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Vi. the Myanmar Prison System
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................1 II. BACKGROUND......................................................................................................4 Subsequent developments..........................................................................................4 Human rights and the National Convention...............................................................6 Summary of recent arrests and releases .....................................................................8 III. UPDATE ON THE ARREST AND PRE-TRIAL DETENTION PROCESS.......10 Arbitrary arrests and detention without judicial oversight ......................................11 Torture and ill-treatment during pre-trial detention.................................................15 IV. UPDATE ON POLITICAL TRIALS AND SENTENCES...................................17 Sentencing................................................................................................................19 The death penalty.....................................................................................................20 V. UPDATE ON PROBLEMATIC LAWS................................................................25 VI. THE MYANMAR PRISON SYSTEM .................................................................30 Continuing humanitarian concerns ..........................................................................31 VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................34 -
On 9Th March 2002, Major General Kyaw Win, Vice-Chief of Defence
3/2002 WILL THE FAILED COUP ATTEMPT DERAIL THE ONGOING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND POLITICAL TRANSITION IN MYANMAR? Maung Aung Myoe1 March 2002 On 7 March 2002, news came out from Myanmar that the government had arrested the son-in-law, U Aye Zaw Win, and three grandsons, Aye Ne Win, Kyaw Ne Win, and Zwe Ne Win, of U Ne Win, who ruled the country between 1962 and 1988. Many people believed that U Ne Win (or General Ne Win) continued to yield and exercise influence among top military commanders who formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), later transformed into the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in November 1997, after the military takeover in September 1988. Some analysts interpreted the event of 7 March as an indication of 'the end of the Ne Win era'. Two days later, on 9 March, at a special conference, Major General Kyaw Win, Vice-Chief of Defence Services Intelligence, explained that the four were arrested in connection with a coup attempt. Additional information on the event was given at special press conferences on 12 and 18 March. According to the information provided by Major General Kyaw Win, the coup plotters had planned to win over some military commanders and to use their troops to overpower and disarm security forces at the residences of the top three regime leaders – Senior General Than Shwe (Chairman of the SPDC and Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar Armed Forces), General Maung Aye (Vice Chairman of the SPDC and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar Armed Forces cum Commander-in-Chief of Army) and Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt (Secretary-1 of the SPDC and Chief of Defence Services Intelligence Bureau). -
Burma/Myanmar in 2001: a Year of Waiting
BURMA/MYANMAR IN 2001 A Year of Waiting Tin Maung Maung Than More than 11 years after the general elections in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by future Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi won a convincing victory at the polls, Myanmar’s ruling military junta, now known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) had still not announced the timetable for a return to civilian rule. Both friends and foes of the NLD were caught by surprise when Malaysian diplomat Tan Sri Razali Ismail (appointed as the U.N. secretary-general’s special envoy in April 2000) revealed in January 2001 that “secret talks” (i.e., a dialogue) had been going on since October 2000 between the regime’s rep- resentatives and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The year 2001 thus might be char- acterized as one in which Myanmar became “a nation awaiting,” as the talks became the focal point of Myanmar politics, notwithstanding the dearth of information on the dialogue’s nature and progress. Politics and Society As Myanmar politics entered a new phase with the ongoing dialogue, the two protagonists assumed a new nonconfrontational and conciliatory stance in both rhetoric and actions. The NLD toned down its criticisms of the govern- ment while the latter ended its relentless media attacks on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her party. Scores of NLD supporters were released from deten- tion in January. There were subsequent intermittent releases throughout the year of NLD elected representatives, members, and supporters, with the total reaching nearly 200 by the end of November. -
Encounters with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
