Chapter 7 Party Alignments. Change and Continuity Herbert Kitschelt and Philipp Rehm

ONLINE APPENDIX 1: The fading of social structure as a direct determinant of vote choices, but the persistence of ideological orientations

Consider in this regard data on Sweden from 1956 to 1999, one of the few cases where at least a time series on attitudes concerning redistribution can be related to vote choice, together with a range of socio- demographic controls that unfortunately does not include an occupational division in the manner proposed by Oesch and Häusermann/Kriesi in this volume (Figure 1 and explanatory note).

If we calculate a richer model for Sweden in 2008 that includes a more sophisticated set of socio- demographic controls (including occupational experiences), as well as attitudes pertaining to distribution (greed), socio-political governance (grid) and external boundary drawing (group), the pseudo R-square of a multinomial model for Sweden exceeds an explained variance of 0.2 – more than the highest score in Figure 1.1

Figure 1: Vote choice in Sweden

Sweden .2

.15 R2

.1

.05

1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996

Redistribution Socio-demographics (few) both

Note:

Data are from the Swedish Election Studies 1956-1998, as provided by Thomassen (2005, 2009). Shown are pseudo-R2 (McFadden) from multinomial estimations, with the following five parties as dependent variable: Left Party (Vänsterpartiet); Social (Socialdemokraterna); Center Party (Centerpartiet); People’s Party (Folkpartiet Liberalerna); Moderate Party (Moderata Samlingspartiet).

The line “both” contains both a redistribution item on hand side, as well as the socio-demographic variables.

The socio-demographic variables are gender, age, marital status, education, and union membership. Income and labor force status are available for most, but not all years and therefore left out (but this does not change the results much).

The redistribution item is based on a survey item that is fairly similar over time:

1 This is consistent with the more detailed and careful longitudinal study of Danish, British, Dutch, Norwegian and Swedish vote choices by Knutsen and Kumlin (2005).

 “We have put together some opinions which appear in the political debate. I will read out this opinion one by one, and ask you to choose one of the answers on this card. Do you agree with the opinion or do you think it is wrong? - 1985-1998: Social reforms in this country have gone so far that the state ought to reduce rather than increase social benefits and support for citizens - 1964-1979: increase social benefits and support for people o 1 agree completely; 2 agree on the whole; 3 disagree on the whole; 4 disagree completely; 8 don’t know; 9 answer missing; 99 did not get the question  There are a few deviations over time (1956, 1960, 1982). They are:

- 1956 Some people think that social reforms in this country have gone so far that the in the future ought to reduce rather than increase subsides and allowances to citizens. Do you agree with this opinion? o 1 agree; 5 disagree; 8 don’t know; 9 answer missing; 99 did not get the question - 1960: We have put together some opinions which appear in the political debate. I will read out this opinion one by one, and ask you to choose one of the answers on this card. Do you agree with the opinion or do you think it is wrong? Social reforms in this country have gone so far that the state ought to reduce rather than increase social benefits and support for people

o 1 agree completely; 2 agree on the whole; 3 disagree on the whole; 4 disagree completely; 8 don’t know; 9 answer missing; 99 did not get the question

- I will now read to you a list of policies which people think ought to be implemented in Sweden. What is your opinion about the proposal to: Reduce social spending (1982):

o 1 very good proposal, very important that it is implemented; 2 fairly good proposal, fairly important that it is implemented; 3 does not really matter; 4 fairly bad proposal, fairly important that it is not implemented; 5 very bad proposal, very important that it is not implemented; 8 don’t know; 9 answer missing; 99 did not get the question.

ONLINE APPENDIX 2: Construction of greed, grid, and group factors

We use the European Social Survey 2008 (ESS 2008) to operationalize the greed-grid-group dimensions, simply not only because it is currently the cross-national survey with the most attitudinal items relevant for our purposes. It also has detailed information on respondents’ occupations, which is critical to measure our core explanatory variables.

