."171 In short, relational analysts:
... do not deny the existence of sentient individuals or collective actors, [but] they typically make two moves that render their accounts incompatible with such stories. First, they portray both individuals and communities as continuously changing products of interaction. Second, they incessantly invoke indirect effects, cumulative effects, unintended effects, and effects mediated by the non-human environment. 172
In my own research, I will build upon Tilly's claim of actors -- states and terrorists -- being products of interaction, mediated by existing and past practices.
However, I expand upon Tilly's claim that relational analysts invoke "indirect effects" by making the assumption that such effects are noticeable only in and through the public use of language since they have to be represented and communicated therein.
A relational approach to terrorism thus looks at social relations as foundational to analysis and examines how boundaries between entities -- between selves and others-- are produced and legitimated. In this way, it draws attention to the processes which constitute entities -- states and terrorists -- and authorize relations between those entities. Since the ontological basis for a relational approach is social relations -- representations of actions and events in my case -- such an approach avoids having to assume pre-existing (and
170 Daniel Nexon, "Paper on 'Relational Tum in International Relations' presented at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association 2008," http://duckofminerva. blogspot. com/2 008/08/virtual-apsa-presentation-relational. html (accessed January 22, 2009).
171 For a more detailed overview ofrelationalism, please see Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel Nexon, "Relations Before States: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics," European Journal ofInternational Relations, 5, no. 3 ( 1999): 291-332.
172 Tilly,Micro, 5. 86
analytically separate) 'state' and 'terrorist' actors. Thus, instead of asking whether a particular state is involved in "state terrorism" or not, which is a question that still remains mired in assumptions about "states" and "terrorism" pre-existing social relations, concerns about how actors use the language of"terrorism" and what this does to actors' identities can be emphasized. In a linguistic/discourse-oriented relational approach, the real (or otherwise) status of terrorism is irrelevant since realism is viewed as a rhetorical practice. 173 This means the focus shifts from whether particular groups are (or were) really "terrorist" and whether particular state actions were really the best practices of counterterrorism to how such practices are made sense of and how they become legitimate practices. A relational approach also avoids having to elucidate the internal characteristics of actors as reasons for why they become violent or join pre-existing terrorist groups.
Another benefit of adopting a relational approach is its emphasis on historical and contextual identity-formation. This means understanding terrorism today requires questioning commonsensical views about it, such as states are not "terrorist" or that states only react to "terrorist" use of violence. The emphasis, instead, is on how "terrorism" is used by various actors within different settings, how representations of groups as
"terrorist" occur and how these change through time. Linguistic strategies which constitute particular identities of states/others and how these might recur in different contexts is centralized in analysis. This is different from much of current terrorism
173 Derek Edwards, Malcolm Ashmore and Jonathan Potter, "Death and furniture: The rhetoric, politics and theology of bottom line arguments against relativism," History of the Human Sciences 8 (1995), 25-49; Reprinted as Derek Edwards, Malcolm Ashmore and Jonathan Potter, "Death and Furniture: Arguments Against Relativism," in Social Construction: A Reader, eds. Mary Gergen and Kenneth Gergen, 231-36 (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003). 87
research which still insists on, for example, learning "best practices" from British
counterterrorism operations in Northern Ireland to inform today's counterterrorist
practices without taking into account the shift in meanings and identities through time in
Northern Ireland itself, and without taking into account that people's understandings of
"terrorism" and the construction of the "terrorist" subject may be different today. In one
of its main forms -- poststructural discourse analysis -- the relational approach centralizes
language use as foundational to meaning-making and identity-construction. So, concerns
about there being a rise of "new terrorism" and how "nuclear terrorism" and "Jihadist terrorism" are now the world's major problems can be taken apart to examine how such claims are put together and what the implication of such claim-making are for those considered "Jihadist terrorist" and, especially, for those whose representations we are exammmg.
Finally, a relational approach is about the social construction of identities with social relations as foundational to analysis. Thus, states and terrorism do not have a pre- given and pre-existing ontological status but only become particular types of state (e.g. counterterrorist state, the state that negotiates with so-called terrorists) and terrorists at specific sites of interaction. On a related note, a social constructionist approach such as this assumes labels and representations do not refer to already-existing entities but, instead, constitute them as particular types of entities. As David Campbell explains:
In international relations ... [traditional] perspective allows for a consideration of the influence of the internal forces on state identity, but it assumes that the external is a fixed reality that presents itself to the pre given state and its agents. In contrast, by assuming that the identity of the state is performatively constituted, we can argue that there are no foundations of state identity that exist prior to the problematic of identity/difference that situates the state within the framework of inside/outside and self/other. Identity is constituted in relation to difference, and 88
difference is constituted in relation to identity, which means that the "state," the "international system," and the "dangers" to each are coeval in their construction. 174
Following Campbell, states and terrorists are then "coeval in their construction"
or, socially co-constituted. Whether there really was a British counterterrorist state in
operation in the mid-l 980s and whether its counterterrorism practices were the best
possible practices, as are commonly-asked in traditional terrorism research, then become
irrelevant questions to ask since a social constructionist approach is concerned with how
identities are formed. Instead, the focus shifts to how official British security practices
against those labeled "terrorist" operated and how they were legitimated such that
massive anti-state protests did not occur. Similarly, whether the IRA still were "terrorist"
even after the Northern Ireland peace process began becomes an equally irrelevant
concern since the emphasis is on the use of the rhetoric of "terrorism" and "terrorist" and
the attendant state/other identity-formation.
While there are different ways in which relational analysis can proceed, I shall
focus on one -- poststructural discourse analysis, which draws upon the works of Michel
Foucault. This will be allied with the more pragmatic approach to discourse and identity-
formation within the subfields of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and
discursive psychology. Summing up relationalism, in Tilly's words, "relational
descriptions and explanations have the advantage of placing communication, including
the use oflanguage, at the heart of social life."175 As such, poststructural discourse
174 David Campbell, "The Biopolitics of Security: Oil, Empire and the Sports Utility Vehicle," American Quarterly 57, no. 3 (2005), 948.
175 Charles Tilly, "Terror as Strategy and Relational Process," International Journal of Comparative Sociology 46, no 1-2 (2005), 19. 89
analysis, since it explicitly focuses on the use oflanguage in specific social contexts, is a useful methodology to study the co-constitution of states and "terrorists" or
"state/terrorism".
Terrorism as Discourse
Looking at the examples described earlier -- when the Nepalese and British states shifted in their relations with groups they considered "terrorist" -- it is evident that traditional approaches to terrorism would find it difficult to explain these actions. This is because traditional approaches remain mired in the understanding that "terrorism" and
"terrorists" and "states" pre-exist analysis, thus seeking to predict actors' actions. Any change -- states negotiating with so-called "terrorists" for example -- has to be explained by resorting to individual, group or systemic reasons. In examples such as those describe above -- when the groups in question continue their "terroristic" activity but still participate in talks with the state -- changes in states' actions in relation to such groups is even less explicable within traditional ways of studying terrorism. This is best expressed by examining Walter Laqueur's The New Terrorism which exemplifies these and other drawbacks of traditional approaches to terrorism. The reason for choosing this book is threefold: One, despite being written at a time before the events of September 11, 2001 led to a rise in studies about terrorism, the book itself is exemplary of how state and terrorist relations are usually understood and communicated in traditional terrorism studies. In addition, it is one of the few well-known books on terrorism which actually dedicates space (an entire chapter no less) to what it calls "state terrorism", 176 a concept
176 Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism : Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (New 90
about which the majority of traditional terrorism research remains silent. Finally, "state terrorism" itself -- states' relationship with groups considered "terrorist" -- is what my own research focuses on, making Laqueur's book an appropriate one to analyze.
In order to describe why analyzing state's rhetoric on terrorism will be useful,
Laqueur's study is an appropriate starting point as it exemplifies many of the weaknesses of traditional terrorism studies, which mostly ignores language use and its implications.
As sociologists Gilbert and Mulkay wrote when drawing a similar parallel in their research into the sociology of science, "it [non discourse analytical work] clearly shows how sociological interpretation of social action typically depends heavily on unexplicated interpretative work carried out by participants and embodied in their discourse." 177 In my project, the "unexplicated interpretative work" is carried out and embodied in statist discourse, since the state's identity shifts and its role in labeling groups as (or not as)
"terrorist" is often silenced in mainstream terrorism studies. It is usually assumed that a good, liberal democratic state would be against terrorism. For example, Laqueur's chapter on the state and terrorism is titled "state terrorism" but begins thus, "state- sponsored terrorism, warfare by proxy, is as old as the history of military conflict."178
Note the (seemingly commonsensical) shift made: "state terrorism" and "state-sponsored terrorism" are taken to be interchangeable. The problem with this, as readers can easily see, is that "state terrorism" leaves open the possibility that states' talk of and practices towards those considered to be "terrorist" can be the topic of study. "State-sponsored
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
177 G. Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay, Opening Pandora's Box: A Sociological Analysis of Scientists' Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 3.
178 Laqueur, New Terrorism, 156 (emphasis added). 91
terrorism", on the other hand, assumes there is a separation between (pre-existing)
"states" and "terrorism" and a state may or may not sponsor practices and activities called
"terrorism". Such a formulation also assumes states do not do terrorism; instead, they find ("sponsor") others to do it for them. The state, thus, remains unrelated to terrorism and uninvolved in such activities. fu this latter case, it is taken for granted that "states" and "terrorists" are commonsensical and easily-identifiable because, if they were not, then states' "sponsorship" of terrorism would not be recognizable, making analysis and explanation impossible under this approach. That is part of the "unexplicated interpretative work" carried out by most traditional terrorism scholars, interpretive work that ignores the use of language and rhetoric that goes into producing these identities.
Traditional explanations of states and terrorism also define particular actions as
"terrorist" and actors as "state sponsors of terrorism'', without giving adequate explanation as to why these actions and these actors are defined as such. This can be noticed in Laqueur's chapter, especially in his description of a series of incidents ending with a claim that those incidences are "terrorism". After listing events ranging from "the rebellious Irish" getting assistance from the French during the French Revolution to great power involvement in l 91hcentury Central Asia to Western support of anti-nationalist and anti-Communist forces in the 201h century, Laqueur writes, "Terrorism was involved in one way or another in all these instances."179 This has the effect ofretroactively constituting these affairs as events where states sponsored "terrorism", even though the term "terrorism" was hardly (if ever) used in contemporary descriptions of the events
179 Ibid., 157. 92
themselves. In this way, Laqueur's listing of these occasions as "state-sponsored terrorism" interprets "state sponsors of terrorism" and "terrorist acts" simultaneously, without acknowledging this interpretive act. The organization of the chapter is thus: after listing events as "terrorism", Lacqueur describes major "state-sponsors of terrorism'', with sub sections titled, "The Soviet Bloc'', "Khadafi' s adventures'', "Iranian foreign terrorism" and "Saddam Hussein et al", where "et al" includes Syria and North Korea. 180
This, too then has the effect of "othering" specific states as "sponsors of terrorism" and linking a series of actions as "terrorist", without taking into account the interpretive work done in the process of categorization. Laqueur is reflexively unaware of his own epistemological standpoint181 when making such claims about state sponsors of terror.
Laqueur does include a paragraph (out of a chapter of 29 pages) to "democratic countries'', writing "our survey of state-sponsored terrorism would not be complete without a mention of the fact that democratic countries have on occasion also engaged in terrorist operations, or at least contemplated such actions."182 His examples here, though, serve the function of telling us, his readers, that democratic countries may have planned
"terrorism" but these were not long-term or were "half-baked" and "seldom attempted" as when he refers to United States' actions against Cuba. 183 In Laqueur's view, democratic countries' actions were in response to what "terrorists" did: "The Israelis systematically
180 Ibid., 158-83.
181 The concept "standpoint epistemology" is also drawn from feminist sociologies of science, especially the works of Sandra Harding and Donna Haraway. It calls for recognition that one's "standpoint" (where one stands in relation to one's work and to the social world) is important in constituting the type of knowledge produced.
182 Laqueur, New Terrorism, 182 (emphasis added).
183 Ibid. 93
hunted down the perpetrators of the massacre in 1972 in the Munich Olympic village and they have sometimes attacked leading members of Palestinian terrorist organizations."184
Or, such actions were a mistake: "they [Israelis] killed the wrong individual."185 Such formulations, once again, assume the need to predict and explain the behavior of
"terrorist" groups prior to states' (counterterrorist) actions. Reading over these sentences, one gets the impression that "democratic states" reluctantly engage in "terrorism" and, when they do, it is sometimes in error (from which they presumably learn better). Much
"better" events, in the sense that if similar definitions of terrorism as Laqueur applied to the former USSR, Libya, Syria, etc are applied to "democratic countries", such as United
States' involvement in Latin America, 186 are ignored in Laqueur's descriptions of "state terrorism".
Overall, Laqueur's chapter, along with other similar traditional research on states and terrorism, ignores the role of language and representation. Or, rather, it takes representation and labeling as referring directly to the external world rather than produced out of social interactions. To put it simply, this type of explanation leads to
"formulating definitive categorizations of participants' actions"187 with some actions deemed "terrorist" and others not. The interpretative work done in creating such categorizations or the view that particular social actions are "terrorist" (and the implications of such a view) is silenced. Describing a traditional sociologist's approach to
184 Ibid., 283.
185 Ibid.
186 Blakeley, Bringing.
187 Gilbert and Mulkay, 3. 94
analysis, Gilbert and Mulkay write, "his procedure is to make a claim about scientific
action, such as that it is political, and then to confirm this claim by presenting material in
which scientists themselves can be seen to be making the same claim."188 This is very
similar to traditional terrorism scholars' approach to state terrorism, wherein they claim
an action (or a group) is "terrorist" and then present a list of events as "terrorist'', thus
linking one to the other even though the term "terrorism" itself might not have been used
in contemporary representations of the events. This is what Laqueur did in the example presented here, wherein various incidents were categorized as "terrorism".
Even when language is focused upon, traditional (and even, to some extent,
Critical) terrorism studies' view on language is similar to traditional sociologists of
science. These traditional sociologists saw language as directly reflecting motivations of participants, so generalized themes in interviews or texts were summarized and presented
"as accurate accounts of what is really going on."189 The problem with such an approach is that, while it does give importance to participants' language, it assumes that the narratives social actors tell are the real reasons for why they acted in particular ways. It operates upon a "mirror" view of the world, a view that assumes representations reflect social actions. 190 Anything going against such a general narrative -- states that negotiate with terrorists, for example -- are deemed to be acting against their own interest, for the greater good, as it were. Gilbert and Mulkay put it thus, "traditional sociological research ... operates according to a methodological principle of linguistic consistency; that
188 Ibid., 5.
189 Ibid.
190 Potter, Representing. 95
is, if a 'sufficient proportion' of participants' accounts appear consistently to tell the same sort of story about a particular aspect of social action, then these accounts are treated as being literally descriptive."191 In other words, even if analyzing language under this approach, if a particular group is labeled as "terrorist" and their actions as "terrorism'', then they must really be so. The language used in the process of representations, in this case, is treated as a resource to get at something else, something deeper, such as (a generalized) interest or ideology that would explain social actions. Such a view of language reifies groups' identities as "terrorist" and does not avoid the problem identified earlier -- of being unable to explain how seemingly non-commonsensical practices such as states negotiating with so-called terrorists occur.
Instead, a poststructural discourse analytical approach would work under the assumption that social action is contextual and has to be interpreted and fixed in meanings at particular times and places. Consistency, especially in official discourses, would be something to question, to examine, to take apart in order to note how it is constructed and produced during social relations. Gilbert and Mulkay explain this as,
[I]t seems best, then, to conceive of the meaning of social action, not as a unitary characteristic of acts which can be observed as they occur, but as a diverse potentiality of acts which can be realized in different ways through participants' production of different interpretations in different social contexts. 192
Here, "participants' production" is key as there is a shift from us, the researcher, pre-identifying "state terrorism" or "state sponsors of terror" to focusing on state/terrorist relations and the identities produced therein. Thus, "state terrorism" is not something where particular states (Iran, Libya, the former USSR) get involved in violent acts of
191 Gilbert and Mulkay, 7.
192 Ibid., 9. 96
"terrorism" but is one of many ways in which "state" and "terrorism" can be examined.
For example, who is (and is not) referred to as "state terrorists"? What are the implications of such representations? What happens if 'states' and 'terrorists' act against the norm by talking to each other? Such questions become possible under the view that
'terrorists' and 'terrorism' are socially-constructed in and through representations.
Adopting a poststructural discourse analytical view thus requires an understanding of language that is very different to seeing it as referring to something else outside of or in addition to it. It is particular interpretations themselves -- representations of specific groups as (or not as) "terrorist -- that become the topic for analysis rather than a resource for how "terrorists" really are or what "terrorism" really is. This approach to discourses requires suspending the materialist/idealist divide in International Relations and, instead, viewing meanings and identities as socially constructed. Gilbert and Mulkay write, "The central feature distinguishing discourse analysis from previous approaches to the sociology of science is that. . .it treats participants' discourse as a topic instead of a resource."193 Discourse -- talks and texts-in-use -- are a topic to note how identities and interests are constituted and how practices are legitimated. Therefore, in poststructural discourse-oriented research, public, social interactions are prioritized and public language use is key. There is no such thing as private language and, instead, as Tilly writes, "its
[language's] location [is] constantly-negotiated conversations rather than individual minds."194 It is these conversations -- texts and speeches, or language-in-use -- the form the data for analysis.
193 Ibid., 13.
194 Tilly, 1997, 8. 97
The question then becomes how are particular state/terrorist identities -- whether counterterrorism or negotiation -- socially legitimated? What identities of states and terrorists are (re)produced in the process of establishing and reestablishing particular meanings of actions and actors? What are the linguistic strategies ofrepresenting which may recur across contexts? Gilbert and Mulkay remain interested in how scientists organize their views of social actions within particular situated narratives. My concern is to note a) how particular descriptions, specifically the use (or non-use) of "terrorism" and
"terrorists" occur in the seemingly very different settings of Northern Ireland and Nepal and the strategies which facilitate identity-construction and legitimation, and to b) discuss shifts in state identities as representations of groups as "terrorist" changes. So, it is a two- way process: representations occur, identities shift simultaneously.
In traditional terrorism studies, the exceptional nature of the danger posed by terrorism is usually given as a reason why the discourse analytical methodology is less useful in this subfield. 195 Traditional explanations look at psychologies, motivations, external forces, and so on which lead to "terrorism'', less so at social relations among actors or at representations of groups as "terrorist". The traditional explanatory narrative about states and terrorists goes as follows: terrorists commit violent acts; the state responds to safeguard itself and its citizens. Two points are key here: "terrorists" remain non-state or transnational (or global); linear causation (and prediction) is the goal of
195 For example, methodological discussions during SWOTT 2006 focused on quantitative analysis, rather than studying rhetoric of (and by) actors involved or even any other qualitative methodology. When there was discussion oflanguage, a view oflanguage as providing reflection of the terrorists' mental state was promoted. My understanding of discourse analysis follows discursive psychology's view oflanguage-in-use as anti-cognitive as in Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell, Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour (Newbury Park, CA and London: Sage Publications, 1987) and Potter, Representing. I shall elaborate upon this later in this chapter. 98
much of existing terrorism research. But what if these assumptions do not hold? As seen
in the case of the IRA and the Maoists, when the state began negotiations with those it
considered "terrorist" despite continued violence from the group itself, the linear
narrative of "terrorists commit violence; the state responds" falls apart.
Foucault, Genealogy and Effective History
Let me start by further explicating what a discourse analytical study of terrorism,
specifically analyzing language in the form of texts and speeches, will contribute to our
understanding of terrorism. First, discourse analysis of state and terrorist relations forms a
genealogical project which aims to understand current state/terrorist relations by
questioning past representations. In doing so, such an approach draws attention to the
connections among power and knowledge-production. This is especially relevant for a
subject such as "terrorism" as representations of people and groups as "terrorists"
automatically authorizes certain actions and practices to get rid of them, to manage them.
Discourse analysis concentrates our attention on the politics ofrepresentation by and of
states. 196 With a focus on power comes a related focus on historical practices. For
example, Zulaika and Douglass write that the media did not generally frame political
violence as "terrorism" until the early 1970s. 197 They add that, since 1972, events which were previously not called "terrorism" were then classified as such, especially when
describing actions in Northern Ireland. 198 In such cases, the language used by states and the practices authorized and legitimated during the process of representing particular
196 Campbell, Writing.
197 Zulaika and Douglass, 45.
198 Ibid., 46. 99
groups -- the IRA for example -- as "terrorist" become central to a study on states and terrorism.
Putting this in context, examining discourses, specifically official discourses, draws attention to how meanings and identities of actors have shifted through time and specifically to the linguistic strategies which explain these shifts. In Foucauldian terms, this is a genealogical project, tracing out state and terrorist identities through time and space, examining British relations with the IRA and Nepalese with Maoists. Before I detail the plan for analyzing official discourses, it is important to clarify some of the concepts the rest of this project will be using, such as what a genealogical study of states in relation to terrorists entails.
A genealogical project examines struggles or encounters from which particular identities and policies are produced. This means it combines a broader sweep of how identities shift through time with particular "state" and "terrorist" encounters at specific sites or events. Genealogy is thus a history of the present, in the sense that it shows what is today was not always the case and also how different processes have coalesced to produce particular identities and practices at specific time periods. It draws attention to politics of knowledge-production, which is ignored in much of traditional terrorism studies. For example, in Inside Terrorism, Bruce Hoffman, a well-known expert on terrorism, automatically presumes the rise of a "dawn of a new era of terrorist violence ... even bloodier and more destructive than before."199 Hoffman adds his concern has been to investigate how "normal" people "have deliberately chosen a path of
199 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), ix. 100
bloodshed and destruction."200 This, once again, ignores the politics ofrepresentation as
Hoffman assumes a set of incidents are "terrorists" and specific individuals, seemingly-
normal but unhesitatingly bloodthirsty, are "terrorist". Scrutinizing Hoffman's work via a
genealogical gaze, one could say he is part of the centralizing forces as Hoffman makes
no effort to reflect (or explain) why particular incidents and groups are classified as
"terrorist" and actions as "terrorism" in his book. He does not question the practices of
linking diverse events as "terrorism" while drawing out the motivations of "terrorists".
This is especially relevant because very different forms of violence (and violent actors)
are all placed in the same category of "terrorist".
Michel Foucault wrote that genealogies were against the "effects of the
centralizing powers which are linked to the institution and functioning of an organized
scientific discourse in a society such as ours."201 By this, he did not mean genealogies are
against science, rather that they are against the practices that consider "science" to be the
only legitimate form of knowledge-production.202 Rephrasing Foucault's question about
science,203 one may then ask questions such as what are (traditional and mainstream)
terrorism scholars doing when they claim certain ways of studying, certain
methodological approaches are not suited to study terrorism? What claims are they
advancing and rejecting? The concern then becomes not whether a particular group was
200 Ibid., xv.
201 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 84.
202 See Charles Taylor, Defining Science: A Rhetoric of Demarcation (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996) for more on how "the scientific method" is itself a series of practices that have been agreed-upon by the scientific community as strategies to establish authority.
203 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 85. 101
(or was not) "terrorist" but what does the use of the language of "terrorism" do? What
types of subjects does such usage produce? What policies and practices does it
(de)legitimate? Looking at official accounts allows for studying the production of"state"
and "terrorist" subjects within this official discourse.
Turning to Hoffman's book once again, Hoffinan claims that the meaning of
terrorism has changed over the years but he goes on to exclude state violence from how
he defines terrorism. Distinguishing between state and terrorist violence, he writes,
" ... there nonetheless is a fundamental qualitative difference between the two types of
violence."204 In Hoffman's view, "there are rules and accepted norms of behavior even in
wars", which make states' use of violence different to terrorists' as terrorists do not
follow these rules. 205 This formulation, common to much of traditional terrorism studies,
has the effect of ignoring (and silencing questions about) state practices in general,
especially its role in interpreting and representing acts as "terrorism" and actors as
"terrorist". It plays into centralizing tendencies of ignoring state actions, unless these
actions are against those labeled "terrorist". When Foucault calls for the revival of "local
knowledges" as one of the main tasks of a genealogy, his understanding of "local" is
against these types of centralizing tendencies i.e. "local" can mean pointing out the
cracks and fissures within any set of discourses. Thus, there is no reason why local knowledges should not be present within and part of official, statist accounts. Indeed, within official texts and talks, attention can be drawn to the continuous public negotiations of meaning in the processes of defining stake and establishing authority.
204 Hoffmann, 129.
205 Ibid. 102
But, why else do a genealogy? The simplest answer is that a genealogical project
draws attention to power relations which produce particular subjects, objects and the
practices that link them. For example, "the British state" which negotiated with the
political wing of the "terrorist" IRA was produced within official security discourses
which helped legitimate the shift of the British government, which had previously
claimed it would never negotiate with "terrorists", to negotiation with Sinn Fein despite
continued use of violence by the IRA. Foucault writes that a genealogy asks, "what are
these various contrivances of power, whose operations extend to such differing levels and
sectors of society and are possessed of such manifold mechanisms? What are their
mechanisms, their effects and their relations?"206 He adds that it is best to analyze the
formation of subjects in terms of "struggle, conflict and war. "207 Conflict, here, would
trace how there are usually alternative meanings for identity-formation available at the
time so official representations continuously have to reproduce and establish their (and
others') identities during particular interactions. Once again, this too questions the
traditional view that states (or other actors) can simply label groups as "terrorist" without
being challenged.
This is one of the reasons why my research argues that it makes sense to study
state/terrorism as co-constitutive rather than "the state" and "terrorism" or "state terrorism". State/terrorism concentrates attention not just on the politics ofrepresentation that Doty claims is missing from much of International Relations208 but on the practices
206 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 88.
207 Ibid., 89.
208 Doty, Foreign; Doty, Imperial. 103
of representing. This "ing" is the mutual, ongoing co-constitution of the state and
terrorism, drawn attention to by the concept "state/terrorism". Here, the state as
constituted within its own representational process of "terrorism" and "terrorists" is
foregrounded instead of presupposing a counterterrorist state that always acts against
violent terrorists, as Hoffman and other traditional terrorism scholars tend to do.
State/terrorism allows for investigating identities of states and terrorists at different points
in time and in different global spaces. A Foucauldian genealogist finds out not that there
is an origin to things and identities but that "there is 'something altogether different'
behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence
or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion."209 Thus, the counterterrorist
state does not just arise on its own, not just because of the use of violence by particular
individuals or groups but, instead, the mechanisms which lead to its constitution and
legitimation can be traced out during various encounters, encounters which may not
always bear resemblance to "terrorism" as is generally understood.
Foucault's description of why "effective history" (genealogy) is useful is worth
repeating here when explaining the benefits of studying terrorism as discourse: A historical analysis is not to show us the essential beginning, the undisputed origin of
things but the chaos and "disparity" of practices from which particular identities are
210 1 produced. Thus, Hoffman's examples of a series of suicide bombings or of20 h century
"terrorist" events, even though he provides no empirical evidence these were labeled
209 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 79.
210 Ibid., 79. 104
"terrorist" during their time, is not useful to show us "terrorist" trends or even
counterterrorism practices. It is also a contradiction to claim, as Hoffinan does, that
terrorism has drastically changed in the recent past211 while, at the same time, drawing
terrorist motivations from earlier "terrorism" incidents. Instead, these lists of "terrorist"
incidents and actors are interesting to note what links them together ("terrorists" are non
state actors; usually liberal, democratic states are "counterterrorist" while other states are
producers and sponsors of terror, etc) and what that says about how we as researchers
define and understand "terrorism" and "counterterrorism".
In this way, a genealogical project is useful to study the discursive strategies (or mechanisms) which constitute state/terrorist identities during specific episodes or events.
History is thus needed to "dispel the chimeras of origin",212 not to point towards an origin
of terrorism. For state/terrorist relations, history is thus useful in noting how counterterrorism strategies were not the only option and how they were not even the most common option at different times. It is useful in reminding us how often possibilities which were deemed unthinkable later were commonplace during specific historical periods. For example, in UK parliamentary discussions about the Internment policy in
Northern Ireland and even in discussions after "Bloody Sunday", the claim that there could be a united Ireland was quite common, a claim that became unthinkable as time passed (and is seen as illegitimate even today).
Therefore, a genealogy or "the search for descent" is "not the erecting of foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it
211 Hoffmann, ix.
212 Foucault, Nietzsche, 80. 105
fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself'. 213 In this sense, studying official discourses about terrorism helps trace discursive strategies that work to produce authoritative and commonsensical public
accounts of states' actions in relation to "terrorist" groups. It also points out how there have been alternative, dissenting voices within and alongside official discourses -- how the "official" becomes official as it were. It is only by paying close attention to the major outcomes -- including official texts and speeches -- during particular sites of interaction that such local knowledges can be explicated and the discursive strategies which configured to produce states traced out. Foucault writes, "the purpose of history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation."214 It is this challenge that my research would like to undertake -- not to discover "best practices" for states against terrorists, but to see how such practices - whether counterring "terrorists" or talking to them-- came about and how rhetorical
(linguistic) strategies were used to produce particular identities and meanings. At the same time, a genealogical approach points towards the use of "terrorism" and "terrorist" in areas seemingly very different -- the IRA in Northern Ireland the Maoists in Nepal, for example --usage which links groups from different spaces and times together as different, as dangerous and as suitable to be eliminated by whatever means necessary.
These linguistic strategies can be traced during the genealogical analysis and can be noted, in different combinations, at various settings. For example, comparing the treatment of "diseased" people -- lepers and those suffering from the plague -- Foucault
213 Ibid., 82.
214 Ibid., 95. 106
notes how there was a shift from the strategies of exclusion, exile and rejection which could be noted in dealings with lepers to quarantine and surveillance used when managing those suffering from the plague.215 Hence, Foucault's analysis showed how states' relations with those considered to be "abnormal" shifted in the process of producing "abnormal" subjects. Relatedly, there was also a shift in the practices authorized to manage the abnormal subjects. As such, Foucault's studies (and, I hope, mine) provide an analysis of the technologies of power, as part of studying the strategies of what Foucault has called "governmentality". It is a "de-centering" of what is commonplace in terrorism studies -- the silences of"state terrorism" in much of traditional terrorism studies and the lack of focus on the politics of representation and labeling.
The brief analysis of Laqueur and Hoffman's work described earlier in this chapter illustrates how traditional terrorism studies performs the interpretive task of presuming the state's anti-terrorist identity, silencing the involvement ofliberal democratic states in producing terror and ignoring processes ofrepresenting. By drawing on Foucault's understanding of genealogy combined with his insights on power and governmentality, my research centralizes the practices by which the object of study -- terrorists and terrorism -- are socially-constructed as part of the representational practices within which the state itself is enmeshed. Following Foucault, it involves "grasping the movement by which a field of truth with objects of knowledge was constituted through
215 Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the College de France, 1974-1975, eds. Valerio Marchetti and Antonella Salomoni, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2003), 42-46 (emphasis added). 107
these mobile technologies."216 These "mobile technologies" which Foucault talks about can also be linguistic strategies since they, too, perform the practical, everyday tasks of social construction of meanings and identities.
But before discussing language and representation, a few words on why the study of the state is useful in understanding terrorism is needed. Here, too, Foucault's words are helpful as he asks: "But, in the last instance, is not the state ultimately responsible for their [disciplinary mechanisms] general and local application?"217 This is especially the case in foreign policy and explaining states' encounters with those considered to be
"terrorists" since, as of today, states remain the main actors dealing with "terrorist" threats. Indeed, adopting a relational study of state/terrorist identity-formation means following Foucault's view that,
We cannot speak of the state-thing as if it was a being developing on the basis of itself and imposing itself on individuals as if by a spontaneous, automatic mechanism. The state is a practice. The state is inseparable from the set of practices by which the state actually became a way of governing, a way of doing t hmgs,. an d a way too o f re 1atmg . to government. 218
These practices include the process of representing others as "terrorist" along with the attendant policies of eliminating these "terrorists" or talking to them. Adopting
Foucault's view means understanding the state as being formed out of these
(representational) practices.
When and how "terrorism" is used and the definitions and practices legitimated
216 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977 78, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 118.
217 Ibid., 119.
218 Ibid., 277 . 108
become key instead of accepting incidents as "terrorism" without question. For example, when Hoffinan writes, "the anticolonial terrorism campaigns are critical to understanding the evolution and development of modem, contemporary terrorism,"219 this has two main effects common to much of traditional terrorism studies. First, Hoffinan categorizes past anticolonial practices as "terrorism" (while relatedly constituting colonial practices as
"counterterrorism"). Second, he links these past practices to current practices of
"terrorism". The problems of such an unreflexive approach to terrorism and the politics of using the language of "terrorism" are not Hoffman's concern, thus silencing questions of representation and power, questions that a genealogy foregrounds.
For Foucault, the state remains relevant because it is part of the practices of
"govemmentality". Govemmentality drew attention to the mechanisms of power relations by which the state established itself as a particular kind of state. 220 This could be a counterterrorist state or a state that talks to "terrorists". This approach de-centers previous studies in that it shifts the gaze from accepting the state's role against terrorism for granted to questioning how that role came about and how it shifts. History, here, is not to show the origins of something, contrary to Hoffinan who notes that "modem, international terrorism" began on July 22, 1968 when the PLO hijacked an Israeli airlines. 221 Instead the role of studying history is to question such claims of origin and the
219 Hoffmann, 62 (emphasis added).
22°Foucault, Security, 381. This is Foucault's view in the early conceptualization of "governmentality", one that my project follows up on. His later views point towards a more general understanding of governmentality while also limiting its analytical focus to a "police state or liberal minimum government" (Foucault, Security, 388), a task which, while useful, moves attention away from all states' practices by creating an exceptional state (and exceptional practices) which uses such techniques of power.
221 Hoffmann, 63. 109
linking of diverse incidents as "terrorist" while analyzing how, precisely, such linkages occur and what their effects are for state/terrorist identities. I see this as a double displacement -- shifting from the perspective of the state to a perspective on the state; shifting from the "good state, evil terrorists" narrative to one which examines how that narrative emerged and how "good states" (often) talk with "evil terrorists".
This dissertation, therefore, fits in with previous critical security studies critiquing commonsensical accounts of state identity as pre-given and unchanging. Foucault pointed out the general view of the state was of "the state as timeless abstraction, as pole of transcendence, instrument of class domination, or cold monster,"222 characterizations that remain valid in much of traditional and even Critical studies of terrorism.
Govemmentality is therefore an analytical perspective which, for Foucault and for my project, allows for a gaze on the state, within the state, examining statist accounts to study how practices ofrelating to others (for example, "terrorists") were constituted. As
Foucault himself writes in Society Must be Defended, "the manufacture of subjects rather than the genesis of the sovereign: that is our general theme."223 Subjects, here, are states, the people, security forces, "terrorists", other threats, global actors and so on and how they are "manufactured" or represented is the general theme in my research. By studying authoritative accounts -- official texts and speeches -- to note how linguistic strategies play out in the process of establishing such accounts and identities therein as authoritative is key to understanding state/terrorism.
222 Foucault, Security, 381.
223 Michel Foucault, "Society Must be Defended": Lectures at the College de France, 1975 76, eds. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 46. 110
In addition, as described earlier, looking at terrorism as discourse means not looking for motivations beyond language use, whether human nature or social and religious motivations. Instead, public performances and practices, public use of language and how identities and interests are publicly-produced and communicated are central to analysis. Therefore, a poststructural discourse analytical methodology is not based on a linear predictive model of knowledge-production. Thus, this type of discourse analysis centralizes agency in that actors can use particular discursive strategies available at the time to remake and reformulate meanings of acts as (or not as) "terrorist" and
"terrorism".
In this, my work closely follows the understanding of social life as laid out by
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe:
Our analysis rejects the distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices. It affirms a) that every object is constituted as an object of discourse, insofar as no object is given outside every discursive condition of emergence; and b) that any distinction between what are usually called the linguistic and behaviourial aspects of a social practice, is either an incorrect distinction or ought to find its place as a differentiation within the social production of meaning ... 224
Analyzing terrorism as discourse is not to deny that terrorism exists or that terrorists are non-existent but to make a different claim -- that the "materiality" of terrorists and terrorism does not make sense until they are represented and communicated as such in and through language and practices. This means that the question of whether, ontologically, terrorism exists is less important than how terrorism and terrorists are represented and the practices which are authorized. There is no "secret origin" to any particular discourse. There are sites where discursive formations expand and shift, where
224 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 2"d ed. (London and New York: Verso, 2001), 107. 111
new strategies come into play, but to seek an origin to a discourse, especially an origin in what is "already-said" prior to the emergence of the discourse itself is to proceed towards a pointless analysis.225 The next section describes what this type of discourse analysis entails.
Language-in-Use as Constitutive of 'State' and 'Terrorist'
By examining 'state' and 'terrorist' relations in this way, discourse analysis draws attention to identity-formation and shifts as occurring within a wider field of meanings.
But, what is discourse? Definitions of discourse itself are drawn from a variety of fields, including linguistics, sociology and social psychology. As such, "discourse" has been used for referring to a diverse range of methods, methodologies and ways of knowing the world around us. 226 For this study, as indicated earlier, I shall draw upon Jonathan Potter and discursive psychology's understanding of discourse analysis. 227 It is worth repeating
Foucault's understanding of discourse analysis here: "A task that consists of not-- of no
225 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 25.
226 See Potter and Wetherell, 6-7 for an overview of some different types of discourse analysis and related understandings of the meanings of discourse. Also, Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon Yates, eds., Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader (Thousand Oaks, CA and London: Sage Publications, 2001) and Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon Yates, eds. Discourse as Data: A Guide for Analysis (Thousand Oaks, CA and London: Sage Publications, 2001) discuss various types of and usage of discourse analysis. In International Relations, Campbell, Writing; Campbell, National, Hansen, Security; Neumann; Weldes, Constructing; Weldes, et al, Cultures all use discourse analysis to study security. See R. Jackson, Writing for a discursive analysis of United States counterterrorism practices.
227 Potter's understanding of discourse analysis differs from the Critical Discourse Analysis (e.g. of Ruth Wodak). Critical terrorism scholars' use of discourse draws upon CDA though they do not make this distinction between CDA and other forms of discourse analysis clear. In IR terms, my research also draws upon the poststructural discourse analysis of critical security scholars, especially Lene Hansen. My study argues Potter's views on discourse and those ofpoststructural discourse analysts bear a family resemblance while there are fewer commonalities with CDA. 112
longer -- treating discourses as groups of signs ... but as practices that systematically form
the objects of which they speak."228 Other definitions of discourse range from
"discourse" as sets of statements to "discourse" as language and practices to "discourse"
as emerging from specific ideological standpoints. But in all these definitions,
"discourse" draws attention to how things have been "put together", i.e. what is
seemingly commonsensical. For example, the traditional narrative of "counterterrorism"
as having terrorists who perform their violent acts first and the response by the
counterterrorist state, itself becomes open to question. As Foucault puts it," ... we must
show that they [pre-existing forms of continuity in discourses] do not come about of
themselves, but are always the result of a construction the rules of which must be known,
and the justifications of which must be scrutinized."229 It is these "rules" -- as evidenced
in the language and practices used during selected events and the resulting strategies of
legitimation -- that my research will draw attention to.
Critical security scholars influenced by Foucault's understanding of discourses, have looked at language-in-use. For example, Weldes, et al ask how is it that the United
States is likely to be threatened by Russian rather than British nuclear weapons and be more afraid of Pakistani rather than British nuclear weapons even though neither has been used against the United States.230 Their answer is that insecurities are social constructions, based on historical associations and identities and supported by common
228 Foucault, Archaeology, 49. He adds that this task is not reducible to language but, I would argue, studying practices includes studying "language-in-use" or, language as it is used during particular interactions. That is what I mean by the term "language-in-use".
229 See, for example, Foucault, Archaeology, 23-30 for his view on discourses, a view that most poststructural discourse analytical work draws upon. This quote is from p. 25.
230 Weldes, et al., Cultures, 12. 113
sense "made real in collective discourse". Indeed, as Weldes, et al succinctly put it when explaining social construction, "it is the discursive constitution of the threat represented by nuclear weapons that we refer to as 'construction', and it means not that the weapons have been made up but that their meaning has been moulded in discourse."231 I am interested in tracing out how identities shift with groups referred to as "terrorists" and as threatening and dangerous at particular times in history, then being seen as suitable to negotiate with during other times.
A related question becomes what happens to state identity when groups previously considered "terrorist" are represented differently? Studying language-in-use or representations also means, as Campbell puts it,
with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming. For a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations; status would be death. 232
Thus, a social constructionist approach looks at how boundaries between state/terrorist identities are produced within social relations (representations). It emphasizes the constitutive nature of state practices of representing groups -- the IRA and Maoists, here -- as "terrorist". Campbell puts this clearly when he notes:
As an imagined community, the state can be seen as the effect of formalized practices and ritualized acts that operate in its name or in the service of its ideals. This understanding, which is enabled by shifting our theoretical commitments from a belief in pregiven subjects to a concern with the problematic of subjectivity, renders foreign policy as a boundary-producing political performance in which the spatial domains of inside/outside, self/other, and
231 Weldes, et al., Cultures, 12.
232 Campbell, Writing, 12. 114
domestic/foreign are constituted through the writing of threats as externalized dangers. 233
Thus, representations of groups as "terrorists" as well as the identities produced
therein are boundary-making performances of the state. Simply put, these representations
by states, including the use of "terrorism" (or its lack of usage) also simultaneously
constitute state/terrorist identities.
One commonly-expressed concern with Foucault's views on discourses is that
they remain at the theoretical and philosophical levels with his examples being broad-
based sweeps through history. Keeping this in mind, my research draws upon Foucault's
understanding of discourses but combines this with the pragmatic emphasis on analyzing
language, as advocated by Potter and Wetherell,234 among others. However, the social
construction of identities and interests remain central to all definitions of discourse. As
Potter puts it, social life is constructed out of practices of representation as things, events,
identities are produced as specific things or events or actors based on how they are
publicly represented. 235 Thus, while it is essential to keep in mind that discourse is not just talk but is a complex set of practices, one way to trace out discursive formations is by
analyzing language -- both talks and texts -- as used in public. Thus, for my study,
discourse analysis, specifically genealogical analysis and the focus on practices
(representations) of govemmentality, is the methodological approach to study state and
terrorist relations; analyzing public language-in-use is the method that will be adopted.
233 Campbell, Biopolitics, 947.
234 Potter and Wetherell.
23s p o tt er, R epresentmg.. 115
Thus, the answer to the commonly-asked question of "how do we study
discourses?" is: we look at language-in-use during specific encounters which produce
'states' and 'terrorists'. Let me explain this further.fumy research, I define discourses to
mean a "concern with talk and texts as part ofsocial practices". 236 fu this definition,
language-use is fundamental to analysis and the representational process takes centre
stage, as I outline how the language of "terrorism" and "terrorist" is used in official
discourses. 237 The evolution of a counterterrorist state and the normalization ofrelations
between "terrorists" and the state are both products of this process. In this way,
representations and identities are related since identities only become such through
representations. By examining how representations are constituted as solid and factual
and how they are used in actions (assigning blame, etc/38 during particular events is key
to understanding the development of a counterterrorist state and the shifting
state/terrorism nexus.
236 Potter, Representing, 105 (emphasis in the original)
237 However, an emphasis on discourse is slightly different from traditional ethnography. Ethnography retains an importance on the perceptions and actions of the researcher and it aims to understand participants' beliefs, which are meant to be explicated during the writing up process. Discourse analysis does not depend on the feelings of the researcher during the course of research and is explicitly relational-focusing on identity-formation of the self and other(s). For my project, this means the constitution of the state is tied to changing representations of"terrorist" groups. Discourse analysis is also more transparent as it analyses publicly-available sources. See Potter, 1996 for a more detailed discussion about the differences between an ethnographic and discourse analytical approaches to research
238 Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter, Discursive Psychology {Thousand Oaks, CA and London: Sage Publications, 1999), 448. See also Potter, 2003. 116
Language and Representations
During the representing process, language used is public, anti-cognitive, interactional and social.239 It is constitutive of subjects, including that of the "terrorist" and "the state", in the international system. Analyzing the public use oflanguage allows for understanding how representations are constituted and legitimated, including those of
"terrorists". Discussing the use of discourse analysis in the natural sciences, Michael
Mulkay says this clearly, "There are many advantages to this form of analysis [discourse analysis]. Firstly, one is no longer trying to use observable evidence to explain unobservables such as past actions or ideas in people's heads."24°For analyzing the public identity-construction of states, data is then official statements as they are tendered in the course of public accounting of actions. This, of course, does not fit in with recent calls by critics of CTS to "ontologise" CTS by explicating its structural foundations, calls where "structure" is seen synonymous with "extra-discursive realm". 241 It is my claim that such appeals for studying "extra-discursive" realms are based on a narrow definition of discourse as language which refers to something else, instead of seeing language-in- use as how to understand representing and constituting identities and interests.
Additionally, the type of discourse analysis proposed for my project will analyze publicly-available and accessible data to study public identity-construction. As such, any structural or power dynamics will be traced out empirically -- within texts -- rather than
239 For more on poststructural discourse analysis in foreign policy, see Hansen, Security.
240 Michael Mulkay, Sociology ofScience: A Sociological Pilgrimage, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991 ), 20.
241 This call to "ontologise" terrorism studies by explicating its extra-discursive structures, a call that most CTS scholars would disagree with, was made by Doug Stokes. See Stokes. Criticism ofCTS's alleged failure to clarify what exactly it is critical of can also be found in Joseph .. 117
assuming up front (as Joseph does) that there are "real structures of power and oppression
that have an objective basis."242 It is worth repeating here that the point I am trying to make is not that there are (or are not) "real terrorists" but that what counts as "real" is a
product of language-in-use and part of discursive practices that can be traced out.
Concurrently, adopting a social constructionist ontology means claims of materiality and
"extra-discursive realm" are themselves treated as moves in public debate about the problem of terrorism.243 On the whole, a focus on the public use oflanguage as data also
allows for investigating how certain actors, states for example, authorize themselves to
act to counter "terrorists'', often through military means.
Thus, in contrast to the majority of views of language in traditional terrorism studies, language is a practical tool that actors can (and do) use to make meanings with while, at the same time, constituting their own identities.244 By saying that the data for this type of analysis is publicly-available language, the emphasis is on the speeches and texts which are tendered in the course of public debate. Potter writes that the reason for emphasizing the public nature of language is that an approach which concerns itself with individual mental states and what is inside people's heads, "draws attention away from how factual accounts are organized and how they are fitted into particular interactions ... [such] theorizing tends towards an individualistic perspective and away
242 Joseph, 97.
243 See Edwards, et al Death, on how adopting a social constructionist approach focuses on how events, actors, issues are socially produced and communicated. This means, unless states (or "terrorists" or other actors) use the language of "extra-discursive realm" we, as researchers, should not impose our viewpoints upon the analysis. This is also a caution that early feminist standpoint theorists, especially Donna Haraway and Sandra Harding have brought up.
244 For more on language as "tool and prosthetic'', see John Shorter, Conversational Realities: Constructing Life Through Language (Thousand Oaks, CA and London: Sage Publications, 1993). 118
from the human practices in which fact construction are embedded."245 This follows
Charles Tilly's view that individualist analyses -- whether "phenomenological", where
"states of body and mind [such as] impulses, reflexes, desires, ideas, of programs" are the drivers of social action or "methodological individualism" where such mental states are less important than an external, market-oriented structure of choices for individuals to act within-- are inadequate for explaining social actions. 246 As a result, my analysis of public language-in-use draws attention to the fact that once actors use language -- whether they describe particular events and actions -- this becomes public. Once explanations are given
-- the British state's account of "Bloody Sunday", for example -- these are public reasonings, public justifications. It makes sense to focus on these when trying to understand state/terrorism.
In traditional terrorism studies, even when there is a focus on language, much of the literature on language and terrorism analyses terrorists' words in an attempt to reveal
"terrorists'" innermost psychology.247 Such a viewpoint is based on language used in social interactions as being reflective of a picture of a world external to words and practices or language as a means to reveal what goes on in people's heads. It is also important to remember that discussions about language and words as revealing "inner experiences" and understanding the minds of terrorists draw upon sociocultural linguistic practices about the mind being internal to ourselves and needing to be revealed. These
245 Potter, Representing, 120.
246 Tilly, Micro, 3.
247 Jerrold Post, The Mind of the Terrorist: the Psychology of Terrorism From the IRA to al Qaeda (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 119
practices are themselves situated within specific sociocultural contexts and are based on linguistic practices needed to make sense of our and others' actions, 248 a factor which gets overlooked in discussions about the psychology of terrorists' minds. Not all contexts and cultures understand language-use as revealing inner mental states. Instead of accessing the minds of the terrorists, my analysis shifts the focus to language-in-use in public settings, looking at texts and talks as used in official accounts. By analyzing states' discourse on terrorists, I plan to shift the focus away from individualistic explanations towards analyzing public representations of danger. This then foregrounds state identity- construction and especially linguistic strategies of legitimation and establishing authority, the examinations of which are often silenced in traditional studies on terrorism.
