DOCSLIB.ORG

Democracy Is a Good Thing Joseph Fewsmith

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Democracy Is a Good Thing Joseph Fewsmith Fewsmith, China Leadership Monitor, No. 22 Democracy Is a Good Thing Joseph Fewsmith Over the past several months there has been a vigorous discussion about democracy in China. Some of this discussion has been undertaken by well- connected, policy-oriented intellectuals, while other parts of the discussion have been conducted by liberal intellectuals who appear to have little policy impact. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, including Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, has, in general terms, endorsed continuing to implement various forms of “inner-party democracy.” Although such calls should be welcomed, they come at an odd time—just as the change of leading cadres at the local levels has come to a conclusion. The discussion on democracy may promote more experimentation at the local level, but the Party center has been firm on the importance of “democratic centralism” and “scientific socialism”—not democratic socialism. Party congresses are first and foremost about personnel arrangements: who gets promoted and who does not. Without a delicate combination of supporters and balancing of interests, Party leaders can find it difficult to implement their preferred policies. But Party congresses also make statements about political priorities. The general secretary of the Party always gives a “political report” that reflects the balance of opinion within the top leadership on the important issues of the day but also—and importantly—underscores where the general secretary stands. Thus, it was important in 1997 that Jiang Zemin, then subject to strong pressure from the left wing of the Party, strongly affirmed Deng Xiaoping’s approach to reform. Although Party congresses are quinquennial affairs outlining the Party’s approach, that “consensus” often does not extend the five years until the next Party congress. The 12th Party Congress in 1982 endorsed Chen Yun’s conservative views on the relationship between planning and markets, but by the time Party delegates convened again, five years later, Zhao Ziyang had led the Party away from planning. Most striking, of course, was the 13th Party Congress’s endorsement of political structural reform in 1987, which disintegrated in the repression following Tiananmen in 1989. Nevertheless, congresses give outside analysts a glimpse into the balance of forces and opinion within the Party and indicate the way the Party is responding to the important issues of the day. In the run-up to any Party congress, there is always a stream of commentary that appears in the press, intended to foreshadow where the leadership stands on important issues but also to lobby the political leadership to move more in one direction or another. It is in this context that the discussion on democracy over the past few months has been particularly interesting. For the first four years of Hu Jintao’s term, we have seen much discussion of party building, addressing the needs of those left behind in the course of 1 Fewsmith, China Leadership Monitor, No. 22 economic development, balancing economic development with environmental protection, and other topics, but there has relatively little discussion of democracy except in the various specialized Party journals that have discussed inner-Party and consultative democracy. Since the end of last year, however, this discussion has broadened and attracted much attention—and considerable opposition. Careful examination of this discussion suggests that there are different strands in the discussion, some of which are likely to receive official backing at the congress and others that will clearly will not. Most interesting is the fact that these discussions have their origins in statements made by Hu Jintao. Perhaps the discussions on democracy should be traced back to Hu Jintao’s speech to the report meeting called to launch Jiang Zemin’s Selected Works in August 2006. After praising Jiang’s work effusively, Hu goes on to discuss how theoretical innovations since the 16th Party Congress (in other words, since Jiang retired) have built on and developed the Three Represents and other contributions Jiang made. In the course of this discussion, Hu says, “We will continue to . actively and yet prudently advance reform of the political system; perfect the democratic system; enrich the forms of democracy; build a socialist country ruled by law; promote socialist democracy in the system, standards, and procedures; expand citizens’ orderly political participation; and guarantee the people’s conduct of democratic elections, democratic decision-making, democratic management, and democratic supervision of the law.”1 Four months later, in December 2006, Hu presided over a collective study session of the Politburo at which two well-known experts on local government—Xu Yong, a professor at Huazhong University, and Zhao Shukai, a researcher at the State Council Development Research Center—discussed issues of rural governance. Hu Jintao was reported as saying, “In developing socialist grassroots democratic politics, it is of utmost importance to guarantee the masses of people directly exercise their democratic rights to manage grassroots public affairs and public welfare undertakings and practice democratic supervision over cadres according to law.”2 Particularly this comment, which went unreported in the world press at the time (with the exception of the Indian press, which was convinced that Hu had been influenced by the Indian practice of democracy during his recent state visit), seems to have created