Joachim C. Fest. Plotting Hitler's Death: The Story of German Resistance. New York: Metropolitan Books., 1996. ix + 419 pp. $30.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8050-4213-9.
Reviewed by Nathan Stoltzfus
Published on H-Soz-u-Kult (July, 1998)
From the former East Germany to the coun‐ writes. All the numerous accounts to date have tries of the former Soviet Union, a paramount lacked a "comprehensive view" and thus have challenge in the 1990s for democracy generally -- "eroded the legacy of the German resistance." and for German unifcation specifcally -- is the Scholars, writing to "the limited number of ex‐ growth of individual courage and sense of social perts in the feld," have tended to write narrow responsibility which provide the backbone of civil accounts, lacking proper context and thus a prop‐ society. Despite a chorus of western voices calling er rendering. Fest acknowledges that "most read‐ for the growth of civil society within eastern Eu‐ ers" are "quite familiar" with the July 20, 1944 rope since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany plot, but he wants to bring attention to the fact continues to commemorate an attempted "coup that well before then, "a substantial number of d'etat" by an elitist institution as "The Resistance" Germans had come to despise Hitler and his poli‐ to the Nazi dictatorship, even though other cases cies" (2-6). Thus on the occasion of the fftieth an‐ of opposition better exemplify the civilian niversary of the conspiracy, Mr. Fest published courage of healthy democracies. "Staatsstreich: der lange Weg zum 20. Juli" Joachim Fest, the famed German journalist (translated and published in English in 1996) in and moderate conservative who has written one order "to provide a full understanding of the con‐ of the best biographies of Adolf Hitler (1973) and a spirators and their actions." book portraying Hitler's closest henchmen (1963), This is certainly a worthy goal, for as the his‐ has now written a history of the German conspir‐ torian Fritz Stern has written, "despite all the ob‐ acy to kill Hitler. The attempted assassination on jections we could possibly raise, we cannot and July 20, 1944 by groups of the elite led by an ele‐ should not withhold our admiration from these ment of the German military, had been "largely men and women [of July 20]." Fritz Stern, suppressed" in Allied countries and "never suf‐ "Dreams and Delusions: The Drama of German ciently appreciated" by the German public, Fest History" (New York: Knopf, 1987), p. 191. The fail‐ H-Net Reviews ure of internal German resistance was a tragedy, time are the most interesting ones Mr. Fest's book especially for those caught in that hideous raises, although the book is also subject to the predicament, and Mr. Fest, a respected public in‐ usual types of criticism. Can an author who claims terpreter of Germany's past, provides a masterful to present a "comprehensive view" of such com‐ synthesis of what we know. Keeping a focus on plex events remain uncriticized for not citing a the characters of resistance as much as on events, single archive? Mr. Fest sometimes cites no he places the history of the conspirators within a sources -- or no relevant ones -- in making debat‐ conventional narrative of political and military able statements, many of which aim to portray the history of the Third Reich, but begins the story of military conspirators in the best possible light. For German resistance with the rise to power of Hitler example, he denies that Count von Staufenberg and the Nazi Party. led the parade at Bamberg celebrating Hitler in Mr. Fest has succeeded admirably in reaching January 1933, although this contradicts the ac‐ out to a broad audience, and in shining more light counts of leading historians. He also states that all on a major event in Nazi and postwar history. senior ofcers "more or less felt" that Hitler was Whether he has added anything to our overall un‐ "ordinaer" -- "vulgar, hucksterish" (37). Then there derstanding of the murder plot and its signif‐ is the matter of secondary literature. Mr. Fest cance is more questionable, however. For it is not draws well on the "eulogistic" or "monumentalist" a larger context Mr. Fest gives to the story so strand of scholarship. With these conclusions he much as a context chosen for a specifc purpose -- has no quarrel. Yet he does not refute, or even ac‐ to cast the conspirators and their motives in the knowledge, the revisionist challenges to this best light possible. In doing so, Mr. Fest eclipses or scholarship. He omits reference even to Martin even