DIIS workingDIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:23paper

Liberal or Illiberal? Discord within the Danish-Swedish Pacific Community Pertti Joenniemi DIIS Working Paper 2011:23 WORKING PAPER

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Pertti Joenniemi is Senior Researcher, DIIS, Copenhagen e-mail: [email protected]

Acknowledgements This paper is part of an international research project on the theme “Decentring the West. The Idea of De- mocracy and the Struggle for Hegemony”, supoorted by the Estonian Science Foundation. An early version was presented at a DIIS-NUPI seminar organized by Stefano Guzzini as well as at a CAST-seminar at the University of Copenhagen. I would like to thank the participants of both seminars for comments and critique, in particular Rasmus Fonnesbæk Andersen, Ulrich Pram Gad, Peter Harder, Henning Koch, Iver Neumann and Vibeke Tjalve. I would also like to ac- knowledge the rather perceptive comments presented by Anders Björnsson, Stefan Borg, Erik Ringmar and Brendan Sweeney.

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DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:23 © The author and DIIS, Copenhagen 2011 Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Strandgade 56, DK-1401 Copenhagen, Denmark Ph: +45 32 69 87 87 Fax: +45 32 69 87 00 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.diis.dk Cover Design: Carsten Schiøler Layout: Ellen-Marie Bentsen Printed in Denmark by Vesterkopi AS ISBN: 978-87-7605-468-7 Price: DKK 25.00 (VAT included) DIIS publications can be downloaded free of charge from www.diis.dk

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Contents

Abstract 4 Pitted against each other 5 Liberal democracy in plural 6 The Danish-Swedish pacific community 7 Staying with the Deutschean theory 9 Opening up for alternative accounts 10 Revisiting the puzzle of Nordic peace 12 A relationship of kinship 15 The cartoon crisis 18 The ‘brotherly feud’ 20 Proceeding along different paths 22 An intensified encounter 24 A realm of silence 26 Questioning neighbourly ties 27 Immigration as a constitutive argument 30 Nation-state and state-society 32 Divergent interpretations of liberal values 34 Particularity versus universality 36 Concluding remarks 38 References 44

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Abstract

Rather than being amiable, the Danish-Swedish relations have more recently turned somewhat contested. Arguments like the other being quite illiberal have frequently been aired in the public debate. The aim of the paper is hence to explored the rift in order to pursue broader questions about the relationship between two neighbouring countries actually quite similar to each other and broad- ly recognized not only as liberal and democratic, but also seen as inherently peaceful due to their belonging to the rather pacific community of Nordic countries. Does the crux of the issue consist of similarity having turned too intimate and therefore intolerable, or are Denmark and Sweden in- stead on their way to sliding apart with their previously rather homogeneous nature in decline and the increase in differences then also amounting to discord and distrust? Answers are sought for by probing the debate and more generally by revisiting relevant theorizations, including the traditional ways of accounting for the pacific nature of Nordic commonality. The findings are then placed in a broader IR-perspective as to use of democracy and liberal values in the construction of similarity and difference, i.e. departures crucial in the ordering of political space.

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Pitted against each other the state in the sphere of border-policies has subsequently led to considerable strains – with This paper aims at exploring the background of Germany as well as Sweden openly criticizing the strains recently present in the Danish-Swedish such a move (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Her- public domain. The findings are, however, also schend-Christoffersen, 2011). employed in passing judgment on the way It might thus be argued, as to the unfolding similarity and difference have been theorized of the Danish-Swedish relations, that the Öre- and comprehended in accounting for the for- sund strait has – rather than narrowing down mation and unfolding of security communities owing to integration and increased interaction such as the Nordic ones. Focusing precisely on – become wider. It has done so at least in a Denmark and Sweden is warranted, as pacific symbolic sense despite of Denmark and Swe- commonality has, for the part of Norden, den being quite alike. They have often been largely rested on their non-securitized, friendly viewed as ‘cousins’ if not ‘twins’, and yet, in the and in general rather trustful relations. sometimes rather acrimonious public debate These relations, although still non-securi- waged during the last couple of years, the em- tized, have now turned puzzling with the two phasis has been on what separates rather than countries being frequently pitted against each unites them. Of course, their relations do not other in the more recent discourse. National just pertain to doom and gloom, but it is yet contests pertaining to a large degree to immi- to be noted that the stress has recently been on gration-related issues have spilled over, influ- remaining aloof from each other rather than encing also the bonds between Denmark and staying close and in amiable terms. Sweden. New populist and radical parties pur- It also appears puzzling that arguments per- suing more emergency-related policies have taining to democracy and liberal values have in entered the political scene. They have subse- this context been employed as key benchmarks quently impacted the way in which politics for difference. The use has been quite divisive, are interpreted, thus emphasizing the need to instead of generating trust and reducing alterity, comprehend the nation in rather unitary and as it has been assumed to do. This is the case de- exclusionary terms. The passions and more spite of that the two Scandinavian countries have conflict-premised comprehensions inherent in been commonly viewed as being quite similar in this discourse have then, it seems, been acted nature with both branding themselves as excep- out and politicised also to include the neigh- tionally democratic and liberal (cf. Browning, bouring country. 2007; Gad, 2010: 346). In actual fact, both have The rift is largely atmospheric, but some of ranked high in numerous international measure- the consequences have also been quite tangi- ments and some of these have even posited them ble. This is so as the aspiration to pit oneself as belonging to the most democratic countries not merely against internal but also external in the world. And yet, these achievements and otherness has, in one of its aspects, amounted qualities notwithstanding, liberal democracy has to efforts to re-establish rather strict external in the recent Danish-Swedish debate figured as borders. A case in point consists of the Danish a divisive argument. It has been predominantly decision in July 2011 – on the initiative of the used as a claim testifying to difference rather than Danish People’s Party (DPP) – to introduce similarity in the context of a hegemony-related more stringent control of the country’s borders contest with both of them claiming the right to with Germany and Sweden. The effort of -re speak in the name of democracy and liberal val- storing some of the regulatory competences of ues as universally valid departures.

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Liberal democracy in plural impacted by whether the framing of the issues at stake is alarmist in nature or premised on My aim is therefore, in elucidating the back- comprehension of normal politics. ground of the othering discernible in some of As the meaning of liberal values and con- the Danish-Swedish public discourse, to gauge cepts such as democracy is embedded in the what undergirds the discourse with democra- employment of these attributes, it would be cy and liberal values being used to stake out rather pointless to explore whether Denmark difference/otherness. What drives these two and/or Sweden have really turned illiberal in countries apart and feeds a debate premised nature. This may or may not be true pending on their divergent being, despite – or precisely on the way the attributes providing ground for because of – their rather obvious similarity? passing judgment are comprehended. And with the increasing stress on what divides It is more meaningful, I think, to explore rather than unites them, does this also entail what invites and allows for the accusations to that the Danish-Swedish commonality is in for be formulated and aired in the first place. How a severe crisis? can liberal values and democracy be at least As to the approach applied, I take it that somewhat credibly articulated in a manner freedom of speech, free and fair elections, re- that casts Denmark and/or Sweden as illiberal spect of the rights of individuals and other lib- in nature? In exploring this, an intertextual ap- eral values as well as democracy are not fixed proach is applied. Such an approach appears attributes. Instead, they figure as discursively warranted as each articulation of liberal values established conventions delimiting the bound- and comprehension of democracy has a history. ary of what is and what is not appropriate and They draw on conventions established through acceptable. In outlining the appropriate, a nor- earlier articulations. As the comprehensions mative superiority is established applicable for currently clashing in the debate are not built the establishment of value-based hierarchies up from scratch, also a covering of the previous but also more concretely in processes part of discourses seems relevant. the ordering of political space. In consequence, an essential aspect of the Moreover, liberal democracy may, as a dis- approach applied here consists of probing the cursive strategy containing a broad variety of unfolding of and interplay between various elements, appear as something consensual and we-concepts such as ‘state’, ‘nation’, ‘society’ harmonious. There may be emphasis on toler- and ‘individual’ as well as the way liberal values ance and equality, albeit the core aspects can and democracy have been attached and related also consist of the right to cultural autonomy over time to the key conceptual constellations and far-reaching freedom of expression imply- underpinning the two cases studied. Arguably, ing hat the pursuance of democracy can also these constellations have a structuring impact take conflictual and almost antagonistic forms. – an enabling as well as a constraining one As argued by Ido Oren (1995: 147), the un- – on how liberal values can be credibly artic- derstanding of the attributes seen as liberal and ulated and attached to democracy in various democratic varies. Comprehensions are not contexts. fixed and it is hence also possible that liberal As to the contentious issues at stake, it democracy turns into a contested issue between seems crucial to include debates pertaining to two countries generally regarded as liberal and immigration within the overall constellation democratic. Moreover, the understandings of the issues to be explored – taking into ac- tend to change over time and are also crucially count that immigration, Islam, and Muslims

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have turned into very central questions in the pact of similarity has been almost axiomatic Danish debate and the somewhat xenophobic since the days of Karl W. Deutsch and his nature of the new Swedish political party, the path-breaking study (1957) on North Atlantic Sweden Democrats (SD). An inclusion is called commonality, a study carried out more than for as the theme of immigration spurs – as one 50 years ago. The study basically asserts that aspect of border-breaking globalization and in- for enmity to be overcome, difference has to ternationalization – debates on the essence of be traded for similarity. The theorization stood liberal democracy, including the way in which for a turning-point in providing the basis for liberal values are related to democracy and how a new IR-thinking, and it has gradually – as to connect and delimit these themes as to the noted among others by Vincent Pouliot (2010: unfolding of the core conceptual constellation 11) – also impacted the very conduct of rela- underpinning respectively Denmark and Swe- tions between states. It has turned into a rather den. In particular the increasing movement influential mode of thinking, as the consider- of people across borders appears to challenge able rhetorical capital embedded in the theory departures premised on tight territorial bor- has been extensively used by various practi- dering, strictly delimited ethnicity and/or the tioners of politics as well. In short, the Deut- existence of a rather homogeneous nation. schean claim of positive identity interaction transforming security relations has succeeded in challenging the traditionalist realist rules: The Danish-Swedish pacific whereas the latter assume that anarchy, rival- community ry and self-help prevails in relations between states, the approach introduced by Deutsch as- In addition to exploring the Danish-Swedish serts that peaceful forms of commonality are debate as such, my effort is also one of position- indeed possible and may materialize under ing the recent rift in a broader context pertain- particular conditions. ing to the unfolding and theorizing of security Stating explicitly that his theorization is communities. This may be done as Danish- contextually dependent and spatially specific, Swedish commonality figures as an integral Deutsch and his colleagues focused extensively aspect of the Nordic one. As the contestations on the exemplary and amiable nature of rela- present in the Danish-Swedish domain also tions between the Scandinavian countries. impact and resonate with the broader constel- Given that the threat of war had been left be- lations, they can be utilized in exploring how hind already in 1814 and developments had similarity and difference play out in such a since pointed to a far-reaching interdepend- context. More particularly, does Nordic peace- ence, the Scandinavians were depicted as a ful togetherness, as unfolding in the sphere of security community par excellence (Archer, Danish-Swedish relations, rest on far-reaching 2003). The preconditions of trust and shared similarity and lean on a down-playing of dif- collective identities were arguably there and al- ference or are there some other ways of reading lowed Deutsch et al. (1957: 5) to assert that the impact of similarity as well as difference in “dependable expectations of peaceful change” the constitution of pacific commonality? had in fact made war between the Scandina- The question is warranted because of the vian countries unthinkable. way security communities such as the Nordic It is also worth noting that the theorization one have been conventionally theorized and rested, in one of its aspects, on the liberal es- comprehended. A trust in the positive im- sence of the Scandinavians, i.e. their political

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and value-related likeness was elevated into a difficulties”. The two authors further note that key explanation for their friendly and peace- it never led to a robust research agenda in the ful togetherness. It was stressed that they rec- sense of the theory being thoroughly tested, ognize each other as liberal democracies (with although considerable efforts have later been democracy and liberal values understood in made to alleviate the various difficulties inher- quite essentialist ways), with the consequent ent in the initial theorizing of security commu- trust, we-ness and perceptions of similar- nities (cf. Adler and Greve, 2009; Cox, 2006; ity then grounding their rather amiable asso- Pouliot 2006, 2008, 2010). These efforts have ciation, premised on expectations of peaceful primarily been constructivist in nature, with change. In other words, shared liberal norms security communities seen as discourse-based were not just linked integrally with issues of and socially constructed. security in facilitating regulation of conflicts Notably, the revised theorization has been and being conducive to peace. Liberal depar- premised on the assumption that the positive tures were actually depicted as constitutive of association is brought about and reproduced the very relationship – and in this sense even in discourses pertaining to identities, values more important as to their formative impact and interests. It is argued that the increasingly than the existence of external threats. They mutual identification allows for a redefinition allowed, as a sign of profound similarity and of interest, therewith facilitating the instilling being very much alike, for a drawing of the of pacific dispositions. The critical revisions distinction introduced above and a switching have also been extended to include the way from emergency politics to normal politics. liberal democracies recognize their likeness As interpreted by Emanuel Adler (1998: 170), and represent each other – or fail to contrib- ‘I’ had been extended to become ‘we’ with the ute to the formation of a collective and shared new collective identity then enhancing a sense identity with this then assumedly endanger- of mutual and reliable trust, that is conditions ing the peacefulness of their relations – as well necessary for the creation of a mature form of as the role of power in the context of security security community. communities being created and sustained (e.g. The association of the Scandinavians was Oren, 1995; Williams, 2001). not idealized, however, as the assertion of However, and the various efforts of correc- peaceful togetherness was accompanied by tion notwithstanding, the stress on similarity the recognition that also conflicts remained and the consequent aversion towards differ- present in the relationship. Disputes existed, ence inherent in the theorization of security but the point was that these could, due to the communities have not been revised to any sig- presence of “dependable expectations of peace- nificant degree. The very idea of transcending ful change” (i.e. normalization of politics) and difference, i.e. the ‘I’ substituted by a ‘we’, has mutual identification, be settled in an amiable basically remained in place. Alternative ways manner. of conceptualizing the nature and impact of The theory coined by Deutsch, although difference have no doubt been developed (e.g. broadly acceptable and thereby impacting IR- Hansen, 2006; Huysmans, 2006; Kupchan, theory to a significant degree, has also been 2011), but the insight provided by these efforts criticized. As pointed out by Adler and Bar- has in general not been extended to cover the nett (1998b: 8; see also Adler, 1997), it is quite issue of security communities. The homogene- behavioralist in character and “fraught with ity brought about by modern progress and in- theoretical, methodological and conceptual tegration is still largely viewed as indispensable

