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Home , Alan Shepard, Betty Grissom, Colin Burgess (author), Collier Trophy, Deke Slayton, Ed Dwight

Volume 20, Number 2 2013 www.spacehistory101.com

THE HISTORY OF QUARTERLY

ON WINGS OF FIRE; SEEKING INDEPENDENCE JOHN F. KENNEDY SUPPORT TO HOMER BOUSHEY AND THE IN SPACE: AND THE OPERATION FIRST -POWERED ’S SPACE “RIGHT STUFF” ENDURING FREEDOM PROGRAM (1958-2010) Contents Volume 20 • Number 2 2013 www.spacehistory101.com

Features Book Reviews (continued)

4 John F. Kennedy and the “Right Stuff” 55 Pathfinders: A Global History of Exploration By John M. Logsdon Book by Felipe Fernández–Armesto Review by Roger D. Launius 16 On Wings of Fire: Homer Boushey 56 The Contours of America’s and the First Rocket Powered Flights Book by Matthew Farish By Review by Martin Collins 57 Down to : Technologies, Industries, 24 Space Support to Operation and Cultures Enduring Freedom Edited by Lisa Parks and James Schwoch By Richard S. Eckert and Kelly Ihme Review by Roger D. Launius

34 Seeking Independence in Space: 58 Visionary: The Odyssey of Sir Arthur C. Clarke South Korea’s Space Program Book by Neil McAleer (1958–2010) Review by Michael J. Neufeld By Hyoung Joon An 59 Inventing the American Book by Matthew H. Hersch Clockwise, from Review by Jennifer Levasseur top left: 60 The New : vs. the Dick Gordon, Book by Erik Seedhouse , Review by Roger D. Launius , and Dave Scott 61 Implosion: Lessons from , High Reliability , Electronics, and the Forces Credit: NASA Which Changed Them Book by L. Parker Temple Review by Roger D. Launius Book Reviews 62 Space Chronicles: Facing the Ultimate Frontier 52 Meta–Geopolitics of : Book by Neil deGrasse Tyson Analysis of Space Power, Security and Review by De Witt Douglas Kilgore Governance 63 The Bay of Pigs Book by Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan Book by Howard Jones Review by James Vedda Review by Roger D. Launius

54 Spacesuit: A History through Fact and 64 America’s Space Sentinels: The History of the DSP Fiction and SBIRS Satellite Systems Book by Brett Gooden Book by Jeffrey T. Richelson Review by Dennis R.Jenkins Review by James David JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE “RIGHT STUFF” by John M. Logsdon

As John F. Kennedy entered the in , of the issues he would soon have to address “he probably knew and understood least about space.”1 This would quick- ly change. The domestic and interna- tional reaction to the 12 April 1961 of the first human to the Earth, Soviet cosmonaut , convinced Kennedy that he had to enter a space race with the ; he asked his advisers to find him “a space program which promises dramatic results in which we could win.” Six weeks later he announced to a joint ses- sion of Congress his decision to send American to the “before this decade is out.” had never paid much personal attention The Mercury 7 astronauts: Project Apollo, the lunar landing to the astronauts, viewing them as mil- Jr., Jr., Jr., Jr., , , itary volunteers for an experiment, program, was not the only space effort and . Credit: NASA that engaged JFK’s attention in his John F. Kennedy from on brief time in the White House. While made them an integral part of his 2 Apollo was just getting started in the administration and included them in its force of manhood.” 1961–1963 period, , social as well as its official life. In the aftermath of the Shepard the National and Space The “” were only flight, Kennedy came to recognize that Administration (NASA) effort to a few years younger than the president. the widespread public interest given to launch the first Americans into orbit, Kennedy at the time of Alan Shepard’s American astronauts could be carried out its six astronaut-carrying flight was 43; Shepard, 37. John Glenn, employed in support of various politi- missions. From Alan Shepard’s 15- the oldest of the original seven cal messages. As a presidential candi- minute suborbital flight on 5 May Mercury astronauts and the astronaut date he had been urged by African- 1961, to the final 22-orbit, 34-hour who developed the closest relationship American leaders to include a black flight of Gordon Cooper on 15–16 May with the president and his brother man in the astronaut corps. While he 1963, Mercury’s flights excited the Robert, was 39. The astronauts repre- seemingly gave little attention to that public and provided a positive back- sented a personality type quite attrac- suggestion at the time, as he became ground for White House decisions on tive to Kennedy and about which he engaged with the U.S. space effort, he the lunar landing program. President had written in his book Profiles in also took initial steps to have an Kennedy, overruling most of his advis- Courage—individuals who had African-American man selected as an ers, took the risk of approving live tel- responded successfully to challenging astronaut, judging that such a choice evision coverage of the Shepard circumstances. In the Mercury astro- would be an important signal both launch. In its successful aftermath he nauts, “Kennedy had found exactly the domestically and internationally of his met the seven military pilots who had type of men he needed as allies in his commitment to civil rights. This effort been chosen in 1959 to be the first U.S. pursuit of new frontiers.” In the words ultimately was unsuccessful, but not astronauts—Alan Shepard, Virgil of ’s classic book on the for the lack of White House effort. This “Gus” Grissom, John Glenn, Scott Mercury astronauts, they had the effort on Kennedy’s part is little Carpenter, Walter Schirra, Gordon “Right Stuff,” defined by Wolfe as a known. Cooper, and Donald “Deke” Slayton— mixture of being eager to engage in The overall history of President and took a strong personal interest in “single combat” against a dangerous Kennedy’s frequent interactions with both their and the program’s fate. enemy (in this case, the unknowns of the Mercury astronauts has not previ- While President Dwight Eisenhower space travel) and of exuding the “vital ously been well documented. That his- tory not only adds new details to exist- Q U E S T 20:2 2013 4 www.spacehistory101.com ing accounts of the Kennedy presiden- flight had been a cy; it is also a case study of the overall failure, it is not behavior of Kennedy as president, con- clear that Kennedy stantly seeking information, open to would have, or could hearing a wide range of views, dealing have, approved a rec- directly with many individuals, but ommendation to send also placing both responsibility and Americans to the trust on the men he selected to head the Moon. various agencies of the executive branch. Questioning Project Mercury The Flight of Alan Shepard: From the start A Necessary Success of Project Mercury in John F. Kennedy’s first exposure 1958, the project’s to issues involving the first seven U.S. plan called for several astronauts was less than positive. Even brief suborbital before he entered the White House, flights with an astro- Kennedy was warned by his transition naut aboard before task force on space that Project committing a human President John F. Kennedy and First Lady Mercury was technically “marginal,” to an orbital mission. The first such Jacqueline Kennedy the launch of the that he should not allow “the present flight would have come in first American in space, Alan Shepard Jr. in Mercury program to continue if it had not been for the combination 1961. Credit: Cecil W. Stoughton. Courtesy: unchanged for more than a very few of some relatively minor problems on a JFK Presidential Library and Museum months” and that he not “effectively 31 January test flight carrying the endorse this program and take the chimpanzee and biomedical con- White House concern, according to blame for its possible failures.” Of cerns about an astronaut’s ability to JFK’s special counsel Theodore particular concern was the possible withstand the stresses of spaceflight Sorensen, was “that such a big buildup death of an astronaut during a Mercury raised by the President’s Science would worsen our national humiliation mission, particularly if he were to be Advisory Committee (PSAC). An [the Bay of Pigs] if the flight were a stranded in orbit. The issue of whether additional March test flight without an failure.” to approve the initial Mercury launch astronaut (or chimpanzee) aboard was The one-orbit flight of Soviet confronted President Kennedy during inserted in the Mercury schedule, and cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin on 12 April his first months in office, and the risks the first astronaut-carrying flight, had multiple consequences. Most involved intensified when that launch Mercury/-3 (MR-3), was important, the flight and the interna- was scheduled only two weeks after the slipped until the end of April or early tional and domestic acclaim that it pro- April 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco. Most of May. (It is interesting to speculate what duced convinced a skeptical president JFK’s advisors suggested postponing might have happened if that March that the United States had to enter, and the launch until the political fallout flight had carried a U.S. astronaut, win, a space race with the Soviet from the abortive Cuban invasion had making him, rather than Gagarin, the Union. It also demonstrated that con- diminished, but Kennedy made the first human to go into space, albeit not cerns regarding the ability of a human risky decision to go ahead with the into orbit.) being to survive the stresses of space- launch and to do so in full view of the Beginning with the transition flight were unfounded; Gagarin world. (By comparison, the Soviet task group report in January and showed no ill effects from his 89- Union launched Yuri Gagarin without extending almost to the day of the minute journey around the Earth. Still, prior notice and only announced his flight, there were White House fears doubts about the wisdom of going mission after Gagarin had successfully that the risks of the MR-3 mission out- ahead with the mission, at least so soon returned to Earth.) This risk paid off weighed its benefits. These fears were after the Soviet orbital flight and the when on May 5 astronaut Alan Shepard only amplified by the failure at the Bay Bay of Pigs fiasco, persisted. The per- was sent on a 15-minute suborbital ride of Pigs in mid-April; the possibility son who had led the PSAC review of in front of live television cameras and that a U.S. astronaut might perish in Mercury, chemist was safely recovered from his Atlantic the full light of media coverage of the , on 18 April sent a Ocean landing. The Shepard flight mission so soon after the United States memorandum to Sorensen raising two came as President Kennedy was con- had looked so weak in its unwilling- questions: (1) “Is MR-3 still justified, sidering the major acceleration of the ness to support the Cuban invasion in view of the risks, after the Russian U.S. space program that he would force was very troubling to President flight?” and (2) “If so, should the pres- announce three weeks later; if the Kennedy and his top advisers. The ent schedule be maintained or should it