eliminates other perspectives on German re‐ Broszat, not to mention other relevant German sistance, sweeping aside the "many [German re‐ historians such as Detlev Peukert, Peter Stein‐ sistance] organizations" and "all the various [Ger‐ bach, Michael Krueger-Charle, and Christof man] resistance groups" in order to focus exclu‐ Mauch (the majority of whom appear in a collec‐ sively on the July 20 conspiracy. In seeking to tion Fest cites repeatedly, Steinbach and raise high these "martyrs," Fest belittles other ef‐ Schmaedeke's "Der Widerstand gegen den Nation‐ forts, referring to some as "events like the idealis‐ alsozialismus"). Is Fest primarily interested in tic and reckless actions of the White Rose" (3). putting these events in their proper light, or in a This brings to mind a paraphrase of the comment particular, exclusive political light? by the American statesman Charles Pinckney to If this is the case, it would hardly be new. The French Foreign Minister de Talleyrand-Perigord search for a "usable past" -- selective memory for in 1797: "millions for defense, but not one cent for didactic purpose -- has beset the history of the re‐ tribute," i.e., millions for the story of July 20, but sistance. Used frst to legitimize the West German none for histories that record and compare other armed forces in the 1950s, the July 20 conspiracy opposition eforts. Relative to the support for representing "The German Resistance" has proven Hitler, of course, there was not that much resis‐ useful ever since to represent a thread of anti-fas‐ tance. But the excluson of other important acts of cism that has blossomed into robust democracy opposition in order to focus on just one, the better throughout the country. July 20 was the act most to make it stand out as illustrious and alone, hard‐ easily understood as resistance, a warlike act ly makes for the best history. which through massive destructive power intend‐ The problems related to eulogizing the July 20 ed to reverse overnight the political leadership, conspiracy in this exclusive way at this point in rooted though it was in social and economic pro‐
2 H-Net Reviews cesses that had been establishing themselves for tance should be defned more by the social and years. political impact of actions than by the motivations Notably, the incident which Hitler's followers behind them. This opened the way to his efort to used to represent the greatest challenge to his document a wide range of actions of noncon‐ power from within does not refect the fundamen‐ formism and dissidence identifed as resistance. tal principle which Hitler used to gain and main‐ More recently, the eulogizing and revisionist tain power. Scrupulous attention to domestic pop‐ treatments of the July conspiracy have led to syn‐ ular support -- or the appearance of it -- coincid‐ theses of these earlier schools. At the same time, ing with the rejection of a military coup was es‐ eulogizers have mounted a retort, spurred on by sential to Hitler's successes. This consideration did social and political changes that have been associ‐ not permit Hitler (at least since the mid-1920s) to ated primarily with German unifcation, which is think he could reverse the political direction of seen as raising obstacles to Mr. Fest's aim of get‐ Germany overnight. It was the fact that the July ting Germans generally to appreciate the July 20 conspiracy had been unsuccessful even in killing conspiracy more fully. This efort has raised im‐ Hitler, however, that helped to shape a postwar portant insights from scholars, including the his‐ defnition of resistance emphasizing motivations, torian Hans Mommsen, who has argued that re‐ a slippery if critical element of human history sistance as indicated by the July conspiracy en‐ that soon proved to be as useful in questioning as tailed a "Lernprozess", a developing awareness in supporting the conspirators' pedestaled posi‐ that led painfully and courageously from support tion as "The German Resistance". to opposition, and that political resistance re‐ Especially with the rise of "Alltagsgeschichte" quired political compromise, represented by an during the 1970s, historians challenged the eulo‐ image of the military conspirators supporting the gistic treatment of the July 20 resistance, and the regime on one shoulder while preparing for its defnition of resistance constructed around it. demise on the other. Hans Mommsen, comment Martin Broszat, a leading German critic of eulo‐ for panel titled "The German Resistance Against gizers, characterized the motives of the military Hitler: New Perspectives," 1997 