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Myanmar: Time for a Unified Approach

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Myanmar: Time for a Unified Approach Myanmar: Time for a Unified Approach ANG CHENG GUAN* Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore Introduction HERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT that the international community should play a constructive and catalytic role in reinforcing and nudging Tforward the process of dialogue in Myanmar. The main thrust of this article is that, in order to do so effectively, the international community, which is generally divided into those who are for engaging with Myanmar and those who are for isolating the country, should focus on their shared concerns, reconcile their different positions and work towards a coordinated carrot-and- stick strategy. To make the case, this article will (1) revisit the Myanmar de- bate; (2) explain the motivations behind the military junta’s decisions to enter into dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi at each stage over the last year; and (3) identify the common areas of concern. The Debate Revisited Engagement and Persuasion The decision by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to admit Myanmar into its ranks prompted a vigorous debate between ASEAN and the major Western/liberal governments that has still not been fully resolved. This was essentially a debate about how states should conduct their relationships with other states that violate human rights and ignore democratic norms. This is not a new issue, and had the admission of Myanmar taken place during the Cold War period, it would perhaps not have been so contentious. The debate was entwined with another argument over what constitutes a state’s internal Security Dialogue © 2001 PRIO. SAGE Publications, Vol. 32(4): 467–480. ISSN: 0967-0106 [021772] 468 Security Dialogue vol. 32, no. 4, December 2001 affairs and what are matters of international concern. It was most intense be- tween 1995 and 23 July 1997, when Myanmar officially became a member of ASEAN. On the one side was ASEAN’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’; on the other was the policy of isolation and punitive action, particularly in the form of sanctions, advocated and implemented by the United States and the European Union. Although, in private, some ASEAN officials might be critical of Myanmar’s poor human rights record, their attitude did not affect ASEAN policy because, if the Myanmar ‘kettle’ is black, some of the other ASEAN ‘pots’ are not much cleaner. Before July 1997, ASEAN could exercise influence over Myanmar’s State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), but it was not prepared to do so. Human rights and human security were not priority considerations for the association. For example, the ASEAN governments did not adopt the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) sugges- tion of drawing up a ‘road map’ for change in Myanmar in the social and po- litical fields.1 Before the onset of the 1997 financial crisis, the view was held by some in ASEAN, Jakarta in particular, that, with Myanmar in ASEAN, the military junta, which had shown some interest in the Indonesian political model, could learn from the Indonesians how the ABRI (the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia; now the National Army of Indonesia [TNI]) man- aged Indonesia. However, after 1997, the Indonesian model was discredited and no longer seen as a viable model. Once Myanmar became an ASEAN member, the hands of the association were tied by its cardinal policy of non- interference in the domestic affairs of its member-countries. ASEAN has clung tenaciously to this policy, despite attempts to change it led by Bangkok and Manila, and briefly by Anwar Ibrahim when he was deputy prime minister of Malaysia (the new Thaksin government of Thailand, which came into office in January 2001, has since signalled a return to the so-called ‘Asian way of non- interference’). Consequently, ASEAN was unable to bring about change in Myanmar. In the August 2000 stand-off between the military and Aung San Suu Kyi, Yangon (Rangoon) rejected the ASEAN proposal of sending Vietnam as an intermediary, describing that as ‘interference’. While ASEAN was un- able to influence Yangon, the junta’s attitude towards and treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD) tarnished ASEAN’s image and caused the suspension of ministerial talks between the European Union and ASEAN from 1997 till 2000. The hiatus finally ended with the resumption of the 13th ASEAN–EU ministerial meeting in Vientiane in December 2000, but some key ministers from the European Union were un- able to participate, ostensibly because of commitments in Europe. Ang Cheng Guan Myanmar: Time for a Unified Approach 469 Isolation and Sanctions Continued isolation and sanctions by the United States and the European Union have made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Myanmar to further improve the current state of its economy. A