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Fraud Report FINAL 23/12/03 3:25 PM Page I Fraud Report FINAL 23/12/03 3:25 PM Page i M E I A N L T R O A F P V I I A C T O R PARLIAMENT OF VICTORIA DRUGS AND CRIME PREVENTION COMMITTEE INQUIRY INTO FRAUD AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE Final Report January 2004 by Authority Government Printer for the State of Victoria No. 55 Session 2003-2004 Fraud Report FINAL 23/12/03 3:25 PM Page ii The Report was prepared by the Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee. Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee Inquiry into Fraud and Electronic Commerce: – Final Report DCPC, Parliament of Victoria ISBN: 0-646-43091-2 Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee Level 8 35 Spring Street Melbourne Victoria 3000 Telephone: (03) 9651 3541 Facsimile: (03) 9651 3603 Email: [email protected] http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/dcpc page ii Fraud Report FINAL 23/12/03 3:25 PM Page iii Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee – 55th Parliament Ms Carolyn Hirsh, M.L.C.– Chair The Hon. Robin Cooper, M.L.A. – Deputy Chairman Ms Kirstie Marshall, M.L.A. Mr Ian Maxfield, M.L.A. The Hon. Sang Minh Nguyen, M.L.C. Dr Bill Sykes, M.L.A. Mr Kim Wells, M.L.A. Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee – 54th Parliament The Hon. Cameron Boardman, M.L.C. – Chairman Mr Bruce Mildenhall, M.L.A. – Deputy Chairman The Hon. Robin Cooper, M.L.A. Mr Kenneth Jasper, M.L.A. Mr Hurtle Lupton, M.L.A. The Hon. Sang Minh Nguyen, M.L.C. Mr Richard Wynne, M.L.A. Committee Staff Ms Sandy Cook Executive Officer Mr Pete Johnston Senior Legal Officer (Inquiry into Amphetamine and ‘Party’ Drug Use) Ms Michelle Heane Office Manager Consultants, Inquiry into Fraud and Electronic Commerce Dr Russell G. Smith (Discussion Paper and Final Report) Deputy Director of Research Australian Institute of Criminology Mr Jamie Walvisch (Final Report) Research Analyst Australian Institute of Criminology Mr Stuart Candy (Discussion Paper) Research Assistant Australian Institute of Criminology page iii Fraud Report FINAL 23/12/03 3:25 PM Page iv Functions of the Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee The Victorian Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee is constituted under the Parliamentary Committees Act 2003 (Vic) Section 7. The functions of the Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee are, if so required or permitted under this Act, to inquire into, consider and report to the Parliament on any proposal, matter or thing concerned with – (a) the use of drugs, including the manufacture, supply or distribution of drugs; (b) the level or causes of crime or violent behaviour. Terms of Reference Received from the Legislative Assembly on Wednesday 17 April 2003. To the Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee – for inquiry, consideration and report by 31 December 2003 on: (a) the extent and nature of fraud and white-collar crime in Victoria; (b) the impact of new technology supporting E-commerce on the opportunities for fraud; (c) the current and proposed state, Commonwealth and international strategies and initiatives in relation to dealing with fraud and white- collar crime; and (d) the need for policy and legislative reform to combat fraud and white- collar crime in Victoria. page iv Fraud Report FINAL 23/12/03 3:25 PM Page v Chair’s Foreword The Inquiry into Fraud and Electronic Commerce was commenced in 2002 by the Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee of the 54th Parliament. A great deal of work was undertaken and a Discussion Paper was produced, providing a comprehensive literature review, clarification and expansion of the Terms of Reference, and a great deal of preliminary evidence. Following the 2002 election, a new Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee, established by the 55th Parliament, was asked to continue the work already commenced. The same Terms of Reference were resubmitted to the Committee to enable work to be completed. This Report is the result. Fraud, and the somewhat broader concept, ‘white-collar crime’, have profound effects on the community, both in terms of financial loss to large organisations and government and its life-changing effects (in many cases) on individual victims. It is estimated that fraud cost the Victorian community as much as $641 million last year, although there are no truly accurate data. Because fraud is not limited to any Australian state, or indeed Australia’s national boundaries, the Committee believes that the major responses to fraud should be co-ordinated nationally. The Committee’s recommendations are therefore formulated to reflect national and international best practice. Despite the proliferation of fraud in the corporate sector, the investigation of corporate crime would be far broader than would be possible in this Inquiry. The Committee believes that corporate crime is best dealt with by such organisations as the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the Australian Crime Commission, and other national organisations specifically established