an atmosphere that spurred a wider-ranging discussion. Democracy Is a Good Thing In late December, Yu Keping, deputy director of the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau and head of the Center for Chinese Government Innovations at Beijing University, published an article, “Democracy Is a Good Thing,” in the paper of the Central Party School. The boldness of Yu’s topic, the article’s publication in such an important paper, and Yu’s reputation as an influential government advisor all attracted much attention. Yu’s short article was surprisingly blunt. Yu states flatly that “for some 2 Fewsmith, China Leadership Monitor, No. 22 officials, who care more about their self-interest, democracy is not a good thing,” and he went on to declare that “among all political systems that have been invented and practiced by humankind so far, democracy is the one having the fewest defects.” In making his case for democracy, Yu cites Hu Jintao’s “recent” statement that “without democracy, there will be no democratization.” It is not clear when Hu made this statement, but it is evident that Yu takes it as permission to discuss democratization. Moreover, Yu defends democracy not on utilitarian grounds but in terms of values. As he puts it, “Even if people have the best food, clothing, housing, and transportation, but they have no democratic rights, then people still do not have complete human dignity.” Such claims are rarely made, at least openly. Yu was not casting in his lot with China’s political dissidents. On the contrary, in keeping with his long-standing belief in “incremental democracy,”3 Yu was advocating incremental reform of China’s political system to increase the democratic quotient. As he put it, “practicing democracy without regard to the necessary conditions may cause disastrous consequences for the state and the people.” For many years, Yu has headed a program that identifies “innovation” in local government and rewards the innovators, and his bold statement that “democracy is a good thing” is in keeping with his belief that China’s political system can be slowly pushed in a more democratic direction. Gaining far less attention was another Yu Keping article, also in Study Times, the previous week. In that article, Yu discusses the importance of citizen participation, which he sees as important to enhancing the stability of the society, restraining the abuse of power, and bringing about better policy. He calls for the government to open up more channels for citizen participation by establishing specific laws and mechanisms that would regulate their participation.4 Yu’s article obviously builds on calls by Hu Jintao and contained in Party resolutions to increase citizen participation over time. Hong Kong’s Ta Kung Pao highlighted the importance of Yu, calling him a “mastermind” of the central leadership who rarely gives interviews because of his “special identity.” Influence is notoriously difficult in China, and it seems difficult to call Yu (or perhaps anyone else) a “mastermind,” but there is little doubt that Yu is well connected in Beijing.5 Wen Jiabao on Democracy In late February, shortly before the National People’s Congress was convened, Premier Wen Jiabao published an article in People’s Daily, in which he said that the “socialist system and democratic politics are not mutually exclusive” and that it is “entirely possible for us to build a democratic country with the rule of law under socialist conditions.”6 Elaborating on his views on democracy at his press conference at the conclusion of the NPC, Wen declared that “socialist democracy is, in the final analysis, to let the people be the masters of the country.” He also said that political reform, “with 3 Fewsmith, China Leadership Monitor, No. 22 developing democratic politics as the goal,” was one of the two major reforms China was undertaking, the other being economic reform.7 Wang Changjiang on Inner-Party Democracy In March, Wang Changjiang, head of the Party Building Section at the Central Party School, published an article in Theoretical Trends, which was subsequently republished in Beijing Ribao, on his understanding of democracy. Wang starts by criticizing the oft- heard view that the “quality” (suzhi) of the Chinese people is insufficient to support democratic politics. He points out that in 1937, when the quality of the Chinese people was far less than it is today, the Party promulgated the “Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia Election Regulations” which not only called for elections but allowed those who were illiterate (most of the population) to vote with beans.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • New China and Its Qiaowu: the Political Economy of Overseas Chinese Policy in the People’S Republic of China, 1949–1959
    1 The London School of Economics and Political Science New China and its Qiaowu: The Political Economy of Overseas Chinese policy in the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1959 Jin Li Lim A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, September 2016. 2 Declaration: I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 98,700 words. 3 Abstract: This thesis examines qiaowu [Overseas Chinese affairs] policies during the PRC’s first decade, and it argues that the CCP-controlled party-state’s approach to the governance of the huaqiao [Overseas Chinese] and their affairs was fundamentally a political economy. This was at base, a function of perceived huaqiao economic utility, especially for what their remittances offered to China’s foreign reserves, and hence the party-state’s qiaowu approach was a political practice to secure that economic utility.
