: Time for a Unified Approach

ANG CHENG GUAN* Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University,

Introduction

HERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT that the international community should play a constructive and catalytic role in reinforcing and nudging Tforward the process of dialogue in Myanmar. The main thrust of this article is that, in order to do so effectively, the international community, which is generally divided into those who are for engaging with Myanmar and those who are for isolating the country, should focus on their shared concerns, reconcile their different positions and work towards a coordinated carrot-and- stick strategy. To make the case, this article will (1) revisit the Myanmar de- bate; (2) explain the motivations behind the military junta’s decisions to enter into dialogue with Suu Kyi at each stage over the last year; and (3) identify the common areas of concern.

The Debate Revisited

Engagement and Persuasion

The decision by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to admit Myanmar into its ranks prompted a vigorous debate between ASEAN and the Western/liberal governments that has still not been fully resolved. This was essentially a debate about how states should conduct their relationships with other states that violate human rights and ignore democratic norms. This is not a new issue, and had the admission of Myanmar taken place during the Cold War period, it would perhaps not have been so contentious. The debate was entwined with another argument over what constitutes a state’s internal

Security Dialogue © 2001 PRIO. SAGE Publications, Vol. 32(4): 467–480. ISSN: 0967-0106 [021772] 468 Security Dialogue vol. 32, no. 4, December 2001 affairs and what are matters of international concern. It was most intense be- tween 1995 and 23 July 1997, when Myanmar officially became a member of ASEAN. On the one side was ASEAN’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’; on the other was the policy of isolation and punitive action, particularly in the form of sanctions, advocated and implemented by the and the European Union. Although, in private, some ASEAN officials might be critical of Myanmar’s poor human rights record, their attitude did not affect ASEAN policy because, if the Myanmar ‘kettle’ is black, some of the other ASEAN ‘pots’ are not much cleaner. Before July 1997, ASEAN could exercise influence over Myanmar’s State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), but it was not prepared to do so. Human rights and human security were not priority considerations for the association. For example, the ASEAN governments did not adopt the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) sugges- tion of drawing up a ‘road map’ for change in Myanmar in the social and po- litical fields.1 Before the onset of the 1997 financial crisis, the view was held by some in ASEAN, Jakarta in particular, that, with Myanmar in ASEAN, the military junta, which had shown some interest in the Indonesian political model, could learn from the Indonesians how the ABRI (the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia; now the National Army of Indonesia [TNI]) man- aged Indonesia. However, after 1997, the Indonesian model was discredited and no longer seen as a viable model. Once Myanmar became an ASEAN member, the hands of the association were tied by its cardinal policy of non- interference in the domestic affairs of its member-countries. ASEAN has clung tenaciously to this policy, despite attempts to change it led by Bangkok and Manila, and briefly by Anwar Ibrahim when he was deputy prime minister of (the new Thaksin government of , which came into office in January 2001, has since signalled a return to the so-called ‘Asian way of non- interference’). Consequently, ASEAN was unable to bring about change in Myanmar. In the August 2000 stand-off between the military and , (Rangoon) rejected the ASEAN proposal of sending Vietnam as an intermediary, describing that as ‘interference’. While ASEAN was un- able to influence Yangon, the junta’s attitude towards and treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD) tarnished ASEAN’s image and caused the suspension of ministerial talks between the European Union and ASEAN from 1997 till 2000. The hiatus finally ended with the resumption of the 13th ASEAN–EU ministerial meeting in Vientiane in December 2000, but some key ministers from the European Union were un- able to participate, ostensibly because of commitments in Europe. Ang Cheng Guan Myanmar: Time for a Unified Approach 469