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for commonality grounding security commu- such as the aiming at a world government, are nities to emerge. taken to lack in credibility. However, Emanuel Adler has together with Patricia Greve (2009) presented a somewhat Staying with the Deutschean more nuanced stance in admitting that the theory prospects for a comeback of anarchy exist in principle, albeit they add that a return is not There are hence reasons, I suggest, for prob- very probable. This is so as similarity is assum- ing far more closely some of the central tenets edly conducive to peace, and peace in turn inherent in the Deutschean theory on security adds to further similarity. The assumedly cu- communities, and the recent dynamics in the mulative nature of security communities, with sphere of the Danish-Swedish relations appear the parties constantly getting closer to each to provide some ammunition for such a revi- other due to firmly embedded routines part of sionist effort. These dynamics invite for the the public debate, implies that there has been question how a reversal of the basically rather little reason or ground to ponder on the as- tight and trustful commonality and, as appears sumedly quite negative impact and meaning of to be the case, the stress on difference rather difference within commonality. The dominant than similarity impact the notion of pacific storyline is simply that of peace being achieved togetherness. Furthermore, what accounts for by expelling difference. Setbacks may no doubt that any drawing on security as a constitutive occur but they are nonetheless viewed as being theme seems to remain a foreclosed option de- at odds with the basic progress – and altered spite the joint ‘we’ being increasingly traded framing of politics – underlying the formation for distinct forms of ‘I’? of security communities. These kinds of critical questions are rarely Yet the option is there to explore, along the raised, as security communities have been lines of the Deutschean theory, whether homo- viewed – in the sphere of standard theoriza- geneity has in fact turned brittle in the Danish- tions – as unfolding in a rather linear fashion. Swedish case. As to the routines present, the They stand out, it appears, as end stations once processes of trust and identity are perhaps not the switch from an emergency-related reading as reciprocal and reinforcing with the develop- to a normal mode of politics has taken place. ment of trust-strengthening mutual identifica- No space has been provided in the stories told tion as has frequently been assumed in the con- for their demise or, for that matter, further text of the Deutschean theory (e.g. Adler and jumps into some different constellation with Barnett, 1998a: 45, 47). There exists, it seems, security void of constitutive impact. Pacific misrecognition rather than recognition in view forms of commonality have instead been taken of the assumed and inter-subjectively shared to form the ultimate outcome, as any revers- rules of the game. The Danish-Swedish rela- als of the contributing processes, according tions have over the recent years not developed to Adler (1998: 181), are “unlikely”. They are as positively with stress on commonality in final in stretching, if seen from the vantage terms of shared liberal democracy and compat- point of realism, too far to start with in having ibility of core values, as one is invited to expect abandoned the standard alarmist and security- on the basis of a theory stressing the similar- geared reading of politics and also optimal in ity-producing effects of modern progress and the sense that the introduction of further op- rationality. Instead, some of the previous we- tions reaching beyond security communities, ness appears to be waning and troubling lines

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of division have emerged, this then calling for than ‘we’, have the potential of generating a a revisiting of at least some aspects of the Deut- considerable dose of ontological anxiety. Their schean theory on security communities. presence may become quite overwhelming – as also noted by Hannah Arendt (1973) in her study on the origins of totalitarianism. Intense Opening up for alternative violence may follow from the demise and in- accounts ability to symbolize, name and locate constitu- tive difference, as has arguably been demon- Such a revisiting could potentially rest on the strated by the war in Bosnia. theorization premised on the narcissism of Violence may no doubt break out, although minor differences, one initially sketched out it has to be added that the aim here is not to by Sigmund Freud (1918). It differs radically insinuate that this potential is present also in from the Deutschean theory in depicting far- the sphere of the Danish-Swedish relations. reaching similarity as something potentially The point is simply to argue that the option quite problematic. The domestication and for security as an argument to return and im- down-laying of difference may, the theory as- pact the unfolding of the Danish-Swedish rela- serts, reach too far. It can, in doing so and in tions is by no means a foreclosed one, and the undermining the difference that is always re- prevailing of a non-securitized state of affairs quired for safe identities to come into being, – such as the Danish-Swedish one – equally bring about a considerable amount of unease calls for an explanation. and anxiety. A somewhat less radical and yet differ- As noted among others by Anton Blok ence-friendly line of argumentation has been (1998: 39), the constitution of identities is coined and applied by Jef Huysmans (2006) unavoidably premised on devising of differ- in his study on migration and the identity-re- ence, and difference is asserted, reinforced and lated impact of the figure of a migrant. The key defended against what is closest and represents problem for the devising of durable together- the greatest threat. Also being alike has its prob- ness, he claims, does not consist of the degree of lematic sides as polities will, he claims, aspire similarity or difference. The difficulties do not to accentuate their differences and emphasize just pertain to similarity or difference becom- distinctiveness in order to guard their identity. ing too pronounced, as highlighted by Arendt, Similarly, Slavoj Žižek (2005: 144) points out Norton and Žižek. They rather originate with that too much similarity may be experienced as the very distinction between similarity and dif- intolerable. It does not generate trust and bring ference being blurred. The emerging ambigu- about peaceful relations but spurs anxiety, and ity implies that the other may at the same time he goes as far as claiming that neighbours can be other and like and becomes, in the form of be viewed as ‘monstrous’ in landing too close. an undecidable, difficult to pin down and sort Their intimacy becomes unbearable in erasing out. The strangeness inherent in the other rais- the protective lines of division needed for dis- es the spectre of chaos and consequently anxi- tinct identities to come about and prevail. eties are bound to ensue with the demise of Anne Norton (2008) asserts, for her part, clear-cut distinctions threatening the very act that the presence of likeness in the other can, in of ordering. entailing the danger of selves being dissolved, So, similarity may – as asserted by the Deut- even invite for intense forms of violence. Those schean theory – be conducive to peace and who are almost as ‘we’, but nonetheless other friendly relations whereas difference needs to

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be downgraded and, if possible, externalized. strife does not necessarily hinge on return of And yet it seems obvious that also an almost difference in the form of illiberal policies. opposite theorization has its merits and may Still, the crux of the issue could also consist be quite relevant here in the context of explor- of similarity having turned too prevalent for ing the dynamics part of the Danish- the discomfort than to be remedied by moves Swedish relationship. Far-reaching similarity of distanciation. It is, however, also possible to may indeed turn problematic whereas differ- think that the increased emphasis on differ- ence calls, under some circumstances and some ence neither threatens the similarity on which of its forms, for a rather positive reading. the relationship basically rests nor is it to be In trying to relate these quite different theo- understood as a counter-reaction in regard to rizations to each other, I suggest that the impact similarity having turned too overwhelming. varies and is highly dependent on how politics It may rather testify to the basic flexibility of are being framed in the first place. The impact the relationship in the sense that similarity and of similarity and difference varies and springs difference do not figure as polar opposites. The above all from the way politics are compre- relationship is not one of either/or. There is hended. The stress on emergency and excep- undoubtedly a shift to be traced towards in- tional conditions brings about an emphasis on creased emphasis on difference and a down- similarity. It is conducive to aversion vis-à-vis scaling of similarity. This, however, is in line difference but it can also amount to alarmism with the very nature of the relationship and and panic if similarity turns too overwhelm- does not trigger any profound anxiety. The ing. And in contrast, a framing premised on plurality with the neighbours seen as partly the normalcy of politics allows for a more flex- self, partly other that has been an integral part ible approach both towards similarity and dif- of Nordic commonality from the very start al- ference. They can be co-present forming even lows for shifts without changes amounting to complex patterns thereby dissolving any false anything of a crisis as long as the framing ap- unity resting on a strict separation between plied remains one of normal politics. However, similarity and difference. A framing -prem if that approach gives way to a more alarmist ised on normalcy invites for tolerate even in framing, then there is also space for explana- the case of far-reaching similarity and opens tions resting on the two other theorizations. equally up the option of interpreting difference These different options invite for ques- in basically benign terms. In sum, the impact tions to be asked concerning the very nature of similarity as well as difference varies and is of Nordic commonality, and in this context highly dependent on the way politics are being also the Danish-Swedish relations. Does the framed. pacific commonality present among the Nor- The above theorizations combined with an dics abide to a Deutschean theorization with emphasis on the way politics are framed then the theory then also applicable and valid for open up for a rather broad repertoire of expla- the part of the more recent dynamics discern- nations. They seem to allow, in the first place, ible in a Danish-Swedish context, or are there for the origins and nature of Nordic peaceful- other accounts that seem more relevant or to ness to be cast differently from the Deutschean put it differently, does the rift now present in account. The peacefulness, inherent also in the domain of the Danish-Swedish relations the Danish-Swedish relations, has perhaps not break with the Deutschean comprehensions, rested as firmly on homogeneity as assumed by thereby also inviting for alternative efforts of the Deutschean theorization, and the current theorizing the Nordic configuration?

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Revisiting the puzzle of and culture, economies and social ties. The Nordic peace previous ‘I’ has arguably turned into a joint and shared ‘we’, and this process – one prem- Unpacking the Nordic relationship and ex- ised on perceptions of the Nordics being alike ploring other possible accounts is challenging, and void of any problematic differences – has as it appears that the existence of Scandinavi- then, according to the theory, been strength- an/Nordic peace has over time turned almost ened through enhanced levels of institutionali- self-evident. As noted by Ole Wæver (2008), zation and communication fostering a sense of there has been a ”retroactive normalization regional community. obcur[ing] the analytical puzzle”. The existence It seems apparent, however, that there re- of profoundly trustful relations and thereby a main several problems with this theorization. pacific community has become conventional Empirically, communications and institution- wisdom. It has turned so obvious that it does alization were already well developed when not invite for any critical questions even if the war, not peace, still had the upper hand in the core countries – Denmark and Sweden – were region. Moreover, a considerable dose of simi- historically wracked by war for some three cen- larity was in place and did not increase to any turies. This has, however, been followed by two significant degree with peace breaking out in centuries of peace with the war-like past erased the sphere of the Danish-Swedish relations. It from collective memory. The assumed normal- appears instead, at closer inspection, that the ity of peace and friendly relations also impinge way of interpreting difference changed with the public discussion: Efforts of addressing space opening up for views more tolerant vis- some of the Nordic neighbours as security- à-vis plurality. A previous ‘I’ did not turn, it related threats are bound to be discarded, as appears, into a joint and shared ‘we’, and in moves of securitization have thoroughly lost general the dialogue waged across the Öresund their credibility in the sphere of the intra-Nor- strait was – during the formative years – not dic relations. premised on an emphasis of similarity. It rather In the Deutschean theorization of security rested – as the way of framing politics changed communities such as the Nordic one, the stress from an exceptional to a normal one and there- on similarity in the form of “compatible self- with brought into view other, far more benign images” goes together with the argument that ways of interpreting difference – on showing the war system has been tamed by a gradual respect if not appreciation towards the differ- implementation of measures pertaining to de- ence inherent in the other. Identities could con- securitization. These measures are then argued sequently be devised with rather than against to invite for the emergence of a new and less the Nordic others owing to a recognition of war-prone security regime. Accordingly, Nor- the legitimate and non-threatening character dic peacefulness is viewed as a product of vari- of the difference inherent in the neighbours. ous facilitating conditions, i.e. similarity as to Recognition could be granted precisely be- compatible values, shared language, religion cause security– in being seen differently due to a change in the way of comprehending politics

 This chapter uses material and arguments from a joint study on Nordic Peace carried out together with Christo- pher Browning.

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– ceased to be a major concern and lost much It is equally to be noted that Nordic peace did of its previous constitutive weight. not flow from security being framed differently In essence, the previously hegemonic and and in a more cooperative manner or, for that unquestioned framing premised on an emer- matter, efforts of de-securitization. No peace gency-related view of politics was substituted treaties were signed, there was no talk on any by a normal one on the level of civil society ac- confidence-building measures, not to speak tors, and gradually these bottom-up processes of the construction of some balance of power, turned dominant. In doing so they deprived perfecting the functioning of deterrence or the state actors of the option of utilizing se- arms control and measures of disarmament. It curity as a key argument in coining identities seems, instead, that it came about by and rest- and in the moves of ordering within the intra- ed on processes of silencing, i.e. silencing in Nordic sphere. the sense of the security becoming superfluous Notably, this theorization of Nordic peace- as an argument and consequently dropping fulness contrasts with the Deutschean reading out of the discourse. The move of silencing in the sense that the other seems to have re- substituted the previous drawing on security in tained, in the Nordic case, his/her otherness, the constitution of commonality, and security and precisely the more benign and trustful ap- became, with the switch to a normal mode of proach towards otherness has allowed and in- politics, less of a concern. One might, in lean- vited for the constitution of ontologically safe ing on a theorization coined by Ole Wæver identities. An interpretation aspiring to oblit- (1995: 60), talk about a ”speech act failure” in erate difference and the other becoming alike the sense of old referents and acts of security with stress on “compatible self-images” along losing their power to securitize and maintain the Deutschean lines could actually have di- the existing, polarized and war-prone order. minished, if not wholly undermined, that op- This is to say that the vacuum and implo- tion. sion of the previous limits of comprehending aspects of otherness were not utilized, in the Nordic case, by drawing on some alternative form of security-talk. It took, instead, place  Interestingly, both the EU and NATO, once viewed as through an activation of the option of bring- security communities, seem to differ from Norden in the sense that security has in both cases underpinned rather explicitly their establishment. The emergency-related fram- ing of politics has stood its ground with the constitution of the EU and in particular NATO resting heavily on secu-  Jef Huysmans (1995) separates between de-securitization rity-talk. In consequence, there been far less flexibility and as a down-grading of danger, constructivist efforts with se- more stringent limits present in the devising of identities. curity seen as socially constructed as well as a de-construc- Similarity has – in line with the Deutschean logic – been tivist strategy inviting for the story of security not only to the aim, and difference has been treated with suspect. The be told in a different and less harmful way but refraining two polities differ from each other, though, in the sense that altogether from a re-telling of the story. My use here of the otherness grounding the EU has been projected into the concept of silencing hence resonates forcefully with Europe’s own past whereas the projection is spatial in the the de-constructivist strategy outlined by Huysmans in his case of NATO with the exterior viewed as dangerous. The work on the securitization of immigrants. His trilogy could option of devising difference without immediately linking be applicable to a distinguishing between Norden, the EU difference with arguments related to security has not been and NATO as security communities in the sense that Nor- present, for the part of the EU and NATO, to the same den arguably rests on a de-constructivist strategy, the EU degree as it has been there in the case of Norden. To put it abides to a constructivist one whereas NATO pertains pre- differently, no ‘speech-act failure’ invited by a switch from an dominantly to securitization altering with de-securitization emergency-related to a normal framing of politics has been without any constructivist or de-constructivist approaches present for the part of the two latter polities. being present.

