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NSA's Efforts to Secure Private-Sector Telecommunications Infrastructure
Under the Radar: NSA’s Efforts to Secure Private-Sector Telecommunications Infrastructure Susan Landau* INTRODUCTION When Google discovered that intruders were accessing certain Gmail ac- counts and stealing intellectual property,1 the company turned to the National Security Agency (NSA) for help in securing its systems. For a company that had faced accusations of violating user privacy, to ask for help from the agency that had been wiretapping Americans without warrants appeared decidedly odd, and Google came under a great deal of criticism. Google had approached a number of federal agencies for help on its problem; press reports focused on the company’s approach to the NSA. Google’s was the sensible approach. Not only was NSA the sole government agency with the necessary expertise to aid the company after its systems had been exploited, it was also the right agency to be doing so. That seems especially ironic in light of the recent revelations by Edward Snowden over the extent of NSA surveillance, including, apparently, Google inter-data-center communications.2 The NSA has always had two functions: the well-known one of signals intelligence, known in the trade as SIGINT, and the lesser known one of communications security or COMSEC. The former became the subject of novels, histories of the agency, and legend. The latter has garnered much less attention. One example of the myriad one could pick is David Kahn’s seminal book on cryptography, The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet.3 It devotes fifty pages to NSA and SIGINT and only ten pages to NSA and COMSEC. -
Canada's Communications Security Establishment: from Cold War to Globalization
CANADA’S COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT: FROM COLD WAR TO GLOBALISATION Martin Rudner OCCASIONAL PAPER No 22 – 2000 CANADA’S COMMUNICATION SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT: FROM COLD WAR TO GLOBALISATION Martin Rudner OCCASIONAL PAPER No 22 – 2000 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Carleton University 1125 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6 Telephone: 613-520-6655 Fax: 613-520-2889 www.carleton.ca/npsia This series is published by the Centre for Security and Defence Studies at the School and supported by a grant from the Security Defence Forum of the Department of National Defence. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent the views of the School or the Department of National Defence. TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ii Abbreviations iv INTRODUCTION 1 THE BEGINNINGS OF CANADIAN SIGINT 2 CANADA’S SIGINT COLLECTION EFFORT 6 COLD WAR SIGINT OPERATIONS 8 CANADA AND THE UKUSA AGREEMENT 11 SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS AND ECHELON 13 SIGINT TECHNOLOGY ACCESS AND SHARING 16 CANADA’S POST-COLD WAR SIGINT AGENDA 18 THE ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE CONUNDRUM 22 FUTURE CHALLENGES 25 Notes 34 About the Author 41 LIST OF OCCASIONAL PAPERS 42 i ABSTRACT The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) is Canada’s largest, best funded and most highly secretive intelligence agency, and is the main provider of foreign intelligence to the Canadian government. CSE collects, analyses and reports on signals intelligence (SIGINT) derived from interceptions of foreign electronic communications, radio, radar, telemetry, and other electromagnetic emissions. In fulfilment of its foreign intelligence function, CSE collaborates closely in a special SIGINT sharing arrangement with the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand known as UKUSA. -
TB 380-41 Final!