Isolation and Sanctions

Continued isolation and sanctions by the United States and the European Union have made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Myanmar to further improve the current state of its economy. A recent report depicted an isolated Myanmar that was being driven by a black market that pervades the whole country.2 Because the isolation was never complete and the sanctions were not as effective as they could have been, the expected change in Myan- mar did not materialize as envisaged. But the USA and other like-minded countries continue to keep up the pressure, believing that it is only a matter of time. Yangon realizes that it cannot overly depend on investments from or count on the ASEAN countries. There are perils involved in being over- reliant on any one country, in this case China. As for ASEAN, besides Singa- pore, most of the other member-countries have yet to recover from the finan- cial crisis of 1997. In addition, most of the ASEAN countries themselves are finding it extremely difficult to attract foreign direct investments. The newer and poorer members, such as Vietnam, and Cambodia, are also under intense pressure to liberalize their economies and adjust their political systems to catch up with Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. If Western countries do not lift their sanc- tions, it will be impossible for Myanmar to catch up with its neighbours and compete in a global economy that is fast-changing and increasingly connected. ‘Engagement’ or ‘isolation’, ‘persuasion’ or ‘sanctions’, the political situation in Myanmar neither worsened nor improved in the last decade. As a result, neither side of the policy divide can claim that its approach has been vindi- cated. Not surprisingly, when news of the talks between Aung San Suu Kyi and the military regime became public in January 2001, both sides claimed credit for the breakthrough. One side is convinced that the military regime was compelled to seek a political solution to the impasse because of the effects of sanctions upon the Myanmar economy. The other side believes that the ‘breakthrough’ was the result of ‘patience and quiet diplomacy’. The sequence of events from October 2000 to the present would indicate that it is neither one nor the other, but rather the interplay of both approaches that contributed to the reopening of dialogue and that continues to keep the talks going, as the following section will show.

A Unified Approach

We should begin with the appointment of Razali Ismail, a Malaysian who is close to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, as the UN Special Envoy to Myanmar in April 2000. The appointment of Razali was well received by the 470 Security Dialogue vol. 32, no. 4, December 2001