German Studies conspirators as somewhat self-interested rather Association Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., than ideologically pure, while others who did not September 28, 1997. See also Mommsen's essay criticize their motives as harshly did characterize "Widerstand und Politische Kultur in Deutschland their political judgment as poor. Most if not all of und Oestereich" (Vienna: Picus Verlag, 1994). the conspirators of 1944, like most Germans, at If Mr. Fest's "comprehensive" treatment of the frst supported Hitler without protest. Military July 20 conspiracy adds something to the work of leaders largely shared Hitler's hatred of bolshe‐ other scholars, it also detracts. He writes, for ex‐ vism and domestic trade unions and, in any case, ample, that "a substantial number of Germans had been no friends of Weimar. They embraced had come to despise Hitler and his policies, even his plans to violate the Treaty of Versailles and as the Fuehrer racked up impressive victories at quickly rebuild the military. But as Hitler's des‐ the ballot box...." Yet he admits historian Ian Ker‐ perate ventures turned to shocking crimes and shaw's well-documented conclusion that Hitler's military defeats, the conspirators plotted his popularity reached its peak around the time of death, even though by 1944 it was virtually impos‐ the Anschluss, when only a very small minority of sible to overthrow the regime from the inside. Af‐ Germans could not identify positively with any ter indicating that the July 20 conspirators also part of Nazism. Ian Kershaw, "'Widerstand ohne had mixed motives, Broszat argued that Resis‐ Volk': Dissens und Widerstand im Dritten Reich,"
3 H-Net Reviews in "Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialis‐ More fundamentally -- how can a coup at‐ mus" ed., Juergen Schmaedeke und Peter Stein‐ tempt which Fest admits was a "symbolic act ... bach (Munich: Piper, l985), p. 794. See also Ker‐ [of] manifest futility" also be an efort that failed shaw, "The Hitler Myth: Image and Reality in the only "miraculously...to maim or kill Hitler?" At Third Reich" (New York: Oxford University Press, this point in the historiography, the best scholars l987), p. 80. How substantial and rapidly rising agree that even if the conspirators had killed could the number of unhappy Germans have Hitler they could not have either "look[ed] to any‐ been, if Hitler's popularity continued to rise until thing diferently structured thereafter" (Gerhard just a small minority of them felt that Nazism did Weinberg), or to diferent terms of peace (Peter not reward them in some way? Mr. Fest em‐ Hofmann). Gerhard L. Weinberg, "Germany, pathizes well with British refusals of propositions Hitler and World War II: Essays in Modern Ger‐ from the German opposition in 1938. Yet he is man and World History" (Cambridge: Cambridge quite harsh with General Ludwig Beck, an opposi‐ University Press, 1996), p. 248; Peter Hofmann tion leader, for resigning from Hitler's military. "Staufenberg: A Family History" (Cambridge: Ironically, although the eulogistic school rejects Cambridge University Press, 1996). While Fest ac‐ Broszat's efort to defne resistance primarily by knowledges that the conspirators had very little its impact rather than by its purity of motive, it chance of overthrowing Nazism, he eulogizes derides General Beck's action in resigning from them for intending to overthrow the system in its the military as a principled rather than efective entirety. But this is certainly a dubious model for response, reducing him, in Mr. Fest's words, to responsible action, then or now. What value is "merely an outraged, and later despairing, observ‐ there in a stated intention if there is no strong log‐ er without position or infuence" (82). ical relationship between that intention and the Mr. Fest lauds men of "action" in contrast actions taken to requite the intention? with the "inaction" of resignation. His rationale Questions regarding the general implications for turning a blind eye to opposition other than of Mr. Fest's model aside, why should we accept July 20, and the illumination that comparisons his statement of comparison -- which identifes with it could bring, is that none of the other inci‐ July 20 as most clearly motivated act of resistance dents had the slightest chance of upending the and most likely to succeed -- without any compar‐ regime. The July 20 conspiracy is "The German Re‐ ative considerations in support of that statement? sistance" because it was the "branch of resistance In fact, no act of opposition was purely motivated whose