8 Encounters with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi During the early 2000s, there were opportunities to have substantive contact with the best-known and most impressive politician in Myanmar, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, whose party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), had won an overwhelming majority of the seats in the only recent elections in 1990, and who had never been charged with any offence under the law, but was regularly placed under house arrest. Usually, neither she nor the NLD were able to carry out normal political activities of any kind, even though the NLD was legally registered as a political party and had not been banned by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). For its part, the military regime (especially its leader from 1994–2011, Senior General Than Shwe) pursued policies towards Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD that were often contradictory and which swung dramatically from tightening restrictions against her in September 2000 to engaging in (secret) talks in January 2001, before releasing her completely in May 2002. Suu Kyi’s party, the NLD, was basically a coalition of left-leaning groups and military leaders who had fallen out with the mainstream of the army. It was formed to compete in the 1990 elections, and was still an officially registered party until 2010, when it split over whether to contest the 2010 elections. Even as a legal political party, the NLD was under constant pressure from the authorities, who constantly monitored NLD members’ movements and activities, 97 EYEWITNESS TO EARLY REFORM IN MYANMAR subjected members to various forms of low-level harassment, and actively sought to pressure them to leave the party. -
National League for Democracy – 2010 Elections – Ethnic Chinese – Bribery – Corruption – Exit Procedures 9 June 2010
Country Advice Myanmar Myanmar – MMR36666 – National League for Democracy – 2010 elections – Ethnic Chinese – Bribery – Corruption – Exit procedures 9 June 2010 1. Please provide information on the structure and aims of the National League for Democracy (NLD). The latest UK Home Office country report on Burma (March 2009) has a section on the National League for Democracy (NLD). According to this collated information, ―the NLD remains the most important source of political opposition to the junta‖, although it is noted that years of intense harassment by the junta have weakened the party. According to information in the country report, Aung San Suu Kyi leads the party, including the youth wing. (Elsewhere she is referred to as the de facto leader.) Committees exist within the NLD, including Social Welfare, Woman‘s Association, Medical Assistance, Adult Membership Committee, Media Committee, Legal Committee and Youth Wing. No further information was found on the structure or internal workings of the party. According to the report, meetings have not been held in many NLD offices in Burma following the September 2007 demonstrations due to restrictions placed on holding gatherings and the closure of offices across the country. One NLD member also reported that ―a lack of direction from NLD headquarters has also hampered some meetings.‖ The section follows in full: 11.09 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) noted in its report on Burma, dated 9 October 2008, that: ―The NLD remains the most important source of political opposition to the junta. However, years of intense harassment by the junta have weakened the party. Most party offices have been forced to close and many members forced to resign. -
Status of Human Rights & Sanctions in Myanmar July
STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS & SANCTIONS IN MYANMAR JULY 2014 REPORT Summary. This report reviews the July 2014 developments relating to human rights in Myanmar. Relatedly, it addresses the interchange between Myanmar’s reform efforts and the responses of the international community. I. International Community and Sanctions........................................................................2 II. Civil and Political Rights...................................................................................................4 A. Election-Related Laws and Acts....................................................................................4 B. Press and Media Laws/Restrictions and Freedom of Association..............................5 C. Official Corruption.........................................................................................................8 III. Governance and Rule of Law...........................................................................................9 IV. Political Prisoners..............................................................................................................9 V. Economic Development.....................................................................................................9 A. Developments in the Legal Framework of Economic Development...........................9 B. Developments in Foreign Investment and Economic Development Projects..........10 C. Land Seizures.................................................................................................................11 VI. -
Jade: Myanmar's “Big State Secret”
JADE: MYANMAR’S “BIG STATE SECRET” OCTOBER 2015 2 JADE: MYANMAR’S “BIG STATE SECRET” ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report would not have been possible without the many organisations and individuals who have contributed their time, knowledge and expertise. We would like to thank in particular Myanmar’s Ministry of Mines, Myanmar Gems Enterprise and the Myanmar Gems and Jewellery Entrepreneurs Association for the data and assistance they have provided. We thank too the companies which have taken the time to share information and their perspectives on the jade industry. These include large firms such as Myanma Economic Holdings Limited, Htoo Group, KBZ, Max Myanmar, Myanmar Takaung and the Ruby Dragon Group as well as small-scale miners based in Hpakant. In analysing company records, Global Witness has benefited from the invaluable support of OpenCorporates and the Open Knowledge Foundation. In reviewing the environmental and social impacts of jade mining, we have been able to draw on research findings generously shared with us by the Kachin Development Networking Group (KDNG). We also appreciate the assistance we have had from a range of expert contributors including Tom Kramer, Mathieu Pellerin, Bertil Lintner, Yeshua Moser-Puangswan and Kevin Woods. JADE: MYANMAR’S “BIG STATE SECRET” 3 CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 Who’s who, and how much are they making? 10 Jade and armed conflict 14 Opportunities for reform and the role of Myanmar’s international partners 15 Recommendations 19 METHODOLOGY AND REPORT STRUCTURE 22 CHAPTER 1: WHAT IS IT WORTH AND -