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ing to the fore previously suppressed and un- reading of difference. However, at the same noticed identities. More precisely, the existence time an emergency-related framing of politics of additional and more trustful forms of differ- has retained its position in the sense that differ- ence not brought into view in the neighbour ence remains linked to security-talk. Security is and hidden by a constant stress on securitiza- not ousted from the discourse as also indicated tion were unmasked by critical reflection, and by that the outcome is conceptualized as a se- then brought to the fore precisely through a curity community, and hence – with security by-passing and going beyond security as a con- standing its ground as a key concern – differ- stitutive argument. Overall, the emergence of ence has to be traded for similarity. Going be- a new and more cooperative regime seems to yond and silencing security becomes an option have entailed processes of subtly escaping the only if the normal framing of politics is ex- former system, as the aim was not one of fix- tended also to cover the meaning provided and ing some particular security problem but use importance allotted to security – this then in the increasing openness – flowing from com- turn impacting comprehensions of both simi- prehensions of normalcy – in order to allow larity and difference. Operating within a nor- for identities to be grounded by themes other mal frame of politics unavoidably downplays than security. much of the drama attached to securitization The stories told entailed, it seems, similarity but precisely the utilization of that option ap- in the sense that the idea of Scandinavia played pears to have opened the door for the coin- an important unifying role in bringing people ing of a non-homogeneous, pluralist and yet together across the previous divides. The dif- peaceful Nordic commonality. ferent and emergent peoples-nations were lo- At large, it seems that the Scandinavian cated as part of the same historical heritage. system – with the core consisting of the rela- This provided for identity-related safety, albeit tions between Denmark and Sweden – abides it took place without efforts of turning war to a logic somewhat different from the one into a key constitutive story. The war-infested underlying the Deutschean theorization, and past was rather sidelined by the civil society- that this logic still largely prevails. Silencing, related actors central in the process through a in the sense of a non-concern, continues to be focusing on the various new nation-building prevalent as to the way security is addressed projects. Otherness and difference were neither within the intra-Nordic sphere and hence also constituted in radicalized terms, nor were they narratives pertaining to similarity and differ- substituted by any far-reaching stress on simi- ence work in particular ways. Difference may larity. They were, by employing new narrative be accentuated and similarity can be down- resources that allowed for recognition of the played without this amounting – as theorized other being simultaneously other and like, ac- by Jef Huysmans – to a backlash with security commodated and embraced. The outcome was back of the agenda. There exists, in the aspiring rather one of mild as well as friendly forms of for safe ontological identities, a rather broad difference being constitutive of peaceful Nor- repertoire of options to be utilized without dic commonality. the concern for physical and material security It hence appears, at a closer inspection, that again coming to the fore, and this may well the Deutschean take stands for and is split be- stand out as a relevant argument also in view tween two quite different interpretations of of the discord currently present in the sphere politics. It operates, on the one hand, with a of Danish-Swedish relations. normal framing, this then allowing for a re-

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A relationship of kinship scholarly interest generated for example by the relations between Sweden and Norway testifies As already noted, the Danish-Swedish rela- to this (cf. Gundelach, 2000; Linde-Laursen, tionship is far from harmonious. Strains have 1995; Mouritzen, 1999; Nielsen, 2004; Peters- – as reflected in the public debate – been there son, 2006; Stenius, 1993). Most studies focus already for a longer period of time, albeit they on the dynamics and features of the Danish- have, it seems, become increasingly aggravated Swedish relationship at large or view the issues during the recent years. The contentious - is at stake from a Danish perspective. Orvar Löf- sues that have been brought into the public gren is in this regard something of an excep- domain consist above all of various questions tion. He lived for some years as a Swede and a pertaining to immigration and asylum, with university teacher in Copenhagen and argues, the political approaches applied attracting a on the basis of the experiences gained, that the considerable amount of critical attention. This up-keeping of the general stereotypes pertain- sometimes highly pitched critique as to the ing to difference seems to matter more than the policies pursued by the neighbour on the other realities of the individual encounter. Increased side of the strait has in essence been premised contacts largely contribute to a foregrounding on the argument that the neighbour’s policies of differences rather than similarities, he asserts are distinctively illiberal in character. In one of (Löfgren, 2003: 216). its aspects the critique – pointing to a rather Hanne Sanders (2008), a Dane by national- oppositional mode of differentiation – appears ity but with studies and a long academic career to indicate that no common Scandinavian as a historian in Sweden, provides a somewhat model of liberal democracy exists. The Scan- similar account of living and teaching on the dinavians are not just different as to the degree Swedish side. A theme common to both Löf- of liberal democracy with some more advanced gren and Sanders seems to be that migrating than others; allegedly there also exists qualita- to the neighbouring country part of a pacific tive differences. The critique also throws into community is not as problem-free as might be doubt the rather general perceptions of a rather expected on the basis of the Deutschean the- tranquil – if not even boringly harmonious ory on “compatible self-images”. Rather than and amiable – Scandinavian togetherness and amounting to increased we-ness and demise of points instead to democracy and liberal values the ‘cognitive distance’ as expected by Deut- being employed in a contest pertaining to he- sch (1957: 36), concrete encounters appear to gemony. highlight distinctiveness and lack of homoge- It may be noted that the Danish and the neity. In sum, there is less self and more other Swedish national mythologies have in general present in the neighbour. been premised on outlining differences and In reporting on her personal experiences otherness rather than similarities. A consid- and in providing reflections based on insight erable bulk of research exceeding by far the into history as to the encounter between Danishness and Swedishness, Sanders con- cludes that the relationship boils down to an uneasy and problematic one. In actual fact,  For a study on the historical unfolding of the Danish- the two entities contradict each other to the Swedish relations, see Anders Linde-Laursen (1995). Mogens extent that also her own in-between position Berendt (1983) stands for an interesting, rather elaborated and blunt case of Sweden-bashing in the 1980s with Sweden as a Dane in Sweden turned increasingly in- being accused of harbouring totalitarian tendencies. convenient.

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One of her main observations is that the metry in the sense that Danes have for long Swedish approach to Denmark remained harboured a rather engaged view on Sweden. somewhat detached over a long period of time, Their neighbour figures, she contends, as an albeit being at the same time basically positive important other with stress on various features if not overly idealizing. There has been much seen as predominantly negative. Sweden has, stress on being alike but not altogether at the ex- as to the more value-oriented issues at stake, pense of otherness. Sanders notes that Sweden’s been frequently purported as being ruled by a significant others have in general consisted big-brother state. The state arguably interferes of America and occasionally also Germany. forcefully in the daily life of citizens, this then The neighbouring countries did not count, as contrasting with the Danes perceiving them- Sweden viewed itself as having already sur- selves as ‘free’. Denmark is hence regarded as passed them in terms of development. Den- being far less restrained by the power of the mark did hence not figure as a competitor or state or, for that matter, by an excessive bu- an alternative model but stood out in the Swed- reaucracy eroding freedom and narrowing ish discourse as being cosy, easy-going, relaxed down the individuality of the citizens. and tolerant. The rather non-political, cultural Overall, Sanders notes that Sweden has and mundane perspective applied was in some been quite important for Denmark as a source sense that of a tourist. It was a consumer- of various ideas, but also functions as a kind of ist one and in broader terms Denmark was non-me to mirror oneself against. She goes as far often depicted as being more ‘continental’ and as claiming that the Danes are actually plagued ‘southern’ in character than Sweden. In short, by feelings of inferiority, among other reasons Denmark was idealized rather than depicted because Sweden has in many cases succeeded in in negative terms and it was not included in a turning itself into a template of a modern wel- contest on Scandinavian hegemony. fare society on the international scene. This then Notably, liberal values and democracy do not stand out as mutually exploited and divid- ing issues in the account provided by Sanders. The emphasis is mostly on various issues part  Anders Linde-Laursen (2007: 269) presents a similar argu- of everyday life singled out in order for a dis- ment, although he also endeavours to provide it with some tance to prevail. Moreover, she points out that historical depth. He thus points to a “foundational schism” present in the Danish society between groups sympathetic the Danish-Swedish pattern has lacked in sym- or adverse to modernity, this then also materializing itself “as hegemonic disapproving narratives about the modern, over-developed Sweden”. These Danish narratives hold, he asserts, that the desire of the Swedes “for modernity and development make them willingly accept modern execu- tions of power that erode the freedom and individuality of  For a more detailed account, see Arne Ruth (1984). Ruth the citizens”. One of the Danish assertions entails the argu- stresses the future-oriented nature of Sweden as ”a sec- ment that the Swedes, in contrast to the Danes themselves, ond new nation”. It is to be noted, though, as to degree are humourless. They are taken to be unable to grasp the of development that Denmark has historically been much arguably sophisticated humour with emphasis on irony. The better off than Sweden, and Sweden has been able to catch argument appears to be an outgrowth and projection of up relative recently mostly in the aftermath of WWII. For claims advanced in the intra-Danish debate positing that the more detailed analysis, see Togeby, 1998 and 2003. elite and intellectuals fail to get the more populist messages  It is to be noted, though, that the period with Sweden aimed at expressing dissatisfaction and frustration through growing affluent is of relatively recent origin and historically the use of language and concepts, advanced in the name of Denmark was over a long period of time clearly ahead of freedom of speech. Instead of receiving the message, the Sweden with Sweden being viewed by the Danes as a poor elite and intellectuals are accused of interpreting the con- and relatively undeveloped country. tents as unduly offending and forms of blemishing.

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accounts for why the various negative myths, as undemocratic fashion”. The occurrence of in- she prefers to call then, are quite insensitive to fringements of human rights contrasts with factual developments. They seem to prevail and the Swedish more humane and democratic have a life of their own for example in the sense approach as, according to the dominant Swedish that the various myths seem to have grown view, “everybody should have the right to par- rather than diminished in strength despite in- ticipate in societal affairs” (Sanders, 2008: 13). creased interaction between the two countries. In other words, her reading of liberal values and The discrepancy between functional and iden- democracy rests on a normal framing of poli- tity-related integration has increased rather than tics rather than abiding to any alarmist inter- diminished, it appears, this then inviting for a pretations. theorization of the relationship along the lines The Danish response to the controversy of Anne Norton, Anton Blok and Slavoj Žižek. rests, she notes, on arguing that the Swedish at- However, Sanders also notes that the pat- titudes towards immigrants and asylum seekers tern is far from stable. It has more recently are actually not much different from the Da- changed radically with Sweden’s previously de- nish ones. In fact, the difference is seen as the tached idealization now traded for a consider- Swedish guardian-state not allowing for critical able and also far more critical interest in the views to be aired freely. Problematic issues are Danish dynamics. In particular, the policies of not discussed openly and democratically, yet immigration and the nationalism articulated in they are present also for the part of Sweden. that context have attracted interest and conse- The effort to stay with a normal framing of quently met with some degree of disbelief and politics is in some sense deceptive and artifi- disappointment. Denmark is seen, she posits, cial. The media are not seen as free and people as having abandoned its previously cosy and do arguably not dare to express their opinions, tolerant nature. The country has turned – de- i.e. there is a well-founded fear present in Swe- spite clinging formally and out of old habits den as well, albeit it is not have an outlet in the to rather liberal values – conservative as well context of the Swedish political system and way as defensive. Furthermore, assumptions per- of framing politics. These Danish perceptions taining to xenophobia – pointing to the intro- of Sweden’s deceptive standing then allow for duction of an increasingly emergency-related side-stepping and circumventing the critique framing of politics – have more recently turned put forward in the Swedish discourse. It surely into a lens that impacts in general the Swedish brings about a Danish debate and is condu- interpretations and views on Denmark, Sand- cive to some self-reflection but the key reac- ers concludes. tions nonetheless consist – rather than testify- This then boils down to Denmark being ing to the existence of some Danish problems increasingly used in the Swedish discourse as – of arguing that the critique testifies, as to a prime source of othering. The previous one- the bottom-line, to Sweden having consider- sidedness of the relationship has changed and able problems of its own but remaining unable been substituted by a Danish-Swedish pat- to face them head on. Swedish approaches to tern of mutual othering. In other words, the liberal values and democracy still rest on com- Danish critique present in the public domain prehensions of normalcy, whereas the framing concerning Sweden has been complemented of politics should, according to a considerable by equally critical Swedish interventions ar- number of Danish voices, also for the part of guing, as Sanders puts it, that the Danes are Sweden rest on an emergency-based reading. “treating people in morally a questionable and

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The cartoon crisis level of principles, pursued a rather different approach. It has displayed much more consid- In probing the Danish-Swedish othering, there eration and willingness to accommodate the is no way around the Danish Muhammed car- Muslim concerns, including the recognition of toon controversy of 2005-06. The incident migrants as a particular and collective group provided much ammunition to be used by with rights of their own. There has, in the case Swedish critics but it is to be noted, though, of Sweden, been space for doing so as the dif- that Sweden also had a case of its own two ference seen as inherent in Muslims is taken to years later. It occurred with three Muhammed- confirm Sweden’s multiculturalist self-under- drawings produced by a Swedish artist being standing rather than to threaten it. It is in line initially censored but then subsequently pub- with a normal framing of politics rather than lished – although not commissioned as in the inviting for an emergency-related one. Hence, case of Denmark – by a local newspaper (Lars- and despite having been confronted by some- son and Lindekilde, 2009). Although freedom what similar challenges, Sweden has succeeded of speech and the right of the media to publish in defusing the explosive potential inherent even provocative materials – if deemed to be in the issues involved. Denmark, in turn, has politically and socially relevant – enjoys broad experienced a considerable amount of internal support in both countries, the issues involved turmoil as well as its worst foreign policy crisis seem to have been granted far more impor- with the reverberations still unfolding. The fre- tance in the Danish discourse. In essence, un- quent use of the word ‘crisis’ is telling as such restricted and almost absolute freedom has in in testifying to an emergency-related rather the latter case been turned into a master sig- than normal framing of politics for the part of nifier underpinning Danishness, whereas the Denmark. formative impact has been far less conspicuous The publication – and the frequent re-pub- in the case of Sweden. This then also implies lications – of the Muhammed cartoons and the that there exists, in the Swedish discourse with crisis that ensued has been seen by some schol- the prevalence of normalcy, space for somewhat ars as pointing to a general political pattern broader and more nuanced views concerning (Engelbrecht Larsen and Seidenfaden, 2006; the pros and cons of unrestricted freedom. Kunelius et al., 2007). For the part of the Dan- The reactions in regard to the Muhammed ish state, there was at least initially little interest cartoon controversies evidence, in one of their in engaging and responding to the complaints aspects, that the issue of immigration figures positing that the publishing amounted to a rather differently in the Danish and the Swed- mocking and ridiculing of the feelings of the ish identity-related discourses. Sweden is ba- Muslims. This contrasted with the approach sically at ease with immigration, whereas the applied by the Swedish authorities who, spear- framing in the Danish case tends to relate far headed by the Prime Minister, endeavoured at more to fear, anxiety and what is sometimes recognizing the problems. They have, in being called ‘moral panic’. Whilst freedom of expres- less inclined to define the difference positioned sion and democracy as arguments advanced in in Muslims as a threat and engaging hence in the public sphere have frequently been used by various acts of securitization, been far more various actors in Denmark in a rather offensive prepared to open up for contacts. The prime manner and seen as particularly Danish quali- strategy has consisted of waging a dialogue in ties to which various ‘newcomers’ – especially order for mutual respect and peaceful co-exist- Muslims – have to adapt, Sweden has, on the ence to emerge. The Swedish authorities have