Thus, language-in-use is non-cognitive. Language, as I am using it here, is not reflective of inner mental states, whether of terrorists or otherwise. As Antaki, et al write, studying language-in-use points towards how, often, explanations involve using commonplaces as a tool to describe mental states and then using mental states as explanation for these commonplaces.249 This is circular reasoning, similar to that of
Laqueur and Hoffman critiqued above. Instead, language is useful as a tool that actors use to make sense of events and each other and as sites where interactive practices can be traced out and understood. Thus, discourse analysis is about the public use of language since, as Potter and Wetherell explain, "to look at how the self [state] is constructed, the
248 Potter and Wetherell, 95.
249 Charles Antaki, Michael Billig, Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter, "Discourse Analysis Means Doing Analysis: A Critique of Six Analytic Shortcomings," Discourse Analysis Online 1 (2003), http://www.shu.ac.uk/daol/articles/vl/nl/al/antaki2002002-paper.html (accessed March 12, 2008). 120
social scientist should research the grammatical matrix and everyday language usage."250
As such, the accounting strategies and the construction of (public) authority become puzzles for analysis. It is this understanding of language that my research is based on and which Potter and Wetherell make clear:
There is considerable tension in social psychology between the principle that people can be trusted to describe their internal states and the principle that the researcher must remain vigilant and sensitive to the possibilities of conscious or unconscious fraud ... Discourse analysis takes a rather different position when faced with this problem of the relationship between utterances and mental states. We argue that the researcher should bracket off the whole issue of the quality of accounts as accurate or inaccurate descriptions of mental states. The problem is being constructed at entirely the wrong level. Our focus is exclusively on discourse itself: how it is constructed, its functions, and the consequences which arise from different discursive organization. 251
In other words, what happens when different language is used? What are the relations amongst 'states' and 'terrorists' in other (contemporary) discourses? How are shifting identities and relations between 'states' and 'terrorists' described therein?
Descriptions of mental states -- the irrational terrorist; the calm and rational soldier who only shoots "aimed rounds" at protesters -- then become "discursive social practices"252 open to investigation instead ofreflective of these actors' mental states.
Language, in this type of discourse analysis, is also interactional.253 This fits in
250 Potter and Wetherell, 107.
251 Ibid., 178.
252 Ibid., 180.
253 This understanding oflanguage is similar to P. Jackson and Nexon who claim language is transactional (1999, 301) since "interaction'', in my view, retains most of the qualities that they give to "transaction". While they critique interaction for prioritizing already-existing entities (1999, 293), it is my understanding that interactions create identities while also being product of relations among various actors. Despite P. Jackson and Nexon's claim that "inter-action" lacks agency (1999, 294), this does not necessarily have to be the case since adopting a social constructionist ontology, one that focuses on 121
with a social constructionist ontology where self/other relations are foundational.
Language-in-use, as explained here, is one way to understand this ontology.254 Seeing
language-in-use as interactional draws attention to the possibility of new meanings
emerging from new interactions. All texts and talks are dialogical and it is this interaction
process which allows for specific meanings to be produced during various episodes and,
also, for changes in identities to occur. The representation of groups as "terrorist" carries
an evaluative meaning of the negative sort. Language, being interactional, is also action-
oriented. All talks and texts perform specific tasks such as maintaining interests, responding to past debates and creating a space for further argumentation and debate. 255
Thus, discursive frameworks are not passive objects waiting to be discovered but involve work -- they are organized to advance and respond to claims and to counter potential
arguments. 256 At the same time, a view of language as interactional means that in the process of describing terrorist threats, states are also constructing state/terrorist identities.
Social relations, such as representations of terrorism, occur through what Charles
Tilly calls "creative interaction". Tilly defines creative interaction as situations where
linguistic exchange as foundational to analysis (re: Shotter, Conversational; Potter, Representing) means the distinction between corporate and social agency which Nexon and P. Jackson criticize becomes an irrelevant distinction. All agency is socially-constructed and agents do not become such until they use language to explain, justify, describe an event or an action. Indeed, "interaction" draws attention to both continuity and change, actors and the discursive formations (or "security repertoire") within which they act. This is similar to the points that Laclau and Mouffe and W eldes, et al, made. Viewing language as interactional constitutes agency as it emphasizes the inter-constitution of actors ('state' and 'terrorist') while focusing attention on the action-oriented nature oflanguage. Transactions, as a linguistic commonplace in everyday use, imply an unequal power relationship among entities, an implication that, in my view, an interactional view of social life avoids.
254 Shotter, Conversational; Shotter, Cultural.
255 Jonathan Potter, "Discursive Psychology: Between Method and Paradigm," Discourse and Society 14 (2003): 783-94.
256 Wetherell, et al., Discourse as Data, 17. 122
"participants work within rough agreements on procedures and outcomes, arbiters set limits on performances, individual dexterity, knowledge, and disciplined preparation generally yield superior play, yet the rigid equivalent of military drill destroys the enterprise."257 For representations of terrorism, actors have to have a (roughly) shared language in order to communicate with each other and, yet, the outcomes of various communications and the identities formed therein are not predetermined because the language is roughly (and not completely) shared.258 Without a general understanding of common terms, particular representations, such as those of the IRA and the Maoists as
"terrorists'', would not make sense to the general audience, both domestically and internationally, and strategies of authorization would not be successful. An interactive and action-oriented understanding of language is necessary to describe this roughly- shared framework within which actors constitute each others' (and their own) identities.
Tilly gives the example of soccer and jazz as arenas where creative interaction can be seen and writes that both activities "proceed through improvised interaction, surprise, incessant error and error-correction, alternation between solo and ensemble action, and repeated responses to understandings shared by at least pairs of players."259 Let me draw out an everyday example to explain this view of language-in-use as interactional. Take a soccer match. What usually happens is there is a team with a set of positions and people playing in this position. Most teams (almost all) have a striker on the pitch. However,
257 Charles Tilly, "How do Relations Store Histories?," Annual Review ofSociology 26 (2000), 723.
258 P. Jackson, Civilizing for a detailed discussion on the implications of roughly-shared language of various actors within a particular discursive setting.
259 Tilly, Relations, 723. 123
during the match itself, the striker may defend, may play at the right wing, may roam around in midfield. The striker may get injured and get substituted. Thus, the striker's identity shifts according to that particular match and according to context as the striker interacts with other players, officials, audience, etc to create meaning. Language-in-use, here, is the practice of playing soccer itself; interviews that the striker and teammates, manager, audience, depending on which discourse(s) the researcher is interested in analyzing, give. Without a view of language as interactional, its capability of being used by particular actors (e.g. the striker in this case) as well as its role in producing particular identities (the injured striker) cannot be clearly centralized.260
This way of understanding the process ofrepresenting threats as creative interaction then means changes in how threats are defined and (re)produced through time, within official discourses, can be noted. It emphasizes the process of representing groups as (or not as) "terrorist" when authoritative accounts of events and actions are produced and publicly-communicated. Tilly writes that both participants and spectators create shared stories of what happened, after an event has occurred.261 These stories, especially those produced by the states themselves as official accounts, are the data for my project on state/terrorism. An example of creative interactionism can be noted during the 2005
February takeover of the Nepalese government by the King. Describing the event, the
Maoists represented the King as a threat to Nepal's future but the King used tropes of
260 Ludwig Wittgenstein, writing about language, rules and social construction, posited a football (soccer) match was an appropriate site for examining how rules and norms (and attendant identities) are produced out of interactions. Indeed, he is attributed as realizing in language "we play games with words", after watching football! See Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 65.
261 Tilly, Relations, 723. 124
legality of the monarchy and the need for Nepal to take a stand against (global) terrorism and positioned himself as the best means to do so. Thus, official descriptions used commonplace understandings of the monarch as a protector, drawing upon past framings and contemporary understandings of the global terrorist threat to establish authority.
Following from this view of language-in-use as public, anti-cognitive and interactive is the understanding that language is also intersubjective and social. Hansen writes, "to understand language as social is to see it not as a private property of the individual but as a series of collective codes and conventions that each individual needs to employ to make oneself comprehensible."262 Taking language as social leads to an associated understanding of data as being publicly-available and accessible talks and texts. Potter explains this as including "the structure of justifications, understandings appropriate norms for action, collectively-shared representations of important institutions, the generalized images held of one's own and other groups and so on. " 263 Words are part of a social process in which, in the case of terrorism, threats and dangers are communicated. The social nature oflanguage is especially important when analyzing the usage of "terrorism" and "terrorist", words which already have a long history of negative association attached and are entangled in global discourses on (in)security. In a social sense, just to say that a group or a collective has an identity as "terrorist" is to say that other groups (e.g. state, humanity, global population, etc) are being threatened and should be responsible for defending against these "terrorists".
262 Hansen, Security, 18.
263 Jonathan Potter, Peter Stringer and Margaret Wetherell, Social Texts and Context: Literature and Social Psychology (London: Routledge, 1984), I. 125
To summarize, my understanding of a discourse-oriented approach state/terrorism
is to study language-in-use to note linguistic strategies that are used in producing specific
representations of threats and descriptions of danger. Such an approach to research
assumes language-in-use is constitutive of interests and identities and is public,
interactional, anti-cognitive and social. Instead of looking at states (and terrorists) as pre-
existing and limiting questions asked to what causes terrorism or how to counter
terrorism, my research looks at how state discourses construct and represent groups as
"terrorist" threats and how attendant responses to terrorism and the related state identity
formed are authorized. It re-reads commonsensical "terrorist" or even not terrorist (e.g.
"Bloody Sunday") events to note how the rhetoric of terrorism was used. My focus here
is on asking "how-possible" questions, asking how identities of specific groups and
institutions -- specifically the state -- are constituted at different points in time. 264 How
does the state justify actions that may be considered "terrorist" on its part? How are such
actions publicly legitimated? What about when states talk with "terrorist" groups despite
ongoing violence on the "terrorist" group's part? How are actions such as these --
seemingly nonsensical in the traditional terrorism narrative of "good states fight evil
terrorists and protect their citizens" -- possible? An analysis oflanguage-in-use will allow
for explaining such actions and the identities formed therein.
Hence, the focus is not on answering questions usually asked in terrorism studies
264 For an overview of "how-possible" types of questions and the differences between them and "why" questions, see Doty, Foreign. She writes, "what is explained [through a how-possible question] is not why a particular outcome obtained, but rather how the subjects, objects and interpretive dispositions were socially constructed such as certain practices were made possible." (298). She later adds that how questions emphasize power relations -- how power works to constitute particular "modes of subjectivity and interpretive dispositions" (299). This was also discussed in Chapter 2. 126
such as why terrorism occurs or why women or various ethnic groups tum to terrorism or why religion leads to terrorism and so on but on the actual processes ofrepresentation of terrorism and the identity-construction of the state. It is worth repeating once more that discourse is not "just language" though it is often misunderstood as such especially among terrorism scholars265 but" ... practices which systematically form the objects of which they speak."266 In this way, social practices form both the "state" and the
"terrorist", at different points in time and space. Studying language-in-use - representations -- is a way to note how strategies by which objects of analysis are produced (as well as the relations among such objects authorized).
A Brief Note on Data
Speeches and texts by government leaders and spokespeople are sources for my project since such officials speak for (and constitute) the state in the international arena. 267 Since my concern here is to examine how states become particular states
( counterterrorist states, states that negotiate with "terrorists"), then studying official texts and speeches as data is appropriate since it is within these that self/other identities are produced and communicated. Additionally, part of the task of de-centering involves studying how "official" texts construct authority within themselves. Using securitization as an example, in securitization theory, the goal is to note how securitization occurs as
265 Joseph; Stokes.
266 Foucault, Archaeology, 49.
267 Weldes, Constructing, 11, 18-19. 127
issues move from politicized to securitized.268 In my project, the concern is how
"politicization" or normalization of particular identities and meanings of state/terrorist
occurs. Therefore, using official texts and speeches as data is suitable. A discourse
analytical approach studies texts -- whether written, visual, or speeches -- since recurrent
strategies that are used when making these texts "authoritative" and "legitimate" can be
noted therein. Therefore, official texts become a site for studying the interactions that
occurred when making them "official" and "legitimate". At the same time, they form the
source from which boundaries between 'states' and 'terrorists' can be traced out.
Texts, including official texts, also refer to other texts and to texts in other genres, making them suitable sources for studying how concepts are disseminated and
legitimated within different contexts. While my research focuses on official texts, it
provides opportunity to note how new concepts are used, communicated and spread in
global and local contexts. Texts are often used to refer to a wide range of discursive communications ranging from informal communication to official documents. Hansen writes that texts refer to one another, in different genres, and work to build authority by citing other texts.269 She adds, " ... reported speech provides a concrete example of how voices may or may not come into contact, interanimate and infiltrate one another in various ways."27°Following Hansen's approach, studying official texts, therefore, provides an opportunity for "investigating the hegemonic status of official discourse, how this status is produced and challenged through intertextual references, and the likelihood
268 Buzan, et al.
269 Hansen, Security, 55-56.
270 Ibid., 25-26. 128
and form of future discursive changes."271
Without studying official texts, how official authority on who and what is
'terrorist' is established and how this authority shifts would be difficult to understand.
This could then lead to research such as that which proliferates within traditional
terrorism studies -- those which take for granted the state's counterterrorist identity and
leave any changes in identity to "terrorists"' actions. As indicated throughout this project,
this is not always the case as government/terrorist discussions continued and even
alliances were made while the IRA and the Maoists, respectively, continued using violence. It is important to remember that texts do not arise out of nowhere but are
"manifestations of social action", 272 making them suitable for analysis for a project such
as mine. Texts are the sites where language-in-use can be traced out and the practical meaning-making and legitimation practices studied.
Texts normalize social relations and are the stable result of social interactions.
They are the result of something that already occurred. This is true especially of official texts which are constructed to naturalize the subject matter and identities of the state and it is this authorization process -- that of establishing state practices as natural and neutral
-- that I want to investigate here. States' use of "terrorism" is suitable for analysis here.
Zulaika and Douglass write that "terrorism ... provides an excellent example of the extent to which both the 'text' and its writer/reader/viewer are produced simultaneously."273
271 Ibid., 216.
272 Gunther Kress, "From Saussure to Critical Sociolinguistics: The Tum Towards a Social View of Language," in Margaret Wetherell, et al., eds. Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader, 29 39 (Thousand Oaks, CA and London: Sage Publications, 2001), 36.
273 Zulaika and Douglass, 29. 129
How this is done -- the strategies used and the identities of state/terrorists produced -- can
be understood by examining language-in-use in texts.
It makes sense to look at official texts on terrorism because it is the public identity
of the 'state' and 'terrorist' that my research plans to explicate. Despite recent research
claiming terrorism to be a "security problem of global proportions,"274 there is no
coordinated "global" response. States remain important actors in the process of
representing events and actors as "terrorist" and thus dealing with "terrorists" in the world today. In order to study these practices of representing groups as "terrorist" and the
related state identity-construction, it makes sense to compare actions and events in
different contexts, to note if similar strategies can be used to understand identity
construction in more than one setting.
On the Selection of Nepal and Northern Ireland
For my project, Nepal and Northern Ireland are the settings where the official use of the language of terrorism and the related identity-constructions will be studied. In terms of a genealogical project, tracing out how strategies of exclusion and inclusion operated in the past -- to refer to the IRA, for example -- helps in questioning and understanding seemingly settled identities of states and terrorists today. As Foucault explains, while Discipline and Punish was about the French penal system, " .. .in order to grasp a specifically French phenomenon I was often obliged to look at something that happened elsewhere in a more explicit form that antedated or served as a model for what
274 Hoffman, 62. 130
took place in France."275 Similarly, though my study began with the goal of
understanding identity-shifts in Nepal, I want to draw out how these strategies of representation play out in different contexts, such as in British/IRA relations. Since my focus is on the representations of groups as "terrorist" and their subsequent identity shift to being political partners of the state comparing representational strategies in Nepal with
Northern Ireland makes sense. Looking at how the IRA and the Maoists were labeled
"terrorists" and how these shifted also facilitates the understanding of the spread and
(de)legitimation of "terrorism" through time (the IRA were labeled "terrorists" much earlier than the Maoists) and space (Nepal and Northern Ireland are distant in terms of physical geography) and of the common strategies within which state/terrorist identities are constituted.
As noted in the introduction to this dissertation, connections between the two contexts were also made on the ground as Nepali officials were taken to a conflict resolution institute in Northern Ireland to learn lessons about conflict resolution. There has thus been a linking of very different contexts and groups via the use of the concept
"terrorism" and "terrorist" here. Analyzing language-in-use, therefore, opens up avenues for questioning what happens when "terrorism" and "terrorist" are used to represent acts and actors across space and time, as in the case of the IRA and the Maoists. It draws attention to similar strategies that recur in the two seemingly dissimilar contexts and to the specific outcomes that are produced.
This questioning of commonsensical identities is a key reason for comparing the use of "terrorism" in Nepal with Northern Ireland. British security practices in Northern
275 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 67-68. 131
Ireland have been described as exemplary in the practice of counterterrorism in military and traditional terrorism circles. Even the failures of early (more repressive, less
"community-oriented") approaches to security have been described as lessons to learn from. Indeed, as Louise Richardson writes,
Few countries have had the same depth of experience in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism as the United Kingdom. As a liberal democracy with extensive societal, governmental, historical and cultural link to the United States, Britain has long faced many of the dilemmas the United States currently faces in combating terrorism, quelling insurgents, and formulating an efficacious security policy without compromising democratic principles. For more than thirty years in Northern Ireland, the British government faced an implacable terrorist threat from the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which sought to expel British rule from Ireland and proved to be one of the best-organized and longest-lasting terrorist groups in modem times. 276
Here, British efforts are noted as something (for the United States) to learn from and the IRA are categorized as one of the most dangerous "terrorist" groups in history. In other practices considered worth emulating, British efforts in Northern Ireland are deemed as beginning and popularizing the "community-policing" approach to counterterrorism. 277 At the same time, most works on terrorism include the IRA as an
276 Louise Richardson, "Britain and the IRA," in Democracy and Counterterrorism: lessons from the Past, ed. Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, 63-132 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 63.
277 Please see Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism: lessons from the Past (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007); Jessie Blackboum, "Leaming Lessons from Counter-Terrorism Failures: The United Kingdom's Pre- and Post- 9111 Counter-Terrorism Policy," February 15, 2009, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New York, USA; Colm Campbell and Ita Connelly, "A Model for the 'War Against Terrorism'? Military Intervention in Northern Ireland and the 1970 Falls Curfew," Journal oflaw and Society 30 no. 3 (2003): 341-75; J. Paul de B. Taillon, The Evolution ofSpecial Forces in Counterterrorism: The British and American Experiences (Wesport, CT: Praeger, 2001); Graham Ellison, and Conor O'Reilly, "From Empire to Iraq and the 'War on Terror': The Transplantation and Commodification of the (Northern) Irish Policing Experience," Police Quarterly, 11 no.4 (2008): 395-426; Thomas Hammarberg, "Fighting Terrorism: Learn the Lessons from Northern Ireland," Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, July 11, 2008, http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/Viewpoints/080711 en.asp (accessed August 15, 2009); Keith Jeffery, "Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency Operations: Some Reflections on the British 132
example of a terrorist group. For much of the 1970s and 1980s, "IRA" and "terrorism" were synonymous. 278 Thus, even though is recent research which separates "old"
(including Northern Ireland) from "new" terrorism, one common view in much of traditional terrorism studies is that the IRA were "terrorists" and (state) reactions against them were "counterterrorism". In a project such as mine which seeks to question the commonsense approach to studying terrorism and the state, the selection of the representing of the IRA as "terrorist" to compare with Nepal's use of "terrorism" is thus appropriate.
As such, choosing these two examples to study makes sense for my research which endeavors to trace out the genealogy of state/terrorism. Of course, a study such as mine could also be framed as comparing "small states" in the international system, or comparing sites where local insurgencies and civil conflicts have occurred. Small-N
"case comparison" in International Relations usually refers to comparing "cases" which are similar or different along a series of (pre-given) characteristics. My research disavows this criteria of small-N case selection since such criteria assumes all "cases" possess a set of factors (e.g. violent "terrorists" or insurgents, lack of human rights, a repressive state) which are intrinsic to the "case" themselves. Instead, an "effective history" such as mine looks at processes and strategies which recur in more than one context. The emphasis is on the replicability of strategies which produce identities, not of unitary "cases". Hence,
Experience," Intelligence and National Security, 2 no. 1 (1987): 118-49; Marie Breen Smyth, "Lessons Learned in counter-terrorism in Northern Ireland: An Interview with Peter Sheridan," Critical Studies on Terrorism, 1 no. 1 (April 2008): 111-23. I am also grateful to my colleague Ben Jensen for helping me elaborate this point.
278 Edward Moxon-Browne, "Terrorism in Northern Ireland: The Case of the Provisional IRA," Terrorism: A Challenge to the State, 6 (1981): 146-63. Almost all the traditional terrorism scholars referred to in Chapters 2 and 3, especially Combs; Hoffmann; Laqueur and Post give the IRA as an example of a 'terrorist' group. 133
state/IRA relations in Britain and Northern Ireland are sites where the strategies of representation of groups as 'terrorist' and political partners can be analyzed. It "serves as
a model" in Foucault's words for understanding mechanisms of governmentality and the
usage of"terrorism" in Nepal. Thus, in studying the application of (and the dropping of) the label of "terrorism" in Northern Ireland and Nepal, it is possible to note how common
strategies ofrepresentation play out in these two contexts. As I see it, my research will supplement current research on United States' and European Union identity and foreign policy. 279
Finally, as a Foucauldian project of"de-centering", it is appropriate to choose
British relations with the IRA and Nepal's with the Maoists for study. By re-reading
British/IRA relations at different points in time, it is my project's goal to question the traditional centralizing terrorism narrative of the state responded to violence by
'terrorists'. For example, as state/others relations during "Bloody Sunday" in Northern
Ireland shows, this was not always so in practice. These centralizing powers could be the preponderance of terrorism studies research on Northern Ireland and the IRA, the non- reflexive methodology in studying terrorism as exemplified by Laqueur and Hoffman, the unquestioned assumption that the counterterrorist state is self-evident (and counterterrorism the only option for the state) and the seemingly commonsensical categorization that Northern states (such as Britain) legitimately act against (Irish/IRA)
"terrorists" while non-Northern states like Nepal use "terrorism" as an excuse to advance their own non-democratic interests. Instead, by focusing on the language of "terrorism" in
279 For example, Blakeley, Elephant; Campbell, Writing; Doty, Foreign; Hansen, Security; R. Jackson, An Analysis ofEU; R. Jackson, Writing; Weldes, Constructing. 134
both the North and South, it is possible to trace out linguistic strategies by which such representations are formulated, shift and practices among 'state' and 'terrorist' authorized.
As a genealogical project on questioning commonsense and de-centering traditional ways of studying the state and terrorism, it is appropriate to re-read (and re examine) what is considered a seminal case in traditional terrorism studies -- that of the
IRA as terrorist. Additionally, tracing the use of "terrorism" means adopting a longer time frame than that provided by many recent works (which concentrate on post
September 11 events and actors). On the whole, both sites are where the concepts of
"terrorism" was commonly used in official discourses in the process of constituting state/other identities. Analyzing the use (or lack of use) of "terrorism" in such contexts allows for studying recurring linguistic strategies in these different times and places and noting how meanings are made while identities shift. How, precisely, this discourse of terrorism will be analyzed is the subject of the following section, which draws upon the works of Jonathan Potter and discursive psychology to outline a plan for studying representations. 135
Analyzing Official Discourses: Rhetorical Commonplaces, Linguistic Strategies and Events
Table 1. Representing 'Terrorists' in Official Discourses
280 Rhetorical Managing Stake/ Establishing Commonplaces Interest Authority l ,__o_f_fi_1c_i_al_d_e_s_c_n_·p_t_io_n_s______.I j Categorization
~E_x_t_re_m_a_ti_z_a_ti_o_nl_M_i_n_im_iz_a_t_io_n_~I I Normalization
When studying state/terrorist identity formation, I shall first delineate and examine the use of specific linguistic tropes or "rhetorical commonplaces"281 in British and Nepalese official texts and speeches (see Table 1). These tropes or commonplaces are simply concepts that appear frequently in descriptions and accounts. Here, since my data is texts and speeches, commonplaces are words and concepts that are commonly used in official descriptions of who and what is "terrorist". This assumes, as noted earlier, that states' identities and interests are discursively constituted and shift through time, and analyzing how terrorists are described and communicated is key to understanding such shifts and the authorization practices that follow. Rhetorical commonplaces retain a history of their use but also gain new meanings as they get used in different times and
280 The steps are adapted from Potter, Representing where he discusses various discursive strategies used by actors in the process of establishing authoritative accounts -- about events and about themselves.
281 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, "Hegel's House, or 'People Are States Too'," Review of International Studies 30 (2004): 281-87. See especially 284-85 for a discussion on rhetorical commonplaces. See also P. Jackson, Civilizing, 44, 96-99. 136
places.282 They can be empirically identified by examining (official, in this case) accounts
at various events or contact zones where self/others are constituted. As my research concern is how groups -- the IRA and the Maoists -- are labeled "terrorist", commonplaces relating to these groups will be focused upon during specific events. The emphasis will be on state/other identity formation.
In order for actors to make sense of events and of each other, they need to create descriptions about the events under discussion. These descriptions are usually arguments along the lines that the self (the state or various social groups) had a reason for doing what they did during the event in question. In this, Jackson and Krebs write, "arguments can prove powerful only when the commonplaces on which they draw are already present in the rhetorical field, which is shaped both by the unintended consequences of prior episodes of contestation and/or by rhetorical campaigns undertaken in advance with the express purpose ofreconfiguring the discursive terrain."283 Commonplaces are thus used in descriptions and can be empirically noted therein. They are articulated284 by state officials in the process of describing the events and the actors involved.
The second part of the analysis will draw out strategies for managing stake and interest in the representational process of state/terrorism. In this, I shall examine official accounts of the various events in question as well as accounts of 'state' and 'terrorist' in the time period immediately following the incidents. Descriptions represent an actor or an
282 P. Jackson, Civilizing, 96-99.
283 Patrick T. Jackson and Ronald Krebs, "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric," European Journal ofInternational Relations 13, no. l (March 2007): 35-66.
284 See Weldes, Constructing for more on articulation as a mechanism during processes of representation. 137
event as a particular type of actor or event. 285 Descriptions are not words abstracted from practice but are themselves practices used to perform a range of activities.286 As Potter writes, "the description presents something as good or bad, big or small, more violent or less violent. .. "287 In this way, the practice of categorization of "states" and "terrorists" or, more specifically, of calling a group of people "terrorist" is part of the process of managing stakes and attributing interests to participants. Descriptions also present actions and events as normal or as exceptional, thus constructing actors as acting within a normal situation or having to respond to exceptional circumstances. It is important to recall that, following Potter, "the aim is to produce an account of how people themselves undermine descriptions through invoking interests, and how, in tum, they design descriptions to attend to such undermining."288 On a practical level, this involves tracing out practices of categorization of groups as (or not as) terrorist and the related state identity produced.
In the third step, the linguistic strategy of establishing authority or legitimation of identity is the focus. Here, how descriptions are "worked up" and their role in specific activities such as linking protesters to the IRA as during "Bloody Sunday" is examined.
For this, normalization is key as how representations of events and actors are produced and communicated as "normal" becomes a topic for analysis. For example, in 1984's
Brighton bombing, "Irish terrorists" or "Republican terrorists" were blamed. At the same
285 Potter, Representing, 110-12.
286 Potter, Representing; Tilly's view that social relations store histories through creative interaction (discussed earlier) and cultural ecology fits in well with this focus on linguistic commonplaces (Tilly, Relations, 723).
287 Potter, Representing, 111.
288 Potter, Representing, 123. 138
time, however, other groups were linked with these "terrorists" in their task of destabilizing the state and democracy. Normalization is linked with the strategies of extrematization and minimization and these strategies all are central to practices of establishing authority. Extrematization and minimization strategies contrast particular issues, events, identities with others, and descriptions are used to work up this contrast.
For example, a particular incident may be described as an extreme form of terrorism, as was the case in some official British descriptions of the IRA hunger strikes. Such representation then links "terrorism" with an action (hunger strikes) but also creates a hierarchy ("extreme form of terrorism"). In this final part of the analysis, identity formation is centralized. As Potter writes," ... the nature of the agent who is speaking or writing is itself established through processes of fact construction and may well become the contentious point in an interaction."289 As such, it is my argument that the good, counterterrorist state that is self-evidently presented in traditional terrorism studies only becomes such within specific representations, with the strategies that produce its identity being traceable in analysis. At the same time, its identity is only one of many possible identities that can be constituted from within the contemporary discursive formation.
Looking at representations of groups as (or not as) "terrorist" and at the representing process itself allows a focus on the action-oriented language used in representing terrorists and constructing state/terrorist identities. These representations are constitutive, not reflective of identities and interests and are formed by active practices of interpretation of specific events as "terrorism" (or not) and actors as "terrorist" (or not).
Choice of words and labels, thus, matter. While adopting a social constructionist
289 Ibid., 124. 139
ontology, my research thus focuses on practices of representation and assumes representations are constitutive of identities.
Events: Sites of Production of 'Terrorist' Subjects
The use of "terrorism" by government officials will be the data of my study. In order to examine the strategies of identity-constitution of state/terrorists, three events in each context will be studied -- one where the rhetoric of "terrorism" started to become commonplace when describing the group in question; the second where the group is explicitly described as "terrorist"; and the third where the group continued using violence but its identity shifted to a (possible) political partner of the state. For Britain, these are the "Bloody Sunday" incident of 1972, the Brighton hotel bombing of 1984 and the
Docklands affair of 1996. For Nepal, the first period will encompass November 2001-
February 2002, when the term "terrorist" was first commonly used in official accounts;
February 2005, when the then-King Gyanendra took over control of government, citing
"terrorist" threats as a reason; and April 2006 when the state's use of "terrorism" did not stick but violence (including bombings attributed to the Maoists) continued. These events are sites where possible challenges of meanings occur and where the active task of representing events and actors as "terrorist" and "terrorism" (or not) was performed.
In both contexts, the final events are incidents where "terrorism" in the traditional definition was ongoing and yet when there were also negotiations ongoing with so-called
"terrorists". In other words, during the Docklands bombing and even after the "terrorist" designation was officially dropped by the Nepalese government, both the IRA and the
Maoists continued using violence. In a traditional approach to studying terrorism, this 140
would automatically have derailed peace processes but that did not happen. Instead, discussions between states and terrorists continued. These events, therefore, serve as sites where the legitimation of talking to "terrorists'', a tabooed activity in traditional terrorism terms, occurred. The second events are where explicit usage of "terrorism" and
"terrorists" and the identification of the state as "counterterrorist" occurred. The first events are where "terrorism" and "terrorist" were used to label the IRA and the Maoists and an increasing formalization of anti-"terrorism" practices -- Internment, anti-terrorism legislation -- took place.
Since my concern here is to note how state/terrorist identities are constituted and to de-center commonsensical narratives of states and terrorists, examining events or sites of encounter is appropriate. This is because such sites are where explicit deployment of
"terrorism", "terrorist" and related commonplaces occurs. Such a study allows for explicating the links between macro (global rhetoric of terrorism) and micro (local usage of terrorism rhetoric). At the same time, as the focus here is on official constitution of identity, concentrating on specific events allows for tracing out micro-level interactions within official accounts ("global" in the sense of being the official account). Events draw attention to small-scale interactions where strategies ofrepresenting can be studied. How did the British state link a significant proportion of the participants during "Bloody
Sunday" with the IRA? How were specific practices of legitimation embodied within official texts? Examining the accounts of actions during these events hones in on such concerns while maintaining focus on the genealogical project of studying state/terrorist identities over time. On a related note, events become particular kinds of events within official descriptions and thus become part of official security discourses for future 141
deployment. Thus, similar to texts, events are sites where the deployment of linguistic strategies by th~ state (and the related formation of state/terrorist identities) can be noted.
Events are "nodes" of the official security discourse, sites where discursive shifts -- as different subject positionings of "state" and "terrorist" are legitimated -- can be traced out.
Foucault calls this a process oflooking at practices that occur during particular events as "eventalization":
It means making visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness that imposes itself uniformly on all. To show that things 'weren't as necessary as all that'; it wasn't a matter of course that mad people came to be regarded as mentally ill; it wasn't self-evident that the only thing to be done with a criminal was to lock him up; it wasn't self-evident that the causes of illness were to be sought through the individual examination of bodies; and so on. A breach of self evidence, of those self-evidences on which our knowledges, acquiescences, and practices rest: this is the first theoretico-political function of 'eventalization' .290
For example, it was not self-evident (though it seems like it today) that counterterrorism was the only option for British-Northern Ireland relations in the late
1960s and early 1970s. In parliamentary discussions about the internment policy and even in the days following "Bloody Sunday", there are numerous calls for a united
Ireland as well as cautions against seeking a military solution. Internment itself was hotly debated, as was the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1974. By seeing meanings as socially- produced, "eventalization" makes it possible to study particular events or sites of interactions where "state" and "terrorist" identities are formulated and relations authorized. What Foucault is trying to get at here is the in-process, relational nature of
290Michel Foucault, Power: Essential Works ofFoucault 1954-1984, Volume 3, ed., James D. Faubion, Series ed., Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 2000), 226. 142
understanding social relations and identity-constitution, an understanding my study draws
upon. Eventalization, for Foucault and for my project, means "rediscovering the
connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies, and so on, that at
a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal, and
necessary."291 So, strategies that establish particular state/terrorist relations as normal and
self-evident become topics of study and events are sites where such "self-evidentness"
can be critically examined. This is, of course, contrary to traditional terrorism studies
which assumes antagonistic state/terrorist relations and posits that individuals and groups
(such as the IRA and the Maoists) have intrinsic qualities which make them 'terrorist'.
The next two chapters will analyze official usage of "terrorism" and related
commonplaces to understand state/terrorist identity formation at different times. Tilly
writes that questions such as "Who are you?", "Who are they?", "Who are we?" are
"Identity questions" and their answers are "always identities -- always assertions, always
contingent, always negotiable, but also always consequential."292 My task here, is not to remove "identity" from research because it has acquired too many meanings but to
examine identity-formation of 'state' and 'terrorist' .293 The next two chapters will adopt
the analytical plan described here to delineate state/terrorist identities in Northern Ireland and Nepal and to depict how linguistic strategies of stake management and establishing authority play out in these two contexts.
291 Foucault, Power, 226-27.
292 Charles Tilly, "Political Identities in Changing Polities," Social Research 70, no. 2 (Summer 2003), 608.
293 If having too many meanings were a reason for expunging a word from our research vocabulary, then "terrorist" and "terrorism" would both be off limits, making "Terrorism Studies" redundant. The immense output of terrorism scholars in recent years is a sign that such an outcome is not remotely likely. CHAPTER4
DANGEROUS "TERRORISTS" TO PARTNERS IN PEACE: STATE/IRA
RELATIONS294
If asked about terrorism in the pre-9/11 era, most terrorism scholars automatically cite British efforts (mostly) against the IRA as illustrations of exemplary counterterrorist activities by the state. Relatedly, the IRA is a common example of "terrorist" in the literature on terrorism, especially those works examining terrorism from a historical perspective. 295 For instance, one of the authors whose work was examined in an earlier chapter, Walter Laqueur uses the IRA as an example of a "terrorist" group throughout his book on The New Terrorism. Cindy Combs, Jerrold Post and Bruce Hoffman also refer to the IRA when discussing various aspects of terrorism.
The study of British efforts against the IRA and the use of the IRA as an exemplary terrorist group has become commonplace in International Relations, with researchers now comparing Northern Ireland with other contexts where paramilitary activity occurred or, currently, where post-conflict peace processes are
294 As indicated earlier in this project, "IRA" here is used to refer to the Provisional IRA, even though during the early years of the conflict there was no split between Official and Provisional (and, later, into other splinter groups). Official accounts which used "Provos" or "Provisional IRA" when talking of events and issues are deemed synonymous with "IRA" unless an explicit distinction was made in by the speaker him/herself.
295 A longer discussion of what "exemplary" means in this context is found in Chapter 3 in the discussion about choosing Northern Ireland and Nepal as sites for my study. Combs, Terrorism; Hoffmann, Inside; Laqueur, New and Sheehan, When Terrorism all include the IRA as an example of a "terrorist" group. All these authors' works were examined in greater detail in Chapters 2 and 3.
143 144
ongoing. 296 The conflict in Northern Ireland has been examined through economic, sociocultural, human rights, gender, regionalism/globalization and various other lenses with the result that Northern Ireland has become one of the, if not the, most studied cases today. 297 This is also true with regard to "terrorist" groups as both republican and loyalist paramilitary organizations have been studied.298 But, in the early years of what are now known at the Troubles, terrorism in Northern Ireland was not as commonsensical as it seems to us today. Instead, during a period of 30 years, the representations of one of the major "terrorist" groups--the IRA-- shifted from "gunmen" to "terrorist" to "politicians," a shift that can be noted by examining British security discourses during specific events.
Within these discourses, the use of the language of terrorism rose in these three
296 Comparisons are most often made with South Africa, Israel and other "divided" societies. See, for example, Paul Arthur, "Some thoughts on Transition: a comparative view of the Peace Processes in South Africa and Northern Ireland," Government and Opposition, 30, no. 1 (1995): 48-59; Helen Brocklehurst, N Stott, B. Hamber and G. Robinson, "Lesson Drawing: Northern Ireland and South Africa," Indicator, South Africa 18, no.1 (2001): 89-95 and Hermann Giliomee and Jannie Gagiano, eds., The Elusive Search for Peace: South Africa, Northern Ireland and Israel (London: Oxford University Press, 1990). The works of Adrian Guelke also compares Northern Ireland with locations considered similar, such as South Africa and Israel. See Adrian Guelke, "Violence and Electoral Polarization in Divided Societies: Three Cases in Comparative Perspective," Terrorism and Political Violence 12, no. 3-4 (2000): 78-105; Adrian Guelke, "The Peace Process in South Africa, Israel and Northern Ireland: a Farewell to Arms?," Irish Studies in International Affairs 5 (1994), 93-106 and Adrian Guelke, "The Political Impasse in South Africa and Northern Ireland: a Comparative Perspective," Comparative Politics 23 no. 2 (1991): 143-63.
297 Bibliographies of research on Northern Ireland can be found at the University of Warwick's "The Troubles" site http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/history/undergraduate/modules/hi385/biblio/, accessed November 20, 2008) and at the Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) site: http://cain.ulst.ac.uklbibdbs/authorbib.htm (list includes over 13,000 sources) (accessed May 20, 2009).
298 See, for example, Geoffrey Beattie and Kathy Doherty, "I Saw What Really Happened: the discursive construction of victims and perpetrators in firsthand accounts of paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland," Journal ofLanguage and Social Psychology 14 no.4 (1995): 408-433; Carolyn Gallaher, After the Peace: Loyalist Paramilitaries in Post-Accord Northern Ireland (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007); Carolyn Gallaher and Peter Shirlow, "The geography ofloyalist paramilitary feuding in Belfast," Space and Polity 10, no. 2 (2006); Liam Kennedy, They Shoot Children Don't They? Child Victims ofParamilitary 'Punishments' in Northern Ireland in 2002 (Belfast: Queen's University Belfast, 2003); Knox, Colin, "See no evil, hear no evil': Insidious Paramilitary Violence in Northern Ireland," British Journal of Criminology 42, no. 1 (2002): 164-85. Overall, however, republican paramilitaries, especially the IRA, have been more extensively studied than loyalist paramilitaries. I am grateful to Dr. Carole Gallaher for this insight. 145
decades and violence against the state was normalized as 'terrorist' and 'terrorism'
became the major threat facing the British state. At the same time, this representation of
people as "terrorist" authorized exceptional measures against "terrorist" violence,
including against specific groups and peoples within the political boundaries of the state
itself. The key issue here, as throughout this research project, how these representations
of groups as "terrorist" were produced and how seemingly-commonsensical
representations can be questioned. Events which were later not classified as "terrorist" -
such as the "Bloody Sunday" incident of 1972 -- were, at that time, labeled as part of a
long-term IRA campaign against the state. Later events, including the Brighton bombing
of 1984 helped solidify the characterization of such violence as "terrorism" and
perpetrators as "terrorist". At the same time, however, other meanings of the event were
present and there were other competing representations of the IRA present. The 1996
Docklands bombing, on the other hand, fit all the previously-established criteria of a so
called terrorist bombing but its representation as a possible aberration allowed for the
peace process to continue and for Sinn Fein to remain potential political allies of the
British state. These examples show that the politics ofrepresentation -- how the IRA was represented in British security discourse -- is key to understanding identity formation of a
counterterrorist state as well as of a state that talks to "terrorists". It is by examining such representations and how they shift from state/other practices to state/terrorist practices that we can better understand how identities of states and terrorists are produced and practices between them authorized.
In terms of the conditions of possibility for identity-formation, the
( counter)terrorism discourse was not the only discourse available for meaning-making 146
during the events that will be examined in this chapter. Yet, it was the one that was most often used, especially in the early years of the conflict. Within the representation of state as-counterterrorist, the British state was constructed as the major, if not the only, legitimate authority to deal with violent actors such as the IRA. Perhaps most importantly, an analysis of British counterterrorist discourses during these events shows how differences were created and maintained, even among the citizens whom the state had a responsibility to protect. Additionally, when representations ofIRA-as-terrorist shifted, the state continued to use (and still uses) anti-terrorism policies which had been authorized during this period of the Troubles, thus continuing practices that were first introduced as temporary.
In this chapter, I will interpret, 299 in the Foucauldian sense, official representations of the IRA in British security discourses and how these shifted through time. What were the state identities and interests produced out of these representations? The focus here is on representations -- and on denaturalizing the state's counterterrorist identity. As Doty wrote, "thinking in terms ofrepresentational practices (such as those of various groups as threats and then as potential political partners) highlights the arbitrary, constructed and political nature of these and many other oppositions (states and threats) through which we have come to 'know' the world and its inhabitants and that have enabled and justified certain practices and policies."300 So, IRA-as-terrorist and Britain-as-counterterrorist identities were not as clear cut as we now understand them to be, even within official representations. At the same time, examining language use and representations -- as my
299 Foucault, Nietzsche.
300 Doty, Imperial, 3 (emphasis added). 147
research does -- opens up the possibility that identities and events could have been
understood differently.
Within this understanding of discourses as constitutive of identities and interests
of states/terrorists, threats are not self-evident but, instead, are formed out of processes of representation during social interactions. In other words, terrorists are not a priori to the
state but their identities are interlinked with those of the state itself. Looking at
states/terrorists in this way allows for tracing out how threats emerge, shift and what happens to the state identity when representations of specific groups as "terrorist"
changes. Without a focus on language as constitutive of identities and interests, such
questions are left unasked (and unanswered) and a continued emphasis on binary opposition of states and threats, with each separate to but attempting to eliminate the other, is maintained. Such a focus closes off avenues for questioning the constitution of the state and terrorist identities and how the counterterrorist state seems commonsensical.
It also ignores social interactions that occur in the process of making "terrorism" meaningful and the related political actions facilitated therein.
I shall examine three events in Northern Ireland -- the "Bloody Sunday" incident of 1972, the Brighton bombing of 1984 and the Docklands bombing of 1996. These events will be sites where the identities of self and others will be studied and official representations of events and participants scrutinized. This chapter shall focus on how state/IRA identities were produced and note the strategies constructing specific identities.
Descriptions of these events will help understand how representations of danger are built up, how they are solidified and how they shift, creating new relations for 'terrorists' and
'the state'. The concepts of"terrorism", "terrorist" and "terror" and how they are used (or 148
not used) in official descriptions will be focused upon. At the same time, I plan to trace out an interpretive repertoire301 (linkages and differentiations among linguistic commonplaces) where a field of meanings for future identity-constructions is available.
Northern Ireland is useful to study terrorism not because "we" can learn from British counterterrorist practices but in order to denaturalize the commonsensical representation of the (British) state being compelled to act against IRA "terrorism" as well as to note the other conditions of possibility available for state/other relations during each of these events.
Linguistic Strategies: Stake Management and Establishing Authority
As discussed in the previous chapter, the construction of identities entails usage of specific strategies during the processes of representing danger. To put it simply, the use of labels such as "terrorism" is linked with and differentiated from other concepts (for example, "the people", "democracy", etc) in the process ofrelational identity-formation.
Since I have discussed these linguistic strategies earlier, here I only offer a brief recap:
Stake management is the active task where accounts of what occurred or reports are constructed as being authoritative and factual. It is how people attribute blame or responsibility and this is what is commonly called "stake". Managing stake would then involve framing specific groups as threats and the reasons given for doing so. It also involves the assignation of specific interests to various actors. For instance, by saying it is
301 The term "interpretive repertoire" is derived from Potter, Representing. It is similar to Michel Foucault's "discursive formations"; Patrick Jackson, 2006 talks of "rhetorical topography". In security studies, Weldes refers to an interpretive repertoire as a "security imaginary". An "interpretive repertoire" is an analytical tool which provides the rhetorical "raw materials" from which representations of states and others are constituted. See Weldes, Constructing, 10-16 for a similar discussion on "security imaginary" and its ideal typical nature. 149
in the interest of a particular group to use (or not use) violence, actors, often the state but also other levels of society, try to assign blame and responsibility to each other, thus constituting legitimate, respected and authoritative subjects versus illegitimate, illegal and non-authoritative threats. Stake management, thus, is explicitly about categorization and boundary-production as state/threat identities are legitimated. While Potter discusses the process of stake management by actors, 302 I am also interested in the simultaneous process through which stake management in the representation process itself produces identities (for example, the state as counterterrorist). Attributions of blame and responsibility in the process of stake management provide legitimacy for actors' courses of action.
Descriptions, especially official descriptions ofevents and actions, play an important role in this stake management process and in establishing authority. This gets at what Potter calls "stake inoculation" where participants manage stake, or provide descriptions in order to avoid seeming to have an active stake in the proceedings. 303 In other words, the "neutrality" or the ordinariness of official discourses and reports about events are products of processes of active stake management, a task which is often made easier when violent acts are described. Stake inoculation is important in understanding how a particular discourse of danger becomes dominant. By showing the active processes of stake management, through attribution of blame and interests and through stake inoculation, I hope to show how a specific conceptualization of the good, anti-terrorist, state comes into being during the representations of specific actors as "terrorist". Stake
302 Potter, Representing, 187-94.
303 Potter, Representing. 150
inoculation also draws attention to how other ways of establishing stake -- within alternative representations, for example -- are given less importance.
During stake management and establishing authority, an associated mechanism is the establishment ofpositioning. As Davies and Harre write, positioning is distinguished from role as it "helps focus attention on dynamic aspects of encounters in contrast to the way in which the use of 'role' serves to highlight static, formal and ritualistic aspects."304
This gives attention to how language-use produces particular subject positionings, such as those of 'states', 'terrorists' and 'citizens'. This process of positioning depends on rhetorical resources present within the interpretive repertoire, the arguments (and identities) produced by other actors and existing descriptions and policies. How an event came to be described the way it was in official documents and speeches and the representations of actors involved, thus involve continuous management of stake and a struggle for establishment of authority on the part of the state. Overall, these two strategies and associated mechanisms work to establish 'state' and 'terrorist' relations -- whether antagonistic or not-- as normal and this is what my research will describe.
Focusing on normalization thus allows for tracing out how descriptions are worked up and also how what is considered normal itself shifts through time, thus legitimating new practices for 'state' and 'terrorist'.
Events are sites where state/terrorist identities are (re)produced as representations of each other and of the event itself occurs. The three events analyzed below are sites where discourses about terrorism shifted and where explicit boundaries between self
304 Bronwyn Davies and Rom Harre, "Positioning: The Discursive Production of Selves," Journal for the Theory ofSocial Behaviour, 20, no. 1 (1990): 43-63. Full text at http://www.massey.ac.nz/-alock/position/position.htm (accessed February 12, 2008). 151
(state's security forces) and others (local citizens, IRA) were maintained -- from regarding groups as "normal'', anti-state protesters to terrorists and, later, as negotiation partners. How terrorism in Northern Ireland was always in contention with other possible meanings and did not result from self-evident, essentialized notion of "terrorist" activity can be examined by looking at specific events. Indeed, "terrorism" was one of many possible options for describing these events and actors therein. If violence and self evident terrorism had been reasons for why groups were identified as "terrorist" in the first place, then "Bloody Sunday" would not have been a site where a "riot" occurred
(since contemporary reports indicated the use of similar levels of violence as at other marches at the time). Similarly, Loyalist paramilitary organizations, for example the
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) which was involved in violence in Northern Ireland since the mid-1960s, would have been classified as a "terrorist" group much earlier than they were.
The purpose of the following sections, therefore, is not just about what happened -
- the shifts in representations of danger as labeling of the IRA shifted -- but to trace out how it happened by identifying and illustrating the strategies of representing "terrorist" threats. In other words, how were "terrorist" and "terrorism" used in public accounts of danger? What were the implications of such usage and what practices were (dis)allowed?
And how did it become commonsensical for the state to act against (IRA) terrorism? By doing so, the following sections and the subsequent chapter on Nepal will do two things: first, give importance to contexts so that the microprocesses of how official accounts of danger are put together and the implications of such constructions for state identity can be traced out; For example, official descriptions of the "Bloody Sunday" marchers as 152
"illegal" categorized "the people" as breaking the law, making it easier to assign responsibility for the incident to them, rather than to those who did the shooting. Second, this and the next chapter will delineate how stakes and responsibilities are constructed within the representational process and assigned to various individuals or groups.305 For example, by linking 'democracy' with political parties, the British government was able to insist Sinn Fein could only participate in the peace process if were 'democratic'. The key here is to note strategies in the processes within which the constitution of state/terrorist identities occurs while, at the same time, questioning the pre-given narrative of states responding to "terrorist" violence.