motives were the clearest and whose ef‐ or perfectly successful, a point which comparison forts came closest to succeeding" (5). Yet to contin‐ would serve well. How can the motives of such a ue in this vein of "what if" history: if the July 20 widely diverse group be as clear as Mr. Fest conspirators "did" come the closest to succeeding, claims? Where is his refutation of Broszat and does this make their "symbolic act," and their others who do not agree even with his characteri‐ martyrdom, less futile than the act of General zation of the motives of specifc individuals? As Beck's resignation? Can we be sure that a collec‐ for the other leg of Fest's model (the conspirators tive resignation of ofcers in support of Beck by came "closest to success"), the case of Johann those who would later participate in the conspira‐ Georg Elser raises the best empirical criticism. cy would not have been as efective, and also hon‐ This redoubtable German came about as close to orable (especially had they occurred together in killing Hitler single-handedly as did the July con‐ public -- a spectacle we know Hitler would have spiracy. Moreover, Elser exploded his bomb al‐ feared)? ready in November 1939, when Hitler appeared to be anything but a loser, when the consequences
4 H-Net Reviews of killing him would have been incalculably position in relation to the ideal of resistance (po‐ greater, and when Staufenberg, as insider, was litically motivated, centrally organized eforts to still jubilant about Germany's smashing defeat of overthrow the regime in its entirety) which no act Poland. Interview statement of Charlotte von der of opposition fully realized? Schulenburg concerning Staufenberg in the docu‐ An accepted adage of comparative history mentary flm, "The Restless Conscience," by Hava claims that "to know one, is to know none," and Beller, released l991. Except for the very diferent the example of Elser serves as well as any to sug‐ dates of their assassination eforts (which re‐ gest the pitfalls of writing the history of the July dound to Elser's beneft on question of motives), 20 conspiracy without a comparative context. One the near-success of Elser and Staufenberg's bomb of the possible misjudgments arising from too attacks are strikingly similar, and both men were narrow a focus on July 20 as "The German Resis‐ indeed executed. Why are there hundreds of tance" is the notion that Staufenberg's heroic books and continuous ofcial commemorations case proves that political resistance presupposes on Staufenberg and July 20, and just several on political compromises. The case of Elser, for ex‐ Elser, which arise primarily from private, not of‐ ample, would be just as efective in indicating the cial, initiatives? opposite. It seems clear that the history of resis‐ Fest argues well that the July 20 conspirators tance in Nazi Germany is determined by political acted on the basis of their character and not on constituencies as well as by rational, objective dis‐ that of their class (325-27). Yet the disparity in course. recognition among the acts of opposition leads One of the mechanisms of politics Mr. Fest's one to wonder whether the commemoration of re‐ own evidence discloses, but does not analyze well, sistance is somewhat dependent on class, and on is that of popular opinion and popular protest. the possibilities of political mobilizaton that at‐ This force, increasingly infuential in history, is tends the actions of elite persons within elite insti‐ relevant for Mr. Fest's particular analysis because tutions. The German Resistance Memorial Center, by his own evidence, Hitler -- and indeed the mili‐ seated in Nazi Berlin's wartime headquarters and tary itself -- were constrained by German popular commissioned in 1983 to document the entire ex‐ opinion. "Any plan [for removing Hitler] would tent of German resistance, has published over have to come to grips with the fact that this was a forty essays from eyewitnesses and scholars on popular regime, headed by a man who had various aspects and personages of resistance, and proved successful [and] was widely admired," none are on Johann Georg Elser. The July 20 con‐ Fest writes (69). Captain Fredrich Wilhelm Heinz spirators, the centerpiece of the Memorial's com‐ argued persuasively that [the conspirators] could memorations, have had powerful family and po‐ not imprison Hitler since "even from a prisoner's litical sponsors. When the Memorial Center, dock, Hitler would prove more powerful than all which exists to increase understanding of all pos‐ of them" (91). "What can the troops possibly do sible