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been prepared to share some of the burden of basically internal in the Swedish case, whereas adaptation for a multicultural society to prevail the ramifications turned broadly international rather than just requesting the Muslims – being for the part of Denmark. outlined as carriers of rather problematic if not It also appears that the lessons learned differ threatening difference – to adjust. The blame in general between the two countries. Sweden has not merely been placed with the Muslims views itself as having coped rather successfully as there has also existed efforts of self-reflexion with the challenges. It has been possible to as well as scrutiny of the policies pursued. tackle the issues at stake without stepping out- The differences in the preparedness to side the normal framing of politics. The coun- carry responsibility and position blame also try managed, in being flexible and without im- became apparent on the level of prime min- posing strict limits as to the identities at stake, isters. Göran Larsson and Lasse Lindekilde to de-escalate the tensions. The episode could (2009: 373) argue, on the basis on their com- thus be regarded as vindicating the Swedish in- parative effort, that the Danish and Swedish tegrative and inclusive approach and in partic- prime ministers “disagree fundamentally about ular the state was provided with an important how to deal with religious diversity and mul- option of demonstrating that it was up to the ticulturalism”. Sweden had in general a clear task of managing a multiculturalist Sweden. advantage over Denmark owing to its broader The prevailing self-understanding, in not being and differently delimited conceptualization of built on some particular taken-for-granted cat- liberal democracy. The Swedish action space egory pertaining to purity and homogeneity or turned out to be broader and allowed for the resting on interpretations of threatening dif- establishment of dialogue – whereas Denmark ference, gained recognition instead of being refrained initially from such a move in defin- undermined. Remaining until very recently ing liberal democracy in more restrictive and short of a political party like the Danish Peo- exclusive terms. Sweden was able to aspire for ple’s Party in the parliament has undoubtedly normative high ground together with the Mus- contributed to the success and, conversely, led lim communities and it seems to have been to the conclusion that the emergence of such easier also for the these communities – with a party could potentially endanger the pursu- their difference being recognized and not in- ance of the Swedish approach premised on a terpreted as something problematic per se in normal framing of politics as well as a rather view of a given, naturalized and strictly delim- benign reading of the difference inherent in ited self-understanding – to position and make immigrants, including Muslims and Islam. themselves heard through the normal channels Denmark, in turn, has been thoroughly of communication existing within the Swedish shaken by the episode. In fact, the contention public sphere. Significantly, they were able to escalated to a rather severe crisis not only in the do so without being compelled and pushed in domestic sphere but also internationally. Some the direction of exceptional forms of politics steps have subsequently been taken to improve such as arranging demonstrations and drawing communication and add to the recognition of in various ways on support from fellow Mus- Muslim communities, albeit it has also been lims abroad. The differences in the Danish and extensively thought that the crisis indeed re- Swedish approaches as to normalcy and emer- vealed the seriousness of the challenge posted gency as well as the very way of comprehend- by issues related to immigration and Muslims ing liberal democracy then implied, in one of in particular. their aspects, that the issues at stake remained

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The experience was, in some of its aspects, both talk somewhat journalistically about a taken to confirm that the difference inher- “brotherly feud” in referring to the constant ent in the ‘newcomers’ endangers Denmark’s needle pricking and quarrelling that took place, purity, cohesion and durability. Accordingly, particularly in the context of the run-up to the a situation emerged which also provided the Swedish parliamentary elections in September state with an opportunity to deal with the dual 2010. The debate in the public sphere, with challenge: To show on the one hand its compe- extensive news coverage and a broad stream of tence in shielding the nation and coping with almost daily commentary appearing for weeks the task of managing a de facto multicultural in most of the media, was this time sparked off Danish society on the other. The engagement by the previously rather insignificant Sweden with diversity then also implied that a number Democrats, a party riding on nationalist and of Danish politicians, supported by key voices xenophobic (albeit not racist) themes, gaining in the media, found reasons to detach them- increased prominence on the Swedish political selves from what they called the more reserved scene. It was, owing to a considerable growth ‘Swedish model’ and a normal reading of poli- in support, bound to achieve a break-through tics. and gain seats in the parliament (the outcome Conversely, a number of Swedish voices was some six percent of the votes and 20 seats gradually joined the debate by aspiring to add turning the party to the third largest one in the to the political, cultural and identity-related Swedish Parliament). distance in regard to Denmark. A landmark in This implied that also Sweden now, along this rather media-driven debate (Larsson and the lines of Denmark, has a rather populist, Lindekilde, 2009: 364) consisted of the Swedish nationalist and xenophobic party represented Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt as well as in the national parliament, thereby forging a the then leader of the opposition Mona Sahlin far more explicit link with the public discourse both pointing in an interview on TV1 (12th of on immigration and the conduct of politics. September 2010) to Denmark as a non-encour- The Swedish party has rather close contacts aging model. The Danish approach concerning with Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party). the policies of immigration did in their view It is socially conservative in character with a not represent an avenue that Sweden should longing for the social democratic and nation- aspire to follow. The two top leaders thereby alist Sweden arguably abandoned in the era repeated on high level an argument that had, as of Olof Palme. The complaints pertain to, as such, been frequently advanced since 2001 in articulated by Matthias Karlsson, part of the the Swedish public discourse (Brandin, 2010: leadership of the Sweden Democrats (see Jalv- 19-23; Lawler, 2007: 114; Nielsen, 2004: 155- ing, 2011: 26-32) that Sweden “no longer 58). has an identity or a history”. The country is claimed to have lost its temporal anchorage, with the drift then generating a considerable The ‘brotherly feud’ degree of alarmism and anxiety. The program- matic aim of the party is hence one of re-nar- With the pattern of othering having been rating the national story. It is one of restoring grounded in the discourse sparked off by the nationalism with liberal values and democracy cartoons, the Danish-Swedish relations seem then comprehended in that perspective. The to have retained their aggravated nature. Bo party is quite traditionalist, as noted among Bjørnvig (2010) and Mikael Jalving (2010) others by Anders Hellström (2010: 28), rather

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than endeavouring at breaking altogether fresh been discriminated against by an activist and ground through the introduction of new issues interventionist Swedish state. In other words, on the political agenda. It aspires back to the the party has not been allowed to pursue its past through struggles in which anti-elitism, policies of likeness. The website of the party resisting the European Union and criticizing was at some juncture closed down on the order the policies of immigration stand central. The of the Swedish secret police (SÄPO), and SD latter issue of opening Sweden up for immi- has occasionally been censored in the media gration is viewed as a profound mistake. It has (TV4 refused to air an electoral video prepared arguably spoiled the country, Karlsson asserts. by the Sweden Democrats in the course of their The argument advanced is that Denmark has election campaign as it was seen as standing for been able to avoid the loss of nationalism and incitement to racial hate and hence regarded il- constitutes in this sense (but not many others, legal). Furthermore, members of the party have he adds) a model to emulate. on occasions been harassed and discriminated The party thus brings about increasing am- against (Orrenius, 2010: 33-49). Considerable bivalence and it challenges the very way of fram- attention has in general been devoted in the ing politics. It does so by aspiring to contribute Danish discourse to that the party did not get to a Sweden increasingly like Denmark and by fair play in the media, pointing for example to threatening to bring about a Danish-Swedish that it was excluded from the final TV-debate we-ness premised on more recent Danish de- prior to the national voting arranged between velopment. The break-through of the party in the various Swedish parties on STV. These September 2010 – described by Jalving (2011: clampdowns have then – instead of being seen 20) as “the Danish People’s Party in blue and as Swedish efforts to protect the country’s dem- yellow colours” – not just broadens the reper- ocratic and political system against breaches of toire of national narratives but aims at chang- the rules – been taken to testify that Sweden ing the very framing of politics with more space is not fully democratic, open and prepared to provided to emergency-related readings. It has, allow for freedom of speech, i.e. freedom being in that context, installed profound identity-re- also utilized in accentuating difference and lated issues on the national agenda. Questions pointing to its threatening aspects. The com- have emerged that do not merely pertain to the plaints seem to pertain to that liberal democ- integration of immigrants, with the bordering racy continues, for the part of Sweden, to be between what is basically Danish or Swedish exercised within a normal framing of politics turning somewhat more diffuse,. The issues at rather than in the context of emergency being stake rather relate more broadly to the nature viewed – as seems increasingly be the case for of the two respective polities, this then also the part of Denmark – as an integral aspect of unavoidably impacting the unfolding of the the conduct of politics. relationship between Denmark and Sweden. Questions pertaining to similarity and differ- ences and, importantly, the framing of politics, have indeed taken a new turn with the appear-  Information was released pointing to that the then Swe- dish Foreign Minister, Laila Freivalds, had actually – although ance of a Swedish political party aspiring for initially denying it – intimidated a website provider to shut similarity on Danish terms. down the website of the Sweden Democrats as the party A considerable number of contributions in was actually about to publish the Danish cartoons. As a consequence of the revelation she resigned from her post the Danish media have allotted much impor- (see Linde-Laursen, 2007: 265; Larsson and Lindekilde, 2009: tance to that the new party has in some ways 367).

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This discrepancy in the approach and - read den remains determined to stay its course. It is, ing of politics has been frequently evidenced the frequently used argument reads, bound to by the employment, in the Danish media, of remain a vanguard of multiculturalism. It has, some quite derogative expressions. To provide in other words, been forcefully denied that the some snapshots of this Sweden-bashing at its country would be on its way of moving over worst: Sweden has been categorized as ‘a Nor- to an assimilationist and monoculturalist ap- dic banana republic’ (an expression used by the proach, i.e. the type of policies that Denmark leader of the Danish People’s Party) and seen as has been comprehended to pursue or, for that a ‘Prozac nation’ (i.e. doped into tranquillity). matter, to switch over to an emergency-related It has been positioned in the ‘Balkans’ and la- way of framing politics. belled as being ‘East European’ (an expression employed by a Danish People’s Party MEP). It has further been talked about as being ‘Asian’ Proceeding along different as well as ‘totalitarian’. At large the discourse paths turned, at least for a while, quite aggravated. Sweden has been confronted with a consider- Although aggravated during towards the end of able number of Danish contributions drawing 2010, the cleavages and the somewhat polar- explicitly on arguments pertaining to universal ized situation between Denmark and Sweden liberal values as well as democracy in a rather as to immigration and asylum policies is not exclusionary fashion. just recent in origin. In fact, the constellation The Swedish replies have sought to deny the has developed gradually over a longer period relevance of the critique and have done this by (cf. Green-Pedersen, 2009). The ground was in employing two different types of arguments. It principle laid already in the 1970s with Sweden has firstly been asserted that the Swedish way developing an active policy of immigration and of coping with the challenges posed by the settling, in principle, for inclusive policies. The Sweden Democrats has not been in breach of previously rather assimilationist policies were democracy or liberal values in general. The aim quite drastically traded for multiculturalism as has rather been one of upholding and defend- a key departure (Rungblom, 1994). Somewhat ing those values, and emergency-related meas- later the country declared itself – part and par- ures may arguably be employed in a justified cel of its quite successful modernization – to manner in defending the prevailing normalcy be multicultural as well as pluralist in essence. of Swedish politics. Secondly, it has been em- Denmark is, in the perspective of devising spe- phatically refuted that Sweden would in some cific policies, a latecomer as the pursuance of regard be on its way to becoming similar to quite exclusive policies has taken place since Denmark owing to the appearance of the Swe- the parliamentary elections in 2001. The poli- den Democrats on the Swedish political arena. cies pursued have been based on the assimila- Suggestions to this effect have been firmly -re tion of differences in order for ethnic homoge- futed and it has been vocally assured that Swe- neity of the country to prevail. It is also to be noted that whilst the issues of immigration and granting of asylum until recently, in the Swedish case, have remained  Janus Brandin (2010) has rather systematically covered largely on the normal agenda without being the debate in the media from 2001 onwards, although he is somewhat less systematic and detailed as to the more excessively politicized, Denmark has stood recent turns in the Danish-Swedish discussion. for a rather different outcome. The national

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political scene has turned, as testified by Ulf for that matter, fearful of a break in the con- Hedetoft (2003: 393), into a kind of “battle- sensuality of the policies pursued? ground” with Danishness being constantly These issues have been found quite troubling played against the difference seen in the ethnic and difficult to grasp in the Danish discourse and religiously defined minorities, immigrants and the dialogue that has emerged has usually (often called “aliens” or alternatively “new been less than helpful in grounding a better Danes”) and asylum seekers. Muslims in par- understanding of the essence of the other. As ticular stand for the Danish other. Taken to- noted by Jan Guillou, a Swedish columnist gether, Denmark intends, in contrast to Swe- and author of rather popular novels, in an in- den, to remain a monocultural society. tervention published also in the Danish media These differences in approach then account (Jyllands-Posten, 2nd of September, 2010, writ- for why the mainstream public debate waged ten by Heidi Joy Madsen), Sweden does not in Denmark has more often than not departed attach much importance to issues of immigra- from the view that there must be something tion and Islam, i.e. the interpretation is not wrong with the Swedish policies. It has, in this an emergency-related one. Migrants do not, vein, been widely assumed that the Swedes do in the case of Sweden, figure as the categorical not fully comprehend the seriousness of the is- others as they seem to do in the construction sues involved. The assertion is that some kind of Danishness. They are not depicted as enti- of political correctness (cf. Petersson, 2006: ties to be cleansed of their otherness in order to 7), or perhaps even outright prohibitions (cf. be accepted into the nation. The constitutive Gundelach, 2002), hamper a free debate. move is thus in the latter case one of exclusion Various inhibitions prevent an open acknowl- with security as a formative argument, whereas edgment of what and how huge the assumed it tends to consist of non-securitized inclusion problems really are. Serious issues are being in the Swedish one (cf. Jensen, 2004). suppressed in the public debate – as claimed Arguably, there prevails – instead of a rather by Jyllands-Posten (1st of September, 2010) – openly pronounced existential fear – a far more “in order to avoid being seen as hostile towards relaxed Swedish attitude. The attitudes remain immigrants”. Denmark, for its part, is viewed relaxed despite of Sweden having accepted a far as being far less cautious as to the approach higher amount of migrants and people with a applied and not similarly inhibited by political different ethnic background than Denmark. correctness. At large, the policies pursued by Guillou therefore views many of the Danish the Swedish government are viewed as difficult accusations and expressions of fear as “both to comprehend and the Swedish public debate humorous and bizarre” in pointing to that im- is lambasted as timid and evasive (Petersson, migration as an issue has a far less pronounced 2006: 8). position on the Swedish than on the Danish It has in general been difficult on the Da- political agenda. nish side to grasp that Swedes tend to frame Also Göran Rosenberg (Information, 5th of the issues at stake quite differently. It has been December 2010), equally a Swedish column- found puzzling that the neighbour is far less ist and author, emphasizes – in line with the alarmed even if some its key constitutive de- dominant structures of the Swedish discourse partures are allegedly in danger. Why are the – the value of tolerance rather than freedom Swedes not worried about the values that bind of expression. In doing so, he posits that there the nation together being threatened, overly is a difference between freedom of expression concerned about a loss of their sovereignty or, and debate as a culture. He also concedes, in