    [Show full text]
  • Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
    3/2006 Data Supplement PR China Hong Kong SAR Macau SAR Taiwan CHINA aktuell Journal of Current Chinese Affairs Data Supplement People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: Institute of Asian Affairs Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax:(040)4107945 Contributors: Uwe Kotzel Dr. Liu Jen-Kai Christine Reinking Dr. Günter Schucher Dr. Margot Schüller Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC LIU JEN-KAI 3 The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC LIU JEN-KAI 22 Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership LIU JEN-KAI 27 PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries LIU JEN-KAI 30 PRC Laws and Regulations LIU JEN-KAI 34 Hong Kong SAR Political Data LIU JEN-KAI 36 Macau SAR Political Data LIU JEN-KAI 39 Taiwan Political Data LIU JEN-KAI 41 Bibliography of Articles on the PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, and on Taiwan UWE KOTZEL / LIU JEN-KAI / CHRISTINE REINKING / GÜNTER SCHUCHER 43 CHINA aktuell Data Supplement - 3 - 3/2006 Dep.Dir.: CHINESE COMMUNIST Li Jianhua 03/07 PARTY Li Zhiyong 05/07 The Main National Ouyang Song 05/08 Shen Yueyue (f) CCa 03/01 Leadership of the Sun Xiaoqun 00/08 Wang Dongming 02/10 CCP CC General Secretary Zhang Bolin (exec.) 98/03 PRC Hu Jintao 02/11 Zhao Hongzhu (exec.) 00/10 Zhao Zongnai 00/10 Liu Jen-Kai POLITBURO Sec.-Gen.: Li Zhiyong 01/03 Standing Committee Members Propaganda (Publicity) Department Hu Jintao 92/10 Dir.: Liu Yunshan PBm CCSm 02/10 Huang Ju 02/11
    [Show full text]
  • 5 China Dreaming
    5 China Dreaming Representing the Perfect Present, Anticipating the Rosy Future Stefan Landsberger Abstract As China has developed into a relatively well-offf, increasingly urbanized nation, educating the people has become more urgent than ever. Rais- ing (human) quality (素质) has become a major concern for educators and intellectuals who see moral education as a major task of the state. The visual exhortations in public spaces aimed at moral education are dominated by dreaming about a nation that has risen and needs to be taken seriously. The visualization of these dreams resembles commercial advertising, mixing elements like the Great Wall or the Tiananmen Gate building with modern or futuristic images. This chapter focuses on posters, looking at the changes in contents and representation of government visuals in an increasingly urbanized and media-literate society. Keywords: visual propaganda; governmentality; normative propaganda; Chinese Dream; Beijing Olympics 2008 Sometimes one still encounters hand-painted faded slogans in the coun- tryside urging those working in agriculture to learn from Dazhai, or to energetically study Mao Zedong Thought. By and large, political messages and the images they use have disappeared from Chinese public spaces, in particular in urban areas. Yet, the production of these images, of what we would call propaganda, has not stopped; the government remains com- mitted to educating the people, as it has over the millennia. Compared to the fijirst three decades of the People’s Republic, the messages have shifted to moral and normative topics, and their visualization has become much more sophisticated than in the earlier periods. This is partly because they Valjakka, Minna & Wang, Meiqin (eds.), Visual Arts, Representations and Interventions in Contemporary China: Urbanized Interface.
    [Show full text]
  • Information to Users
    INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript Pas been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissenation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from anytype of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely. event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material bad to beremoved, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with smalloverlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back ofthe book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. UMI A Bell &Howell Information Company 300North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor. MI48106-1346 USA 313!761-47oo 800:521·0600 THE LIN BIAO INCIDENT: A STUDY OF EXTRA-INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY AUGUST 1995 By Qiu Jin Dissertation Committee: Stephen Uhalley, Jr., Chairperson Harry Lamley Sharon Minichiello John Stephan Roger Ames UMI Number: 9604163 OMI Microform 9604163 Copyright 1995, by OMI Company.
