Cyprus - Tuomioja Report

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Title items-in-Peace-keeping operations - Cyprus - Tuomioja Report

Date Created 08/06/1964

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Container s-0870-0001: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant: Cyprus

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

CYPRUS MEDIATOR

,/v^ Nicosia, 8 June 1964

My dear U Thant, In order that you and your colleagues at Headquarters may have some opportunity, before I arrive for the forth- coming consultations, to know what I have in mind as the next step, I am sending you herewith a copy of a draft of my first periodic report. I should like to make two brief observations on it. The first is that it remains only a tentative draft, and subject to revisions which I may suggest as well as those which may emerge from our discussions. This applies especially to the formulation of the general principles and guidelines which, with an introductory passage, come under the heading of "A suggested basis for discussion" from page 46 onwards. These principles and guidelines need further research and further careful examination, in which I will value the thoughts of yourself and your colleagues. My second observation is that, as you recall, the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 requires me to report to you, and not directly or necessarily to the Security Council. I feel that careful consideration will therefore need to be given to the question of whether, and in what form, you would wish any report from me to go before the Council, and, if so, the question of the timing of any such submission. These also are matters which I look forward to discussing with you and your colleagues. I am sending copies of the draft at the same time to Mr. Narasimhan and Mr. Rolz-Bennett,

Yours sincerely,

Ivuv^ttV ( Sakari Tuomioja)

U Thant Secretary-General United Nations Headquarters New York SECRET

SECOND DRAFT

FIRST PERIODIC REPORT TO THE SECRETART-GENERAL BY THE UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR IN CYPRUS

PART I - GENERAL

Introduction

1, In accordance with the resolution of the Security Council dated 4 March 1964, you designated me on 25 March as the United Nations Mediator in Cyprus, in agreement with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom*

2» After a t>rief visit to Headquarters for consultations I took up my duties in Cyprus on 2 April 1964. My terms of reference as set out in the resolution mentioned above require me to report periodically to the Secretary-General on my efforts. These have now reached a stage at which I feel it appropriate to submit this first periodic report* In it I give a brief account of my activities; an outline of the circumstances prevailing in Cyprus which have a bearing on efforts at mediation; an explanation of the existing constitution and of the present approaches of the parties towards a settlement of the problem; and finally, my carefully considered conclusions and suggestions as to the next step which should be taken. - 2 -

Functions and activities

3* The function of the Mediator in Cyprus, in the terms of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964, is to use his "best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, "for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security."

4* I conceived the first phase of my task to "be that of securing the fullest possible understanding and appreciation of the Cyprus problem as it now stands; of the historical, political and other circumstances under which, in years of calm as well as in periods of disturbance, the problem has developed; of the opinions of the parties concerned, both internal and external, as to the roots of the problem; of their aspirations for the future; and of the means by which they believe that these aspirations can be achieved in a manner which will accord with the considerations set forth in my terms of reference,

5, To that end I have had a very large number of discussions with members and officials of the Government of Cyprus and with other representatives, both official and unofficial?

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of the Greek—Gypriot and Turkish—Gypriot communities. These have included, on the official side, the President of the Republic, the Vice-President, the members of the Council of Ministers, the leaders and mem"bers of the House of Representatives and of the Greek and Turkish Communal ChambersI /, judges of the courts and senior public servants. On the non-official side my talks have been with delegations from commercial, professional and other societies and interests and with a large number of individual citizens*

6» Since my mandate requires me to apply my endeavours also to the three external Governments which have been directly concerned with the problem of Cyprus, I have also visited the capitals of Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom. In Ankara (17-18 April and 4 June) I had meetings with the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other officials of the Government of Turkey; in Athens (26-27 April and 3 June) with His Majesty the King of Greece, his Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and other officials; and in London (30 April- 4 May) with the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Deputy-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and other

I/ I regret to have to report that I was able to see the President of the Turkish Communal Chamber only in Ankara, from which he did not feel able to return to Cyprus without guarantees by the Government of his safe conduct from the Nicosia Airport to the Turkish sector of the city. Such guarantees have not yet, as far as I know, been given. 4 -

officials. I have also maintained frequent contacts with. O the diplomatic representatives of those countries in Cyprus. In addition, and in view of the wider international interest in the Cyprus problem signified "by the present action of the United Nations on it, I have made myself available for consultations, as appropriate, with the diplomatic representatives of other States.