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trying at least to some extent to address the solute right overriding other liberal concerns divergent interpretations and application of such as human rights and equal treatment. liberal principles, that the campaign video of Freedom of speech should be employed, to- the Sweden Democrats (censored in Sweden) gether with other liberal approaches, to guard would presumably have been shown in Den- and strengthen a normal framing of politics mark. Actually, “it would not have caused rather than employed as one of the means any problems or raised particular concern” part of a more emergency-related reading. An as “almost everything can these days be pub- awareness of the potentially rather problematic licly said in Denmark regarding immigration consequences of the ‘right to offend’ and the and Muslims in particular”.10 Yet there is, he use of freedom of speech as part of a majority- claims in line with a broader Swedish debate, rule without regard for minorities undergirds no essential difference between Denmark and the Swedish approach, whereas this awareness Sweden. This is also the case in regard to free- seems largely to be lacking in the mainstream dom of expression, albeit the respective debate Danish discourse, Rosenberg claims. cultures are – or at least have been – different, with Denmark having a culture entailing “that nothing essential can any longer be discussed An intensified encounter within the public sphere as all are talking past each other”. The unfolding of the ‘brotherly feud’ towards In essence, Rosenberg is somewhat vaguely the end of 2010 is, as such, nothing altogether pointing out that an unrestricted application new or isolated. It rather reflects a broader pat- of the freedom of expression can in some cases tern of increased interest in the waging of a boil down, in being employed in the context of cross-border dialog with the neighbour as evi- an emergency-related framing of politics, into denced for example by the recent investigative something quite illiberal. He asserts – in prob- journalism and literature with focus on Danish- lematizing the dominant Danish narratives Swedish relations. – that restrictions in the freedom of speech do Lene Sundström, a journalist at the Swedish not amount to political correctness. They can Aftonbladet, contributed to the debate by mov- be quite justified as the singling out of weak ing in 2009 over to live for three months at the and marginalized groups of people may add to outskirts of Copenhagen. She did so in order their estrangement, alienation, discrimination to explore Denmark more closely and with the and stigmatization. Cautiousness may actu- aim of reporting on recent Danish develop- ally help to avert these problems (see also Jør- ments. Her findings then appeared in a book gensen, 2006: 267; Rostbøll, 2011). Crucially, with a somewhat provocative title “The World’s freedom of expression is not viewed as an ab- Most Happy People” (published both in Da- nish and Swedish). The title no doubt points to the perception of Danes being rather self-cen- tred. In her report she focuses in particular on 10 In fact, Ulf Hedetoft (2004: 79) has in the Danish debate the Danish People’s Party and explores Den- articulated a similar view far more explicitly by referring to “slogans almost routinely put forward in the debate in mark in order to shed light on what also Swe- the name of ‘freedom of speech’ in order to back up and den might sooner or later have to encounter, justify the spread of the most vulgar stereotypes concern- taking into account the increasing support en- ing immigrants”. In other words, freedom of expression is employed in accentuating difference and providing it with joyed and gathered by the Sweden Democrats. connotations of danger. The point of her reporting consists predomi-

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nantly of demonstrating that strange and to as a master signifier and ultimate nodal point some extent unpleasant things are underway in of politics. Denmark. The aim of the book is then to con- And in consequence, Sweden is in deep tribute to the growth of an increased awareness trouble. It is arguably in demise, Jalving in order for Sweden to be better able to avert claims, due to its nature as a messenger of the similar developments if the likeness inherent future, moral guardian and entity premised on in the Sweden Democrats spreads and under- self-sufficiency as well as social experiments. mines the current divergences present between The fact that Sweden has turned over-ambi- Denmark and Sweden with Denmark turning tious and pursues erroneous policies further less self and increasingly other. strengthens this perspective. Arguably, the In addition to the treatment and focus on project cannot be accomplished and the break the Danish populist party provided by Sund- away from what the country should be and ström, three other books have recently been the utopian effort of becoming a multicul- published on that theme (Mattsson, 2009; tural polity do not carry. The aspirations have Ekman and Pohl, 2010; Orrenius, 2010), and therefore led Sweden into a rather self-destruc- there is also one focusing on the Danish and tive state of denial. Except for some dissident the Swedish populist parties in a comparative voices closer to Danish views (interviewed in perspective (Uvell and Carlsen, 2010). the book), Sweden has arguably turned into a One of the unintended consequences of “realm of silence” in refusing to politicize eth- Sundström’s book was that it prompted the nic and religious issues. The utopian elements publishing of a somewhat similar book, al- in the Swedish policies allowing for a normal beit written from a Danish perspective. The and rather pragmatic framing of politics are il- counter-offensive, as it might be called, was lusory in nature, Jalving asserts. This is so as initiated by Jyllands-Posten and authored normalcy does not prevail. In reflecting on the by a columnist, Mikael Jalving (2011). The Swedish confidence in progress and the option basic message, premised on extensive travel- as to the transcending history, he suggests that ling in Sweden, meeting and interviewing a these beliefs should be abandoned. The ef- considerable number of experts and probing forts of making temporal jumps, with the state a variety of basically historical studies, con- having abandoned its traditional protective sists of arguing that Sweden is on its way to functions and instead aiming at contributing turning into something rather different. The to post-national developments, do not carry, problem is, according to Jalving, a temporal Jalving posits. Normalcy as a way of framing one. Sweden aims, he claims, at transcend- politics is, he claims, hence not just misleading ing its past instead of endeavouring at re- but also highly problematic. turning to its former being of a nation-state. Although the general aim of the book is one It has stepped out of the pattern concerning of searching for entries that allow and invite the past, present and future typical for na- for a critique in the dominant Swedish narra- tion-states, this temporality then also setting tives (while viewing the Danish ones as given Sweden apart from Denmark. Strangely, the and closed), it also entails some quite accurate Swedish state does not aim at saving the na- and informative analyses. Among other things, tion as it should, but rather contributes to Sweden’s historical track is described quite el- the emergence of quite different constella- egantly and it is perceptively pointed out that tions. Moreover, it does not seem to be overly also the Swedish approach entails some bor- concerned about the nation being undermined dering. In order not to slip into the advocacy

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of cosmopolitan universalism there are also be taken seriously. Her comments clearly tes- limits, in the case of Sweden, in the embracing tify to the rather tough and polarized media of difference. climate that labels the Danish-Swedish rela- But the merits of the book notwithstand- tionship with emphasis on difference instead ing, Jalving’s analysis remains quite aggravated of similarity. due to its rather Danish qualities, including Mattias Gardell (2010), professor in the the application of an emergency-geared way history of religion at the University of Uppsala, of framing politics. In addition to the Swedish has for his part contributed to the discourse by state elites being blamed for pursuing errone- writing on Islamophobia and he has, in that ous and ill-advised policies, various cultural context, devoted considerable attention to the radicals, humanists and left-wing participants occurrence of such fears in Sweden as well as in in the Swedish debate are condemned and Denmark. One of his main points consists of criticized. They are hanged out very much in arguing that the growing fear of Islam resides line with the way the Danish debate has un- in the loss of the ‘good’ enemies of the Cold folded over the recent decades. Basically the ar- War era (Gardell, 2010: 81). Islamophobia gument is that they are leading Sweden astray compensates, he alleges, for this loss of radical due to a false, i.e. tolerant and post-nationalist otherness, fits the bill and fills the identity-re- teleology. Instead of defending nationalist con- lated vacuum by providing a new significant structions as they should, they tend to engage other. The national ‘we’s’ are hence increasingly themselves in re-shaping and going beyond the defined by Islamophobia with religion (and not established conventions. In consequence, they just individual carriers of religion) purported as are blamed for having contributed to the crisis a problem per se. In addition, Gardell (2011) which Sweden is assumedly experiencing and asserts that the spread of the new fear restrains therefore also denied a legitimate standing in the conduct of democracy in inviting for and the debate. legitimizing various undemocratic practices as part of the struggle waged against Islam. It could be argued, in line with Gardell’s claim A realm of silence pertaining to the appearance of an identity-re- lated vacuum, that Denmark and Sweden have It is, against this background, quite unsurpris- gradually started also to draw upon each other ing that Lisa Bjurwald (Dagens Nyheter, 25th of with an emphasis on difference as to their read- February, 2011) reviews the book under the ing of religion in the context of politics, and title “The Danish Disease”. The choice could Islam in particular. They draw on difference have been impacted by Jalving himself appear- rather than similarity in their endeavours of ing a couple of days earlier in the Danish Poli- filling the vacuum. tiken, (22nd of February) under the title “The Without much surprise, the book has Swedish Bacillus”, with the author arguing that quickly prompted – clearly spurred by the Denmark should avoid turning into anything occurrence of a terrorist act in Stockholm in resembling Sweden in the sphere of values. December 2010 – a considerable amount of Bjurwald claims, as a mirror image, that it is debate as well as some pointed reviews. Pernil- actually Denmark which stands for “the realm la Ouis (2010), a researcher living in southern of silence”. She denounces the whole book by Sweden and a specialist on Islam, sides with insisting that Jalving and his publisher are far the claim put forward by Gardell that the car- too much to the right in the debate in order to toons published in Jyllands-Posten do not bear

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testimony to values such as freedom of expres- transcend national borders often present in the sion, but rather stand for Islamophobia, i.e. an Danish-Swedish discourse.11 emergency-related framing of politics. How- ever, she also asserts that there is nothing in the book on how to cope with the consequent Questioning neighbourly efforts of restraining opinions or conduct- ties ing moves of censorship. Is censorship not as such in breach with normal comprehension of It seems, overall, that neither Denmark nor politics? Discussion would be needed, she con- Sweden are at ease with the increased atten- tends, on how to respond to claims of religious tion and scrutiny. The debate waged over the feelings being insulted. The issue of liberal val- recent years has, in fact, on occasions been de- ues being under threat is pertinent also in the scribed as “hysterical”, seen as “unserious” or case of Sweden and would, in her view, have it has even been described by the Danish daily deserved explicit and a more thorough treat- Politiken (1st of September, 2010) as reflecting ment. a “highly charged political warfare across the The debate generated by Gardell’s book has Öresund”. Arne Ruth (2006) argues that the equally touched ground in Denmark. While cleavage setting Denmark and Sweden apart welcoming the publication and praising the from each other as to various values has turned aim of attacking too simplified thinking on “ocean-wide”. This broadening has taken place, Islam and the Muslim culture, Bjørn Bredal he notes, despite of Malmö and Copenhagen (2010) – a journalist at the Danish Politiken – increasingly figuring as a common urban con- nonetheless thinks that more attention should glomerate due to the integrating impact of the have been devoted to the factual situation pre- new bridge. Increasing closeness does not seem vailing in some of the Islamic regions. This is to bring about, contrary to the anticipations required, he asserts in a contribution also pub- part of a Deutshean approach, merely feelings lished in the Swedish daily Dagens Nyheter, of similarity and togetherness, but is also con- in order to avert the danger that the picture ducive to a considerable amount of othering provided becomes too rosy. Moreover, Bredal and stress on difference. joins Pernilla Ouis in arguing that some of At large, space has been opened up for the the dilemmas which Sweden has recently been airing of quite populist themes such as the one confronted with call for more thorough and put forward by Pia Kjærsgaard, leader of the self-critical treatment, albeit he concedes at Danish People’s Party. She proposed that the the same time that Sweden has in general fared Öresund bridge ought to be closed. The dis- much better than Denmark as to the policies cord should be settled by even re-drawing bor- pursued. Moreover, and in line with a number of voices critical of the Danish developments, he concludes that the tone in the Swedish dis- course on immigration, Islam and Muslims 11 As noted by Ulf Hedetoft (2006: 392), voices of opposi- is more dignified and respectful, i.e. basically tion as to the Danish policies have been inspired by per- ceptions of Swedish tolerance and normalcy and tolerance non-alarmist as to the underlying comprehen- has in general also been a significant theme in the Danish sions. On that basis he then argues that this is debate as noted by Carsten Stage (2011). For a Swedish actually something that Denmark should try to analyst showing considerable appreciation and respect for the policies pursued by Denmark, see Aje Carlbom (2003 emulate. Being a Danish journalist, he clearly and 2006). Carlbom is also extensively interviewed by Mi- breaks with the one-sidedness and inability to kael Jalving (2011: 45-52).

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ders, thereby adding to the spatial separation already for quite some time. And with this in- between Denmark and Sweden, while some creased ‘normalcy’, the need for mutual other- voices on the Swedish side recommended, in ing, for long present in the Danish-Swedish turn, a handing back of Skåne to Denmark relations, would be considerably reduced. (the region located in southern-most Sweden This is to say that the considerable intake of forming a stronghold of the Sweden Demo- immigrants and the attendant ethnic diversity crats and prior to 1658, along with some other has gradually turned into a contested issue in regions in southern Sweden, a rather central Sweden as well. Finally also the alternative and and important part of Denmark). more Denmark-like Swedish self – which ac- Crucially, the neighbourly ‘feud’ appears to cording to a broadly held Danish opinion has cover the whole political spectrum stretching been there all along among the Swedish people from the right to the left, although it has been albeit in a suppressed form – turns visible and particularly visible in the relations between the gains political influence. It is out in the open parties to the right. Hence, the impression of as the Swedes seem to comprehend – despite Sweden suppressing democracy in the context various persistent efforts of quelling the issues of the parliamentary elections prompted key – the severity of the situation. They no longer politicians from the Conservatives, Venstre stay with their alleged “naivity” and “state of (center-right party) and the Danish People’s self-deception” but comprehend “that their es- Party to air the idea of inviting the Council of sence is truly in danger” (Jyllans-Posten, 15th Europe to send electoral observers to Sweden of September, 2010). in order for them to cover the 2010 parliamen- The appearance of the Sweden Democrats tary elections. There was obviously little trust hence figures, once interpreted in this perspec- in Sweden’s ability to conduct elections in a fair tive, as a sign of Sweden’s recovery: The differ- and democratic manner. However, and quite ence inherent in migrants is increasingly seen unsurprisingly, this move was rejected, con- as problematic and conducive to conflicts. It demned and sharply criticized by the Swedish signals, according to quite a number Danish conservatives and liberals. They criticized the views, the arrival of a far more healthy state of proposal by regarding it as highly “populist” affairs. The new party contributes to a change and “unserious” in nature (Jyllands-Posten, 1st in perspective by stressing the need for more of September, 2010). emergency-related interpretations, and there is As to the media, the recent Danish public consequently scant understanding in the Da- debate has been spearheaded by tabloids, but nish debate for the Swedish efforts of purport- has also entailed interventions in the more seri- ing the Sweden Democrats as “contagious” or ous papers. The critique articulated in the dis- to view them as “pest-infected”, i.e. an entity course appears in general to have a dual kind of that in essence endangers the Swedish nation character. Sweden has, on the one hand, been (Folkhemmet) (Kristensen Berth, 2010; Hardis, blamed for having a rather authoritarian politi- 2010). The perspective held by the SD should, cal culture that quells and censors critical voices according to dominant Danish views, be seen in an undemocratic fashion but, on the other as a remedy helping Swedes to see things in a hand, it has also been seen as showing signs of correct perspective. a return to ‘normalcy’ (Hardis, 2010; Jalving, Thus, what is often termed as a ‘crisis’ as 2011). The country is, in other words, com- to the unfolding of the Swedish multicultural pelled to struggle increasingly with the same society (cf. Trägårdh, 2010) has in the Danish issues which also Denmark has encountered debate been predominantly viewed as a kind