Myanmar government. The military junta did not relate well to his predecessor, Alvaro de Soto. Razali’s first trip to Yangon in his capacity as UN envoy was in July 2000, and few had any expectations for that visit. In August, Aung San Suu Kyi was prevented from travelling to Yangon and spent six days at a roadside on the outskirts of Yangon. The following month, the junta carried out a mas- sive crackdown on the opposition, and Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters were stopped from travelling by rail to Mandalay. Aung San Suu Kyi was sub- sequently kept under virtual house arrest at her lakeside home. These develop- ments reignited the simmering debate on Myanmar within the international community, embarrassed ASEAN, the country’s strongest supporter, and led to reports that the ASEAN–EU meeting scheduled for December in Laos might be called off. In July 2001, the economic situation in Myanmar was also revealed to be in a bad state by Myanmar’s deputy planning and economy minister, Zaw Tun, who was subsequently sacked for his candour.3 The decision of the Inter- national Labour Organization (ILO) to apply sanctions against Myanmar effec- tive from November 2000 further aggravated the situation. In the wake of these events, Razali Ismail made his second trip to Yangon in October, and it was re- ported that, besides Aung San Suu Kyi, he also met with Senior General Than Shwe (Chairman, State Peace and Development Council). This was seen as a positive sign, as this was the first time that Than Shwe had met with a UN Spe- cial Envoy, having ignored Razali’s predecessor. Not long afterwards, the mili- tary junta released James Mawdsley, the British human rights activist. There were cheers all around when the news first broke in January 2001 that Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the military regime had been engaged intermittently in dialogue since October 2000, and most signifi- cantly in early 2001, even though the content of the meetings was shrouded in secrecy. The dialogue was the first since 1994. According to Razali Ismail, who was in Yangon on his third visit in early January 2001, the dialogue parties were ‘satisfied with the results so far in the area of confidence-building’.4 Both the EU delegation5 and former Australian human rights commissioner Chris Sidoti,6 who met Aung San Suu Kyi in Yangon in late January and in February respectively, also reached similar conclusions. The military government media had stopped its regular lambasting of Aung San Suu Kyi since January, which observers interpreted as a ‘sign of thaw between the two sides as they edge towards a landmark dialogue’.7 It appeared then that Myanmar politics was perched at a historic juncture. As Stanley Roth, who was then US assistant sec- retary of state for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, put it, ‘For the first time in over ten years, there’s the possibility that a process of dialogue might get going’.8 It is worth noting that Razali’s visit to Myanmar coincided with that of Ma- laysian Prime Minister Mahathir’s visit to Yangon. If there is one ASEAN leader who could be frank and direct with the military regime, albeit behind closed doors, it is Mahathir. He was the staunchest supporter of Myanmar’s admission into ASEAN back in 1997. Kuala Lumpur, which held the chair of Ang Cheng Guan Myanmar: Time for a Unified Approach 471 the ASEAN Standing Committee in that year, was particularly keen to achieve the expansion of ASEAN to ten members (ASEAN-10) at the 30th anniversary of the association’s founding. The military leadership in Myanmar is believed to be more receptive to Mahathir’s views and suggestions because he is not seen to be a mouthpiece of the West. Also, Mahathir is seen to be friendly with Beijing, so there is a certain comfort level between him and the junta. In an interview in Osaka not long after his Myanmar visit, Mahathir made the fol- lowing observations that are worth recalling: First, the conflict between Aung San Suu Kyi and the military could not be resolved by confrontation; second, there was a need to place the interests of Myanmar above party interests; third, the military was willing to discuss with Aung San Suu Kyi to find workable solutions; and, fourth, the less the West interferes, the easier it will be to solve the problems in Myanmar. Mahathir also revealed that the junta was willing to hold elections ‘eventually’, though not in the next two years.9 It appears that Malaysia has taken on the mantle, with the concurrence of the other ASEAN members, to coax the Yangon government towards national reconciliation. Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar has said that Kuala Lumpur will try to build on the progress made by Mahathir to end dec- ades of isolation for Myanmar by encouraging ‘political reform through eco- nomic development’.10 The dialogue, however, appeared to have stalled soon after that somewhat positive start, and there were calls for Razali Ismail, who had brokered the dialogue, to return to Myanmar amid reports that the junta had refused to al- low him to visit the country. In May, Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Sri Syed Hamid Albar explained that the Myanmar government wanted to hold the discussions with Aung San Suu Kyi ‘under the conditions of strict se- crecy’.11 In the same month, a bill to ban all imports from Myanmar was intro- duced in the US Senate, and a similar bill was introduced in the House of Rep- resentatives on 19 June. Both bills will be debated in October 2001 and, if ap- proved, will seriously affect Myanmar’s garment industry, which is the sec- ond largest employer in the country. The ILO sent a delegation to Myanmar in September, and a decision on whether it will renew its sanctions will be made in November. According to a report in the Asia Wall Street Journal, Yangon is already feeling the impact, as buyers are finding alternative sources of supply in anticipation of the bills’ being passed.12 Meanwhile, Razali Ismail was fi- nally able to make another trip to Yangon in early June, which led to the re- lease of a number of political prisoners. The NLD was also given permission to