    [Show full text]
  • Francis Fukuyama the National Interest Summer 1989
    The End of History? Francis Fukuyama The National Interest Summer 1989 IN WATCHING the flow of events the intellectual climate of the world's over the past decade or so, it is hard to two largest communist countries, and avoid the feeling that something very the beginnings of significant reform fundamental has happened in world movements in both. But this history. The past year has seen a flood phenomenon extends beyond high of articles commemorating the end of politics and it can be seen also in the the Cold War, and the fact that "peace" ineluctable spread of consumerist seems to be breaking out in many Western culture in such diverse regions of the world. Most of these contexts as the peasants' markets and analyses lack any larger conceptual color television sets now omnipresent framework for distinguishing between throughout China, the cooperative what is essential and what is restaurants and clothing stores opened contingent or accidental in world in the past year in Moscow, the history, and are predictably Beethoven piped into Japanese superficial. If Mr. Gorbachev were department stores, and the rock music ousted from the Kremlin or a new enjoyed alike in Prague, Rangoon, and Ayatollah proclaimed the millennium Tehran. from a desolate Middle Eastern What we may be witnessing is not capital, these same commentators just the end of the Cold War, or the would scramble to announce the passing of a particular period of rebirth of a new era of conflict. postwar history, but the end of history And yet, all of these people sense as such: that is, the end point of dimly that there is some larger process mankind's ideological evolution and at work, a process that gives coherence the universalization of Western liberal and order to the daily headlines.
    [Show full text]
  • Socioterritorial Fractures in China: the Unachievable “Harmonious Society”?
    China Perspectives 2007/3 | 2007 Creating a Harmonious Society Socioterritorial Fractures in China: The Unachievable “Harmonious Society”? Guillaume Giroir Édition électronique URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/2073 DOI : 10.4000/chinaperspectives.2073 ISSN : 1996-4617 Éditeur Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine Édition imprimée Date de publication : 15 septembre 2007 ISSN : 2070-3449 Référence électronique Guillaume Giroir, « Socioterritorial Fractures in China: The Unachievable “Harmonious Society”? », China Perspectives [En ligne], 2007/3 | 2007, mis en ligne le 01 septembre 2010, consulté le 28 octobre 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/2073 ; DOI : 10.4000/ chinaperspectives.2073 © All rights reserved Special feature s e Socioterritorial Fractures v i a t c n i in China: The Unachievable e h p s c “Harmonious Society”? r e p GUILLAUME GIROIR This article offers an inventory of the social and territorial fractures in Hu Jintao’s China. It shows the unarguable but ambiguous emergence of a middle class, the successes and failures in the battle against poverty and the spectacular enrichment of a wealthy few. It asks whether the Confucian ideal of a “harmonious society,” which the authorities have been promoting since the early 2000s, is compatible with a market economy. With an eye to the future, it outlines two possible scenarios on how socioterritorial fractures in China may evolve. he need for a “more harmonious society” was raised 1978, Chinese society has effectively ceased to be founded for the first time in 2002 at the Sixteenth Congress on egalitarianism; spatial disparities are to be seen on the T of the Communist Party of China (CPC).