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of comforting fact. It provides comfort in the sociated with the pursuance of rather illiberal sense that it testifies to the potential of change policies appears to be on its way of penetrat- in the previous temporal and hierarchic order ing the inside instead of the nation instead of with Sweden now showing signs of following remaining firmly on the outside. The entry of the Danish monoculturalist route instead of the Sweden Democrats into the Swedish par- figuring as an alternative and multiculturalist liament has hence been accompanied – at least model for Denmark to emulate. It opens up in the aftermath of the elections – by relatively the option of the ‘I’ to turn into a joint ‘we’ on large public demonstrations in various parts of Danish rather than Swedish terms, i.e. changes Sweden. And more profoundly, the established in the sense of problematic difference being parties have pledged not to cooperate with the converted to similarity. The Danes may, - in Sweden Democrats or allow them to influence stead of being on the defence as has previously the setting of the national agenda. They fur- been the case, apply more offensive approaches ther aspire to stay aloof from situations which in denying the Swedes the option of “looking would enable the newcomer to the parliament down [on Denmark], as they have always been – seen very much as an intruder and carrier of doing” (Jalving, 2011: 13). unhealthy difference – to gain influence by bal- The ‘crisis’ may thus be seen in the Da- ancing between the government and the oppo- nish discourse as relieving the country’s own sition. In other words, the SD is, despite being “disgrace and shame” (Guillou, 2010).12 By re- a legitimate political party present in the parlia- minding the Danish voters of the alleged fail- ment, treated as an exception. The normalcy of ure of the Swedish model, it alleviates feelings liberal democracy is defended by some degree of inferiority in the sense of merely being Swe- of exclusion. Göran Greider (2011) testifies, den’s “little brother” (cf. Brandin, 2010: 84). among others, by probing the record of the It undermines the hierarchy that has for quite party on various liberal issues, that “they are some time been present in the Danish-Swedish not like the others”. They are inside Sweden relations and allows Denmark to aspire for and undoubtedly present in Swedish politics, a more equal standing. Issues pertaining to and yet partly self and party other. democracy and liberal value are in this sense There seems, in general, to be the feeling employed as devices for re-ordering political that the success of the Sweden Democrats space. augurs something new and ground-breaking. It is further to be noted that quite a number There are references to a formative moment of Swedes seem, as such, to share the view that and a kind of cultural upheaval along the lines the break-through of the Sweden Democrats is experienced by Denmark due to the outcome formative in character and impacts the essence of the parliamentary elections in 2001, with of their country in a rather profound manner, the outcome then leading to the formation of a although most of them perceive the challenge Liberal-Conservative minority government, a as pointing to something unwarranted, nega- government hinging – in order to stay in power tive and quite un-Swedish. The difference as- – on the backing of the Danish People’s Party. In any case, the spatiality as well temporality of the Danish-Swedish relations appears to have changed. The Danish type of critique is now, 12 Notably, Brent Steele (2005) has included the concept and inconveniently from a Swedish point of of shame in his analyses of processes of identity-formation between states, by asserting that shame points to ontologi- view, also furnished with an outlet inside Swe- cal insecurity. den and no longer confined merely to positions

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located outside the country. Similarly, it is less ence inherent in immigration is in both cases safe to assume – with the Sweden Democrats constitutive in character. It is formative but using the space that has opened up and offer- differs as to its structuring effects and is there- ing alternative ways of framing politics, and fore also part of the unfolding of two rather comprehending in that context the country’s different types of polities. These differences national being – that Sweden is different in the may be outlined by exploring how the various sense of being ahead – within the context of an we-concepts such as ‘state’, ‘nation’, ‘society’ established hierarchy – of Denmark. and ‘individual’ (cf. Hansen, 2003: 311) have been unfolding historically. Thus, the relevant conceptual logic at stake Immigration as a in the processes of self-definition and steering constitutive argument the debate pertains in the Danish case almost exclusively to the concepts of nation and state. It is to be noted, as to the background to the The coupling between these two concepts is, ‘brotherly feud’, that Denmark and Sweden according to a number of studies, quite tight clearly relate in ways of their own to the dif- (Lawler, 2007: 113), although it is also one ference inherent in immigration. They abide in which the nation has had the upper hand to quite different grammars. In the first place, while being at the same time almost ‘organical- Danes have remained far more worried and ly’ tied to the concept of Folk/People (Hansen, have even categorized the difference encoun- 2002: 60). Yet, and as noted among others by tered as standing for threat and danger. It is Linde-Laursen (2007: 267), the state and na- taken to have the potential of undermining the tion – with the latter forcefully represented by established national self by derailing the peace- a folkish civil society – have remained largely fulness of the society, destroying welfare as a detached from each other in figuring as distinct crucial aspect of Danishness and by endanger- entities. The concept of Volksnation may thus ing the country’s cultural identity. The Swe- aptly express the essence of the overall constel- dish approach has, in turn, been far less alarm- lation. The integrative evolution between the ist and fearful. One could go as far as arguing state and the nation never occurred, he elu- that immigration has in the Swedish case been cidates, with the civil society having a power viewed – rather than standing for something base of its own. This then allows the nation quite problematic and perhaps even undermin- to figure as an alternative public sphere – with ing the imperative of survival – as contributing democracy, freedom and liberal values as key to the emergence of something new, challeng- points of departure – independent from and ing and basically positive. It allows and pro- in parallel to the state (see also Stenius, 1993; vides opportunities for Sweden to display its Østergård, 2004). supposedly unique character as standing for a The basic conceptual constellation under- vanguard country, one fully embracing liberal pinning Sweden is in some sense quite differ- and universal values. The country thus exem- ent. There is, and to some extent in contrast plifies what democracy and liberal values mean to Denmark, a considerable dose of integrative as universally valid departures in a changing evolution to be detected as the civil society world. forces establishing themselves as key power- But these differences notwithstanding, holders have done this through the state rather Denmark and Sweden are quite similar to each than by opposing and staying aloof from the other in the sense that the impact of the differ- state. Integrative development has clearly

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gone further in Sweden than in the case of projecting the Swedish attitude onto the world Denmark, thereby narrowing the distance be- stage as a special sort of idealism. tween the key components of the constellation Obviously, the Swedish elements of feeling with the emerging state-nation being largely morally superior and rather self-confident in based on conditions imposed and influenced having transcended the past and being called by a rather strong civil society. It is also to be to show the way into a non-nationalist/post- noted that with the constellation grounded in nationalist future differs sharply from the the pre-eminence of the civil society, there has key constitutive moves applied in the case of been a considerable amount of breeding-space Denmark. This is so as the latter project has present for the Swedes to be part of and inte- been very much about preserving the country’s grate themselves into the basic constellation as national distinctiveness and not to turn into individual citizens. Henrik Berggren and Lars anything post-national. As noted by Linde- Trägårdh (2009) endeavour at catching a cru- Laursen (2007: 267), the temporal perspective cial aspect of this integration by coining the of the discourse sets the two countries apart concept of “state-individualism”. from each other with Sweden gearing itself in- These latter features have then over time creasingly towards the future rather than pur- also opened the door for a strengthening of the suing a kind of preservationist struggle – as has civil society and position of the individual as re- largely been the case for the part of Denmark. flected for example in Sweden being frequently Furthermore, the more flexible, citizen- denoted as Folkhemmet (People’s Home). Stat- based and future-oriented nature of Sweden ed differently, the emphasis on Sweden as a na- premised on modernity and progress also ac- tion-state has been in decline with the country counts for that immigration is viewed as less aspiring for universality. It has been guided by of a treat. As underlined by Heidi Avellan feelings of being “the most emancipated coun- (2010: 16), “xenophobia denotes something try in the world” (Ruth, 2006: 2). The cru- rather un-Swedish”. Therefore, the pursuance cial aim has been one of leaving behind and of basically inclusive policies based on compas- abandoning narrow nationalism. Individuals sion vis-à-vis migration figures as an integral have been depicted as individuals without im- part of a broader setting in signalling “open- mediately casting them as either nationals or ness towards the world”. It is there in order non-nationals, thereby also restraining their to provide further support to the underlying individuality. This liberation and employment conceptual constellation grounding Sweden as of a different constitutive logic has, according a polity. to Arne Ruth (2006: 2), been “the way out of But this does not imply that immigration a cumbersome historical tradition”. The tradi- would, as an issue, be somehow less signifi- tional nationalism has, instead of carving out cant. It rather stands out, as aptly noted by more progressive and democratic alternatives Aje Carlbom (2006: 32), as an integral part of within the logic of nationalism, in fact been the Swedish ‘model’. He points out that the “turned upside down” amounting to anti-na- Swedish discourses on migration “carry the tionalism as a national paradigm. This must state” (“utgör en statbärande ideologi”). This is be the one of the strangest social paradoxes of the case as being a Swede, Carlbom observes, political history, he concludes. Swedish poli- is not determined or prioritized by history, cul- ticians and diplomats have been convinced, ture and language. Swedishness is not viewed, Ruth further asserts, that “they had a privileged due to its diffuse and relatively weakly defined insight into the future of humanity” thereby nature in the first place (cf. Johansson Hein��ö,�

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2011: 36), as something original or positioned to remain within the confines of its histori- above other ethnicities. Rather, as argued by cally premised constellation of a nation-state, Jonathan Friedman and Kaisa Ekholm Fried- Sweden has utilized immigration as an argu- man (2006: 77), it has turned into one privi- ment pertaining to change. Whereas the theme leged ethnic category part of a larger pluralist functions in the Swedish case as a necessary constellation, i.e. eminence among those well condition for the society premised on a direct on their way towards universality. These -de relationship between the state and the indi- partures and conceptual constellations invite vidual rather than coming about via the me- immigration to be positioned as an aspect of diating effect of some civil society organization renewal rather than being related and seen as (Trägårdh, 2002: 141), immigration is for the threatening something which is already there part of Denmark seen as endangering not just and part of the nation’s very being. comprehension of a rather homogeneous na- tion but also the very bond between the nation and the state. Nation-state and state- Overall, the nation-state and state-society society constellations appear to set the tone and filter the way the issue of immigration is approached This, therefore, appears to allow for the con- and argued in the public debate. The two clusion that immigration has a rather different countries ground the conditions, account for constitutive meaning in the Danish and Swed- the clash and provide the background to the ish cases. The path providing access to Danish- cleavages that set the polities of Denmark and ness – in the sense of the dominant conceptual Sweden apart from each other. They are nei- codes pertaining to state, nation, society, peo- ther unified in what they aspire for nor similar ple and individual – seems to be more narrow in their way of using immigration as a con- and better guarded than the one allowing for stitutive argument. In fact, Denmark seems to entrance into Swedishness. The general tone of endeavour at preserving and staying with what the Danish debate has, as noted by Ulf Hede- in the Swedish case figures as something- al toft (2006: 408), been “acrimonious, border- ready left behind – with the new constellation ing on vengefulness” with immigration being called ‘an immigrant-nation’ by Henrik Berg- projected as the most imminent and most seri- gren and Lars Trägårdh (2009: 27. And for ous threat to the history, culture, identity, and sure, if defined as a ‘migrant-nation’, questions homogeneity of “little Denmark”. The debate, to purity, origin and common descent decline he posits, has been “pervaded by diffuse fears, in relevance. Similarly, the concept informs moral panics, and unspecified enemy images”. that something crucial has emerged once the The effort has been one of putting a stop to the previously dominant departure has been left inflows of “undesirable aliens” in order to re- behind. instate Denmark to its imagined former status Lars Trägårdh (2009: 173) further elaborates as a peaceful, stable, ethnically homogeneous, the issues at stake by employing the term ‘neo- and politically sovereign welfare state. Yet the national’ in endeavouring at grasping some key expectations for this to happen remain, he as- aspects of Sweden’s developmental path. Swe- serts, “unrealistic” in view of the effects of glo- den is, he asserts, “again ahead of others”. It balization and Europeanization. is defined by an aspiration for betterment, i.e. Thus, whilst Denmark employs the other- preservation and defence are secondary in view ness seen as integral to immigration in order of development and efforts of staying in tune

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with the incoming (see also Sanders, 2008: of Swedishness. They are hence not just ‘new- 25). The future-oriented aspiration, premised comers’ but recognized as having contributed on a normal framing of politics, provides the early on to the development making Sweden a country with meaning. Accordingly, history is future-oriented project. In essence, they have in the case of Sweden narrated above all in the been provided with space in the stories about sense that it is there in order to be overcome Sweden having turned exemplary in the sphere and left behind, whereas the logic carrying of modernity with wartime refugees such as Denmark appears to be almost opposite to the Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky contributing Swedish one. to the spreading of the model. Probing the constitutive impact of immigra- Even Mikael Jalving (2001: 273-4) con- tion thus points to the existence of a mismatch cedes that Sweden stands for a kind of “mi- between Denmark and Sweden in substantial gration nationalism”. “The whole world is in as well as in temporal terms. Whilst Denmark Sweden, and Sweden would not exist if de- aspires to remain a rather tight and defensive prived of immigration”, he notes. One type nation-state (cf. Hansen, 2002: 60) premised of nationalism has been replaced by another on moves of either/or and self/other, Sweden “with Sweden being a product of migration”, has since the 1970s opted for the appearance Jalving concedes. of a pluralist society with this society then kept Taken together, whereas the formative im- on track by the state. Notably, the conceptual pact of immigration relates in the case of Swe- constellation underpinning Sweden as a polity den to a future-oriented process pertaining to and an identity does not call for the delinea- progress rather than fear and with considerable tion of strictly binary divisions but allows also openness as to the outcome, the setting appears for the formation of both/and configurations. far more pre-given for the part of Denmark. It Sweden too is undoubtedly premised on bor- is, in the latter case, determined by history and der drawing and differentiation but it invites, moves of closure. Clearly, the direction of the as a political project, for difference to be in- time’s arrow remains different for the part of cluded. This is needed for multiculturality to the two neighbours. It allows in the Swedish come about. The borders delineating various case, in pointing towards the future, for a dis- cultural entities run within the entity and are missal of fear as a basic constitutive argument not categorical or exclusive in nature. Instead, underlying also the way democracy and liberal the country’s identity as a ‘vanguard’ and a values are comprehended and implemented. It ‘forerunner’ invites inclusion rather than ex- invites and allows the country to pursue basi- clusion and favours plurality instead of homo- cally inclusive policies with liberal democracy geneity as core constitutive departures. coming into being as part of the process. Deal- There is then consequently also less stress on ing with the liminality and ambiguity inherent a preservation of the strong emotional bonds in migrants does not cause – with the migrants to the past as in the case of Denmark – with being both in and out – panic. It rather figures the neighbouring country therefore viewed as as a worthwhile engagement providing Sweden a temporal non-me. Besides, and as noted by with meaning and purpose. Lars Trägårdh (2002: 152), economic success By contrast, the significance of history and has figured as a crucial aspect of Sweden’s more the grip of the past appear to be far stronger progressivist and future-oriented self-under- in the case of Denmark. The many lost wars standing with migrants having already since the and being occupied during WW II add to the 1960’s contributed significantly to this aspect strength of an emergency-related framing of

