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Burma/Myanmar in 2001: a Year of Waiting

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Burma/Myanmar in 2001: a Year of Waiting BURMA/MYANMAR IN 2001 A Year of Waiting Tin Maung Maung Than More than 11 years after the general elections in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by future Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi won a convincing victory at the polls, Myanmar’s ruling military junta, now known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) had still not announced the timetable for a return to civilian rule. Both friends and foes of the NLD were caught by surprise when Malaysian diplomat Tan Sri Razali Ismail (appointed as the U.N. secretary-general’s special envoy in April 2000) revealed in January 2001 that “secret talks” (i.e., a dialogue) had been going on since October 2000 between the regime’s rep- resentatives and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The year 2001 thus might be char- acterized as one in which Myanmar became “a nation awaiting,” as the talks became the focal point of Myanmar politics, notwithstanding the dearth of information on the dialogue’s nature and progress. Politics and Society As Myanmar politics entered a new phase with the ongoing dialogue, the two protagonists assumed a new nonconfrontational and conciliatory stance in both rhetoric and actions. The NLD toned down its criticisms of the govern- ment while the latter ended its relentless media attacks on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her party. Scores of NLD supporters were released from deten- tion in January. There were subsequent intermittent releases throughout the year of NLD elected representatives, members, and supporters, with the total reaching nearly 200 by the end of November. What’s more, NLD Chairman U Aung Shwe and Vice-Chairman U Tin U were freed on August 26 from Tin Maung Maung Than is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. Asian Survey, 42:1, pp. 115–123. ISSN: 0004–4687 2002 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Send Requests for Permission to Reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704–1223. 115 116 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLII, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2002 nearly one year of house arrest. Nevertheless, human rights advocates point- ed out that over 1,000 “political prisoners” remained in custody and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was still confined to her home. In the case of the former, the government did not acknowledge them as such; as for the latter, it was argued that her continued confinement was by mutual consent to facilitate the dialogue process. Beginning in mid-year, the government had selectively al- lowed the NLD to reopen its branch offices (hundreds had been closed over the preceding three years) and hoist signboards. By the week of November 25, the NLD’s offices in Yangon as well as in three other locations had re- opened. Nevertheless, such confidence-building gestures were seen by critics as symbolic and not having really expanded the NLD’s extremely limited political space. Several factors were posited as reasons for the talks, including economic crisis, political crisis, and Western sanctions. These were all dismissed by government spokespersons. Others pointed out that friendly persuasion by leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other friendly regional states were more likely to be responsible. It probably was a combination of all of them that nudged these steps from the junta, which also had to contend with the challenges posed by globalization and the need for performance legitimacy. Despite several premature forecasts of an imminent breakthrough that would entail some power-sharing formula, no substantive outcome was reached. In the 11 months following the talks’ announcement, neither the form nor the content of the dialogue was revealed and both parties declined to say who else was involved besides Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. This had led to speculations that the talks were going nowhere, but the government repeat- edly insisted that the talks were on track. Opposition groups abroad repeat- edly expressed frustration and skepticism over the dialogue’s secret nature and glacial pace. In particular, non-Bamar (non-Burman) ethnic groups op- posing the junta argued that only tripartite talks incorporating them could be credible and alleged that the junta had been implementing a divide-and-rule strategy. Even the ethnic-based parties allied with the NLD complained that the talks had not yielded any tangible benefits for them. On the other hand, Ambassador Razali, in Yangon for his sixth visit, told reporters on November 28, after meeting NLD leaders and ethnic-party politicians, that the “future is very encouraging.”1 Cabinet and Military Reshuffles The junta’s command structure was disrupted on February 19 by the death of Secretary-2 and Army Chief of Staff Lt. General Tin Oo (fourth in the peck- 1. “U.N. Envoy Optimistic on Secret Burma