    [Show full text]
  • HU Jintao Hú Jǐntāo ​胡锦涛 B
    ◀ HU Die Comprehensive index starts in volume 5, page 2667. HU Jintao Hú Jǐntāo ​胡锦涛 b. 1942 President of China (2002– present) Hu Jintao is the current President of the Peo- of Guizhou Province (July 1985–November​­ 1988), and the ple’s Republic of China. During his two terms party secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region (De- in office he has faced several crises, with vary- cember 1988–January​­ 1991). Currently Hu serves as presi- ing degrees of success. His handling of the dent of the PRC, as well as general secretary of CCP’s Central Committee, and chairman of the CCP’s Military 2008 Sichuan earthquake was initially praised Affairs Committee. for his break from previous government se- Since his succession to Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao has crecy but later criticized outside China after taken an active role in developing China’s foreign rela- widespread media censorship of the event be- tions. The first developments were the introduction of came apparent. He has been very active in pro- the concepts “harmonious society” and “peaceful rise,” moting development at home and improving the latter of which was proposed in 2003 by Chairman foreign relations, notably with Taiwan. of the China Reform Forum Zheng Bijian. Peaceful rise, later termed the peaceful development path by Hu, was touted as a path of economic development that could raise “China’s population out of a state of underdevelopment” orn in Shanghai in December 1942, with ances- (Glaser & Medeiros 2007, 295) while working coopera- tral roots in Anhui Province, Hu Jintao gradu- tively with other countries to promote national security ated in 1965 from China’s Qinghua University, and world peace.
    [Show full text]
  • The Chinese Liberal Camp in Post-June 4Th China
    The Chinese Liberal Camp [/) OJ > been a transition to and consolidation of "power elite capital­ that economic development necessitated further reforms, the in Post-June 4th China ism" (quangui zibenzhuyr), in which the development of the provocative attacks on liberalism by the new left, awareness of cruellest version of capitalism is dominated by the the accelerating pace of globalisation, and the posture of Jiang ~ Communist bureaucracy, leading to phenomenal economic Zemin's leadership in respect to human rights and rule of law, OJ growth on the one hand and endemic corruption, striking as shown by the political report of the Fifteenth Party []_ social inequalities, ecological degeneration, and skilful politi­ Congress and the signing of the "International Covenant on D... cal oppression on the other. This unexpected outcome has Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" and the "International This paper is aa assessment of Chinese liberal intellectuals in the two decades following June 4th. It provides an disheartened many democracy supporters, who worry that Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."'"' analysis of the intellectual development of Chinese liberal intellectuals; their attitudes toward the party-state, China's transition is "trapped" in a "resilient authoritarian­ The core of the emerging liberal camp is a group of middle­ economic reform, and globalisation; their political endeavours; and their contributions to the project of ism" that can be maintained for the foreseeable future. (3) age scholars who can be largely identified as members of the constitutional democracy in China. However, because it has produced unmanageably acute "Cultural Revolution Generation," including Zhu Xueqin, social tensions and new social and political forces that chal­ Xu Youyu, Qin Hui, He Weifang, Liu junning, Zhang lenge the one-party dictatorship, Market-Leninism is not actu­ Boshu, Sun Liping, Zhou Qiren, Wang Dingding and iberals in contemporary China understand liberalism end to the healthy trend of politicalliberalisation inspired by ally that resilient.
    [Show full text]
  • The “China Dream” in the PRC's Propaganda Regime in the Digital
    The “China Dream” in the PRC’s Propaganda Regime in the Digital Era: Case Study of the Constitutional Debate during 2012-2013 Dr. Chin-fu Hung Department of Political Science & Institute of Political Economy National Cheng Kung University TAIWAN Abstract At such a time a new “fifth-generation” leadership, led by Xi Jinping, was installed at the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th National Congress in November 2012. The “China Dream,” put forth by the General Secretary Xi Jinping when he visited the exhibition “The Road to Revival” at China’s National Museum in Beijing in late November 2012, has ever since become his governing ideology by which his generation will achieve what is officially proclaimed as “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” In the wake of Xi’s further elaborations on “China Dream” in a keynote speech at the National People’s Congress in March 2013, forcibly propagating the “China Dream” as a leading patriotic education campaign has apparently been the core duty of the propaganda regime at all level. The official slogan－China Dream－has, however, confronted by alternative discourses both mediated in Chinese cyberspace and physical space, leaving an increased fierce conflict over the seizure of discourse rights between the Chinese propaganda government and the governed, epitomized as Netizens and elites in this work. Both the Chinese Communist Party and the public intellectuals are seizing and expanding their respective discourse power which is coined as “sovereign discourse rights” in this work. Applying the notion of “sovereign discourse rights” into the study of “China Dream” campaign, with a special reference to the controversial constitutional debate, we find it helpful to comprehend conceptually and analytically the transitions as well as dynamics between the Chinese propaganda regime and the new empowered Chinese blogosphere in this global information age.