1 20 h Century Northern Ireland: A Very Brief Overview
The conflict in Ireland is usually explained with reference to its history but it is a
"history" that is used selectively by the parties concerned. Since my focus is on the
British government's use of "terrorism" as related to the IRA during the period of the
Troubles, I shall briefly draw attention to two key issues in British-Irish relations -- colonization and partition. 306 British colonial practices in Ireland included economic deprivation and social oppression throughout the island but the main feature of interest in the case of Northern Ireland was of plantation. Plantation referred to the deliberate
305 These features of discourse analysis are adapted from Potter and Wetherell, 54-55. As they write, " ... the discourse approach shifts the focus from a search for underlying entities --attitudes (that the state is against terrorism of all kinds and that terrorism is easily-recognizable for the state to counter) - which generate talk and behavior to a detailed examination of how evaluative expressions are produced in discourse (Potter and Wetherell, 55; parenthesis and emphasis mine).
306 For a more detailed overview of British-Irish relations during colonization, please see Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry, The Politics ofAntagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland, 2"ct ed (Atlantic Highlands, NJ and London: The Athlone Press, 1997), especially Chapter 2 "The Colonial Roots of Antagonism: Fateful Triangles in Ulster, Ireland and Britain, 1609-1920" and Chapter 3 "Exercising Control: The Second Protestant Ascendancy, 1920-1962''. 153
movement of people from Scotland and England to Ireland as settlers, thus displacing the
local Irish. In terms of religion and ethnic identities, these settlers were almost all
Protestant while the locals were mostly Catholics. The practice was undertaken
throughout the island but was deemed more successful in Northern Ireland (Ulster) than
elsewhere. New towns were built and settled by these Scots and English settlers. As
O'Leary and McGarry sum up, "Tudor, Stuart, Cromwellian, and Williamite state-
building conquests and settlements established patterns of ethnic and religious
differentiation which have persisted to the present day ... "307 While there is a Catholic
majority in what is now the Republic of Ireland, the (mostly settler) Protestants
outnumber Catholics in the North.
This separation of religious and ethnic identities was further entrenched during the
partition of Ireland into the North and South in 1921. While independence from British
rule was granted to the entire island of Ireland, provision was made for Northern Ireland
to opt out of the alliance (and remain tied to Britain) and this is what occurred in 1922.
Northern Ireland, with its Protestant majority population, chose to remain part of the
United Kingdom. The rest of the island, with a strong Catholic majority, became the Irish
Free State (later known as the Republic oflreland) and an autonomous, sovereign state.
These political and ethnic divisions are important to keep in mind when reading about
British-IRA relations during the Troubles. At the same time, the fluid nature of identities
and historical alliances should also be considered. 308
307 O'Leary and McGarry, 56.
308 Liam O' Dowd, Bill Rolston and Mike Tomlinson, Northern Ireland: Between Civil Rights and Civil War (London, CSE Books: 1980) write the Presbyterian background of the Scots settlers often conflicted with the Anglican English amongst the 17th century settlers. Indeed, according to them, 154
In the following decades, there was a lack of civil rights for Catholics in Northern
Ireland as employment, housing, and educational policies favored the majority. In the late
1960s, people, predominantly (but not all) Catholics, in Northern Ireland started using the
rhetoric of civil rights, borrowed from civil rights marches in the United States, and
asking for equal opportunity in housing, politics and general employment. These led to
clashes in different cities,309 eventually culminating in the arrival of British troops. The
protesters, at this time, used the language of oppression and linked their actions in
Northern Ireland to similar civil rights marches, especially in the United States.310 The
deployment of British troops had occurred against opposition even from within the
British government itself. Unionist politicians in Northern Ireland were especially
opposed as they saw the deployment of troops as a sign of no confidence in the
government of Northern Ireland. Despite this, and more importantly for future relations
between security forces and local people, the troops were at first greeted with joy by
many residents who saw them as a bulwark against ongoing rioting. These riots had
erupted mostly in Londonderry but also spread to other parts of Northern Ireland. Prior to
the deployment of British troops, the Irish prime minister had called for United Nations
early Republican separatist movements included significant numbers of" ... the largely Presbyterian United Irishmen" ( 1980, 5). On a similar note on fluid alliances, they write that the abolition of the Dublin Parliament under the Act of Union between Great Britain and Ireland in 1801 was "opposed by the newly formed Orange Order and favored by the Catholic Church ... " (O'Dowd, et al., 5).
309 One of the main ones being 1969's "Battle of the Bogside". For more details, see Russell Stetler, The Battle ofBogside: the Politics of Violence in Northern Ireland (London: Sheed and Ward, 1970).
31°For more on how the Northern Ireland civil rights activists were inspired by the United States, see Bob Purdie, Politics in the Streets: The Origins ofthe Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1990), especially 2-3, 91-93 and 156. For how the US and Northern Ireland were yet different because of their different starting points, see 156-158. Full text of the book is available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/crights/purdie/index.html (accessed November 12, 2008) 155
peacekeeping troops to be sent to Northern Ireland.311 Describing the arrival of the British troops in Derry, Dillon writes, "although some people within the area, mainly republicans, warned against a welcome for the soldiers, that did not deter the battle-weary
Catholics from regarding the soldiers as their protectors, and Catholic housewives offered them tea and sandwiches."312 Over the next 38 years, over 300,000 British troops would be sent to Northern Ireland.
In this early period, two themes were to be of import to how violence and violent actors were represented. First, the status of the British troops and their powers of authority remained unclear and contested. There was a Northern Ireland government in place at the time as well as the British government in London. Also, the British army was deployed in a "peacekeeping" role on the ground but the parameters of this role were unclear. Second, the troops lacked knowledge of the local situation and were better used to colonial settings, with most of the troops having had previous experience in such contexts. Reactions which were legitimate in colonial settings, where the British/other difference had been clearly distinguished (and maintained) over a long period were not as easy to justify in the case of Northern Ireland, where the violent actors were also internal to the political boundaries of the British state. This was to have implications later, especially during the imposition of internment and during "Bloody Sunday". Overall, this early period set the scene where there was a tension between representations of Northern
Ireland (and violent actors therein) as a domestic incident and a local insurgency versus a
311 An account of what happened at the time is found in "BBC on this day: August 14, 1969," http://news.bbc.eo.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/14/newsid 4075000/4075437.stm (accessed August 12, 2009). In it, it is said, "The British Government has sent troops into Northern Ireland in what it says is a 'limited operation' to restore law and order."
312 Martin Dillon, The Enemy Within (London and New York: Doubleday, 1994), 86. 156
competing local representation of Northern Ireland as part of a global movement for civil
rights. At the same time, the role of the British forces as protectors of civilians came into
tension as it was unclear which group of civilians -- Catholics or Protestants -- the troops
were expected to protect (and did protect).
But what of the IRA? In these early years, the republicans were divided into
various factions with different groups urging differing reactions to the arrival of British
troops. However, British security policies had a tendency to regard much of the ongoing
protests as either part of the IR.A's attempts at infiltrating local communities or even as
IRA-led (with the civil rights leaders and other campaigners as active or passive
collaborators). One outcome of such practice could be that of constructing the IRA as a
more coherent group with better weapons and strategy than it probably warranted at that
time. Keeping in mind that IRA strategies and responses to the British were still being
debated and discussed, British descriptions of them as a major threat to be reckoned with
and as having persuaded or forced local people to collaborate with them had the effect of
producing IRA identity as a strong, coherent and long-term threat, one that had the
capability of creating instability within the British state while luring local people as
collaborators. This conceptualization ignored violent activities by groups other than the
IRA and also ignored that the British troops themselves were sometimes involved in
inciting violence. What these also ignored was that the loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force
(UVF) had formed in 1966 against a rising Irish nationalist trend. Over the course of the next three decades, the UVF killed over 500 people, most of whom were civilians. In the
1960s, the UVF began a campaign of violence and bombings, many of which were 157
initially attributed to the IRA. 313
Early British condoning oflow-level violence in Northern Ireland gave way to a more hardline approach, especially regarding local people's response to the 1971 policy of internment. Internment has been considered a reason for the increase in number of IRA recruits and in firming boundaries between different groups. Yet internment itself was hotly debated within the British government and criticized even by "hardline" Unionists such as Ian Paisley of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). 314 After internment, marches and protests which previously had been about civil rights now were against internment and explicitly referenced it during protests.
313 Martin Dillon, 73. For more on the UVF and loyalist paramilitaries, please see Peter Taylor, Loyalists (London: Bloomsbury, 1999). For a short overview, see BBC; "What is the UVF?" http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/northern ireland/6619417 .stm (accessed July 12, 2009).
314 Ian Paisley gave the internment as a reason for the violence on "Bloody Sunday". He said, "The matter of internment lies at the heart of the present problems in Northern Ireland. I have taken an entirely different line from many people on this side of the House who say they are loyalists. I believe that the House must look at internment and say why it is that if certain people can be charged, put through the courts and be found guilty -- and this applies to 200 people who have gone through the courts in the proper way-- others cannot also go through the courts in this way.", Paisley, February 1, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol 830, col 300 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/ 1972/feb/O 1/northern-ireland#column 300 (accessed March 10, 2008). The DUP is the one of the two main Unionist political parties in Northern Ireland. 158
Table 2. Major Rhetorical (Linguistic) Commonplaces Used to Describe (IRA) 'Terrorism' Within Official British Discourses
Event Rhetorical (linguistic) Commonplaces
Bloody Sunday The people, democracy, Army (as having a difficult task), riot, illegal march, (no) military solution (in Northern Ireland), minimum force used, internment, aimed shots, inquiry, casualties (rather than "killing")
Brighton bombing Irish terrorist threat, Republican terrorism, freedom, democracy, the people, emergency services (as doing their job), extremism, courage (of emergency services and victims), sympathy (for the victims), business as usual, security (versus) freedom
Docklands bombing Terrorist act, Sinn Fein-IRA, the British people, move the peace process forward, ceasefire, negotiations, Mitchell Report, Downing Street declaration, decommissioning, confidence, democratic process
In the following sections, I shall first examine official British accounts of "Bloody
Sunday", with a view to note rhetorical commonplaces in use at that time in the construction of state/IRA( others) identities. This will be followed by an analysis of the
Brighton and Docklands bombings (See Table 2), ending with an analysis of how state/other relations shifted over time. The first event that will be examined is "Bloody
Sunday". The events of January 30, 1972 in Londonderry, Northern Ireland, when 14 people died315 and many more were injured when British paratroopers shot into a crowd of civilian marchers, have been represented in different ways. 316 Despite eyewitness accounts, there remains disagreement about key questions regarding who shot first. There
315 13 people died on the day; one died later from wounds sustained during the shooting.
316 A selected reading list is available at the Conflict Archive on the Internet web site, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/bsunday/read.htm. (accessed February 20, 2009) There are also commemorative web sites for the event. 159
have been numerous books, plays and articles written about the event. Films have been made about it. On walls of the city where it occurred, there are murals which depict the events of that day. The Irish band U2 wrote a song about it, as did John Lennon and Paul
McCartney. So why, in the post September 11 era and writing about terrorism study an event that occurred over 35 years ago in a small city that is hardly mentioned in international media of today? Why describe a time of which others have talked of already and done so in far more comprehensive detail? The answer is this study is not about how there are (and can be) different interpretations of the same event. Instead, it is to analyze how official accounts described the event in a specific way as to constitute it as a site for terror and its participants as threatening the security not just of Britain but also of similar liberal democratic states elsewhere. It is to note how linguistic strategies -- stake management and establishing authority -- played out in official representations of this event. It is to note how the 'terror' and 'terrorism' were used and the resulting identification of specific groups, including local citizens, as threats and dangers to society, not just at that time but in the long-term. Additionally, revisiting "Bloody
Sunday" allows for investigating how particular identities of 'states', 'the people' and
'terrorists' were produced out of this event, identities that were to remain the basis for future understandings of terrorism.
In official accounts, "Bloody Sunday" was represented as an illegal march infiltrated by IRA gunmen, with British security forces as having acted in good faith against armed opponents to protect 'democracy' against 'terrorism'. By re-reading contemporary British accounts of the incident immediately following the event itself, the following section will trace out the meaning-fixing which had the effect of constituting 160
and reinforcing this identity-formation. In other words, the identities of the participants
and the state were not self-evident immediately after the incident and there were other
possible meanings. It is my view that "Bloody Sunday" is a site where there was a shift in
descriptions of danger, as official accounts changed from regarding such marches as an
everyday event within the context of Northern Ireland to depicting them (and participants
therein) as dangerous and as threats to the state. Changes in discourses do not occur by
themselves but there is active work involved and such shifts lead to new rhetorical
formulations for making future identity-constructions possible. 317 This active work can be
traced out in the discursive strategies used in the descriptions of the events and actors.
For example, the positioning of "Bloody Sunday'', where the state's military forces used
violence against a mainly-unarmed civilian population, as an event that was potentially
destabilizing to the state and harmful to its security, played a key role in future
descriptions of terrorism in Britain.
Thus, the reason for this re-reading -- not just of "Bloody Sunday" but of the
Brighton and Docklands bombings -- is twofold. One, each of these events is where a
shift in state/IRA identities can be noted. For example, "Bloody Sunday" exemplified a
shift from depicting civilians as in need of protection to innocent (or not) dupes (or co conspirators) manipulated by the IRA. Second, since I am utilizing a discourse analytical approach to terrorism, I plan to read contemporary texts through a rhetorical lens318 to identify basic discourses319 in play at that time and to map out the representations of
317 P. Jackson, Civilizing, 7.
318 Charles Taylor, 11.
319 Hansen, Security. 161
threats and the attendant identity-constructions of the state through time. Overall, the re-
reading focuses on how identities of states (and the IRA) are reproduced at different sites
and times. 320
The details of what happened on "Bloody Sunday" are well known. On January
30, 1972, in Londonderry, Northern Ireland, thousands of people participated in a march
to protest the British policy of internment without trial. During the march, shooting began
and, by the end of about 20 minutes of gunfire, 26 protesters were shot by the British
security forces. 13 died on the spot and another person died later in hospital. The British
government maintained that "IRA gunmen" hiding in the buildings alongside the protest
route fired the first shots and the security forces were merely returning this fire.
Eyewitnesses disagreed, saying the marchers were unarmed and it was the British forces
who indiscriminately shot into the crowd. The issue remains unresolved as a second
official inquiry into the events is to report only in "late 2009". 321 After "Bloody Sunday",
British/IRA relations became solidified as state/terrorist relations, communities in
Northern Ireland came under suspicion of aiding "terrorists" and direct rule from London
was imposed. A related but important outcome was the establishment and continuation of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1974), legislation that was only recently superseded by the Terrorism Act (2000).
320 My sources for the following section are statements about the event by government officials as well as statements tendered during the course of public debate in the UK Parliament. These were supplemented by media stories about the incident as reported in the media (specifically The Times and The Guardian). Since I am interested in representations immediately following the incident, a period of seven days following the incident was examined. However, I shall also refer to April 1972 report of the Widgery Tribunal (see fn 335) as it was (at the end of August 2009) the only official report of"Bloody Sunday".
321 This Second Inquiry -- the Saville Inquiry as it is commonly known -- was set up by then Prime Minister Tony Blair in 1998. Its results are supposed to supersede the only other official Report on "Bloody Sunday"-- the Widgery Report of April 1972. 162
In the decade from 1972 to the early 1980's, the domestic/international distinction within official representations was maintained partly by constituting Northern Ireland as
"home affairs", one where "Irish terrorists" threatened the democratic ideals of the
British state. This was, of course, helped by the establishment of direct rule since March
1972. On the whole, international attention was not welcomed and attempts by the
European Union and, especially, the Republic oflreland to become involved in conflict negotiation were rebuffed. The main themes evident in the aftermath of "Bloody Sunday"
-- that terrorists were fighting a war against British ideals of freedom and democracy -- were consistently invoked in subsequent descriptions. This meaning-making was assisted by frequent bombings and other overt violent actions on the part of the IRA, including a shift in their bombing campaign from Northern Ireland to mainland Britain. Yet, similar activities by other groups -- especially loyalist paramilitaries -- were not commonly labeled "terrorism" in official British accounts. At this time, "Irish terrorism" was synonymous with the IRA in British security discourses.
However, in the late 1970's and early 1980's, some nonviolent actions of the IRA and related international attention disrupted this official British narrative of state actions as counterterrorism and the IRA as violent, irrational "terrorists". Chief among these events was a series of hunger strikes by Republican prisoners. These hunger strikes322 and the subsequent hard line response by the British state drew international attention as the
322 There were a series of hunger strikes during the late 1970s-early 1980s. I have used "IRA hunger strikes" to refer to the 1981 hunger strikes, which began on March 1, 1981. For a more comprehensive overview of the strikes, please see http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/hstrike/index.html (accessed March 30, 2008) and Tom Collins, The Irish Hunger Strike (Dublin, Belfast: White Island Book Co., 1986). For an article which examines how legitimacy was constructed within media representations of the strikes, see: Aogan Mulcahy, "Claims-making and the construction oflegitimacy: press coverage of the 1981 Northern Irish hunger strike," Social Problems 42, no. 4 (November 1995): 449-67. 163
hunger strikers were sympathetically regarded by many. The hunger strikes, which were non violent, were also characterized as "terrorism" in official British accounts but this representation was challenged in local and international circles as the IRA hunger strikers were not using violence.
Thus, in the few years prior to 1984, it had been the IRA hunger strikers who had dominated the news about and from Northern Ireland. In these representations, the IRA were gaining sympathy as the international community disapproved of Britain's refusal to compromise even as the IRA hunger strikers were dying on people's television screens.
Responding to the hunger strikers' call to be treated as prisoners of war, then Prime
Minister Thatcher said, " ... the Government cannot concede, since it would encourage further blackmail and support for terrorism. We cannot treat persons convicted of criminal offences as prisoners of war, which is what they want."323
In terms of stake, British interest was still countering terrorism since the hunger strikes were represented in official accounts as acts by "terrorists". At the same time, these formulations indicate how the language of terrorism was, by now, used to generally refer to the IRA and its actions, even if non violent (as in the case of the hunger strikes).
This was exemplified in Thatcher's remarks after the death ofIRA hunger striker Bobby
Sands: "Her Majesty's Government are on the side of protecting the law-abiding and innocent citizen and we shall continue in our efforts to stamp out terrorism. Mr. Sands was a convicted criminal. He chose to take his own life. It was a choice that his
323 Margaret Thatcher, "Letter to Cardinal Thomas 0 Fiaich (Hunger Strikes)," Margaret Thatcher Foundation, May 15, 1981, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid= 104650 (accessed May 20, 2009). 164
organisation did not allow to many of its victims."324 Here, 'terrorism' is linked with
("the criminal") Bobby Sands and it is his choice that led to his death thus differentiating
the state from responsibility. Similar to "Bloody Sunday" it is the victim (those who died
in the march, Mr. Sands) who is responsible for their death and the state's responsibility
is to not give in to such "terrorism". While the reproduction of the British counterterrorist
state was explicitly noted during the hunger strikes, the strikes also provided a site for
increasing internationalization of the IRA identity and were a space for alternative
meaning-making about the IRA. Since the hunger strikers explicitly used the rhetoric of
civil rights and human rights in their protests, they gained international sympathy.
International media were sympathetic to the views of the hunger strikers. 325 Families of
hunger strikers gave interviews to international media and appeared on morning
television in the United States.:. Most of Britain's allies, especially Ireland, emphasized
the need to search for peace and urged discussions with the IRA rather than letting the
hunger strikers die. When Bobby Sands finally died, over 100,000 people looked on from
the streets as his funeral procession went through Belfast. This was widely reported
around the world and images of the funeral procession (and the crowds lining the streets)
were published and broadcast worldwide. This contrasted with British representations of
events in Northern Ireland as a domestic and internal matter. The hard line taken by
Britain during the strikes also led to strained relations between Britain and Ireland.
324 Margaret Thatcher, "House of Common PQs," Margaret Thatcher Foundation, May 5, 1981, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=l 04641 (accessed May 20, 2008)
325 "A contemporary survey of 73 newspapers around the world suggested world opinion was sympathetic to the Republican cause," BBC on this day, "IRA Maze Hunger Strikes at an End," October 3, 1981, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/3/newsid 2451000/2451503.strn (accessed April 13, 2008). 165
At the international level, British officials also had to make sense of the Falklands
War and establish (domestic) authority for intervention in a far-off part of the world. In
1982, less than a year after the end of the hunger strikes, almost 300 British troops died during a two-month war on the other side of the world from Britain. The response to increasing internationalization and disapproval of British government actions was a hawkish foreign policy and increased emphasis on counter-(IRA)terrorism, with Prime
Minister Thatcher claiming, " ... Britain is not prepared to be pushed around. We have ceased to be a nation in retreat."326 Thus, as during "Bloody Sunday'', there was a tension in the identity of the state produced in the period preceding the Brighton bombing. On the one hand, Britain was a counterterrorist state, threatened by terrorism. In this formulation,
Northern Ireland was a domestic issue and the state was resisting attempts by other actors
(for example, the Republic oflreland) to become involved in the conflict in Northern
Ireland. Threats were, thus, internal to the state and had to be responded by the state. On the other hand, overseas events such as the Falklands war were also threats to the state.
There was a tension over how threats were represented in official accounts (domestic, terrorist) and in the location of the threats themselves (Falklands).
At the same time, the use of 'terrorism' as a reason for the British state's
(in)action and hardline approach to the IRA hunger strikers ensured the link between anti-terrorist actions and a need to safeguard 'freedom' and 'democracy', continually reproduced during British descriptions of the hunger strikes, continued. In the early
1980s, race riots were occurring in major British cities, there was high unemployment
326 Margaret Thatcher, "Speech to Conservative Rally at Cheltenham," Margaret Thatcher Foundation, July 3, 1982, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=104989 (accessed April 12, 2008) 166
and, in March 1984, miners began striking over government-ordained pit closures. All
these contributed to expanding sites of violence from the IRA to additional actors and,
yet, loyalist paramilitaries were still not part of official designation of threats. This also
meant there was constant negotiation over who constituted a threat to the state with this
negotiation complicated by the non-violent IRA hunger strikes and the violence used by
miners and other protesters. So, as an analysis of the Brighton bombing shows, while the
label of "terrorist" was firmly applied to the IRA by 1984, there were general concerns
about "terrorism" and "extremism" as dangers to the British state. In contrast to "Bloody
Sunday" and even the IRA hunger strikes when there were two clear interpretive
repertoires -- that of democracy and danger (terrorism) -- available for choice, the
Brighton bombing provided an opportunity to further contrast democracy (Britain) with
terrorism (IRA). Unlike "Bloody Sunday'', however, there was less usage of "IRA" to
refer to the group. Instead, "terrorist" or "Irish terrorism" were commonplace when
referring to IRA activities. A new issue was the struggle over 'security' and its place in a
free and democratic state. In the section following "Bloody Sunday", I shall once again
trace major linguistic commonplaces, note how they were linked (and differentiated
from) 'state' and 'terrorist' identities and trace out any disruptions to the counterterrorism narrative. t h at was present at t h e time. . 327
In the decade following the 1984 Brighton bombing, the Cold War ended and there was increased attention paid to ongoing conflicts around the world. Northern
327 Once again, the sources are the UK Parliamentary sessions from October 12- October 18, 1984. However, since there were no sittings that directly discussed the Brighton bombing for some of those days, the October 22, 1984 debate on the bombing is also included. These are supplemented by official statements as reported to the media for a period of one week after the bombing itself (October 12, 1984 to October 18, 1984). 167
Ireland's conflict became well-known and efforts to end it intensified. The United States became more involved in advocating for peace in the region and calling for a non- military solution. In the British state's relations with the IRA and its political wing, Sinn
Fein, the Docklands bombing of 1996 came at a critical time when the British government was pushing for all-party talks and calling for a political settlement in
Northern Ireland. Prior to the Docklands bombing, there had been an IRA ceasefire since
August 31, 1994 when the group had announced a "complete cessation of military operations". The British broadcasting ban on Sinn Fein had been lifted in September
1994. Some IRA prisoners were released. Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams had met Irish,
British and United States government officials including, in 1995, the US President Bill
Clinton. In November 1995, the British and Irish governments had announced a "twin track" approach to the peace process, incorporating both decommissioning and all party talks. In early 1996, however, the British government responded to the Mitchell Report by calling for elections to precede all party talks, a procedure about which there was much disagreement. 328 There had been concern in various quarters that the peace process was moving too slowly. This was the situation in early 1996, just before the Docklands bombing occurred. This changed on February 10, 1996 at 7.0lpm local time. There was a large explosion in the Docklands area of London where numerous businesses, including the offices of various media companies, had their headquarters. Two people died in the blast and around 100 were injured, most of them with only superficial wounds. In
328 Not just Sinn Fein but other actors including the moderate Social Democratic and Labor Party and the Irish government were against elections preceding talks ("Bomb blasts rock London after IRA ends cease-fire," The Washington Post, February 10, 1996). For the full text of the Mitchell Report, see Senator George J. Mitchell (Chairman), General John de Chastelain, Mr. Harri Holkeri, Report of the International Body, January 22, 1996, http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=8741 (accessed July 10, 2009). 168
conventional security (and counterterrorism) terms, the commitment of a violent act (the
bombing) by a group (the IRA) labeled "terrorist" by the media and government should
have derailed or ended the peace process. But, the peace process did not end.
The puzzle, then, becomes: how did an act that could be considered "terrorism"
according to the definitions of terrorism at that time not end the peace process? The final
section of this chapter shall examine official accounts of the event and especially how the
language of terrorism was (or, in this case, was not) used in constructing stake so that it would be in the interest of the British state to continue negotiations with Sinn Fein. The
focus is on the language used (or not used) to describe groups commonly referred to as
"terrorist", and how this language-use had a significant role in creating a political context where talking to "terrorists" became a legitimate action for the state to pursue. A traditional study of the Docklands bombing would presume it to be a case of "terrorism"
and search for ways to improve the state's counterterrorism policy. This is, however,
inadequate at explaining how the peace process did not end in failure and how
antagonistic relations between the state and terrorists did not re-emerge after the
Docklands bombing. Representations -- of the event itself and of the actors -- were key in producing the identity of the state as one which could continue talking to (or leaving open the possibility of talking to) "terrorists". But first, the incident generally known as
"Bloody Sunday" will be reviewed and official accounts of it examined in order to note if
(and how) the concepts of "terrorist" and "terrorism" were used and the attendant state/other identities produced. 169
"Bloody Sunday" and the Production of Threats Against the British State
Let me start with a brief interaction that occurred on the floors of the House of
Commons on January 31, 1972, the day after the incident which later came to be known as "Bloody Sunday":329
Frank McManus, MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Unity Party): On a point of order. It is a fact that a Member of this House, the hon. Member for Mid-Ulster (Miss Devlin) was the subject of a murderous attempt on her life yesterday on a platform at Derry and that she has not been allowed to speak in this short exchange.
Selwyn Lloyd, the Speaker of the House of Commons (Conservative Party): The hon. Lady has raised two points of order. I must remain in control of the proceedings.
330 Bernadette Devlin, MP for Mid-Ulster (Unity Party) : On a point of order. I am the only person in this House who was present yesterday when, whatever the facts of the situation might be said-[Interruption.] Shut up! I have a right, as the only representative in this House who was an eye witness, to ask a question of that murdering hypocrite-
Hon. Members: Order!
Miss Devlin: I will ask him a question-
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Lady has no such right. She has that right only if she is called on by me.
329 The term "Bloody Sunday" has been used to refer to other events within and outside of Northern Ireland. It is not just state's use of violence that labeled as "Bloody" since "Bloody Friday" is used to commonly refer to the events of July 21, 1972 when nine people were killed by the IRA in Belfast (http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/bfriday/nio/nio72.htm, accessed May 10, 2009). For my dissertation, "Bloody Sunday" indicates the incident of January 30, 1972 when 14 people died.
330 In possibly one of the earliest labelings of the event as "Bloody Sunday", Ms. Devlin later said during a Parliamentary debate: "This is not our first bloody Sunday at the hands of the British Army", Bernadette Devlin, February 1, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 298 http://hansard.rnillbanksystems.com/commons/ 1972/feb/O 1/northern-ireland#column 298 (accessed March 10, 2008). 170
Miss Devlin: rose-[Interruption.]
Paul Rose, MP for Manchester Blackley (Labour Party): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. It is well known to many hon. Members who received direct eye-witness reports from Derry yesterday that the hon. Lady the Member for Mid-Ulster (Miss Devlin) with my noble Friend and others on that platform were forced to prostrate themselves while a hail of bullets was fired in their direction and that you, Mr. Speaker, refused to call one of those people who were present-
Hon Members: Shame!
Mr. Rose: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Although there can be no excuse for the conduct of the hon. Lady just now, which is most reprehensible, is it not right that that was provoked by a murderous attempt on her and by your attempt to silence her?
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member has no right to challenge my decision. What I was about to say to the hon. Lady was that the place for her to give her account of what happened is the inquiry. That is where she should rightly make her statement.
Stan Orme, MP for Salford West (Labour Party): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker, I believe that the situation this afternoon has been heightened by the hon. Lady the Member for Mid-Ulster (Miss Devlin) not being allowed to put her point of view whether the House agrees with it or not. She is the elected Member for Mid-Ulster. She was present at the demonstration. Surely it would have been in the interests of democracy for the hon. Lady to have been heard (emphasis added)
Mr. Speaker: I called the hon. Lady twice to points of order. I was about to point out to her that the proper place for her to give her evidence was not to the House but to the committee of inquiry.
Tom Boardman, MP for Leicester South West (Conservative Party): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker, I seek your guidance. What is the position of an hon. Member who, having taken the oath, incites others to break the law?
Hon. Members: Sit down!
Mr. Boardman: I refer in particular to the hon. Lady the Member for Mid-Ulster (Miss Devlin), who must bear a very heavy responsibility for yesterday's tragic events. 331
331 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 830, January 31, 1972, cols. 41-42 http://hansard.millbanksystems.conv'commons/1972/jan/31/northern-ireland#column 41 (accessed March 10, 2008). 171
As a short exchange (of many) on "Bloody Sunday" in the British Parliament, this
interaction is not well-publicized.332 However, as an indication of the subject positionings
produced at the time, it is useful for analysis. First, Miss Devlin was an eyewitness to the
events of January 30, 1972 in Londonderry333 and yet, here, she was not allowed to present her view of the incident until much later in the proceedings (by which time various MPs had put forth their favorable views of the Army's action). Overall, though, the discourse of democracy -- that it would be "democratic" to allow Ms. Devlin (even though her representation of the event might be different to those of others) can be noted.
To let Ms. Devlin speak would have been democratic, to silence her is against
'democracy'. This indicates how concerns about terrorism and violence were usually balanced against considerations of 'democracy' even within official accounts.
Another facet of 'democracy' as it is commonly understood, that of civil rights, was central to discussions about "Bloody Sunday" itself. While the marchers drew upon the rhetoric of civil rights when justifying their marching, security forces and official accounts claimed "Bloody Sunday" was an "illegal march". Indeed, the march itself and its organizers were constructed such that they were differentiated from the (legal, law-
332 Though it did make for a fascinating read of media representations of female MPs as the newspaper The Times described Ms. Devlin as "diminutive", "mini-skirted", and with "her long dark tresses flying" "took off'/ "threw herself' at "the normally unflappable" Mr. Maudling (The Times, "March Ends in Shooting," February 1, 1972: 1 and 5). While the scope of a gender-based analysis of UK Parliamentary identities is beyond the scope of this project, it was an intriguing glimpse into representational politics within a seemingly neutral description of events by a (then) well-respected newspaper.
333 While aware of the political issues behind naming in conflict situations and especially in Northern Ireland, I've maintained "Londonderry" as the term used throughout this project unless it is specifically referred to as "Derry" by the speaker(s). Contemporary official government texts referred to the city as Londonderry. This was also the case with international media reports, which were often based on British press releases and government statements. 172
abiding) identities of security forces. Two basic discourses can be noted in accounts immediately following "Bloody Sunday": one, how the march and the marchers were linked with dangerous IRA gunmen and as against state stability. Two, that "Bloody
Sunday" was a domestic security ("home") issue of Britain. These representations of
"Bloody Sunday" reinforced the dangerous nature of the IRA while, at the same time, linking a significant section of the local people with the IRA. Here, 'democracy' was noted as a quality of the state and something that was being threatened by the activities of the marchers. In short, representations of the march produced the state's representatives- the security forces-- as having acted to safeguard 'democracy' and 'the people' and prevent an "illegal march. "334
There were a series of linguistic strategies at play in how "Bloody Sunday" was constructed as an "illegal march". These linked the marches with IRA activities, thus constituting both as anti-democratic (state) and anti-security. They included naming the event itself and representations of the Army and the participants (victims, marchers, and so on). 'The people' thus had a dual identity, as both supporters of the IRA as well as needing to be protected by the state. There were, however, other alternative discourses available for meaning-making but these were given less relevance in official identity formation even though they were raised during discussions and in media reports. These alternative resources included: (i) the option of a united Ireland as one of the solutions to the ongoing situation in Northern Ireland, (ii) concern about the Inquiry, (iii) calls for international involvement in dealing with the conflict and (iv) there being no military solution to Northern Ireland. These alternative meanings are useful to elucidate since the
334 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th series, January 31, 1972 to February 6, 1972. 173
commonsensical view of "Bloody Sunday" today is that it was a case of state repression.
By re-reading official accounts of the time, it is possible to examine how linguistic strategies of stake management and establishing authority responded to these alternative ways of making sense while state officials performatively reproduced state identity as counterterrorist. The state that emerged from these representations was one which was counter-IRA but also linked a significant proportion of its own citizens with 'terrorism' while constituting marches as sites for potential ('terrorist') violence.
Naming 30/1: An Illegal March Infiltrated by the IRA
Official accounts labeled the events of January 30, 1972 as an "illegal march" and later, in the official Widgery Report, as a "riot".335 By calling it "illegal'', the participants were then constructed as having acted against the state instead of being part of a civil rights protest. As R. Jackson writes, "Because words have histories, the act of naming things is always a highly charged process that can have serious political and social consequences. "336 Speaking in Parliament the day after the event, Defence Secretary Lord
Carrington stated: "This, of course, was an illegal march and it was up to the security
335 Where there were a few mentions of the event as a "riot" in the days immediately following the march, this label was more commonplace by April 1972 when the Widgery Report was published. The Widgery Report is the common term for Lord Widgery, Report of the Tribunal Appointed to Inquire into the Events on Sunday, Jdh January 1972, Which Led to Loss ofLife in Connection with the Procession in Londonderry on That Day (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1972). Full text available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/widgery.htm (accessed June 10, 2008). In future citations of this document in this dissertation, it will be referred to as The Widgery Report. Lord Widgery was the presiding (and sole) member of this Tribunal. In the Widgery Report, the description of the event as a "riot" is common. By constituting the event as a "riot", security forces who used violence against the protesters were not just stopping an illegal march or acting against the civil rights movement but were safeguarding against "rioters". Thus, the usage of 'riot' and 'rioters' within official narratives constituted a specific position for the participants -- that of threats against the state and society, even if they were not (directly) linked with the IRA.
336 R. Jackson, Writing, 23. 174
forces to stop it at some point, and they decided to stop it where they did. In the event, they were attacked by these disorderly elements and they felt it necessary to go in and arrest some of them, and that is where the trouble took place."337 Indeed, the term, "the illegal march" was commonly used to refer to the incident in the Parliamentary discussions. This had the effect of assigning blame for what happened to those who had organized and participated in "the illegal march". The marches themselves were then described by the Minister of State for Defence (Junior Defence Secretary) Lord Balniel as a "chance for it [the IRA] to create trouble."338 rather than being held to raise awareness of civil rights issues or to protest against internment, as the participants claimed they were.
In addition to assigning blame, naming was also important in constructing
"Bloody Sunday" as a domestic issue and thus under the British state's responsibility.
The geographical marker of "Londonderry" firmly established 'Bloody Sunday' as a domestic, internal matter. This was contrary to the march organizers' representations which sought to internationalize their actions by using the language of human/civil rights during their protests. The march was organized by the Northern Irish Civil Rights
Association (NICRA) as a march against the internment policy. By calling it an "incident in Londonderry", official representations clearly demarcated Bloody Sunday as a
337 Lord Carrington, January 31, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol 327, col 515, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1972/jan/31/northem-ireland-londonderry- shootings#colurnn 515 (accessed June 20, 2008).
338 Lord Balniel, The Minister of State for Defence, February 1, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 273, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1972/feb/Ol/northem ireland#colurnn 273 (accessed June 20, 2008). 175
domestic event, one which fell within the jurisdiction of the state. 339 Nationalists called
the city "Derry", a term which was not commonly used in British reports or in newspaper
stories about the incident. The term by which the incident is commonly known today,
"Bloody Sunday", was not commonplace at that time. In official accounts, the event
became known as "disturbances in Londonderry", "tragic events in Londonderry",
"Londonderry shootings'', "loss of life in connection with the procession in
Londonderry. "340 and so on. In terms of managing stake, by establishing "Bloody
Sunday" as a domestic event, the state was positioned as having responsibility for
responding (and for investigation).
The Participants: The Marchers and the IRA
Contemporary official representations of "Bloody Sunday" depicted it as a
defensive act by British security forces, one which was necessary to protect the security
forces and (the few) non violent local people and commercial enterprises. Identities of the
marchers (as threats) and the Army (as safeguarding against threats) were produced out
of these representations. For example, a statement made in the House of Commons by the
Home Secretary Reginald Maudling on day after the incident claimed that the
"disturbances in Londonderry" were caused when "a large number of trouble-makers refused to accept the instructions of the march stewards and attacked the Army with
339 At the same time, the participants were described as "Irish" (not "British" or even "the people", as was done later). Thus their subject positioning in the security discourse was as "not British".
340 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., January 31, 1972 to February 6, 1972. 176
stones, bottles, steel bars and canisters of C.S."341 This description links participants with
'attack', thus constructing them as violent. At the same time, they are also disobedient and deliberately ignoring the Army's instructions.
However, in the period immediately following the incident, there was a distinction made between ordinary marchers and these "trouble-makers'', a distinction that was less common by the time the Widgery Report was published in April 1972. A couple of days after "Bloody Sunday", Minister of State Lord Balniel said:
Between 4.5 and 4.10, the brigade commander ordered the 1st Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, to launch an arrest operation against the rioters, who, as I have said, were well separated from the marchers. These rioters were flagrantly breaking the law; hurling missiles at the troops and establishing a degree of violence which was quite unacceptable. The level of their violence was highly dangerous to the police and the Army. 342
Even though there had been no official investigation as yet, a statement about what had happened was thus made public by the Minister of State himself. By the time the Widgery Report was published in April 1972, "terrorists" and "rioters" were the more common labels used when referring to the marchers. In the Report, it was mentioned, that the Army was "given instructions progressively to regain the initiative from the terrorists and impose the rule of law"343 and "the hooligan gangs in Londonderry constituted a special threat to security."344 By then, three months had passed and the struggle over
341 Reginald Maulding, Home Secretary, January 31, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 32, http://hansard.millbanksysterns.com/commons/1972/jan/3 l/northem ireland#column 32 (accessed June 20, 2008; emphasis added).
342 Lord Balniel, February 1, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 275, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1972/feb/O I /northern-ireland#column 27 5 (accessed June 20, 2008).
343 W idgery, n 12.
344 Widgery, nl4. 177
labeling the participants had been fixed as they were 'rioters' or even 'terrorists', rather
than just marchers. 345
These identities were not as clear-cut in the days immediately following "Bloody
Sunday", though even then the security forces were represented as working to prevent an
"illegal march". 'Illegal march' and 'violence' were linked with 'the marchers' to
produce their identity as responsible for what had occurred. Speaking on February 1,
1972, Home Secretary Maudling claimed,
I say again that the people who organised this procession, though I readily recognise that they did all they could to make sure that it was lawful and peaceful, must have known-they were warned about this-that hooligan elements, as they often associate themselves with processions, would use the shield of the procession to conduct violent attacks on the British Army. The people who carried out that procession did so in the knowledge of this danger, and therefore carry responsibility [for the event].346
Referring to the IRA, "IRA gunmen" were claimed to have shot at British troops, thus necessitating a reaction and leading to the events of "Bloody Sunday."347 Indeed, civil rights marches were linked with IRA activities as in this statement made by the
Minister of State for Defence Lord Balniel: "Civil rights marches suit the I.R.A. 's tactics and purposes well -- not just because of their propaganda value but also because they
345 Ibid.
346 Maulding, February 1, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 325, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1972/feb/O l/northern-ireland#column 325 (accessed June 20, 2008)This was repeated in the first conclusion of the Widgery Report which read, "There would have been no deaths in Londonderry on Jan 30 if those who had organised the illegal march had not thereby created a highly dangerous situation in which a clash between demonstrators and the security forces was almost inevitable".
347 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, vol. 830, January 31, 1972; Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, vol. 830, February 1, 1972. 178
give it a chance to create trouble."348 Another theme about the IRA was of its
involvement in long-term violence, even war, and "Bloody Sunday" was part of this
instead of one in a series of protests against internment. Later in the same speech, Lord
Balniel positioned the IRA as fighting a military and propaganda war against the state as
he said:
We must also recognise that the LR.A. is waging a war, not only of bullets and bombs but of words. It is waging a highly skilled war of propaganda, in which corpses, the unutterable sadness ofrelatives, the confusion, the gullibility and the downright lies are all brought into play.349
At the same time, the theme of Britain being at war (and thus justifying the
presence and actions of British security forces) and a need to defend against the IR.A's
war was introduced. If those present at the march were not just civil rights activists, not just civilians but were part of a war, then the state that killed some of these participants
was merely protecting its own (good) citizens and ensuring security.
When the concept "terrorist" was used, it was clearly linked with the IRA. This,
along with the constitution of marches as sites for IRA activity, had the effect of reinscribing Catholic/IRA and Protestant/(British) state identities. It was common to talk
of "the Catholic community" or "Catholic priest [name]" as identity markers and
'Catholic' was linked with and sympathetic to 'terrorists'. This can be seen, for example, in these comments made by the head of the armed forces at the time, the Defence
Secretary Lord Carrington who said, " ... the sad fact is that, for reasons that go beyond
348 Lord Balniel, February 1, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 273, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/l 972/feb/O l/northern-ireland#column 273 (accessed June 20, 2008).
349 Ibid., col. 270, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/l 972/feb/O l/northern ireland#column 270 (accessed January 12, 2009). 179
intimidation, a sizeable part of the Catholic community is sympathetic to the terrorists
and is willing, in varying degrees, to afford them shelter, and even positive assistance."350
By saying so, Lord Carrington clearly links 'the Catholic community' with 'terrorism', a
formulation that would continue in the years ahead.
Official accounts also linked 'the marchers' and 'the IRA' so both could be
positioned as being responsible for the violence that had occurred. Additionally, the use
of "war" to describe the march meant the use of violence (by the state) could be
legitimated. However, despite this acceptance of IRA terrorism being a growing concern,
there were other views about the IRA even within the government. There was
disagreement over the IRA's strength and even normalization of its actions as those of
"all guerillas". There were also related descriptions of the IRA as weakening. To
underscore this supposed weakness of the IRA, Lord Balniel said:
The pattern of events in recent months has shown the continued ability of LR.A. terrorists to wreak havoc and destruction. However, if we analyse the recent activities of bombers and gunners we do not see a picture of growing strength but rather one of growing desperation ... Some areas of Belfast which were previously largely under terrorist domination have now become nearly trouble-free.351
However, the IRA at that time were not considered irredeemable. Lord Annan, a
member of the House of Lords, said, "all we know is that the violence is there, and that we are dealing with an appalling situation where you have a terrorist organisation which
operates from strongly patriotic motives, and whose methods are the usual methods
350 Lord Carrington, February 2, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 327, col. 834, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/l 972/feb/02/the-situation-in-northem-ireland#column 834 (accessed May 12, 2008). Lord Carrington was also a former leader of the House of Lords and a member of the Conservative Party.
351 Lord Balniel, February 1, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 273, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/ 1972/feb/O 1/northem-ireland#column 27 3 (accessed June 20, 2008). 180
which all guerillas use."352 Indeed, in this formulation, there was little that was special or unique about the IRA since they were using similar tactics that "all guerillas" use and were operating under "strongly patriotic motives". These types of identity constructions -
- that there might be a legitimate "patriotic" reason for "terrorist" actions -- would become less common over time. But they were present in the immediate aftermath of the event.
The British Army: Calmly Performing their Duty
While the marchers were depicted as deliberately breaking the law and taking part in an illegal march, the British Army were described as doing their duty and defending themselves against great provocation. Discussing the role of the Army, Home Secretary
Maudling said, "the Army was acting under normal instructions, which is to deal with breaches of the law, to apprehend lawbreakers, and to do both with the minimum necessary force."353 The state -- represented by the Army -- was under threat but used minimum force in defending itself. Speaking two days after the event, Lord Balniel described what had occurred as:
The soldiers continued to arrest the rioters whom they had chased. They arrested about 28 in a matter of a few minutes. At the same time, they came under fire from gunmen, nail bombers and petrol bombers, some in the flats and some at
352 Lord Annan, February 2, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 327, col. 871, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/ 197 2/feb/02/the-si tuati on-in-n011hem-ireland#column 8 71 (accessed March 10, 2008). Lord Annan goes on to recommend that "the Cabinet and certainly the Secretary of State for Defence"watch the film The Liberation ofAlgiers so the government would realize "you cannot win a war ofthis kind''. He adds, "We are too incapable of fighting the kind of a11-out war which will eliminate a terrorist movement."
353 Maudling, January 31, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 34, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1972/jan/3 l/northem-ireland#column 34 (accessed June 22, 2009). 181
ground level. Between 4.17 and 4.35 p.m., a number of these men were engaged. Some gunmen and bombers were certainly hit and some almost certainly killed. In each case, soldiers fired aimed shots at men identified as gunmen or bombers. They fired in self-defence or in defence of their comrades who were threatened. I reject entirely the suggestion that they fired indiscriminately or that they fired into a peaceful and innocent crowd ... 354
Here, "aimed shots" is used to describe the Army's actions, thus constituting the
Army and its actions as rational and level-headed while the (violent) participants are described as having attacked the Army with "firearms" and even bombs. Coming directly after the event at a time when there had been no official record or investigation, such descriptions helped establish marchers (and marches) as sites of violence and as threats to state stability, thus needing state actions to control them.
While 'the Army' shot at "identified gunmen or bombers", it was also positioned as having been fired upon first. Home Secretary Maudling, speaking the day after the event said:
... when the Army advanced to make arrests among the trouble-makers they came under fire from a block of flats and other quarters. At this stage the members of the orderly, although illegal, march were no longer in the near vicinity. The Army returned the fire directed at them with aimed shots and inflicted a number of casualties on those who were attacking them with firearms and with bombs. 355
The Army was thus presented as only doing its job to defend itself and its surroundings from gunmen and terrorists as well as preventing long-term violence while being in great danger themselves.
354 Lord Balniel, February 1, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 276, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/ 1972/feb/O 1/northem-ireland#column 27 6 (accessed June 20, 2008; emphasis added).
355 Maudling, January 31, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 34, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1972/jan/31/northem-ireland#column 34 (accessed June 22, 2008). 182
Reiterating this viewpoint, the Minister of State for Defence Lord Balniel said,
The security forces are trying to fulfil their task in incredibly difficult circumstances under orders to use no more force than is necessary to preserve law and order. In the process of using minimum force they have suffered many casualties and death. This weekend, for instance, another soldier died of his wounds.356
The Army and the local people were placed in opposition to each other, with the
Army having to counter 'rioters'. The Home Secretary explained, "The Army was there yesterday to assist the civil power in enforcing the law against a deliberate attempt to break the law. That is our duty, and when people fire on troops, when people attack soldiers with bullets and bombs, they must expect retaliation."357 In these conceptualizations, the security of the state and society was at stake and under threat from the people who were deliberately breaking the law. That such actions on the part of the marchers were commonplace and had become normalized358 was not often mentioned in official representations immediately following "Bloody Sunday". Instead, the representations of the Army were thus: local hooligans were threatening the rule of law, the Army had tried its best to cooperate with the local communities through its hands-off
356 Lord Balniel, February 1, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 272- 273, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/ 1972/feb/O 1/northem- ireland#S5CV0830PO 19720201 HOC 295 (accessed June 22, 2008).
357 Maudling, January 31, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 36, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1972/jan/31/northem-ireland#column 36 (accessed June 20, 2008)
358 "Normalized" here refers to the activity of those who continued organizing marches, despite there being a law banning marches. It also refers to the acceptance oflow-level violence (such as stone-throwing by local youths) by the security forces. See Peter Pringle and Philip Jacobson, "Those are Real Bullets, Aren't They?" Bloody Sunday, Derry, 30 January 1972 (New York: Grove Press, 2002) for further elaboration of how it was "normal" (and not unexpected) for youths to throw stones and even crude home-made bombs at the army, especially in the period following Internment. The Introduction of the Widgery Report also mentions such low-level violence as commonplace. Hence, it should not have been a surprise to the troops that there were frequent clashes and stone-throwing during "Bloody Sunday". 183
approach, but violence remained high and it was necessary to counter this violence and
re-establish the rule oflaw. Thus, 'the people' also had a dual identity -- they were
threatened (and needed to be protected by the state) but were also violent lawbreakers.