klg DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION STATEMENT The technical or operational information in this manual is required solely for official use; therefore, distribution is authorized to U.S. Government agencies only. This determination was made on 1 January 1993. For further information, see page i of this document. WARNING: Military or civilian personnel who misuse or disclose to unauthorized persons information marked For Official Use Only (FOUO) may be subject to administrative sanctions brought under UCMJ Article 92, or in accor- dance with AR 690-700, Chapter 751, Table 1-1. Elec- tronic copies made of any publication herein must (1) bear the Four Official Use Only marking, and (2) include this WARNING in its entirety. Protective marking is in accordance with paragraph 3-200, Exemption 3a, AR 25-55. Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. Headquarters, Department of the Army Date of this Publication is 1 August 2003. Current as of 1 July 2003. This bulletin supersedes TB 380-41, October 1994 and rescinds the use of DA Forms 2008 and 2009. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TB 380-41 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION STATEMENT OUTSIDE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT RELEASE: Requests from outside the U.S. Government for release of this publication under the Foreign Military Sales Program must be made to Commander, U.S. Army Security Assistance Center, ATTN: AMSAC-MI/I, 5002 Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, VA 22333-0001. Request from outside the U.S. Government for release of this publication under the Freedom of Information Act must be made to the Director, Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM), Communications Security Logistics Activity (CSLA) at ATTN: SELCL-ID-P3, U.S. -
KY-58 (Vinson)
KY-58 (Vinson) The KY-57/58 is a member of the VINSON family. The VINSON family consists of wideband secure voice (WBSV) units developed by the National Security Agency to provide line of sight half-duplex voice and data encryption at 16 Kbps. The KY-57/58 provides security for AM/FM, VHF, UHF, half-duplex PTT combat net radios and tactical wireline systems when used with the HYX-57. Also used by non-tactical users for high-level communications in the local wideband telephone networks and wideband satellite terminals. The KY-57 is the manpack/vehicular model and the KY-58 is the airborne/shipborne version. The KY-57/58 is certified to pass data up to TOP SECRET and accepts key from the family of Common Fill Devices and also incorporates remote keying. KY-57/58 production was completed in 1993. No further production is planned. KY-58 photo by Tim Tyler Tim Tyler comments."The photo above depicts the KY-58 unit inside a USCG HH-65C 'Dolphin' helicopter taken in September 2008. It is currently configured just for use on their 225-400MHz aircraft band radio. Supposedly, they're in the process of upgrading the HH-65 helos into an MH-65 (Special Ops capable) configuration which will have APCO P-25 compliant radios (with AES crypto, for talking to other DHS agencies) as well as ANDVT / KY-100 type crypto for communicating with the military-side of USCG ops". The photo above depicts a KY-58 RCU installation in an A-10 attack aircraft. -
Corp Bro Inside Layout
Message from the Director, NSA The National Security Agency’s rich legacy of cryptologic success serves not only as a reminder of our past triumphs, but also as an inspiration for our future. Harry Truman, the man responsible for signing the legislation that brought our Agency into existence, was once quoted as saying, “There is nothing new in the world except the history you do not know.” Like all truisms, it is only partially accurate. Each generation of Americans must at some point deal with unforeseen problems and issues that transcend the status quo. Most would agree that the challenges faced by NSA in today’s war against terrorism are far different from those of World War II, Vietnam, or Desert Storm. Even so, President Truman was correct in his assertion that there is much to be learned from the past. The history of the National Security Agency has in many respects been based on and characterized by feats of intellectual brilliance. Pioneers like William Friedman, Frank Rowlett, Dr. Louis Tordella, and Agnes Meyer Driscoll, to name but a few, were able to build on past successes and do whatever was necessary to meet the challenges of their time. We should not forget, however, that NSA’s success is due not just to the efforts of the well- known legends of the cryptologic past, but also to the dedicated work of thousands of men and women whose names will never be noted in any history book. History tells us that both genius and hard work are required to ensure success. -
Using PSTN Encryption HC-2203 Over BGAN Version 1 3 September 2009
Using PSTN Encryption HC-2203 over BGAN Version 1 3 September 2009 inmarsat.com/bgan Whilst the information has been prepared by Inmarsat in good faith, and all reasonable efforts have been made to ensure its accuracy, Inmarsat makes no warranty or representation as to the accuracy, completeness or fitness for purpose or use of the information. Inmarsat shall not be liable for any loss or damage of any kind, including indirect or consequential loss, arising from use of the information and all warranties and conditions, whether express or implied by statute, common law or otherwise, are hereby excluded to the extent permitted by English law. INMARSAT is a trademark of the International Mobile Satellite Organisation, Inmarsat LOGO is a trademark of Inmarsat (IP) Company Limited. Both trademarks are licensed to Inmarsat Global Limited. © Inmarsat Global Limited 2009. All rights reserved. Contents 1 Overview 1 1.1 PSTN encryption explained 1 2 Typical users 1 3 Key features 1 4 Benefits to BGAN users 1 5 Setting up 1 5.1 Setting up HC-2203 PSTN Encryption 1 5.2 About your BGAN SIM card subscription 1 5.3 Setting up the EXPLORER 500/527 and EXPLORER 700 1 5.4 Setting up the Hughes 9201 or Hughes 9250 terminal 1 6 Technical specifications 1 7 General data 1 8 Further details and support 1 1 Overview Inmarsat BGAN offers the same telephony services as its predecessor system GAN, namely Standard Voice (compressed), ISDN Data and the Audio 3.1kHz service which can be used for fax and data communication. -
