BURMA/MYANMAR IN 2001 A Year of Waiting
Tin Maung Maung Than
More than 11 years after the general elections in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by future Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi won a convincing victory at the polls, Myanmar’s ruling military junta, now known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) had still not announced the timetable for a return to civilian rule. Both friends and foes of the NLD were caught by surprise when Malaysian diplomat Tan Sri Razali Ismail (appointed as the U.N. secretary-general’s special envoy in April 2000) revealed in January 2001 that “secret talks” (i.e., a dialogue) had been going on since October 2000 between the regime’s rep- resentatives and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The year 2001 thus might be char- acterized as one in which Myanmar became “a nation awaiting,” as the talks became the focal point of Myanmar politics, notwithstanding the dearth of information on the dialogue’s nature and progress.
Politics and Society As Myanmar politics entered a new phase with the ongoing dialogue, the two protagonists assumed a new nonconfrontational and conciliatory stance in both rhetoric and actions. The NLD toned down its criticisms of the govern- ment while the latter ended its relentless media attacks on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her party. Scores of NLD supporters were released from deten- tion in January. There were subsequent intermittent releases throughout the year of NLD elected representatives, members, and supporters, with the total reaching nearly 200 by the end of November. What’s more, NLD Chairman U Aung Shwe and Vice-Chairman U Tin U were freed on August 26 from
Tin Maung Maung Than is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. Asian Survey, 42:1, pp. 115–123. ISSN: 0004–4687 2002 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Send Requests for Permission to Reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704–1223.
115 116 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLII, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2002 nearly one year of house arrest. Nevertheless, human rights advocates point- ed out that over 1,000 “political prisoners” remained in custody and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was still confined to her home. In the case of the former, the government did not acknowledge them as such; as for the latter, it was argued that her continued confinement was by mutual consent to facilitate the dialogue process. Beginning in mid-year, the government had selectively al- lowed the NLD to reopen its branch offices (hundreds had been closed over the preceding three years) and hoist signboards. By the week of November 25, the NLD’s offices in Yangon as well as in three other locations had re- opened. Nevertheless, such confidence-building gestures were seen by critics as symbolic and not having really expanded the NLD’s extremely limited political space. Several factors were posited as reasons for the talks, including economic crisis, political crisis, and Western sanctions. These were all dismissed by government spokespersons. Others pointed out that friendly persuasion by leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other friendly regional states were more likely to be responsible. It probably was a combination of all of them that nudged these steps from the junta, which also had to contend with the challenges posed by globalization and the need for performance legitimacy. Despite several premature forecasts of an imminent breakthrough that would entail some power-sharing formula, no substantive outcome was reached. In the 11 months following the talks’ announcement, neither the form nor the content of the dialogue was revealed and both parties declined to say who else was involved besides Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. This had led to speculations that the talks were going nowhere, but the government repeat- edly insisted that the talks were on track. Opposition groups abroad repeat- edly expressed frustration and skepticism over the dialogue’s secret nature and glacial pace. In particular, non-Bamar (non-Burman) ethnic groups op- posing the junta argued that only tripartite talks incorporating them could be credible and alleged that the junta had been implementing a divide-and-rule strategy. Even the ethnic-based parties allied with the NLD complained that the talks had not yielded any tangible benefits for them. On the other hand, Ambassador Razali, in Yangon for his sixth visit, told reporters on November 28, after meeting NLD leaders and ethnic-party politicians, that the “future is very encouraging.”1
Cabinet and Military Reshuffles The junta’s command structure was disrupted on February 19 by the death of Secretary-2 and Army Chief of Staff Lt. General Tin Oo (fourth in the peck-