reopen up to 18 branches around Yangon. Because the talks have been conducted in such secrecy, Myanmar ‘watchers’ and those following the dialogue have had to resort to the techniques of ‘Kremlinology’ to decipher much of the developments. In early July, Thai De- fence Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, who has close ties with the Myanmar military junta, expressed his confidence that the dialogue would lead to 472 Security Dialogue vol. 32, no. 4, December 2001 reconciliation. However, Aung San Suu Kyi’s refusal to attend the annual ceremony commemorating her assassinated father, Aung San, in July would appear to indicate that she was signalling to the international community that she was still not satisfied with the progress of the talks. Not long after Aung San Suu Kyi’s absence on Martyr’s Day, Myanmar For- eign Minister announced on 27 July that Razali would again return to Yangon on 27 August. On the eve of his visit, the junta released Aung Shwe and , Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the NLD respectively. Both had been under house arrest for almost a year. With their release, all executive members of the NLD, with the exception of Aung San Suu Kyi, had been freed, although there are many more political prisoners still in custody. Razali Ismail’s visit to Myanmar in August 2001, his second in about three months, reminds one of his January visit. This time it coincided with that of Malaysian Defence Minister Datuk Sri Mohamed Najib bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak, who was on his first official visit to the country. In his opening remarks at a security workshop sponsored by the Myanmar Defence Ministry, the Malaysian Strategic Research Centre and the Sasakawa Peace Fund, Najib made the point that, while he agreed that a democratic system was the only way to achieve prosperity, the establishment of a democratic system should not be the ultimate goal. Rather, this should be political stability. In his words, ‘it was not important what kind of governance system was in place as long as the system served the majority of the people’.13 Meanwhile, besides Aung San Suu Kyi and the junta, Razali also met with five ethnic leaders, essentially to assure them that the UN would not neglect them and that the nationality issue could only be settled in tripartite talks, which could only take place after the on-going bilateral talks. We do not know what transpired, because the UN en- voy refused to divulge any information about the talks he had in Myanmar except to say that he was satisfied with his efforts. According to U Khun Tun Oo of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), who was amongst the five ethnic leaders who met with Razali, he was told that ‘the [bilateral] talks were proceeding in a very cautious and closely controlled manner’ and that they were ‘progressing well and satisfactorily’.14 On 6 September, during a meeting with Chavalit in Bangkok, General reportedly disclosed, without elaborating, that the Myanmar junta had proposed a power-sharing arrangement with Aung San Suu Kyi and was awaiting her response. However , Secretary of the NLD, rejected Khin Nyunt’s remarks as unfounded.15 Given the lack of information on decisionmaking in Myanmar, it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain whether the military junta is really sincere about its dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi or this is merely a tactic of appeasing the international community that could be discarded at the first convenient op- portunity. What we do know is that Myanmar is undergoing a slow and diffi- cult leadership transition, and there are hints here and there that a power Ang Cheng Guan Myanmar: Time for a Unified Approach 473 struggle is going on, which not unexpectedly impinges on the ongoing dia- logue with the opposition.16 A crash in February 2001 killed a num- ber of senior military officers, most notably Lieutenant-General Tin Oo, and this accident might be a reason for the hiatus after the January talks. Who will eventually replace Senior General Than Shwe remains a question mark. Until the military junta has sorted out its internal differences, it is unlikely that there will be any substantial breakthrough in the talks with the opposition. But, from the above account, it would appear that a combination of quiet di- plomacy and well-timed punitive actions have nudged the dialogue process forward. The events preceding the ‘successful’ January and August 2001 talks confirm this. It is my contention that the actions taken could have been more effective if carried out in a coordinated manner. For example, the counterpoise between Tokyo’s decision to provide a huge aid package to Myanmar, the largest in a decade, albeit premature, and Washington’s strong opposition is contradictory and unhelpful.17 The proposed import-ban legislation, intro- duced by a group of US congressmen soon after Razali Ismail’s somewhat successful early-June visit to Myanmar, is also badly timed. There is therefore strong reason for convening a ‘Chilston-3’ meeting of the interested countries as soon as practicable to discuss how sanctions can be better calibrated and when incentives or rewards should be offered, and to achieve a win–win situation for all concerned. The meeting should attempt to unify the ‘pro-isolationists’ and those who are ‘pro-engagement’. Here, a change of mind-set is required. On one hand, the United States will need to recognize that high-level talks between Washington and Yangon are necessary and that the strategy of isolating Myanmar will not benefit either country in the long run. Bringing down the Myanmar regime is a non-starter, and, even if it could be toppled, this would not serve US interests in the region. Washington ought to take cognizance of both the strategic regional environ- ment and the history and culture of Myanmar, and give the military regime some room to manoeuvre.18 On the other hand, the ASEAN states have the re- sponsibility to take their fellow-member to task to ensure the stability and prosperity of the region. If it is true that ASEAN is one big family, this should not be construed as ‘interference’.