Talks,” Reuters, November 28, 2001. BURMA/MYANMAR IN 2001 117 ing order) in a helicopter crash attributed to bad weather. Also killed were a minister from the prime minister’s office (PMO), a regional commander (who was also an SPDC member), and several senior military officers. At the year’s end, Tin Oo’s posts remained vacant. A second shock manifested on November 9 when Secretary-3 and Adjutant General (AG) Lt. General Win Myint was dismissed, together with Deputy Prime Minister cum Minister for Military Affairs and Quartermaster General (QMG) Lt. General Tin Hla. The official explanation was that they “violated the state policy.”2 This probably meant serious corruption, given that they had supervised military-linked busi- ness enterprises rumored to have accountability problems. It was also an- nounced that two other aging deputy prime ministers (Myanmar had three) and three ministers with less influential portfolios (Culture, Cooperatives, and Immigration and Manpower) resigned. This was followed by a minor Cabi- net reshuffle in which the labor minister exchanged his portfolio with one of the PMO ministers, who also took charge of the Culture Ministry. Another PMO minister was moved to the Cooperatives Ministry, while the Immigra- tion and Manpower portfolio was given to the social welfare minister as a joint assignment. Thus, no new members were added to the Cabinet to make up for the seven departures. These pieces of news were followed by rumors that 10 regional com- manders (that is, all but the two most junior ones) were promoted to the officiating rank of lieutenant general and summoned to Yangon to assume vacant and newly created command and staff positions. However, according to official press reports, only those designated as adjutant general and quarter master general had assumed their duties by the end of November. Observers generally concluded that these changes in the Cabinet and armed forces greatly strengthened the positions of the top three junta leaders (chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary-1) and reflected an attempt to im- prove the junta’s image while at the same time ensuring that there is a steady infusion of young blood into the military-executive nexus. Moreover, ex- cluding the new crop of regional commanders from the ruling junta could pave the way for a de-linking of military command and executive authority, both of which were exercised by previous regional commanders, in a future constitutional government. Finally, taken together with the news that My- anmar bought a squadron of 10 Russian MiG-29s (worth some US$130 mil- 2. “Myanmar Junta Says Generals Dismissed for ‘Violating State Policy’,” Associated Press, November 17, 2001. Earlier, on May 10, the minister for communications, posts, and telegraphs (CPT) was dismissed and replaced by another brigadier general and the ambassador to the U.S. was appointed as a minister in the PMO. One deputy minister was reassigned and an educator was promoted to fill the vacancy. The dismissal of the CPT minister was speculated to have been linked to irregularities in providing a new mobile phone system in Yangon. 118 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLII, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2002 lion),3 the aforementioned developments indicate a further step in the post- 1988 restructuring of the armed forces from its traditional counterinsurgency orientation toward modern conventional warfare. Insurgency and Drug Trade The military wing of the All Burma Student Democratic Front operating along the Thai-Myanmar border practically existed in name only, while its Kayin allies in the dwindling forces of the Karen National Union were re- duced to fighting a rearguard action against the powerful Myanmar military. The Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) rebels were most active dur- ing the year, having engaged in major skirmishes with government forces in the first quarter of 2001. Former insurgent groups that had made peace with the government contin- ued to maintain quasi-autonomous enclaves bordering Thailand and the infa- mous Golden Triangle. The more organized nationalities (such as the Kachin and Wa) among the 17 groups in peaceful coexistence with the military be- came more successful in legitimate business activities, concentrating on re- source extraction and border trade but with increasing diversification into banking, imports/exports, manufacturing, and infrastructure development. On the other hand, the contentious issue of the Wa ethnic group’s involve- ment in narcotics production and trafficking remained unresolved. The U.S. and Thai anti-narcotic agencies still refused to accept that the Wa had made good on their promise to give up those lucrative business activities and grad- ually eradicate poppy growing. These refusals came despite the Wa’s re- peated denials and the government’s many attempts to convince the critics through its own media, public bonfires of seized drugs, and sponsorship of site visits by accredited foreign media, diplomats, and visitors.
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