1. “U.N. Envoy Optimistic on Secret Burma Talks,” Reuters, November 28, 2001. BURMA/MYANMAR IN 2001 117 ing order) in a helicopter crash attributed to bad weather. Also killed were a minister from the prime minister’s office (PMO), a regional commander (who was also an SPDC member), and several senior military officers. At the year’s end, Tin Oo’s posts remained vacant. A second shock manifested on November 9 when Secretary-3 and Adjutant General (AG) Lt. General Win Myint was dismissed, together with Deputy Prime Minister cum Minister for Military Affairs and Quartermaster General (QMG) Lt. General Tin Hla. The official explanation was that they “violated the state policy.”2 This probably meant serious corruption, given that they had supervised military-linked busi- ness enterprises rumored to have accountability problems. It was also an- nounced that two other aging deputy prime ministers (Myanmar had three) and three ministers with less influential portfolios (Culture, Cooperatives, and Immigration and Manpower) resigned. This was followed by a minor Cabi- net reshuffle in which the labor minister exchanged his portfolio with one of the PMO ministers, who also took charge of the Culture Ministry. Another PMO minister was moved to the Cooperatives Ministry, while the Immigra- tion and Manpower portfolio was given to the social welfare minister as a joint assignment. Thus, no new members were added to the Cabinet to make up for the seven departures. These pieces of news were followed by rumors that 10 regional com- manders (that is, all but the two most junior ones) were promoted to the officiating rank of lieutenant general and summoned to Yangon to assume vacant and newly created command and staff positions. However, according to official press reports, only those designated as adjutant general and quarter master general had assumed their duties by the end of November. Observers generally concluded that these changes in the Cabinet and armed forces greatly strengthened the positions of the top three junta leaders (chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary-1) and reflected an attempt to im- prove the junta’s image while at the same time ensuring that there is a steady infusion of young blood into the military-executive nexus. Moreover, ex- cluding the new crop of regional commanders from the ruling junta could pave the way for a de-linking of military command and executive authority, both of which were exercised by previous regional commanders, in a future constitutional government. Finally, taken together with the news that My- anmar bought a squadron of 10 Russian MiG-29s (worth some US$130 mil-
2. “Myanmar Junta Says Generals Dismissed for ‘Violating State Policy’,” Associated Press, November 17, 2001. Earlier, on May 10, the minister for communications, posts, and telegraphs (CPT) was dismissed and replaced by another brigadier general and the ambassador to the U.S. was appointed as a minister in the PMO. One deputy minister was reassigned and an educator was promoted to fill the vacancy. The dismissal of the CPT minister was speculated to have been linked to irregularities in providing a new mobile phone system in Yangon. 118 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLII, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2002 lion),3 the aforementioned developments indicate a further step in the post- 1988 restructuring of the armed forces from its traditional counterinsurgency orientation toward modern conventional warfare.
Insurgency and Drug Trade The military wing of the All Burma Student Democratic Front operating along the Thai-Myanmar border practically existed in name only, while its Kayin allies in the dwindling forces of the Karen National Union were re- duced to fighting a rearguard action against the powerful Myanmar military. The Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) rebels were most active dur- ing the year, having engaged in major skirmishes with government forces in the first quarter of 2001. Former insurgent groups that had made peace with the government contin- ued to maintain quasi-autonomous enclaves bordering Thailand and the infa- mous Golden Triangle. The more organized nationalities (such as the Kachin and Wa) among the 17 groups in peaceful coexistence with the military be- came more successful in legitimate business activities, concentrating on re- source extraction and border trade but with increasing diversification into banking, imports/exports, manufacturing, and infrastructure development. On the other hand, the contentious issue of the Wa ethnic group’s involve- ment in narcotics production and trafficking remained unresolved. The U.S. and Thai anti-narcotic agencies still refused to accept that the Wa had made good on their promise to give up those lucrative business activities and grad- ually eradicate poppy growing. These refusals came despite the Wa’s re- peated denials and the government’s many attempts to convince the critics through its own media, public bonfires of seized drugs, and sponsorship of site visits by accredited foreign media, diplomats, and visitors. However, the Thai foreign minister claimed that anti-narcotics “cooperation has been really affective” among China, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand, and asserted that the Myanmar junta was committed to the eradication of drugs.4
Human Rights The International Labor Organization (ILO) Governing Body’s (GB) Novem- ber 2000 resolution calling for sanctions against Myanmar for its failure to take adequate measures to prevent forced labor put the issue at the center stage of the debate on alleged human rights abuses in the country. In 2001, the Myanmar government adopted a conciliatory stance toward ILO initia-
3. Nikolai Novichkov, “Myanmar Signs for Surplus MiG-29s,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 11, 2001, in BurmaNet News, no. 1842, July 13, 2001, at
Anti-Muslim Riots In February, anti-Muslim riots broke out in Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine State, which has a sizeable Muslim population. These were followed by spo- radic clashes between Muslims and Buddhists in several towns in southern Myanmar during May and October. A security clampdown and curfew were imposed on the affected areas, and some travel restrictions were reportedly imposed following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. Neverthe- less, the authorities gave assurances that the situation was under control.