The China Factor

Rather than continue to undercut each other’s efforts, ASEAN member-states, Western countries, and Japan should begin to focus on their common concerns and pursue a unified approach in order to reinforce the dialogue process. One issue that immediately comes to mind is the shared concern over China’s growing influence in Myanmar. 474 Security Dialogue vol. 32, no. 4, December 2001

It is necessary to recall some aspects of and milestones in Myanmar–Chinese military ties. In April 1996, a Chinese delegation led by General Zhang Wannian, Vice-Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, paid a six- day visit to Myanmar. The purpose of the visit, according to Zhang, was to ‘further promote mutual understanding, friendship and cooperation between the two countries, the two armed forces and the two peoples’.19 In October 1996, General (Vice-Chairman of SLORC, Deputy Commander of the armed forces and Commander-in-Chief of the army) paid a return visit to China, where he again met Zhang, as well as Premier Li Peng and Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian. Maung Aye said that the purpose of his trip was to enhance the ties between the two armies, and also between the two countries.20 An agreement was apparently reached regarding military coop- eration, training and the exchange of intelligence during the visit, and this was subsequently signed by General Than Shwe and Li Peng sometime in Decem- ber 1996/January 1997. Under this agreement, China would train 300 Myanmar and naval officers in flying and naval duties as well as in intelligence-gathering in the coastal areas. More senior officers could attend the colleges in China. China would provide munitions to Myanmar at ‘friendship prices’, and the two countries would exchange military intelli- gence.21 Today, China is the main supplier of the Myanmar military, and all weaponry and equipment used are from China. Myanmar–Chinese military relations continue to be close after Myanmar joined ASEAN in July 1997. In July 2000, Chinese Vice-President Hu Jintao paid a three-day visit to Myanmar. Military and defence-related issues would also have been discussed during the numerous visits to China by the high command of the military junta, for example Than Shwe (who had visited China on three occasions, his most recent in January 1996), Maung Aye (Octo- ber 1996 and June 2000) and Khin Nyunt (who had visited China five times; the fourth was in September 1994 and the most recent in June 1999). Myanmar–Chinese naval cooperation in particular is an issue of concern in the region. It is common knowledge that the Chinese have been helping to upgrade the Myanmar naval facilities at Akyab, Bassein, Monkey Point and Mergui, as well as to build new bases at Hainggyi and the Coco Islands. It is believed that, although Beijing had so far only sent instructors and technicians to these places, the installation of Chinese-made in the Coco Islands, which would require Chinese operators, would facilitate Chinese intelligence- gathering in the region. There have been many allegations that China is devel- oping spy posts and naval bases in Myanmar waters. This has particularly discomforted India, Indonesia, Thailand and Japan, among others.22 Myanmar and China conducted joint naval exercises in the waters between Tavoy and Mergui towards the end of July 2000.23 Beijing is also interested in obtaining a naval base on Myanmar’s western seaboard and/or access to the Indian Ocean. A March 1997 Chinese report Ang Cheng Guan Myanmar: Time for a Unified Approach 475 disclosed that a Sino-Myanmar expert group had concluded a feasibility study on the development of a land and water transport route, via Yunnan, into River Valley and, from there, into the Indian Ocean. Two months later, an agreement was signed for the joint development of the Irrawaddy River to open a new and short channel to the Indian Ocean. Chinese officials described this as ‘of profound impact’ for China’s general opening-up, espe- cially for southwest China, whose economic development had been circum- scribed by its inland location and poor transport system.24 But, to date, this has yet to materialize, as Yangon was hesitant to give the Chinese such a high de- gree of access in Myanmar. The question is how long they can continue to stall Beijing. According to Helen James, Yangon has built, with finance and exper- tise from Hong Kong, a deep-sea port at Tilawa (which faces the Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean), and some analysts have predicted that it could host Chinese nuclear submarines in future. The port is also being linked to Yangon by a six-lane highway, which is currently being built and, when com- pleted, could provide China with a road link to the Indian Ocean.25 Perhaps one clear indication of the increasing close ties between the two countries was the granting of a newspaper permit in 1998 to publish the Myanmar Morning Post in Chinese, the first since 1966.26 Because of the finan- cial crisis, Myanmar later turned even more to China for economic support and investment. In January 1998, Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Tang Jiaxuan visited Myanmar. Amongst the topics discussed were trade and economic cooperation. According to Chinese statistics, Myanmar–Chinese trade was worth $381.1 million in 1998, compared to $313.5 million in 1997. This was an increase of 21.56%.27 The figure for the first six months of 1999 was $202.73 million, a 9.9% increase over the same period in 1998.28 By April 1999, Myanmar had opened six trading points along the Sino-Myanmar bor- der to facilitate the border trade, and, in June, the authorities were considering opening one more. In 1998, China was Myanmar’s fourth largest trading part- ner after Singapore, Thailand and Japan, in that order. By 2000, China had moved up to the second spot.29 It has been observed that, in the last few years, China has become the largest investor in Kazakhstan, Nepal, Cambodia, North Korea and Myanmar, and that ‘economic clout increasingly spills over into politics’.30 Although it was never expressed publicly, various ASEAN officials had con- fided that, in the decision to accept Myanmar into ASEAN in 1997, concern over the growing influence of China was uppermost in their minds. Domingo L. Siazon Jr, at that time foreign secretary of the Philippines, had on more than one occasion tried to explain that Myanmar’s entry into ASEAN was not one- dimensional and that there were other strategic realities that had to be consid- ered.31 By the early 1990s, it was already well known that Mandalay, the sec- ond largest city in Myanmar, was being transformed into a Chinese city.32 Admitting Myanmar into ASEAN was seen as a strategic necessity in order to 476 Security Dialogue vol. 32, no. 4, December 2001 wean Yangon away from the tightening embrace of Beijing. It is therefore ironic that the one country that is quietly benefiting from the continuing pol- icy disagreements is China. The reality is that, after July 1997, Myanmar–Chi- nese relations continued to strengthen while Myanmar’s relation with Thai- land has remained problematic. Not only has the association failed to draw Yangon away from China, but in recent years almost all the ASEAN countries, adjusting to what they see as the rising Chinese power (most notably Indone- sia, Malaysia and Thailand), have improved their relations with Beijing con- siderably. However, beneath the façade of closer ties, the ASEAN states re- main wary of China.33 Tokyo is concerned that Yangon’s dependence on China could pose a secu- rity liability to Japan if China becomes expansionist. It has also been con- cerned about losing influence to China in a country that had substantial eco- nomic potential.34 The late Japanese prime minister Keizo Obuchi met General Than Shwe at the ASEAN Summit in December 1999, the first meeting be- tween a Japanese prime minister and his Myanmar counterpart in 15 years. This was also the first meeting between a major power and Myanmar since 1988. Japan was reported to be considering restoring aid to Myanmar in an in- direct way via the Mekong project.35 It is therefore not at all surprising that, not long after the news of the dialogue between the military junta and Aung San Suu Kyi broke, Tokyo approved – and some have argued prematurely – the largest grant aid package to Myanmar since 1988, as ‘positive reinforce- ment for the discussions’.36 The situation with India is somewhat similar. Former Indian defence minis- ter George Fernandes had openly accused China of helping Myanmar install surveillance and communication equipment in the Bay of Bengal.37 The ‘China factor’ explains India’s volte-face towards Myanmar. Indian Chief-of-Army General V. P. Malik made two visits to Yangon within a space of six months in 2000.38 General Maung Aye led a 16-member delegation to New Delhi in No- vember 2000, and, most recently, in February Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh visited Yangon to explore possibilities for cooperation. While in Myanmar, he inaugurated a 130-kilometre road linking the two countries. The United States under the Bush administration has identified China as a ‘strategic competitor’, although it has since refrained from using that phrase in public discourse. Beijing’s intention to challenge the USA for influence in Southeast Asia is common knowledge. In May, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji paid his first visit to Thailand, where he signed a number of trade agreements and described Sino-Thai relations as a ‘friendship between brothers’. The countries of the European Union, given their geographical distance, might be less acutely concerned about the growing Chinese power in the region, but nor would they want a dominant China in the region. One need not necessar- ily have to buy into the ‘China threat’ thesis to feel discomforted by the dis- proportionate economic, political and military clout of China in Myanmar. Ang Cheng Guan Myanmar: Time for a Unified Approach 477