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politics and imply that arguments pertaining facilitating factors as well as obstacles hamper- to threats and danger are easily mobilized. It ing the aspirations pertaining to democracy, also appears that the approach and way of im- equality and freedom of speech have not been plementing liberal values remain more defen- identical. The respective struggles have rather sive in character, and there is in this context had logics of their own, this then also implying obviously more stress on homogeneity than that the two countries have their specific views heterogeneity. Liberal democracy has been as to the way their particularity as a carrier of there, with narratives of the folkish Denmark these values resonates with the assumed uni- having early on successfully mobilized itself in versality of liberal democracy. order to shed off various forms of domination. It may also be observed, in exploring fur- In short, democrarcy is viewed as an integral ther the different ways in which liberal values part of the heritage to be defended. are comprehended in the sphere the two na- Immigrants – and in particular Muslims tional cultures, that in the case of Sweden the – figure predominantly as ‘non-us’. They are state has a more prominent and autonomous the strangers to be cleansed of their other- position. Arguably, the country stands out as ness and converted into becoming part of ‘us’ “an extreme form of statism” (Trägårdh, 2002: for the pre-given nation to prevail within a 131). It has not been a problem but has rather broader configuration of a tight nation-state. stood for a solution in having historically facil- The more exclusionist aspiration subsequently itated the liberation of the individual from the sets the tone of the rather restorationist – and grip of various social institutions: the nobility hence also emergency-related – Danish debate and bourgeoisie, but also those embedded in whereas Sweden, in being defined through the the civil society as the family, neighbourhood, employment of the concepts of society and churches and charity organizations. The -in individual rather than that of nation, actually equalities and dependencies preventing indi- gains its meaning by tackling and accommo- vidual self-fulfilment have been pushed aside dating the very difference part of immigrants. to be replaced, with the help of the state, by a rather egalitarian social order. What counts in the Swedish case consists Divergent interpretations of allegiance to such a polity rather than a of liberal values sense of belonging together. The Swedish state thus stands out as “a good state” contributing As already noted, there exists a conspicuous to the emancipation of the culturally rather similarity between Denmark and Sweden in than ethnically premised citizens. The Swe- the sense that both regard themselves as intrin- dish state is actually there in order to protect sically – if not exceptionally – democratic, lib- citizens against ethnic or religious discrimina- eral and freedom-loving. Narratives pertaining tion whereas the Danish one has been some- to democracy and freedom have in both cases what difference in essence. As already noted, a central role in grounding their national self- Trägårdh (2002: 143) coins perceptively the understanding. concept of “statist individualism” in account- Yet it appears at closer inspection that the ing for the relationship. This is also to say that ways in which universal liberal values have the state has been experienced as a “liberator”. been incorporated into their respective na- Such a conceptualization contrasts sharply with tional cultures and invoked in the context of the Danish constitutive narratives emphasizing the national stories are far from uniform. The liberation from below. The Danish stories are

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overwhelmingly about taming the state for it Volksnation rather than Staatnation, and there then to shelter and guard a basically homoge- is no room for the application to concepts such neous nation. as ‘statist individualism’. It was initially important for the part of Moreover, the state is not depicted as a neu- Denmark, with the whole-state – sometimes tral guardian – as liberal theory would have it. also called the composite state – existing as a It is not expected to pass fair and principled dynastic and multinational construction, to judgment from above but instead required to articulate a difference between the state and provide active support for the nation in the en- the nation. For the second, the nation had deavours of the latter to stay unified, coherent to be nationalized into a truly Danish one by and solidarist. Denmark hence boils down, as leaning on ethnic and cultural nationalism. a political construct, to a kind of people’s de- And finally, correspondence had to be estab- mocracy. This comprehension invites, among lished between the state and the nation with other things, for a strong emphasis on the par- the outcome being one of the tightest, genuine liament as the undivided voice of the (undivid- and conceptually intertwined nation-states on ed) people (Mouritsen, 2006b: 164). And with the international scene. Importantly, neither the nation – rather than the individual citizen the nation (with strong emphasis on the Da- as in the Swedish case – as the key political nish Folk/People defined according to descent) vessel for belonging, there is much concern for nor the individuals were liberated by the state preserving the traditions understood as liberal as the nation has predominantly been seen as that once dispelled the various threats, brought having liberated itself. about the liberation and allowed Danes to stand Put somewhat differently, the liberation en- out as a very homogeneous national nation, i.e. tailed and was followed by the nation estab- an entity qualified by being inherently egalitar- lishing a state of its own with “the Danish na- ian and freedom-loving (Lægaard, 2009). tion and the Danish state becoming so closely The preservation calls – with multicultural- knit together that Denmark could enter the ism seen as being at odds with solidarity and textbooks as one of the few true nation-states also conducive to conflict – for loyalty and in the world” (Hansen, 2002: 60). The key solidarity, and for unity as well as cohesion to emerging conceptual constellation was prem- prevail. Overall, it is taken to be natural that ised on the slogan “Denmark for the People”, newcomers actively demonstrate their identi- or as articulated by Lene Hansen (2002: 61): fication and loyalty. They have to adapt and “….the politics based on the ‘People’ implies fit in on terms dictated by the nature of the that the state being formed consists of the na- polity formed in order for the previous state of tion’s state”. In other words, the people have plurality not to return. built a welfare state to nest the unfolding of the As to liberal values, it is to be noted that inner qualities of the nation (for such an artic- N. F. S. Grundtvig – priest and poet but also ulation, see also Gad, 2010: 250). It then also viewed as the founding father in the sphere of follows that in order to be fully legitimate and early Danish nation-building – stood for the with the state having been more of an obstacle idea that that the Danish Folk-based culture, than anything integral to the bottom-up pro- in resting on an egalitarian concept of popu- cess of emancipation, the state has constantly lar participation, is particularly conducive to provide assurances that ‘the People’ are “ad- to democracy. His brand of nationalism was equately represented by the state” (Hansen, premised and tied to images of a rather heroic 2002: 67). This evidently testifies to a tight national past. It rested institutionally, as sum-

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marized by Henrik Breitenbauch and Anders Particularity versus Wivel (2004: 423), on a “fundamental con- universality gruence between ubiquitous Grundtvigian re- ligion and was carried by the large commerce- On a somewhat broader note, the Danish po- dependent middle-class comprised of farmers. litical culture holds a particular universalism as There was, with protestant beliefs serving as a also stressed by Christian Rostbøll (2010: 405), basic point of departure, stress on the impor- with the universal values seen as intrinsically tance of education, including ways of life that Danish. The values – regarded as given, vulner- denoted “egalitarianism, anti-authoritarianism, able and non-negotiable – are also taken to be speaking one’s mind, deliberation and consen- critically dependent on homogeneity, shared sual decisions” (Mouritsen, 2006b: 174). faith and preservation of historical achieve- The strength of the nation then also- im ments. They are, according to Per Mouritsen plies, in one of its aspects, that there has been (2006b: 177), “very ancient, very distinct and relatively little space for individuality to unfold very important for the form of welfare democ- within the Danish nation-based configuration, racy, which is represented in turn as almost albeit it has been catered with considerable unique in the world”. He also points out that space in the sphere of religion with the link this variation of universalism is of a certain between comprehensions of liberty, personal brand. It is particularly Danish in essence with autonomy, secularization and Lutheranism individualism and tolerance for difference cir- seen as quite tight. Importantly, it also ap- cumscribed by strongly held collective norms pears that the discourse on liberal departures and values nested in a free-spirited (frisindet) has been quite closely related to religion with reading of Lutheranism (Mouritsen, 2006a: stress on rationality and pragmatic approaches 78). Universalism can also be employed, owing rather than comprehended as originating with to its restrained and assumedly incontestable Enlightenment and rationalism (see Stage, nature and the way it is tied to national culture 2011: 66-72). A liberal outlook has been taken and history, for purposes of exclusion. It essen- to be guaranteed by and embedded in a par- tially underpins what Denmark stands for, and ticular kind of faith. As posited by Per Mourit- in this sense it also impacts what others have sen (2006b: 171), religion has in general had a to accommodate and take on board in order to crucial constitutive impact in the sense that it have a chance of being included into the Da- is commonly regarded that “the type of religion nish ‘we’. that prevents political culture from becoming The same paradox of universal values being illiberal is Danish Lutheranism”. However, at invoked as inclusive but still employed nation- the same time he finds reason to underline that ally for purposes of delimitation, exclusion, the Lutheran church still remains tied (contra- preservation and outlining something seen as ry to Sweden) to the state. In fact, the linkage quite particular (cf. Lægaard, 2007: 51) is not combining religion with politics remains so to the same extent present in the Swedish case. tight that “failure to respect the popular reli- Liberal values are instead drawn upon in the gious sentiment means faltering readiness to context of change and border-breaking rather stand up for liberal values” (ibid.: 173). Islam than the enhancing of existing and established might, no doubt, be seen as presenting such borders. Ethnicity does, for the part of Swe- a faltering readiness inviting for the historical den, not qualify the nation in any categorical understanding of liberal democracy to be mo- manner, as nationness pertains above all to the bilized once again in defence of Danishness. quality of the individuals part of the nation.

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Ethnicity has, no doubt, some importance, sumedly illiberal elements are in the key Swe- but it is by and large relegated to the sphere of dish constitutive discourse neither positioned inter-personal affairs and therefore viewed as exclusively in the sphere of the exterior nor something of minor relevance in societal and merely approach through monologue; they can national contexts – with the latter premised on also be located within the interior in the form civic rather than ethnic departures. Moreover, of forces refusing dialogue and recommending the stress on individuality implies that indi- instead monologue as an exclusive approach as viduals are assumed to qualify on their own indicated by the claims advanced by Sverige- merits rather than on the basis of some col- demokraterna and their supporters. Forces that lectively held qualities. They are not depicted according to a Danish reading portray and de- as inherently different to start with and they fend liberal democracy can hence according to may – with the deterministic logic of national the dominant Swedish views actually endanger homogeneity broken – be subsequently treated the very same aim. They may do so by abusing in an inclusive manner as newcomers without and downplaying the option of dialogue if not much emphasis on traditions and the depth of disciplined by and subordinated to the overall their roots in society. requirements of future-oriented liberal democ- It also seems that Denmark and Sweden sit- racy put forward by the dominant Swedish uate and interpret the relevant contests pertain- forces. ing to liberal democracy somewhat differently. In displaying openness as to the underlying The crucial struggles are fought, according delimitations in terms of time and space, the to dominant Danish views, between a liberal Swedish understanding of liberal values clearly democratic interior and an inherently illiberal differs from the Danish one. It draws, as does exterior with the values integral to the interior the Danish approach, on universality but devi- then to be defended against unwarranted exter- ates from the Danish understanding as it does nal intrusion that may potentially undermine so without insisting on liberalism to be recon- the liberal nature of the interior, whereas the ciled with nationalism. In a nutshell, Sweden’s Swedish reading is different. It is different in more post-nationalist essence structures the the sense that the nature of the exterior is not understanding pertaining to liberal democracy viewed as categorically different and hence in- in a way of its own. It remains particularistic commensurable with the interior. The option in essence, although does so quite differently of a dialogue and tolerance for difference arises from the Danish approach as it does not de- as the exterior is neither delimited in the Swe- part from the nation and nationality as catego- dish discourse as something inherently illiberal ries to be reified trough the pursuit of liberal nor differentiated as adversarial in character. democracy. The Swedish openness as to the At large, there is much more normalcy present country’s key constitutive features and anchor- in the framing and flexibility in the interpreta- age in the present and future rather than past tions at hand. clearly allow difference to be seen in a more The Swedish approach has also a nature of benign and challenging rather than threaten- its own in the sense that the opening up of a ing light. dialogue does not merely aim at applying some Both Denmark and Sweden are undoubted- pre-given liberal principles. Instead, the aspira- ly provided with an ability to uphold a sense of tion pertains to the creation of a process and identity and purpose, although the approaches setting which actually brings liberal democracy applied differ markedly and have different con- into being. It is also to be noted that the as- sequences. Above all, Sweden appears to be less

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immersed in established routines and prone to stering their own position but also impact the the temptation to fall back on the past. It is way international relations are ordered at large. therefore also less inclined to experience feel- Their efforts of discursively establishing a -he ings of anxiety once circumstances change and gemonic setting premised on the centrality of more able to construe new constitutive stories democracy and liberal values have in general in tune with the challenges at hand. Stories been quite successful with almost all countries about migrants and in particular Muslims are accepting, at least in principle, the argument. helpful in keeping similarity apart from differ- This has allowed for that the countries at the ence in the Danish case, whereas Sweden has core do not just aspire to secure and improve basically refrained from narrating such strict- their own standing but also aim at downgrad- ly divisive lines. The narratives also impact a ing the position of some other actors arguably number of other things, including the position less advanced and universal in the sphere of allotted to the two populist parties. Both are democracy and liberal policies. In addition, radical in essence in questioning the previously hegemonic moves have been accompanied by dominant national stories, albeit the radical- counter-hegemonic ones as evidenced for ex- ism and alternative offered by the Danish Peo- ample by the Russian efforts of purporting the ple’s Party (DPP) seem to have made consider- country as a ‘sovereign democracy’. Fareed Za- able inroads in having turned into a relatively karia (1997) has coined the concept of ‘illiberal normal part of the Danish political setting, democracies’ in order to illuminate and catch whereas the Sweden Democrats have been met some crucial aspects of the struggles underway with considerable resistance. The SD contin- with the term indicating that democracy as a ues to figure as a kind of internal non-us dis- discursive strategy is at the core of contests per- criminated against by the other Swedish politi- taining to the unfolding of current-day inter- cal parties despite having, as such, a legitimate national relations. position in the parliament. Their emergency- The Danish-Swedish rift is, in this perspec- related framing of politics is rejected and the tive, part of a more general pattern. However, party continues to generate considerable resist- at the same time it is also something of an ance not only on the political scene but also in exception in the sense that the disputes have the public domain more generally. This treat- mostly taken place between the allegedly fully ment tends to strengthen Danish perceptions democratic and less democratic actors. The of Sweden’s somewhat illiberal nature, whereas Danish-Swedish one does not fit with this pat- it is in the Swedish debate basically viewed as tern as it has played out between two countries testifying to the opposite, i.e. the prevalence of clearly on top of the hegemonic constellation. liberal values and democracy as cornerstones of Their dispute, with two broadly recognized Sweden’s being. Scandinavian democracies questioning the credentials of the other, breaks with the rule of the liberal democracies staying together and Concluding remarks refraining from efforts of bordering pursued within the hegemonic constellation. Critique In a broader perspective, a considerable number has, instead, been ordinarily directing against of actors on the scene of international relations those at the margins of the constellation. assert that they represent the common good It is conceivable, against this background, in terms of democracy and liberal values. In that the Danish-Swedish discord could have doing so, they do not just endeavour at bol- considerable repercussions in representing ef-