In terms of responsibility, the British state was constructed as having a gentle
approach to policing and security in Northern Ireland. 359 The (violent) participants
themselves were thus responsible for the amount of force used against them as this
comment by the Home Secretary suggests:
People who attack British soldiers with bullets and bombs are themselves responsible for the degree of force that the Army has to use to resist them ... That ban [on marches] was legal. This march was organised clearly in deliberate contravention of it and, that being so, how could any Government do other than instruct their security forces to prevent a breach of the law? That is what took place. The security forces were told to prevent the march and they prevented it with the minimum use of force. 360
Finally, in representations of the Army and its actions, commonplaces of
'Britishness' was contrasted with 'Irishness' when describing the (British) Army and the
(Irish) marchers. Indeed, the Army could not have fired first not just because they always
used minimal force and were well-trained but also because they were British. This
formulation can be noted in the Lord Chancellor's comment, "I say now, and I do not
believe that I shall be contradicted, that it is unthinkable that any British Government, of
whatever complexion, would authorize the indiscriminate destruction of life. I believe it
359 See, for example, the "overview of the events in Londonderry during the past six months" section of the Widgery Report. The Army planned to "reduce the level of military activity" (Widgery, nlO) and engage in "passive containment" (Widgery, nl 1) despite the "increasingly common sniping and bombing" (Widgery, nl 1). Even official reports acknowledged a (low) level of violence was normal in Northern Ireland.
360 Maudling, February 1, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 324-25, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1972/feb/O 1/northem-ireland#colunm 324 (accessed June 20, 2009). See also Lord Balniel's statement during the same Parliamentary session. 184
quite unthinkable that British troops would obey such an order if it were given."361 This, once again, has the effect of positioning the participants (even without the IRA) as "not
British", not part of those the state should protect. Indeed, the participants' "Irishness" made them engage in rowdiness and rioting and ultimately responsible for what happened. As a member of the House of Lords, Lord Burnham summed up:
... there seems to be quite a considerable proportion of the hooligan element who so far have regarded rioting as a game, relying on the policy of the British Government and the restraint and discipline of the British Army. It is not for nothing that the Irish have a reputation for courage and for loving a good "scrap". It seems to me that the use of such weapons as rubber bullets and water cannon fits in entirely with that sort of philosophy. Unfortunately, rough games, as many of us were told in our childhood, usually end in tears. Hitherto, the security forces, in a praiseworthy attempt to avoid over-reaction, seemed to have allowed such activities as bus-burning, building barricades and stoning troops to continue for considerable periods before taking any action. It is only when the situation becomes altogether intolerable that they sally forth with the intention of arresting some of those involved. It is in the confusion of such metes, that the gunmen are so well able to pursue their own evil ends. I can understand the reluctance to take drastic action until it is essential. However, it must be easier to stop a riot or to disperse an illegal assembly at the start rather than when it is in full swing and tempers are aroused. 362
The 1972 Inquiry
Despite these representations of 'the people' as participating in an 'illegal march' and the Army as justified in acting, there remained concern over investigating what had happened. The government's establishment of a one-man Tribunal led by a British judge
361 The Lord Chancellor, February 1, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 327, col. 77 4, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/l 972/feb/O 1/tribunals-of-inguiry-evidence-act- 1921 #column 774 (accessed March 2, 2009).
362 Lord Burnham, February 2, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 327, col. 913, http ://hansard.millbanks ystems. com/lords/ 1972/feb/02/the-situation-in- northem-ireland#co lumn 913 (accessed March 2, 2009). 185
was questioned even prior to its inception.363 The potential for a lack of impartiality was put forth as a major concern and international participation in the investigation was called for. The possible lack of legitimacy of a government-backed Inquiry was a concern raised, among others, by Gerry Fitt, MP for Belfast West. Fitt said,
Will the right hon. Gentleman take it from me that people in Northern Ireland will not accept the findings of any inquiry which is set up under the auspices of a Tory Government? The only inquiry they will accept is one set up under international auspices such as the United Nations.364
Such a question, however, led to responses where state officials drew upon the commonplace of sovereignty and "domesticized" the event. The Home Secretary
Reginald Maudling's response to concerns of neutrality was to reassert British sovereignty by saying, "the Government intend this inquiry to be impartial. We do not intend to hand over our responsibility for any part of the United Kingdom to an international body. "365 Here, at stake was British sovereignty and calls for having non-
British presence on the Tribunal were considered interference into British domestic affairs. An event that was contrary to the notion of a liberal state became understood as a domestic affair where the state acted to maintain its peace and security by countering violent actors -- rioters, gunmen and terrorists -- to ensure the safety of its people.
363 Merlyn Rees, January 31, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 33, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1972/jan/31 /northem- ireland#S5CV0830PO 19720131 HOC 207 (accessed March 2, 2009).
364 Gerry Fitt, January 31, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 35, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/l 972/jan/3 l/northem- ireland#S5CV0830PO 19720131 HOC 215 (accessed June 12, 2008).
365 Maudling, January 31, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 35, http ://hansard.millbanks ystems.corn/ commons/ 1972/j an/31 /northem- ireland#S5CV 0830PO 19720131 HOC 214 (accessed June 20, 2009). 186
Other Representations: Democracy and Civil rights, Internationalization, no Military Solution
There were also alternative narratives about "Bloody Sunday" present during its immediate aftermath but these were not drawn upon in official accounts. Media reports quoted some eyewitnesses'claims that the dead were unarmed. 366 Even within the interpretive repertoire of "Bloody Sunday" being a site of violence, who actually shot first was debated during the time. 367 The IRA consistently denied responsibility for having fired first and claimed its snipers only fired in response to shooting by the government forces. While the IRA could be positioned as an unreliable source, many eyewitnesses at the time also claimed participants of the march were not armed and that accounts of injuries were inconsistent. As MP Bernadette Devlin, an eyewitness to the events said,
The British Army stated that they fired only at identifiable objects, targets and people, people who were about to fire on them, snipers from the Rossville Street flats. Hon. Members may not be aware that the Rossville Street flats are 12 storeys high. If a British soldier shot at a sniper on the roof of those flats, that sniper would now be lying in hospital with multiple fractures, but there is not one body with such injuries as would indicate that the person had fallen from such a height. If those people were all snipers as the Minister of State for Defence says, or people throwing petrol bombs at the British Army, how does it come about that the majority happened to be shot in the back or in the back of the head?368
In addition, the abnormal reaction to normal events -- that confronting the British
Army was normal but being shot was not -- was emphasized in some discussions,
366 The Times, January 31, 1972 (entire edition).
367 Both The Times and The Guardian had extensive coverage with both including descriptions from eyewitnesses saying participants were unarmed and security forces had used excessive force.
368 Devlin, February 1, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 296-297, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1972/feb/01/northern-ireland#column 296 (accessed March 12, 2008). 187
including those in the British parliament. Ms. Devlin claimed that the previous penalty
for marching was jail, not being shot. 369 These formulations did not become normalized
in official discourses but were present at the time.
Another representation that was present was of "Bloody Sunday" as an
international event. The Irish Foreign Minister Dr Patrick Hillery called for United
Nations intervention and had discussions with United States officials about the event,
asking for help in establishing what had occurred. 37°Furthermore, disagreements over the
Tribunal and its composition also drew upon the need to examine the event from an
external perspective. It was claimed that an international presence in the Tribunal would
increase its legitimacy amongst the local people in Northern Ireland. 371 There was increasing violence in the Republic of Ireland in the days following Bloody Sunday.
Airport staff went on strike and the British embassy in Dublin was set on fire. 372 To respond to these alternative formulations of "Bloody Sunday", British officials reiterated
"Bloody Sunday" as a domestic event where external links or viewpoints (e.g. of the Irish government) were disallowed (and irrelevant).
Within British government itself, however, another representation also present at
369 Ibid., col. 293.
370 Indeed, he said the British government had "gone mad". See "Britain has gone mad, Dr Hillery says in US," The Times, February 3, 1972, 4. The Republic oflreland also recalled its ambassador from London.
371 Some local actors in Northern Ireland, including NICRA, were skeptical about the impartiality of the Tribunal even before it began its work. See "Lord Widgery to sit as one-man tribunal on Londonderry clash," The Times, February 2, 1972, 1. Concerns were also raised during Parliamentary discussions (Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, cols. 264-331).
372 These are detailed in "Gelignite blast at British embassy in Dublin," The Times, February 2, 1972, 1 and "20,000 mob destroys Dublin Embassy," The Times, February 3, 1972, 1. 188
the time was that of there being no military solution in Northern Ireland. The possibility of a united Ireland was also raised, an option that became unthinkable (and unsayable) later during the conflict.373 In a parliamentary debate, the leader of the opposition Harold
Wilson said, " ... there will be no answer to this [Northern Ireland issue] on a basis purely of a military answer; that there has to be a political solution."374 Even Home Secretary
Maudling agreed, "Heaven alone knows, yesterday's events should add weight to the importance of finding a political solution." 375 Indeed, there were calls for talks even in this early period of the conflict as this following speech by the Liberal Democrat peer
Lord Beaumont indicates:
The military solution, at any rate anything like a short-term military solution, has failed ... We have two separate communities and it is very doubtful whether, in anything like the foreseeable future, the Army will be able to go into any Catholic area except as an invading and hostile army. The only solution left to us now is that of talking together, and it is that on which we must concentrate our ideas, as to how we are best to get all parties to this problem round the table and talking.376
The option for British troops moving out of Northern Ireland was even presented in Parliamentary discussions.377 These representations, unlike official ones, constituted
British troops as having failed to maintain security on the ground and, instead, as having
373 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 830, January 31, 1972 to February 6, 1972.
374 Harold Wilson, January 31, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 38, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1972/jan/31/n01ihem-ireland#column 38 (accessed June 22, 2009).
375 Maudling, January 31, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 39, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/ 1972/j an/31 /n01ihem- ireland#S5CV0830PO 19720131 HOC 230 (accessed June 20, 2009).
376 Lord Beaumont, February 2, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 327, cols. 823- 824 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/ 1972/feb/02/the-s ituation-in-northem- ireland#column 823(accessed May 10, 2009).
377 Fitt, January 31, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 830, col. 35, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/ 1972/jan/31/northem- ireland#S5CV0830PO 19720131 HOC 215 (accessed June 12, 2008). 189
contributed to further divisions among the Catholic and Protestant communities. Thus, official descriptions of "Bloody Sunday" were not as straightforward as is generally understood. Instead, what was normal -- to act against marchers and the IRA -- was still being debated in the immediate aftermath of the event. 378
State/IRA Identities Following "Bloody Sunday"
To reiterate, the puzzle here is: why did not the British state admit that "Bloody
Sunday" was an error by its security forces? By doing so, it could have retained international goodwill, and avoided a situation where many young people joined paramilitary organizations in order to protest what they saw as the injustice of the state.
Additionally, an admission of error might have avoided the situation in which a large segment of the population in Northern Ireland felt they were discriminated against by the state of which they were citizens. However, an admission of guilt by the state could have challenged its own identity as being the legitimate user of military force. As such, state officials described "Bloody Sunday" as one of many incidents in the IRA's war against the British state, and as an attack on the stability of a liberal democratic state. Within the
British security imaginary of that time, the Northern Irish protesters' discourse of democracy and civil rights did not "stick" as marches were represented as sites of IRA infiltration and violence and not civil rights struggles.
The shift in marchers' identities from civil rights protesters and engaging in commonplace, everyday low level violence to being linked with excessive violence and the IRA can be noted at the site of"Bloody Sunday". As Pringle and Jacobson note about
378 This was also noted in some MPs' criticisms of the internment policy, a criticism which cut across political divides. 190
Derry, by the time of Bloody Sunday, rioting had become commonplace: " ... most afternoons the youths chucked stones and the soldiers fired rubber bullets and canisters of
CS gas ... rioting became a daily ritual, creating local heroes out of those who took on the army. The spectacle made good television and the youths would sometimes take a break to see themselves on TV in a local bar."379 Small-scale violence was normalized by then.
British discourses about Bloody Sunday did not draw upon these normalized understandings. Instead, by a specific construction of the event, dangerous subjects were produced, subjects capable of and likely to harm society at large and threaten the British state.
Thus, the identity of the marchers shifted from civil rights protesters in the late
1960s and fairly harmless troublemakers engaging in everyday anti-security forces activities to violent rioters, supporters of terrorists and terrorists. Early descriptions of events and actors drew upon these meanings. For example, in discussions the day after
Bloody Sunday, Lord Carrington said, "I must say it is my information that some of those who were killed were some of the IRA men who were shooting at the Army ... ",380 even though it was unclear at that time what the actual sequence of events had been or who had been killed. These descriptions about the event and the participants served to produce the marchers as dangerous subjects, likely to destabilize state and society. The stake now became higher as the security forces were not just involved in maintaining an "acceptable
379 Pringle and Jacobson, 16.
38° Carrington, January 31, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 327, col. 517, http:/ /hansard. millbanks ystems. com/lords/ 1972/j an/31 /northem-ireland-londonderry shootings#S5LV0327PO 19720131 HOL 63 (accessed March 20, 2008). 191
level of violence" as Home Secretary Maudling had expressed it381 but in countering rioting and preventing illegal marches. "Bloody Sunday" thus helped set the foundations for what was at stake within official security discourses -- the stability of the state itself.
These categorizations had become further stabilized in the three months following the incident to when the Widgery Report, which remains the only official account of
"Bloody Sunday" was published. In the Widgery Report, the identities of state/terrorists were reproduced such that the state and its security forces were linked with safeguarding themselves (and the few non-violent marchers) against 'rioters', 'hooligans' and
'gunmen'. The soldiers, on the other hand, were depicted as merely doing their duty and being calm and resolute during chaos. About the soldiers, the Widgery Report had this to say:
A typical phrase is 'I saw a civilian aiming what I thought was a firearm and I fired an aimed shot at him'. In the main I accept these accounts as a faithful reflection of the soldier's recollection of the incident...There is no question of the soldiers firing in panic to protect their own skins. They were far too steady for that.. .In 1 Para the soldiers are trained to go for the gunmen and make their decisions quickly. In these circumstances it is not remarkable that mistakes were made and some innocent civilians hit. 382
Notice that in this depiction, "some innocent civilians" were "hit'', not that they were unarmed and shot dead by armed troops. The recurring trope of how soldiers were reasonable and rational can be explicitly noted here as security forces' mistakes are excused by apportioning blame to rioters and to the exigencies of the (chaotic)
381 See "Northern Ireland: Acceptable Violence?" Time, December 27, 1971 http://www. time.corn/time/magazine/article/0,9171,905596,00.html (accessed May 10, 2008) for further details on how British/IRA relations at this time included a certain amount of violence as "normal".
382 Widgery, n104. 192
situation.383 Despite eyewitnesses' claim that there was no continued firing by snipers during the march and, indeed, it was the security forces who continued to shoot, the
Widgery Report reiterated that the marchers had shot at the troops. In the Report, Lord
Widgery wrote, "I would not be surprised if in the relevant half hour as many rounds were fired at the troops as were fired by them. The soldiers escaped injury by reason of their superior field-craft and training."384
The discourse of a violent, terrorist group infiltrating an illegal march was the one that took hold and provided the basis for future representations of danger and the related constitution of the state threatened by terrorism. It was by magnifying violence of the
IRA, constituting marchers as allied to the IRA and minimizing the violent actions of its own troops that British security discourses thus produced the state as authorized to act against terror. As the Defence Secretary Lord Carrington said at the time, "There can be no concession to violence and terrorism. "385 When the two groups deviated from these constitutions -- participants were found to be unarmed, despite being shot; soldiers discharged weapons, despite orders which seemed to forbid such behavior -- it was the troops who were given the benefit of the doubt386 and their actions excused as accidental errors or misunderstandings. These positionings of state and IRA (and 'the people') were
383 Testimonies of some of the participants were described as shielding or protecting those who had started the shooting. Some were not allowed to speak as it was deemed their testimonies came too late to be included into the final Report (Widgery, n8, n48-49).
384 Widgery, n95; The soldiers were also described as "truthful'', Widgery, n104.
385 Carrington, February 2, 1972, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 327, col. 835, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1972/feb/02/the-situation-in-northem-ireland#column 835 (accessed May 22, 2008).
386 Widgery, n22, n23, n31. 193
noticeable in the next decade as more local people joined the IRA, Northern Ireland was governed by direct rule from London, the IRA stepped up its campaign of violence and various iterations of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1974) were established and used. 387
The Brighton Bombing: Terrorists on the Mainland
At 3am on October 12, 1984, during the Conservative Party's annual conference in Brighton, a bomb went off in the hotel where many of the party leaders, including
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, were staying. By the time the security forces cleared up the rubble, five people were dead and over 30 others injured. In terms of the number of people who died during the Northern Ireland conflict, there were other incidents which were deadlier. In terms of the worldwide publicity received by the event and it being the first (and only) time the entire British Cabinet had been targeted, Brighton was a critical moment in British discourses about the IRA. How the Brighton bombing was represented meant there could be a re inscribing of the democratic, freedom-defending anti-terrorist identity of the British state, an identity which had been questioned during the IRA hunger strikes and other disturbances including the Falklands war and ongoing protests by miners over pit closures.
The Brighton bombing was followed by the establishment of stronger anti- terrorism legislation as well as more extensive anti-terrorism powers for security forces, not just in Northern Ireland but also on mainland Britain. 'Brighton bombing' itself was used to remind people of what was at stake: the existence of the (democratic) state itself and the future of peace and security in a freedom-loving democracy. 'The IRA' could be
387 Established as a temporary measure in 1974, this Act was periodically renewed until 2000 when the more permanent Terrorism Act (2000) was established. 194
reproduced as dangerous and unpredictable, people who were irrational and who would have no hesitation striking anywhere at any time and even among high levels of government. Also, the domestic nature of 'terrorism' and the necessity of a strong state response to counter it were emphasized. At the same time, the 'terrorism' was linked with the production of a new group of violent actors -- not just the IRA but also miners, protesters, etc -- 'extremists' who threatened the security of the state and society. The dominant anti-terrorism discourse was also challenged by concerns over increased security measures and there was a spirited debate about the meaning of 'security' within official representations. On the other hand, external representations (e.g. of the Irish government) jointly created a shared view of the bombing as leading to "revulsion" against the IRA.388 Unlike during "Bloody Sunday" and even the recent hunger strikes, this joint action linked Britain with Ireland as potential problem-solvers. In the following sections, I shall examine the use of commonplaces of 'peace', 'democracy', 'terrorism' and 'security' in official accounts immediately following the bombing.
388 "Fitzgerald is shocked by IRA," The Times, October 13, 1984. Indeed, Irish government officials were at the Brighton conference, proposing talks with the British government on the issue of Northern Ireland. 195
Table 3. Descriptions of the Brighton Bombing in Official British Accounts Immediately Following the Bombing
• Appalling act of violence • Criminal attack • Bomb exploded • Wicked and grave act • Terrible events • Acts of barbarism • Barbarous and hideous act • Terrible deed • Bomb outrage • Repulsive and hideous murder • Hideous and wicked barbarity • Irish terrorist attack
The British State: 'Peaceful' and 'Democratic', Against 'Irish Terrorism'
State officials described the Brighton bombing as a challenge to 'democratic'
values and as a strike at the essence of 'democracy'. 'Terrorists' were differentiated from
'peace' while the state was linked with it. Prominent in descriptions about the bomb and
bombers was that it was an attempt by 'terrorists' to disrupt 'democracy'. Speaking at the
conference in the afternoon of the day the bombing occurred, Prime Minister Thatcher
said,
It was an attempt to cripple Her Majesty's democratically-elected Government. That is the scale of the outrage in which we have all shared, and the fact that we are gathered here now -- shocked, but composed and determined -- is a sign not only that this attack has failed, but that all attempts to destroy democracy by terrorism will fail. 389
Thus, "terrorism" was used in a general sense and the Brighton bombing thus
389 Margaret Thatcher, "Speech to Conservative Party Conference," Margaret Thatcher Foundation, October 12, 1984, http://www. margaretthatcher. org/speeches/ displaydocument.asp? doc id= 105 7 63 (accessed May 22, 2 0 8). 196
became not just an IRA activity against the British state but as one of a series of attempts
to destroy 'democracy' by 'terrorism'. The state could (and would) thus take steps to
counter any 'terrorist' activity, not just those by the IRA. This exemplified an expansion
of the usage of 'terrorism' to include groups and actors other than the IRA.
In that way, 'terrorists' did not just threaten the current government but the ideals
upon which that government was founded. These ideals, especially those of 'freedom'
and 'democracy', made it easier for 'terrorists' to take advantage and commit violent
acts. However, 'terrorism' is depicted as ineffective in leading to change in government
as can be noted in this formulation by the Home Secretary Leon Brittan: "Those who
believe that terror can prevail against democracy understand neither the Members of this
House nor the British people."390 Similarly, in Prime Minister Thatcher's articulation,
the British state was represented as the "home of democracy", one where "democratic
change" has and will occur but "the sanction for change is the ballot box."391 As Thatcher
made clear, the state would not be rid by 'terrorism'.392
In these descriptions, however, it was not just 'terrorists' but 'extremists' too who
were against a 'democratic' state and its ideals of freedom. Thatcher reiterates the state's
position as against 'extremists', thus linking the state and 'democracy' to those who are
not extremists:
390 Leon Brittan, Home Secretary ("The Secretary of State for the Home Department"), October 22, 1984, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 65, col. 441, http ://hansard.millbank:s ystems. com/ commons/ 1984/ oct/22/bomb-incident-brighton#co lumn 441 (accessed May 22, 2008).
391 Thatcher, October 12, 1984.
392 Gerald Kaufman, October 22, 1984, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 65, col. 441, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1984/oct/22/bomb-incident brighton#S6CV0065PO 19841022 HOC 178 (accessed May 22, 2008). 197
The nation faces what is probably the most testing crisis of our time, the battle between the extremists and the rest. .. This Government will not weaken. This nation will meet that challenge. Democracy will prevail. 393
Indeed, by saying "all attempts" to destroy democracy by terrorism would fail and then
linking this to the miners' strike and rising unemployment as she did earlier in her
speech, Thatcher constructed the British state as besieged by "an organized revolutionary
minority" whose " ... real aim is the breakdown of law and order and the destruction of a
democratic parliamentary govemment."394 Thus, representations of danger, here, linked
"breakdown of law and order" (by miners and rioters) with "destruction of a democratic
parliamentary government" (by the IRA). 'Extremists' are thus a larger category of these
people who threatened 'democracy'. The state, here, was authorized to act against these
'extremists' in order to protect 'democracy'.
Officials describing the bombing used "terrorist" synonymously with "Irish
terrorist" or "Irish Republican terrorists", indicating this link had been normalized in the
past decade since "Bloody Sunday". Speaking in Parliament about improving security
measures, Home Secretary Brittan said,
In addition, I have set in hand new arrangements centrally for countering the Irish terrorist threat. The aim is to bring to bear the widest range of experience in assessing Irish terrorist intentions and capabilities, and to advise on, and co ordinate, the counter-measures required to meet them. These measures will supplement the continuing role of the Metropolitan police special branch as the focal point for the collection and evaluation of intelligence and for police operations against Irish Republican terrorists. 395
393 Thatcher, October 12, 1984.
394 Thatcher, October 12, 1984.
395 Brittan, October 22, 1984, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 65, col. 441, http:/ /hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/ 1984/oct/22/bomb-incident-brighton#column 441 (accessed May 22, 2008). 198
In further Parliamentary discussions, it was mentioned that "Republican terrorists" were a problem for both Britain and the Republic of Ireland, thus linking these two states in a way that had not been done during "Bloody Sunday.''396
Within the British interpretive repertoire of the time, there were two main discourses about the IRA -- as well-organized 'terrorists' attacking democracy and the state or lacking morale and confidence and resorting to desperate measures to gain support. On the one hand, they had the capability to make and use new technologies and were becoming increasingly bolder and more sophisticated in their attempts to spread terror. This representation of the IRA as sophisticated was linked with their (stealthy and underhanded) identity from past representations (as in "Bloody Sunday"). Immediately after the Brighton bombings, the head of Scotland Yard's anti terrorist group Bill
Hucklesby claimed the IRA had gained the ability to develop and set up a complex timing device, one which could be set weeks in advance. He said, "The IRA now have the ability to time a device in a far more sophisticated manner than before. It could be possible to place the bomb and time it to go off in 3 weeks, 2 hours and 30 seconds."397
At the same time, the IRA was linked with weakness and loss of morale. It was claimed that the IRA depended on assistance from overseas. As Jill Knight, Conservative
396 John Biggs-Davison, October 22, 1984, quoting the Republic of Ireland's leader Garret FitzGerald, in Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 65, col. 444, http ://hansard. rnillbanksystems. com/commons/ 19 84/oct/22/bomb-incident- bri ghton#S6CV 0065 PO 19841022 HOC 188 (accessed May 22, 2008).
397 Michael Getler, "Security Questioned: in Bombing's Aftermath, Critics Cite Police Laxness," The Washington Post (October 14, 1984), A15. As Mary Holland writing in the New Statesman puts it, this "sophistication" of IRA tactics was a commonplace in the aftermath of the bombing. See Mary Holland, "Ireland blasts back," The New Statesman, October, 19, 1984. Published in David Pierce, ed, (2000) Irish 1 Writing in the 20 h Century: A Reader, ed. David Pierce, (Cork: Cork University Press, 2000). 199
MP for Birmingham Edgbaston said, "[The IRA] could not continue its campaign of anarchy without help from its two major sources of money and arms -- the Soviet Union and the United States of America."398 There had been a seizure of an IRA arms shipment on September 29, 1984 and this had been the largest capture of IRA arms in more than a decade. The Irish authorities had discovered an IRA bomb-making factory at Balbriggan, north Dublin. IRA morale was described to have been greatly affected by these and their capacities weakened.399 In both these narratives, however, there was little distinction made between the military wing (the IRA) and the political wing (Sinn Fein). Indeed,
"Sinn Fein" was rarely mentioned in accounts of the bombing. "The IRA",
"Provisionals", "Republican terrorists" or "Irish terrorists" was the preferred term in accounts of events considered "terrorist". The Times, for example, claimed "The Brighton bombing might signal a Provisional IRA bombing campaign in mainland Britain this autumn" and "Thatcher defies IRA bombers" was a prominent front page headline the day after the bombing.400 However, the IRA or "Irish terrorists", whether sophisticated or weakened, were positioned such that it was in the state's (counterterrorist) interests to get rid of them by military means.
398 Jill Knight, October 22, 1984, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 64, col. 445, http://hansard.rnillbanksystems.com/commons/ 19 84/oct/22/bomb-inc ident- brighton#S6CV0065 PO 19841022 HOC 196 (accessed May 22, 2008).
399 "Conference Ovation for Prime Minister," The Times, October 13, 1984, 3; "Trawler's Seizure Called Major Setback for LR.A.," The New York Times, September 30, 1984.
400 The Times, October 13, 1984, 1. 200
'Security' and 'the People'
While 'democracy' was threatened by 'terrorism' and 'extremism', there were
other representations as well. For example, post-bombing discussions mentioned lax
security at the Grand Hotel. A report in The Times claimed, "Journalists and delegates
said that from late evening onwards they were able to come and go through the doors of
the Grand Hotel. .. without showing their passes. Photographers' bags were not being
checked."401 In the evenings, anyone could walk into the hotel without having their
identifications checked. These practices came under scrutiny as there were calls for
greater secunty.. 402 H owever, t h ere were a 1so ongomg . concerns th at greater secunty.
measures would impact upon freedom. The Home Secretary, Leon Brittan, commented,
"There is no way, in a free society, that total security is possible."403 In her first interview
after the bombing, Prime Minister Thatcher agreed as she said, "The fact is that we do
live in a certain amount of danger, and if you are to carry out your job, we shall continue
to live in danger."404 'Security' and 'freedom' had to be balanced but balanced such that
people's access to their leaders would not be curtailed.
Indeed, the type of state that Britain was and should continue to be was a state that was in favor of openness and freedom, a state that would maintain democracy, a state
401 "Police Chief Will Study Precautions at Hotel," The Times, October 13, 1984.
402 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 6th series, vol. 65 and Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th series, vol. 456, October 12, 1984 to October 19, 1984.
403 Brittan, October 22, 1984, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 65, col. 441, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/ 1984/oct/22/bomb-incident-brighton#column 441 (accessed May 22, 2008).
404 Thatcher, "TV Interview for Channel 4 A plus 4," Margaret Thatcher Foundation, October 15, 1984, http://www. margarettha tcher. org/ speeches/ displaydocument.asp? doc id= 105 7 64 (accessed May 22, 2008). 201
where, despite terrorist attacks, it would be as Thatcher had claimed, "[ n ]ow it must be
business as usual."405 At the same time, this struggle over the meaning of 'security'
meant not just 'terrorism' but tougher security practices themselves were differentiated
from 'democracy'. To implement stringent security measures would go against the state's
identity of being a free society. This concern is expressed by the Deputy Prime Minister
Viscount Whitelaw, "I have already made known my own view that total, impregnable
security is not compatible with the free society we enjoy. We must continue to search for
improvements in security arrangements but without calling into question the entire basis
upon which public life in this country is conducted."406
Alongside this contest over the meaning of 'security', there was also a struggle
over the what 'the people' meant and who the concept encompassed (and left out). On the
one hand, unlike in Bloody Sunday when the identity of the participants was as illegal
march organizers, hidden IRA snipers or those allied to the IRA, 'the people' here are to
be safeguarded and protected by the state while being a victim of 'terrorist' activities.
Despite the target of the Brighton bomb being a group of politicians, their everyday-ness
and link to the general population was clear in official descriptions of the event.
Describing the bombing, Thatcher said it was "an inhuman, undiscriminating attempt to massacre innocent unsuspecting men and women ... "407 thus linking Conservative
politicians, who were the targets of the bombing, with regular people. The state and the
405 Thatcher, October 12, 1984.
406 Viscount Whitelaw, October 16, 1984, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 455, col. 8 85, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/ 1984/oct/ 16/grand-hotel-brighton-bomb- explosion#S5 LV0455PO 19841016 HOL 86 (accessed May 22, 2008). Viscound Whitelaw was also the first Secretary of State for Northern Ireland after direct rule was established in March 1972.
407 Thatcher, October 12, 1984. 202
people were linked together, and differentiated from the bombers. This was exemplified
in the Deputy Prime Minister's comments in Parliament," ... those who perpetrate such
actions will meet with the implacable hostility of a united Parliament and people together
with the Government."408 It was not just 'the people' who were linked with the
government, but all parties -- opposition and the government -- were linked together as
resolute in the face of terrorism.
Of course, 'extremists' and 'terrorists' were not part of this conceptualization of
'the people'. Here, 'the state' was linked to the majority of 'the people' who were
presumed to be in favor of freedom, democracy and against terrorism and against the
"organized revolutionary minority" (which the IRA but also striking miners, etc). Those
against the state -- the "organized revolutionary minority" and the "Irish terrorists" -- were explicitly not part of 'the people' and were different, dangerous. These were
dangerous and needed to be eliminated if the state was to be able to conduct its everyday
tasks of guaranteeing security and upholding democracy. Furthermore, 'the people' were not all linked with 'the state'. Indeed, similar to "Bloody Sunday" there were also concerns that some people were supporting the IRA. For example, the Labour MP for
Middlesborough Stuart Bell said that people of the United States were, by their support of
Noraid, "in no way assisting in finding a solution to the problems oflreland."409 This
408 Whitelaw, October 16, 1984, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 455, col. 885, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/ 1984/oct/ 16/ grand-hote l-brighton-bomb explosion#S5LV0455PO 19841016 HOL 86 (accessed May 22, 2008).
409 Stuart Bell, October 22, 1984, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 65, col. 445, http ://hansard.millbanks ystems. com/ commons/ 1984/oct/22/bomb- incident- bri ghton#S6CV0065 PO 19841022 HOC 198 (accessed May 20, 2008). Mr Bell was Labour's spokesman on Northern Ireland at this time. Noraid is an Irish-American fund-raising organization with republican aims. Most of its money was alleged to go to the IRA to support its activities. See "Passing the Hat for the Provos," Time, November 26, 1979, 203
formulation also applied domestically to the people of Northern Ireland. The Lord Bishop of Chichester expressed this as:
I should like to repeat something that I said yesterday morning in church, and recall again that the terrorists could not have the success which they do were they not supported and sheltered by very large numbers of ordinary people who, we may think misguidedly, have nevertheless been brought up with a certain view of history and of culture and who believe that they are ministering to that view.410
The struggle over which people supported whom-- the state or "the terrorists" -- was ongoing in these descriptions of the event.411
State/IRA Identities After the Brighton Bombing
After the Brighton bombing, threats were still from the 'terrorists' but, in addition to 'terrorists', society was also threatened by the "organized revolutionary minority" who were attempting to create chaos. This category included additional groups than just the
IRA. In this way, the Brighton bombing provided an opportunity for expanding what or who threats were, thus re-establishing authority for the anti-terrorist (and anti-extremist) state. This formulation also produced state identity wherein protesters' actions, actions which could easily have been described as part of their right to protest as citizens of the
British state, became delegitimated and considered threatening to democratic values.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,946419,00.html?promoid=googlep (accessed August 20, 2009).
4 10 Lord Bishop of Chichester, October 22, 1984, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 456, col. 31, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/Iords/1984/oct/22/grand-hotel-brighton-bomb explosion#column 31 (accessed May 22, 2008).
4 lt Different uses of 'peace', 'democracy' and 'the people' could be noted in the IRA's statement claiming responsibility for the bombing. It called the British government "Tory warmongers" and said, "Give Ireland peace and there will be no war". This was also where the IRA claimed: "Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once." ("Seaside Blast May Signal Mainland Bombing Campaign," The Times, October 13, 1984). For more on contemporary descriptions of the event by the IRA and also by the Republic oflreland (which categorized it as an attack on "democratic institutions"), also see "Bomb ours, says IRA/Responsibility claimed for Brighton bombing," The Guardian, October 13, 1984. 204
'Bloody Sunday' helped establish the British counterterrorist state and set up stakes as
the IRA fighting a long war and the state being the legitimate user of violence. The
Brighton bombing provided an opportunity reiterating these identities and to paper over
the cracks in the mainstream security discourse. The IRA remained central as the threat to
the British state but other groups were also acting against the state and threatening
democratic ideals. At the same time, however, there were concerns raised even within
official accounts of whether increased anti-terrorist security measures would reduce the
British public's traditional access to its elected leaders.
Thus, even though the incident was characterized as 'terrorism' and threats were
expanded to include "extremists" (and not just the IRA), counterterrorist policies were
not a straightforward response. Instead, ongoing concerns about the stringency and the
type of security measures to be implemented could be noted in the days following the
bombing. There were debates about increased security measures and their role in a
democratic society with public access to politicians noted as a key feature of British
society. Additionally, there was also a tension between representing the IRA as
sophisticated 'terrorists' or a group reduced to showy bombings to reestablish its
authority among its supporters.
In the early 1980s, the hunger strikes indicated a tension in the counterterrorism discourses. International condemnation of the British government's response to the hunger strikes -- including, informally, by the United States and the European Human
Rights Commission -- meant representations of the IRA as 'terrorists' were increasingly challenged in international circles. Other discourses -- that of human rights and equality -
- gained ground. It was possible to describe the hunger strikers are "non violent" instead 205
of "terrorist" which created tensions within the counterterrorist state identity. Other
issues, such as increasing unemployment, strikes and protests against economic changes
in mainland Britain and the Falklands war, also challenged official descriptions that
'terrorists' were the major danger to 'the state'. The Brighton bombing, however, gave an
opportunity for state officials to performatively reproduce state identity as against
'terrorism' while, at the same time, positioning (miners, rioters) 'extremists', in general,
and 'terrorists' as threatening 'democracy' and 'stability'. Such linkages of 'extremists'
and 'terrorists' expanded the category of threats to the state. The usage of 'terrorism',
however, was to decrease during the Docklands bombing as 'peace' became the new
stake for all actors to aim for.
Talking to 'Terrorists': Britain, Sinn Fein and the 1996 Docklands bombing
In the period prior to the 1996 Docklands bombing, there had been an IRA
ceasefire in place since August 1994 and the peace process had begun. After the
Docklands bombing, security practices which had become more lenient during the IRA
ceasefire were strengthened and, yet, Sinn Fein remained a possible partner in peace.
During the period of the ceasefire, British troop numbers had been reduced, prisoners were released, especially from prisons in the Republic of Ireland, the US President Bill
Clinton visited Northern Ireland and the broadcasting ban imposed upon Sinn Fein by the
British government was lifted. There had been economic benefits as well: "In the year before the ceasefire was called, there were 6,133 terrorist incidents involving the retail trade with losses totaling pounds 226 million. Last year [1995] the losses, mainly from 206
the actions of animal liberation groups, were pounds 4.9 million, a fall of 98 percent. "412
If the Docklands bombing had been constructed as part of a series of IRA attacks, similar to other attacks in the past, the peace process could have ended.
The use of the language of "terrorist" and "terrorism" are key here in investigating the constitution of state/other (threat) identities. First, 'peace' and especially 'peace process' was a rhetorical commonplace used by all sides when describing their actions and when discussing future possibilities. Second, there was a distinction made, in official accounts of the incident, between the act -- the bombing was "terrorism"-- and the actors.
Sinn Fein, despite being the political wing of the IRA and the group who admitted responsibility for the bombing, remained a suitable party for the state to negotiate with as long as Sinn Fein conformed to certain guidelines such as giving up of arms and reestablishing a ceasefire. This was assisted by the related distinction made between the
IRA and Sinn Fein, a distinction that was not as explicitly made in earlier events, when the tropes of "Irish terrorism" and "Republican terrorism" were commonly-used in official descriptions ofbombings.413
'Peace' and 'Democracy' as Goals for Everyone
Within official representations of the Dockland bombing, the rhetoric of 'peace' being the responsibility of everyone allowed for linking 'the state' with 'peace' and produced a state that had 'peace' as its goal. The British state produced out of official
412 David Pallister, "London: Tighter security brought in as the capital prepares for a return to the bad old days of roadblocks and checks after 17 months free of terrorism," The Guardian, February 10, 1996, 3 (emphasis added).
413 This was the case, for example, during the 1984 Brighton bombing. 207
discourses about the Docklands bombing was one that was attempting to move the peace process forward and one that took risks for peace. Discussing the IRA ceasefire, Prime
Minister John Major said, " .. .in order to move the peace process forward we were prepared to act on the working assumption that the ceasefire would last". 414 In this, the government was linked with moving advancing the peace process while the IRA's uncertain ceasefire was an impediment to peace. Since the government wanted to move the peace process forward, it "reduced the visible and inconvenient aspects of security".415 Indeed, in the Prime Minister's words, "no one took more risks for peace than the Government over the past two years ... " while "the IRA peace was not a true peace."416 Here, the state is clearly linked with taking risks to move the peace process forward while the IRA continued to obstruct peace since it "remained ready to resume full-scale terrorism."417
At the same time, having 'peace' at stake allowed for Sinn Fein to link its own goals to peace, rhetorically distancing itself from (the IRA's) non-peaceful actions. In interviews following the bombing, Gerry Adams said, "I think we need to redouble our efforts to rebuild this peace process. That's why I have called for urgent talks with the
414 1 John Major, February 12, 1996, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 6 h ser., vol. 271, col. 656, http://hansard.rnillbanksystems.com/commons/ 1996/feb/l 2/northem-ireland-peace-process (accessed May 20, 2008). Gerry Adams, writing in The Guardian, blamed the British state for "the collapse of the peace process''. He added "Sinn Fein has repeatedly pointed out that the peace process could not stand still. If it was not moving forward, it was in grave danger of moving back." (Gerry Adams, "Bad Faith and Dishonesty," The Guardian, February 12, 1996).
415 Ibid.
416 Ibid.
417 Ibid. 208
British and Irish governments."418 He added, "Sinn Fein's peace strategy remains the
main function of our party. It is my personal priority."419 Unlike during "Bloody Sunday"
and the Docklands bombing, Sinn Fein and the state were jointly producing 'peace' and
both had 'peace' as their goal (though the methods of achieving that peace differed for
both). This joint action left open the possibility that Sinn Fein could participate in peace
negotiations. Here, both British security and Sinn Fein accounts of the bombing used
commonplaces of 'peace' as a long-term goal for all sides. There was an emphasis made
on the need for 'peace' in Northern Ireland (rather than a military response to the
bombing) and there was also a narrative of the ending of the ceasefire coming as a
surprise not just to the British and Irish governments but also to Sinn Fein. 'Peace' was
linked with future, long-term benefits for Northern Ireland, thus constituting any actor
who went against this formulation as being against 'peace'.
The continued emphasis on 'peace' on all sides was in contrast with the IRA
statement announcing "it is with great reluctance that the leadership of Oglaigh na
hEireann announces the complete cessation of military operations will end at 6 pm on
1 420 February 9 \ this evening." This statement had been sent to media outlets in Dublin a
couple of hours before the bombing occurred. Since the IRA was not using 'peace' as a
reason for its actions, it could continue to occupy the position of an adversary to the
418 Adams, "Gerry Adams on the Ending of the IRA Ceasefire (1996)", YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og574xIVoW4 (accessed March 20, 2008).
419 Ibid.
420 "Text of alleged IRA statement on end of ceasefire'', Deutsche Press-Agentur, February 9, 1996 (accessed May 20, 2008). Full text also in Paul Bew and G. Gillespie, The Northern Ireland Peace Process, 1993-1996: A Chronology (London: Serif, 1996). 209
British state while the door remained open for potential negotiations with Sinn Fein.
'Terrorists' and 'Terrorism': Sinn Fein-IRA
The state was repeatedly linked with 'peace' and continued to be against
'terrorism'. Prime Minister Major said, "the government shall not be deterred by terrorism,"421 a formulation that echoes then PM Thatcher's words during the Brighton bombing. However, while newspaper articles and some officials talked of"terrorism" after the bombing, the label itself was not commonly linked to Sinn Fein in official accounts. Instead, it was the use of their names -- separately (with the IRA explicitly blamed for the bombing while Sinn Fein occupied a liminal position) or together "Sinn
Fein-IRA" (as in some Member of Parliaments' comments) -- which were commonplace. 422
In the immediate aftermath of the bombing, government officials and media personnel were positioned as not being sure that it was the work of the IRA or of more hardline splinter groups.423 The government was described as being shocked by the bombing. Sinn Fein, too, was constituted as being taken aback by what had happened, thus constituting the event and the end of the IRA ceasefire as an unexpected outcome.
When the IRA first gave warning of a bomb in the Docklands, media outlets contacted
Sinn Fein for confirmation and Sinn Fein was unable to confirm or deny the end of the ceasefire. Sinn Fein's leader Gerry Adams described himself as being surprised when the
421 Major, February 12, 1996.
422 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 6th ser., February 12, 1996 to February 18, 1996.
423 "The IRA Back to Their Old Ways," The Guardian, February 10, 1996, 26 210
bombing occurred. Adams spent the day after the bombing talking to various news media
about Sinn Fein's continued commitment to peace.424 In an interview on Irish television
Adams said, "that is not to say that the IRA if it be the IRA that were involved tonight. It
does appear that it is the IRA ... my whole life has been consumed in recent years by the need to build the peace process."425
Another strategy that allowed for the continuation of the peace process was thus this separation between the IRA and Sinn Fein. Compared to the previous two events, the
separation of IRA (and) Sinn Fein during the Docklands bombing was different. The IRA was described as having taken advantage of the period of the ceasefire to regroup and acquire more arms and ammunition while planning further violence. Post-bombing descriptions referred to the existence of IRA "sleeper" cells in mainland Britain and represented the IRA as having used the time of the ceasefire to strengthen its bases and its cells in Britain instead of working for peace.426 The IRA was described as composed of more hardliners than Sinn Fein. This was a common representation in the post-bombing period with the British state claiming it was ready to continue talks with Sinn Fein, if a ceasefire was reinstituted. The prime minister said, "it is clear we cannot negotiate with
Sinn Fein while a campaign of violence is taking place ... we can negotiate, of course,
424 For example, on February 10, 1996, The Guardian ran a story titled, "Sinn Fein Officials Sounded as Surprised as Reporters who Rang to Ask if the Ceasefire was Really Over". The story claimed, "Senior Sinn Fein officials sounded as surprised as the reporters who were ringing to ask them whether it was true." See: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oq574xIVoW4 (accessed March 20, 2008) for Adams' statement on February 11, 1996 on the end of the IRA's ceasefire.
425 "They've Not Gone Away," The Times, February 11, 1996.
426 "Police Warning of More IRA Bomb Attacks," The Guardian, February 12, 1996. 211
once there is a verifiable ceasefire back in place ... "427 Thus, the violence was not the responsibility of a homogenous group of "Irish terrorism" or "Republican terrorism" as on previous occasions.428 Additionally, there were descriptions of a dissension in the
IRA ranks between hardliners and those supporting a political solution to the conflict.
427 Major, February 12, 1996.
428 This was different to past accounts. For example, during Bloody Sunday, the IRA was seen as infiltrating regular people and the marchers, whether through persuasion or threats. Sinn Fein and its role did not come up during the description of Bloody Sunday in British security discourses. During the Brighton bombing, too, Sinn Fein received little or no mention with the focus and the blame squarely on the IRA or "Irish terrorists" or "Republican terrorists", with little distinction made between the IRA and Sinn Fein. Instead, during the Brighton bombing (or other previous incidents), "Irish terrorism" or "Republican terrorism" was the problem, not a possible part of the solution. Here, in the case of the Docklands bombing, Sinn Fein had been and still could be part of the solution, as it was 'peace' which was presented as the main goal of everyone, not just the state. 212
Table 4. Self/Other Representations in Official British Accounts Immediately Following the Docklands Bombing
The British state IRA and Sinn Fein
- protection of the public is our first priority - No doubt "the evil act" was the - government sought to make "appropriate work of the IRA and proportionate" response - IRA callously sacrificed innocent - reduced security measures during ceasefire lives - moved peace process forward - "No shred of an excuse" for this - "no one took more risks for peace than the return to violence by the IRA government" - IRA never said it was a permanent - SF should decommission to create ceasefire confidence - "the IRA peace was not a true - remained cautious about the IRA's motives peace" - remained strongly committed to a political - IRA continued to train and plan for settlement in NI terrorist attacks - will work for peace with "all the democratic - IRA remained ready to resume full- political parties and with the Irish govt" scale terrorism - cannot meet with SF without an end to the - IRA continued punishment violence beatings and killings - In line with Irish govt's views - SF must decide if it is democratic - Support popular will, which is for peace or a front for the IRA - Peace process has received a setback from - SF called for all-party talks (but "the men of violence" IRA continue to plan for terrorist - Ceasefire led to benefits attacks) - will not be deterred by terrorism - SF misrepresented the Mitchell - Will leave "no stone unturned" in search Report and decommissioning for peace, both now and in the future proposal - people of GB and NI deserve peace - SF has to return to the ceasefire if it is to participate in future talks
On the whole, Sinn Fein occupied a liminal position at this time within British statist discourses -- both as linked to and separate from the IRA. It thus had a choice: it could decide if it were democratic or a front for the IRA. As noted in Table 3 above, two identities for Sinn Fein were possible: 1) either Sinn Fein did not know for certain about 213
the IRA's plans to break its ceasefire or 2) Sinn Fein and the IRA were acting together,
with the result that the fragile peace process was in danger of collapsing. There was
ongoing debate about whether Sinn Fein was committed to the peace process or whether
it made sense to talk to them if its ties to the IRA (and influence on IRA actions) had
weakened. While Gerry Adams had called the US President a few days before the
bombing warning him that the IRA's patience was running low, he had not specified
there would be end to the IRA ceasefire. Additionally, when the IRA first gave warning
of a bomb in the Docklands, media outlets contacted Sinn Fein for confirmation and Sinn
Fein was unable to confirm or deny the break of the ceasefire. At the end, the former
identity -- that of Sinn Fein being suitable to negotiate with-- became commonplace,
mainly due to the foregrounding of 'peace' by all sides, including Sinn Fein.