Since we derive the greed-grid-group dimensions deductively, we hand-picked potential survey items to arrive, in a trial and error process, at measures of the three dimensions. We performed extensive data reduction analyses (mainly principal component analyses and various types of factor analyses) to determine which items should make our final list. In the end, we decided to capture each dimension by three items on fairly similar scales. They are, respectively:

Group:  [b35=imsmetn]: Now, using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here? Answer categories (AC): 1 Allow many to come and live here; 2 Allow some; 3 Allow a few; 4 Allow none; 7 Refusal; 8 Don't know; 9 No answer. Note: Scale is reversed  [b36=imdfetn]: How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people? AC: 1 Allow many to come and live here; 2 Allow some; 3 Allow a few; 4 Allow none; 7 Refusal; 8 Don't know; 9 No answer. Note: Scale is reversed  [b37=impcntr]: How about people from the poorer countries outside ? AC: 1 Allow many to come and live here; 2 Allow some; 3 Allow a few; 4 Allow none; 7 Refusal; 8 Don't know. Note: Scale is reversed

Grid:  [d2=schtaut]: Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: Schools must teach children to obey authority. AC: 1 Agree strongly; 2 Agree; 3 Neither agree nor disagree; 4 Disagree; 5 Disagree strongly; 7 Refusal; 8 Don't know; 9 No answer  [d5=hrshsnt]: Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: People who break the law should be given much harsher sentences than they are these days. AC: 1 Agree strongly; 2 Agree; 3 Neither agree nor disagree; 4 Disagree; 5 Disagree strongly; 7 Refusal; 8 Don't know; 9 No answer  [c13=trrprsn]: Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of these statements : If a man is suspected of planning a terrorist attack in [country], the police should have the power to keep him in prison until they are satisfied he was not involved. AC: 1 Agree strongly; 2 Agree; 3 Neither agree nor disagree; 4 Disagree; 5 Disagree strongly; 7 Refusal; 8 Don't know; 9 No answer

Greed:  [d1=dfincac]: Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. Large differences in people’s incomes are acceptable to properly reward differences in talents and efforts. AC: 1 Agree strongly; 2 Agree; 3 Neither agree nor disagree; 4 Disagree; 5 Disagree strongly; 7 Refusal; 8 Don't know; 9 No answer  [d4=smdfslv]: Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. For a society to be fair, differences in people’s standard of living should be small. AC: 1 Agree strongly; 2 Agree; 3 Neither agree nor disagree; 4 Disagree; 5 Disagree strongly; 7 Refusal; 8 Don't know; 9 No answer. Note: Scale is reversed  [b30=gincdif]: Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels. AC: 1 Agree strongly; 2 Agree; 3 Neither agree nor disagree; 4 Disagree; 5 Disagree strongly; 7 Refusal; 8 Don't know; 9 No answer. Note: Scale is reversed

Selecting a small set of items to represent each of the dimensions was fairly unproblematic for the group and grid dimension, but we had some difficulties with the greed dimension. This is surprising since the literature has focused almost exclusive on this dimension. The difficulties probably stem from the fact that the “redistributive” dimension can be quite multifaceted, relating to as various things as redistribution and , conceptions of justice as equality of outcomes vs. opportunities, and so on.

To arrive at measures of greed, grid, and group, we factor analyzed each of these sets of three items together (iterated principal factor analysis), and predict factor scores (regression scoring method). We also ran a factor analysis on all items simultaneously, which yielded a clear three-factor solution. The factor scores from this approach are almost indistinguishable from those estimated from separate factor analyses. Since our input variables are ordinal, we also compared the factor scores to those derived from factor analyses on a matrix of polychoric correlations, finding again that the results are almost indistinguishable. Finally, we also explored the results when performing the factor analyses country-by-country, and found that the patterns are fairly comparable.

As mentioned before, the three dimensions are not necessarily independent. The correlation between greed and the other two dimensions is very low (-0.07 for both grid and group), while the correlation between grid and group is 0.36.

One way to assess construct validity is by calculating Cronbach’s alpha, which can range from zero to one. Our measures score 0.59 (grid), 0.6 (greed), and 0.91 (group), respectively. The first two alphas are fairly low, but they are based on only three items – more items typically increase the alpha. In other words, there is room for improvement, although one would probably need to rely on a survey that contains even more relevant attitudinal items (which does not exist, to our knowledge ONLINE APPENDIX 3: Scoring Representation

In simple bivariate OLS regressions predicting the positions of a party’s electorate on an issue dimension from knowing the position of its elites (based on expert scores), the following scoring rules apply to the evaluation of political representation:

