S/PV.8449 the Situation in the Middle East, Including the Palestinian Question 22/01/2019
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QRCS Delivers Medical Aid to Hospitals in Aleppo, Idlib
QRCS Delivers Medical Aid to Hospitals in Aleppo, Idlib May 3rd, 2016 ― Doha: Qatar Red Crescent Society (QRCS) is proceeding with its support of the medical sector in Syria, by providing medications, medical equipment, and fuel to help health facilities absorb the increasing numbers of injuries, amid deteriorating health conditions countrywide due to the conflict. Lately, QRCS personnel in Syria procured 30,960 liters of fuel to operate power generators at the surgical hospital in Aqrabat, Idlib countryside. These $17,956 supplies will serve the town's 100,000 population and 70,000 internally displaced people (IDPs). In coordination with the Health Directorate in Idlib, QRCS is operating and supporting the hospital with fuel, medications, medical consumables, and operational costs. Working with a capacity of 60 beds and four operating rooms, the hospital is specialized in orthopedics and reconstructive procedures, in addition to general medicine and dermatology clinics. In western Aleppo countryside, QRCS personnel delivered medical consumables and serums worth $2,365 to the health center of Kafarnaha, to help reduce the pressure on the center's resources, as it is located near to the clash frontlines. Earlier, a needs assessment was done to identify the workload and shortfalls, and accordingly, the needed types of supplies were provided to serve around 1,500 patients from the local community and IDPs. In relation to its $200,000 immediate relief intervention launched last week, QRCS is providing medical supplies, fuel, and food aid; operating AlSakhour health center for 100,000 beneficiaries in Aleppo City, at a cost of $185,000; securing strategic medical stock for the Health Directorate; providing the municipal council with six water tankers to deliver drinking water to 350,000 inhabitants at a cost of $250,000; arranging for more five tankers at a cost of $500,000; providing 1,850 medical kits, 28,000 liters of fuel, and water purification pills; and supplying $80,000 worth of food aid. -
The Illegal Excavation and Trade of Syrian Cultural Objects
JOURNAL OF FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY, 2018 VOL. 43, NO. 1, 74–84 https://doi.org/10.1080/00934690.2017.1410919 The Illegal Excavation and Trade of Syrian Cultural Objects: A View from the Ground Neil Brodiea and Isber Sabrineb aUniversity of Oxford, Oxford, UK; bUniversitat de Girona, Girona, Spain ABSTRACT KEYWORDS The illegal excavation and trade of cultural objects from Syrian archaeological sites worsened Syria; looting; cultural markedly after the outbreak of civil disturbance and conflict in 2011. Since then, the damage to objects; coins; policy archaeological heritage has been well documented, and the issue of terrorist funding explored, but hardly any research has been conducted into the organization and operation of theft and trafficking of cultural objects inside Syria. As a first step in that direction, this paper presents texts of interviews with seven people resident in Syria who have first-hand knowledge of the trade, and uses information they provided to suggest a model of socioeconomic organization of the Syrian war economy regarding the trafficking of cultural objects. It highlights the importance of coins and other small objects for trade, and concludes by considering what lessons might be drawn from this model to improve presently established public policy. Introduction conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/). Nevertheless, most of what is known about illegal excavation and trade inside Like that of many countries in the Middle East and North Syria comes from some of the better media reporting, Africa (MENA) region, for the past few decades the archaeo- which has on occasion managed to access people with first- logical heritage of Syria has been robbed of cultural objects for hand knowledge or experience of the problem. -
The New Israeli Land Reform August 2009
Adalah’s Newsletter, Volume 63, August 2009 The New Israeli Land Reform August 2009 Background On 3 August 2009, the Knesset (Israeli parliament) passed the Israel Land Administration (ILA) Law (hereinafter the “Land Reform Law”), with 61 Members of Knesset (MKs) voting in favor of the law and 45 MKs voting against it. The new land reform law is wide ranging in scope: it institutes broad land privatization; permits land exchanges between the State and the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemet Le-Israel) (hereinafter - the “JNF”), the land of which is exclusively reserved for the Jewish people; allows lands to be allocated in accordance with "admissions committee" mechanisms and only to candidates approved by Zionist institutions working solely on behalf of the Jewish people; and grants decisive weight to JNF representatives in a new Land Authority Council, which would replace the Israel Land Administration (ILA). The land privatization aspects of the new law also affect extremely prejudicially properties confiscated by the state from Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel; Palestinian refugee property classified as “absentee” property; and properties in the occupied Golan Heights and in East Jerusalem. Land Privatization Policy The law stipulates that 800,000 dunams of land currently under state-control will be privatized, enabling private individuals to acquire ownership rights in them. The reform will lead to the transfer of ownership in leased properties and land governed by outline plans enabling the issuance of building permits throughout the State of Israel in the urban, rural and agricultural sectors. Change in the organizational structure of the Israel Lands Administration The reform further stipulates a broad organizational re-structuring of the ILA. -