Myanmar: Time for a Unified Approach
Myanmar: Time for a Unified Approach ANG CHENG GUAN* Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore Introduction HERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT that the international community should play a constructive and catalytic role in reinforcing and nudging Tforward the process of dialogue in Myanmar. The main thrust of this article is that, in order to do so effectively, the international community, which is generally divided into those who are for engaging with Myanmar and those who are for isolating the country, should focus on their shared concerns, reconcile their different positions and work towards a coordinated carrot-and- stick strategy. To make the case, this article will (1) revisit the Myanmar de- bate; (2) explain the motivations behind the military junta’s decisions to enter into dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi at each stage over the last year; and (3) identify the common areas of concern. The Debate Revisited Engagement and Persuasion The decision by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to admit Myanmar into its ranks prompted a vigorous debate between ASEAN and the major Western/liberal governments that has still not been fully resolved. This was essentially a debate about how states should conduct their relationships with other states that violate human rights and ignore democratic norms. This is not a new issue, and had the admission of Myanmar taken place during the Cold War period, it would perhaps not have been so contentious. The debate was entwined with another argument over what constitutes a state’s internal Security Dialogue © 2001 PRIO. SAGE Publications, Vol. -
A History of the Burma Socialist Party (1930-1964)
University of Wollongong Research Online University of Wollongong Thesis Collection 1954-2016 University of Wollongong Thesis Collections 2008 A history of the Burma Socialist Party (1930-1964) Kyaw Zaw Win University of Wollongong Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses University of Wollongong Copyright Warning You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose of your own research or study. The University does not authorise you to copy, communicate or otherwise make available electronically to any other person any copyright material contained on this site. You are reminded of the following: This work is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of this work may be reproduced by any process, nor may any other exclusive right be exercised, without the permission of the author. Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe their copyright. A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a copyright infringement. A court may impose penalties and award damages in relation to offences and infringements relating to copyright material. Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, for offences and infringements involving the conversion of material into digital or electronic form. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the University of Wollongong. Recommended Citation Win, Kyaw Z, A history of the Burma Socialist Party (1930-1964), PhD thesis, School of History and Politics, University of Wollongong, 2008. -
Eyewitness to Early Reform in Myanmar
Eyewitness to Early Reform in Myanmar Eyewitness to Early Reform in Myanmar TREVOR WILSON ASIAN STUDIES SERIES MONOGRAPH 7 Published by ANU Press The Australian National University Acton ACT 2601, Australia Email: [email protected] This title is also available online at press.anu.edu.au National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Creator: Wilson, Trevor, author. Title: Eyewitness to early reform in Myanmar / Trevor Wilson. ISBN: 9781925022988 (paperback) 9781925022995 (ebook) Series: Asian studies series monograph. Subjects: Democratization--Burma. Government, Resistance to--Burma. Burma--Politics and government--1988- Dewey Number: 320.9591 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Cover design and layout by ANU Press. Cover photograph: Golden Rock Kyaiktiyo at Dawn by David Wansbrough. This edition © 2016 ANU Press Contents Preface . vii Acknowledgements . ix List of Acronyms and Abbreviations . xi 1 . Introduction . 1 2 . The Historical Contexts . 9 3 . Australian Ambassador to Myanmar . 23 4 . Working Under Military Authoritarian Rule . 33 5 . Myanmar in 2000: Ready Or Not For Change? . 57 6 . Engagement Versus Disengagement . 69 7 . Australia’s ‘Limited Engagement’ Initiatives . .. 83 8 . Encounters with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi . 97 9 . Bilateral Sanctions and Successful Alternative Approaches . 115 10 . Early Australian Public Diplomacy Possible in Myanmar . 129 11 . Reflections on Coming to Terms with Myanmar: Personally and as Convener, ANU Burma/Myanmar Update 2004–13 . 145 Bibliography . 153 Map of Myanmar/Burma Source: The Australian National University CartoGIS Preface The period between 1999 and 2003 proved to be quite an interesting period in modern Myanmar history, because it provided unusual insights into the political and other forces that propelled Myanmar on its pathway towards a transition to democracy. -
Will the Failed Coup Attempt Derail the Ongoing National Reconciliation and Political Transition in Myanmar?