recent report depicted an isolated Myanmar that was being driven by a black market that pervades the whole country.2 Because the isolation was never complete and the sanctions were not as effective as they could have been, the expected change in Myan- mar did not materialize as envisaged. But the USA and other like-minded countries continue to keep up the pressure, believing that it is only a matter of time. Yangon realizes that it cannot overly depend on investments from China or count on the ASEAN countries. There are perils involved in being over- reliant on any one country, in this case China. As for ASEAN, besides Singa- pore, most of the other member-countries have yet to recover from the finan- cial crisis of 1997. In addition, most of the ASEAN countries themselves are finding it extremely difficult to attract foreign direct investments. The newer and poorer members, such as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, are also under intense pressure to liberalize their economies and adjust their political systems to catch up with Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. If Western countries do not lift their sanc- tions, it will be impossible for Myanmar to catch up with its neighbours and compete in a global economy that is fast-changing and increasingly connected. ‘Engagement’ or ‘isolation’, ‘persuasion’ or ‘sanctions’, the political situation in Myanmar neither worsened nor improved in the last decade. As a result, neither side of the policy divide can claim that its approach has been vindi- cated. Not surprisingly, when news of the talks between Aung San Suu Kyi and the military regime became public in January 2001, both sides claimed credit for the breakthrough. One side is convinced that the military regime was compelled to seek a political solution to the impasse because of the effects of sanctions upon the Myanmar economy. The other side believes that the ‘breakthrough’ was the result of ‘patience and quiet diplomacy’. The sequence of events from October 2000 to the present would indicate that it is neither one nor the other, but rather the interplay of both approaches that contributed to the reopening of dialogue and that continues to keep the talks going, as the following section will show. A Unified Approach We should begin with the appointment of Razali Ismail, a Malaysian who is close to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, as the UN Special Envoy to Myanmar in April 2000. The appointment of Razali was well received by the 470 Security Dialogue vol. 32, no. 4, December 2001 Myanmar government. The military junta did not relate well to his predecessor, Alvaro de Soto. Razali’s first trip to Yangon in his capacity as UN envoy was in July 2000, and few had any expectations for that visit. In August, Aung San Suu Kyi was prevented from travelling to Yangon and spent six days at a roadside on the outskirts of Yangon. The following month, the junta carried out a mas- sive crackdown on the opposition, and Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters were stopped from travelling by rail to Mandalay. Aung San Suu Kyi was sub- sequently kept under virtual house arrest at her lakeside home. These develop- ments reignited the simmering debate on Myanmar within the international community, embarrassed ASEAN, the country’s strongest supporter, and led to reports that the ASEAN–EU meeting scheduled for December in Laos might be called off. In July 2001, the economic situation in Myanmar was also revealed to be in a bad state by Myanmar’s deputy planning and economy minister, Zaw Tun, who was subsequently sacked for his candour.3 The decision of the Inter- national Labour Organization (ILO) to apply sanctions against Myanmar effec- tive from November 2000 further aggravated the situation. In the wake of these events, Razali Ismail made his second trip to Yangon in October, and it was re- ported that, besides Aung San Suu Kyi, he also met with Senior General Than Shwe (Chairman, State Peace and Development Council). This was seen as a positive sign, as this was the first time that Than Shwe had met with a UN Spe- cial Envoy, having ignored Razali’s predecessor. Not long afterwards, the mili- tary junta released James Mawdsley, the British human rights activist. There were cheers all around when the news first broke in January 2001 that Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the military regime had been engaged intermittently in dialogue since October 2000, and most signifi- cantly in early 2001, even though the content of the meetings was shrouded in secrecy. The dialogue was the first since 1994. According to Razali Ismail, who was in Yangon on his third visit in early January 2001, the dialogue parties were ‘satisfied with the results so far in the area of confidence-building’.4 Both the EU delegation5 and former Australian human rights commissioner Chris Sidoti,6 who met Aung San Suu Kyi in Yangon in late January and in February respectively, also reached similar conclusions.
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