Q U E S T 20:2 2013 5 www.spacehistory101.com President John F. Kennedy congratulates Alan B. Shepard Jr., the first American in space, on his historic 5 May 1961 ride in the Freedom 7 spacecraft and presents him with the NASA Distinguished Service Medal. The ceremony took place on the White House lawn. Shepard's wife, Louise (left in white dress and hat), and his moth- er were in attendance in addition to the other six Mercury astronauts and NASA officials, some visible in the background. Credit: NASA

be carried out at a later time?” Hornig it become a well-publicized failure.” flight should go forward as scheduled. noted that after the Gagarin flight “the President Kennedy made the Kennedy asked his secretary to place a fact that one human can withstand final decision to approve the flight in call to NASA’s public information offi- these conditions [of spaceflight] is now an Oval Office meeting on 29 April. cer in Florida, Paul Haney, to discuss established.” Hornig’s conclusion was Present at the meeting were Wiesner, plans for television coverage and to that “it seems likely that we should Sorensen, national security adviser discuss the reliability of the Mercury proceed on schedule, particularly since McGeorge Bundy, and Edward Welsh, capsule’s escape system. Salinger the world already knows that sched- Executive Secretary of the National talked to Haney from the Oval Office ule,” but that “our estimate of the risk Aeronautics and Space Council, among and, after Haney reviewed the history is still that it cannot presently be others. One of those present raised the of the launch escape system, told demonstrated that the likelihood of dis- point of “maybe we should postpone Kennedy that he felt that JFK’s con- aster is less than one in ten or one in the Shepard flight, maybe we shouldn’t cerns about astronaut safety had been twenty.” take this risk, something might go bad, adequately answered. On 26 April, JFK’s science there might be a casualty, and we’ve adviser Jerome Wiesner told the execu- had a number of things go rather poor- MR-3 a Success tive secretary of the National ly here and maybe we shouldn’t do this Because of poor weather, the Aeronautics and Space Council, right now.” The majority of the group MR-3 flight was postponed on 2 May Edward Welsh, that his office had been favored this position, but Welsh argued and again on 4 May. Finally, on 5 May receiving messages from “some of the that it was no riskier than flying from astronaut Alan Shepard was launched scientists . . . raising a question about Washington to Los Angeles in bad on what he described as a “pleasant the advisability of our going forward weather and asked the president, “why ride.” A wave of national relief and with the Mercury man-in-space shots.” postpone a success?” Kennedy sided pride about an American success swept Their concern, said Wiesner, was that with Welsh and decided to go ahead the country, from the White House “if these shots were successful, they with the Shepard flight. down to the person in the street. At the would still look relatively small com- Even after he made this decision, White House, Kennedy’s secretary pared with what the Russians have Kennedy continued to worry. On 1 Evelyn Lincoln interrupted a National done, and, if the shots failed, the dam- May, the day before the flight was Security Council meeting to tell the age to our prestige would be serious.” scheduled to lift off, NASA president that Shepard was about to be Concerns about the wisdom of pro- Administrator James Webb and White launched. Kennedy, joined by Lyndon ceeding were not limited to the White House press secretary Pierre Salinger Johnson, Robert Kennedy, Secretary of House. Senators John Williams (R-DE) met with Kennedy for a final review of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary and William Fulbright (D-AK) sug- the press arrangements for covering the of State Dean Rusk, and presidential gested “that the flight should be post- launch. Webb assured the president that advisers Sorensen, Bundy, Arthur poned and then conducted in secret lest all precautions had been taken and the Schlesinger, and others, crowded