Myanmar too is beginning to feel uncomfortable with the growing Chinese influence. Fiercely nationalistic and independent, the Myanmar people are aware that, in order to ensure Myanmar’s independence, Yangon must return to its policy of nonalignment/neutrality, a point that is constantly emphasized in the foreign policy speeches of both Khin Nyunt and Maung Aye. According to the latter, Myanmar ‘must strive to be a nation with firm sovereignty and avoid coming under the influence and domination of major powers’, and the country would not ‘tolerate the loss of even an inch of territory’.39 Yangon has recently been courting India to balance China, but this is a short-term solution and fraught with danger. Myanmar also needs to be able to engage all the other major powers operating in the region. The international community should capitalize on this fact.

Regional Stability

Besides the concern over the growing influence of China, all the countries mentioned above also share a common interest in ensuring that the region, which already has a number of potential flashpoints, namely Kashmir, Taiwan, North Korea, the South China Sea and now Indonesia, stays stable and conducive to economic development. There are two possible scenarios (both involving China) if the situation in Myanmar deteriorates further. One, Myanmar’s reliance on China will further deepen. Two, if the military regime is indeed brought to its knees by the eco- nomic strain and a repeat of the 1988 unrest occurs, a post-Suharto Indonesian scenario is likely to develop. Anyone who is familiar with the political dy- namics and ethnic make-up in Myanmar will know that this is not too far- fetched. And, if it comes to pass, the situation will have immediate interna- tional ramifications, perhaps more so than in the case of Indonesia, given Myanmar’s porous borders and its proximity to India and China. Beijing will not remain idle in the face of any uncertainty in northeastern Myanmar, which borders the southwestern province of China (Yunnan), and is likely to take steps to ensure that its border is secure. India, Thailand and to a lesser extent Bangladesh will certainly be involved. Indeed, some analysts have noted that Myanmar is already an arena of competition between India and China. Bang- kok is already having a problem with Yangon over the trafficking of narcotics and the civil war between the Myanmar military and the Shans in eastern and southeastern Myanmar, which borders Thailand. Peacekeeping or peacemak- ing will be a nightmare in a country like Myanmar. ASEAN will not be able to cope with two politically unstable members simultaneously, and the associa- tion will not be able to recover its credibility and effectiveness, which were damaged by the financial crisis and developments in Indonesia. 478 Security Dialogue vol. 32, no. 4, December 2001