7* Although, as you know, my mission is quite separate from that of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, whose creation was also authorized "by the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964, I have also felt it necessary to maintain close relations with the Force Commander. This is "because the progress made "by the Force, as well as the difficulties encountered "by it, in carrying out its functions of helping to prevent a recurrence of fighting and to contribute to the maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions, have self-evidently "borne directly on the problem of bringing about those circumstances in which the process of mediation can most fruitfully be undertaken. For similar reasons I have also kept in touch with the Special Representative whom you designated on 11 May to help solve the non-military problems of the immediate situation.

8, In all of the consultations and relationships which I have outlined above, I have unfailingly encountered the utmost courtesy and goodwill, for which I express my gratitude. - 5 -

The general situation in Cyprus

9« What I have to report on the aspirations of the parties concerned and on the prospects of finding common ground "between them as a "basis for agreement can "be fully appreciated only against an understanding of the prevailing situation in Cyprus. Your reports to the Security Council , with particular reference to the functions and operations of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, have set out the facts of the situation as it has evolved over the past several weeks, and I shall only recapitulate here those elements which seem to me to bear directly on my own mission*

10 * The normal conditions which might "be regarded as conducive to, or even a prerequisite of, any successful effort to find an agreed settlement had not returned to Cyprus "by the end of the period upon which I am reporting, Large numbers of armed men, in and out of uniform and apparently under widely varying degrees of control, faced one another from fortified positions in many parts of the island. While, as you have stated, the United Nations operation could claim no small credit for having contained several situations which might have led to major military clashes, almost every day of the period saw one or more incidents of one kind or another* These incidents, taken in their sum, fortunately did not lead to such widespread injury or loss of life as might have been expected, but they prolonged and compounded the atmosphere of

I/ In particular, S/5671 and S/5679 - 6 -

insecurity j> and fear which had seized many members of the population since the outbreak of violence last December.

11* The feeling of insecurity was heightened during the period by the visible evidence of hostility, past and present, between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Gypriots : damaged and gutted houses and buildings; closed or abandoned factories, stores and offices; road-blocks and barricades formed of sandbags, barbed wire and earth-filled oil-drums; fortifi- cations at the windows of houses; armed police checking traffic at many points on the streets and highways; men and even youths, armed by one side or the other, and many of them not in uniform and not clearly under the discipline of the regular security forces, openly manning strongpoints; the Greek and Turkish national flags, in many places more prominent than the Gypriot flag, flying as if in symbolic separation over different and in fact divided parts of towns and villages. In some of these, and especially in the capital city of Nicosia and in the town of Larnaca, the so-called "green lines", which roughly follow what were intended to be cease-fire lines established before the arrival of the United Nations Force, formed armed barriers which effectively divided the citizens according to their national origin. In other towns such as Famagusta, another important centre, the wall surrounding the old town formed a similar fortified line between the two communities,

• ##/»• • - 7 -

12, They are lines which few from either side dared — or so they claimed — to cross. They were afraid not only of "being shot at but also of Toeing arrested, abducted or held as hostages. In Nicosia the "green line", and this ostensible fear of crossing it even under United Nations escort, kept Greek-Gypriot civil servants from Government Offices on the Turkish-Cypriot side, and vice versa; it kept the Vice- r.' President and the Turkish Cypriot Ministers and other representatives from their offices and from Cabinet and parliamentary meetings; it prevented the normal flow of traffic for purposes of both business and pleasure; it curtailed the functioning of the Courts and Government services and the implementation of development plans; and it prolonged the abandonment by many people of their homes, business and jobs on one side or the other. The few breaches that were being made in the line, such as to allow a limited movement of foodstuff, of mail, and occasionally of persons, and even to re-open a few telephone connections, were very largely due only to the persistent efforts of the United Nations Force, and were hedged with many difficulties,