    [Show full text]
  • Democratic Centralism and Administration in China
    This is the accepted version of the chapter published in: F Hualing, J Gillespie, P Nicholson and W Partlett (eds), Socialist Law in Socialist East Asia, Cambridge University Press (2018) Democratic Centralism and Administration in China Sarah BiddulphP0F 1 1. INTRODUCTION The decision issued by the fourth plenary session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or Party) in 2014 on Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Promoting Governing the Country According to Law (the ‘Fourth Plenum Decision’) reiterated the Party’s determination to build a ‘socialist rule of law system with Chinese characteristics’.P1F 2P What does this proclamation of the ‘socialist’ nature of China’s version of rule of law mean, if anything? Development of a notion of socialist rule of law in China has included many apparently competing and often mutually inconsistent narratives and trends. So, in searching for indicia of socialism in China’s legal system it is necessary at the outset to acknowledge that what we identify as socialist may be overlaid with other important influences, including at least China’s long history of centralised, bureaucratic governance, Maoist forms of ‘adaptive’ governanceP2F 3P and Western ideological, legal and institutional imports, outside of Marxism–Leninism. In fact, what the Chinese party-state labels ‘socialist’ has already departed from the original ideals of European socialists. This chapter does not engage in a critique of whether Chinese versions of socialism are really ‘socialist’. Instead it examines the influence on China’s legal system of democratic centralism, often attributed to Lenin, but more significantly for this book project firmly embraced by the party-state as a core element of ‘Chinese socialism’.
    [Show full text]
  • Chinese Literature in the Second Half of a Modern Century: a Critical Survey
    CHINESE LITERATURE IN THE SECOND HALF OF A MODERN CENTURY A CRITICAL SURVEY Edited by PANG-YUAN CHI and DAVID DER-WEI WANG INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS • BLOOMINGTON AND INDIANAPOLIS William Tay’s “Colonialism, the Cold War Era, and Marginal Space: The Existential Condition of Five Decades of Hong Kong Literature,” Li Tuo’s “Resistance to Modernity: Reflections on Mainland Chinese Literary Criticism in the 1980s,” and Michelle Yeh’s “Death of the Poet: Poetry and Society in Contemporary China and Taiwan” first ap- peared in the special issue “Contemporary Chinese Literature: Crossing the Bound- aries” (edited by Yvonne Chang) of Literature East and West (1995). Jeffrey Kinkley’s “A Bibliographic Survey of Publications on Chinese Literature in Translation from 1949 to 1999” first appeared in Choice (April 1994; copyright by the American Library Associ- ation). All of the essays have been revised for this volume. This book is a publication of Indiana University Press 601 North Morton Street Bloomington, IN 47404-3797 USA http://www.indiana.edu/~iupress Telephone orders 800-842-6796 Fax orders 812-855-7931 Orders by e-mail [email protected] © 2000 by David D. W. Wang All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. The Association of American University Presses’ Resolution on Permissions constitutes the only exception to this prohibition. The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences— Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.
    [Show full text]
  • Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?
    Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution? The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Perry, Elizabeth J. 2007. Studying Chinese politics: Farewell to revolution? China Journal 57:1-22. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11595641 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA STUDYING CHINESE POLITICS: FAREWELL TO REVOLUTION? Elizabeth J. Perry Nearly three decades after Mao’s death and more than fifteen years after the Tiananmen uprising, China is still a Leninist Party-state. In fact, one might well argue that the prospects for fundamental political transformation look less promising today than they did in the 1980s when leaders like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang spearheaded serious, if short-lived, efforts at political reform.1 But while political progress appears to have stalled, the Chinese economy continues to demonstrate impressive growth. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, scholarly interest in village elections and other signs of “democratization” has in recent years been somewhat eclipsed by debates about political economy: can China sustain high rates of economic growth without a clear specification of property rights, as has occurred in many formerly Communist countries? 2 Will China succumb to the scourge of crony capitalism which has hamstrung a number of This paper was originally prepared for presentation at the conference to celebrate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University (December 2005).
    [Show full text]