to deal with corporate crime. This Report focuses on fraud committed by individuals, with particular attention given to identity-related fraud and credit card fraud that relate to electronic commerce. The Report focuses particularly on financial crimes committed using electronic technologies. The dramatic and continually increasing use of electronic commerce by individuals, small businesses, large corporations and government, invariably requiring electronic funds transfer, has led to an increase in all three factors which enable fraud to take place – motivated offenders, suitable targets and the absence of adequate constraints or guardians. page v Fraud Report FINAL 23/12/03 3:25 PM Page vi Inquiry into Fraud and Electronic Commerce – FINAL REPORT Evidence to the Committee demonstrated that it is impossible to develop a truly effective response to fraud until a more accurate picture of its nature and extent is available. Many of the Committee’s recommendations concern the collection, analysis and dissemination of data related to all types of fraud in Victoria. A major recommendation concerns the establishment of a Victorian Fraud Information and Reporting Centre within the Victorian Police. The Committee envisages that this centre would be staffed primarily by civilians with an understanding of criminology and expertise in areas such as law, commerce, banking and statistics. The Committee believes that one of the greatest deterrents to fraud within organisations is a commitment by upper-level management to the prevention of fraud, an understanding of how to achieve the goal of fraud prevention, a set of policies to this end, and communication with employees both directly and through modeling of a fraud prevention ethic. An important fraud control measure lies in education of members of the community to decrease their vulnerability to becoming victims of fraud. The more awareness in the community about the types of fraud likely to be perpetrated, the less likely is a potential perpetrator to succeed in a ‘scam’. Many people do not report fraud, as they feel it is somehow their own fault and they do not want others to see them as ‘foolish’. The Committee has recommended that the central collection and analysis agency also take responsibility for dissemination of information about fraud to the public. The Committee hopes that this Report will provide a basis for Victorians to prevent becoming victims of fraud, to be discouraged from attempting to commit fraud, and to establish adequate security measures to make the commission of fraud impossible. I want to express my sincere thanks to Dr. Russell Smith and Mr Jamie Walvisch, consultants for this Inquiry, for their commitment to the project and for drafting this Report, and to Committee staff – Ms Sandy Cook, Executive Officer, for her outstanding efforts and attention to detail in all aspects of the preparation of this Report, and Ms Michelle Summerhill, Ms. Rhonda MacMahon and Ms Sandy Jensen, Office Managers, for their assistance with the Inquiry. I would also like to thank the members of both Committees for their participation and contribution to the Inquiry. In particular the previous Chair, for his committed stewardship of the preliminary research and the production of Discussion Paper which formed the basis of this Report. I hope that all key individuals and organisations concerned about fraud and ‘white-collar crime’ closely consider the contents of this Report, as the Committee believes significant community benefit will flow from the implementation of the recommendations made. Carolyn Hirsh M.L.C. Chair page vi Fraud Report JUST EXEC 23/12/03 3:21 PM Page vii Executive Summary and Recommendations Fraud and white-collar crime have far-reaching effects on the community, not only in terms of the financial impact on business and government, but also because of the effects on individuals who are victimised. It is estimated that these crimes cost Victoria as much as $641 million last year – money which could be better used for essential community works in promoting health, education and security. It is the purpose of this Inquiry to examine the trends in this area, and to look at how Victorian law and policy can best respond. Due to the ease with which fraud transcends domestic and international jurisdictional boundaries, especially in the context of electronic commerce, the Committee believes that the best response should be a national, integrated approach that uses the resources of the many federal, state and territory bodies working in this area in a co-ordinated fashion. No one agency, acting alone, can expect to be able to tackle crimes of dishonesty effectively. The Committee is therefore concerned to ensure that any Victorian response reflects best practice and is in accord with measures implemented in other places in response to these global concerns. The Committee is also concerned to ensure that any safeguards or controls that are put in place to minimise fraud risk, should not be so onerous as to preclude or frustrate any legitimate activities of business and government.
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