incidents of resistance, decided to honor against a leader this victorious?" reckoned Gener‐ communist actions as resistance, it did so over the al Witzleben at the time of the Munich Agree‐ opposition of many, including surviving family ment. In 1940, General Franz Halder said he members of the truly heroic military conspirators. would "spearhead" opposition only if it were Even so, the Memorial Center does honor a range "backed by a broad-based political movement" of resistors and their organizations that Fest does (136). There was no sign of this, nor any that Gen‐ not. How is it possible that Mr. Fest can consider a eral Halder could build a broad-based movement, history of the July 20 conspiracy fnally "compre‐ and Halder, leaving the military opposition bereft hensive," without the context of other acts of op‐
5 H-Net Reviews of hope, abandoned his position in September itary was the "one institution [which] had man‐ 1942 (187). aged to preserve most of its traditional autonomy Hitler's popular support was, after all, the and internal cohesion" and thus the only entity fundamental condition which caused the German positioned to raise a successful resistance. In fact, conservatives to hand him the chancellery in the only acts of resistance with any success were 1933. The conservatives thought they could con‐ those mounted collectively by ordinary citizens, trol the new Chancellor through the military and some with the help of church prelates. These par‐ Franz von Papen, the vice-chancellor. Papen tial successes include the Catholic struggles "boasted that he would 'soon have Hitler pushed against Nazi decrees which removed crucifxes so far into a corner he would squeak'" and was in‐ from schools; the increasing unrest -- brought to a stead "blindsided by the new chancellor, who head by Bishop von Galen -- to the murder of toured the country making triumphant appear‐ handicapped and insane Germans; and the non‐ ances, a performance that the vice-chancellor compliance and public protest of intermarried could hardly hope to match" (27). For their own Germans which saved the lives of thousands of part, ofcers and enlisted men swore an oath of German Jews. Mr. Fest mentions none of them. In personal allegiance to Hitler in August 1934. his lexicon, "events like" the White Rose were When General Beck resigned four years later, "idealistic and reckless," and important protest ac‐ Hitler asked him not to do it publicly "lest it pro‐ tions are "nicht mal ignoriert". voke an unfavorable reaction" (84). In military ex‐ Despite the theories and actions of Nazi lead‐ pansion, Hitler had garnered prestige by scorning ers and despite his own evidence, Mr. Fest's over‐ the overly cautious advice of his military ofcers. all representation of resistance suggests that he But when the public looked on in disinterest at a does not recognize a signifcant role for ordinary military display by the Second Motorized Division persons in the establishment and exercise of Nazi in Berlin on September 27, 1938, Hitler's de‐ political power. Yet a comprehensive model of re‐ meanor changed from a jaunty "War next week!" sistance should take account of protests that to a chastened mood in which he wrote a concilia‐ achieved their smaller, more realistic demands, tory letter to the British Prime Minister. Reports along with the truly heroic conspirators. This is on the Berlin response to the Second Division and especially important since the successful, limited its impact on Hitler are in William Shirer "Berlin demands of partial resisters mirror the fact that Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent" Hitler accrued power bit by bit. No single sector of (New York: Popular Library Edition, 1961), pp. Germans was responsible alone for the rise and 109-10; Paul Schmidt, "Hitler's Interpreter" (New maintenance of Nazism, and following the July 20 York: Macmillan, 1951), p. 105; Max Domarus, ed., attempt on Hitler's life there was an outpouring of " Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, 1932-1945" support for Hitler by Germans in general as well (Munich: Sueddeutscher Verlag Muenchen, 1991), as by leaders of their major institutions, including pp. 923-38. the churches. The military conspirators Fest eulogizes felt The elite military leaders dealt with weapons their own power restricted by Hitler's massive of destruction and were unaccustomed to paying popularity. Thus the capacity (or lack of it) to in‐ attention to popular support. The elite Kreisau fuence German popular opinion is a relevant fac‐ group which Fest does count among the resisters tor in assessing the viability of any action intend‐ spent its time contemplating the ideal govern‐ ed to overthrow the regime. Yet Fest writes that ment in case Hitler were to fall. Fearing the in‐ following the Nazi "Gleischaltung" of 1933 the mil‐ evitable trend of egalitarianism in the new mass