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forts of bordering at the core of the hegemonic ed, in some cases, to be applied to question setting instead of just using it as a strategy di- the credentials of the fellow liberal democratic rected against those at the margins. Such an states as well. The discord of these two coun- approach could, taking in particular into ac- tries thus opens up new perspectives as to the count the rather broad and worldwide atten- contests pertaining to democracy and liberal tion generated by the Danish cartoon issue, values. It testifies to that also the countries at weaken the discursive position of the countries the core may in some regards be vulnerable seen as established democracies. It may invite and challenged, and hence the application of for the argument to be made that there re- liberal democracy as a discursive strategy in mains much to be hoped for also at the core of various contests pertaining to hegemony and the democratic/liberal hegemony. Overall, the hierarchies does not boil down to a one-way Danish-Swedish dispute could be taken to evi- street. It may, as a discursive strategy, backfire dence that there is not much of an agreement and to do this in particular as the meaning among the impeccably democratic countries of democracy and liberal values in bound to regarding the meaning of liberal democracy. change over time. The meaning is not fixed as Clearly visible and loudly communicated rifts new definitions have to be searched for better at the very core of current-day international in tune with a changing world. Hegemonies relations would hence weaken the impact and are not stable and even rather established hier- perhaps even undermine the use of democracy archies can be challenged as indicated, in one and liberal values as discursive strategies. of its aspects, by the Danish-Swedish discord, However, these points remain speculative in although thus far the challenge has remained nature as there are, in fact, no signs pointing to potential rather than real. that any of these arguments would have been It is, against this background, of impor- raised and employed by countries not part of tance to raise the question whether the Danish- the inner ring of liberal democracies. In the Swedish rift has merely been related to a par- first place, the Danish-Swedish discord has not ticular situation in the relations between the attracted international attention. Firstly, it has two countries or if it reflects something more merely been viewed as a local and seen as an general and persistent. Is there ground to as- internal issue of concern to the parties them- sume that the discord may drag on and per- selves if noted at all and it might, for the sec- haps grow in magnitude to such an extent that ond, well be that their credentials are so estab- it does indeed attract broader attention as a lished that it takes far more than a somewhat contest unfolding at the core of the interna- limited quarrelling unfolding primarily in the tional hegemony? Danish and Swedish media for any significant The different theorizations of Nordic peace- re-evaluation to take place. fulness might be helpful in addressing this Yet there are reasons to believe, I suggest, question. They provide for deviant conclusions that the rift between the two Scandinavian in the sense that what according to a Deut- countries points in an embryonic form to schean theorization – with shared democracy rather far-reaching changes. Obviously, fric- and liberal values carrying the pacific relation- tions have occurred also within the inner core ship – would amount to something of a cri- of the established hegemony and the discursive sis, figures as a small shift and modest change practices part of upholding the hegemony are within a rather normal setting in view of the not just directed against countries allegedly less account provided by Jef Huysmans. The latter democratic and liberal but have been extend- type of reading points equally to changes, but

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does not connote changes with stagnation, de- interventions been viewed as quite illiberal. And mise and the unravelling of a previously rather on the other hand, the discriminatory policies ideal and peaceful state of affairs. pursued in relation to the Swedish Democrats by The latter theorization of the Danish-Swedish the other Swedish political parties as well as some relations – as part of a broader Nordic constella- of the media despite of the SD having gained its tion – merits attention in allowing for the simul- standing through normal and democratic elections taneous presence of similarity and difference. The testify – as claimed by a considerable number of two attributes are not viewed as opposites and Danish interventions – to Sweden’s illiberal nature. played against each other but are instead taken to In consequence, views have clashed on rather rel- form a complementary relationship. These quali- evant issues in the recent Danish-Swedish debate. ties then entail that difference does not have to be They clash as the comprehension regarding liberal substituted by similarity (in terms of democracy) values and democracy are, above all for historical for friendly and pacific relations to prevail and reasons, somewhat different. the increased emphasis on difference does not, as There are equally differences to be traced -be such, signal threat and danger. In fact, the presence tween Denmark and Sweden as to the way politics of difference and the neighbour remaining oarty are framed in general. It appears, in this respect, other is as crucial for endurance of the relationship that emergency-related comprehensions have a as is that of similarity. Both aspects have to be there more pronounced position in the Danish than for a well-functioning and peaceful constellation in the Swedish debate. This then contributes es- to come about. They have to co-exist with simi- sentially to that the parties tend to talk past each larity bringing about closeness and difference, in other and the rather systematic application of dif- turn, providing the ground for the pin-pointing of ferent framings no doubt adds to the intensity of a benign non-me and outlining a partly other. At the rift. large, similarity as well as difference are necessary Yet the discord may be viewed – once the as- ingredients and required for safe identities to come sumedly positive aspects of similarity are down- into being. played and difference seen as a necessary ingredient Thus, the flexibility that grounded Nordic of a healthy relationship – as something basically peacefulness has also shown its value as well as positive. It accentuates the meaning of difference strength in the more recent Danish-Swedish de- without endangering the rather friendly nature of bate. As such, the debate turned particularly pro- Danish-Swedish relations. The row amounts to nounced and vocal in the context of the Swedish a quarrelling among friends and does not augur parliamentary elections in 2010, and did so espe- danger and demise as the Deutschean theorization cially because of the break-through of the Sweden of pacific commonality would have it. Moreover, Democrats not just into the domain of the public the debate pertains to the very nature of liberal debate but also the parliament and Swedish politi- values and democracy and unavoidably brings, in cal life in general. some of its aspects, about a broader reflexion than The debate undoubtedly testifies to an increased the one present in the national debates.13 The emphasis on difference. On the one hand, the encounter has, and done so perhaps precisely Danish rather defensive employment of liberal de- mocracy in order for a rather tight and traditional constellation of a state-nation to be preserved and directed to some degree against immigrants for 13 The recent article by Christian Rostbøll (2011) on the tension between freedom of expression and democracy the latter to adapt to some pre-given and histori- shows that the issues at stake have also fertilized and stimu- cally defined standards has in some of the Swedish lated a scholarly debate.

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due to its conflictual nature, also amounted to on difference rather than similarity without a rather broad exchange of views. Important difference translating into alterity and security issues have been related to and pondered upon having to be re-introduced and brought back in the context of changing internal and exter- as a key constitutive argument. nal conditions. There are, in fact, good chances for plural- It also appears unlikely, given that the shift ity to remain and ground friendly togetherness takes place within a flexible rather than a di- also during the years to come, albeit it seems chotomous relationship, that the rift amounts equally clear – taking into account that the dif- to similarity being traded for any profound ferent comprehensions of liberal values and de- form of difference. Instead, Denmark and mocracy are deeply embedded in the way Den- Sweden will remain simultaneously other and mark and Sweden have historically emerged as alike. Flexibility will presumably prevail and specific conceptual constellations – that the allow them to view each other similar and dif- discord will continue in one form or another. ferent, partly other and partly self. In some The need to pit oneself against benign forms sense the crux of the issue might – paradoxical- of difference remains and it might even grow ly – consist of pressures towards increased em- with the border-breaking effects of intensified phasis on similarity flowing from the growth of Europeanization, internationalization and glo- closeness, intimacy and integration. This may, balization. The neighbourly non-me part of as theorized by Anne Norton, Anton Blok and the Danish-Swedish relationship stands in this Slavoj Žižek, among others, bring about iden- perspective out as a resource – and does so in tity-related anxiety. The strains pertain, in this particular if also theorized along the lines sug- perspective, to efforts of compensating for and gested by Jef Huysmans rather than Karl W. minimizing the impact of an overdose of bor- Deutsch. der-breaking similarity. The accentuation of Overall, the peacefulness part of nordicity similarity will, however, most probably remain appears to be firmly in place despite of liberal within bonds. It will not amount to any major values and democracy having recently turned ‘moral panic’ as similarity can rather safely be into rather contested issues within the Danish- down-graded within the Danish-Swedish rela- Swedish public domain. It might well be argued tionship with the neighbouring other purport- that the Deutschean account, setting basic- ed, in a hegemony-related contest, as some- ally similarity and difference up against each what more other but still basically alike. other in the context of a somewhat emergency- Similarity as well as difference are quite related reading of commonality, is not applica- likely to remain part of the constellation with ble for a variety of reasons. In the first place, the neighbour embraced as integral to a rather accusations of the other being illiberal do brotherly relationship. The increasing similar- actually not boil down to pronouncements of ity may be compensated by some additional profound Danish or Swedish otherness. They stress on difference without the difference hav- rather pertain to efforts of bolstering one’s ing to be entirely ousted and externalized and position within a firmly shared liberal order. also framed, in this context, as something pro- With Denmark and Sweden sharing and being foundly threatening and security-related. The both part of a hegemonic international order duality embedded in the other being both dif- premised on liberal democracy, it is hardly in ferent and alike upholds the flexibility of the their interest undermine that order through relationship. It allows, somewhat paradoxically, some laud and persistent quarrelling. for safe identities to be devised through a stress

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This is to say that the arguments advanced do, at theorization approaches liberal democracy as a closer inspection, not entail that the neighbour benchmark of similarity as well as trust, and has turned altogether different with no traces left views trust as integral to the very constitution of similarity. Instead, the neighbour is depicted as of the similarity needed in the grounding of not-yet-fully-me rather than regarded as radically security communities such as the Nordic one. different. Importantly, the discursive aim is not to In addition, a pacific order tends to be pitted oust the neighbour from a particular, liberal and against a non-pacific one in the context of a pacific order owing to the neighbour’s problem- Deutschean approach, and in order for the pa- atic, if not threatening, difference. It rather marks cific order to come into being and stay around, contests within that constellation with arguments there is stress on bolstering the impact of simi- pertaining to the other being ‘illiberal’, ‘undemo- larity and, conversely, forcefully minimizing cratic’ or ‘authoritarian’ questioning abut in some the impact of difference. Struggles pertaining sense also validating that order. In some of their to forms and degrees of liberal democracy are aspects the claims put forward also contribute to depicted as order-producing. They uphold or the constitution of a common sphere of politics undermine particular orders instead of being and testify to contests as to the setting of stand- more moderately seen as related to contests ards and competitions in regard to positions oc- within a given and liberal order. cupied jointly within the established order. ‘Illib- This then implies that the application of eral’ means, in this context, that the neighbour is a Deutschean take leads to overly dramatic taken to remain incomplete rather than seen as interpretations. Contests such as the Danish- wholly different. The distinction is temporal in Swedish one become easily attached to security- nature with the time’s arrow pointing to that the related issues and associated with the danger neighbour may and should catch up as the poten- of pacific commonality breaking down. A tial to do so is there. Whereas the assumedly lib- Deutschean framing is inclined to amount to eral party has already arrived and therefore carries a somewhat dramatic reading with security the hegemonic order, the neighbour is arguably and peace as central concerns even if the aim still in the process of transformation remaining a of the Danish-Swedish discord aims merely second-best, incomplete and muted form of the at inducing the liminal non-me increasingly liberal party. In short, the neighbour is viewed as to resemble and copy the more advanced me. liminal in essence rather than taken to stand for The difference inherent in the neighbouring some form of profound otherness.14 almost-me figures, according to the latter read- Crucially, the liminality of the neighbour ing, as a promise rather than a threat. allows for the co-presence of similarity and dif- And more broadly, a revisiting of the Nordic ference and points to a shared order. This is configuration, and in that context the consti- in line with the theorization presented by Jef tutive aspects of the Danish-Swedish relation- Huysmans whereas the Deutschean account ship, does not just invite for a critique of the seems unable to follow suit owing to its rather Deutschean stand; it also challenges the pre- dichotomous way of depicting the relationship disposition present in much of the liberal and between similarity and difference. The latter constructivist IR-scholarship with homogene- ity viewed as a necessary ingredient for onto- logical security and safe forms of community to emerge. This is to say that most liberal and 14 For an elaboration of the theme of liminality, see Bahar constructivist accounts of community adopt Rumelili (2010). what may seem the commonsense view that

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communities are primarily held together by gency amounts to perceptions of difference as that ‘which makes us common’. This has also a source of danger, chaos and demise of order, been evidenced by the debate on democracy whereas views premised on normalcy bring and liberal values. Such accounts appear to into sight flexibility and the existence of op- focus too much on the need of homogeneity tions that go beyond the customary. in terms of values, culture and identity. Ten- The argument advanced here has been that sions, disputes and discord such as the one per- Nordic peacefulness, and the Danish-Swedish taining to the essence of liberal values and de- relations as part of the broader Nordic constel- mocracy tend to be interpreted as destabilizing lation, should be accounted for by drawing on for community-building. They are depicted as the latter option. It is the flexibility brought representing rupture and seen as undermining about by the application of a normalcy-based the properties that enhance the peacefulness of framing of politics which has allowed for the relations. Moreover, the explanations mostly co-presence of similarity and difference. Simi- on offer to miss – in assuming that security is larity remains relative within such a setting and always present in a way or another in the de- difference takes forms which can be embraced vising of commonality – the options of forget- and perceived as friendly. It hence appears ting, silencing and opting out of security-talk rather unlikely, against the background of this with security ousted from the discourse. theorization, that the Danish-Swedish cleav- It is hence important to recall, in order for ages of the recent years would accentuate fur- the Deutschean reading to be circumvented, ther and seriously impact the broader constel- that there exist alternative theorizations that lation of international relations. However, the point to the potentially rather problematic issues at stake in the Danish as well as Swedish impact of similarity and/or bring into view cases are quite relevant as such. The two cases the positive impact of difference. Far-reaching are quite different from each other but both similarity may under some conditions, pend- – with Denmark pursuing a policy of shield- ing on the way it is narrated and framed, un- ing and endeavouring at anchoring itself in the dermine commonality, whereas difference has past and Sweden instead reaching out in order always, in one form or another, to be present to cope with the challenges posed by transna- as a key ingredient of identity-construction. tionalization and globalization – very much of It provides for clear and unambiguous selves general interest. in the form of alterity, albeit it may also be theorized as conducive to the construction of peaceful commonality rather than seen as a source of threat to be minimized or ousted. Moreover, and instead of depicting the rela- tionship between similarity and difference in strictly dichotomous terms as has usually been the case, there exists the option of a more nu- anced reading. As noted above, the other can also be viewed as similar as well as different, alike and other, and the consequences of this duality vary pending on the way such a state of affairs is theorized, narrated and framed. A reading premised on comprehensions of emer-

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