5. ILO, GB, HLT, Developments Concerning the Question of the Observance by the Govern- ment of Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29): Report of the High-Level Team, GB.282/4 (Geneva: ILO, November 2001), p. 13,
External Relations The adversarial relations between the junta and its Western critics have been replaced by a wait-and-see stance on the latter’s part, due to the goodwill created by the dialogue process. The U.S. and EU have not lifted their sanc- tions yet; however, they did indicate that they were encouraged by the ongo- ing efforts toward national reconciliation and that future actions would be contingent on Myanmar’s progress on issues of human rights and democracy. ASEAN continued to support Myanmar’s stand on human rights and demo- cratic transition and successfully resisted Western pressures to isolate My- anmar in bloc-to-bloc relations. The EU dropped its objection to Myanmar’s future participation in EU-ASEAN meetings. Yangon hosted a retreat for ASEAN foreign ministers in April and SPDC Chairman Senior General Than Shwe attended the 7th ASEAN Summit in Brunei in November. Moreover, Britain and the U.S. also expressed some cautious optimism regarding devel- opments in Myanmar and, preoccupied as they were with their war on terror- ism, these two harshest critics of the junta did not put additional pressure on Myanmar. Myanmar’s bilateral relations within Asia seemed to be on track in 2001. Some significant developments in its favor could be seen in relations with Japan, China, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Thailand. Intense Myanmar lobbying apparently paid off with Japan, which in April announced a US$29 million aid package to repair Myanmar’s oldest hydroelectric power plant (built with Japanese aid). News of the government’s secret talks probably encouraged the Japanese to act despite its moratorium on official development aid to Myanmar. China continued to provide assistance through yuan-denominated loans and technical support for infrastructure and industrial projects. The high point in Sino-Myanmar relations was the visit of Senior General Than Shwe to China in September and Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s return visit on December 12. BURMA/MYANMAR IN 2001 121 With respect to South Asia, perhaps in response to India’s enhanced mili- tary and governmental ties with Myanmar, Pakistan arranged for a three-day official visit by President General Pavez Musharraf from May 1–3. Mushar- raf mentioned in a press conference in Yangon that his amicable relationship with Myanmar’s chairman was due to “the two of us [being] in uniform.”7 Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad went to Myanmar on a work- ing visit from January 3–4 and the SPDC chairman returned the favor Sep- tember 25–27, leading a large official delegation. This resulted in Malaysia promising assistance and cooperation in the fields of trade, agriculture, en- ergy, and information technology. Relations between the two states became closer in the year due to these exchanges as well as the role of Ambassador Razali, who is perceived by Myanmar’s leaders as being closely associated with Mahathir, in facilitating the dialogue. Myanmar-Thailand relations went through an extremely rough patch in the first few months of 2001, when armed forces of both sides confronted each other over alleged violations of territorial integrity in the course of conflict between SURA rebels and Myanmar troops. Myanmar accused local Thai troops of abetting SURA forays while the Thais retaliated with allegations of Myanmar collusion in Wa narcotics operations. Media from both sides joined the fray, further aggravating tensions. However, the new Thai govern- ment of Premier Thaksin Shinawatra and Deputy Premier General Chavalit quickly reined in the military and soothed Myanmar nerves, with Thaksin visiting Yangon for two days in June to thrash out the problems at the highest levels. Chavalit’s visit of July 23 further strengthened the rapprochement. Following the red-carpet treatment for SPDC Secretary-1 Lt. General Khin Nyunt during his three-day visit to Thailand in late September, Yangon ex- pressed its goodwill by releasing 66 Thai prisoners, endorsing the formation of the Myanmar-Thai Cultural and Economic Friendship Association, and of- fering Thai fishing companies partnership in offshore fishing (concessions had been revoked in late 1999). Thailand gave tariff concessions and offered to construct a new bridge linking Maesai and Tachilek in Myanmar. Myanmar’s reaction to the September 11 terrorist attack on the U.S. was muted. The government press carried little news of the attack and the imme- diate U.S. reactions. The SPDC chairman’s message of condolence was be- latedly released to the public only on the 21st. The government stepped up security around the diplomatic missions of the U.S. and its allies. Myanmar kept silent on the U.S.’s call for a war against terrorism, but joined the ASEAN declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism issued at the Bru- nei Summit. In referring to global terrorism, Myanmar authorities also
7. “Perspectives,” New Light of Myanmar, May 5, 2001. 122 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLII, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2002 branded the armed opposition groups and the NLD government-in-exile as terrorists.