Hydro-Hegemony in the Upper Jordan Waterscape: Control and Use of the Flows Water Alternatives 6(1): 86-106
www.water-alternatives.org Volume 6 | Issue 1 Zeitoun, M.; Eid-Sabbagh, K.; Talhami, M. and Dajani, M. 2013. Hydro-hegemony in the Upper Jordan waterscape: Control and use of the flows Water Alternatives 6(1): 86-106 Hydro-Hegemony in the Upper Jordan Waterscape: Control and Use of the Flows Mark Zeitoun School of International Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK; [email protected] Karim Eid-Sabbagh School of Oriental and African Studies, Houghton Square, London; [email protected] Michael Talhami Independent researcher, Amman, Jordan; [email protected] Muna Dajani Independent researcher, Jerusalem; [email protected] ABSTRACT: This paper blends the analytical framework of hydro-hegemony with a waterscape reading to explore the use and methods of control of the Upper Jordan River flows. Seen as a sub-component of the broader Lebanon-Israel-Syria political conflict, the struggles over water are interpreted through evidence from the colonial archives, key informant interviews, media pieces, and policy and academic literature. Extreme asymmetry in the use and control of the basin is found to be influenced by a number of issues that also shape the concept of 'international waterscapes': political borders, domestic pressures and competition, perceptions of water security, and other non-material factors active at multiple spatial scales. Israeli hydro-hegemony is found to be independent of its riparian position, and due in part to its greater capacity to exploit the flows. More significant are the repeated Israeli expressions of hard power which have supported a degree of (soft) 'reputational' power, and enable control over the flows without direct physical control of the territory they run through – which is referred to here as 'remote' control. -
Annual Report 2016 Contents
Regional Office (Amman) Ramallah Tel: +96264647837 Tel: +97022948222 Fax: +96264630451 Fax: +97022948223 P.O.box: 6181 Amman 11118 - Jordan P.O.box: 1708 Ramallah - Palestine [email protected] [email protected] Annual Report Committed to investing in Palestine Palestine Development and Investment, Ltd. (PADICO HOLDING) Foreign, limited, public shareholding limited Liability Company, registered in the Republic of Liberia Under the Liberian Business Law of 1976 Annual Report 2016 Contents PADICO HOLDING Profile 5 PADICO Holding: Twenty two years of investment in Palestine 7 Board of Directors 12 Shareholders 15 Milestones& Prominent Landmarks since PADICO HOLDING Inception 18 Board of Directors’ Message 20 Executive Committee Report 24 Summary of the Palestinian economy performance during 2016 30 PADICO Scope of Investments: Economic Sectors and Investments 32 Summary of Investments’ Performance 35 Future Perspectives (outlook) 77 Social Responsibility and Thought Leadership 78 PADICO Financial Performance Report during 2016 93 Main Financial Indicators 100 Performance of PADICO Holding Shares 101 Auditors’ Report and Consolidated Financial Statements 102 PADICO HOLDING Profile 5 PADICO Holding: Twenty two years of investment in Palestine 7 Board of Directors 12 Shareholders 15 Milestones& Prominent Landmarks since PADICO HOLDING Inception 18 Board of Directors’ Message 20 Executive Committee Report 24 Summary of the Palestinian economy performance during 2016 30 PADICO Scope of Investments: Economic Sectors and Investments 32 Summary of Investments’ Performance 35 Future Perspectives (outlook) 77 Social Responsibility and Thought Leadership 78 PADICO Financial Performance Report during 2016 93 Main Financial Indicators 100 Performance of PADICO Holding Shares 101 Auditors’ Report and Consolidated Financial Statements 102 4 General Overview Palestine Development and Investment, Ltd. -
Towards a Middle East at Peace: Hidden Issues in Arab–Israeli Hydropolitics
Water Resources Development, Vol. 20, No. 2, 193–204, June 2004 Towards a Middle East at Peace: Hidden Issues in Arab–Israeli Hydropolitics ARNON MEDZINI* & AARON T. WOLF** *Department of Geography, Oranim School of Education, Tivon, Israel **Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, USA ABSTRACT When peace negotiations do one day resume between Israelis and Arabs, shared water resources will again take centre stage, acting both as an irritant between the parties, and as a tremendous inducement to reach agreement. The ‘hidden’ hydropo- litical issues that will need to be resolved between Israel, Lebanon and Syria in the course of eventual boundary talks are considered. Two of these issues, the village of Ghajar and its relation to the Wazani Springs, and the possibility of groundwater flow from the Litani to the Jordan headwaters, change the fundamental understanding of the relation- ship between hydrologic and political claims, and could threaten the entire approach to water negotiations both between Israel and Syria and between Israel and Lebanon. Fortunately, other agreements within the basin can inform the path solutions here might take. The most critical step towards conflict resolution is separating the concepts of territorial sovereignty from water security. This can be done most effectively by offering joint management, monitoring and enforcement strategies, as well as encouraging greater transparency in water data across boundaries. Introduction Despite the current deadly, and apparently intractable, conflict between Israelis and Arabs, history suggests that peace negotiations will one day resume. When they do, shared water resources will again take centre stage, acting both as an irritant between the parties, and as a tremendous inducement to reach agree- ment. -
Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations
Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations Casey L. Addis Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs February 1, 2011 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R40054 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations Summary Lebanon is a religiously diverse country transitioning toward independence and democratic consolidation after a ruinous civil war and the subsequent Syrian and Israeli occupations. The United States and Lebanon have historically enjoyed a good relationship due in part to cultural and religious ties; the democratic character of the state; a large, Lebanese-American community in the United States; and the pro-western orientation of Lebanon, particularly during the cold war. Current policy priorities of the United States include strengthening the weak democratic institutions of the state, limiting the influence of Iran, Syria, and others in Lebanon’s political process, and countering threats from Hezbollah and other militant groups in Lebanon. Following Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 and the war between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, the Bush Administration requested and Congress appropriated a significant increase in U.S. assistance to Lebanon. Since 2006, U.S. assistance to Lebanon has topped $1 billion total over three years, including for the first time U.S. security assistance for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) of Lebanon. Several key issues in U.S.-Lebanon relations could potentially affect future U.S. assistance to Lebanon. The scope and influence of foreign actors, primarily Syria and Iran; unresolved territorial disputes; concerns about extremist groups operating in Lebanon; and potential indictments by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) are among the challenges facing the Lebanese government and U.S. -
S/2019/321 Security Council
United Nations S/2019/321 Security Council Distr.: General 16 April 2019 Original: English Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018) Report of the Secretary-General I. Introduction 1. The present report is the sixtieth submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014), paragraph 10 of resolution 2165 (2014), paragraph 5 of resolution 2191 (2014), paragraph 5 of resolution 2258 (2015), paragraph 5 of resolution 2332 (2016), paragraph 6 of resolution 2393 (2017),paragraph 12 of resolution 2401 (2018) and paragraph 6 of resolution 2449 (2018), in the last of which the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide a report at least every 60 days, on the implementation of the resolutions by all parties to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. 2. The information contained herein is based on data available to agencies of the United Nations system and obtained from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and other relevant sources. Data from agencies of the United Nations system on their humanitarian deliveries have been reported for February and March 2019. II. Major developments Box 1 Key points: February and March 2019 1. Large numbers of civilians were reportedly killed and injured in Baghuz and surrounding areas in south-eastern Dayr al-Zawr Governorate as a result of air strikes and intense fighting between the Syrian Democratic Forces and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. From 4 December 2018 through the end of March 2019, more than 63,500 people were displaced out of the area to the Hawl camp in Hasakah Governorate. -
Covid-19: Tool of Conflict Or Opportunity for Local Peace in Northwest Syria
Supported by the UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), the Covid Collective is based at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS). Research Report July 2021 C ovid-19: Tool of Conflict or Opportunity for Local Peace in Northwest Syria? © Baraa Obied Juline Beaujouan Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP) at the University of Edinburgh Acknowledgements This research is an output from the Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP), a partner in the Covid Collective. Supported by the UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), the Covid Collective is based at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS). The Collective brings together the expertise of UK and Southern-based research partner organisations and offers a rapid social science research response to inform decision-making on some of the most pressing Covid-19 related development challenges. Opinions stated in this brief are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Covid Collective, its partners, or FCDO. Any use of this work should acknowledge the author and the Political Settlements Research Programme. For online use, we ask readers to link to the original resource on the PSRP website. Thanks are due to Christine Bell for peer review and editorial advice, and to Eyas Ghreiz and Abdulah El hafi for collaborating on the study and offering feedback on various versions of the draft. Thanks to Harriet Cornell for editing and production work. Thanks to the Blue Team and Civilization Team for illustrating the report with original artwork. The author hereby thanks all the people who took the time to participate in this study and all the collaborators who contributed to this project. -