In all these formulations, 'the people' included British and Northern Irish people
and all were explicitly linked with 'peace'. The British Prime Minister John Major said,
"It would be a tragedy if the hopes of the people ofBritain and Northern Ireland for a
lasting peace were dashed again by the men of violence ... for my part I remain committed
to the search for peace in Northern Ireland and will not be distracted by terrorism."429
Here, 'the people' explicitly included "the people of Britain and Northern Ireland", a
clarification rarely made during the earlier events. 'The people' were to help the state's
security forces: "you can help us by being millions of eyes and ears," Sir Paul Condon the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police said to Londoners after the bombing.430 In
429 Major, February 12, 1996.
430 "The End of the Ceasefire: Armed Police Patrols in Anti-terrorist Drive," The Guardian, February 13, 1996. 214
fact, 'the people' in this representation not only included people in both Britain and
Ireland but Sinn Fein's choice (peace or continued violence) mattered to everyone and not just the state. PM Major; in the same speech, added, "the British and Irish peoples need to know where Sinn Fein stands."431 Thus, 'the people' had a stake in the peace process and were active participants rather than just 'terrorist' victims or supporters of
'terrorists'. Major explained this new role of 'the people' as: "the people of a democracy are not passive spectators to events."432
Other Representations
'Peace' was centralized in other representations as well. The US president Bill
Clinton said, "the terrorists who perpetuated today's attack cannot be allowed to derail the effort to bring peace to the people of Northern Ireland -- a peace they overwhelmingly support."433 The lack of mention of the IRA continued in Irish Prime Minister John
Bruton's remarks, "This resumption of violence, by whomsoever organised, is entirely unjustified. I condemn it without reservation."434 Ireland refused to meet with Sinn Fein officials unless a ceasefire was reinstated, "You can't in a democracy negotiate under the threat of violence", Mr Bruton said in an interview with Irish radio.435 The US, however,
431 Major, February 12, 1996.
432 Ibid.
433 Richard W Stevenson, "Bomb Wounds 100 in London as LR.A. Truce Said to End," The New York Times, February 10, 1996, l.
434 "Bomb Shatters IRA Ceasefire," The Times, February 10, 1996 (emphasis added).
435 However, low-level contacts with Sinn Fein on the part of the British and Irish governments were to continue. The Times said, " ... two Sinn Fein councillors will be in a party of local politicians invited to Downing Street this week" ("Dublin turns on Sinn Fein," February 11, 1996). Mr. Bruton was also quoted in "Police Warning of More IRA Bomb Attacks," The Guardian, February 12, 1996. 215
did not cut off ties with Sinn Fein.
Despite the continued emphasis on the 'peace process', increased security measures, similar to that of pre-ceasefire years, were reestablished. Both London and
Belfast had reduced security measures during the ceasefire with fewer troops on the street and with low-key security arrangements in the City in London (where the bombing occurred and which was the target of previous IRA efforts). Within 30 minutes of the blast, roadblocks on main routes into the City were reinstalled and there was an increase in the number of troops patrolling the streets. The "Ring of Steel" was rebuilt.436 This was also the case in Belfast where there were more visible signs of change. During the ceasefire, the troops on the street had started wearing berets. Following the bombing, these berets were replaced by helmets and flak jackets. Also, army troops returned to the streets after having spent most of the ceasefire period within barracks and there was increased security in border areas. 437 Extra troops were sent to Northern Ireland.438
State/IRA Identities After the Docklands Bombing
During the Docklands bombing, two news ways of establishing stake could be noted -- one, the emphasis on 'peace' as the goal of all parties (except the IRA). Two, the distinction made, not just between the IRA and Sinn Fein, but also between the act and
436 "They've Not Gone Away," The Times, February 11, 1996 and "One hundred bomb alerts cause travel chaos across capital," The Times, February 13, 1996. The "Ring of Steel" was the name given to a security cordon around London. It was set in place in order to deter threats to the city, especially threats from IRA 'terrorism'. Previous usage of the term referred to a similar surveillance grid in Belfast. See Jon Coaffee, "Rings of Steel, Rings of Concrete, and Rings of Confidence: Designing out Terrorism in Central London pre and post September 11th," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 28, no. 1 (March 2 004): 201-11, http://www.lse.ac. uk/ coll ections/resurgentCi ty/Papers/ coaffee. pdf (accessed July 12, 2009) for an overview of the practice of a "Ring of Steel" as a counterterrorism measure.
437 "They've Not Gone Away," The Times, February 11, 1996.
438 "500 Extra Soldiers for Ulster," The Times, February 15, 1996. 216
the perpetrators, between 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' and that Sinn Fein could still be part of the peace process. While in earlier events, at stake was the security of the people and the British government, in the Docklands bombing the peace process itself was at stake.
This linked not just Northern Ireland and Britain but also the Irish (and, to a large extent,
American) governments. The Docklands bombing was therefore a crucial event in British
counterterrorist identity-formation, one where options for various meaning-making
(continued war, increased military involvement, ending the peace process, excluding Sinn
Fein from the peace process) were present. By making the choice of maintaining 'peace' at the foreground, the British state (and other actors) left open the possibility of future discussions with Sinn Fein, despite the IRA involvement in the bombing.
Overall, there was a shift from depictions of "Bloody Sunday" as an internal event, needing to be dealt with as a domestic issue to the internationalization of terrorism
(as against democratic ideals) during the Brighton and Docklands bombings. The terms
"terrorism" and "terrorist act" were used more often in legislation set in place following each of these incidents, rather than during official reports of the events. For example, the
Brighton bombing was called "an appalling act of violence", "a criminal attack", "a wicked and grave act'', an "act of barbarism'', a "barbarous and hideous act", "a terrible deed", "hideous and wicked barbarity" and "a repulsive and hideous murder" in official discussions immediately following the event (see Table 3) rather than a "terrorist" act.
Similarly, in terms of 'democracy', who was (and was not) 'democratic' shifted from "Bloody Sunday" to the Docklands bombing. During the Docklands bombing,
'democracy' became central with democratic parties being allowed to participate in all party negotiations for peace, thus leading to discussions about how Sinn Fein could 217
become democratic. 'Peace', too, shifted from something that the British government had responsibility for to something that parties in Northern Ireland, the British and Irish governments and the people had responsibility for. The British government could negotiate with Sinn Fein, previously considered "terrorist", by describing the peace process and the search for peace in Northern Ireland as its main goals, to be aimed for by all sides. While it had been 'democratic' to stop an illegal riot and to prevent the IRA's long-term strategy of infiltrating civil rights marches during Bloody Sunday, it became
'democratic' to maintain focus on 'peace' during the Docklands bombing. This allowed for the state to negotiate with those previously (and even then) considered "terrorist", breaking the taboo against publicly talking to 'terrorists' .439
Shifting Identities of State/Terrorist: "Bloody Sunday", and the Brighton and Docklands Bombings
These shifting identities of state/IRA as examined during these three events indicate how 'terrorism' and 'terrorists' are not pre-given and natural acts or actors but are, instead, produced during everyday representations of danger. At the same time, such
439 There had been private discussions between Republican leaders and British state officials prior to this period. There were other engagement procedures as well. For example, the strategy of normalization also produced the IRA as actors who provided signals of their actions, such as regularized warnings and coded messages telling the security forces about upcoming bombings. In the case of the Docklands bombing, IRA messages to media stations included the use of a coded word that confirmed the message was actually from the IRA and not a hoax. This exchange of information between the 'terrorists' and the state created normalized expectations of behavior and served to create conditions where future discussions and engagement, despite continued IRA violence, could occur. Thus, normalization here was not just about the actions of the British security forces and the state or about IRA's identity as a 'terrorist' group. In the time between "Bloody Sunday" and the Docklands bombing, the IRA had been produced as a group of actors whose communication with the government was governed by specific codes, codes understood by the government and used by the IRA when phoning warnings about the bomb. Despite claims of non engagement with 'terrorists' on the part of the British state, this engagement -- of decoding threats, waiting for warnings and even the Broadcast ban, which did not forbid actors speaking for the IRA and Sinn Fein - was ongoing. 218
an analysis allows for a description of how the state's understanding of violence (and violent actors) shifts through time, thus denaturalizing violence itself. By focusing on the words and concepts used to describe the IRA and terrorism during this period, this chapter hoped to destabilize the ontological self (and security) of the state. It moved away from asking why people become 'terrorists' or how to counter 'terrorism' to showing how representations of others, such as the IRA-as-terrorists and local people as IRA sympathizers during a large part of the Troubles, then produced a state which has to counter these 'terrorists'. It is not just a case of the IRA (in this case) being involved in violence that allowed for the state to justify anti-terrorism measures but, instead, representations of specific groups as dangerous, as 'terrorist' were tied up with the practices through which the state constituted itself as an entity countering such threats.
At the same time, these counterterrorist measures were not inevitable. Writing in
1996, Arthur and Jeffrey discuss how Northern Ireland is barely mentioned in high school and undergraduate textbooks on British politics and add, "This is rather curious because the problem has had such a debilitating effect on the political process. One thinks of the obvious, such as the huge security operations which attend every party conference in the aftermath [of the Brighton bombing]. "440 As I have delineated in this chapter, however, in the immediate aftermath of the Brighton bombing itself, there was a struggle over the meaning of 'security' and how to balance 'security' and 'democracy'. It was even commonplace that "total security" is never possible in a democracy and public access to politicians should take priority over repressive security measures. Over time, the meaning
440 Paul Arthur and Keith Jeffrey, Northern Ireland Since 1968, 2°ct ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996), 1. 219
of 'Brighton bombing' as an event which led to increased security measures might have become commonplace but immediately after the bombing, this was far less certain. Thus a re-reading, not just of the Brighton bombing but also of "Bloody Sunday" and the
Docklands bombing shows how, while strategies for representation remain similar, what is deemed to be at stake, how identities and practices are authorized and what is considered normal was not as commonsensical then as our current understandings might make it seem.
The commonplace understanding of each of these events -- that "Bloody Sunday" was an example of state repression and the Brighton and Docklands bombings were
"terrorist" ignores the struggle for establishing their (and various actors') identities during the events themselves. Similar to what proponents of "state terrorism" have said, the state did use (the language of) "terrorism" 441 but there was an ongoing struggle over its meaning, what/who (else) it was linked to and the type of state produced during each event. As indicated in Chapter 2, CTS' call for studying "state terrorism" ignores this struggle over meanings and presumes states' can use "terrorism" without such usage being questioned. It ignores processes of establishing authority and legitimation. It was not just internal or Parliamentary debates that were sites for debates over 'security' (in the case of the Brighton bombing) or even the presence of British troops in Northern
Ireland ("Bloody Sunday"). But, as noted after the publicity of the IRA hunger strikes, representations of events from external sources, such as Ireland and the United States
441 This is, of course, fundamentally different from the R. Jackson and R. Blakeley's call for "state terrorism" to be studied (R. Jackson, Ghosts; Blakeley, Bringing) wherein it is the state's use of "terrorism" as an objectively-recognizable strategy of violence that is focused upon. In my dissertation, "terrorism" is a concept whose use positions actors -- states or otherwise -- as "terrorist" and "anti-terrorist" and helps authorizing relations amongst them. 220
were increasingly addressed within official British accounts. As US President Bill
Clinton's continued relation with Sinn Fein after the Docklands bombing showed, these
representations and the identities formed therein often challenged British practices. By
concentrating on the use of 'terrorism' during particular events and tracing out the
struggle over meanings and identities immediately after each event, common strategies of
constituting state identity can be noted. The strategies of stake management and
establishing authority focus squarely on legitimation and on how state identity was
authorized in public.
In all three events, linguistic strategies of managing stake and establishing
authority drew upon common linguistic commonplaces but how they were linked to the
state and the IRA differed. Stake shifted through time. For example, the commonplace of
'democracy' became more evident in the 1980s, as noticed in the representations of the
IRA during the Brighton bombing as against 'democracy' and against the democratic,
free ideals of the (British) state. 'Democracy' also meant access to leaders had to remain
open even after a close call such as the Brighton bombing, and 'freedom' (and the state's
actions) were linked to 'democracy'. At the same time, however, there were other links made to 'democracy', such as that of the IRA and other republicans that they lacked democratic rights (as in the case of the "Bloody Sunday" and other civil rights marches
and the hunger strikes). During the Docklands bombing, 'democracy' was used in two ways: one, to ensure that the peace process would move forward, democratic parties could participate in negotiations. Second, 'democracy' was linked to non-violence so that there was tension over whether Sinn Fein could be included in discussions after the IRA had broken its ceasefire. In this formulation, too, 'the state' was linked with 'democracy' 221
and, instead, it was others -- Sinn Fein here -- who may or may not be 'democratic', depending on their use (or renunciation of) violence. Descriptions also constructed specific actions and actors as routine and normal and others as exceptional. 442 Thus, the
British state produced out of the competing representations was one which normalized acting against the IRA (during "Bloody Sunday" and the Brighton bombing) while leaving space for Sinn Fein's continued involvement in the peace process (after the IRA's
Docklands bombing).
In the next chapter on Nepal, I shall discuss examine how these strategies of establishing stake and authority played out in a context where the use of the rhetoric of
"terrorism" was not common prior to a particular time period. The linguistic commonplaces -- people, democracy, freedom, terrorism, freedom, etc -- which linked to or differentiated from each other to form specific identities of state/others are also replicable (and identifiable). The point to be made here is that, as Potter succinctly observes, " ... although the details of what is talked about may be endlessly varied, the sorts of procedures for constructing and managing descriptions may be much more regular, and therefore, tractable in analysis."443 It is to an overview of these procedures
(strategies) that I tum to next when examining representations of 'terrorists' by Nepalese officials.
442 Potter, Representing, 111.
443 Potter, Representing, 112. CHAPTERS
STATE/MAOIST IDENTITIES IN NEPALESE SECURITY
DISCOURSES
In this chapter, the use of "terrorist" and "terrorism" in Nepal will be examined, specifically focusing on the period November 2001-April 2006. Three events -- the announcement of the first state of emergency and the subsequent establishment of
Nepal's first anti-terrorist legislation in November 2001; the takeover of government by
King Gyanendra in February 2005 and the protests of April 2006 which eventually began a long-term peace process leading to elections in 2008 -- will form sites where the construction and reproduction of state/terrorist identities will be closely studied. The focus remains, as it did in the previous chapter, on official discourses and the use of
"terrorist" and "terrorism" by government officials.
1 In the first part of the chapter, a brief history of Nepal in the 20 h century is provided, followed by analysis of official accounts of the first event. Then, a brief overview of the 2001-2005 period is followed by the second event and the identities produced therein. The following section analyzes the April 2006 protests. Finally, a reiteration of linguistic strategies of stake management and establishing authority in the context of Nepal along with a brief discussion of how these played out in the context of
Northern Ireland ends the chapter. While similar commonplaces of 'the people', 'peace',
'security', 'democracy' and, of course, 'terrorism' were used in both Northern Ireland and Nepal, discourses in Nepal produced the Nepalese counterterrorist state as linked 222 223
with the fight against 'terrorism' regionally and globally, thus internationalizing Nepal's relations with 'terrorists'. Thus, stake management in Nepal -- that 'terrorism' in Nepal was part of global terrorism -- was different to Northern Ireland where one of the ongoing stakes constructed Northern Ireland as a domestic issue for the British state to deal with.
Similarly, while both the IRA and the British state attempted to establish authority in
Northern Ireland, the link of 'democracy' to the state was generally accepted. This was not the case in Nepal where the meaning of 'democracy' itself was more strongly contested by various actors. Also, regular use of the rhetoric of terrorism in Nepal occurred within a shorter time period than in Northern Ireland. These and other effects of the use of "terrorism" will be discussed later but, first, let us start with a short history of
Nepal in the 20th century. Some of the commonplaces present herein are drawn upon by the state (and others) during subsequent identity-formation after November 2001.
A (Very) Brief History of 20th Century Nepal
Prior to the 20th Century, Nepal did not have formalized relations with other countries in the international system. There had been people and goods exchanged between Nepal and Tibet and British India, and Nepalese Gurkhas were recruited to fight by the East India Company (and, later, by the British government). In terms ofleadership, the Shah dynasty ruled the country from its early days as a "unified" Nepal (in the late
18th century). However, for 105 years from 1846 (until 1951) the country was under the leadership of the Rana family, with the royals only nominally in charge. Official trips overseas, contacts (mainly with British India and Britain itself) and diplomatic exchanges were handled by the Ranas. 224
This state of affairs continued until the 20th century. Nepal remained mostly
closed to the outside world until the 1920s, when George Mallory's expeditions to climb
Mt Everest generated interest, at least in the British/Indian world. Formal diplomatic
relations with the United States were only established after World War Two, in 1948.
After Tenzing Norgay and Edmund Hillary climbed Mt Everest in 1953, Nepal became more prominent in overseas news and representations of Nepal as "the Himalayan
Kingdom", "Shangri-la" or "the top of the world" became more common and still continue today. For example, in the majority of foreign media accounts about the Maoist insurgency, the country's name "Nepal" was qualified by "the Himalayan Kingdom of'.
Other common adjectives used in these international representations of Nepal were
"picturesque but poverty-stricken", "one of the poorest countries in the world" and
"underdeveloped. "444
1 In the early to mid-20 h Century, while Nepal itself remained closed off to outsiders, it was not high on the agenda for the international community either. As
Whelpton writes, "Despite its gee-strategically important position in the Himalayas between India and China and its popularity as an exotic tourist destination, Nepal has not normally loomed large in the consciousness of the average educated person in the
English-speaking world."445 The international community was more concerned with the two World Wars, anti-colonial struggles and communism. Nepalese soldiers fought all over the world for Britain (and, later, India) in many of these conflicts. There was
444 Michael Hutt, "Introduction: Monarchy, Democracy and Maoism in Nepal," in Himalayan People's War: Nepal's Maoist Rebellion, ed. Michael Hutt, 1-20 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press) also makes a similar point.
445 John Whelpton, A History of Nepal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1. 225
Nepalese participation in both World Wars, Korea and (as part of the British forces) in
anti-colonial struggles in South and Southeast Asia. British counterinsurgency operations
of the mid-20th century involved a heavy Nepalese presence. Unlike the country-- which
continued to be represented as a lost paradise and/or a socioeconomically-backward state
(but with friendly people) -- Nepalese soldiers were commended for their courage and
bravery. 446
If this was the external world, at the domestic level the end of the Rana rule in
1951 meant the beginnings of democracy. An armed movement led by the Nepali
Congress had led to the overthrow of the Rana dynasty, followed by Nepal's first-ever elections. These elections were won by the Nepali Congress and, for the first time in its history, Nepal had a democratic political system with an elected government. However, within two years of the establishment of democracy, in 1961, King Mahendra dismissed parliament and established the Panchayat (or "village council") system. Under this system, heads of the Panchayat would report to the king and the king would be in direct control of the government. State authority, therefore, rested with the king.
From January 1962 onwards, political parties were deemed illegal. At around the same time, the Nepali Congress began an armed rebellion, in which attacks upon village councils and government offices were common.447 There was limited popular support and
446 See also Lionel Caplan, Warrior Gentlemen: 'Gurkhas' in the Western Imagination (Providence and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995) and Lionel Caplan, '"Bravest of the Brave': Representations of 'the Gurkha' in British Military Writings," Modern Asia Studies, 25, no.3 (July 1991): 571-97; Recent discussions about unfair pay/citizenship rules for retired British Gurkhas also drew upon these tropes.
447 A Nepali Congress supporter, informally interviewed by the author in December 2008, said the Nepali Congress and its activities at this time were labeled atankakari in the 1960s when they began their first pro-democracy activities (atankakari is directly translated as "revolutionary" but has been used to 226
so the armed rebellion was short-lived, and the absolute monarchy system continued until
1990. In 1990, the Nepali Congress passed a resolution calling for "a country-wide peaceful mass movement" in favor of democracy. During this pro-democracy movement,
50 or so civilians were killed (the actual number remains unknown) as protesters clashed with state security forces. "Multiparty democracy" was established and the monarchy gave up its absolute authority and transformed into a constitutional monarchy. The term
"multiparty democracy" was used to distinguish this system from the Panchayat system which had represented itself as a democracy led by the king and one (his supporters') party.
1 During the second half of the 20 h century, Nepal also increased its formal contact with the world beyond its political borders. After the first ascent of Mt. Everest, more climbers began to arrive. The 1970s and 1980s were days when Nepal (especially
Kathmandu) was known for its easy-going attitude and when Kathmandu's "Freak
Street" entered travelers' vocabularies. Once again, the exotic and different nature of
Nepal was prominent in these representations, both in popular culture and traveler lore.
Since tourism is one of the highest earners for Nepal's economy, tourists' representations, whether in travel journals, books or guidebooks, forms an important part of Nepal's representations. m . t h e 201h century.
In terms of self-representations, during the Cold War period, Nepal's security imaginary448 had a theme of non alignment to both sides and, in the 1980s, positioned
mean "terrorist" in recent times). Nepali Congress supporter, interview by author, Kathmandu, Nepal, December 10, 2008.
448 For more on "security imaginary", please see Weldes, Constructing. 227
Nepal as a "Zone of Peace".449 The Zone of Peace representation was introduced during
King Birendra's coronation in 1975 and heavily promoted thereafter especially international meetings.450 In relations with its neighbors, Nepal publicly constituted itself as not taking the part of either India or China during their conflicts in the 1960s and afterwards. This neutral positioning continued as Nepal joined the non-aligned movement. This movement was described by its conveners as a way to stay out of the bipolarly constructed politics of the Cold War period. Thus, in the Cold War era, the constitution of Nepal's public identity was very much along the lines of neutrality and non-involvement in others' affairs as the Nepalese state positioned itself as uninvolved in and separate from regional and global tensions. Instead, its stated concerns were socioeconomic development and poverty alleviation.
This continued in the 1980s as official accounts continued promoting Nepal as a
"Zone of Peace", where different groups and peoples and religions were represented as harmoniously living together. Nepal was also promoted in the international arena as the birthplace of Gautama Buddha with the area where Buddha was born, Lumbini, declared as a United Nations World Heritage Site by UNESCO in 1997. So, Nepal was constituted internally as having multiple and diverse groups of peoples, languages (Over 120 languages, many with their own alphabets, are used in the country)451 and religions and as
449 This representation was not officially recognized by India.
450 John Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 149-150.
451 This is according to Ethnologue, which catalogues (and collects information on) the world's languages. "Languages of Nepal," Ethnologue http://www.ethnologue.com/show country.asp?name=NP (accessed June 10, 2009). 228
an area of peace. The historical past of Nepal as the land of Buddha ("a messenger of
peace") and of peace was constitutive of Nepal's security imaginary.
Alongside this "Zone of Peace" construction was that of other subjects in the
international system as potential allies and friends. Nepal was represented as having no
enemies except poverty and a lack of development.452 The construction of others as allies
or potential allies was seen in the case of Nepal's continued relations with both India and
China and with the United States and the Soviet Union, opposing sides during the Cold
War period. Prithvi Narayan Shah, the king who joined many smaller kingdoms into a
unified Nepal in 1768, had described Nepal's situation as "Nepal is a yam between two
stones"453 and this representation of being a weak and smaller (and potentially crushable)
entity between two big, tough actors formed part of Nepalese security repertoire (and its
self/other constitutions) since. By representing itself as a neutral, peaceful area, non
aligned to any side or ideology and by representing others as friends and allies (no matter
their Cold War identities), Nepal's constitutions of other actors in regional and global
arena attempted a delicate balancing act, similar to the image of a yam between two
stones. In this formulation, security threats to Nepal were from poverty and
underdevelopment, not from either side of the Cold War since Nepal was a (potential or
actual) ally of all sides.454
452 King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah, "Toasts of the President and King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev of Nepal at the State Dinner," December 7, 1983, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/120783c.htm (accessed June 20, 2008).
453 Louise Brown, The Challenge to Democracy in Nepal: A Political History (London: Routledge, 1996), 5.
454 Birendra, Toast; Andrea Matles Savada, ed., Nepal and Bhutan: Country Studies (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1993). 229
This succeeded in terms of Nepal not being a top priority in any side during the
Cold War. In regional and global representations of the time, Nepal bordered Tibet and
was thus geographically close to (Communist) China but separated from it by the
Himalayan mountain ranges. Nepal was therefore seen as unlikely to become of strategic
interest to China. Indeed, China was more concerned about achieving rapid economic
growth and was already involved in military and social tensions in Tibet to be interested
in expanding southwards through the difficult mountainous terrain. In the United States
security repertoire, Nepal was also part of the Third World, where people were
represented as irresponsible and childlike and needing (United States') assistance.455 But,
it was also peaceful (though with high levels of poverty) so, as described within the
United States' Cold War representations, Nepal was not a threat and not part of the direct
fight against Communism. Since Nepal had a single party rule (led by the monarch) from
1961 to 1990, the international community deemed it fairly stable.
After 1990 and the end of the Cold War, the bipolarly-constructed international
system ended. But even then, elections were held frequently in Nepal, starting from
1990's establishment of multiparty democracy, and there was a multiparty contestation of
these elections. Again, within global security representations of the time, Nepal was
merely another small state at the periphery of the international system which had now
become democratic in the post Cold War wave of democratizations and its people were
exercising their democratic rights. When the Maoist rebellion started in 1996, the rebels were not very numerous and their activities were described (in domestic and regional representations) as being that of a small group of dissatisfied people who would not be
455 Doty, Imperial. 230
supported by local people. They were not seen as serious threats to Nepal's security and not described as such. Instead, Nepal's security discourses drew upon themes oflack of educational and economic opportunities as leading to poverty, not terrorism. Later, these descriptions would be reused and provided and reasons for "terrorism".
In February 1996, six years after the establishment of a multiparty democracy in
Nepal, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) launched itsjanayuddha ("People's
War"). Their stated goal was to establish a People's Republic of Nepal in place of the existing monarchy but they also had a 40 point list of demands, most of which called for increased social equality and an end to ethnic and gender discrimination.456 In the period from then to November 2001, their use of violence gradually increased, especially outside the Kathmandu valley, but they were not given much attention in local media.
Descriptions of Nepal in the international media, too, drew upon representations of poverty, lack of socioeconomic development and the need for industrial growth, rather than on security or terrorism.457 This did not mean violence had stopped. By mid-2001, almost 2,000 people had been killed.458 There was also the practice ofreciprocal killings, with the Maoists killing people and then the police retaliating (or the other way around).
In 2001, violence escalated with over 70 people killed in the first week of April alone. Then, there was news which suddenly brought international attention on Nepal. On
456 The full statement of the Maoists' call for change is available at http://www.humanrights.de/doc en/archiv/n/nepal/politics/130299 40demands Maoist.htm (accessed July 22, 2008). See also Thapa, Kingdom, 211-16 for a full list of the Maoist demands.
457 When I was in Nepal in December 1998, there was not much mention of the Maoists as a problem to community-based management practices. Indeed, at that time, Nepal's community management programs were well-known for being successful and as an example to other countries.
458 Hutt, Himalayan, 6. 231
June 1, 2001, King Birendra and his whole family were killed in a massacre which occurred within the royal palace. Official reports assigned blame to Crown Prince
Dipendra who was said to have been thwarted in his choice of wife and then killed his family. Birendra's surviving brother Gyanendra was crowned king on June 4. However, there continued to be numerous rumors about whether Dipendra was really guilty with popular suspicion even placed on Gyanendra. During this time, there was a curfew in
Kathmandu and public demonstrations were frowned upon. On June 6, the Maoist leader
Baburam Bhattarai wrote a column in a popular Nepali-language daily Kantipur alleging that King Birendra had supported the Maoists' goals (and inferring this was the reason for his killing). 459 At this time, descriptions of the Maoists in official security discourses were of them as a danger, but one which could be dealt with without using the Army.
Discussing King Birendra's views on the Maoists, Hutt writes, "It was also known that the palace had lines of communication open to the Maoists ... "460 It was well-known that
King Birendra had been reluctant to deploy the Army against the Maoists.461 A few days after the publication of Bhattarai's column, another Maoist leader, Prachanda, said the massacre was an imperialist conspiracy, supported by the United States and India. 462 In the weeks following the killings of the royal family, the Maoists increased their calls for a republic but received little public support, especially in urban areas. There was also a
459Baburam Bhattarai, "Naya 'Kotparba' lai manyata dinu hunna" ("[We] shouldn't give legitimacy to the new kotparba"), Kantipur, June 6, 2001. Kotparba was a massacre in Nepali history, one that led to the over 100-year-long indirect rule of the Ranas.
460 Hutt, Himalayan, 8.
461 Thapa, Kingdom, 116-19; Hutt, Himalayan, 6-9 for more detailed accounts of the royal massacre. Thapa focuses on the Maoists' reactions while Hutt gives a general outline.
462 Thapa, Kingdom, 117. 232
change in government and the new government declared a ceasefire. The Maoists
followed suit, with peace talks starting in August 2001. In the months that followed, the
peace process would falter and violence would continue. By the end of November 2001, a
state of emergency was declared. In the next section, I shall analyze official usage of the
rhetoric of "terrorism" during and after the declaration of the state of emergency.
November 2001: The State of Emergency and the Emergence of the Counterterrorist state
Nepal's political situation following the royal family's massacre gained attention
in regional and international settings. The socioeconomic discourses -- and the
commonplace of Nepal as one of the poorest countries in the world -- still continued but
within this discursive framework, the Maoists' demands of equality for all ethnic groups,
better education and the ending of a feudal land ownership system463 could be legitimated
as calls for equality and democratic participation. For a country where around 90 percent
of the population still depended on agriculture for a living, unequal access to land
remained a key issue. 464 Within a socioeconomic/poverty alleviation discursive
repertoire, killings by the state could be represented as repressive and illegal and against
the wishes of the people. At the official level, violence against citizens dissatisfied with
their lot could not be adequately explained under such a repertoire without then leading to
463 Deepak Thapa, ed., Understanding the Maoist Movement ofNepal (Kathmandu: Martin Chautari, 2003 ), 39 l.
464 Devendra Chapagain, "Land Tenure and Poverty Status and Trends Land Systems in the Hills and Mountains of Nepal," in Growth, Poverty Alleviation and Sustainable Resource Management in the Mountain Areas ofSouth Asia, ed. Mahesh Banskota, Trilok S. Papola and Jurgen Richter, 407-433 (Feldafing, Germany: German Foundation for International Development, 2000) writes, "Concentration of land in the hands of a few elite and severe exploitation of the peasantry through the excessive expropriation oflabour and land revenue have been the principal policies of the rulers through much of the nation's history." (2000, 413). 233
the constitution of state identity as having the responsibility to protect all citizens,
increase equal representation in government and improve educational and other social
benefits for all ethnic groups and geographical regions.465
Similarly, Nepal's past support for the non aligned movement and its Zone of
Peace identity drew upon commonplaces of non-violence and neutrality, and upon the
identity of Nepal as the birthplace of the Buddha to call for non-violence on the part of everyone. This discursive framework, too, would not be applicable for state/Maoist identities where both groups were commonly using violence since 'Zone of Peace' had been linked to neutrality and non-violence in the past. By late 2001, one of the more common discourses available, especially with regard to international security, was that of terrorism. The terms "terrorism" and "terrorist" were commonly-used globally, especially
after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centers in New York and the subsequent declaration of a "global war on terror" by the United States. The Nepalese government was one of those to express early support for this global war on terror. In
Nepal, the use of the language of terrorism started to proliferate. Other linguistic commonplaces of 'the people', 'peace', 'democracy' -- also noted in the Zone of Peace and non-alignment days -- were repositioned and added to as 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' became more widespread.
Official use of the rhetoric of terrorism became more common as peace talks between the Nepalese government and the Maoists collapsed on November 23, 2001.
There had been a five-month Maoist ceasefire from July 23, 2001 but this ended on
465 There is geographical disparity in socioeconomic growth in the country, with the Western region lacking adequate roads and other infrastructure and with a lower socioeconomic growth rate. 234
November 23. At this time, Maoists attacked security posts in 42 (out of 75) districts and killed almost 200 police and army personnel. After this, the Maoist-as-terrorist formulation became more common in official accounts of Maoist activities. The Interior
Security Minister Khum Bahadur Khadka said, "they [Maoists] are terrorists and we will deal with them accordingly,"466 even before official anti-terrorism legislation was announced. On November 26, 2001, the government declared a countrywide state of emergency467 and authorized the use of the Nepalese Army against the Maoists. This was the first time that the Army had been formally deployed against the Maoists. Prior to this, the Army had been used to defend Nepal from foreign attack and for United Nations
Peacekeeping duties, with the police charged with fighting the Maoists. The deployment of the Army coincided with the formulation of Nepal's first-ever anti-terrorism legislation. These practices also had the effect of partially "terroristizing" the Maoists as they became 'terrorists', rather than criminals, who could be dealt with by the police and by the legal system. The implementation of the anti-terrorism legislation was key in this identity-shift as linguistic strategies therein and in official descriptions that followed worked to position the Maoists as dangers to the state. From being local people dissatisfied with the status quo, their position shifted to that of dangers to the state and not even part of the people of Nepal. Instead, they were 'terrorists', who could then be dealt with by military means.
466 Binaj Gurubacharya, "Nepal's Leaders Weigh Response After Rebel Offensive Ends Cease fire, Leaves 37 Soldiers, Police Dead," November 24, 2001, Associated Press.
467 The first state of emergency had been declared by then King Mahendra against the democratically-elected Nepali congress government in December 1960. That government was dismissed for "fail[ing] to maintain law and order and endangering the sovereignty of Nepal". (Hutt, Himalayan, 3) A similar reason would be given by King Gyanendra for his takeover of power on February 1, 2005. 235
All these practices were tied in to the declaration of a state of emergency at the end of November 2001. The declaration of the State of Emergency and the Terrorist and
Destructive Activities (Control and Punishment) Ordinance of November 26, 2001 helped establish a new counterterrorist identity of the state, while affixing the "terrorist" label firmly to the Maoists. Maoists thus shifted from citizens who were disenchanted with the government and who, in some accounts, were campaigning for ethnic and social rights (under which formulation, it would be the state's responsibility to improve their situation) to threats to the state's stability (in which case, the state's responsibility would be to eliminate them). These socioeconomic and poverty alleviation discourses existed as did the neutrality/ nonviolence discourses but, instead, official accounts used the language of terrorism describe Maoist actions while, relatedly, helping constitute state identity as counterterrorist. At the same time, other representations were present and official discourses had to continuously respond to these.
That the state of emergency had been implemented against the threat of
'terrorism' and 'terrorist' forces was made clear in the Prime Minister's address to the nation on November 28, 2001. In this, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba claimed,
"Terrorists by the name of Maoists have terrorized Nepalese life through killings, violence and bloodshed."468 Here, an explicit link between 'the Maoists', 'terrorism' and violence was made. Only a few days prior, before the end of the Maoist ceasefire, the prime minister had said, the government was "committed" to "resolve the Maoist issue
468 Sher Bahadur Deuba, "Nepal Prime Minister's Address to the Nation," (speech Kathmandu, Nepal, November 28, 2001), South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/PM Speech.htrn (accessed July 20, 2008). 236
through talks"469 and that the security situation had improved in the past few months. But,
he had also said that Maoist violence would not be acceptable at a time when the world
was fighting 'terrorism', thus categorizing Maoists' use of violence and global 'terrorism'
as similar. This usage of 'terrorism' at this time was not the only possible course of
actions as past representations of Nepal had drawn upon the commonplaces of peace and
neutrality. However, these commonplaces were not used in the same way in the
November 2001 identity-constructions.
Maoists and the State after November 2001
'Terrorism' and 'terrorists' became explicitly used in public accounts of events
and actions, mostly involving the Maoists but also when describing the security situation
in general. In accounts immediately following the declaration of the state of emergency, the Nepali government drew upon the definitions of terrorism laid out in its Anti- terrorism Ordinance. In the Ordinance, "terrorism" is used to refer to "any act or plan of
using any kinds of arms, grenades, or explosives, or any other equipment or goods with the objective of affecting or hurting sovereignty or the security and law and order of the
Kingdom of Nepal.. ."470 Here, "terrorism" is differentiated from "the government" and
"state sovereignty". Therefore, the definition itself draws upon the traditional
469 "Fourth Round of Govt, Maoist Talks after Thursday," Nepalnews.com, November 20, 2005, http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2001/november/arc293.htm#9 (accessed February 2, 2009). The Nepali Congress had declared the Maoists "terrorists" even before the state did so. India, too, declared them "terrorists" prior to the official labeling of the Maoists as "terrorist" by the Nepalese government (Hutt, Himalayan: l ln5).
470 His Majesty's Government of Nepal, "Terrorist and Destructive Activities (Control and Punishment) Ordinance," (November 26, 2001), South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://satp.org/ satporgtp/ countries/nepal/ document/actandordance/Terrorism Ordinance.htm (accessed July 20, 2008) 237
understanding of terrorism as non-state-based since as it constructs state actions or actions by state security forces as not terrorism. In the Nepalese government's definition,
'terrorism' is against 'sovereignty' while state actions and actions of the state security forces cannot be considered 'terrorism' since they fall outside of the category of
'terrorism' defined here. 471 In addition, according to this definition, conversely, anyone who is against sovereignty could be a 'terrorist'. Furthermore, the Ordinance gives the state the power of naming areas as "terrorist-affected" and individuals and groups as
"terrorist" as it is written in the Ordinance that, "The government can declare a terrorist affected area or terrorist individuals. "472 Such constructions further strengthened the counterterrorist identity of the Nepalese state as a state threatened by 'terrorists' rather than it fighting its own discontented citizens. Poverty and socioeconomic development were not central to Nepal's representations anymore in this anti-terrorist formulation of state/Maoist identities.
These characterizations -- and the more widespread use of 'terrorism' and
'terrorist' -- could be commonly noted in official descriptions of government activities during the days immediately following the declaration of the state of emergency. Indeed even a main opposition party, the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) said it was the "Maoist terrorists" and their actions which had led to the current conflict.473 In another example, on November 28, 2001, the prime minister began his
471 Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 discussed this ignoring of the state's actions as "terrorism" in traditional studies.
472 His Majesty's Government of Nepal, Terrorist 2001.
473 CPN (UML) is the main official Communist party in Nepal. "CPN-UML Holds Maoists Responsible for Current Situation," Nepalnews.com, November 29, 2001, 238
speech by saying: "Today, our country is passing through a difficult situation. Terrorists by the name of Maoists have terrorized Nepalese life through killings, violence and bloodshed."474 Similar representations can be noted in a guideline to the press that was published after the Anti-Terrorism legislation was put in place. In these guidelines, a section entitled "Materials not to be broadcast or published" included "News that support
Maoist terrorists including individual or groups" while "News that expose criminal activities of Maoist terrorists" could be published or broadcast. 475 In these representations, the general category of 'terrorist' includes the Maoists, such that the
Maoists are now linked with 'terrorism' in general and not just in Nepal. On the whole, there are two basic discourses about danger that can be noted herein: one, it posits
'terrorists' as threats to "Nepalese life'', a formulation that was less evident in previous descriptions of danger. Two, 'terrorism' in general is explicitly linked with the Maoists, such that both are used interchangeably.
'The People': Supporting 'the State' vs 'Terrorism'
In giving his reasons for the state of emergency, the prime minister directly linked
'Maoists' with 'terrorists' as he said, "in an utter disregard to the government's efforts and people's goodwill, the Maoist terrorists carried out attacks on the innocent people, political party workers, civil servants, etc."476 Here, the 'Maoist terrorists' are
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/200 l/november/arc298.htm#15 (accessed November 20, 2008).
474 Deuba, Address.
475 "Ministry oflnformation and Communication Press Circular," Nepalnews.com, November 29, 2001, http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2001/november/arc298.htm#l 5 (accessed November 20, 2008).
476 Deuba, Address. 239
differentiated from both 'the government' and 'the people', thus reinforcing state identity as linked to 'the people' while, also, producing the Maoists as 'terrorists', who ignore
'the people' and their wishes. At the same time, the Maoists' actions are against
"people's goodwill". Finally, this also serves to distinguish the government (who makes
"efforts") and the Maoist 'terrorists' who carry out attacks on "innocent people". It is worth noting, too, that 'the people' described as being attacked by the Maoists are, in the
Prime Minister's words, "innocent people, political party workers ... " and not (armed) security forces. In terms of strategies of extrematization and minimization here, the government's role in the conflict and its participation in killings are minimized, while the
Maoists' activities are extrematized. The government's self is thus aligned to 'the people' and has their goodwill. It is making efforts (presumably to engage the Maoists) while the
'Maoist terrorists' are disregarding people's wishes and attacking and killing ordinary citizens. Later, in the same speech, the prime minister says, "His Majesty's Government will bring the terrorists before the people and to book" and adds the state is "with the people because it is not a separate entity aloof from the people."477 This, too, reinforces the identity of 'the people' as the group on whose behalf 'the government' acts. That most of those who died on November 23 were security personnel is not mentioned.
However, it is essential that 'the people' remain cohesive and united and not question or challenge state efforts. Emphasizing this need for unity, the prime minister adds, "In the present situation, all Nepali people should be united for the sake of public interest, monarchy, the present constitution, multi-party democracy and the welfare of
477 Ibid. 240
Nepal and remain committed to root out terrorism."478 This, obviously, shores up representations of the state as counterterrorist and 'the people' as its allies in the state's
counterterrorism efforts. Indeed, 'the people' in Nepal are more closely linked with 'the
state', compared to early days in Northern Ireland where during "Bloody Sunday", for
example, 'the people' were divided between the problematic illegal rioters and the (few)
organized marchers. Paralleling later representations in Northern Ireland, the Nepalese people are to help the government against terrorism as the prime minister makes clear, "I make an earnest appeal to all Nepalese brothers and sisters to focus our power and
attention against terrorism."479 This is a categorization that ignores that the Maoist themselves are also Nepalese people.
Instead this use of 'the people' as linked to the state's counterterrorism goals is part of the othering process within which the Maoists are constructed as not part of the body politic, not Nepalese citizens and not included in the category of 'the people'.
However, 'the people', too, have their responsibilities -- if they do not follow these precepts or do not support the state's goals, they are shirking their (patriotic, anti terrorist) duty. Therefore, if they do not support the government's anti-terrorist actions,
'the people' can be considered dangerous as well. Later in the same speech, the prime minister warned people against assisting 'terrorists' as he said, "Encouraging terrorism under any pretext will be considered as a serious crime against the country, people and democracy. "480
478 Ibid.
479 Ibid.
480 Ibid. 241
Such representations, therefore, divide 'the people' into supporters of the state or
(potential) 'encouragers of terrorism', with the Maoists outside of the whole category and not part of the Nepalese people. Once again, the link of 'the people' with the state and the struggle over the meaning of 'the people' (linked to the state versus potential supporters of 'terrorists') draws upon similar strategy of categorization as in Northern
Ireland where 'the people' also had this divided identity and, as such, no fixed meaning.
'The state' is here positively linked with 'peace' and 'security' while the Maoists threatened these with their attacks on 'the people' and by their unpredictable nature. The prime minister made another connection between the Maoists and 'terrorists' as he said,
"But the Maoist terrorists totally ignored our honest efforts and people's wishes'', were
"not democratic" and "treated the Nepalese people and democracy as enemies."481 So, the
Maoists were not just against the state, as such, but were against the people, people's wishes, and against democracy.
Other Representations of Maoists
While official accounts produced the Maoists as 'terrorist' and the state as counterring 'terrorism', other interpretations of their actions were also present at this time but the majority of external actors operated within a similar anti-terrorism security repertoire as that of the Nepalese state. At the international level, many countries including the United States and India supported Nepal's 'anti-terrorist' endeavors. News reports claimed the Indian prime minister had called Nepal's king and "offered whatever
481 Ibid. 242
assistance is required in its [Nepal's] fight against terrorism,"482 thus accepting Nepal's
formulation of 'terrorism' as the main danger facing it. India offered not just military
hardware but paramilitary assistance as well. The United States urged Nepal to act within
its constitutional limits but did not condemn Nepal's use of the language of 'terrorism' or
the representation of the Maoists as 'terrorist'. Other regional countries -- China and Sri
Lanka -- too supported Nepal's anti-terrorism identity. At the domestic level, though,
opposition parties used the rhetoric of human rights to claim the state of emergency was
"unnecessary" and that the Army's involvement would aggravate the problem instead of
ending it. 483 These interpretations (and the human rights-state) did not gain much ground
in local or international settings as Nepal's counterterrorist identity became prominent.
However, they provided an alternative set of meanings which state counterterrorist
discourses had to respond to. The next few sections of this chapter will illustrate this.
State/Maoist Identities after November 2001
To recap, state/Maoist identities shifted after November 2001 as the relatively new concept (for Nepal) of "terrorism" was used to help construct the stake for the state
as being against terrorists. The social construction of the Maoists was not only as dangerous 'terrorists' and acting against the people's wishes but as having unpredictable natures, making it impossible for the state to negotiate with them. The state was acting defensively and military actions would cease when, as the king put it, the Maoists "joined
482 "India to Assist Nepal to Fight Terrorists," Nepalnews.com, November 29, 2001, http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2001/november/arc298.htm#15 (accessed February 23, 2009) and "India Offers Paramilitary Assistance to Nepal'', The Statesman November 29, 2001 (accessed February 23, 2009).
483 "Nepal: Prime Minister Denies Civilians Killed in Anti-rebel Operations," BBC Monitoring South Asia Political, December 11, 2001 (accessed via LexisNexis November 22, 2008). 243
the mainstream of national life."484 The Maoists were described as unpredictable. Prime
minister Deuba said, the Maoists "unilaterally broke the dialogues and peace efforts all of
a sudden", leading to "a vicious cycle of violence, killings and terrorism."485 So, it was
the Maoists' lack of interest in people's wishes and their volatile nature that led to this
"vicious cycle" of killings. Here, motivation and nature of the Maoists is itself part of the
rhetorical strategies by which the state/Maoist identities are constructed and the stake --
anti-terrorism--reiterated.486 Unlike the Maoists, the state produced out of these early
usages of 'terrorism' was one that was peaceful, sympathetic of people's wishes and
wanted to avoid military conflict. The state, as articulated by the Prime Minister, sought a
"peaceful resolution to our differences" and "showed utmost flexibility" to bring the
Maoists "into the mainstream of politics."487 This use of 'the mainstream' as a site where
the Maoists should be in so they could engage with the government was another
commonplace, one that would continue to be used in future representations. The Maoists
were outside the mainstream while the state was positioned as the mainstream.
Another theme which would continue in future constitutions of state/Maoist
identities is the link of 'terrorism' in Nepal with 'terrorism' overseas. In Nepal, part of
the establishment of authority included internationalization of 'terrorism' as incidents in
Nepal were described as part of the global war on terrorism. This was contrary to how
484 "Maoists Must Disarm and Join the National Mainstream: King," Nepalnews.com, December 11, 2001, http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2001/december/arc302.htm#14 (accessed November 22, 2008).
485 Deuba, Address.
486 See Potter, Representing for his discussion on how interests are assigned to various actors during the processes of constructing and managing stake.
487 Deuba, Address. 244
authority was established in Northern Ireland as British represented IRA activities and
state counterterrorist practices as internal (domestic) affairs. In Nepal, "friends" of Nepal would support it in its endeavors against the Maoist 'terrorists'. To underscore this, the
Nepalese prime minister said, "I want to state here that all friendly countries and
institutions having goodwill towards Nepal and democracy are with the Nepalese people
and his Majesty's government in combating terrorism."488 The King reiterated this
formulation of "friends" as he said, "Friends have given their support and understand our compulsions."489 So, friendship now depended on their support of Nepal's anti-terrorism position, a representation that was not the case during the previous neutral identity- formation during the Cold War.
This formulation also has the effect of classifying those not supporting Nepal's anti-"terrorist" actions as unfriendly and undemocratic. This was a shift from the previous neutral stance since, now, friends of Nepal were also against 'terrorism' (as was
Nepal). Previously, during the Cold War, Nepal had positioned itself as an ally to countries on both sides of the conflict but this was not the case anymore. Also, the state's new anti-terrorist identity was not just limited to its borders. The prime minister made this clear when he said, "All the persons, groups and institutions within and outside the country aiding and abetting terrorism through a supply of arms, money and information have to be brought under the purview oflaw and punished accordingly."490 'The people'
488 Ibid.
489 "Maoists Must Disarm and Join the National Mainstream: King," Nepalnews.com, December 11, 2001, http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2001/december/arc302.htm#l4 (accessed November 20, 2001).
490 Deuba, Address. 245
were either supporters of the state or encouragers of 'terrorism'. In the next sections, I
shall briefly trace out how Maoist 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' identities solidified in Nepal
during the next few years, leading to the takeover of the state by the king in February
2005.
State/Maoist Relations from January 2002 to February 1, 2005
Thus, the use of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' in official discourses during the state of
emergency of November 2001 produced state/Maoist identities where the state was
linked with the people's wishes and was 'anti-terrorist'. The Maoists, on the other hand,
were outside the mainstream (thus unsupported by the people) and irrational, killing
"innocent people" as part of their 'terrorist' activities.
A key event following the declaration of the state of emergency in November
2001 was that, for the first time in Nepal's history, the United States provided military
aid to Nepal to train "anti-terrorist" forces. The death tolls also rose in the first three
months following the declaration of the state of emergency and by June 2002, 2,850
Maoists, 335 police, 148 soldiers and 194 civilians were said to have been killed in these
few months.491 Peace talks between the government and the Maoists were held and, once
again, collapsed. Elections were ordered in May 2002 after the King dissolved
parliament. Political tensions continued as, in October 2002, the king assumed executive
power. The parliament remained operational but with the king as its head. In the next two years, joint US-Nepal army exercises to counter "terrorism" were held and killings --
491 Hutt, Himalayan, 12. 246
both by Maoists and the security forces (now including both the police and the Army) -- continued. Ceasefires and peace talks also occurred and ended as did frequent strikes or ban dh s. 492
At the regional level, too, 'terrorism' was noted as a problem, linking Nepal's identity construction with that of the wider region. The South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit of 2002 extensively discussed terrorism and came up with the following as part of its Resolution:
The Heads of State or Government were convinced that terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, is a challenge to all states and to all of humanity, and cannot be justified on ideological, political, religious or on any other ground. The Leaders agreed that terrorism violates the fundamental values of the United Nations and the SAARC Charter and constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the Twenty-first century. The Heads of State or Government emphasized the need for the urgent conclusion of a Comprehensive Convention on Combating International Terrorism. They also emphasized that international co-operation to combat terrorism should be conducted in conformity with the UN Charter, international law and relevant international conventions.493
Here, the construction of 'terrorism' as ubiquitous and as a global threat, a threat to "all of humanity" can be noted, similar to constructions in Nepalese accounts of
'terrorism'. However, the SAARC formulation invokes international law as a means to deal with 'terrorism', while Nepal constituted itself as having authority over 'terrorists'.