A History of U.S. Communications Security (U)
A HISTORY OF U.S. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (U) THE DAVID G. BOAK LECTURES VOLUME II NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755 The information contained in this publication will not be disclosed to foreign nationals or their representatives without express approval of the DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. Approval shall refer specifically to this publication or to specific information contained herein. JULY 1981 CLASSIFIED BY NSA/CSSM 123-2 REVIEW ON 1 JULY 2001 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREI6N NATIONALS SECRET HA~mLE YIA COMINT CIIA~HJELS O~JLY ORIGINAL (Reverse Blank) ---------- • UNCLASSIFIED • TABLE OF CONTENTS SUBJECT PAGE NO INTRODUCTION _______ - ____ - __ -- ___ -- __ -- ___ -- __ -- ___ -- __ -- __ --- __ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ iii • POSTSCRIPT ON SURPRISE _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I OPSEC--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS ___ -------- --- ___ ---- _______________ ---- _ --- _ ----- _ 7 THREAT IN ASCENDANCY _________________________________ - ___ - - _ -- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 9 • LPI _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I I SARK-SOME CAUTIONARY HISTORY __ --- _____________ ---- ________ --- ____ ----- _ _ 13 THE CRYPTO-IGNITION KEY __________ --- __ -- _________ - ---- ___ -- ___ - ____ - __ -- _ _ _ 15 • PCSM _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
AR 380-40 Safeguarding and Controlling Communications
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Army Regulation 380–40 Security Safeguarding and Controlling Communications Security Material Distribution Restriction Statement. This publication contains technical or operational information that is for official Government use only. Distribution is limited to Government agencies or their contractors. Requests from outside the Government for release of this publication under the Freedom of Information Act will be referred to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, (IACSF–FI), Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755–5995. Requests from outside of the Government for release of this publication under the Foreign Military Sales program must be made to the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2 (DAMI–CDS), 1000 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310–1000. Destruction Notice. Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. Rapid Action Revision (RAR) Issue Date: 24 April 2013 Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC 9 July 2012 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SUMMARY of CHANGE AR 380–40 Safeguarding and Controlling Communications Security Material This rapid action revision, dated 24 April 2013- o Updates responsibilities for Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command; Commanders, Army commands, Army service component commands, and direct reporting units; command security officers; commanders at all levels; and individual users (paras 1-8, 1-11, 1-12, 1-13, and 1-16). o Provides expanded policy and guidance for administering the Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph Program in support of the Department of the Army Cryptographic Access Program (chap 7). o Requires use of the U.S. -
(U) a History of Secure Voice Codin~: Insights Drawn from the Career of One of Tile Earliest Practitioners of the Art of Speech Coding JOSEPH P
DOCID: 3860926 UNCLASSIFIED Cryptologic Quarter1y (U) A History of Secure Voice Codin~: Insights Drawn from the Career of One of tile Earliest Practitioners of the Art of Speech Coding JOSEPH P. CAMPBELL, JR., and RICHARD A. DEAN Editor's Note: This artrde Is basecl on one publlshecl In Dlgittl Signal Processing, July 1993, wfth permission ofthe authors. The history of speech coding is closely tied to tion of PCM. A "Buzz" /"Hiss" generator was used the career of Tom Tremain. He joined the as an exciter for the vocoder corresponding to the National Security Agency i~ 1959 as an Air Force voiced/unvoiced attribute of each 20-ms speech lieutenant assigned to duty at the Agency. Llttle segment. Balance of the "Buzz" /"Hiss" generator, did he know then that this assignment would or voicing, represented a major factor in the qual shape his career as well as' the future of speech ity of the speech. Early practitioners of speech coding. 1 coders, like Tom, can still be found today speak I . ing"Aaahhh" /"Sshhhhh" into voice coders to test Thomas E. Tremain was the U.S. govern- this balance. ment's senior speech scientist. He was a recog nized leader and an expert in speech science. From the time of SIGSALY until Tom arrived 1 Tom's work spanned five dife3des of state-of-the- at NSA, several generations of voice coders had art modem and speech co<;Iing innovations that been developed in conjunction with Bell Labs. are the basis of virtually e~ery U.S. and NATO The K0-6 voice coder, developed in 1949 and modem and speech coding standard. -