(1) A necessary, but insufficient condition for partisan congruence is a high explained variance demonstrating the relationship between mass and elite level. But it is not sufficient, as observed differences between the parties may be small, yielding a negligible substantive effect. Very high R-squares are scored as 4 (>=.90), and going down from that level: 3 >.70; 2 >.50; 1 > .30; 0 <.30). (2) A very large slope coefficient indicates that elites overstate differences in their electorates (polarization), a small coefficient that they are understanding the differences and fail to be responsive. We score slopes between 0.5 and 1.5 = 2, and slopes between 1.5 and 2.0 = 1 (there are no slopes >.50), provided the R-square is > .50. The score is halved, if the R-square is only .25 to .50. The slope score is 0, if the R-square is below .25. (3) The size of the intercept indicates how far “off” elites, as a group are from the population distribution. Ideally, the intercept should be zero. Intercepts with absolute values smaller .50 receive a score of 1.0, those under 1.50 a score of 0.50, provided R-squares are >.25. No scores are awarded where there is little correlation between elite and mass positions.

Precise scores for the greed dimension can be inferred from the information conveyed in figure 1. For the other dimensions, inquire with the authors. The total congruence scores for countries on the three dimensions are as follows:

GREED GRID GROUP (distribution) (socio-political governance) (identity and boundary drawing) R- Slope intercept TOTAL R- Slope intercept TOTAL R- Slope intercept TOTAL square coeff. SCORE square coeff. SCORE square coeff. SCORE BELGIUM 4 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 2 .5 1 3.5 4 2 .5 6.5 4 2 1 7 4 2 .5 6.5 FINLAND 4 2 .5 6.5 2 0 .5 2.5 0 0 0 0 FRANCE 3 2 .5 5.5 4 2 1 7 3 1 .5 4.5 GERMANY 3 1 1 5 1 1 .5 2.5 3 1 .5 4.5 GREECE 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1.0 IRELAND 0 0 0 0 4 2 .5 6.5 2 1 1 4.0 NETHERL. 3 2 .5 5.5 1 1 1 3.0 3 1 1 5.0 3 2 1 6 0 0 0 0 2 1 .5 3.5 PORTUGAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3.0 SPAIN 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 .5 .5 3.0 SWEDEN 4 2 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SWITZERL. 2 .5 1 3.5 2 2 .5 4.5 4 1 .5 5.5 UNITED K. 3 2 .5 5.5 3 1 .5 4.5 4 1 .5 5.5

ONLINE APPENDIX. 4: Figure : Parties’ Clientelistic Efforts and Per Capita Economic Income (2008)

ONLINE APPENDIX 5: Party system precision over time. Average left-right Placement Variance of Partisan Constituencies Over Time

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) first-last yr <1989 >1990 Change Trend (obs) Austria 0.173 -2.7 90-03 (14) Finland 0.161 -3.1 90-03 (14) Australia* 0.297 0.202 -0.095 -15.2 72-04 (33) Netherlands 0.199 0.167 -0.032 -11.9 72-03 (32) Canada* 0.215 0.187 -0.027 -7.0 72-03 (32) Belgium 0.209 0.189 -0.020 -6.8 73-03 (31) Ireland 0.215 0.199 -0.016 -4.5 73-03 (31) UK* 0.198 0.183 -0.015 -4.6 72-04 (33) Germany* 0.186 0.173 -0.013 -3.7 73-03 (31) Switzerland 0.185 0.175 -0.010 -7.0 72-03 (32) * 0.202 0.197 -0.005 -2.0 81-02 (22) USA* 0.146 0.142 -0.004 -2.4 72-04 (33) France 0.159 0.155 -0.004 -0.2 77-03 (27) Portugal 0.168 0.165 -0.003 0.3 86-04 (19) Sweden* 0.151 0.152 0.001 1.0 72-03 (32) Denmark* 0.154 0.158 0.003 -0.5 73-03 (31) Iceland 0.172 0.176 0.004 -1.1 84-03 (12) Italy 0.154 0.163 0.009 2.7 73-02 (30) Greece 0.143 0.152 0.009 0.5 80-03 (24) Spain 0.152 0.166 0.015 0.3 81-03 (16) Norway* 0.134 0.159 0.026 4.5 73-03 (31)