In fact, discussion about 'international law' did not form much of Nepal's subsequent identity-formation with relation to the Maoist 'terrorists'. If it had, the treatment of civilians by both sides -- the Maoists and the security forces -- could be publicized and safeguards for human rights, for example, might have to be put in place. Official accounts
492 Which translates as "closure" or "closing".
493 Report of the 11th SAARC Summit, Kathmandu, Nepal, January 6, 2002, http://www.saarctourism.org/eleventh-saarc-summit.html (accessed November 20, 2008). 247
thus internationalized the problem of 'terrorism' but maintained that responses to 'Maoist
terrorists' should be state-based. This way of establishing authority was thus both similar
and different to British practices in Northern Ireland. Similar to Nepal, during much of
the Troubles, 'terrorism' was a problem for the British state to deal with domestically.
Contrary to Nepal, however, attempts to internationalize the conflict within other
representations were countered by British officials.
In terms of the state/Maoist relations, ceasefires and peace talks continued and
failed during this period. In 2003, one Maoist ceasefire lasted almost seven months, though there continued to be frequent low-level violence during this ceasefire period. But when it ended on August 27, 2003, the peace process was deemed by the Maoists to be
finally over. The Maoists' leader, Prachanda, said: "Since the old regime has put an end to the forward-looking solution to all existing problems through the cease-fire and peace talks, we herein declare that the rationale behind ceasefire and the peace process has
ended."494 Here, the way 'peace process' was deployed linked it to the failure of "the old regime" (the state) to consider innovative options.495 The Maoists were positioned as looking towards the future.
Clashes, strikes and killings continued in 2004, which saw a rise in street demonstrations in Kathmandu and other cities around the country. These demonstrations were variously described as in favor of 'peace', 'anti-monarchy', and 'pro-democracy'.
Then, in February 2005, the king took over power as he dismissed the government,
494 Tilak P. Pokharel. "Nepalese Rebels Walk Away from Peace Talks," Worldpress.org, August 27, 2003. http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/1478.cfm (accessed July 20, 2008).
495 The use of the rhetoric of 'peace' will be further discussed later. 248
placed prominent party leaders and media personnel under house arrest and closed off communications for at least a week after his takeover. While there had been significant press restrictions during the November 2001 state of emergency and media personnel had been arrested in the years since then, censorship laws became more restrictive following the February 1, 2005 takeover. This included censoring local and international news media and cutting off cable television stations and internet service providers. In the months that followed, there was increased (and long-term) censorship of local media. 496
The February 1, 2005 event is crucial in noting how the language of "terrorism" and "terrorist" again shifted as 'the Maoists' were still threats but two distinct themes can be noted herein, different from past constructions. One, the Maoists in Nepal were now more explicitly linked with regional and global 'terrorists', thus further constituting
Nepal as an ally of those fighting the global war on terror. This also had the related effect of separating 'the Maoists' from 'the people', thus constructing them as not-people, inhuman. Two, political party-led government, which had previously constituted itself as being "anti-terrorist" and allied to the people, was now represented in official descriptions as weak and unsuccessful in controlling terrorism. Hence, it needed to be removed. Instead, the king was linked to 'the people' and was (and always had been) the people's protector. The monarchy took on the position which had previously -- especially in and just after the declaration of the 2001 state of emergency -- been held by various political parties who had formed the government. The positioning of 'the people' shifted from linked to the (parliamentary) government to the king. However, their meaning
496 This has to be taken into account when reading the following sections which is based on publicly-available data. 249
remained contested since all parties -- the state, the political parties and the Maoists -- claimed to be acting in the name of 'the people'.
There was a shift in who used the language of 'terrorism' from the (elected or appointed) government to the king and his supporters. There was a similar shift in the related usage of other rhetorical commonplaces of 'peace', 'the people', 'security' and
'democracy'. Prior to February 2005, the government used 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' when describing the Maoists while linking itself to 'the people'. But, after February 2005, it was the monarch (and his allies) who were linked to 'the people'. The common strategy in both cases was that the state was against 'terrorism' and was 'anti-terrorist'. The difference being state identity itself shifted as it was the king who represented himself and his allies as 'anti-terrorist', with the (previous) govemment(s) being characterized as weak and failing to fight 'terrorism' or hold elections. The next section will trace out, within official texts and speeches, how this shift occurred, what was now at stake and whose actions were constructed as "authoritative". The subject positionings of the
Maoists, the king, the people, and international actors within this anti-terrorism security repertoire will be outlined.497
497 In the following section, I examine the use of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' after February 1, 2005 in the process of fixing Nepal's identity as a counterterrorist state. My sources are the then King Gyanendra's speech of February 1, 2005 (the English translation of the speech provided by the Nepalese Royal Palace), subsequent discussions of the takeover by senior members of the Royal Nepalese Army and by senior ministers (appointed by the King), including the Chief Justice and Finance Minister, all in the international arena. In addition, the King's speeches during an international summit in Indonesia in April and his interview with Time Asia Magazine's April 25, 2005 edition are texts for analysis. These people - leaders of the state-- constitute Nepal's identity in the public arena, especially in international circles and it is this public construction of and changes in national identities and related descriptions of threats that I am interested in. For convenience sake, I shall refer to Gyanendra as the King as he was the monarch at that time, even though Nepal is now a republic. Additional data was obtained from Lexis-Nexis searches and from official media The Rising Nepal and Gorkhapatra. All issues of these two newspapers and of the aggregate news site Nepalnews (www.nepalnews.com) from February 1, 2005-February 7, 2005 were examined to note state/Maoist identity formation in the period immediately after the event. For Lexis Nexis, the period of investigation spans February 1, 2005- February, 3, 2005 for the search term "Nepal" 250
'Terrorist' Threats and the Establishment of a Counterterrorist Monarchist State
On February 1, 2005, King Gyanendra of Nepal sacked the coalition government
and took sole control of the country. In an address to the nation, he declared a state of
emergency and vowed to re-establish democracy within the next three years. In the hours
and days that followed, top party leaders were placed in house arrest, overseas flights
were cancelled and communication within and outside Nepal were cut off. Various civil
rights as granted in the 1990 Constitution, including those of freedoms of peaceful
assembly and expression, were suspended.
By then, in the 14 years since the establishment of multiparty democracy, Nepal
had had 13 changes of government, nearly two-thirds of the country was claimed by
Maoists and peace talks between the government and the Maoists had begun and ended
more than once. Prior to his actions of February 1, the king had dismissed parliament
before but had replaced it with another government instead of taking direct control himself as he did in 2005.
In official accounts following the takeover, Nepal's security was described as
being threatened by Maoist 'terrorists'. This identification of Maoists as 'terrorist' (not
explicitly made in the king's speech on February 1 though more explicit in later descriptions by government officials) used representations that had proliferated since
2001. The difference, however, was who was authoritative shifted as political parties -- previously described as 'anti-terrorist' -- were now themselves positioned as weak and unable to perform their tasks of getting rid of 'terrorism'. This constitution linked
and February I, 2005-April, 30, 2005 for the search terms "Nepal" and "terrorism" (and variants thereof). 251
Nepalese people and the king together in promoting and safeguarding 'democracy'
against instability and 'terrorism'. As such, 'the people' were supporters of the king's
actions as well as supporters of and reasons for the state's counterterrorist operations
against 'terrorists'.
'The People': Victims of 'Terrorism', Supporters of 'the Monarchy'
In his speech to the nation informing people of his takeover of government, King
Gyanendra described 'the people' as wanting effective reforms and never before in
history having had to "bear the burden of such terrorism, such agony and exploitation."498
'The people' were linked to 'the government' (now headed by the king) in that it was the
people's wishes that the government sought to fulfill. The king said, "I have already
made a commitment during my announcement on February 1 that the government will
operate according to the wishes of the people."499 Indeed, 'the people' was used as a justification for the February 1 event and for the king's actions. Making this clear,
Foreign Minister Ramesh Nath Pandey said, "the decision taken by His Majesty was for
the betterment of Nepali people and it was right because the Nepalese people consider it to be so. The days ahead will now be as wished for by the Nepalis, not as per the whims
of others."500 Thus, 'the people' were not only suffering from 'terrorism' but were also
498 Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah, "Proclamation to the Nation From His Majesty King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev," (Speech, Kathmandu, Nepal, February 1, 2005), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.gov.np/uploads/news/20060313115845.pdf (accessed July 14, 2008).
499 "Terrorism vs Peace, No Third Force Left: His Majesty," Nepalnews.com, February 24, 2005 http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2005/feb/feb24/news 14.php (accessed February 22, 2009).
500 "Nepal Hopeful oflnternational Support in its Fight Against Terrorism: Minister Pandey'', Nepalnews.com, March 1, 2005, http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2005/rnar/mar01/news05.php (accessed February 22, 2009). 252
the reason why the February 1 event (and related counterterrorism measures) were
"right". At the same time, the future would depend on 'the people' and their wishes.
While there was little mention of how people's wishes would be sought and addressed,
'the people' was commonly used as a reason for the state's (and the king's) actions. This is different to the strategy of constructing authority in Northern Ireland where the question of who was the authoritative (i.e. a democratically-elected political party)
British state remained fairly stable. While the authority of the British state itself had to be
(re)established during particular interactions, who was authorized to speak on behalf of the state remained relatively uncontested. This was different in the case of Nepal where the authority of the king as representing the state had to be established and legitimated in the period following February 2005.
To do so, 'the people' were drawn upon as supporters of the king's actions and as victims of terror. Past representations of Nepal as a country of diversity and peace were also re-used when King Gyanendra maintained 'the people' were "peace-loving" wanted justice, wanted democracy and "[their] only wish" was to end the violence and "return peace and tranquillity to the country without further delay."501 The return to peace and tranquillity, by implication, would be due to the activities of the monarch and the
Nepalese people together since they were linked. Thus, this formulation uses resources from Nepal's past security imaginary in that the king linked 'the monarchy' and 'the people', with the monarchy being a guide to restore and maintain 'democracy'. Also,
Nepal's previous identity as a "Zone of Peace" was drawn upon since 'peace' was to
501 Gyanendra, February 1, 2005. Emphasis added. 253
return to the country, indicating a past when Nepal had been peaceful. Again, while historical representations were drawn upon in both Nepal and Northern Ireland in official accounts, the outcomes were different. Northern Ireland was not considered a land of
'peace' but as (always having been) a British problem. Additionally, characters--
(negative) stereotypes oflrishness -- were referred to during explanations for behavior in
Northern Ireland (and 'terrorism' there) while this was not the case in Nepal. Ethnicity was not given as a reason for the state's (or 'terrorists') actions in Nepal. Instead, 'the people' were linked with 'peace' and 'the monarchy' in constituting authority for the counterterrorist (and, post February 1, monarchist) Nepalese state. This is made clearer in the next section which traces out the commonplace of 'the monarchy' and its differentiation from 'terrorism'.
'The Monarchy': Working With 'the People' for 'Democracy' Against 'Terrorism'
In his February 1 speech declaring his intention to take control of the government, the king linked 'the monarchy' with 'the people' and their wishes by using phrases such as: "the Nepalese people and the king", "in keeping with popular aspirations", "to fulfil the people's aspirations", "our people", etc. In contrast to the 2001- February 2005 official accounts, 'the people' were linked to the king and against political parties. The king then described the political parties as weak and ineffective who had not worked for the people's benefit but had been selfishly interested in only promoting themselves.
Phrases such as "at the expense of the nation", "Nepal's bitter experiences over the past 254
few years", "fulfilling personal and communal interests at the expense of the nation", etc
were used to describe the political parties. 502
Here, the king and the Nepalese people were linked as working together to
maintain security against 'terrorists' but also against the ineffective political parties. In an
interview with a Japanese news agency Kyodo News on March 3, 2005 the vice chairman
of the government Tulsi Giri said "the motive behind all this is to fight terrorism and to
stop and lesson terrorist activities in the country."503 Such construction positioned
Nepal's existence as under threat, both from 'terrorism' and from the inaction of 'weak'
political parties. 'The monarch', however, sought to safeguard Nepal's democracy (and
its existence) as King Gyanendra reiterated in an interview with Time Asia," .. .the
institution of the monarchy will see to it that no one can get rid of it [democracy in
Nepal]."504
Indeed, under this formulation, the monarchy was even open to talks with the
Maoists. Home Minister Dan Bahadur Shahi said, "The government will be making an
appeal to the Maoists to come for peace talks," and added, "The king has the chief
executive authority now, so it will be easier for the rebels to come for peace talks. It is what they have been wanting. 11505 Thus, 'the king' is positioned as the sole leader and talks with him as what "the rebels" have wanted all along. 506
502 Ibid.
503 "Nepal Urges International Community to Reassess Security Situation," Press Trust oflndia, March 3, 2005 (accessed via Lexis-Nexis November 20, 2008).
504 Gyanendra, "It's a Question of Survival," Interview with Alex Perry, Time Asia, April 18, 2005, extended online version, http://www.time.com/time/asia/2005/nepal/ext int ganendra.html (accessed July 20, 2008).
505 "New Nepal Government to Invite Rebels to Return to Peace talks," Associate Press 255
'Terrorism' and 'Terrorist' as Threats to Nepal
During this period, 'terrorism' continued to be described as the main threat facing
Nepal and supporters of the king's actions were against 'terrorists' while those condemning his actions were, by implication, supporters of 'terrorists'. 507 These simple binary identifications of friends and enemies once again produced Nepal not as neutral and a potential friend to all states and peoples as in the Zone of Peace days, but as 'anti- terrorist' in the global war on terror. Insecurity construction here was based on
'terrorism', a term which was not common in Nepal's security imaginary before
November 2001. After February 2005, Nepal was described, not as neutral or balancing between different sides, not as a yam between two stones as in the Zone of Peace days, but as an active participant in the global war on terror. Indeed, Nepal was acting on the behalf of the international community in its fight against 'terrorism'. As the king reiterated in public pronouncements, Nepal's actions meant it was "committed to eliminating terrorism in her own interest as well as in the interest of democracies around the world ... " and since Nepal "aspires for peace", it was committed to "rid the world of the threat to peace [ofterrorism)."508 Here, 'terrorism' in Nepal was linked with the previous governments to show their inability and disinterest in dealing with threats from
'terrorists'. 'Terrorism' was also contrasted with 'democracy', thus making previous governments anti-democratic as well as weak on dealing with terrorist threats.
Worldstream, February 2, 2005 (accessed via Lexis-Nexis November 20, 2008).
506 However, public pronouncements a month after the takeover said the government did not want to negotiate with "terrorists" and it was not interested in sitting "down at the table with their agenda".
507 Gyanendra, Question ofSurvival.
508 Gyanendra, February 1, 2005; Gyanendra, Question ofSurvival. 256
In terms of stake, the stability of Nepal was threatened but regional and global security was also under threat. Nepal -- the monarchy and the people -- was prepared to take measures to counter terrorism "in the interests of democracies" worldwide. The counter-Maoist actions in Nepal were part of eliminating 'terrorism' from the world. This constructed Nepal as a democracy, its actions as democratic and linked Nepal to other democracies also fighting terrorism worldwide. At stake, therefore, is not just Nepal's democracy but peace and stability in democracies worldwide. Again, this establishment of stake is different to Northern Ireland wherein stake management worked to position
'terrorism' as a domestic problem for Britain. While the IR.A's global links (training in other countries, financial assistance from US-based sources, etc) were acknowledged,
'terrorism' remained a British problem for much of the conflict and continued to be discussed a part of "Home" affairs in parliament. The Nepalese state is, however, positioned as one of many actors combating global 'terrorism', which then constitutes the
Maoists as part of the global 'terrorist' problem. Yet in both contexts authority was established such that 'peace', 'democracy' and 'stability' were stakes for the state (not international actors) to safeguard.
At the same time, there was an interchangeable use of 'terrorist' and 'Maoist' in official descriptions. For example, a front page story in the state newspaper The Rising
Nepal on February 3, 2005 reported that two "terrorists" were killed in the latest action carried out by the security forces. The report continued, "According to the Defence
Ministry, the so-called section commander of the terrorist group Rajesh Bo hara and another unidentified terrorist were killed on January 31 in action carried out by security forces ... A pistol, its bullets and terrorist documents were recovered from the te1rnrists 257
killed in the incident."509 Such formulations -- where 'Maoist' was not used at all and, instead, 'terrorist' and 'terrorism' were commonly used -- became commonplace in the post-February 2005 period. Tulsi Giri, a leading government official and the vice chairman of government, said, "the Maoist terrorism and the maintenance of peace and security are the major problems facing the country." 510 In this way, the Maoists were clearly linked with 'terrorist', sidelining other possible interpretations of the Maoists' identity. This is similar to the use of "Irish terrorism" or "Republican terrorism" during the 1970s and 1980s in Britain when the name of the group was not mentioned and, instead, it was "terrorism" in general that was the problem. Both strategies worked to establish stake as 'terrorism' (in general) as a problem for the state to deal with and thus normalized the existing situation as a situation of 'terrorism', one which could only be managed by the counterterrorist activities of the state.
'Peace', 'Security, and 'Democracy' at Stake in Nepal and Abroad
While 'peace' had been a trope in the Nepalese security imaginary in the past, in
2005, it became a 'peace' that had to be "given a chance", as King Gyanendra put it. 511
Government ministers echoed this view. "Peace and democracy in South Asia will be safeguarded if Nepal is successful in implementing its public commitment to restore
509 The Rising Nepal, February 3, 2005, 1.
510 Tulsi Giri, "Don't Abandon Nepal, King's Deputy Tells Foreign Governments," Interview with Agence France Presse, February 17, 2005.
511 Gyanendra, Question ofSurvival. 258
peace and security," added Ramesh Nath Pandey the Nepalese foreign minister.512 In this
formulation, peace in Nepal implied peace in South Asia, thus categorizing Nepal's
concerns (and the state's antiterrorist actions) as concerns of the region and the world.
'Peace' was used against the political parties since it was said, "even when bloodshed,
violence and devastation has pushed the country on the brink of destruction, those
engaged in politics in the name of the country and people continue to shut their eyes to
their welfare."513 Indeed, in this formulation, the political parties were a hindrance to
peace as they were involved in internal fighting, rather than peace. As the king clarified,
restoring peace was the goal of the state:" .. .in keeping with popular aspirations, a
historic decision must be taken to defend multiparty democracy by restoring peace for the
nation and people."514
Security forces then were linked with producing this 'peace'. 'Terrorism', in
Nepal and in the world, was against 'peace' and was a threat to 'peace'. On a related note, those not in favor of 'peace' "will stand condemned by the motherland."515 This called upon resources available in the Zone of Peace security imaginary but Nepal was not positioned in such a (neutral) way anymore. A non aligned positioning, as in the pre-
2001 years, would facilitate other representations apart from the one of Nepal as fighting
'terrorists'. Within this security repertoire of 'terrorism', non alignment or Zone of Peace identities would be difficult to produce and sustain.
512 "Nepal Serious about its Commitments: Minister Pandey," Nepalnews.com, February 22, 2005, http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2005/feb/feb22/news09.php (accessed November 22, 2008).
513 Gyanendra, February 1, 2005.
514 Ibid.
515 Ibid. 259
At the same time, 'democracy' was linked with 'peace'. However, 'democracy' itself depended not just on the people -- as may be imagined from its conventional definition -- but upon the monarchy. Official accounts positioned the monarchy as
'democratic' as the history of monarchy was differentiated from totalitarianism. King
Gyanendra expressed this as, "totalitarianism and authoritarianism are entirely inconsistent with the monarchical traditions ... "516 That the king had a "roadmap for democracy" was repeatedly mentioned in post-February 1 accounts, especially after some countries criticized the king's move as against democracy. "The government has a clear roadmap to restore peace and security and to reactivate multi-party democracy," said a government official at an international meeting of aid donors. 517 The king also added
'democracy' would be "restored" within three years. 518 Here, 'democracy' was something that had to be "reactivated" or "restored". The deployment of 'democracy' was also a means by which the king (and his actions) were constructed as democratic and the actions of other actors as venal, corrupt, weak (politicians) and 'terrorist' (the Maoists).
The International Community: Anti-'terrorist' or (Implicitly) Supporting 'Terrorists'
A relatively new rhetorical commonplace of the post- February 1, 2005 period was the 'international community'. The 'international community' was characterized as either supporting the king's actions or against it (and thus implicitly supporting
"terrorism"). If friendly to Nepal then countries would support the February 1, 2005
516 Gyanendra, Question ofSurvival.
517 Nepal Rebels Torch Offices as Government Vows Not to Waver in Face of Terror," Agence France Presse, March 4, 2005 (accessed February 22, 2009).
518 Gyanendra, February 1, 2005. 260
actions of the monarch. 'The international community' and 'the king' were linked together in ensuring 'peace' and 'multi-party democracy' would be established in Nepal.
The foreign minister made this link when he said the following at a United Nations session on human rights, " ... there is a meeting point of minds between the international community (who are supporting multiparty democracy in Nepal) and the king on basic issues of peace, security and democracy."519
'Terrorism' was thus also used to categorize friends (and, relatedly, enemies) of
Nepal. That countries allied to Nepal were against 'terrorism' and thus supporters of the king's actions was a formulation that was repeated in this period. The king made this clear: "Nepalese have chosen an agenda of peace and the international community must provide support to deal with the threat of terrorism."520 This link of 'the people',
'friends', 'democracy', and 'terrorism' was common as can be noted later in the same speech by King Gyanendra where he said the following: "People would want to know what kind of message they [other countries who suspended aid or criticized the king's actions] are trying to send. They must understand that we are trying to wipe out terrorism and protect democracy. " 521
Part of this binary identity construction meant that countries such as Norway,
Denmark, Britain, who criticized the king's actions on February 1, were all described as being against democracy and even as potential supporters of 'terrorists'. The king said he
519Ramesh Nath Pandey, "Statement by Hon. Ramesh Nath Pandey, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Leader of the Nepalese Delegation at the Sixty-first session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Geneva," March 15, 2005, http://www.mofa.gov .np/news/pressclipping.php?NewsID= 131 &bread=Speeches (accessed November 22, 2008).
520 Nepalnews, Terrorism vs Peace.
521 Ibid. 261
was surprised by the reaction of others (those who suspended aid and criticized his
actions) because his objective was "to fight for democracy, against terrorism. Now our
friends must come and tell us if this objective is incorrect, or help us in this cause."522 He
added that, if they did not support the king's actions, 'the international community'
would be in favor of a non-democratic communist system in Nepal: "The international
community should give a clear decision whether it will support the current move to
safeguard democracy or one-party communist authoritarianism."523
The term "one-party communist authoritarianism", used in other public occasions
as well (for example, in King Gyanendra's speech at the SAARC summit on November
12, 2005). linked Nepal with other actors concerned about the non-democratic
implications of communism. The United States also expressed concern about a Maoist
takeover of Nepal and compared such a possibility with past brutal communist-led
dictatorships. US official Donald Camp described as "a top official in the State
Department's South Asia bureau", is quoted as saying, "The humanitarian ramifications
of such [Maoist] a regime would be immense, reminiscent of the nightmare brought upon
Cambodia by Pol Pot." 524 On the part of Nepalese officials, this link of communism as
something to be feared was contrary to past self representations. In the 1970s and 1980s,
Nepal had positioned itself as non-aligned and as a Zone of Peace during the Cold War.
522 Gyanendra, Question ofSurvival.
523 "Nepal Hopeful oflnternational Support in its Fight Against Terrorism: Minister Pandey", Nepalnews.com, March 1, 2005, http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2005/mar/mar01/news05.php (accessed November 22, 2008)
524 "Nepal May Become Khmer Rouge-type Risk: Official," Taipei Times, March 4, 2005, 4. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/03/04/2003225397 (accessed March 23, 2009). In this report, US official Donald Camp is quoted as saying, "The humanitarian ramifications of such [Maoist] a regime would be immense, reminiscent of the nightmare brought upon Cambodia by Pol Pot." 262
However, in the post-February 2005 period, communism became something to be feared, once again indicating a different mode of establishing authority.
By saying that those condemning the king's actions had to say if his objective
(fighting for democracy) was wrong or support what he had done, official accounts constructed a binary friends and enemies identity for other actors in the international system in contrast to Cold War identity-formation where the international system was populated with (potential and actual) friends and Nepal was neutral and non aligned. By condemning the king's actions and by stopping military aid, Britain, along with Denmark,
Norway, and, at first, India were, by implication, part of the group supporting 'terrorism' and creating fear amongst 'the people'. "Unfortunately, friends have not understood the king's motive and created fear psychosis for the Nepalese people by talking in terms of suspension of aid," said Tulsi Giri. 525 Similarly, at a donor countries' meeting in Paris in
France, the Nepalese finance minister told countries that suspending aid would fuel
'terrorism'. He said, "They [the donors countries] have to choose between supporting us and helping the terrorists."526 Once again, supporters of the king's actions were anti- terrorist, those against his actions were assisting terrorism. This was a very different link of aid and government, as aid was deemed necessary not for socioeconomic development or poverty alleviation as in the past but as necessary for Nepal's counterterrorism practices to succeed.
The link between '[anti]terrorism', 'international community', 'peace',
525 "Nepal King Grabbed Power Only to Restore Peace, Deputy Says," Japan Economic Newswire, March 3, 2005.
526 Rajesh Mahapatra, "Nepal Says Suspending Aid Will Fuel Terrorism," The Associated Press, March 7, 2005 (accessed via Lexis-Nexis February 22, 2009). 263
'democracy' and 'the people' was summed up by the king during his first press
conference after taking control:
Nepalese have chosen an agenda of peace, and the international community must provide support to deal with the threat of terrorism. Now, clearly the message is some of our friends have decided to suspend aid, that too military aid, and the Nepali people want to know what their message is. Are they telling us that we should not fight against terrorism, that we should put our democracy into jeopardy? As the Nepali people have chosen an agenda of peace, the international community must provide support to deal with the threat of terrorism. 527
It is not the state which will suffer if aid is suspended by 'the international
community' but 'the people'. Also, suspension of aid is linked with a lack of support of
anti-terrorism operations (and thus against 'democracy'), a formulation that would be
repeated in the months that followed.
Other Representations of February 1, 2005
Other representations of February 1 were also present at the time but they were
not drawn upon by government officials. For instance, international human rights groups
condemned activities of the Nepalese security forces in indiscriminately detaining people,
with Human Rights Watch claiming over 1,200 people disappeared after being detained
by the security forces been 2000-2004.528 Human Rights Watch blamed both the
government and the Maoists for human rights violations during the conflict. When asked
about these disappearances and the role of the security forces, King Gyanendra replied by referring to events in Guantanamo Bay and Iraq. He said, "Think of Guantanamo, Iraq.
527 Nepalnews, Terrorism vs Peace.
528 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 2005 - Nepal, January 1, 2005, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/42lda3177.html (accessed March 2, 2009). 264
We don't have bad stories like them."529 Thus, Nepal was not only fighting "terrorism" but, in some cases, it was better than the United States since it did not have "bad stories" like the US did. Here, stake management meant positioning Nepal as not having "bad stories" like Guantanamo and Iraq, thus constituting Nepal as (possibly) a better anti- terrorist state than other states in the international system. At the same time, this also referred to Nepal's identity as a land of peace and non-alignment since Nepal did not have stories of human rights abuses in Iraq and Guantanamo as the US did.
Additionally, external reactions to the takeover of power by the king used commonplaces of 'peace', 'the people' and 'democracy' but also 'stability', a trope that was less evident in Nepal's own descriptions of the event. The United States, for example, said it was "deeply troubled by developments in Nepal" and that the actions of
February 1 were "a step back from democracy."530 'Democracy' remained central in the
US' representation but it was democracy in general, rather linking 'democracy' with 'the monarchy'. US official Richard Boucher added, "The United States supports a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Nepal. The protection of civil and human rights and strengthening of multi-party democracy are key components of Nepal's progressing along this path."531 India, too, used 'stability' but linked 'democracy' and 'the monarchy' in a way that the US construction did not. In an official press release after the February 1,
2005 event, the Indian government made the following statement: "India has consistently
529 Gyanendra, Question ofSurvival.
530 Richard Boucher, "Dismissal of Government and State of Emergency in Nepal," United States Department of State Press Release, February 1, 2005, http://2001- 2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/41457.htm (accessed November 20, 2008).
531 Boucher, Dismissal. 265
supported multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy enshrined in Nepal's
Constitution as the two pillars of political stability in Nepal. This principle has now been violated with the king forming a government under his Chairmanship."532 Stability remained central in Indian representations of events in Nepal. The tropes of 'multiparty democracy' and 'stability' were used in British representations as well and it was a
'multiparty democracy' that had to be reinstated. UK Foreign Office Minister Douglas
Alexander stated, "I am extremely concerned to hear of the King of Nepal's dismissal of his Prime Minister this morning ... This action will increase the risk of instability in
Nepal, undermining the institutions of democracy and constitutional monarchy in the country .... We call for the immediate restitution of multi-party democracy, and appeal for calm and restraint on all sides during this difficult time."533 This need for 'multiparty democracy' to be "reinstated" fit in with official Nepalese usage of 'democracy', even though Britain's overall response was not fully supportive of the king's actions. The UN also drew upon potential instability in its statement on Nepal: "The secretary general views these actions as a serious setback for the country. He does not believe that they will bring lasting peace and stability to Nepal."534 'Stability' was thus centralized in these external accounts and even those not fully in favor of the king's actions referred to the need for 'stability'.
532 "Government oflndia Issues Statement on Developments in Nepal," Hindustan Times, February 1, 2005.
533 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Britain 'Gravely Concerned' by Nepalese Developments," January 31, 2005, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=PressR&id=2002599 (accessed November 10, 2008).
534 United Nations Office of the Secretary General, "Statement Attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on Nepal," February 1, 2005, http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=l289 (accessed November 4, 2008). 266
This need to restore 'democracy' was commonplace in other representations about the February 1 events. "Steps should be taken immediately to restore democratic
freedoms and institutions," UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said while Canadian
Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew said, "Nepalese across the political spectrum
[should] co-operate in developing a broad national consensus to facilitate a swift restoration of democracy."535 But, since official accounts, too, represented 'democracy' as needing to be restored through state actions, state identity (and actions) could be constructed as being in line with these other uses of 'democracy'. It was the who was democratic -- the state in official representations -- that could be challenged but since these other representations also linked 'democracy' with 'stability' without then linking
'stability' to any particular actor, the state's use of 'democracy' as against 'terrorism' was not strongly contested. Government officials linked the February 1 move to 'stability' as well, not contesting that 'stability' was the main goal for Nepal.
In some of these representations, the king's actions were deemed as weakening
Nepal's fight against the Maoists, an alternative meaning to that provided in official
Nepalese representations. US official Boucher said, "These actions will undermine the
Nepali struggle with the Maoist insurgency, a very serious challenge to a peaceful and prosperous future for Nepal."536 India made a similar claim: "The latest developments in
Nepal bring the monarchy and the mainstream political parties in direct confrontation with each other" and added, "This can only benefit the forces that not only wish to
535 Estanislao Oziewicz, "Nepalese 'Palace Coup' Draws Fire: But King Justifies Actions as Necessary in Fight Against Maoist Insurgents," The Globe and Mail, February 2, 2005, AIO
536 Boucher, Dismissal. 267
undermine democracy but the institution of monarchy as well."537 Canadian Foreign
Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew said the king's dissolution of the government "runs the
risk of increasing instability in a country already affected by political divisions and
violent conflict. "538 On the other hand, Belgian Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht drew
upon non-'terrorist' linguistic resources and called the February 1 event a "coup". He
cautioned the European Union against exporting weapons to Nepal. But, instead of Nepal
as counterterrorist, it was against 'democracy' as De Gucht added, "This runs counter to the development of democracy in Nepal. I have no longer any decision-making power regarding arms exports because this matter has been regionalized, but I would deem it
irresponsible to continue exporting weapons to this country in the current context. "539
Despite such representations and initial cautions against the king's actions, most countries did not suspend aid or, if they did, they resumed aid flow soon after. Two other countries -- Pakistan and China -- both represented the takeover as Nepal's "internal
affair". Pakistan even praised Nepal in its fight against 'terrorism', one of the few times the term itself was used by the international community when referring to the events in
Nepal. A Pakistani official said, "Pakistan is also facing terrorist threat on her western border and we have developed some kind of expertise, especially in the use of high-tech equipment by terrorists, which we are ready to share with Nepal."54°China, too, called
537 "Government oflndia Issues Statement on Developments in Nepal," Hindustan Times, February 1, 2005.
538 Oziewicz.
539 "Belgian Foreign Minister Critical of Nepalese King's 'Coup'," De Standaard, (in Dutch) (accessed via Lexis-Nexis November 2, 2008).
540 "Pakistan Offers Arms to Nepal," Press Tmst oflndia, March 11, 2005. 268
the king's actions an "internal affair" ofNepal541 thus representing the king's actions as
something the international community should not be involved in.
While international representations mostly used 'stability' and drew upon
international/domestic binaries, domestic representations drew upon local meanings. The
former prime minister referred to the 1990 constitution, while the Maoists used the
language of feudalism when describing the king's actions. The ousted prime minister
Sher Bahadur Deuba issued a statement accusing the king of" a flagrant violation of the
constitution of Nepal". He added, "It is an anti-democratic step and we strongly denounce
this act. ... This step has thrown the country into a grave crisis. "542 The use of 'democracy'
as something the king's (and the state's) actions were against was noted in other domestic
representations as well. Ram Sharan Yadav, the general secretary of the Nepali Congress
Party claimed, "Virtually there is military rule there, there is no political right, there is no
civil right there, we cannot gather, we cannot demonstrate, we cannot oppose
peacefully ... in the name of Maoists he [the king] has killed democracy there." 543 These
representations positioned the state as against 'democracy' thus challenging the state's
counterterrorist identity.
On a similar note, Maoist leader Prachanda urged, "We heartily call upon the
entire pro-people forces of the world to raise voice against this autocratic step and in the
541 Oziewicz.
542 Mr. Deuba's Nepali Congress party joined four other opposition parties in commencing a nonviolent protest for the "restoration ofmultiparty democracy'', calling for an end to the state of emergency and a release of all detained political and civil leaders and journalists. Nepalnews.com, February 26, 2005 (accessed November 12, 2008).
543 Anjana Pasricha, "Nepal's King Says He Seized Power to Save Democracy," The Journal of Turkish Weekly, February 18, 2005, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/5017/nepal-s-king-says-he-seized power-to-save-democracy.html (accessed November 24, 2008). 269
favor of Nepalese people's democratic movement."544 Later, in an interview with Time
Asia, Prachanda added the Maoists' goal was to "crush feudal autocracy" and they were
leading "the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist democratic struggle" where the "struggle" was
between "feudal autocracy versus people's democracy. "545 But it was a "democratic
struggle" that did not include " ... the hyprocrisy of a so-called democracy" of the United
States. Here, the Maoists' Nepal was not an ally of the United States or part of the
international campaign against 'terrorism'. Instead, the United States was framed as an
imperialist other, one which was against the Maoists and "the masses". These
interpretations of the king's takeover as 'autocratic' and 'feudal' did not draw upon
global commonplaces of 'terrorism' that were available in the post-September 11 era.
Thus, these discourses of danger did not directly contest official representations as the
stake posited by the Maoists -- that of feudalism and imperialism - were not common in
the global war on terror discourse. Here, the Maoists' use of language from a different
discursive repertoire is similar to that of the IRA in the early years of the Troubles. Both
described their actions as against a feudal, oppressive state, a formulation that did not
draw upon the security repertoire present at the time. Hence, it was easier for the state not
to directly engage with these representations in the process of establishing authority.
On the whole, official accounts constituted Nepal's domestic arena as fragmented
and beset with discord rather than the diverse, multi-ethnic and multi-religious identity of
544 Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), http://cpnm.org/new/English/statements/2005/statements 1feb2005 .htm#stl (accessed November 24, 2008).
545 Prachanda, "We Are Trying to Crush Feudal Autocracy," Interview with Alex Perry, Time Asia, April 18, 2005, extended online version, http://www.time.com/time/asia/2005/nepal/ext int prachandar.html (accessed July 20, 2008). 270
the "Zone of Peace" days. The international arena was also similarly constructed -- either
you were with Nepal (and against 'terrorism') or against Nepal (and implicitly supporting
'terrorism'). This justification strategy -- that rise in 'terrorism' domestically, regionally
and globally was at stake -- was successful in maintaining most of the aid flows into
Nepal, despite the takeover of government by the king. 546 By April 25, after a meeting between king Gyanendra and the Indian prime minister during the Asia-Africa summit in
Indonesia, there were reports saying India would resume arms supplies to Nepal. This
later proved to be the case and so the suspension of military aid by India lasted no more than a few weeks. Thus, India's change of policy with regard to the sale of arms, which it had suspended after February 1, 2005, could be interpreted the counterterrorist monarchist state being publicly accepted. Development aid provided by the International
Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank did not cease during this time.
Nepal's identity as a counterterrorist monarchist state seemed to be getting stabilized as it was accepted as such in the regional and international arena. But in the year that followed, there were challenges to this identity. It is to those that the next section will tum to. In the next section, I shall analyze how political parties -- who had originally begun using the language of terrorism around 2001 -- now reduced its use. I will argue this reduced usage provided space for establishing 'democracy' and 'peace' as goals for everyone, including Maoists. Thus, the state's narrative of 'terrorism' against
'democracy' became further contested as political parties allied themselves with the
Maoist 'terrorists' and began using 'democracy' against the 'autocratic' monarchist state.
546 An act that was against the 1990 Constitution's tenets of "multiparty democracy". 271
April 2005-March 2006: Fixing and Contesting the Counterterrorist State Identity
Official representations of danger remained focused on 'terrorism' as the main problem
faced by the state. The connection of political parties with 'terrorism' was made more
explicit in official representations with political parties described as misguided and
naively allowing the Maoist ('terrorists') to infiltrate their activities. These
categorizations became more common after November 2005, when the seven main political parties and the Maoists created a loose alliance against the monarchy. During the period of November 2005 to March 2006, political parties' discourses used 'democracy'
against 'autocratic' monarchy rather than against 'terrorism'.
Before that, in the months following the February 1, 2005 takeover of absolute power by the king, official representations of the Maoists as 'terrorist' continued. Instead of explicitly naming the Maoists as 'terrorist', official accounts described Nepal as beset by 'terrorism' in general but military operations against Maoists were described as against 'terrorists'. Official media -- the state-run Radio Nepal and Nepal Television along with newspapers The Rising Nepal and Gorkhapatra -- interchangeably used
'Maoist' and 'terrorist; Headlines such as "15 terrorists killed" were common. 'Peace' and 'democracy' continued to be linked to the king and his actions as well as to the actions of the security forces. Linguistic commonplaces of 'the people', 'peace' and
'democracy' were complemented by other commonplaces of 'the monarch/monarchy',
'the 1990 constitution' and '1 February' itself. There were also repeated mentions of 'the international community' by Nepalese officials when describing actions against the
Maoists. The following section will briefly outline the use of these rhetorical 272
commonplaces during the April 2005-March 2006 period and help establish the context
for the next and final event in this chapter.
Nepalese Terrorists as Regional and Global Threats
In the period after the king's takeover of government, the language of 'terrorist'
and 'terrorism' became commonplace in official discourses, with domestic and
international representations of Nepal drawing upon the language of 'terrorism' and
making regular references to Nepal's problems from 'terrorism'. Throughout the
February 2001-March 2006 period, the state's efforts since February 1, 2005 were
described as being successful in reducing 'terrorism'. Speaking on the occasion of the
Dashain festival of 2005, King Gyanendra said,
During the past eight months, there has been a decline in terrorist activities due to the dedicated efforts of our dutiful security personnel and the cooperation of our determined, patriotic countrymen. As a result, the people have now begun to feel more secure. Yet, in keeping with the people's aspirations as well as the nation's need, all of us must remain ever alert and active in safeguarding the nation and democracy against terrorism. 547
The counterterrorist activities of the state were deemed a success. At the end of
his speech, King Gyanendra advocated vigilance in safeguarding the country and
democracy against 'terrorism'. He drew upon similar tropes about defending democracy
and democratic values, prevalent in other past occasions such as British representations
of danger discussed in the previous chapter. As such, the king explicitly invoked 'nation'
and 'democracy' as stakes against 'terrorism'. Counterterrorism was normalized as an
547 Gyanendra, "Full Text of the Message by His Majesty King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev on the Auspicious Occasion ofBada Dashain on October 12, 2005," (Speech, Kathmandu, Nepal, October 12, 2005), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.gov.np/news/pressclipping.php?NewsID=203&bread=Proclamations (accessed November 12, 2008). 273
option -- perhaps the only option -- for the state in its goal of safeguarding 'democracy' and ensuring 'security'.
The ubiquitous use of the language of terrorism can be noted in the king's speech at the South Summit in mid-2005. Speaking at the Second South Summit in Doha, Qatar on June 15, 2005, King Gyanendra listed challenges faced by the South, including socioeconomic inequalities, debt burdens, unequal access to trade, the North-South divide and lack of private sector cooperation. He added,
My own country is a sad witness and a microcosm of how inequality, social and economic exclusion, poor governance, rampant corruption and non-delivery by various governments in the last decade and a half have been exploited by terrorists to fulfil their own agenda -- an agenda already discarded and rejected by the world at large. We in Nepal have been enduring the scourge of terrorism for over a decade now and we understand the chaos it creates. Terrorism knows no boundaries. Nor does it respect any human value. 548
In contrast to Nepal's past Zone of Peace identity, socioeconomic development is no longer central to state identity-formation. Instead, (lack of) socioeconomic growth is the cause due to which 'terrorism' has flourished. Thus, stake has shifted, again, with the state's primary responsibility not socioeconomic growth but getting rid of 'terrorism'.
Two main themes are evident in these post-February 1, 2005 representations: one, the weakness of past governments allowed 'terrorism' to flourish in Nepal and, two,
'terrorism' in Nepal has been a long-term problem. Both these helped construct the identity of Nepal as counterring 'terrorism'.
This 'long-term' aspect of 'terrorism' in Nepal was a commonplace that was noted after the February 1 event and had the effect ofretroactively constituting various
548 Gyanendra, "Address from His Majesty King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev at the Second South Summit Doha," (Speech, Doha, Qatar, June 15, 2005), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.gov .np/uploads/news/20060313122719 .pdf (accessed February 22, 2009). 274
acts as 'terrorism'. In terms of establishing stake, descriptions of Nepal having "endured" from "the scourge of terrorism" for more than ten years had the effect of maintaining
'terrorism' had been a durable problem for Nepal and one that had remained unsolved for over a decade. This was not a formulation that had been commonly available in official discourses of the 1996-February 2005 period. At the same time, military measures against
'terrorism' were necessary because Nepal had been suffering from 'terrorism' for the past decade. In this way, an additional aspect to the construction of Maoists as 'terrorists' and the political parties as weak on countering this terror could be noted -- that of 'terrorism' in Nepal having been a long-term problem.
Such state/terrorist identities were reproduced in regional and international settings and also domestically. For example, at the regional meeting of Heads of States of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries, King
Gyanendra reiterated how Nepal "has been the victim of senseless terrorism for nearly a decade now."549 Here, 'terrorism' was present in Nepal for almost a decade and Nepal is a "victim" of such terrorism. Once again, this ignored past identity-formations within which Nepal's identity had been constructed as needing financial aid for socioeconomic growth and poverty alleviation. This positioning of Nepal as a long-term victim of
'terrorism' served to reinforce the state's counterterrorist identity. A Nepal which, (like many other countries in the world, including the United States) was suffering from
'terrorism' and had been doing so for a decade could (and should) use whatever means
549 Gyanendra, "Address from His Majesty King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev King of Nepal at the Thirteenth Summit of the Heads of State or Government of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)," (speech, Dhaka, Bangladesh, November 12, 2005), http://www.mofa.gov.np/uploads/news/20060313123853.pdf (accessed November 22, 2008). 275
necessary to protect itself. The king called upon SAARC countries to "spearhead a coordinated and earnest action against it [terrorism]."550
As had been done since February 1, 2005, the problems of Nepal were linked with international 'terrorism'. In the SAARC 2005 speech, king Gyanendra said, "Terrorism has emerged as a serious threat to international peace, security, stability and democracy.
The growing menace of terrorism, both at home and abroad, concerns us all. Terrorism has metamorphosed our world."551 This draws upon similar linguistic commonplaces used by other actors in 'the international community', particularly the United States and its supporters in its war on terror. The king emphasized the ubiquity of 'terrorism' as he said,
We would like to emphasize that, as terrorism knows no geographical boundary, terrorism in Nepal is certain to affect the whole of South Asia. Nepal condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, whatsoever and for whatever reasons. We expect a similar attitude on the part of the international community. 552
Again, two strategies of stake management can be noted here: one, the link of
"terrorism in Nepal" as having a possible effect on "the whole of South Asia" (and the international community). Two, since Nepal condemned 'terrorism' around the world, the international community should also do the same with regard to 'terrorism' in Nepal. The principle of reciprocity from past representations of relations with others as friendly to all countries was reworked in attempts to fix Nepal's counterterrorist identity.
While there was an internationalization of Nepalese 'terrorism' in that it was
550 Gyanendra, SAARC 2005.
551 Ibid.
552 Gyanendra, SAARC 2005. 276
linked with 'terrorism' in South Asia and even globally, the responsibility for dealing with this rested at the state level with Nepal. The 'international community' was constituted as suffering from 'terrorism' but also ignoring 'terrorism' in smaller countries like Nepal as can be noted in the following statement by King Gyanendra:
While we strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and stand by the international community in its resolve to fight this serious global threat, we strongly urge the international community to resolutely come forward with an effective framework in curbing the financing of terrorism .... Countries hit by terrorism need to be considered as countries with 'special needs' by the international community and this is not the case at present. Recent efforts in Nepal, intended as they are to safeguard democracy, peace, and development, we believe, are yielding encouraging results. 553
On the one hand, Nepal's issues were linked with issues overseas as the king called for 'the international community' to help those countries (such as Nepal) which were "hit by terrorism". Within this formulation, Nepal was characterized as a country suffering from 'terrorism', linking its issues with other areas also suffering from
'terrorism'. In terms of establishing authority, too, these formulations had the effect of establishing the king's actions as legitimate and against 'terrorism'. On the other hand, since 'the international community' had not performed its task of assisting Nepal and safeguarding democracy and peace, Nepal had to step forward and act accordingly and deal with 'terrorism' as best as it could (including through by military means).
'The international community', in this formulation, ignores 'terrorism' in "weak and vulnerable countries". Later in the same SAARC 2005 speech, the king said:
It is ironical to note that the global war on terrorism is not matched by global action against it. The global war on terrorism has failed to reach every nook and comer of the world, especially in weak and vulnerable countries, as if they do not deserve justice and protection from terrorism. It is this double standard and
553 Gyanendra, June 15, 2005. 277
selective approach that is assuming a dangerous character rather than terrorism itself. We cannot make a distinction between good and bad terrorism; terrorism is terrorism. 554
The struggle over the meaning of 'terrorism' and how it is deployed in Nepal in the context of "the global war on terrorism" should be noted here. Not only is Nepal
suffering from 'terrorism' and has been for "over a decade", but those fighting the global war on terrorism have ignored areas and places such as Nepal "as if they [these areas] do not deserve justice and protection from terrorism". According to this representation, this
selective approach, in which some 'terrorism' is given more importance than others, is more dangerous than the 'terrorism' itself.
This, once again, has the effect of constituting those countries who did not support the king's actions as having adopted this double standard. In terms of establishing authority, 'terrorism' in Nepal was part of global 'terrorism' but Nepal had been failed by
'the international community'. Therefore, it needed to deal with 'terrorists' by itself using whatever means necessary. In this way, authority for the state's military response and hardline anti-terrorist policies was established. For Northern Ireland, concerns of 'the international community' were not explicitly part of representations of danger in British security discourses. Stake management was locally-based, with the state and its democratic values threatened by 'terrorism'. Unlike Nepal, Britain was not positioned as one of many actors in a global war on 'terrorism'. So, stake management worked differently in the two contexts, despite the similar use of the language of terrorism.
In Nepal, 'terrorists' were against people's wishes, they were ubiquitous and, yet,
'the international community' was operating under double standards of ignoring
554 Gyanendra, SAA RC 2005 (emphasis added). 278
'terrorism' in small states in favor oflarger concerns. This construction, once again,
bolstered Nepal's counterterrorism legislation and practices in that it produced a Nepal that was not only the victim of disease, poverty, underdevelopment but was the victim of
'terrorism' and was under threat from it. In his 2005 SAARC speech, the king did not explicitly name the Maoists but said, "the agents of terror are bent on overthrowing a constitutional order and replacing it with a rejected ideology of a one-party communist dictatorship [in Nepal]."555 Since the only actors interested in establishing a "one-party communist dictatorship" in Nepal were the Maoists, here, they are described (though not explicitly named) as being "agents of terror". The way these state/terrorist identities were produced had the effects of constituting 'peace', 'democracy', 'security' as stakes. But the actors responsible for maintaining these were the king and his allies and not the political parties as had been the case in pre-February 2005. These state/terrorist identities
-- the Nepalese state being threatened by 'terrorists' -- were continually re-produced in regional and international arenas.