Syria Market Monitoring Exercise Cash-Based Responses Snapshot: 16-23 October 2017 Technical Working Group
Syria Market Monitoring Exercise Cash-Based Responses Snapshot: 16-23 October 2017 Technical Working Group KEY FINDINGS OVERVIEW • The most significant trend was the near currencies decreased this month, which • To inform humanitarian actors’ cash and voucher Syrian household for one month. doubling of SMEB costs in besieged areas. resulted in decreasing prices of several programming, REACH and the Cash-Based • Between 16 and 23 October 2017, a network While SMEB data collected was incomplete assessed items. The median exchange rates Responses Technical Working Group (CBR– of 12 NGOs involved in cash-based responses due to shortages and consequently the paucity for USD/SYP decreased by 10%, TRY/SYP by TWG) conduct monthly monitoring of key markets in Syria (CARE/Shafak, Concern, Danish of price data, the sudden increase in the price 10%, and JOD/SYP by 5% across assessed throughout Syria to assess the availability and Church Aid, GOAL, IRC, Mercy Corps, People of key items in the past month is evident. areas. affordability of basic commodities. in Need, REACH, Save the Children, Solidarités • The shortages of chicken and potatoes • SMEB cost changes greater than 10% were • Monitored commodities reflect those that are International and Violet) contributed data from 72 continued in multiple communities in Eastern observed in 11 of the 50 subdistricts with typically available, sold in markets and consumed subdistricts spanning 11 governorates. For Ghouta, with additional shortage of eggs and comparable data between September and by an average Syrian household including food coverage, see the map on the left. milk in Arbin. In addition, LPG continues to be October. -
Avoiding Another War Between Israel and Hezbollah
COUNTING THE COST Avoiding Another War between Israel and Hezbollah By Nicholas Blanford and Assaf Orion “He who wishes to fight must first count the cost.” Sun Tzu, The Art of War ABOUT THE SCOWCROFT MIDDLE EAST SECURITY INITIATIVE The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative honors the legacy of Brent Scowcroft and his tireless efforts to build a new security architecture for the region. Our work in this area addresses the full range of security threats and challenges including the danger of interstate warfare, the role of terrorist groups and other nonstate actors, and the underlying security threats facing countries in the region. Through all of the Council’s Middle East programming, we work with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region. You can read more about our programs at www.atlanticcouncil.org/ programs/middle-east-programs/. May 2020 ISBN-13: 978-1-61977-099-7 This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. This report is made possible by general support to the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. COUNTING THE COST Avoiding Another War between Israel and Hezbollah CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................2 -
Galilee Sea Of
UN Demilitarised Zone 0 10 km Mt Hermon 0 5 miles Mt Hermon Hatzbani Ski Station River Dan Nahal 98 Neve Ativ Tel Dan Banias (Israeli Metula Nature Nature Nimrod settlement) L E B A N O N Ghajar Reserve ReserveFortress Majdal Nahal Iyyun Shams Kibbutz 989 Kibbutz Kfar Nature Reserve Nimrod (Israeli Kibbutz Dan 99 Gil’adi settlement) Tel Hai Ma’ayan Ein Kinya ine Kibbutz Banias 4 99 Birket UN Demilitarised Zone 9977 Baruch Snir Waterfall Mas'ada Ram 7 HaGoshrim 9 1 Kiryat Beit Hillel raeli L Shmona Border of 1923 Is Buq'ata Manara 9888 British Mandate 918 of Palestine 978 98 90 Sde Nehemia Odem Kibbutz (Israeli Quneitra Kibbutz Neot Kfar Blum settlement) Viewpoint Mordechai 977 Mt Bental 959 (1165m) 886 Wasset Jct Hula 9881 Merom Golan Quneitra Valley (Israeli settlement) Ramot Agamon HaHula Mt Avital Naftali Ein Zivan 899 (Israeli Zivan Jct 886 978 settlement) Kerem Beit 90 Hula Bar'am Nature 918 Zimra Reserve Gilabon 98 Yesud Nature Ramat Dalton Nafah Jct HaMa'ala Yesud Reserve Jct HaMa'ala 91 Ramat Dalton Jordan River Rafting Jish Industrial Park Zavitan UPPER GALILEE Ayalet Mt Meron Summit (13km); Gadot GOLAN HaShahar Jct Nahariya (40km) Tel Hatzor Nahal HEIGHTS Kadita Hatzor B'not Ya'akov Katzrin Tomb of iver Bat Ya'ar HaGlilit 91 Bridge (Israeli Katzrin Industrial Zone the Rashbi Mahanayim R settlement) Rosh n 9088 87 Pina Yehudiya Nature Reserve – 866 Meron Mahanayim Kfar Ani'am Artists' Village Jct Jct HaNasi Jorda Mesushim Entrance (Israeli settlement) 888 Mt Meron Tsfat Yehudiya Nature Reserve Nature Reserve 89 90 Yehudiya Nature