Q U E S T 20:2 2013 6 www.spacehistory101.com around a small black–and–white televi- in the Rose Garden sion set in Lincoln’s office to watch the by a gathering that takeoff. As Jacqueline Kennedy walked included President by, the president said: “Come in and Kennedy and his watch this.” Sorensen suggests that the wife Jacqueline, group watching the flight in Lincoln’s members of office “heaved a sigh of relief, and Congress, NASA cheered” as Shepard and his spacecraft leaders, and others. were pulled from Ocean. Awarding the NASA After Shepard was safely aboard the Distinguished recovery ship, Kennedy, in an Service Medal to unplanned move, called him, saying, “I Shepard, the presi- want to congratulate you very much. dent said: “how We watched you on television, of proud we are of him, course, and we are awfully pleased and what satisfaction we proud of what you did.” take in his accom- If the Shepard flight had been a plishment, what a catastrophic failure, it is very unlikely service he has ren- that President Kennedy would have, or dered to his coun- politically could have, soon afterward try.” He noted once set as a national goal the flight of again that “this Americans to the Moon. However, the flight was made out Engineer Commissioner of the District of Columbia Brigadier unqualified success of the flight in both in the open with all Frederick J. Clarke (third from right) presents astronaut technical and political terms likely the possibilities of John H. Glenn Jr. (second from right) with a key to the city during swept away any of Kennedy’s lingering failure, which would a reception honoring Glenn. Looking on (L-R): President John F. reservations with respect to the benefits have been damaging Kennedy’s niece Maria Shriver (in profile), President Kennedy, of an accelerated space effort. In a for- to our country's and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson (partially hidden at edge of mal statement issued after the flight, prestige. Because image, holding hat), 26 . Credit: Cecil W. Stoughton. Courtesy: JFK Presidential Library and Museum. Kennedy said: “All America rejoices in great risks were this successful flight of Astronaut taken in that regard, Shepard. This is an historic milestone it seems to me that in our own exploration into space. But we have some right effectively in space.” Robert Gilruth, America still needs to work with the to claim that this open society of ours the director of NASA’s Space Task utmost speed and vigor in the further which risked much, gained much.” Group that was managing Project development of our space program. After the award ceremony, the Mercury, was present. He remembered Today's flight should provide incentive seven astronauts and others in the gath- Kennedy saying, “Look, I want to be to everyone in our nation concerned ering joined President Kennedy in the first.” Gilruth replied: “Well, you’ve with this program to redouble their Oval Office; the group totaled 20 to 25 got to pick a job that’s so difficult, that efforts in this vital field. Important sci- people, including Vice President it’s new, that they’ll [the Soviets] have entific material has been obtained dur- Johnson, the chairs of the Senate and to start from scratch. They can’t just ing this flight and this will be made House space committees, and several take their old rocket and put another available to the world's scientific com- managers from NASA. The astronauts gimmick on it and do something we munity.” At a press conference later in sat on couches on either side of the can’t do.” Gilruth added, “it’s got to be the day, Kennedy announced that he president, who “gushed with ques- something that requires a great big planned to undertake “a substantially tions.” He and Shepard discussed how rocket, like going to the moon. Going larger effort in space.” the flight had demonstrated the ability to the moon will take a new rocket . . . of a human not only to survive a space- and if you want to do that, I think our Kennedy Meets the Astronauts flight, but also to carry out various country could probably win because On the morning of 8 May Alan functions while in space; Kennedy we’d both have to start from scratch.” Shepard and the six other Mercury seemed well aware of the reservations Kennedy’s reply was “I want to go to astronauts were flown from Grand of his science advisers on this point. the Moon.” Gilruth, only five years Bahama Island, where Shepard had Alan Shepard recalled that “everybody older than Kennedy, added “He was a been brought after his recovery from certainly was running over with confi- young man; he didn’t have all the wis- his suborbital mission, to Andrews Air dence at that time because the flight dom he would have had. If he’d been Force Base and then by helicopter to had gone so well and we had proved older, he probably would never have the White House lawn. They were met our point . . . that a man can operate done it.”

Q U E S T 20:2 2013 7 www.spacehistory101.com was not happy with the way he had two weeks later, and Glenn left Florida been treated on that day. He recounted to visit his family in suburban that he “did not like what was happen- Washington. When he got there, he ing . . . He disliked, intensely, being learned that President Kennedy wanted used. Walking in on the broadcasters’ him to “stop by” the White House while convention with the president would be he was in the area. Glenn and Kennedy showing off a war trophy named met on 5 February. According to Glenn, Shepard, and it smelled.” He also the president’s questions about the described himself as being treated as upcoming flight were “so detailed that I “Kennedy’s new pet.” At the end of the asked him if he wanted me to come day the astronauts, according to back with models and blueprints that Shepard, thought that “much of it had would explain things better”; Kennedy been great, much of it left a bad taste in said yes. Kennedy asked about “the their mouths, and most of them would anticipated g level during launch; were have been happy never to see we actually going to drive it like we did Washington, D.C. again.” Shepard’s an airplane . . . What pressures we Project Mercury Flight Director Christopher was most likely a minority view, and he would be operating under; what we C. Kraft Jr. (left) and astronaut John H. came to enjoy his subsequent contacts would do if the pressure in the space- Glenn Jr. (center) brief President John F. with the president. Also, of the original craft failed?” Kennedy also asked Kennedy on the operation of the Mercury seven astronauts, only Shepard benefit- Glenn whether he and the other astro- Control Center at Air Force ted directly from JFK’s decision to go nauts “felt very personally every possi- Station, before the presentation ceremony to the Moon; he was the commander of ble thing had been done to ensure our of the NASA Distinguished Service Medal the mission to the lunar sur- safety.” to Glenn. Brevard County, Florida, 23 face in .4 A few days later Glenn came February 1962. back to the White House “with models, Credit: Robert Knudsen. Courtesy: JFK maps, and charts”; he and the president Presidential Library and Museum The Flight of John Glenn: moved from the Oval Office into the Creating an American Hero Cabinet Room, where they talked for an In contrast to Alan Shepard’s hour. Glenn was “impressed with his negative assessment of his first about everything that was After leaving the White House, encounter with President Kennedy, going to happen on the flight.” Glenn Shepard was taken by President Marine John H. judged Kennedy’s interest “as an inter- Kennedy to a meeting of the National Glenn Jr., the astronaut chosen to make est in one human being to another—as Association of Broadcasters; this was the first orbital flight in Project one ‘guy’ to another, if you will.” not on the planned schedule for the day, Mercury, had no such resentments. Kennedy talked about the space pro- but Shepard’s surprise visit provoked a Glenn from the time he was selected as gram “with passion,” and believed, as tumultuous welcome. After his an astronaut was the most “political” of did Glenn, “that it was not just a scien- stopover at the broadcasters’ meeting, the Mercury seven; Shepard, whom tific journey, but a source of inspiration Shepard and the other astronauts parad- together with Glenn were the recog- that could motivate Americans to pur- ed up Pennsylvania Avenue to the nized leaders in the astronaut group, sue great achievements in all fields.”6 Capitol as thousands, assembling with noted that ever since the astronauts’ President Kennedy flew to little advance notice, cheered. Shepard first press conference in 1959, Glenn Cape Canaveral on 23 February to greet suggests that “these two things—the “had been wrapped in the American Glenn on his return to the United States successful demonstration of man’s flag,” was “NASA’s fair-haired boy,” after his successful 20 February flight. capability and the public support of a and had “polished a lot of apples.”5 He presented medals to Glenn and program which immediately became to While this may have been an over-char- Robert Gilruth and viewed Glenn’s them a very thrilling, exciting pro- acterization, Glenn certainly was the spacecraft, which had also been gram—affected him [President most politically oriented, clean cut, and returned to the Cape. Kennedy also Kennedy] in his decision-making conventionally behaved of the original toured the facilities; it was his first visit process.”3 seven astronauts. to the center. After Glenn While Kennedy enjoyed his first Glenn’s orbital flight was origi- spent a weekend on Key West unwind- encounter with the Mercury astronauts, nally scheduled for late 1961, and was ing with his family, on 26 February he that warm feeling was not immediately delayed several times; he got as far as and astronauts Alan Shepard and Gus reciprocated. Writing 33 years after he being strapped into his spacecraft on 27 Grissom, who had made a second sub- was welcomed to Washington by the . When that launch was orbital flight in July 1961, flew with president, Shepard suggested that he scrubbed, NASA set a next launch date Kennedy on Air Force One from