6 H-Net Reviews age, this group proposed to stop the trend by protest. Rather, they remained silent due to their maintaining an "elite" through government inter‐ sympathy -- and that of their lay members -- to‐ vention and traditional values. While other Ger‐ ward at least some of the teachings of National So‐ mans forced the regime to give in by threatening cialism. Hamerow writes that since the war, inter‐ its popularity, the Kreisauers associated resis‐ pretations of German opposition have changed, tance with assassination of Hitler, and then reject‐ leaving "soldiers and bureaucrats" as the "big ed resistance because they associated it with dras‐ winners," while "churches and churchmen" are tic violence (159, 160). One disadvantage of focus‐ the big losers. In this piece he discusses only the ing overwhelmingly on the elite and military lead‐ losing end of this spectrum, concluding that "the ers for a defnition of resistance is that it shifts at‐ great majority of clergymen failed to oppose the tention from the basic National Socialist theory Nazi regime, not only out of fear of reprisal but that the regime's power and legitimacy derived out of expediency or even conviction." primarily from the "racial" people. Such a focus Drawing largely on the documents of Cardi‐ also ignores histories which show that the regime nal Faulhaber, along with those of Bishop Galen relented when it felt this base of its power was and relevant secondary sources, Hamerow has threatened. [7] further concluded that Catholic as well as Protes‐ Mr. Fest faults Germany's deeply rooted "au‐ tant leaders were entrenched within mainstream thoritarian heritage" for a continuing ambiguity German society in proportion to their level of au‐ among Germans as to whether the July 20 con‐ thority: "the higher [the clergymen's] position...the spirators were traitors or resisters (3). But if popu‐ more reluctant they were to challenge the author‐ lar mentality has been the problem, is it not logi‐ ity of the state." [9] Individual protests, such as in cal to critique the popular aspects of Hitler's rise private letters, were not an efective form of op‐ to and maintenance of power as a key problem in position to the Nazi dictatorship, as Galen's public the study of resistance, instead of shifting power acts indicate in stark contrast to those of Preysing and responsibility for resistance onto the shoul‐ and Grueber. The categorization of the acts of ders of just one segment of the population, name‐ these three as the same "brand" of "resistance" ly the elite? Mr. Fest gives no defnition of resis‐ then, is as helpful as arguing that German propa‐ tance, and the reader is left wondering what he ganda on forthcoming 'wonder weapons' belongs means in stating that, following the Concordat, to the same brand of action as Blitzkrieg ofen‐ "only gradually did the Catholic Church fnd its sives. Bishop von Galen's impact in overturning way back to a frmer brand of resistance in the ef‐ the regime's attempts to ban crucifxes from forts of individual clerics such as Cardinal schools and in denouncing Euthanasia from the Preysing of Berlin, Bishop Galen of Muenster, and pulpit indicate that he knew how to challenge spe‐ Bishop Grueber of Freiburg" (32). cifc policies efectively by mass circulation of ser‐ Theodore Hamerow, in an article which fo‐ mons among the members and by speaking out cuses on the church in relation to the persecution publicly. of Jews, has infered that discussions about such a Any disregard today by conservative elites of "brand" of church resistance, or how little the the increasing importance of mass protest may re‐ churches could do to resist, is premature since fect the same feckless sentiments of the Kreisau such discussions assume that the churches want‐ group. Mr. Fest rightly honors the July 20 conspir‐ ed to do this in the frst place.[8] Hamerow acy. But doing so by excluding other events of op‐ demonstrates that Church leaders, Catholic and position undermines good history. "Plotting especially Protestant, did not lack the courage to Hitler's Death" presents German resistance with‐