The Economy According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) data, the real gross do- mestic product (GDP) for the fiscal year ending March grew by 6.2%, down from 10.9% reported by the government for the previous year.8 The Econo- mist Intelligence Unit (EIU) estimated a slower growth rate of 5% for fiscal 2001–02.9 The agriculture sector was expected to do well in 2001 due to favorable weather and multi-cropping. Rice production was estimated at 13 million tons (MT) compared to 12.5 MT in 2000. Beans and pulses are expected to rise from 2.2 to 2.5 MT, while the increase in maize production was esti- mated at 47%. All these were remarkable achievements given that there were diesel shortages and lower domestic fertilizer output. On the other hand, the manufacturing sector appeared to be constrained by energy and foreign exchange shortages, while the private construction sector had yet to recover from the property bust in 1997. Onshore oil and gas pro- duction fell by about 10% in the first half of 2001 on a year-on-year (y-o-y) basis.10 Thailand’s payment, in mid-2001 of over US$300 million in arrears for the offshore natural gas that remained unutilized in its “take or pay” deal with Myanmar might have boosted the latter’s foreign exchange reserves, which stood at around US$200 million in March, according to the latest available IMF data. The foreign direct investment (FDI) slump since 1998 continued with the pledged amount falling by 33% to US$49.5 million in the first seven months of 2001 on a y-o-y basis. The tourism sector also faltered with tourist arrivals falling by 48% on a y-o-y basis from January to June. This was probably due to the sharp drop in cross-border visitors affected by the conflict with Thai- land. The outlook for the year in any event would be rather gloomy because of the worldwide downturn in tourism and the economic woes in Asia The trade deficit narrowed by 42% (y-o-y) in the first half of the year as exports surged by 66%, outstripping the 19% increase in imports. However, consumer price inflation, which registered 6.3% in 2000, rose by 21% in the first six months of 2001. Moreover, the kyat took a beating, with its open market exchange rate falling from around 440 kyats per U.S. dollar in early
8. Statistics in Myanmar are treated with some skepticism by international and Western agen- cies. 9. All EIU citations are from EIU Country Report: Myanmar (London: EIU, November 2001). 10. Beginning May 2001, the daily petrol ration for private vehicles in Yangon was cut from three to two gallons. BURMA/MYANMAR IN 2001 123 January to over 740 kyats at November’s end. Meanwhile, business for au- thorized money changers (who work with the US$-denominated foreign ex- change certificate, or FEC) slowed down after the government replaced the previous concessionaires with new companies in July and placed restrictions on the buying of FECs. In November, rumors that 1,000- and 500-kyat notes would be withdrawn caused panic in Yangon, raising prices of gold, con- sumer durables, and cars. Despite assurances at a news briefing by the dep- uty chief of military intelligence, confidence in kyat remained weak. As in previous years, the economy in 2001 was constrained by distortion- ary fiscal and monetary policies and lack of far-reaching reforms. Despite a relatively significant rise in exports, problems related to foreign exchange shortage, power failures, inefficient state enterprises, and excessive state con- trol persisted.
Conclusion It was a year of waiting in Myanmar. The political opposition and people were waiting for a positive outcome in the government’s dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The government was waiting for the cessation of puni- tive measures and resumption of overseas development aid (on account of the government’s apparent concession in relation to the dialogue) as well as the resolution of the forced labor issue. And both government and the polity were waiting for the economy to take off. However, the waiting continued as the year ended without a significant breakthrough on all counts. Given the complexity of the issues and the long- standing enmity of the protagonists, one cannot expect a quick-fix solution to Myanmar’s myriad problems, associated with political and economic transi- tion toward democracy and a vibrant market economy. For now, as men- tioned in the UNGA resolution of November 30, one could only be “cautiously encouraged” by incremental moves in a positive direction yet “gravely concerned” about the situation.11
11. “Myanmar Says U.N. Resolution Inaccurate,” Agence France Presse, in BurmaNet News, no. 1930, December 3, 2001. Myanmar authorities said that such a conclusion was inaccurate and “not totally fair.”