Q U E S T 20:2 2013 8 www.spacehistory101.com Florida to Washington DC. During the flight, Glenn, Shepard, and Grissom spent an hour discussing with the pres- ident “some things of a more personal nature, expressing our opinions about how we could possibly be used to help sell the space program,” both domesti- cally and internationally. At least some of the Mercury astronauts had been in personal contact with the director of the U.S. Information Agency, famed journalist Edward R. Murrow, and had come to realize “what this thing [their ] had meant international- ly.” The three astronauts suggested to Kennedy “Some kind of a scheme . . . so that we could make appearances . . . and help sell the program domestically and abroad, and at the same time allow Astronauts Walter Schirra and Gordon or in gatherings of “serious minded us a certain amount of freedom to par- Cooper brief President Kennedy and Vice ticipate in our own requirements,” youth groups of national or internation- President Johnson on the Mercury space- including “time to stay in training and al stature which might help motivate craft. Credit: NASA help in the various areas of young people to study science or engi- the program.” Kennedy listened to the neering.” Webb promised to call the three astronauts, but seemed much White House if there were exceptional ond Mercury orbital flight, scheduled more interested in discussing their cases that might “involve any of the for late May 1962. But on 15 March actual experience of spaceflight.7 matters which the President mentioned 8 1962, NASA abruptly announced that The combination of the airplane to me.” because of an “erratic heart rate” he conversation between the president and President Kennedy’s involve- was being replaced on the flight by the the three Mercury astronauts on 26 ment with John Glenn did not end in astronaut who had been John Glenn’s February and the many celebrations the aftermath of Glenn’s flight. The backup, Scott Carpenter. Although the surrounding Glenn’s flight seems to astronaut became a social friend of the announcement was sudden, in fact have had an unintended and rather neg- president and especially JFK’s brother Slayton had been under close medical ative impact on President Kennedy’s Robert. This personal contact allowed surveillance for more than two years attitude toward the activities of the Glenn later in 1962 to exert direct because of a tendency toward cardiac Mercury astronauts. When NASA influence on administration policy with fibrillation. Although Slayton had pre- Administrator James Webb met with respect to allowing current and future viously been cleared to fly, James him a few weeks later, Kennedy made astronauts to continue to receive pay- Webb early in 1962 had ordered a com- it “very clear” that he wanted to com- ment for their and their family’s per- 9 plete reevaluation of his situation, and municate a public impression “that our sonal stories. between January and March both gov- astronauts are at work for the next ernment and eminent private doctors flight with all their energy and vigor, Kennedy’s Involvement in the reviewed Slayton’s case. and that the parade celebrations and so Remaining Mercury Flights The outside doctors unanimously forth were behind us.” This impression, The remaining three Project recommended that Slayton should not Kennedy thought, was particularly Mercury missions were very high-pro- make his scheduled flight; this conclu- important in terms of creating a percep- file events for the United States, and sion was communicated to Webb on 15 tion that the United States was doing the White House kept careful track of March and led to the NASA announce- everything it could to catch up with the their preparation and of the missions ment that Slayton was being grounded. Soviet Union in space. Webb stressed themselves. In addition, President At some point preceding this to the president that NASA policy was Kennedy got personally involved in announcement, Webb and White House to limit astronaut public appearances to each mission, with each involvement science adviser Jerome Wiesner debat- an absolute minimum; the only excep- being very different in character. ed whether such a switch was neces- tions to this restrictive policy were sary. According to Slayton’s account, allowing astronauts to participate in Slayton Grounded Wiesner told Webb, “take him off this scientific meetings at which the astro- Astronaut Donald “Deke” flight, dammit. It’s a risk we can’t naut himself could make a contribution Slayton was scheduled to pilot the sec- afford.” He asked the NASA chief