China has a fair degree of influence and leverage in Myanmar, but Beijing has so far been benefiting from Myanmar’s unfortunate situation and is re- luctant to exert any pressure on Yangon. China also objects to the Western hardball approach towards Myanmar. It is unlikely that the Chinese will be willing to cooperate in the near future. However, in the longer term, if it sees a concerted and more nuanced effort by all interested countries, it is likely that Beijing would reconsider and want to play a constructive role for two reasons. First, as many Chinese leaders have reiterated, most recently Jiang Zemin in Hong Kong, China wants to focus on its economic modernization programme and the challenges of globalization. Consequently, Beijing has a strong interest in the stability of its backyard and the region. Second, China has aspirations to be a respectable and influential power in the global community, and playing a mediating role to encourage national reconciliation in Myanmar will definitely enhance Beijing’s prestige and image. For example, Beijing recently hosted a regional anti-drug summit that brought together China, Myanmar, Thailand and Laos.40

Conclusion

For many years, various countries have prevailed upon the Yangon govern- ment to adopt democratic norms and to move towards national reconciliation – with little success. Part of the reason for this failure is that, although the countries share the same good intentions, they embrace and advocate differ- ent, and often conflicting, strategies to achieve more or less the same ends. The policy of isolating and sanctioning Myanmar has inadvertently strengthened Myanmar–Chinese relations to a degree that is worrying some regional countries to the extent that some of them are having second thoughts about the policy of isolation and sanctions.41 As shown above, adopting one approach alone is not effective. Assuming that taking a softer stance with Myanmar could deter Yangon from getting closer to China, this still does not help the reconciliation process. The challenge faced by the international community is how to prevail upon Myanmar to adopt democratic norms without shattering the territorial integ- rity of the country and destabilizing the region. Nobody should be under the delusion that national reconciliation, nation-building and nurturing a democ- racy in Myanmar can be easily achieved. But allowing the situation to drift is a sure recipe for disaster. Ang Cheng Guan Myanmar: Time for a Unified Approach 479

NOTES AND REFERENCES

* Dr Ang Cheng Guan is Head of Studies at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Stud- ies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. The publication of this article was supported by the Berghof Foundation for Conflict Research, Berlin, as part of Security Dialogue’s series on ‘Resolving Modern Conflicts’. 1 Jusuf Wanandi, ‘The ASEAN-10 and its International and Regional Implications’, in Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, ed., A Pacific Peace: Issues and Responses: Papers Presented at the 11th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, June 5–8, 1997, Kuala Lumpur (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1998), pp. 197–203. 2 ‘Isolated Myanmar Driven by Black Economy’, Straits Times, 21 May 2001. 3 ‘Myanmar Minister Sacked for Criticism’, Straits Times, 24 August 2000. 4 ‘UN Spokesman Says Rangoon–Aung San Suu Kyi Holding Direct Talks since Octo- ber’, Hong Kong AFP, 9 January 2001, FBIS-EAS-2001-0110. 5 ‘EU Delegation Cautiously Upbeat about Political Situation in Yangon’, ‘The World Today’, BBC Radio, London, 1 February 2001. 6 ‘Australian Visitor Reports Aung San Suu Kyi in Optimistic Mood’, Radio Australia, 20 February 2001, SWB/FE/4077/B/1. 7 ‘Yangon Media Stops Attack on Suu Kyi’, Straits Times, 15 January 2001. 8 ‘In Sign of New Flexibility, Burmese Junta Opens Door to EU Eyes’, International Herald Tribune, 17 January 2001. 9 ‘Japanese Report Says Mahathir Says Burma Agrees to Election “Eventually”’, Hong Kong AFP, 28 January 2001, FBIS-EAS-2001-0128. 10 ‘Malaysia Urges Aid to Myanmar to Spur Reforms’, Straits Times, 27 February 2001. 11 ‘Malaysian Minister Says Burma Not Denying Permission for UN Envoy’s Visit’, Bernama News Agency web-site, Kuala Lumpur, 7 May 2001; reported by BBC Moni- toring, http://www.monitor.bbc.co.uk/newsfile.shtml (accessed 10 May 2001). 12 ‘US Bill to Ban Imports Hits Myanmar’, Asia Wall Street Journal, 9 July 2001. 13 Myanmar Times, 7 September 2001. 14 Democratic Voice of Burma, Oslo, 31 August 2001. 15 ‘Junta Proposes Sharing Power with Suu Kyi’, Straits Times Interactive, 6 September 2001, http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg (accessed 10 September 2001); Democratic Voice of Burma, Oslo, 6 September 2001. 16 See, for example, ‘Local Warlords Holding the Keys to Reform’, Straits Times, 1 June 2001. 17 ‘Powell Slams Japan over New Aid Package to Myanmar’, Straits Times, 17 May 2001. 18 See Mary P. Callahan, ‘Democracy in Burma: The Lessons of History’, National Bureau of Asian Research, vol. 9, no. 3, 1998, pp. 5–26. 19 For details of Zhang Wannian’s visit, see Xinhua reports in the April 1996 issues of FBIS-CHI. 20 For details of Maung Aye’s visit, see Xinhua reports in the October 1996 issues of FBIS- CHI. 21 ‘China, Burma Said To Sign Military Cooperation Accord’, Hong Kong AFP, 22 January 1997, FBIS-CHI-97-014. 22 See Andrew Selth, ‘Burma and the Strategic Competition Between China and India’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 19, no. 2, June 1996, pp. 213–230. 23 Democratic Voice of Burma, 30 June 2000, in SWB/FE/3883/B/1; ‘Burmese Leader Fails Chinese Test’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 August 2000, pp. 10–11. 480 Security Dialogue vol. 32, no. 4, December 2001