Note: The Table shows information on changes and trends in precision of party systems, defined as the average standard deviations of a party’s supporters left-right self-placements. There are five columns for each of these measures: (1) Average precision before and including 1989 (2) Average precision after 1989 (3) Column (2) minus column (1). This column sorts the Tables. (4) t-value of regressing precision on time. Positive [negative] t-values greater than 2 indicate that precision went down [up] in a statistically significant way. (5) Shows the first to last year of observations, as well as the number of years of data in parentheses (which are partially interpolated). * indicates better data quality. Online Appendix 6: Performance of Partisan Families 1955/65 to 2001/11: National Legislative Elections

Centrists (C): Secular Agrarians (A), Social Democrats Loss of Ethno- Authori- Liber- Hard Conservatives (SC) Christian or Socialists (SD) establi- Countries cultural tarian tarian Econom Othersb or Economic Democrats (CD), and Marxist Left shed Parties Right Left ic Left Liberals (EL) and National Rally (ML) partiesa (NR)

Australia SC: 36.9→38.9 A: 8.7→3.4 SD: 52.9→39.2 -15.7 1.4 8.0 SD:43.9→34.2 Austria EL: 7.1→7.7 CD: 45.2→34.2 - -24.2 18.6 10.3 ML: 3.6→0 Belgium EL: 15.0→23.0 CD: 40.5→26.7 SD:33.6→26.7 3.9→all -22.4 10.5 8.0 A: 8.2→0 10.5 (Parti Canada SC: 38.5→35.8 SD: 13.0→20.5 -10.8 4.9 Lib: 35.5→28.1 Quebecois) SC: 18.2→9.9 SD: 41.1→26.8 Denmark CD: 9.2→6.4 -22.9 13.0 11.2 EL: 22.3→28.8 ML: 4.0→0 SC: 15.2→20.4 SD: 21.4→21.7 Finland A: 23.1→21.2 6.6→4.5 -18.3 8.3 3.9 EL: 6.1→0 ML: 22.6→8.9 SD: 19.4→27.3 France EL: 29.3→3.8 C/N: 27.7→44.8 -16.3 8.3 3.9 ML: 20.4→4.6 Germany EL: 10.0→11.0 CD: 47.7→35.8 SD: 35.8→31.9 -14.8 - 9.1 8.2 SC: 42.9→40.9 SD: 27.8→40.8 Greece C: 13.8→0 -9.1 3.9 5.5 Soc.Lib: 13.8→0 ML: 13.5→7.2 Ireland SC: 31.1→32.6 C: 46.6→33.5 SD 11.6→13.4 SF: 1.8→7.2 -8.0 3.6 SC 2.4→0 SD: 19.3→31.9 NC: 40.2 Italy CD: 40.3→5.2 - -56.0 5.6 5.2 EL 6.7→0 ML:24.0→4.6 (FN+AN) SD: 33.7→2.1 Japan C: 59.1→43.5 -43.6 40.2 (SL) ML: 2.9→6.5 Netherlands EL: 10.4→17.1 CD: 52.3→24.2 SD: 30.4→20.8 -34.3 11.1 5.9 8.2 N. Zealand SC: 46.3→34.9 C: 7.9→0 SD: 45.1→38.5 -26.0 5.4 6.3 SC: 20.0→17.5 CD: 9.3→8.2 SD: 46.1→30.8 Norway -33.4 19.9 9.2 EL: 9.6→3.9 A: 9.5→6.1 ML: 5.4→0 PS: 33.4→39.9 Portugal SC: 26.2→32.6 C: 13.7→8.8 +6.5 ML: 15.3→13.8 Spain SC: 7.1→39.1 C: 34.8→?? SD: 30.0→43.6 +6.8 CD: 23.3→14.5 SC: 23.7→16.6 SD:26.7→21.8 +16.5 Switzerland A: 11.7→(11.3) -30.4 9.2 EL: 2.2→2.1 ML: 2.5→0 (27.8) LdU: 5.3→0 SC: 16.7→23.9 SD: 46.5→35.2 Sweden A: 12.2→6.9 -24.0 3.3 12.3 EL: 19.1→9.3 ML: 4.5→0 Liberal United SC: 47.5→33.4 SD: 44.8→35.2 -15.6 3.1 2.3 Democrats: Kingdom EL: 6.6→(14.7) 15.6 (SL) SC: 45.3→47.4 DEM: 53.9→48.3 -3.5 SD: 32.8→29.1 Average SC: 27.8→28.3 (15) CD: 33.5→19.4 (8) (20) change in EL: 12.6→10.2 A: 12.3→8.1 (6) 96.3→ ML: 10.7→4.1 support of (12) C: 29.8→20.9 (10) 79.5 = 9.2 (14) 7.3 (16) (12) party families BOTH: 28.8→27.3 ALL THREE: -16.8 BOTH: 37.3→31.6 c (20) 30.2→20.6 (20) (20)