Q U E S T 20:2 2013 9 www.spacehistory101.com On 25 April 1962 the United States resumed testing of nuclear weapons, with some of the tests planned to take place in the atmosphere and outer space. These were the first above-ground tests carried out by the United States since 1958. The U.S. action was in response to Soviet atmos- pheric tests of very high-yield nuclear weapons in late 1961. On 9 July 1962 the STARFISH test exploded a 1.4– megaton device at an altitude of 400 kilometers. Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Glenn Seaborg noted that “to our great surprise and dismay, it developed that STARFISH added significantly to the electrons in the Van Allen belts. This result contra- President John F. Kennedy (left), John Glenn (center), and General Leighton I. Davis vened all predictions.” The added (right) ride together during a parade in Cocoa Beach, Florida, after Glenn's historic space radiation disabled or shortened first U.S. human orbital spacefight. Credit: NASA the operating lifetimes of at least six , five American and one Soviet. In addition, it created questions “Why take the risk with the unknown Slayton’s being selected as a Mercury about the impact of high altitude when you have astronauts in perfect astronaut, had even at that time strong- nuclear testing and the resulting added 13 physical shape ready to go?”10 ly suggested that Slayton was not qual- radiation on human space missions. When President Kennedy learned ified for spaceflight. In 1962, Lamb The first to raise this issue was of NASA’s decision, he asked Vice was not only a senior staff member of the Soviet Union. Cosmonaut Andriyan President Johnson to provide him with the Air Force Aerospace Medical Nikolayev was launched on a four-day the relevant background. Johnson on Center in , , but also mission on 11 August. That same day 22 March sent the president “a chronol- a friend of President Kennedy’s per- the Soviet Union in Moscow delivered ogy of the Slayton case.” Johnson told sonal physician, Dr. Janet Travell, and a diplomatic note addressed to Kennedy that “a decision has been an acquaintance of Kennedy’s military Secretary of State Dean Rusk, which made by NASA to assign Slayton to fly assistant Major General Ted Clifton. said that “terrestrial and cosmic obser- a subsequent three-orbit mission, pro- When NASA first announced that Deke vations of Soviet scientists have shown vided physiological tests now being Slayton was the astronaut for the sec- that nuclear explosions at high altitude planned for him produce no anomaly.” ond Mercury orbital flight, Lamb similar to the explosion carried out by In fact, Slayton’s fibrillations did “communicated with Clifton about the USA [on] 9 July 1962 create dangerous appear in those tests, and he did not go Slayton problem and he relayed the conditions for life and health of cosmo- into space until the Apollo- information to the President.” Lamb nauts.” Thus, said the note in tele- mission.11 subsequently discussed the issue graphic form: “Government Soviet Kennedy did not intervene to directly with President Kennedy; he Union expects that Government USA question NASA’s decision to ground remembers that “In the Kennedy tradi- will exhibit understanding of responsi- Slayton; this reflected his general tion, he asked me many searching bility lying on it and will refrain from approach of letting those officials in questions.”12 carrying out nuclear explosions which charge of a government agency make could create threat to safety of Soviet decisions specific to the operation of Nuclear Tests and Project Mercury cosmonaut.” Rusk quickly issued a that agency, unless there were excep- There was direct presidential public statement that “We wish Major tional circumstances that required involvement of a very different charac- Nikolayev a safe flight and a happy White House involvement. But ter in the next Mercury flight. Walter landing. The United States of course Kennedy, in this case as in many other Schirra was to be the pilot. The mis- contemplates no activities that would 14 instances in his presidency, did have an sions of Glenn and Carpenter had last- interfere with him in any way.” independent source of information. Dr. ed only three ; Schirra’s flight The implications for astronaut Lawrence Lamb, who had been one of was planned for six orbits and sched- safety of the unexpected added radia- the physicians that had examined uled for late September or early tion from the STARFISH test con- Slayton in 1959 during the process of October. cerned President Kennedy. At a 4

Q U E S T 20:2 2013 10 www.spacehistory101.com September meeting to discuss the issue, extended mission would carry Council staff, who was responsible for Kennedy wanted to know whether the Cooper’s spacecraft over Chinese, space issues, suggested to McGeorge existence of an artificial radiation belt North Vietnamese, and Cuban territory Bundy that in the kind of contingencies resulting from additional testing and territorial waters, and there was being discussed, “some flavor of “would preclude, or could preclude, concern regarding what might happen Presidential authorization would be our going to the moon.” He asked if an emergency forced Cooper to land highly desirable.” In response, Bundy NASA’s number three official, in or near one of those communist in a 3 May National Security Action Associate Administrator Robert countries. On 15 March the Joint Memorandum 237 told the secretaries Seamans, “What the impact could be Chiefs of Staff had requested “policy of State and Defense and the director of on a team of astronauts.” Seamans guidance at an early date to facilitate the Central Intelligence Agency that assured the president that the potential recovery operations”; astronaut and “the President is aware of the contin- impact was not life-threatening. In a spacecraft recovery was a Department gency planning” with respect to the National Security Council meeting on of Defense responsibility. This request possibility of landing in unfriendly 6 September, Kennedy decided to drop was relayed to the Department of State waters, and “agrees that the Secretary three of the remaining eleven tests and by Deputy Assistant of Defense for of Defense has adequate authority to directed that the planned schedule for International Security Affairs William authorize the penetration of the territo- future nuclear tests be revised “to Bundy (McGeorge Bundy’s brother) in rial waters . . . for the purpose of locat- accommodate the next MERCURY a 28 March letter. Bundy asked for ing, rendering assistance to, and launching.” Schirra’s six-orbit flight on “development of alternative contin- retrieving the personnel and space- 3 October went off without prob- gency plans for immediate considera- crafts [sic].” Cooper’s flight had no lems.15 tion and early implementation in the problems that might have forced an event the astronaut descends into early descent from orbit.16 Contingency Planning for unfriendly territory,” including plans Cooper Flight “covering situations in which force is No More Mercury Flights The last flight of Project Mercury required in the rescue of a downed On 21 May 21 Gordon Cooper was to be launched on 15 May 1963; astronaut.” and his fellow astronauts came to astronaut Gordon Cooper would stay in The White House got involved in Washington for a Rose Garden ceremo- space for 22 orbits. Unlike previous this policy issue. On 3 May Charles ny honoring Cooper and the end of the short-duration Mercury flights, this Johnson of the National Security Mercury program; President Kennedy

On 21 May 1963 President Kennedy and his wife Jacqueline hosted the Mercury astro- nauts and their wives for dinner in the White House family quarters. (Gordon Cooper and his wife are not in this photograph; John Glenn was in ). President Kennedy had presented the NASA Distinguished Service Medal to the astronaut from the final Mercury flight, Gordon Cooper, earlier in the day. As they relaxed over drinks, the astro- nauts lobbied the President, unsuccessfully, to add one more flight to Project Mercury. Clockwise from right: President Kennedy (in rocking chair), Alan Shepard, Virgil “Gus” Grissom, M. Scott Carpenter, Rene Carpenter, Donald “Deke” Slayton, Marjorie Slayton, , Mrs. Kennedy, Jo Schirra, Walter Schirra, Louise Shepard. Credit: JFK Presidential Library and Museum

Q U E S T 20:2 2013 11 www.spacehistory101.com paid tribute to the Mercury team. He noted that: that “it would not be unwarranted if the NASA were to pay the transportation expenses of your wife and children,” and “asked I think one of the things which warmed us the most during Mr. Webb to do this.”19 this flight was the realization that however extraordinary President Kennedy’s last encounter with the Mercury computers may be that we are still ahead of them and that astronauts was on 10 . In a Rose Garden ceremo- man is still the most extraordinary computer of all. His ny, he presented the astronauts with the “for judgment, his nerve, and the lessons he can learn from pioneering manned space flight in the United States.” experience still make him unique and, therefore, make Kennedy’s remarks at the ceremony placed the Mercury astro- manned flight necessary and not merely that of satellites. I nauts’ achievements in a broad context. The president said he hope that we will be encouraged to continue with this pro- was particularly glad to be awarding the Collier Trophy to the gram. I know that a good many people say, “Why go to the Mercury astronauts, because “I hope this award, which in moon,” just as many people said to Lindbergh, “Why go to effect closes out a particular phase of the program, will be a Paris.” Lindbergh said, “It is not so much a matter of logic stimulus to them and to the other astronauts who will carry our as it is a feeling.”17 flag to the moon and perhaps, some day, beyond.”20