7 H-Net Reviews out a single important role for women or ordi‐ proper understanding of history itself. The July 20 nary people. Fest approaches history by focusing conspirators were not motivated purely by politi‐ on "big men" and big guns, stressing ruthlessness cal ideals but also by matters of personal con‐ -- along with an overwhelming tide of propaganda science. Fest notes that Justus Delbruck, on the and wily machinations -- as the key for under‐ day after the attempted coup, "captured the standing the mismatch between Hitler and his pathos and paradox of the resistance" with his would-be assassins. Far from dealing with statement: "I think it was good that it happened, protests from the areas of everyday history, Mr. and good too, perhaps, that it did not succeed" Fest does not even take account of Ian Kershaw's (343). The actions of intermarried Germans, to fndings that the Nazi dictatorship made numer‐ take a very diferent example of opposition, illus‐ ous concessions in order to maintain popular sup‐ trates a mere partial opposition, but one exercised port and to avoid social unrest, thus trying, in the consistently and openly throughout the entire pe‐ words of Armaments Minister Albert Speer "to riod of the Reich. Unlike the idealized heroism of keep the morale of the people in the best possible the July conspirators, credited for acting on politi‐ state by concessions." [10] Kershaw concludes that cal ideals, intermarried Germans risked their there was no general resistance because very few lives to rescue those they were connected to most non-persecuted Germans were unhappy with the deeply. Yet they did not risk their lives to protect dictatorship -- a conclusion about resistance that their partners purely out of self-interest (which, appears logical, when taking into account Hitler's as it seemed at the time, would have been di‐ successful decision to win and exercise power vorce). Most of these marriage partners of Jews through building a mass movement. did act out of personal reasons, but some re‐ While the history of "big men" has its place, mained married only for the duration of the Third should it be allowed to hide other important ac‐ Reich, thus indicating that they perhaps acted in tors from view? The portrayal of resistance only order to protect a life. as heroics and a hopeless efort to overthrow the An accurate, if more ambiguous, historical regime is an all-or-nothing picture of reality that picture returns responsibility for resistance to the may easily fall prey to broad black-and-white people and their institutions in direct proportion brush strokes which paint a few men against a to their responsibilty for bringing Hitler to power backdrop of hapless masses. Too exclusive a focus and keeping him there. If as Fest writes, hundreds on the role of big institutions and their leaders of books have been written on the July 20 conspir‐ tends to bracket of society's role, and thus the no‐ acy without getting it right, how can we be sure table role of ordinary persons and the potential that the other elements which he dismisses as un‐ victims they protected, as the historian Robert worthy have been properly accounted for, given Gellately's work well illustrates. the far smaller efort given to writing about them? This is not to suggest that resistance was Why have acts of resistance by the White Rose, So‐ widespread -- it certainly was not -- but rather cialists, Communists, Catholics, Jehovah's Witness‐ that resistance, like collaboration, was difuse. As es, intermarried Germans, and others also not Vaclev Havel has observed, and as the historian been properly contextualized? Why -- to pose one Klemens von Klemperer has emphasized, the line outstanding question -- were the (successful) between collaboration and resistance does not protests for crucifxes in schools as well as for the run between individuals, but within them. [11] lives of intermarried Germans overwhelmingly This allows for ambiguity. At issue is not just comprised of women rather than men? Has Mr. equal coverage for equally eserving parties, but a Fest constructed a history of "The German Resis‐ tance" or has he made an efort, decades later, to
8 H-Net Reviews shore up "The German Resistance" as it was de‐ fned following the war? Mr. Fest has formidable talents, and one wishes he could write about oth‐ er actors within Nazi Germany as well -- particu‐ larly about, say, ordinary people and mass protest. ENDNOTES
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Citation: Nathan Stoltzfus. Review of Fest, Joachim C. Plotting Hitler's Death: The Story of German Resistance. H-Soz-u-Kult, H-Net Reviews. July, 1998.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=16163
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