This document is downloaded from DR‑NTU (https://dr.ntu.edu.sg) Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Will the failed coup attempt derail the ongoing national reconciliation and political transition in Myanmar? Maung Aung Myoe. 2002 Maung, A. M. (2002). Will the failed coup attempt derail the ongoing national reconciliation and political transition in Myanmar? (RSIS Commentaries, No. 003). RSIS Commentaries. Singapore: Nanyang Technological University. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/91856 Nanyang Technological University Downloaded on 02 Oct 2021 12:32:11 SGT ATTENTION: The Singapore Copyright Act applies to the use of this document. Nanyang Technological University L3/2002ibrary WILL THE FAILED COUP ATTEMPT DERAIL THE ONGOING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND POLITICAL TRANSITION IN MYANMAR? Maung Aung Myoe1 March 2002 On 7 March 2002, news came out from Myanmar that the government had arrested the son-in-law, U Aye Zaw Win, and three grandsons, Aye Ne Win, Kyaw Ne Win, and Zwe Ne Win, of U Ne Win, who ruled the country between 1962 and 1988. Many people believed that U Ne Win (or General Ne Win) continued to yield and exercise influence among top military commanders who formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), later transformed into the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in November 1997, after the military takeover in September 1988. Some analysts interpreted the event of 7 March as an indication of 'the end of the Ne Win era'. Two days later, on 9 March, at a special conference, Major General Kyaw Win, Vice-Chief of Defence Services Intelligence, explained that the four were arrested in connection with a coup attempt. -
Monthly Chronology of Burma's Political Prisoners for September, 2010
Monthly Chronology of Burma's Political Prisoners for September, 2010 P.O Box 93, Mae Sot, Tak Province 63110, Thailand e.mail: [email protected] website: www.aappb.org P.O Box 93, Mae Sot, Tak Province 63110, Thailand e.mail: [email protected] website: www.aappb.org ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- MONTHLY CHRONOLOGY September 2010 Summary of current situation There are a total of 2193 political prisoners in Burma. This is an overall increase of 10 in comparison to last month’s figure of 2,183. In September, 13political prisoners were arrested, four of those arrested were released within the month. Retrospective information explains why there is actually an overall increase of 10 this month. These include: CATEGORY NUMBER Monks 256 Members of Parliament 12 Students 285 Women 176 NLD members 413 Members of the Human Rights Defenders and Promoters 31 network Ethnic nationalities 233 Cyclone Nargis volunteers 20 Teachers 26 Media activists 40 Lawyers 12 Labor activists 36 88 Generation Students 39 Doctors 11 Individual 602 In poor health 141 Total 2193 Since the protests in September 2007 leading to September’s Saffron Revolution, a total of 1,178 activists have been arrested and are still in detention. 1 Monthly Trend Analysis During the month of September 2010, 11 student activists, one journalist and one NLD member were arrest- ed. 21 political prisoners were sentenced, including two monks sentenced for politi- cally motivated charges. Political prisoners continue to suffer the consequences of inhumane living conditions. At least141 political prisoners are in poor health due to the harsh prison conditions, transfers to remote prisons where there are no doctors, and the denial of proper medical care.