After leaving the White House, Cooper addressed a joint A Black Astronaut? session of Congress. The astronauts then attended a luncheon As the Mercury program got underway, the issue of at the State Department hosted by Vice President Johnson at broadening the ethnic basis of the astronaut corps became an which NASA paid tribute to all those who had made Project issue of presidential concern. In an anecdote of questionable Mercury a success. Next they joined others at a reception at authenticity, one of Lyndon Johnson’s biographers reports that Administrator Webb’s house. Finally, the six astronauts and President Kennedy “liked to tell the story of how he and their wives (John Glenn was in Japan) were invited by Lyndon had watched [John] Glenn’s takeoff together from his President Kennedy and his wife Jacqueline to an informal din- office [in ], and how, as the countdown began and ner in the family quarters of the White House. After a few they were both watching very tensely, Johnson suddenly turned drinks, the president raised the question of another Mercury to Kennedy and said, ‘If John Glenn were only a Negro.’”21 flight, and the astronauts, led by Alan Shepard, “expressed All seven of the Mercury astronauts were Caucasian; this their views very vocally to the President that we should have was an unavoidable outcome of President Eisenhower’s 1958 another flight.” Kennedy “didn’t react strongly” to this argu- decision to limit astronaut candidates to military test pilots. ment, saying that “he felt that it should be the decision of the There were no non-Caucasian test pilots in the military servic- Space Administration to make.” es as the initial astronaut selection took place in 1959, and that The astronauts had told Webb at the reception at his was still the case as the Kennedy administration took office in home that they had intended to raise the issue with the presi- 1961. On 21 September 1961, Edward R. Murrow, the presti- dent. Webb had raised no objection, asking only that the astro- gious radio and television correspondent who had become the nauts also present to the president Webb’s reasons for opposing director of the U.S. Information Agency, wrote to James Webb, an additional flight. Webb was confident that the president asking “Why don’t we put the first non-white man in space?” would not intervene to reverse the judgment of NASA manage- He added “If your boys were to enroll and train a qualified ment. That indeed was the case; Kennedy asked the astronauts Negro and then fly him in whatever vehicle is available, we “What does Mr. Webb think?” Told that Webb opposed the could retell our whole space effort to the whole non-white additional flight, Kennedy responded “I think we’ll have to go world, which is most of it.” Webb responded to Murrow on 18 along with Mr. Webb.” Kennedy called Webb the next morn- October telling him that NASA had many suggestions for ing to reaffirm that he was not going to overrule Webb’s deci- adding to the seven Mercury astronauts, “including consider- sion.18 able interest . . . in the selection and flight of a woman.” There was one additional indication of President Webb’s reply “did not give any encouragement” to Murrow’s Kennedy’s personal interest in the Mercury astronauts. John suggestion because it was “inconsistent with our agency’s poli- Glenn had supported Gordon Cooper’s flight from aboard a cies.” 22 tracking ship off the coast of Japan, and then had flown his It is very likely that Murrow at this time or earlier also wife and two children to Japan at his own expense for a 10-day communicated his proposal directly to John Kennedy. holiday. However, both the U.S. Information Agency and the Kennedy as a presidential candidate had already been sensi- U.S. Embassy in Tokyo asked Glenn while he was in the coun- tized to the symbolic benefits of having at least one black U.S. try to make public appearances and to meet with Japanese lead- astronaut. According to one account, when Kennedy met with ers, including the Crown Prince and the Prime Minister. This various African-American leaders during his campaign to ask transformed what was supposed to be a vacation into almost an them what was needed to make sure he was the choice of most official visit; Glenn estimated that he spent two-thirds or three- black voters, Whitney Young, executive director of the quarters of his time in Japan on U.S. government matters. National Urban League, suggested that Kennedy pledge that he When President Kennedy learned from U.S. Ambassador to would make sure that NASA would recruit a black astronaut. Japan Edwin Reischauer about what had happened, he decided Although Kennedy did owe his election, among other factors,