Encryption of Voice, Data and Video (Vdv) for Secure Terrestrial and Satellite Communications
Dimov Stojce Ilcev / International Journal of New Technologies in Science and Engineering Vol. 2, Issue. 4,October 2015, ISSN 2349-0780 ENCRYPTION OF VOICE, DATA AND VIDEO (VDV) FOR SECURE TERRESTRIAL AND SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS Stojce Dimov Ilcev Durban University of Technology (DUT), 133 Bencorrum, 183 Prince Street, Durban, South Africa Abstract: This paper introduces the Voice, Data and Video (VDV) encryption as protection shield for secure terrestrial and satellite communication systems deploying special hardware and software scrambling solutions against government or private surveillance and spying. The encryption covers fixed, personal and mobile (cellular) solutions including computer, fax and telex messaging modes for commercial and military applications. Keywords: Encryption, VDV/NSA, DES/AES, RSA/IBE I. INTRODUCTION Secure communication is when two entities are communicating and do not want a third party to listen in or to communicate in a way not susceptible to eavesdropping or interception. It includes means by which people can share mutual information with varying degrees of certainty that third parties cannot intercept what was said, heard, sent and saw. Other than spoken face-to-face communication with no possible eavesdropper, it is probably safe to say that no communication is guaranteed secure in this sense, although practical obstacles such as legislation, resources, technical issues (interception and encryption), and the sheer volume of communication serve to limit surveillance. In cryptography, encryption is the process of encoding voice (speech and fax), data (messages or text) and video (TV, videoconference and images) in such a way that only authorized parties can listen, read or see it properly. Encryption does not of itself prevent interception, but denies the speech, message and image content to the interceptor. -
Model 90Si Secure Fax Gateway User's Guide
Model 90si Secure Fax Gateway User's Guide GateWay Fax Systems, Inc. Secure Fax Products Virginia, USA Tel: 804-796-1900 Toll-Free: 877-951-9800 Fax: 804-796-1116 E-Mail: [email protected] Web: www.gwfs.com Help Line: 877-951-9814 Revision 4.7 3/27/2013 GateWay Fax Systems, inc. Model 90si Secure Fax Gateway User's Guide 90si Quick Reference Guide Your 90si comes from the factory set for the Secure Only mode, whereby the commercial (COTS) fax connects to the 90si’s FAX jack (the other two phone jacks remain empty) and the 90si’s RS-232 Data cable connects to the Secure Data port of your crypto device. In this configuration the COTS fax can only be used for classified transac- tions with the crypto in Secure Data Mode. Connecting the COTS fax, 90si and Crypto This diagram shows the default (and recommended) factory configuration for the 90si. Shown are the rear panel of the 90si, Secure Telephone, Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) fax and the outside telepone line connection. Although there are other 90si configurations, this one will work right out of the box. See Section 2.3, Choose a Configuration, for others. 90si Secure Fax Gateway Rear Panel FAX Commercial-Off-The-Shelf Fax Machine 5VDC Power LINE (Set to Auto-Answer on 1 Ring) Supply "Red" Data Port "Secure" Secure Telephone PSTN Phone Line / Crypto (Set to Async 9.6kbps) Telephone Wall Jack Transmitting a Secure Fax Step Procedure 1. Place a call on your secure telephone / crypto. 2. Place it in secure data mode and set the handset on the table 3. -
Going Dark: Impact to Intelligence and Law Enforcement and Threat Mitigation
GOING DARK: IMPACT TO INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THREAT MITIGATION Bonnie Mitchell Krystle Kaul G. S. McNamara Michelle Tucker Jacqueline Hicks Colin Bliss Rhonda Ober Danell Castro Amber Wells Catalina Reguerin Cindy Green-Ortiz Ken Stavinoha ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to first thank the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) for its generous funding and support for our study and learning journey to the DEFCON hacking conference. We are also very grateful to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for its support during the duration of the program. We could not have completed this study without the unwavering support and dedication of Ms. Bonnie Mitchell, ODNI Deputy National Intelligence Manager for the Western Hemisphere and the Homeland, our devoted Team Champion who steered us throughout this study and helped turn an idea into a product. We would like to acknowledge and thank each member of our public-private sector working group for their tireless efforts from around the U.S., which includes Krystle Kaul, G. S. McNamara, Michelle Tucker, Jacqueline Hicks, Colin Bliss, Rhonda Ober, Danell Castro, Amber Wells, Catalina Reguerin, Cindy Green- Ortiz and Ken Stavinoha. We are very thankful for all the unique insight we received from interviewees who contributed to this report by educating our group on the many aspects of ‘going dark,’ and we take full responsibility for any and all errors of fact or interpretation implied or explicit in this paper. Our interviewees include the Village sponsors at DEF CON, private sector industry experts and government officials. We are thankful for the interesting and diverse perspectives particularly from senior government officials and private sector experts.