Note: a From 1955/65 to 2001/11 b new Social Liberals (SL), Conservatives (NC), Christian Moral Reform (CMR), Ethnoculturals (EC) c unweighted by country or party size

Coding of party families: Australia: 1955-65: Social Democrats are Australian Labor Party (45.2) and Democratic Labor Party (7.7). Secular conservatives is Australian Liberal Party. Agrarians is Country Party. 2001-11: Right-Authoritarians are One Nation.

Austria: 1956-62: Austrian Party (FPÖ) counted secular-. 2002-8: FPÖ as well as Alliance Future of Austria (BZÖ) counted as radical right parties, but one might subtract the baseline support the party received 1975-83 before its strategic turn (in brackets: 5.7% added to the persistence of established parties in 2001-11. Liberales Forum and List Dr. Martin (2006) counted as liberal-conservative.

Belgium: Counts the Christian Democrats in Flanders as well as the New Flemish Alliance consistently as Christian Democratic successor organizations (albeit only sometimes in electoral union). Humanistic Democratic Center as successor of the PSC, Open VLD and Mouvement Reformateur as LP/PL VVD/PL successors. Vlaams Blok/Belang counted as right-authoritarian, although claim could be made to include it in the “ethnocultural” label.

Canada: 1957-65: Liberals counted as “centrists.” Party as agrarians, although could also be centrists. Parti Quebecois as new ethnocultural party. The Coopeerative Commonwealth Movement is counted as predecessor of the New Democrats (from 1958 onwards).

Denmark: 1957-64: Venstre as economic liberals, Danish Liberal Social Party (Radical Venstre) and counted as centrist, Socialist People’s Party as Marxist. 2001-7: Red-Greens and Socialist People’s Party counted as left-libertarian, Danish People’s Party as right-authoritarian.

France: First period includes only 5th elections 1958 and 1962. Social is Section Francais de L’International Ouvriere (SFIO) and center-left Radicaux-Socialistes (RS) in 1958-62 and Parti Socialiste plus affiliated small leftist parties in 2002-7. “Liberals” is center right in France, i.e. Mouvement Republicain Populaire (MRP) and Radicaux Centre (RC) in 1958-62, Mouvement Democrate in 2007. Marxist Left is PCF. Second period (2001-11) Gaullists are parties affiliated with pour une Mouvement Populaire (UMP).

Germany: 2001-11: Partei des Demokratischen Socialismus (PDS), later Die Linke, counted as “new hard left,” but could also be counted as continuation of the hard left of the 1950s, the KPD, which then received an average of 0% , because it was outlawed. At the last election, it received 2.2% of the vote (1953).

Greece: 1956-64: Parties classified by leaders. National Radical Union (Constantine Karamanlis), later succeeded by New 1974 (under son and grandson) is secular Conservative party. Centrist forces in 1956 and 1958 are umbrellas that move into the Marxist Left (United Democratic Left and successors under Spiros Passalidis), to be reconstituted as KKE after 1974. George Papandreou and son first under Progressive Rural Democratic Union (1958), eventually as PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Party) after 1974. Popular Orthodox Rally as new radical right. Various labels for KKE/Interior, radical left, and Ecologists for left-libertarians after 2000.

Ireland: Throughout, counted Fine Gael as a conservative party, although it also fits the Christian Democratic template, albeit with a dosage of market . Fianna Fail is a centrist party, Sinn Fein an ethnopolitical undertaking. 2001-11: -libertarian entry is , the new conservative party the short-lived .

Italy: 1955-65: Monarchists under secular Conservatives; Economic Liberals: Liberal party (PLI) and (PRI); Social Democrats consist of PSI and PSDI; MSI under ethno-nationalists; 2001-11: changing name of the Christian Democratic legacy: Italian People’s Party and Patto Segni (1994); CCD-CDU (1996); Whiteflower (2001), Union of Christian and Center Democrats (2006), Union of rhe Center (2008); Greens and under left-libertarians; ethno- radical right: Lega Nord; new centrist liberals: Radicals/Panella only in the 1990s; New conservatives: Allianzia Nacional and after 1994.