24 ‘Study with Burma on Water Transport Route’, in Zhongguo Xinwen She, 4 March 1997, FBIS-CHI-97-063; ‘Yunnan Ready to Develop New Trade Route to Indian Ocean’, Xinhua, 5 May 1997, FBIS-CHI-97-125. 25 International Mekong Research Network (IMRN), Item 20/2001. Further details of the IRMN are available at http://www.anu.edu.au/asianstudies/mekong/. 26 ‘Burmese Newspaper Begins Publishing in Chinese Language’, Xinhua, 4 November 1998, FBIS-CHI-98-308. 27 ‘Sino-Burmese Trade at $381.1 Million, up 21.56 Percent’, Xinhua, 8 April 1999, FBIS- CHI-1999-0407. 28 ‘Burma–PRC Trade Up 10 Percent’, Xinhua, 19 October 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-1018. 29 ‘Burma to Add More Border Trade Points’, Xinhua, 22 June 1999, FBIS-CHI-199-0622; ‘PRC, Burma Enjoy Steady Development of Ties’, Xinhua, 5 June 2000, FBIS-CHI-2000- 0605. 30 ‘Resurgent China Draws Neighbours into Its Orbit’, Asia Wall Street Journal, 13 July 2000. 31 See ‘Thailand: Foreign Ministers “Firmly” Support Burma’s ASEAN Entry’, Hong Kong AFP, 29 April 1997, FBIS-EAS-97-119; ‘Thailand: Philippine Ambassador Defends Burma’s ASEAN Entry’, Bangkok Post, 11 June 1997, FBIS-EAS-97-162. 32 ‘Myanmar and China: But Will the Flag Follow Trade’, The Economist, 8 October 1994, pp. 31–32. 33 See ‘China Steps in Where US Fails’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 November 2000, pp. 20, 22. 34 ‘Japan Sees Myanmar as Linchpin’, Straits Times, 9 December 1999. 35 Kyodo News Service, 27 June 2000, SWB/FE/3879/B/1. 36 ‘Japan Rewards Burma for Talks with Opposition’, International Herald Tribune, 26 April 2001. 37 See ‘… But Stay on Guard: India Keeps Up Its Bengal Baywatch’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 July 1998, p. 21; ‘Burma Completes Military Buildup’, Hong Kong AFP, 19 May 1999, FBIS-EAS-1999-0518. 38 ‘India Army Chief Visits Myanmar’, Straits Times, 5 July 2000. 39 ‘Burmese Leader Says Country Will Not Tolerate Any Loss of Territory’, TV Myanmar, Rangoon, in Burmese, 22 May 2001. 40 ‘Chinese Premier Welcomes Thai Counterpart’s Idea of Four-Nation Drugs Summit’, The Nation web-site, 20 May 2001; reported by BBC Monitoring, http://www.monitor.bbc.co.uk/newsfile.shtml (accessed 24 May 2001). 41 See report on the so-called ‘Chilston-2’ meeting in Seoul in March 2000 in ‘Inside “Se- cret” Meetings: The Chilston Conferences To Engage Yangon’, Asiaweek, 31 March 2000, p. 30.