In this way, 'terrorism' remained central to discussions about events in Nepal, with other interpretations made to fit within this counterterrorist imaginary. Speaking on the one-year anniversary of his takeover of government, King Gyanendra said:
Nepal has unflinching faith in and is totally committed to the principles of human rights. It is in this spirit that our country has adopted the policy of institutionalizing the promotion and protection of human rights and rectifying its shortcomings. It is not easy for a country combating terrorism to strike a balance between the compulsions of national security and upholding the rights of the citizens - this is a reality faced by all democratic countries afflicted with the scourge of terrorism. 556
555 Ibid.
556 Gyanendra, "Proclamation to the Nation from His Majesty King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev" (speech, Kathmandu, Nepal, February I, 2006), 279
Here, human rights are important but they need to be balanced against the dangers
of 'terrorism' just like in all "democratic countries". Nepal is categorized as 'democratic'
(with the challenges and problems of all democratic countries faced with "terrorism").
The anti-human rights practices of state security forces and the state's responsibility to
protect all its citizens were not referred to in these accounts. Instead, international
representations of anti- 'terrorism' took precedence and established authority within this
framework. The usage of 'the people' helped shore up this counterterrorist identity of the
state and it is to 'the people' that the next section will turn to.
'The People': Targets of 'Terrorism', Supporters of 'the Monarchy', Seeking 'Peace', Needing 'Unity'
In official accounts of these events, 'the people' were targeted by (Maoist)
terrorism. 'The people' wanted long-term peace and were supporters of the king since
they understood his actions were in favor of peace and democracy. In the speech on the
anniversary of his takeover, King Gyanendra said, "We have always, single-mindedly
and with determination, strived to fulfil our beloved people's aspirations in the greater
interest of the motherland. We have no desire other than the Nepalese people's welfare
and the responsibility towards Nepal's glorious history". 557 Here, the monarchy is
constructed as unselfish and its actions as being for 'the people' and 'nation's' benefits.
Authority is established through the linking of 'monarch', 'people', 'nation'
("motherland"). Other descriptions of events and actions can then be characterized as not
http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2006/feb/feb01/news09.php (accessed December 04, 2008).
557 Gyanendra, February 1, 2006. 280
being for the people's and the motherland's interest.558
Along with the link between 'the people', 'peace', 'monarchy' and 'nation',
'unity' is another commonplace that is drawn upon by the king as he said: "We have been
touring different parts of the country and have interacted directly with the common man
so as to instill in them a greater sense of unity, especially against the malicious designs
posed by terrorists." He added, "the nation can be freed from the clutches of poverty and made prosperous only through the collective participation of all."559 This characterization, again, constructs 'terrorists' as creating disunity in the country and yet not part of "the common man" category. This need for 'unity' was to become a contested commonplace during the April 2006 protests.
'The people' were also linked with 'patriotism' and 'unity' especially after
November 2005 when major political parties and the Maoists formed an alliance.
Speaking to the public after his return from participating at SAARC 2005, the king said,
"It is obvious that a consensus can be achieved only if the national psyche of the
Nepalese people, who have always remained independent throughout history, and patriotism is made the focal point."560 Indeed, 'the people' are better-off under the stewardship of the king as he made clear in his one-year anniversary speech,
Yet, given the commitment of our patriotic countrymen, all the Nepalese people have experienced the nation grow in confidence and the self-respect of the
558 So, "interest" itself is constructed as part of this representational process.
559 Gyanendra, February 1, 2006.
560 Gyanendra, "Message to the Nation from His Majesty King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev on Returning Home after Participating in the Thirteenth SAARC Summit in Dhaka and the World Summit on the Information Society in Tunis," (speech, Kathmandu, Nepal, December 2, 2005) http://www. mo fa. gov .np/news/pressclipping. php ?NewsID= 13 9 &bread=Proclamations (accessed December 22, 2008). 281
Nepalese people restored within a short span of one year, with the cloud of pessimism dissipating. We are confident that, remaining alert to the sensitivities of the self-respecting Nepalese people and our glorious ever independent history, we will be able to ensure for the nation peace, stability and prosperity within the next one year through mutual understanding and with patriotism as the focal pomt.. 561
Here, the king's actions are described as restoring self-confidence and hope to the
Nepalese people with the possibility of peace and stability to follow within another year.
However, a relatively new concept -- that of 'patriotism' -- is introduced. Coming at a time when the political parties were allied with the Maoists, the use of 'patriotism' in official statements had the effect of constituting the king's actions as patriotic, others' actions as non-patriotic and against 'the people'.
This link of 'the people' with 'the monarchy' continued in international settings.
'The people' were the reason for the king's actions but the monarchy was also forward- looking. For example, speaking at an event in Japan, Crown Prince Paras said, "Above all, both our countries recognize the people as the strength of the Institution of Monarchy and the Institution of Monarchy is totally devoted to the service of the people. We in
Nepal know well that the twenty-first century belongs to peace, human rights and multiparty democracy, to serve in the interest of which we are committed and duty- bound."562 By linking the people, peace, human rights and multiparty democracy, the identity of the monarch as the representative of all these is, once again, emphasized. 'The people' are more homogenous in these representations than in Northern Ireland where it
561 Gyanendra, February I, 2006.
562 Paras, "Address by His Royal Highness Paras Bir Bikram Shah Dev Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Nepal at the Ceremony to Mark the National Day of the Kingdom of Nepal," (speech, Aichi, Japan, July 7, 2005) http://www.mofa.gov .np/news/pressclipping.php?NewsID=204&bread=Proclamations (accessed November 12, 2008). 282
was much later in the process that 'the people' were not further classified as "Irish",
"British" or "Catholic/Republican" or "Loyalist/Protestant". Such ethnic designations were less common in Nepal where the commonplace of 'the people' was synonymously used with the Nepali people (as a whole).
This, of course, draws upon the historical unity of people within Nepal563 and their links to the monarchy, which was not the case for Britain and Northern Ireland where the people in Northern Ireland were considered "Irish" rather than "British" for much of British history.
Finally, the February 1, 2005 event itself became part of official constructions of danger. It was described as a necessity because of the inefficiencies of political parties and the growing threat of 'terrorism. Speaking at SAARC 2005, the king said,
The February First step in Nepal was necessitated by ground realities, mainly the failure of successive governments to contain the ever-emboldening terrorists and maintain law and order. It has not come at the cost of democracy, as some tend to project it. We remind the international community of the pre February First situation in Nepal. Our friends and well-wishers were warning us of the dangers ofNepal turning into a failed state.564
Strategies of extrematization construct 'terrorists' as "ever-emboldening" and unable to be contained by previous governments, an identity that requires strong action to quell them (hence, a need for the king's authority and for a military response). King
Gyanendra also links the international community's warnings against Nepal becoming a failed state with his own actions to safeguard against 'terrorists'. Thus, 'democracy' is not in danger now (post-February 1) but had been in danger prior to that when a 'failed
563 There is a well-known saying, attributed to King Prithvi Narayan Shah the ruler who started the Shah dynasty: "Nepal is a flower garden made up of four ranks and 36 castes".
564 Gyanendra, SAARC 2005. 283
state' was a possibility. The monarch-led state prevented Nepal from becoming a 'failed
state' and maintained law and order. Therefore, others -- Maoists and political parties --
were lawless and disorderly, their actions possibly leading to a 'failed state'.
November 2005: The Seven Parties and the Maoists' Alliance
In November 2005, seven opposition political parties allied together into what
was called the "seven party alliance" (hereafter, SP A). Furthermore, this alliance loosely-
aligned itself with the Maoists, with 'multi party democracy', elections and protests
against 'autocratic' monarchy described as common goals for all sides. This is an
important period, since the opposition (previously in power) parties broke their links with
past allies (the monarchy and the Army) and made new links with the Maoists. From
hereon, the opposition to the state included not just the Maoist 'terrorists', but also the
political parties, some of which had been supporters of the king (and in governments
appointed by him) previously. A brief overview of what happened in November 2005
will set the scene for the next and final event in this chapter.
A 12-point agreement was released by the Maoists and the SPA on November 22,
2005. In this agreement, called "Letter of Understanding", their "struggle" was
characterized as "between absolute monarchy and democracy", with the signatories (the
SPA and the Maoists) linked with 'democracy'. Thus, in contrast to the 'terrorism' versus
'democracy' construction of official discourses, the 12-point agreement positioned
'absolute monarchy' as against 'democracy'. 'Terrorism' and 'terrorist' were not used.
Commonplaces of 'absolute democracy' are used against that of an 'autocratic 284
monarchy'. 565 The parties agree to "dialogue" with the Maoists and to continue janaandolan (or, "people's revolution"/ "people's movement"). The upshot being the
SP A and the Maoists would work together to re-establish the Constituent Assembly and
hold elections. In the Agreement, there was no mention of the weakened security
situation or that almost two-thirds of the country was under Maoist control. The stakes
were the same for all sides -- democracy, peace, stability -- but who was in charge and
how actions were interpreted (anti-terrorism for the state; anti-autocratic monarchy and
pro-democracy for the SP A and Maoists) differed.
By the end of 2005, therefore, the rhetorical struggle over who was the legitimate
authority of the country, what was 'democratic' and the role of 'the international community' were all tied in with representations of 'terrorism'. Official accounts claimed
'peace' and 'democracy' of Nepal were at stake and only a strong 'anti-terrorist' action would lead to peace for "the people's benefit". The opposition SPA also used the rhetoric of 'peace' in describing what was at stake. Except in SPA representations, 'peace' and
'democracy' was in their hands and in the hands of 'the people'. 'The people' thus became central to both discourses as the anti-'terrorist' actions of the state as well as the anti-monarchy activities of the opposition political parties were authorized in their name.
Here, both parties presented themselves as acting on the behalf of 'democracy' and 'the people' but the SP A reduced (if not completely ceased) using the language of 'terrorism'.
Two other commonplaces -- that of 'elections' being key to "total democracy" and of 'the
565 "12 Point Understanding Between Parties and Maoists," eKantipur, November 22, 2005 http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=57858 (full text of the Agreement in both Nepali and English, accessed November 22, 2008). In Nepali, the Agreement calls for Loktantra -- a word closer to "folk-led government" -- rather than Prajatantra -- the word traditionally used to refer to democracy. In the English text provided, Loktantra has been translated as "absolute democracy" or "total democracy". 285
1990 Constitution' as the foundation for authority-- can be noted during and after this
period.
Official reactions to the 12-point Agreement said it meant the seven parties were
now linked with Maoist 'terrorists'. Officials said the Maoist 'terrorists' had infiltrated
the political parties and their activities. However, official accounts also began using
tropes of 'the 1990 Constitution' and 'autocracy', both of which had been more common
in SPA discourses. In official constructions, 'the 1990 Constitution' conferred authority
to the state and thus to the king's actions, including his takeover of government. Speaking
after the announcement of the 12-point agreement by the opposition, government official
(and Royalist spokesman) Tulsi Giri said, "I have been misquoted and misunderstood by
media. The February 1 royal move is not the coup, it is constitutional since it was done as
per the article 127 of the constitution". Giri added, "This [the king's takeover of power
on February 1, 2005] is also not autocratic because there is the constitution functioning.
Had there been no present constitution, the situation could have been termed as
autocracy." 566 Here, the constitution was provided as the reason why the king's actions
remained legitimate and not 'autocratic'. This is a clear response to the SP A's
formulation of the February 1, 2005 event as unconstitutional and autocratic, rather than
anti-terrorist. The performatively constituted state identity needed to respond to these challenges (more so than the feudal charge of the Maoists or the human rights discourses used by nongovernmental organizations) since they were based on a similar security repertoire -- that of 'terrorism' -- as that used by state officials.
566 "Tulsi Giri Conference: No News is Good News?," United We Blog!, December 20, 2005, http://blog.corn.np/united-we-blog/2005/12/20/tulsi-giri-conference-no-news-is-good-news/ (accessed November 20, 2008). 286
'Terrorism' remained the state's main concern and getting rid of it was the state's responsibility. The state was represented as having been successful in its anti-'terrorist' endeavors. In the same interview, Giri said, "The King had three agendas: 1. Ending
Terrorism, 2. Controlling Corruption, and 3. Holding Election." Once again, the description of the king's actions as against "terrorism" is at the top of the agenda listed.
Giri ended by claiming, "And the latest news on those agendas? Maoists have been decapitated, they have massively lost attacking capacity ... "567 Here, the post-2005 link of the 'terrorist' and 'Maoists', with both used interchangeably, can be noted. Instead of using 'Maoist terrorists' or 'Maoist terrorism', the more general 'terrorism' is used, with empirical data referring to the Maoists. This is different to the British example where
"Irish terrorism" or "Republican terrorism" was commonly used in the early years while, later, "terrorism" became common.
Another commonplace in the 2005 period is that of 'elections', especially "free and fair elections". Here, the use of 'elections' in official discourses was another challenge to SP A's use of 'democracy' since the SPA were not in favor of government- held elections at that time. The SP A considered proposed elections illegitimate since they were being held under the auspices of the (to them) illegitimate government of the
'autocratic' monarch. Instead, it was the state which linked 'elections' with 'democracy' and differentiated both from the SP A. The following few sentences from a speech by
King Gyanendra illustrate this:
Restoration of a lasting peace and a meaningful exercise in multiparty democracy is what Nepal needs and what the Nepalese people yearn for. As peace and security in the country has improved, the country is gearing up for municipal and
567 United We Blog!, Giri 287
general elections. Such a state of affairs is a matter ofjoy to all those who believe in democracy and any contribution towards strengthening this situation which will restore sustainable peace and enable the elected representatives to govern is praiseworthy. The nation's determination in conducting free and fair elections, which is the very soul of democracy, can be realized only if violence is renounced and efforts are made to win the hearts and minds of the people rather than running from pillar to post. 568
Here, again, at stake is people's needs and desires. Yet, similar to representations since 2001, the category of 'the people' does not include the Maoists or the political parties, those who were unable to curb 'terrorism'. Another link with globally-available rhetoric of counterterrorism -- the need to "win the hearts and minds of the people"-- can also be noted here. This was a phrase commonly used by British counterterrorist forces in
Northern Ireland and, later, by US-led forces in post-Saddam Iraq. Finally, in this formulation, 'violence' did not include the violence used by security forces.
The One Year Anniversary of the Royal Takeover: February 1, 2006
All these themes for managing stake and establishing authority of state identity -- that of 'terrorism' in Nepal as linked to the country's negative socioeconomic development, as being long-term, as the source of people's problems, as part of global terrorism and as being neglected by past governments -- were also evident in King
Gyanendra's public broadcast on February 1, 2006, the one-year anniversary of his takeover of power. Commonplaces of 'unity' or 'consensus' and 'elections' were used.
By then, the call was for "multiparty elections", with official accounts drawing upon
'unity' as a goal to aim for and as a means to fight terrorism. In his speech a year after his
568 Gyanendra, December 2, 2005. 288
takeover, King Gyanendra said, "We are confident that a road-map of consensus will forever end all possibilities ofresurgence of violence and terrorism in our motherland, which will otherwise put at risk the universally acclaimed multiparty democracy and hurt the self-respect of Nepal and the Nepalese people."569 That the Army was involved in military operations against Maoists was not mentioned in the majority of speeches after
November 2005. In fact, continuing the theme started in late 2005, anti-'terrorism' operations were deemed successful as the king stated, "The nefarious designs to portray
Nepal as a failed state a year back has now begun to unravel with acts of terrorism being limited to petty crimes."570 This ignored that almost 10,000 of the 13,000 people killed during the conflict were killed in the 2001-2006 period.
'Democracy' was linked with 'the people' in this formulation and was also the responsibility of the state. King Gyanendra expressed this as:
Democracy flourishes only through the enfranchisement of the people and democrats are never losers when democracy is upheld. Therefore, the first and foremost preconditions for consolidating democracy are to gain the support of the people through the ballot and respect their mandate. In keeping with these universally accepted democratic principles, the process to reinstate all the elected bodies through free and fair elections has been initiated. We are confident of the active participation of all democrats who have faith in the people's democratic rights. Democratic norm dictates that, while upholding the people's rights, their confidence can be won only through participation in the democratic process. 571
Again those who did not support elections at that time are deemed non-democratic and working outside the democratic process (and, hence, illegal). Since the SP A and
Maoists had withdrawn from elections, saying these were unconstitutional when held
569 Gyanendra, February 1, 2006.
570 Ibid.
571 Ibid. 289
under the auspices of the monarch, this use of 'democracy' positioned them and their
actions as anti-democratic within official representations.
Thus, by March 2006, at stake was still 'democracy' and 'peace' but 'unity' of the
people was stressed as was the need for 'elections' as the (only) possible way forward.
That Nepal was a victim of 'terrorism' was emphasized in official representations but this
identity had to be continually reinforced as opposition discourses claimed official actions
were unconstitutional and non-democratic. But these people were misguided, had moved
away from the mainstream and needed to be brought back on track as this statement by
the king indicates, "inspired by our glorious tradition of patriotism, those who have been
misguided should, without further delay, enter the mainstream of peace and multiparty
democracy, eschewing the path of violence and destruction".572 Once again, the security
forces' actions and use of violence are not part of this need to "eschew" violence.
State/terrorist identities and the role of 'the people' by March 2006 are best
summed up by these words from King Gyanendra. In the same speech on the one-year
occasion of his takeover, he linked 'people' with 'peace', implicitly linked the Maoists
and the political parties (as "those who have gone astray") and drew upon Nepal's past to
call for unity as he said:
The Nepalese people desire for sustainable peace. This was clearly spelt out to us when we had direct contacts with our beloved people during our recent visits to various parts of the Kingdom. The vigilant Nepalese have well understood the conspiracy to foment further acts of terrorism in the name of momentary cessation of violence. If those who have gone astray wish to rejoin the mainstream of peace and creativity, democracy and coordination, and if they wish to dedicate themselves in the service of the people through the ballot, abjuring their murderous acts against the nation and people, we make
572 Gyanendra, "Message to the Nation from His Majesty King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev on the Occasion of National Democracy Day," (speech, Kathmandu, Nepal, February 19, 2006) http:/ /www.mofa.gov .np/news/pressclipping.php?NewslD= 197 &bread=Proclamations (accessed November 20, 2008) 290
it clear that they will be given the security and opportunity necessary to shoulder the responsibilities of governance in their capacity as the people's representatives, having won the people's confidence through the universally accepted democratic exercise. The people can be won over only through peaceful political and constructive activities. Activities like disrupting peace, encouraging discord and creating hurdles on the road to rapprochement in the name of democracy will benefit none. Let us, therefore, unite, with patriotism as the focal point, in dedicating ourselves to the people's welfare and initiating a new chapter in the exercise in meaningful democracy. We wish to emphasize that all differences can be resolved within the framework of the Nepalese patriotic tradition in keeping with the Nepalese psyche, which has never had to put up with subjugation throughout history. 573
'The state', in this formulation, remained at the mainstream but "those who have
gone astray" could also become part of this mainstream if they gave up their "murderous
acts against the nation and the people". Here, 'terrorism' is only mentioned once and
linked with a ceasefire, one that is characterized as a "conspiracy" that is recognized as
such by the Nepalese people. Elections are key and 'the people' are positioned so they are
linked with the state and "can only be won over by peaceful political and constructive
activities". The rhetorical struggle over 'the people' is explicit here as 'the people' are
linked to the state and its actions, capable ofrecognizing others' acts as "conspiracy".
These others -- SP A and the Maoists -- are still not part of 'the people'. At the same time,
they can become part of the mainstream if they give up killing. Security forces, their
actions or even the curtailment of political and civic rights since February 1, 2005 are not referred to in this representation. This was the situation prior to April 2006.
In the next section, I argue that the reduction of the usage of 'terrorism' and
'terrorist' by the SPA and its alternative use of 'democracy' made it difficult for the monarchist state to fix its counterterrorist identity, especially within the official narrative of anti-terrorism in favor of (global) democracy as a means of establishing authority.
573 Gyanendra, February 1, 2006. 291
Thus, the locus of authority shifted as the official stake management proved to be less successful than that of the opposition SPA. One reason for this is the use of the language of 'democracy' by the SPA itself as it, too, placed 'democracy' at stake but it was a
'democracy' that was against 'autocratic monarchy', not against (Maoist) 'terrorists'.
This had the effect of constituting the SP A (and by their alliance, the Maoists) as part of
'democracy' while delegitimating the counterterrorist monarchist state. Due to their links with the 1990 movement for democracy, SP A leaders were more successful in establishing authority of the meaning of 'democracy' as linked to their actions. Official accounts, which continued to use "terrorism" to label the Maoists (and by their alliance the SPA) found their use of 'democracy' as against 'terrorism' questioned. There was a struggle over the meaning of (and link to) 'democracy' and its relationship with
'terrorism'. This is what the next section will trace out -- how the use of 'terrorism' by the state was contested by the use of 'democracy' by political parties (and the Maoists in their alliance with the political parties). This had the effect of weakening the
(anti terrorist) authority of the state as its own formulation of 'terrorism' versus
'democracy' could not be stabilized. 292
The Unraveling of the Counterterrorist Monarchist State: April 2006 Protests574
Table 5. Major Events During April 2006 in Nepal
• April 3, 2006: Amendments made to Nepal's anti-terrorism ordinance • April 6-9, 2006: protests begin. Continue till April 24, 2006. • April 14, 2006: the king addresses nation on the occasion of the Nepali New Year. • April 16, 2006: the king meets with ambassadors from China, India and the US • April 19, 2006: Indian envoy Karan Singh arrived; Senior party leaders released • April 20, 2006: 3 unarmed protesters shot dead at Kalanki, Kathmandu; K.P. Bhattarai refused the king's offer to be PM • April 21, 2006: the king hands executive power back to the people and asks parties to nominate a PM • April 22, 2006: the SPA rejects the king's offer. • April 24, 2006: the king addresses country around midnight local time and reinstates dissolved parliament. • April 27, 2006: Maoists declare a unilateral three month nationwide ceasefire.
Source: various newspaper articles and media reports on www.nepalnews.com
In early April 2006, a general strike calling for democracy was announced by the
SP A. This followed similar calls in January 2006, when there had been a few popular protests but many protesters were arrested and the protests dwindled. This call was followed by the Maoists declaration of a ceasefire within the Kathmandu Valley (though
574 For this section, data included official speeches during the period April 1, 2006-April 26, 2006. Further data was obtained from media and online sources via the Lexis-Nexis database. A search for "Nepal" resulted in over 1,000 news stories from April 1, 2006-April 11, 2006; 424 stories from April 14, 2006- April 16, 2006; 996 stories from April 21, 2006- April 23, 2006; and 999 news stories from April 24, 2006- April 26, 2006. All these were examined and official accounts reported by these media sources were noted and full texts searched for. These were found on the www.nepalnews.com, www.ekantipur.com sites or the biogs United We Blog! and Democracy in Nepal and on sites of various Nepalese news channels on www.YouTube.com. Additionally, these online sites were searched for speeches by Tulsi Giri (Royal spokesperson), Kamal Thapa (Home Minister) and Shrish Sharnsher Rana (Information Officer). Finally, all the stories on the aggregate news site: www.nepalnews.com for the dates April 4, 2006- April 6, April 14, 2006-April 16, 2006 and April 21, 2006-April 26, 2006 were examined since these periods are when officials commonly used the language of"terrorism". 293
this did not apply to areas outside the Valley and there was continued involvement of the
Maoists in violent activities). 575 This was the Maoists' second ceasefire in recent months
since the previous one (a four-month long ceasefire, declared on September 1, 2005) had
ended on January 1, 2006 after the Maoists claimed the government was not reducing its
military activities. The general strike itself was scheduled for April 6 to April 9, 2006 a
weekend which included the 16th anniversary of the end of the one-party Panchayat
system and the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1990. Political parties' leaders,
most of whom had participated in the 1990 protests for democracy, called upon a return
to 'democracy' and reminded people about the struggles they had jointly undertaken then.
The link between SPA, 'democracy' and 'the people' was explicitly made in SPA
descriptions of these protests.
In the weeks that followed, the government banned public protests, declared a
curfew (later with shoot-on-sight orders), lifted it and re-declared it. Nepalnews.com
reported the original curfew orders from the government as:
Issuing separate public notices, the District Administration Offices (DAO) of Kathmandu and Lalitpur said the prohibitory orders have been clamped within Ring Road area of Kathmandu Metropolitan City and Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City as per the Local Administration Act 2028 B.S, citing the possibility of 'infiltration ' of the 'Maoist terrorists ' in the seven-party demonstrations. The prohibitory orders will be effective until further notice, the DAOs stated. 576
Similar to British representations of civil rights protests in Northern Ireland in the
575 The International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International said this ceasefire was insufficient since use of violence continued outside Kathmandu Valley. See "Maoists' Partial Ceasefire Not Enough: AI, ICJ," Nepalnews.com, April 4, 2006, http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2006/apr/apr04/news05.php (accessed November 20, 2008).
576 "Prohibitory Orders Clamped in Kathmandu and Lalitpur (4:55 p.m.)," Nepalnews.com, April 4, 2006, http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2006/apr/apr04/news07.php (accessed November 20, 2008, emphasis added). 294
early days of the Troubles, the Nepalese state constituted these protests as sites where
'terrorists' had taken control and the protests were described as "a conspiracy". On that
note, civil servants were told not to take part in these protests. The state's task was then
to halt these protests since they had been infiltrated by 'terrorists'. The Home Minister
Kamal Thapa said, "Since the Maoists are involved in the general strike, the government
must foil it," and added that there was "a Maoist conspiracy" behind the strikes. 577
However, protests spread nationwide, beyond the weekend originally planned, as
hundreds of thousands of people defied the government's shoot-on-sight orders for
breaking curfew.
Reports claimed three protesters were killed and over 1,000 injured with around
1,000 arrested over the weekend of April 7-8, 2006. Daytime curfew in Kathmandu was
lifted on April 12 but rallies and protests continued and intensified. On April 19, curfew
was once again re-established in Kathmandu. Overall, hundreds, if not thousands, of
people including journalists, political party leaders, human rights activists and students, were arrested. 450 people were arrested just on the first day of the strike and many others were placed under house arrest, with little or no means of communication open to them.
Media censorship was tightened. And, during specific periods (including a week-long period in early April), mobile communications including internet usage were banned.
Outside Kathmandu valley, there were protests but there were also continued clashes between the Maoists and the Army, with many killed. It is important to remember these practices, especially the ongoing state censorship, in terms of publicly-available and
577 "Govt is Set to Foil Seven-Party Agitation: Home Minister," Nepalnews.com, April 4, 2006, http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2006/apr/apr04/news08.php (accessed November 20, 2008). 295
communicated sources while reading the rest of this narrative about state/terrorist
identity-formation during this period.
On New Year's Day April 14, 2006, the king gave a nationwide address that was
broadcast live on all state media. In this, he reiterated the 'terrorism' versus 'democracy'
formulation of the past few years, as he said, "Democracy demands restraint and
consensus as all forms of extremism are incompatible with democracy. " 578 Here, the
formulation of 'extremism' as against 'democracy' is, once again, similar to the subject
positioning of the British state in the aftermath of the Brighton bombing. In both
constructions, the state is against 'extremists'. The Nepalese king also called for
"dialogue" as "the basis for the resolution of all problems" but did not discuss what form
this dialogue would take. At this time, the call for political parties to discuss issues with
the king positioned the state as open to discussion while, at the same time, ensuring
safety and peace for its citizens. There was no mention made of the ongoing street
protests though the king claimed, "the verdict of the ballot alone is legitimate"579 thus
working to delegitimate (peaceful) mass protest as a means of political change. This use
of "elections" (as a legitimate mechanism for political change) was similar to the British
state's use of similar language. In both representations, 'terrorists' are against elections
(or the ballot box) and, instead, create instability and chaos. However, there were also
differences as the Nepalese state's use of 'dialogue' (and the view that consensus is
578 "Full Text of His Majesty's Message to the Nation On the Occasion of the New Year's Day 2063," Nepalnews.com, April 14, 2006, http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2006/apr/aprl4/full text new year 2063.php (accessed October 22, 2008).
579 Gyanendra, April 14, 2006. 296
needed for democracy) was not something the British state drew upon.
On April 21, 2006, the king gave back executive power to the people but refused
to concede his position as the head of state. The SP A and the Maoists rejected this move
"inadequate and ambiguous". 580 They said they wanted a return to the democratically-
elected government that the king had dissolved some years back. Protests continued until
April 24, 2006 when the king reinstated parliament. He transferred authority back to the people via the SP A and called upon the SP A to move forward with elections for a constitutional assembly. The use of 'terrorism' and representations of state/others during the periods -- April 14-16 and April 21-26, 2006-- will be more closely examined in the paragraphs that follow.
'Terrorism' Versus 'Democracy'? Contesting the State's Counterterrorist Identity
By 2006 'terrorism' in general was described as the major problem faced by
Nepal and 'Maoist' and 'terrorist' were interchangeably used in official accounts.
Anyone who had contact with 'terrorists' was deemed a danger to the state. In 2006, the government strengthened anti-terrorism legislation. Previously, in the 2001 legislation,
"encouraging" terrorism had been banned. In the latest version, people who had contact with 'terrorists' could be imprisoned. This construction -- that it was legal to arrest and imprison people who had had "contact" with Maoists -- reinforced the anti-terrorist identity of the state. At the same time, it also interchangeably used 'Maoist' as 'terrorist' since contact with 'terrorists' was forbidden but successive sections discussed contact
580 Thomas Bell, "King's Offer to Marchers is 'Too Little, Too Late'," The Daily Telegraph, April 22, 2006, http://www.telegraph.co. uk/news/worldnews/asia/nepal/ 1516413/Kings-offer-to-N epalese marchers-is-too-little-and-too-late.html (accessed February, 22, 2009). 297
with 'Maoists' as prohibited.
Such constructions had the effect of making it possible for the government to
imprison human rights activists, journalists, people who had been intimidated by Maoists,
people whom the Maoists had asked for shelter (and who had been compelled to provide
it), and so on since these people would (or could) all have had contact with Maoists.
Additionally, the new legislation said an individual who disseminated the information of
the terrorists could face one to three years' imprisonment. 581 Under this categorization, journalists as "individuals who disseminated information of terrorists" could be jailed.
Another category of "accessory" as "a person who is in contact with any person or group
involved in terrorist and disruptive activities and thereby assists them" was also
formulated in this amended legislation. This had the effect of, once again, linking
'Maoist' with 'terrorist'. So, this formulation of "terrorist accessory" had the effect of
categorizing large groups of people as "accessories" of 'terrorists'. Overall, this representation linked "association" or "contact" with "terrorists" as unacceptable behavior and those who associated with 'terrorists' as equally unacceptable as the
'terrorists' themselves. The identity of 'the people' thus became more contested after this revision of the Anti-Terrorism legislation. They were the reason given for the king's (and the state's) actions, they suffered from 'terrorism' and yet they could also be 'terrorist' accomplices and accessories to 'terrorism'.
581 His Majesty's Government of Nepal, "Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control and Punishment) Ordinance, 2006, Ordinance no. 71 of the Year 2005/2006," http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/TADO 2006.pdf (accessed November 8, 2008). 298
From 'Peace' and 'Democracy' to 'Permanent Peace' and 'Multiparty Democracy'
'Peace' remained a well-used concept during this period but the government sought 'permanent peace' rather than just 'peace'. The Nepalese government was positioned as open for discussions with anyone. 'Peace' was linked with 'democracy' as goals to aim for and to be achieved through the 'unity' of 'the people'. For example, in his New Year's Day address to the nation, the king did not refer to the ongoing protests against his rule and in favor of democracy and nor did he mention the collaborations between the Maoists and the other political parties. Instead, he talked about 'democracy' and 'peace' as goals for Nepal and Nepalese people to strive for as he said the following:
Democracy demands restraint and consensus as all forms of extremism are incompatible with democracy. While facing the challenges confronting the nation, democracy also emphasizes acceptance of the preeminence of the collective wisdom in charting a future course. 582
The state was linked to 'democracy' but it was a 'democracy' that also required
"collective wisdom'', a formulation that meant political parties could become involved as long as they conformed to the terms of the state. The political parties had a dual identity -
- as associated with Maoist 'terrorists' but also with the potential of supporting
'multiparty democracy'. 'Democracy' was the responsibility of all parties and the king's call for dialogue emphasized this. Later in the same speech he claimed, "We believe that there is no alternative to multi party democracy in the 21st century and the verdict of the ballot alone is legitimate. It is our wish that in order to reenergize multiparty democracy, there should not be any delay in reactivating all representative bodies through
582 Gyanendra, April 14, 2006. 299
elections."583 Here, the link of 'democracy' with 'elections' and these being the only
"legitimate" verdict for authority is made. Again, the state is produced as the actor
responsible for making this happen and with the responsibility for 'democracy'.
The rhetorical commonplace of 'the constitution', noticed in the post-February 1
period, is again present during April 2006 and it, too, is linked with 'democracy' and
'peace' in the king's speech:
Democratic norms and values demand a commitment that the goals set forth by the Constitution of the Kingdom ofNepal-1990 can be achieved only through constitutional means. It is, therefore, our desire that with the active participation of all political parties committed to peace and democracy, a meaningful exercise in multiparty democracy be initiated through an exemplary democratic exercise like the general elections. 584
'The constitution' is often referred to, as the Maoists are represented as being
lured away from the "constitutional" path, the path the king's government is on. Thus,
there is a differentiation of 'the Maoists' (and others in general) from the constitutional
mainstream. In a speech a week later, the king said, "While safeguarding multiparty
democracy, the nation must be taken ahead along the road of peace and prosperity by
bringing into the democratic mainstream those who have deviated from the constitutional
path. "585 Here, official representations link tropes of 'peace', 'prosperity' and
'democracy' by claiming multiparty democracy requires the participation of "those who have deviated from the constitutional path", a category that could include the political
583 Ibid.
584 Ibid.
585 "Full Text of The Proclamation to the Nation from His Majesty King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev," Nepalnews.com, April 21, 2006, http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2006/apr/apr21/kings address apr 21 06.php (accessed October 22, 2008). 300
parties as well as the Maoists.
On April 21, in the course of a short speech of about five minutes, the king twice
refers to "the 1990 Constitution", first when returning executive power to the people and,
second, when referring to how the Council of Ministers (appointed by the king) would
maintain responsibility for governing "in accordance with the Constitution of the
Kingdom ofNepal-1990."586 Thus, the state's actions are in accordance with the
Constitution of Nepal, everybody else has to be brought back to "the democratic
mainstream". While there had been previous usage of 'the mainstream' as including
political parties, current usage drew upon those formulations but de-linked the political
parties from 'the democratic mainstream'. The identities here -- with the SP A and the
Maoists linked as being outside of the democratic mainstream and the king (and his
Council of Ministers) as following the Constitutional path -- delinked who was at the
mainstream (political parties) and linked the mainstream with the monarchist
government. In terms of establishing authority, that the state, led by the king, was
authoritative and constitutional was the identity that was reinforced.
The opposition protests, originally planned only for the weekend of April 6-9,
2006 continued and spread. After two weeks, on April 21, 2006, the king stepped down
from his role as the sole leader of the country, handed executive power to the people and
asked the parties to nominate a new prime minister. He did not, however, reinstate the elected parliament which was what the SP A and Maoists had been calling for. The by now commonplace tropes of national unity and the need to maintain security were deployed as reasons for the actions of the monarchist counterterrorist state. At stake was
586 Ibid. 301
the future, "long-term" and "sustainable" 'peace'. Official actions had been undertaken to
safeguard 'democracy'. The king's takeover of February 1, 2005 was described as him having been compelled to take action to, in his words, "set in motion a meaningful
exercise in multiparty democracy by activating all elected bodies, ensuring peace and
security and a corruption-free good governance through the collective wisdom, understanding and the united efforts of all the Nepalese."587In this way, the monarchist
state was and had always been on the side of 'peace' and 'democracy', working for unity
and good governance. Thus, 'the state' was performatively linked with 'the 1990 constitution', 'democracy', 'peace' and was against 'terrorism' and open to 'dialogue'.
While stake management used similar commonplaces linked together (e.g., 'terrorism' against 'democracy'), there was a difference in that the identity of the state itself was more explicitly (and directly) contested in Nepal, less so in the context of Britain in
Northern Ireland.
'The People' in Official and Other Representations
Official accounts described 'the people' as in support of the king and security force's actions and as having "made clear their desire for peace and security."588 Their
"independence" was continually alluded to as was the categorization of 'the people' as the foundation for state sovereignty. The king reiterated this as, "Aware of our traditions and sensitivities, as well as the self-respect and self-confidence of the Nepalese people
587 Ibid.
588 Ibid. 302
who have always remained independent throughout history ... "589 During his midnight
speech on April 24, 2006, the king reinstated parliament. In a speech addressed to the
nation, he claimed to "embrace the fact that Nepal's sovereignty rests with the Nepalese
people" and "the source of Nepal's strength are the Nepalese people". He added he
respected the people's wishes as evidenced in the currentjanaandolan or "people's
revolution,"590one of the few times the protests were mentioned in official statements
during April 2006.
'Monarchy' continued to be linked to 'the people' and both these were in favor of
democracy and unity and against terrorism. The king described himself as having done
his best for the people and the country, both of which were linked together: "By visiting
different parts of the country, we made honest endeavors to acquaint ourselves with the
hopes and aspirations of our people, mitigate their hardships and boost their morale". 591
The people and country remained "afflicted by violence and terrorism" but the king had
asked the political parties to "enter into a dialogue". 'The people' were central in leading
to peace as the king noted, "As the source of Sovereign Authority is inherent in the
people, harmony and understanding must be preserved in the interest of the nation and
peop 1e m. an environment . o f peace an d security . " . 592
589 Gyanendra, April 14, 2006.
590 This is usually translated as "people's movement". I've used both "people's movement" and "people's revolution" throughout the chapter. Aandolan translates to "revolution". King Gyanendra's speech, Arghakhanchi.com (media channel), YouTube, April 24, 2006, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=heTL4 zMZ4o&feature=related (accessed February 22, 2006; my translation)
591 Gyanendra, April 21, 2006.
592 Ibid. 303
The SPA: Needed to be Brought Back to the (State-led) Mainstream Through 'Dialogue'
Early in April 2006, the SP A were characterized as linked with the Maoist
'terrorists' and having their peaceful protests infiltrated by Maoists. Yet calls for 'unity' and 'dialogue' were also made, with the SPA positioned as having an opportunity to become part of the (monarchist counterterrorist) 'mainstream'. Later, they were described as bearing the 'responsibility' of the country's security. On April 24, the king referred to
"murderous conflict" ongoing in the country. He then called upon the "revolutionary parties" to safeguard and be responsible for "multiparty democracy, permanent peace and national unity" in the country. 593 He added, "We call upon the Seven Party Alliance to bear the responsibility of taking the nation on the path to national unity and prosperity, while ensuring permanent peace and safeguarding multiparty democracy". 594 The SPA in this and in previous April 2006 formulations, had to dialogue with the state, become part of the electoral process and, now, become responsible for Nepal's peace and prosperity.
This was different to earlier representations which had categorized the SP A as weak and as having allowed Maoist "terrorists" to infiltrate their non-violent protests.
The SPA, while weak and potentially misguided, needed to 'dialogue' with the state as the king said, " ... dialogue must form the basis for the resolution of all problems". He added, "We, therefore, call upon all political parties to join in a dialogue, which we have always advocated, to bear the responsibility of and contribute towards activating the
593 Gyanendra, April 24, 2006.
594 Gyanendra, April 24, 2006 (UWB! Translation) 304
multiparty democratic polity."595 The "weakness" of political parties, a commonplace in
2005 representations of countering terrorism, was not part of these April 2006 representations. Also, it was not clear whether the category "political parties", who were being called upon to dialogue with the state, included the Maoists since 'terrorism' was still centralized as the main threat facing Nepal.
As demonstrations continued, two main discursive strategies could be noted in the process of establishing authority for the counterterrorist monarchist state: one, the need for everyone to be united in favor of 'democracy' and 'permanent peace' and, two, that the Maoist 'terrorists' had infiltrated these SPA-led protests.
Other Representations of the Maoists and the State
The human rights discourse was the main alternative meaning-making repertoire available during this period. As during the earlier events, discourses about human rights and Nepal's -- both state and Maoists' -- poor record in safeguarding rights of children, journalists, civil activists, and the general population were drawn upon by various actors such as local human rights organizations and international ones like Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch. That public protests are a crucial right of citizens was mentioned by the ICJ and the United Nations. The European Union continued its call for increased human rights and dialogue amongst all parties. 596 UNESCO emphasized children were at risk during the conflict and claimed Nepal was one of the most dangerous countries for children in terms of the possibility of them being exposed to
595 Gyanendra, April 14, 2006.
596 "Nepal Facing a Strong Risk of Political Collapse: Finnish Envoy," Nepalnews.com, April 3, 2006, http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2006/apr/apr03/newsl 1.php (accessed February 22, 2009). 305
explosions.597 Local human rights organizations protested and labeled state actions as
"state terror", a concept the Maoist leader Prachanda had also used. 598
Indeed, Nepal's human rights situation was deemed as having worsened since
February 1, 2005. In its annual Human Rights Report for 2005-2006, the US government
claimed, "Although the king lifted the state of emergency in April, restoring many civil
freedoms, his restrictions on NGOs, the press, civil society, and political party activists
were concerns, and Nepal's poor human rights record worsened."599 Both the government
and the Maoists were described as having committed human rights abuses. The Report
added, "Amidst the ongoing Maoist insurgency, security forces engaged in serious human
rights abuses, including arbitrary detentions, disappearances of detainees, torture, and
arbitrary and unwarranted lethal force ... " while the Maoists "in pursuit of establishing an
authoritarian single-party state, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) systematically
employed violence and terror and committed serious human rights abuses, including
torture, killings, bombings, extortion, and conscription of child soldiers." 600
However, as noted here, even in a human-rights centric representation, the
Maoists are linked with 'violence and terror' while the government's actions do not warrant those definitions. "Unwarranted lethal force" has the effect of constituting
another set oflethal force as "warranted". On the whole, human rights representations
597 "Nepali Children Facing Daily Threat of Explosion: UNICEF," Nepalnews.com, April 4, 2006, http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2006/apr/apr04/news0 l .php (accessed November 23, 2008).
598 "Stop Oppression Against Peaceful Agitations: Rights Groups," Nepalnews.com, April 9, 2006, http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2006/apr/apr09/news16.php (accessed November 22, 2008).
599 "Human Rights Situation in Nepal has Worsened: US," Nepalnews.com, April 6, 2006, http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2006/apr/apr06/news13.php (accessed November 22, 2008).
600 Ibid. 306
remained absent from official accounts and the Nepalese state produced within official
discourses continued to prioritize anti-terrorism.
After November 2005, however, domestic actors especially the SPA and also the
Maoists used discourses of 'democracy' against authoritarianism and 'autocracy', instead
of against 'terrorism'. In this representation, the SPA had urged the Maoists towards a
democratic agenda and 'the international community', therefore, had to support SPA's
actions: "It is the duty of a democratic force to bring the non-democratic force into the
democratic constitutional framework. That's what we are doing," said Nepali Congress
leader Girij a Koirala in an interview with the BBC Nepali service. 601 Thus, it was the
SPA and, relatedly, the Maoists who were 'democratic' or at least on the path towards
'democracy', not the existing monarchist state. 'Democracy' was also contested, with
both the SP A and the state linking themselves to 'democracy' but calling for different
outcomes -- acceptance of the new elections (for the state) and a return to the elected
parliament (for the SPA and Maoist alliance).
Overall, however, much of the coverage about Nepal only occupied small portions
of the international news section in international media. The United States continued to
centralize 'dialogue' as needed to restore 'democracy' while not mentioning what (if any)
role the Maoists would play as the Maoists remained listed on the US' Global Terror
Watch list. In an interview with CNN, US official Richard Boucher drew upon
commonplaces of 'democracy' but claimed the king's February 1, 2005 actions had
failed. He said, "The steps the King took a year ago to eliminate democracy and to try to
601 "Prospect of Dialogue Not Exhausted Yet: Koirala," Nepalnews.com, April 2, 2006, http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2006/apr/apr02/news10.php (accessed November 20, 2008). Full text obtained from BBC Monitoring archives (via Lexis-Nexis). run the country, they haven't worked, and they're not working, and they're not going to
work. The steps he's taking now to arrest people, they're not working. There needs to be
a restoration of democracy."602 Here, the monarchist Nepalese state is differentiated from
'democracy', a formulation that is against that proposed in official Nepalese discourses at
that time. These representations, using similar commonplaces as that in official
discourses, had the effect of constituting a different identity for the state: instead of "anti-
terrorist", it was hindering "democracy".
Strategies of Stake Management and Constructing Authority: State/Terrorist Identities in Nepal and Northern Ireland
Table 6. State/Other(s) Identities in Nepalese Official Discourses 2001-2006
Self (state) Others Time Period
Political parties + king + the Maoist "terrorists" November 2001- February people+ security forces 2005
King+ Security forces+ the "Terrorists" + political February 2005- April 2006 people parties (+ the people)
00 Maoists + political parties + Other political parties 2008 elections j the people
602 Richard Boucher, "Interview with CNN," April 7, 2006, http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/pr041006.html (accessed November 12, 2008). Boucher also criticized the Maoists for "doing horrible things" and reiterated the need for "democracy to come back".
603 This period is beyond the scope of my project at present since I sought to examine the state's use of the label of "terrorism" to refer to the Maoists until April 2006. Future research can examine how the Maoists were described during the peace process and the state/other(s) identities produced therein.
307 308
Managing Stake in Nepal
During the 2001-2006 period, what was deemed to be at stake in official accounts -- anti- terrorism -- remained constant. That 'terrorism' was at stake was generally accepted in the 2001-2006 period with increased military aid, joint training operations between Nepal and the United States (for example) and the placing of the Maoists on the US Global
Terror Watch List and on the list of proscribed "terrorist" organizations.604 But, by
November 2005, 'democracy' became contested with both the counterterrorist state and the SP A/Maoist coalition linking it to their own selves. In 2001-2006, state actions were against Maoist 'terrorists' and then against 'terrorism' in general. After the Seven Party
Alliance and the Maoists aligned themselves, there was an explicit challenge of the state's construction of itself as anti-'terrorist' and pro-'democracy'. Instead, it was SPA representations which also drew upon commonplaces of 'democracy' and 'the people' but linked them together with anti-'autocracy' (instead of anti-terrorism, as in official discourses).
In terms of "basic discourses,"605 there were three basic discourses present in
2001: economic development, poverty alleviation and terrorism. In November 2001, after the end of yet another Maoist ceasefire, the state used globally-available rhetoric of
'terrorism' and 'terrorists' to label the Maoists and their actions. This meant at stake was still Nepal's future, stability and democracy but now violence and terrorism, instead of
604 Indeed, the US State Department's Travel Advisory for Nepal for May 22, 2009 states, "The U.S. Government's designation of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) as a 'Specially Designated Global Terrorist' organization under Executive Order 13224 and its inclusion on the 'Terrorist Exclusion List' pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act remain in effect," (US Department of State, "Travel Warning: Nepal," May 22, 2009, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis pa tw/tw/tw 927.html (accessed June 22, 2009).
605 Hansen, Security. 309
poverty and lack of educational, employment opportunities or inequality threatened 'the
people'. As indicated earlier, this shifted the state's responsibility from helping people
develop socioeconomically or to alleviate poverty to a responsibility to counter
'terrorism'.
The construction of 'the people' as having suffered from 'terrorism' had the effect
of positioning them as victims and in need of the state's military assistance. David
Campbell in National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia (1998)
quotes Jacques Derrida as saying authority is often constructed retroactively as particular
actions are said to be performed on the behalf of 'the people', an entity that had not
existed as such until actions were performed in their name. 606 This is not to say that 'the
people' are invisible but to say that what is done in their name or the actions performed
on their behalf constitutes them as particular types of 'the people'. This could be noted in
the process of state/terrorist identity formation in Nepal since 'the people' were in favor
of the state's counterterrorist actions, were in support of the SPA's democratic and anti-
monarchist actions, were the reasons for the Maoist insurgency (their war was "the
People's War") and, of course, suffered from 'terrorism'. At the same time, the category
of 'the people' in official discourses excluded the Maoists who were then not-people but
were 'terrorist'. The character of the 'terrorist' is therefore an effective accounting
strategy within official discourses. As Potter and Wetherell write, when discussing "the
stirrer", "it articulates a self, a particular kind of personality or brand ... and the
606 The example provided is of the signatories to the United States constitution (Campbell, National, 26). 310
individual's actions are then explained by this self."607 In other words, the 'terrorist' self is violent, anti-democratic and not part of category of 'the people'.