Japan: 1955-65: National Rally Parties consist of the Liberal Party and the Japan in 1955, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 1958- 2009. Social Democrats are Rightist Socialist Party and Leftist Socialist Party in 1955, JSP in 1958-63, and Democratic Socialist Party in 1960-63. Japan Communist Party is Marxist Party throughout. Social Democratic Party in lieu of JPS 2003-09. Democratic Party as “New Conservatives” in 2003-09.

Netherlands: Christians include all parties of the 1950s that later formed the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA). Liberals is VVD, social democrats PvdA, hard is Socialist Party. Radical Right is either List Pim Fortuyn (2002-2003) or Groep Wilders (2006-2010). Left-libertarians is Groen-Links. New Christian party is Cristen Unie (2002-10). New Centrist liberals is Democrats ’66.

New Zealand: 1955-65: Count Social Credit Party somewhat inaccurately as “centrist” 2001-11: Greens are left-libertarians, (-2008) counted as radical right, although somewhat inaccurate (it is anti-immigrant). ACT as new market-liberal conservative party, as new , and the Maori party (2005-8) as new ethnic representation.

Norway: In 1961-65, the new Socialist Left (SV) counted as element of the Marxist left, together with the Norwegian Communist Party (NKP). SV successor Socialist People’s Party (SF) counted as left-libertarian party.

Portugal: Time framces compared here are 1975-79 with 2002-9. The Social Democratic Party (PSD) is a secular-conservative party, whereas the Democratic and Social Center-People’s Party (CDS-PP) is a centrist Christian Democratic Party. In 1979 they ran as a joint list (Popular Alliance, AP), but this did not pay off electorally. Shares of AP here allocated to individual coalition partners in proportion to the shares they received in elections preceding the coalition. On the left, Marxist currents divided into two streams, the Left Bloc (BE) and the Democratic Unity Coalition (CDU). An Ecology Party is a minor element of the CDU, but does not warrant counting it as left-libertarian. Various stripes of dominate both fission products of the Portuguese Communist Party of the 1970s. PSD and CPS- PP ran in 1979

Sweden: 2001-11: Both the Miljöpartiet (Environment Party) as well as the Venstre (Left) counted as left-libertarian parties, although the latter originated in the Marxist-communist party and changed only through a strategic reversal in the 1970s and 1980s. The Christian party is a and therefore not listed among established Christian Democratic parties.

Switzerland: 1955-65: Freisinnige Demokratische Partei (FDP) counted as secular Conservatives, but could also be counted as market-liberals. Here small Liberale Partei der Schweiz counted as liberal. The Bund der Gewerbetreibenden und Bauern (BGB) was succeeded in 1971 by the Schweizer Volkspartei (SVP). Like the Austrian FPÖ, it underwent a sharp strategic reversal in the 1990s toward radical right appeals. Its pre-reversal electoral support 1983-91 (11.3%) can therefore be counted as continuation of the “old” party system, while its additional increment reflects the “new” party system (16.5% 2003-7), or the party is wholesale counted as new. Marxist party is the Partei der Arbeit (PdA). All other labels are directly related to the categories: social democratic, Christian democratic, and Green.Shown as second element of the centrist forces, next to the Christian/Catholic party in 1955-65: Landesring der Unabhängigen (LdU), received an average of 5.3% from 1955 to 1963.

United Kingdom: 2001-2011: It is difficult to score the Liberal Democrats, given their (partial) origins in the Liberal Party. The table therefore reports maximal and minimal scores for party system change. The minimal score counts the average performance of the Liberal Party in the 1970s (1970-79) as the baseline support the “traditional” Liberals would have received after 2000 as an establishment party (14.7%) and only the increment of improvement that the Liberal Democrats achieved after 2000 (21.1% - 14.7% = 6.4%) as decline of the established parties. The maximal score counts the Liberal Democrats as new foundation in toto. With the party having branched out beyond opposition to the EU toward a market-liberal and , the UK Independence Party (2001-11: 2.2%) and the British (2001-11: 0.9%) are now counted as right-authoritarian. The and are in the new ethnocultural parties.

United States: The Republican Party counted as “secular conservative,” as “centrists.”