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THE NEW IAEA REPORT AND IRAN’S EVOLVING NUCLEAR AND MISSILE FORCES Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy November 8, 2011 [email protected] Cordesman: Iran’s Evolving Nuclear Weapons Program 11/8/11 1 Table of Contents The Warnings in the Weapons Annex to the IAEA Report of November 8, 2011..................... 4 Non-Compliance on Enrichment and Research Activity ........................................................ 4 Development of Nuclear Weapons ......................................................................................... 5 Credibility of Information ....................................................................................................... 7 Programme Management Structure ........................................................................................ 8 Nuclear Material Acquisition .................................................................................................. 9 Nuclear Components for an Explosive Device ....................................................................... 9 Detonator Development ........................................................................................................ 10 Initiation of High Explosives and Associated Experiments ................................................. 11 Hydrodynamic Experiments ................................................................................................. 12 Modeling and Calculations ................................................................................................... 13 Neutron Initiator.................................................................................................................... 13 Conducting a Test ................................................................................................................. 14 Integration into a Missile Delivery Vehicle .......................................................................... 14 Fusing, Arming and Firing System ....................................................................................... 15 The Broader Context of the Iranian Nuclear and Missile Threat .............................................. 16 Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program and its Role in US and Iranian Military Competition ........... 16 Estimating the Iranian Nuclear Threat ...................................................................................... 18 The US View of Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Efforts................................................................. 20 What Iran’s Actions and Statements Say About Its View of Ballistic Missiles ....................... 23 Iran’s Statements About Nuclear Competition: Nuclear Program ....................................... 25 Figure I.1: Estimated Range of Iranian Long-range Missile Forces ............. 28 Figure I.2: Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal ................................................... 29 Figure I.3: Iranian Rockets and Missiles ...................................................... 30 Figure I.4: Cumulative LEU Production at Natanz ...................................... 31 Figure I.5: Number of Centrifuge Cascades enriching, under vacuum, installed, or with centrifuges disconnected, January 31, 2010 ..................... 32 Figure I.6: Centrifuge Trends at Natanz ....................................................... 33 Figure I.7: ISIS Estimate of Monthly Trends at Natanz ............................... 34 Cordesman: Iran’s Evolving Nuclear Weapons Program 11/8/11 2 Figure I.8: Amount of Fissile Material Need to Build a Basic Fission......... 35 (Non-Boosted) Weapon ................................................................................ 35 Figure I.9: February 25, 2011 IAEA Report ................................................. 36 Figure I.10: Lack of Iranian Cooperation with the IAEA as of February 25, 2011............................................................................................................... 37 Figure I.11: IAEA on Possible Military Dimensions as of May 24, 2011.... 39 Figure I.12: IAEA on Natanz, May 24, 2011 ............................................... 40 Figure I.13: 20% Enrichment and Weapons Production .............................. 41 Figure I.14: IAEA on Qom (Fordow) as of May 24, 2011 ........................... 42 Figure I.15: Enrichment to 20% at Fordow .................................................. 43 Figure I.16: IAEA on Plutonium/ Heavy Water Facilities as of May 24, 2011 ....................................................................................................................... 44 Figure I.17: IAEA Concerns as of June 2011 ............................................... 45 Figure I.18: September 2, 2011 IAEA Reporting on Natanz: LEU Production and Centrifuge Levels at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) .......................... 46 Figure I.19: September 2, 2011 IAEA Reporting on Natanz: Deployment of Advanced Centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), 20 Percent Enrichment Continues ................................................................................... 47 Figure I.20: September 2, 2011 IAEA Report: Heavy Water Production .... 48 The Potential Impact of Iranian Nuclear Weapons on US and Iranian Capabilities ................ 49 US Responses to Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Efforts ............................................................ 49 US Strike Options Against Iran ........................................................................................ 50 Figure I.21: Key assets for a US strike on Iran ............................................. 55 Figure I.22: Potential US Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities ....................... 57 Figure I.23: Gulf Integrated Missile Defenses .............................................. 58 Possible US War Plans: Attacking, Delaying, Waiting Out ............................................. 59 Figure I.24: US Demonstrative, Coercive, or Deterrent Strikes ................... 60 Figure I.25: Limited US Attacks ................................................................... 61 Figure I.26: Major US Attacks on Iranian CBRN and Major Missile Targets ....................................................................................................................... 62 Figure I.27: Major US Attacks on Military and Civilian Targets ................. 64 Figure I.28: Delay and Then Strike ............................................................... 66 Figure I.29: Ride Out Iranian Proliferation................................................... 67 The Impact of Israeli-Iranian Nuclear Arms Race ................................................................ 68 Cordesman: Iran’s Evolving Nuclear Weapons Program 11/8/11 3 Potential Israeli Options for Striking Against Iran’s Nuclear Program ............................ 68 Figure I.30: Israeli Conventional Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities ........... 72 Figure I.31: Probable Israeli Strike Route .................................................... 73 FigureI.32: Low-Yield Israeli Nuclear Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities .. 74 The Critical Role of Energy in US-Iranian Military Competition ............................................ 75 Figure I.33: Estimated US Dependence on Petroleum Imports: 1990-2035 77 Figure I.34: Growing Strategic Importance of Gulf Petroleum production: 2008-2030 ..................................................................................................... 78 Implications for US Policy........................................................................................................ 80 Cordesman: Iran’s Evolving Nuclear Weapons Program 11/8/11 4 The Warnings in the Weapons Annex to the IAEA Report of November 8, 2011 Iran’s potential acquisition of nuclear weapons and the ability to arm its missiles and aircraft with such weapons represents the most serious risk that shapes US, Arab, Israeli and other international perceptions. It is an area in which the exact details of threat perceptions are particularly critical, although many key aspects of Israeli, US, and Gulf perceptions – as well as the perceptions of the decision makers in other states – are again impossible to determine at an unclassified level. The new IAEA report issued on November 8, 2011 highlights both the evident and the uncertainties involved. Reports by groups like ISIS describe what the new IAEA report says about Iran’s near term capability to manufacture nuclear weapons in detail. Some of the key point in the new IAEA report do, however, provide a broad warning about Iran’s actions and intentions: Non-Compliance on Enrichment and Research Activity Once again, Iran is failing to comply with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The IAEA report states that: The Agency is still awaiting a substantive response from Iran to Agency requests for further information in relation to announcements made by Iran concerning the construction of ten new uranium enrichment facilities, the sites for five of which, according to Iran, have been decided, and the construction of one of which was to have begun by the end of the last Iranian year (20 March 2011) or the start of this Iranian year. In August 2011, Dr. Abbasi was reported as having said that Iran did not need to build new enrichment facilities during the next two years. Iran has not provided information, as requested by the Agency in its letter of 18 August 2010, in connection with its announcement on 7 February 2010 that it possessed laser enrichment technology.
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