At stake therefore were 'democracy' and 'stability', both of which were under attack by 'terrorists'. The need to preserve 'democracy' and 'stability' meant the people should be willing to accept difficulties for the sake of getting rid of the country of
'terrorists'. By using the language of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist', other interpretations of the state's actions -- human rights-oriented, socioeconomic development and so on - could be discounted. As Potter explained, "Each time one of these descriptive categories is drawn on it not only engages a particular form of understanding, constituting the world in a particular way, it also counters opposing descriptions and forms of understanding."608
By 2005, the discourse of 'terrorism' was commonplace in official accounts of Nepal's situation. The theme of 'democracy' versus 'terrorism' was common. After February 1,
2005 in official representations, the king was linked to 'democracy' with political parties differentiated from 'democracy'. Instead the political parties were weak on 'terrorism' and failed in their tasks of controlling 'terrorism'. These tasks were to organize elections
(thus drawing upon the democratic discourse), to counter 'terrorists' and to safeguard 'the people'. This led to 'the people' and 'the king' versus political parties and the Maoist
'terrorists'. Such constructions had the effect of shoring up the counterterrorist identity of the state as well as reinforcing its responsibility to rid Nepal of 'terrorism'.
'Democracy', 'peace' and 'stability' were at stake throughout, along with the happiness and security of 'the people'. However, who was represented as being
607 Potter and Wetherell, 114.
608 Potter, Representing, 218. 311
responsible for these and, especially, how these were to be achieved were contested, especially after November 2005. During the April 2006 protests, official discourses still re-produced a counterterrorist state and represented the protests as being led by and/or infiltrated by 'terrorists'. However, it was difficult for this identity-formation to be upheld since the SPA also drew upon 'democracy' and 'peace' and claimed the Maoists had joined (its) democratic movement. SP A rhetoric alluded to a similar movement for democracy in the past (1990), when most of the SP A leaders had participated to help establish "multiparty democracy". This link with past democratic actions helped construct SPA authority as more 'democratic' than the 'anti-terrorism' activities of the state. 'Democracy' thus became centralized as a major stake but it was a 'democracy' that was linked to the political parties and their actions, according to this discourse.
Official discourses continued to use 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' while the political parties
(and other international representations) did not. In this way, official representations of what was at stake and how this could be achieved were challenged, leading to a shift in state/others relations in the post-April 2006 period. Unlike in Northern Ireland after the
Docklands bombing, all actors here were not operating within a similar security repertoire of 'peace' as central to all parties' goals. Instead, the Nepalese state was operating under an anti-terrorist security repertoire while the SPA (and the Maoists) were pro-democracy and anti-autocratic monarchy. In this way, how stake was established and managed within British and Nepalese contexts was different since there was a continued usage of the language of 'terrorism' by the state in Nepal during this period while it was
'peace' that was centralized after the Docklands bombing. 'Democracy' was the commonplace centralized in Nepal as the state and SPA both linked 'democracy' to their 312
actions. In the end, the SP A's narrative of 'democracy' versus 'autocratic monarchy' became normalized as authoritative.
Establishing Authority in Nepal
Strategies of establishing authority thus used 'democracy' (and 'anti-terrorism') as stakes until late 2005, after which time there was a struggle over meanings of commonplaces such as 'the people', 'peace' and 'democracy'. By April 2006, commonplaces of 'elections' and 'multiparty democracy' became more noticeable with both sides using 'the people' as reasons for their actions. The counterterrorist identity of the state became less stable as the group to which the label "terrorism" was applied -- the
Maoists -- allied themselves with the political parties who were using the language of non-violent protests, anti-autocracy and 'democracy'. While the 2001 representations helped establish the authority of the 'anti-terrorist' Nepalese state, the 2006 representations, which sought to link 'the monarchy' and 'the people' with 'democracy', did not have this effect. Past activities of SP A leaders in helping establish 'democracy' in
1990 and in bringing 'peace' was drawn upon in 2006, contrary to 2001 when these leaders were themselves part of the state. Hence, the counterterrorist monarchist state of
2006 found it more difficult to fix the meaning of 'democracy' and link itself to
'democracy'.
The protests of 2006 established pro-democracy and anti-monarchy language-use as central and authoritative, making it harder for official accounts' anti-terrorism language to become stabilized. Even after the February 2005 takeover of government by the king, the political parties could have continued using "anti-terrorist" language to 313
describe their actions while labeling the actions of the Maoist as "terrorist". But, instead, their descriptions used the language of 'multiparty democracy' and emphasized the king's actions then (and in the months that followed) as against the 1990 constitution.
Therefore, alternative representations of the state saying the April 2006 protests were
"Maoist-owned" and "infiltrated by terrorists" could not be stabilized. By the time of the
April 2006 protests, 'the 1990 constitution' was also commonly drawn upon in the SPA's self representations. The SPA and the Maoists claimed their actions were constitutional while differentiating the king's actions as unconstitutional. Since the constitution had provisions for the right for public gatherings, this allowed the non-official domestic
(mainly SPA) discourses to construct the state's actions of implementing a curfew, banning public protests, and shoot to kill orders as against 'the constitution' and thus establish authority for a different representation of self/Maoist relations than that of official discourses. Hence, in these SPA representations, the language of 'terrorism' was not used and instead it was 'the state' was differentiated from 'democracy' and 'the 1990 constitution' and linked with 'autocratic monarchy', thus constructing an anti-
' democratic' and unconstitutional state instead of a counterterrorist one.
In official discourses, 'terrorism' was, at first, normalized in the process of state identity-formation as 'terrorism' as a threat to the state's existence was a common narrative since November 2001. However, a similar strategy of establishing authority was difficult to sustain when the political parties -- not linked with 'terrorism' explicitly - allied themselves with Maoist 'terrorists'. Another theme here, in the process of establishing authority within official discourses, was that of 'terrorism' as a normal and long-term occurrence in Nepal. In statist accounts, the presence of 'terrorism' for the past 314
decade was emphasized, especially in post-February 2005 accounts as was the link of
'terrorism' in Nepal with 'terrorism' elsewhere. This internationalization of 'terrorists' in
Nepal as threatening regional and global security was different to British usage of
'terrorism' which sought to domesticize 'terrorism' as an internal issue of the state.
Nepalese representations used 'terrorism' to link it with regional and global problems
while, at the same time, domesticizing the response to 'terrorists' since 'the international
community' was not ready or willing to help countries like Nepal.
Thus, the authority of the counterterrorist state was established partly by its link to
'the people' and to 'democracy' and 'peace' but also partly by the representation that 'the
international community' had ignored 'terrorism' in Nepal. It was the state's
responsibility to act to counter 'terrorists' since international actors were disinterested in
doing so. The state's motive, therefore, was to get rid of 'terrorists' for the benefit of
local and international security. This formulation of getting rid of 'terrorism' as being in
the interests of Nepal and 'the international community' helped construct actions not
against 'terrorists' as against the people's interests. As such, such practices constructed
the motives of the state. As Potter writes, "The simple point here is that the language of
motives is closely bound up with constituting acts in particular ways and building and
undermining the legitimacy of actions."609 By saying its motives were to be rid of
'terrorism', the state's actions against the Maoists were 'anti-terrorist'. Similarly, media reports about the Maoists were "encouraging terrorism" and those reporting on the
Maoists could be arrested.
These identities -- the state as counterterrorist and the Maoists as 'terrorist' -- were
609 Potter, Representing, 215. 315
challenged by the use of similar commonplaces (that of 'democracy', 'the people', and
'peace') in SP A/Maoist discourses in the post-November 2005 period. This means the state was unable to successfully establish its counterterrorist authority despite continued usage of "terrorism" to refer to the Maoists. Unlike British discourses on Northern
Ireland, Nepalese official security discourses did not reduce or cease using 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' to represent itself and others but the identities thus produced could not be successfully stabilized and reproduced when the political parties and the 'terrorists' formed an alliance. In other words, a stable counterterrorist monarchist state was difficult to establish as the 'terrorism' versus 'democracy' formulation of officials was contested by other (SPA) accounts which linked 'democracy' to SPA and not the state. In the next section, I shall briefly compare these outcomes of managing stake and establishing authority in Nepal with British/other relations in Northern Ireland.
Table 7. Common Discourses and Stakes for the State
Discourse Responsibility of the State
Human rights Protect citizens, especially vulnerable groups
Socioeconomic Promote Economic and social growth
Terrorism Counter 'terrorists' 316
Managing Stake and Establishing Authority in Nepal and Northern Ireland
Official accounts posited that the existence of the state's self and, especially, its democratic values were at stake in both Nepal and Northern Ireland. On a related note, long-term prospects for peace and socioeconomic development of 'the people' were also at stake as these were under threat from the IRA and Maoist 'terrorists'. Of course, as traced out in this chapter and the previous one on British/IRA relations, these stakes are constructed and reworked over time. During "Bloody Sunday'', it was the security of the state that was deemed to be at stake. At this time, 'peace' was the responsibility of the state and its army. One of the outcomes of such a link -- of 'the state' with 'peace' -- was that other actors' peaceful practices could be reformulated within official accounts as against 'peace'. Taking another example from British/IRA relations, in the 1980s, the
IRA hunger strike was linked with 'terrorism' in official discourses despite being non violent in nature. By 1996, once again, stake had shifted and 'peace' was centralized as the goal for all sides including Sinn Fein. Similarly, in Nepal, in November 2001,
'security' was at stake and under threat from 'terrorism' and 'the people' were under threat by 'terrorist' actions. By April 2006, it was 'democracy' that was centralized with both the state and the SP A (and Maoists) linking their selves with 'democracy'. Both these chapters indicate how commonsensical 'state' and 'terrorist' identities actually involved rhetorical work and both the 'counterterrorist' state and the state that negotiated with 'terrorists' were outcomes of strategies of establishing authority and stake management. This process of construction indicates the contingent nature of identities and how an identity that has been constituted within social relations may (and can) shift. 317
At the same time, official accounts of what was at stake were contested by other representations. Other actors did not always accept what official accounts deemed to be at stake ('terrorism' in Nepal in April 2006, for example, and the ongoing formulation by the IRA that the British military presence in Northern Ireland was unacceptable). Part of these processes of stake management were category entitlements. 610 To be 'anti-terrorist', as the Nepalese government formulated its own identity against the Maoists, was to also be 'democratic'. This was, of course, because anti-terrorism was linked with democracy, a formulation that resonated in the post September 11 world and was, hence, more difficult to contest. The category of 'anti-terrorist' entitled the actor(s) to link their selves with 'democracy'. However, as outlined in this chapter in the discussion about state/Maoist relations in Nepal, such category entitlements could also be counterred.
Even though the human rights discourse (and the subsequent responsibility for the state to protect its citizens rather than deploying the army against them) was less well-used than the terrorism discourse, it provided rhetorical resources with which official state/Maoist relations and the use of 'terrorism' could be questioned. In the case of Nepal, it was
'democracy' and its link with participants who had been involved in previous democratic actions that also helped authorize the link of 'democracy' with the SP A (and against the
'autocratic' monarchist state). Using 'peace' allowed for Sinn Fein and the British state
(along with the United States and the Republic of Ireland) to leave open the possibility of talks even after the IRA's bombing of the Docklands. As noted in Chapter 4, the act itself was labeled "terrorism" but the actors were referred to mostly by their names (IRA or
61 ° Categorization as an ongoing activity in the process of establishing (and managing) stake is discussed by Potter, 1996 318
Sinn Fein) rather than as "terrorists".
While official accounts were using the language of terrorism in the process of
normalizing state/threat identities, there were concurrent contemporary representations of
the events and of the actors. In Northern Ireland, these were most evident in the
discourses of the IRA itself but alternative representations were noted within official
accounts as well. During Parliamentary discussions about "Bloody Sunday", for example,
there was consideration given to the withdrawal of British forces from Northern Ireland
as well as to there needing to be a United Ireland, both options which became more
unthinkable as time passed. Another alternative approach was the internationalization of
the conflict in Northern Ireland, while official accounts linked 'terrorism' with domestic
or "Home" affairs.
In Nepal, the major alternative discourse available was that of human rights and,
yet, it was not used in official (or Maoist) accounts during the conflict. Indeed, human
rights organizations blamed both the Maoists and the state for human rights violations.
Instead, as this chapter touched upon, the Maoists' use of the rhetoric of imperialism and
feudalism did not resonate with the 21st century, post-September 11 world, making it
more difficult to for their narrative about the conflict to be legitimated in an international
setting. It was when the Maoists allied themselves with the SP A, which used the rhetoric
of anti-autocratic monarchy and pro-democracy (instead of anti-terrorism) that the
meaning of 'democracy' and the formulation of 'democracy' against 'terrorism',
common in official discourses in Nepal (and also in Britain in the past) was questioned.
As such, the establishment of authority worked out differently in the two contexts. In
Nepal, the authority of the state itself was open to question with the SP A able to 319
reformulate its link with 'democracy' (during the 1990 movement for political change) in
order to establish its 'democracy' versus 'autocratic monarchy' as the authoritative
narrative during the April 2006 protests.
Similar to shifts in stake, the establishment of authority and normalization also
changed through time. A common way to establish authority for the state was through
mechanisms of extrematization and minimization, especially in descriptions of violence.
So it became, as described iri chapter 4, that British parliamentary debates immediately
following the incident noted that participants in "Bloody Sunday" had shot at the Army
and the Army had had to defend itself. This was said despite there being no confirmation of such actions by eyewitnesses. Here, there was an extrematization of violence of the marchers in official descriptions of "Bloody Sunday'', which then helped establish the
authority of the state as anti-violence and safeguarding 'the people'. On the other hand, during the Docklands bombing, there was a minimization of the violence of the IRA so that Sinn Fein could remain a possible partner for the state in peace negotiations.
Similarly, during the April 2006 protests in Nepal and even afterwards, the Maoists continued using violence in areas outside Kathmandu. This violence was minimized -- not in official representations but in those of the Seven Party Alliance -- such that the
Maoists could link themselves with the 'democratic' SP A.
Discussing strategies ofrepresentation, Potter writes,
Formulating as something brings the thing into being only in so far as it is understood or treated as such in a particular interaction. What exists is the description -- no mysterious entity is brought into being -- and this description may be understood in various ways, or has having various implications and consequences.611
611 Potter, Representing, 177. 320
Of relevance here is that representations are tied in with strategies of managing stake and establishing authority. For example, the representation of the IRA hunger strikes as 'terrorism' meant its perpetrators were treated as 'terrorists' in the media (and in British law). At stake, therefore, was the possibility of an increase in 'terrorism' and the establishment of state authority included practices to safeguard against such an mcrease.
These identities of state/others may be understood in varied ways and there are usually other representations about any event or action, making the process of establishing authority an ongoing one. As an example, let us again look at the IRA hunger strikes. Official accounts of these linked the hunger strikers with (terroristic) characteristics of the IRA and posited they had only themselves to blame. Additionally, the British state was described as having given the hunger strikers a choice -- a choice that the IRA itself did not give to many of its victims. 612 These representations were produced within the British security (anti-terrorist) repertoire of the time. Yet, their authority was questioned--after all, 100,000 people lined up in the streets of Belfast to see the coffin of a dead hunger striker pass them by. What this means is that, as discourse analysts have continually noted, establishment of authority is an ongoing, continuous process, one which does not always succeed. The counterterrorist monarchist Nepalese state of April 2006 continued the use of "terrorism" to label Maoist activities but was unable to establish its authority in positioning the Maoists as 'terrorist' once the SP A and the Maoists formed an alliance.
612 See Chapter 4. 321
Another aspect of relevance in terms of establishing state authority in both
Northern Ireland and Nepal is that 'terrorists' in both contexts were internal to the political boundaries of the state. Unlike the current global war on terror, for example, when "the enemy" -- often al-Qaeda or its associates -- is usually external and there is less need to engage with or respond to 'terrorist' views (after all, it is not often the United
States or Britain comments on what al-Qaeda says), both Britain in Northern Ireland and the Nepalese state did have to respond to those labeled "terrorist" to a certain extent.
Thus there was a rhetorical struggle within official accounts and also with other representations in the processes of establishing stake and authority, in the process of establishing meanings of security, peace and democracy. This chapter and the previous one traced part of this rhetorical struggle focusing on the use of the language of terrorism and its role in reproducing state/other identities.
It seems apposite to end with a comment on discursive construction of identities.
In Potter and Wetherell' s words:
... people become fixed in position through the range of linguistic practices available to them to make sense. The use of a particular discourse which contains a particular organization of the self not only allows one to warrant and justify one's actions .. ., it also maintains power relations and patterns of domination and subordination. In constructing the self in on way, other constructions are excluded, hence ... the creation of one kind of self or subjectivity in discourse also creates a particular kind of subjection.613
Both the Nepalese security discourses and that of the British state in the earlier chapter thus had the effect of utilizing particular discursive repertoires while ignoring others which were also present at that time. This indicates that the use of 'terrorism' and
'terrorist' language and the identities produced therein are not always natural and
613 Potter and Wetherell, 109. 322
commonsensical but have to engage with other representations. In both Britain and
Nepal, groups considered 'terrorist' who later entered into negotiations with the state, continued to use violence while negotiations were ongoing. At the same time, discourses are not all-pervasive and nor do they force particular subject positionings and more than one interpretation (e.g. the usage of 'democracy' and 'the people' by the SPA after
November 2005 in Nepal) is possible even from within the same discursive repertoire.
Indeed subject positionings allow for choice of actions as actors utilize meanings available within particular discursive repertoires and, in the process, make and remake identities and relations, including their own. CHAPTER6
TERRORISM AS DISCOURSE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF
TERRORISM TODAY
On March 7, 2009, two soldiers at a barracks in Antrim Town, Northern Ireland were shot dead by a splinter group of the IRA called the Real IRA. Within two days, a policeman was shot and killed, this time by the Continuity IRA, another splinter group.
British media reports (The Guardian, for example)614labeled these acts "terrorism" but, despite these being the first killings of British security personnel in Northern Ireland since 1997, they were not described as "terrorism" in most official accounts. Instead,
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown called the Northern Ireland killings an "evil and cowardly act" but the people committing the act were "murderers" rather than
"terrorists". He said, "no murderer will be able to derail a peace process that has the support of the great majority of Northern Ireland."615 The killings were represented as a threat to the (ongoing) peace process, rather than an act of 'terrorism' against the British state.
614 Remy McDonald, "Northern Ireland Killings Were an Act of War, Says Hardline Republican Group," The Guardian, March 26, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/mar/26/northem-ireland killings-terrorism (accessed June 12, 2009). While Republican Sinn Fein (linked to Continuity IRA) said Sinn Fein and Northern Ireland's deputy first minister Martin McGuinness were guilty of treachery, McGuinness responded by calling Republican Sinn Fein "traitors to the island oflreland". See "McGuinness: These People are Traitors," BBC News, March 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/northern ireland/7934894.stm (accessed July 22, 2009).
615 "PM Condemns Northern Ireland Killings," The Official Site of the Prime Minister's Office, March 8, 2009, http://www.numberlO.gov.uk/Pagel8531 (accessed June 10, 2009).
323 324
Compare this with the incident at Scotland's Glasgow airport on June 30, 2007. A car was set on fire and driven at the main terminal of the airport. One of the two men arrested after the incident later died in hospital. Following the Glasgow attack, the British government raised its terrorism alert level to "critical", its highest level and one which meant "further [terrorist] attacks expected imminently." The attack was treated as terrorism by the security forces. 616 The attempted bombing was called an "Islamist" attack617 and almost all reports, in the early days after the bombing, wondered whether the bombers were "home-grown". News reports also specified the ethnicities of the two men who drove their vehicle into an airport building.618 This language of "home grown" perpetrators was not commonplace in descriptions of the 2009 killings in Northern
Ireland.
As the descriptions of "terrorism" here indicate, terrorism is not inherent in the act itself or in the behavior of the users of violence. Indeed, for an explanation of these events using traditional terrorism approaches, the use of violence alone should have meant both incidents were "terrorism". The 2009 killings of three British soldiers in
616 "Airport Incidence 'Was Terrorism'," BBC News, July I, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/scotland/6257846.stm (accessed June 8, 2009).
617 In an article in the Observer the British Prime Minister's new terrorism adviser, Lord Stevens, was quoted as saying: "Make no mistake, this weekend's bomb attacks signal a major escalation by Islamic terrorists". Full article "Terror Threat 'Critical" as Glasgow Attacked," The Observer, July 1, 2007 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/jul/Ol/terrorism.world2 (accessed July 30, 2009). See also R. Jackson, "Constructing Enemies: "Islamic Terrorism" in Political and Academic Discourse," Government & Opposition 42, no. 3 (2007): 394-426 for an overview of the effects of the "Islamist" discourse on society.
618 The BBC, which normally does not use "terrorism" to describe events, wrote that witnesses said they saw two Asian men driving the car ("Blazing Car Crashes into Airport," BBC News, June 30, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/scotland/6257194.stm (accessed June 10, 2009)). The ethnicities of the killers in Northern Ireland were not mentioned in most media reports. Another example is "Glasgow Airport Attack Man Dies," BBC News, August 3, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/scotland/glasgow and west/6929991.stm (accessed July 20, 2009) where the places of birth of both suspects are clearly detailed and used as identity markers. 325
Northern Ireland were deadlier than the attempted attack in Glasgow in 2007 where there were no deaths except that of one of the attackers. It was also not the actors themselves, their intrinsic "terrorist" features or their aims which made something "terrorism" here, since both the Real and Continuity IRA clearly expressed their reasons for the 2009 killings as part of a war where the British security forces were described as "forces of occupation."619 Despite such claims by the perpetrators which in a traditional terrorism reading would indicate their "real" motives for the killings, the 2009 killings were not categorized as "terrorism" in official accounts. Thus, traditional terrorism is unable to explain the inconsistent application of the label of "terrorism" or, indeed, to explore the implications of such variable applications of "terrorism" on identity-formation of groups as (or not as) terrorists.
On the other hand, it could be argued that it was in the British state's "interest" to characterize the 2007 Glasgow attacks as "terrorism" and the 2009 killings as not
"terrorism". Indeed, this could be something a CTS-based analysis would uncover -- that elites usually have some generalized "interest" which leads to particular actions being labeled (or not labeled) "terrorism". It could even be argued that CTS, with its focus on the political nature of the use of the language of terrorism by officials, is similar to the discourse analytical approach adopted in my study. Therefore, the relational, poststructural discourse analytical methodology advanced here in Chapter 3 does not provide much "value added" to the study of terrorism. While it is certainly the case that
CTS opens up the field of terrorism studies to studying the implications of
619 BBC, Northern Ireland Killings. 326
representations of specific actions and actors as terrorism and counterterrorism, this study argued CTS remains limited in its outlook because of its insistence that there is a real form of political violence called "terrorism'', one which remains outside of representational practices. 620
Instead, my study argued that what (and who) is considered 'terrorist' depends on public representations and is not just reducible to the interests, however defined, of those doing the labeling. This is contrary to the views of some CTS scholars who have posited that Northern states as well as elites of the South use the label "terrorism" in order to rid themselves of undesirable groups and to justify undemocratic practices against such groups. 621 If this were the case, then it could be claimed it was against the "interest" of the British state to use "terrorism" during "Bloody Sunday" or even to link the marchers with the IRA. Similarly, the Nepalese king and his ministers' continued use of
"terrorism" to refer to the Maoists during the April 2006 protests could be considered against the state's interests if "interest" is conceptualized as wanting to retain control of government. Indeed, in Nepal's example, the official use of "terrorism" to refer to the
Maoists did not stick during the April 2006 protests despite the rhetoric of terrorism still being commonly used in regional and global arenas.
CTS also advocates "counter-hegemonic struggle" through the discovery of alternative narratives outside of the counterterrorist discourse.622 Such a call assumes one can hold a standpoint outside of discourse, a view that my study denies. Instead, my study
620 See Chapter 2 for a more detailed explanation of the weaknesses ofCTS.
621 Blakeley, Bringing; Blakeley, Elephant; R. Jackson, Core Commitments.
622 R. Jackson, Writing, 188-89. 327
argues the language of terrorism is appropriated, localized and (re)used in various
settings as in the example of Nepal since 2001. Yet alternative narratives are not always
found outside of the discourse of terrorism and counterterrorism. Instead, rhetorical
commonplaces from within the counterterrorism discourses themselves were used and
reused in the processes by which identities of states and others were continually
formulated. As Chapter 5 indicated, the rhetoric of the Seven Party Alliance in Nepal did
not use an alternative vocabulary to that of the state. Instead, it linked commonplaces of
'democracy' and 'security' to its self while contrasting them from the self of the state.
There was a struggle over the meanings of these concepts even within the overall
counterterrorism discourse and this struggle -- the contingency of social relations as it
were -- was outlined within my study which took social interactions as foundational to
analysis.
Thus, an analysis of the language of terrorism as used in constituting state and
terrorist identities while legitimating counter (and negotiating) practices is useful to
delineate discursive repertoires within which state and other(s) identities are constituted.
Discourse analysis moves away from asking what "terrorism" really is to asking what
"terrorism" does. In doing so, it links language and practices, discourse and identity
formation. At the same time, discourse analysis focuses on change -- how do state/other relations become (counterterrorist) state/terrorist relations and then (negotiating)
state/political partners relations? These shifts are not just up to the change in behavior of the so-called "terrorist" actors since, as has been said here before, both the IRA and the
Maoists continued using violence especially during the initial stages of the peace processes. A poststructural discourse analytical approach, by focusing on representing 328
strategies explains these identity shifts while, at the same time, questioning the notion of a generalized "terrorist" identity.
Therefore, examining how "terrorism" is used -- who or what is classified as
"terrorist" and "terrorism" -- allows for tracing out how responses against threats are organized and at the strategies that legitimate such responses. As Lene Hansen writes when discussing threat-formation and naming,
to argue that something or someone is threatening is to constitute a 'who', who is threatened, and to constitute a set of subjects who are part of forming -- or countering -- this threat. This implies that the construction of political subjects (naming the relevant subjects and deciding on their identity) is indeed as, if not more, important than whether there is a threat or not. 623
For instance, in the early years of the conflict in Nepal, the Maoists were not considered
1 as a major threat. Even earlier than this, for much of the 20 h century, it was a lack of socioeconomic development that was described as a threat to Nepal.624 This meant state responsibility would be to improve the socioeconomic welfare of its people. This was different to the state's responsibility if the danger was from "terrorism" as then the state would have to counter the "terrorist" threat.
Four Advantages of Studying Terrorism as Discourse
There are four major advantages that a poststructural discourse analysis of terrorism as attempted in this dissertation provides:
(i) It rescues and maintains the contingent nature of social interactions while emphasizing change and continuity. This is similar to what R. Jackson called for-- to
623 Hansen, Global.
624 Hutt, Himalayan. 329
identify vulnerabilities in discourses. 625 However, poststructural discourse analysis takes it a step further and destabilizes stabilized discourses (and positioning) while, at the same time, drawing attention to human agency. In the end, it is government officials, working within various discursive repertoires, who used (or did not use) the language of terrorism.
Noting down how this was done not only allows for the delineation of what can (and was) said during specific events (the discursive repertoire or "structure" as it were) but also who used the language of terrorism and how (the agency). As such, it moves away from CTS which, appears to prioritize the structure of discursive formations over human agency.
In the examples drawn upon in my study, there was contention even within official discourses on the interpretation of events and identities in the time period immediately following the events in question. For instance, descriptions of a seemingly commonsensical "terrorist" event such as the Brighton bombing ranged from the bombing as a terrorist incident to concern about increased surveillance and security measures and their impact upon British identity. Indeed, tropes of "Britishness" were drawn upon by officials who were concerned that stricter security measures would limit people's access to government officials. Even government officials themselves, including the prime minister who was a target of the attacks, acknowledged there were always risks in being in their position. Such calls for continued open access to government officials in the wake of a major bombing or even the relatively open set of practices in and around the Brighton hotel prior to the bombing itself is unthinkable today.
Thus, the study of discourse of terrorism here helps in rereading the established
625 R. Jackson, Writing. 330
"states automatically and invariably counter terrorist violence" or the "states to do not talk to terrorists" narratives. It helps in unsettling settled identities and especially critiquing practices against those labeled "terrorists'', practices that have become commonsensical. By maintaining the contingency of social relations and by mapping the discursive formation within which identity of state officials was represented as (always) being at risk and yet having to continue their jobs, 'the people' as needing to have open access to their elected officials, a discourse analytical account indicates how things are today were not how they have been in the past. At the same time, how they became what they are depended on contingencies -- what language was used (and not used) by officials, how representations formed and shifted and so on. While other forms of analysis may give credence to the contingent nature of social relations, they usually privilege one primary reason for a particular outcome. Even CTS in its calls for a real form of terrorism is founded upon notions of there being a universal ideology or universal interests (of global elites) which affect the constitution of "terrorism". My dissertation questioned such viewpoints.
A focus on continuity and change also leads to a related emphasis on questioning common sense,626 which itself is a critical move. That Britain was threatened by Irish terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s is a commonplace in terrorism (and security) discourses
626 See Weldes, Constructing, Chapter 7 "National Interests and Common Sense" for a longer discussion on how the commonsensical nature of the Cuban Missile Crisis is open to question under a poststructural discourse analytical approach. Weldes quotes Antonio Gramsci's definition of common sense as "Common sense .. .is the diffuse, unco-ordinated features of a generic form of thought common to a particular period and a particular popular environment." (Weldes, Constructing, 225). It is by tracing out what forms common sense-the links and differentiations among various rhetorical commonplaces and their link with state/IRA (and Maoist) identities that strategies for constituting commonsensical understandings of states/terrorists can be examined and questioned. This is what Chapters 4 and 5 of my project outlined. 331
today and, as indicated in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, is even foundational to much of traditional terrorism studies. But, even during an obviously "terrorist" incident such as the Brighton bombing, there was concern about state identity -- whether the typically
(and historically) accessible British politicians would become closed off to the public.
'Democracy' was contrasted with 'terrorism' but also linked with openness, a formulation that would be very different today. On a related note, the Brighton bombing occurred on October 12, 1984 and yet there were no Parliamentary sittings until October
16, 1984 and extensive discussion in the House of Commons about the bombing did not take place until October 22, 1984. Such a delay -- when an entire government had been targeted by bombers -- would be unthinkable today, showing how the ubiquity of terrorism has increased.
(ii) Following from this point, poststructural discourse analysis is an effective history or a history of the present.627 But, contrary to traditional terrorism scholars such as Bruce Hoffman, the history of the present is not "learning from" the past. Instead, poststructural discourse analysis notes how similar linguistic strategies were present then and now. The focus thus shifts from similar identities to similar strategies.628
In doing so, a discourse analytical approach more than any other allows for questioning or interrogating history. My primary concern at the commencement of this project was to study practices wherein state/other relations in Nepal had transformed from relatively benign to state/terrorist relations where the counterterrorist state was
627 For further elaboration of"effective history" please see Chapter 3.
628 See Chapter 3 for a critique of how Bruce Hoffman unreflexively uses "terrorism" to refer to acts and actors from the past, even at times when contemporary usage did not describe such acts and actors as "terrorist". 332
fighting "terrorists" within its borders and was part of the global war on terror. It was to note the specific concepts and terms that allowed for the construction of the counterterrorist Nepalese state and the Maoist "terrorists". During the course of analysis it became clear the representing particular groups as "terrorist" utilizes similar linguistic strategies in seemingly-different contexts such as Nepal and Britain. Here, "history" is not something that terrorism scholars can draw lessons for future counterterrorism goals from. Contrary to the approach of Bruce Hoffman, for example, a poststructural discourse analytical study of terrorism does not list a series of so-called "terrorist" events and attempt to note their common features or possible causes. Instead, a discourse analytical approach questions how these incidents (and actors therein) became known as "terrorist" in the first place. What are the implications of the representational process wherein
(some) local people are labeled "terrorist"? As such, this discourse analytical approach critiques normalization i.e. identities and events that have been "normalized" as (or not as) "terrorists". It focuses on the variability of the application of the "terrorism" label.
Thus it questions the apparent solidness and objective nature of "terrorism" over time, a solidness that even traditional terrorism scholars who are historians like Hoffman take for granted. 629
Both chapters 4 and 5 showed how practices we think of as commonsensical today (such as the search of bags and persons during high-profile meetings) were not so in the past. As indicated in Chapter 4 and referred to earlier in this chapter, while there
629 Again, this is not to say Hoffman does not acknowledge that there are many definitions of "terrorism". He, along with most traditional terrorism scholars, concede "terrorism" has many and often contradictory definitions. However, they then do two things: a) proceed with the analysis as though this is not a problem, orb) continue to list events (and groups) from the past as "terrorist", without taking into consideration contemporary representations. 333
were calls for increased security safeguards for politicians in the days following the
Brighton bombing, there was also increased concern whether the "British" notion of easy
public access to politicians would cease to exist. A similar outcome -- that stronger
security measures against terrorism would have to be balanced against public access to
politicians is difficult to imagine today. Similarly, reports at the time mentioned that
people were allowed to go in and out of the Grand Hotel in Brighton, where the bombing
occurred, without having to pass through stringent security procedures or even without
having their bags checked. Such practices, too, are unthinkable today at a time when
security measures are stringently applied and bags (and persons) checked while passing
through border security controls. Thus, the counterterrorism outcomes of even seemingly
iron-clad "terrorist" actions such as the IRA's bombing in Brighton were not as clear-cut
as one would assume.
(iii) Poststructural analysis of terrorism also indicates the boundaries of what can
(and cannot) be said and done. In doing so, it provides the opportunity to question these
boundaries and also to utilize rhetorical resources within the discursive formation to
remake new meanings. Again, the example of the opposition in Nepal and its use of
'democracy' is pertinent here. Another example is the brief comparison between Glasgow
2007 and Northern Ireland 2009 provided earlier in this chapter. By 2009, discussion of
Northern Ireland as a post-terrorism site, a site where the peace process has been ongoing has become normalized. Hence, there is reduced usage of the language of "terrorism" when describing events and actors there. This was different in the case of Glasgow 2007 -
- it has become normalized to talk of "Islamic terrorism", a narrative that could be deployed to represent the perpetrators and the act of the bombing. Both these meanings -- 334
"terrorist" and "not terrorist" -- were not inevitable results of the acts or the actors'
physical characteristics. Instead, they were products of choices made by officials in the
process of representing danger.
However, official representations were always in contention with other
representations present at the time. There were alternative representations of events and
actors within official discourses as well as can be noted in processes to fix the meaning of
"terrorism" and the related state identity-formation during all these events. For example,
Chapter 4 describes how, immediately after "Bloody Sunday", there were contrasting
accounts of the British Army having been fired on but there were also eyewitnesses'
descriptions of the Army having first started shooting. Official reports had to engage with
these different representations by categorizing the marchers as illegal rioters, working up
representations about the professional nature of the Army and so on. At the same time,
there were debates in the British Parliament about withdrawing troops from Northern
Ireland and about the drawbacks oflntemment, all of which had to be responded to in
official discourses. These indicate not only that counterterrorism discourses have
vulnerabilities, as CTS scholars have indicated, but that these vulnerabilities themselves
can be sites where the official, settled meaning of an event can be questioned.
What this means is that asking what terrorism is or why it occurs is not enough for understanding "terrorist" threats and related practices of the state. For that, an analysis of
language-in-use is needed. The way the objects -- 'terrorist' threat and the
'counterterrorist state' for example -- are constructed is tied to the practices within which the language of terrorism is invoked. How the terrorism repertoire is deployed in particular settings to constitute contrasting objects -- the state that safeguards, Maoists 335
that threaten the people, for example -- then becomes a topic to understand identity formation and the policies facilitated therein.
(iv) Finally, a poststructural discourse analytical approach to terrorism does not depend on ideology for explanation. This, too, is contrary to CTS which sees ideology as foundational to the meaning-making of "terrorist" and "terrorism", thus calling for a reduction in usage of the term "terrorist". Poststructural analysis notes ideology is not all encompassing and does not compel actions and behaviors. For example, both Real and
Continuity IRA's "ideology" remained anti-British state and was clearly expressed as such. Yet both groups were not commonly described as "terrorist" in official discourses.
Similarly, in Nepal, comparisons between the threats from communism and terrorism were made by the state as well as by external actors (such as the United States, as described in Chapter 5). Yet, these were strategic assertions, made by the state during particular public regional meetings and discussions with US officials and were not overarching ideological positions since parallels to communism were not common in domestic usage of "terrorist" in Nepal.
To sum up then, this dissertation began with modest aims: to study how was there a shift in the identities of Maoists in Nepal from people dissatisfied with the existing political system to "terrorists"? How did meanings of the local people shift from them as a source of pride to the state to victims of or supporters of Maoist "terrorists"? What were the related implications for state identity? These were some of the questions my study sought to investigate. In the process, my study expanded to include terrorism and identity-formation in other contexts -- how was the "terrorist" identity of the IRA in
Northern Ireland constituted? How were commonplace representations of events and 336
actors as "terrorist" constituted and authorized? How did a seemingly-"terrorist" event
such as the Docklands bombing not derail the nascent Northern Ireland peace process?
My study was based on the foundation that it is not just the use of violence that made
groups "terrorist" and nor was there a real form of "terrorist" violence. Instead, my study
investigated representations of "terrorism" and was based on the view that how danger is
represented is an integral part of state identity-constitution.
Directions for Future Research on Terrorism
With its focus on identity and practice, on the constitutive role oflanguage-in-use
and the emphasis on questioning commonsensical understandings of states and terrorists,
poststructural discourse analysis has a great deal to offer to the study of terrorism. At the
Summer Workshop on Teaching about Terrorism (SWOTT) 2006 where I was a
participant, methodological discussions were relegated to the final day's session at a time
when numerous participants had already left. Additionally, discussions about
methodology focused on "quantitative methods to study terrorism" and "formal methods
to study terrorism,"630 leaving aside questions of language-use and identity. But, it is not
just the silencing of language as a topic of study that was problematic since the mere
addition of "language" as a method may not appreciably increase our understanding of
terrorism. 631 Instead, it is the reification of the narrative that "we" as researchers should
be searching for and conducing research upon better and more improved models of
630 SWOTT 2006 syllabus.
631 Especially iflanguage-use is taken as reflective of "terrorist" motives and inner mental states (e.g. Post) and analysis of "terrorist" language is done to understand their motives (such that better counterterrorist strategies may be designed). Please see Chapter 3 for a longer discussion on why such a view of language is problematic for research on terrorism. 337
understanding "them" (terrorists) such that "they" can be eliminated/managed [by the
state] that was interesting and open to question.
This ignoring of non-positivist methodologies and the lack of acknowledgement
ofresearchers' standpoints is problematic since it leads to a narrow focus of study
wherein state and terrorist identities are assumed to pre-exist prior to analysis and also
where "we" (researchers) should produce research that counters terrorism. This ignores
that states commonly use the language of terrorism and that representations of groups as
"terrorist" is an ongoing activity where states, media, people, popular culture and so
called "terrorists" themselves all participate in. In my research, I have found that
examining the politics of representation and reflecting upon the impacts of this silencing
of discourse analysis (among other non-positivist approaches to research) fruitful. Here,
"fruitful" is best described as outlining how the meaning of terrorism and the related state
identity were established in negotiation with other representations present at the time.
The strategies by which who (and what) is considered "terrorist", who the label
"terrorism" is applied to (or not as in the case of the 1996 Docklands bombing, the April
2006 protests in Nepal and the 2009 Northern Ireland bombings) is key to understanding
state/terrorist identities.
Even within non-positivist methodologies and especially in discourse analysis, there is a need for intra-methodological debate, a call that other poststructuralist scholars have made. For example, Lene Hansen advocates "intra-post-structuralist debate" and for
"explicit discussions of methodological choices and their consequences".632 CTS is
632 Hansen, Security, 217. 338
relevant here since its "Critical" move appears based on an unacknowledged view that
"Critical" means needing to unearth ideological foundations of counterterrorist practices.
My study is a critical (small "c") study which disagrees the CTS need to rest explanations
upon ideological foundations and views such claims as reifying "terrorist" violence as
arising from unique (and universal) attributes of particular acts and actors. 633
In addition to considerations of methodology and knowledge-production, another
future direction for the study of terrorism is to examine the intertextuality of terrorism
discourses. It should be understood that this dissertation is the initial step of a larger
project described earlier -- a Foucauldian analysis of the production of danger which
would investigate how representations of terrorism work themselves out in practice by
looking at how power becomes localized and diffused. In this study, I have concentrated
on the production of danger within official discourses. Future trajectories for research
could examine popular representations of terrorism such as everyday representations of
"terrorism" by people as they go about their daily lives, by the media and in popular
culture. How do they use the language of "terrorism"? Who do they apply it to? The
answers to these questions would be valuable in noting how self/other relations are
constituted at popular levels. Other analyses could focus on how "terrorism" is used in
popular culture such as films and TV shows about terrorism. US television, for example, has shows such as 24, Sleeper Cell, Homeland Security and the new (starting in Fall
2009) The Wanted, all of which have various depictions of "terrorist" others and of
633 Discussions with Jacob Stump led to this insight (and to a forthcoming presentation for ISA 2010 on the differences between "large C" and "small c" Critical and the need for further methodological clarification amongst terrorism scholars). 339
counterterronst. practices. . 634
Intertextuality can also be examined as further study on the language of terrorism is conducted in areas where the concept "terrorism" was not commonly used prior to a certain period. While Nepal is an example of this, my focus in this dissertation remained on the official articulations of danger. Research conducted during December 2008 when I was in Nepal indicated the term "terrorism" to describe the Maoists was not popularized amongst the people during the 2001-2006 period, despite being commonly used in official accounts and official media.635 Instead, supporters of the Maoists were called
"Maobadi" and the term "Maobadi" was used to refer to a range of crimes, public disturbances and so on, especially amongst Kathmandu's population. Further research on such popular meaning-making practices could provide useful information on how self/other constitutions occurred at non-official levels and how "terrorism" is variably used when describing events and peoples.
Popular usage of "terrorism" is not limited to its use in contexts where the term is relatively new. For example, a Washington Post article of August 11, 2009636 quoted a woman who participates in the "Book Crossing" program. She used the term "terrorist" to
634 See Brian Stelter, "Chasing Terrorists (and TV Ratings)'', New York Times, July 13, 2009 for concerns about government-television links in The Wanted. Full story here: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/14/arts/television/14want.html? r=l (accessed July 15, 2009). Sleeper Cell was a miniseries whose first season tagline was "Friends. Neighbors. Husbands. Terrorists'', implying terrorists could be anywhere (and everywhere). Homeland Security USA is described as a documentary and followed Homeland Security officials around the US as they performed their tasks. It was based on the Australian show Border Security but the US version was cancelled after one season. The Australian show continues as of the time of writing (August 2009).
635 Data was collected from informal interviews with some NGO officials as well as with shopkeepers and local people in the "New Road" area of Kathmandu in December 2008.
636 Christina Ianzito, "In This Club, Books Free to a Good Roam," Washington Post, August 11, 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/101AR2009081002840.html (accessed August 11, 2009). 340
describe a book wrapped in a plastic bag (to be left on the Metro).637 A few intriguing things are brought up in this concise example: one, Book Crossing is an online site which facilitates the exchange of used books amongst strangers. People leave books in public places for other people to pick up. It seems one of the least likely contexts where the term
"terrorism" would be applicable. Two, it is the packaged book in the Metro that the woman links with "terrorism". She routinely leaves wrapped up books elsewhere (in the
Zoo, in the Mall) and does not consider these practices "terrorist". Finally, an unattended package on the Metro is considered possibly "terrorist" to the extent that an individual involved in the (altruistic, social) practice of leaving used books for strangers, uses
"terrorist" as a commonplace description. Such usages could be the a topic for examining the type of subjects ("citizens", "anti-terrorist") that are formed in today's world. At the same time, such research would draw attention to the ways in which popular and official texts refer to and contradict each other.
Yet another investigation of intertextuality of the "terrorist" discourse could be to analyze the rhetoric of those labeled "terrorist" in order to note their representations of danger. In doing so, the proliferation (or otherwise) of rhetorical commonplaces within particular societies and across contexts as well as (possibly) common strategies of representation may be noted. While Chapters 4 and 5 referred to IRA and Maoist representations of danger, these were not the main focus of my study and were only
637 Her quote was actually about why she did not wrap a book that she left in the Metro. The article mentions, "On the train she usually leaves them sans plastic bag, since there's no need for weatherproofing indoors and 'a plastic bag seems a little more terrorist"' (Ianzito, quotation in the original). It is also mentioned that the woman lives on a (United States) air force base, making her use of the term "terrorism" less unusual. Her residence, however, does not negate the points I am trying to make about the ubiquity of"tenorism" today as well as its link with specific practices (leaving a package on the Metro) but not with others (leaving a package on a bench in the Zoo). 341
referred to as they were referred to in official accounts. For Northern Ireland and the
IRA, there are extensive primary sources of IRA (and Sinn Fein) views on events and
there exists research on the IRA and on other paramilitary organizations. For Nepal, data
is scarcer but there are online resources, especially YouTube videos of Maoist training
exercises and even of Maoist military actions against security forces. These and other
related representations by "terrorists" would be useful sources for tracing out how
self/other formulations were produced within "terrorist" representations of danger and
how this related to the state's use of "terrorism".
The final direction the study of terrorism as discourse calls for is for further
analysis of non-linear causality. As indicated earlier in this chapter and in Chapters 2 and
3, most poststructuralist research disavows causality, instead referring to co-constitution
or combinability. But, there is no reason to discount causality when doing discourse
analytical work. While underscoring continuity and change, a poststructural discourse
analysis of terrorism also calls attention to a different notion of causality. Such research
provides opportunities to reconceptualize causality itself to something where the
discursive formation allows for a range of identities and policies to be produced.638 It
touches upon how linguistic strategies can recur in different contexts but, at the same
time, the outcomes they produce in terms of identities vary depending on the local
conditions and how they play out in local settings.
These strategies of representation can be considered causal in the sense they recur in both contexts during the constitution of state and terrorist identities. This, too, draws
638 Also called "discursive repertoire" or "security imaginary" throughout this dissertation. P. Jackson calls it "rhetorical topography" (P. Jackson, Civilizing, 46-72) . 342
attention to connections and disruptions in state/other identity-formation.639 P. Jackson claims "rhetorical commonplaces and the legitimation processes involving them can certainly be understood as causal, to the extent that the overall 'shape' of the discursive environment contributes to the formulation of policy initiatives."640 The strategies of constitution which my research focused on were stake management and establishing authority and these, in discourse analytical terms, helped make conditions of possibility possible.
The point I am making here is that linguistic strategies are identifiable and replicable in different settings. As Potter points out when discussing the representational process, "although the details of what is talked about may be endlessly varied, the sorts of procedures for constructing and managing descriptions may be much more regular, and therefore, tractable in analysis."641 Antaki, et al followed up on this as they wrote,
" ... [discourse] analysis should seek to show how established discursive devices are used, in new sets of material, to manage the speakers' interactional business ... " 642It is this part of the process-that of showing how "established discursive devices" are combining and re-combining in different contexts as descriptions of "terrorist threats" occur within official representations that I will delineate. Thus, how concepts are used, how they link up and differentiate from self/others matter in the outcome produced. Davies and Harre
639 For more on non-linear causality, see P. Jackson, Civilizing, 32-37; 40-45 and his discussion on legitimation, 17-27. See also McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 26-28, 310-11; Tilly, Mechanisms.
640 P. Jackson, Civilizing, 41.
641 Potter, Representing, 112.
642 Antaki, et al. 343
call this the "constitutive force of discursive practices."643 At the same time, examining changes in subject positionings, as the IRA become partners in peace, as the Maoists enter politics, as other groups are linked with "terrorist" allows for tracing out how stake changes and how (different) ways of establishing authority are undertaken. It allows for understanding how state identity is always challenged and performatively reproduced partly in and through the usage of the language of "terrorism".
On a related note, these common strategies combine with local meanings while producing state/other identities. The example of the use of "terrorism" in Nepal, as outlined in Chapter 5, indicates how the Maoists became represented as "terrorist" in official discourses from December 2001. This allowed for a shift in normalization from
Maoists as dissatisfied groups fighting for social and political rights to Maoists as
"terrorists". It became normal for officials to describe the Maoists as "terrorist". Here, the strategy of establishing authority in official discourses worked to position the Maoist
'terrorists' as acting against the 'democratic' state. However, in allying themselves to the
Maoists in November 2005, the Seven Party Alliance (SP A) linked itself (and, relatedly, the Maoists) to 'democracy', thus utilizing a different form of establishment of authority i.e. that it was the opposition protesters who were 'democratic', not the state. Here, the ways in which strategies play out do not just differ according to context but also according to time periods within the same context.
Thus, further research on the discourses of terrorism has numerous directions to proceed in. Even if only concentrating on the official level, there is also the potential (and need) for extending this study to other states' use of "terrorism" as well as to other ways
643 Davies and Harre. 344
of representing and communicating danger. If, as Campbell writes, foreign policy is "an integral part of the discourses of danger that serve to discipline the state,"644 then the state is the outcome or the effect of a range of practices especially those in which it determines and communicates threats to its existence. Hansen writes, "the strength of the national security discourse is that while it draws upon the politically powerful identity of the national community it also simultaneously masks its specific, historical, and thus contestable nature by constructing security as an objective, dehistoricized demand."645
One may say the same about terrorism (or any other form of threat). By opening up avenues for researching terrorism not as an objective, dehistoricized demand to be responded to, nor as an intrinsic feature of a group or individual but as a rhetorical commonplace used by various actors in different settings, it becomes possible to research the constitution and change of the 'terrorist' threat through time while questioning the ways in which it has been understood today.
644 Campbell, Writing, 51.
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