Q U E S T 20:2 2013 12 www.spacehistory101.com to his strong support from African- The program began in August American voters, addressing civil rights 1962. Dwight completed the first por- issues was not one of his top policy pri- tion of the course (according to Yeager, orities, and neither during the campaign only with special attention and tutoring; nor in his first year in office did he make Dwight, in contrast, suggests not only such a public pledge. that he was not given special help, but Kennedy did take several civil that barriers to success were placed in rights steps in 1961, however. Among his path), and applied to enter the sec- them was putting pressure on the ond, more rigorous, phase, which would Department of Defense to enforce exist- focus on space skills and thus qualify its ing equal opportunity legislation and graduates to be candidate astronauts for regulations and promoting racial inte- either the Air Force or NASA. After the gration in the military services. As part Air Force reviewed all the applications of this initiative, the White House appar- for the second phase, Dwight, according ently quietly urged the Air Force to to Yeager, was rated 26th and last among include at least one black officer in an finalists for acceptance; plans called for incoming class at its new Aerospace accepting only 11 candidates. Research Pilot School, which had been As those who would be selected established in October 1961 as the first for the second, space-oriented portion of formal U.S. course. the course were about to be announced USAF Captain Ed Dwight. The criteria for applicants to the school in Spring 1963, Yeager was called by Air Credit: USAF. Courtesy of Ed Dwight included being under 35 years of age, Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay and having at least 1,500 hours of experi- told that “Bobby Kennedy wants a col- ence flying jet airplanes, possessing at ored in space. Get one in your course.” Edward R. Murrow continued to push least a bachelor’s degree in science or Yeager first tried to defer Dwight’s the White House regarding the benefits engineering, and having three consecu- acceptance to a subsequent space class, of having a black astronaut. Murrow tive “outstanding” ratings from his mili- but when he was told that this was not again contacted President Kennedy, tary superiors. acceptable to the White House, he stressing “the favorable international Of the then current black Air agreed to increase the number of stu- impact which would stem from our hav- Force pilots, only one, Captain Edward dents accepted to 15 instead of the ing a negro in training as an astronaut.” Dwight Jr., met all the criteria for planned 11, with 3 additional white 23 The Space Council got involved at this acceptance to the school. According applicants who had been rated ahead of point. Kennedy told Vice President to Dwight, on 4 , with- Dwight, but not originally selected, also Johnson that he hoped that “something out prior warning, he received a letter admitted. According to Dwight, on the might be done” in order to place an inviting him to apply to the Edwards night before the formal announcement African-American in training as an school. His goal at this point, he that he had been accepted into the astronaut. Space Council Executive recounts, was to become a career Air advanced course, President Kennedy Secretary Edward Welsh at a 12 July Force officer, not a and poten- called Dwight’s parents to congratulate 1962 meeting of the council reported tial astronaut candidate. Dwight did them on their son’s accomplishments, that NASA had already looked into the apply and was accepted for the first and the fact that he was to be admitted matter, and that “there are not available phase of the year-long program, aimed was leaked to the media by the White any but Caucasian males who could at teaching basic test pilot capabilities. House. meet the rigorous competence and expe- The commander of the Aerospace It was Attorney General Robert rience qualifications required.” Welsh Research Pilot School was legendary Kennedy, rather than his brother the had contacted the secretaries of the Air test pilot Colonel , the first president, who was most active at this Force and Navy, who “agreed to exam- person to fly faster than the speed of time in promoting Dwight’s astronaut ine the possibilities of working negroes sound. Yeager remembers that “from candidacy. While Dwight was complet- and orientals into their test pilot training the moment we picked our first class, I ing the first phase of his training and programs, as an initial step toward qual- was caught in a buzz saw of controversy even after he was admitted to the space ification for astronaut eligibility.”26 involving a black student. The White portion of the program, “every week, it As he progressed through his House, Congress, and civil rights groups seemed like, a detachment of Civil advanced training, Dwight applied to be came at me with meat cleavers, and the Rights Division lawyers would turn up a NASA astronaut. He was one of 26 only way I could save my head was to from Washington”; they “squinted in the people, many from venues other than the prove I wasn’t a damned bigot.” He adds desert sunlight and asked a great many Aerospace Research Pilot School, rec- that he “was informed that the White questions about the progress and treat- 25 ommended to NASA by the Air Force as House wanted a black pilot in the space ment of Ed Dwight.” potential astronauts; a total of 136 indi- course.”24 As the Dwight situation unfolded, Q U E S T 20:2 2013 13 www.spacehistory101.com viduals applied for selection. Of these, ipation in the space course at Edwards, events during the two years between NASA selected 14 as astronaut candi- the White House did not interfere with May 1961 and May 1963. While the dates in October 1963. Dwight was not NASA as it selected the 1963 class of Soviet Union continued to lead the among them, although two of his astronauts, and Dwight did not contest United States in developing and school colleagues, Dave Scott and NASA’s decision. That being the case, demonstrating capa- , both Caucasian, the immediate issue of naming a black bility, Project Mercury captured the were selected. astronaut disappeared. Indeed, NASA imagination of the American public and Several members of Congress would not select African-Americans for people around the world, by being con- and the black-oriented magazine Ebony astronaut training until 1978; the Air ducted in an open manner and by dram- suggested at the time and later that Force in 1967 did select a black man, atizing the Mercury astronauts as repre- Dwight had suffered from racial dis- Robert Lawrence, as a military astro- senting the best of American courage crimination during his time at Edwards; naut. and skill. Mercury gave the United according to Dwight that allegation States the breathing room it needed to was never investigated. Chuck Yeager Conclusion develop the launch vehicles and space- suggests that “the only prejudice The interaction between craft needed to catch up with Soviet against Dwight was a conviction shared Kennedy and the Mercury Seven is in capabilities; without its accomplish- by all the instructors that he was not many ways a microcosm of the ments, the Soviet Union would have qualified to be in the school.” Dwight Kennedy style as president. In execut- been unchallenged in human space- in his autobiography paints a very dif- ing the duties of his office, he kept him- flight achievements until the middle of ferent picture of systematic harassment self informed in detail about those gov- the decade. While in technical terms and prejudicial behavior by Yeager and ernment activities of highest priority Mercury achieved little more than other members of the school’s staff. and significance to the success of his demonstrate that humans could survive Yeager’s deputy Thomas McElmurry presidency, and used his various staff and function in the environment of later commented that “Dwight was per- advisers, in addition to his voracious space, it was a crucial political step on fectly capable of being a good astro- consumption of the public media, to the path to U.S. space leadership. For naut . . . He would not have been num- make sure that there was a constant President John F. Kennedy, Mercury ber one, but if it was important enough flow of relevant information reaching and its astronauts validated his 1961 to this country to have a minority early him. The president became personally decision that space leadership was, and in space then the logical guy was involved in every Mercury flight, even would continue to be, an important ele- Dwight. But it wasn’t important if it was just a congratulatory call to an ment of U.S. power and pride. Kennedy enough to somebody in this country at astronaut after his successful mission. did not live to see the culmination of this stage of the game to do it, so they But Kennedy also in almost all cases that decision in the form of the Apollo just chose not to do it.” Dwight’s class- deferred to those whom he had selected missions to the Moon; for him, it was mate Dave Scott, who was selected by to be in charge of a particular area of Project Mercury that began the explo- NASA as an astronaut candidate and government activity when decisions ration of what he called “this new later walked on the Moon, says that were required on how to proceed; only ocean” of space. Dwight was not selected as an astro- when there were significant conflicts naut because he was less qualified than among his advisers and the responsible About the Author other applicants, rather than as a result line officials was he likely to intervene. Dr. John M. Logsdon is the founder of of racial prejudice. This perspective This was the approach he followed, for the Institute and a profes- was confirmed by the individual in example, on the question of whether to sor emeritus at George Washington charge of NASA’s selection process, add an additional flight to Project University. His research interests focus Mercury astronaut Deke Slayton, who Mercury. on the policy and historical aspects of had been named head of the astronaut Kennedy’s presidency was also U.S. and international space activities. office after being taken off active flight highly personal. He wanted to know the Dr. Logsdon is the author of John F. status. Slayton notes that NASA was people involved in major government Kennedy and the Race to the Moon well aware of White House interest in programs and to see for himself what (2010), The Decision to Go to the Dwight’s candidacy, but although they were doing. He got to know the Moon: Project Apollo and the National “Dwight got through the school and did Mercury astronauts personally, inter- Interest (1970), and was the general okay . . . Okay wasn’t really enough. acted with them in both formal and editor of NASA’s seven-volume series, Had he been white, he wouldn’t even informal settings, and made sure that Exploring the Unknown: Selected have been a serious candidate . . . Just their concerns were heard at NASA and Documents in the History of the U.S. based on the flying and technical mat- in the White House. Civil Space Program. ters, Dwight finished out of the run- The six successful flights during ning.”27 Project Mercury, two suborbital and After supporting Dwight’s partic- four in Earth orbit, were headline

Q U E S T 20:2 2013 14 www.spacehistory101.com Notes 10. Shepard and Slayton, , 19. Letter from John F. Kennedy to Colonel 1. Unless otherwise noted, this and all 152-153. Glenn, 13 , White House Central Subject Files, Box 176, JFKL; John other quotations in this section are drawn 11. Loyd Swenson, James Grimwood, and Glenn Oral History Interview, 12 June from John M. Logsdon, John F. Kennedy Charles Alexander, This New Ocean: A 1964, JFKL. and the Race to the Moon (Palgrave History of Project Mercury (Government Macmillan, 2010). Printing Office, 1966), 440-442; 20. John F. Kennedy, “Remarks Upon 2. Tom Wolfe, (Farrar, Memorandum from Lyndon B. Johnson to Presenting the Collier Trophy to the First Straus, Giroux, 1979), 24. The President, 22 March 1962, with U.S. Astronauts,” 10 October 1963. Online attached chronology, President’s Office by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, 3. This account is drawn from Neal Files, Box 30, JFKL. The American Presidency Project. http:// Thompson, Light This Candle: The Life www.presidency.ucsb.edu and Times of Alan Shepard, America’s 12. Lawrence E. Lamb, M.D., Inside the /ws/?pid=9461 (Accessed 9 April 2013). First Spaceman (Crown Publishers, Space Race: A Space Surgeon’s Diary 2004), 260; Oral History Interview with (Synergy Books, 2006), 201. Lamb was 21. See Joseph D. Atkinson and Jay M. Alan B. Shepard Jr., 12 , John also one of Vice President Lyndon Shafritz, The Real Stuff: A History of F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Johnson’s physicians, but says that he NASA’s Astronaut Recruitment Program MA (JFKL); Wolfe, The Right Stuff, 122- never discussed the Slayton issue with (Praeger, 1985); Chuck Yeager and Leo 125, 273, 348. Johnson. Janos, Yeager: An Autobiography. (Bantam Books, 1985); Ed Dwight, 4. Alan Shepard and Deke Slayton with 13. Glenn T. Seaborg with the assistance Soaring on the Wings of a Dream (Third Jay Barbee and Howard Benedict, Moon of Benjamin S. Loeb, Kennedy, World Press, 2009) for a discussion of the Shot: The Inside Story of America’s Race Khrushchev and the Test Ban (University attempts to diversify the astronaut corps. to the Moon (Turner Publishing, Inc., of Press, 1981). 22. Atkinson and Shafritz, The Real Stuff, 1994), 129-132. 14. Telegram from McSweeney, U.S. 98-99. 5. Shepard and Slayton, Moon Shot, 77. Embassy, Moscow, to Secretary of State, While the media coverage of the seven 11 August 1962, National Security Files, 23. Dwight’s self-published 2009 autobi- astronauts during Project Mercury, espe- Box 307, JFKL; Seaborg, Kennedy, ography is a rambling account of his prej- cially by LIFE magazine, portrayed them as Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 156. udicial treatment during his time as an astronaut candidate and is of question- relatively bland individuals with similar 15. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and able historical reliability. For example, personalities, the reality was rather differ- the Test Ban, 158; Oral Dwight recounts an eight-hour interroga- ent. See Wolfe, The Right Stuff, for a col- History Interview, 27 March 1964, JFKL; tion in the West Wing of the White House orful portrayal of the behaviors of the National Security Council, “Record of as he was beginning his training and sev- seven men. Actions, 504th NSC Meeting, ” NSC eral unlikely sexual incidents. 6. John Glenn with Nick Taylor, John Action 2456, 6 September 1962,” Nevertheless, this brief account of White Glenn: A Memoir (Bantam Books, 1999), National Security Files, Box 313, JFKL. House involvement in support of Dwight’s 253, 281. John Glenn Oral History 16. Memorandum from Charles E. training as an astronaut candidate would Interview, 12 June 1964, JFKL. There is no Johnson for Mr. [McGeorge] Bundy, 3 May not be complete without reflecting record of the second meeting between 1963, National Security Files, Box 340, Dwight’s views of the experience. In addi- Glenn and Kennedy in the president’s offi- JFKL; McGeorge Bundy, National Security tion, there are inconsistencies in these cial appointment calendar, but it is clear Action Memorandum No. 237, “Project four accounts; what is written here is the that not all of Kennedy’s visitors were MERCURY Manned Space Flight (MA-9), 3 author’s best effort to provide an accurate noted therein. May 1962, National Security Files, Box rendering of events. Later in life, Dwight 7. Oral History Interview with Alan B. 340, JFKL. During the Kennedy adminis- reinvented himself as a successful sculp- Shepard Jr., 12 June 1964, JFKL. tration, President Kennedy signed many tor, particularly of African-American sub- National Security Action Memoranda, but jects. 8. Memorandum from James Webb to others were signed in the president’s Robert Gilruth and Hilden Cox, 16 March 24. Yeager and Janos, Chuck Yeager, 269. name by McGeorge Bundy. 1962, NASA Historical Reference 25. Yeager and Janos, Chuck Yeager, 270. Collection, NASA Headquarters, 17. John F. Kennedy: "Remarks Upon Washington, DC (NHRC), Folder 008936. Presenting the NASA Distinguished 26. Edward C. Welsh, “Astronaut Training The NASA policy on astronaut appear- Service Medal to Astronaut L. Gordon Report,” Record of National Aeronautics ances was contained in a 13 March direc- Cooper,” 21 May 1963. Gerhard Peters and Space Council Meeting, 12 July 1962, tive signed by James Webb and addressed and John T. Woolley, The American National Aeronautics and Space Council to the senior NASA leadership, National Presidency Project. http://www.presiden- Files, Box 2, JFKL. cy.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9225. Security Files, Box 282, JFKL. 27. Yeager and Janos, Chuck Yeager, 270; 9. For an account of the controversy 18. Thompson, Light This Candle, 291; Dwight, Soaring on the Wings of a Dream, about the selling of the Mercury astro- Robert Seamans Oral History Interview, chapter 1, 2, 15; Atkinson and Shafritz, The nauts’ personal stories, see Robert 27 March 1964, JFKL; Alan B. Shepard Jr. Real Stuff, 101; Donald “Deke” Slayton Sherrod, “The Selling of the Astronauts,” Oral History Interview, 12 June 1964, with Michael Cassutt, Deke: U.S. Manned Columbia Journalism Review (May/June JFKL. Space from Mercury to the Shuttle (Tom 1973). Doherty Associates, 1994), 133.

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