13* Perhaps most seriously of all, through all these weeks of tension there has been little healthy movement of ideas -- indeed, little movement of ideas at all, except of the kind that have been shouted across the dividing lines, in uncompromising and often hostile and provocative terms, by the partisan radio stations and newspapers and the propaganda machines of both sides*

»»*/•»• - 8 -

14* You will recall that when you formulated, with the assistance of the Force Commander, a programme of steps and objectives directed towards the restoration of freedom of movement and other immediate requirements for a return to normal conditions, you reported-/to the Security Council that "in the prevailing climate of mistrust and hostility, the communities concerned in the Cyprus problem are themselves often inhibited from taking the kinds of initiative which might lead to a substantial reduction of tension and conflict, and when proposals are put forth they are likely to "be rejected, less on their merit than on the fact of their origin in one group or the other."

15• This same phenomenon which helped to delay a return to normal life in Cyprus worked with no less force, during the period of my report, against the prospects of a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem in the longer-term sense* There was no direct discussion between the parties of each other's proposals, and neither of them sought such a discussion. There waslittie calm and rational consideration by one party of the other's point of view. And there was the same tendency as you have previously described for one side to reject the other's proposals out of hand on the basis not of merit but of suspicion and mistrust, and to close the door even to a discussion of possible compromise lest it be taken as a sign of weakness.

16. During this first phase of my endeavours I deemed it to be in Cyprus, rather than outside the country, where an agreed solution to the Cyprus problem must first be sought — and then

I/ S/5671, para. 12, - 9 - primarily in the capital, Nicosia, since most of the principal leaders of local opinion had gathered there on one side or another. But in Nicosia the Turkish-Cypriote purported to regard themselves as being under actual siege "by the Greek- Cypriots, and to feel obliged to place before everything else the protection and defence of their persons and property. By no means all of them had given up hope of external military intervention in their favour. The Greek-Gypriots, on their side, where they now in effect have exclusive control of the central organs of the Republic, continued to regard at least part of the other community as being in a condition of rebellion, with designs on the security of the State, and with the actual or potential support of military intervention from outside. Their decision towards the end of May, through the Greek members of the Council of Ministers, to seek the enactment of a law to establish a national guard by means of conscription if necessary, was openly "justified" on such grounds•

17. It was not possible during this period, moreover, to be confident that the formal political leaders of the two sides were in full control of, rather than in some sense responding to, those responsible for the excessive numbers of their people who were carrying guns. But for whatever reason, and whether by design or not, the intractability of the military postures assumed by each side served to make even more rigid the positions which they had tfeken on the political future of their country and even on the question of their ability to share it in peace. - 10 -

PART'II - THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

The Zurich and London Agreements

18* The present Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, which dates from the first day of independence (16 August I960), has its roots in -the agreements reached between the Heads of Governments of Greece and Turkey at Zurich on 11 February 1959» which in turn were incorporated in the agreements reached "between these Governments and that of the United Kingdom at London on 19 February of the same year. On that date also the Representatives of the Greek-Gypriot community and of the Turkish-Gypriot community accepted the documents concerned, and accompanying declarations by the three Governments, as "the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus".

19. I shall mention only briefly the circumstances which dictated those agreements. Although Cyprus was at the time a British colony, its arrival at independence did not follow the classical pattern of a territorial nationalist movement winning its sovereignty by means of negotiation with or a struggle against the colonial power alone. The strongest internal political pressure, which led to armed revolt in 1955» had been that of the Greek-Cypriots; and it had been directed not at independence as such but rather at Enosis (union) with

» • * / » • » 11 -

Greece, This had produced a counter-pressure from the side of the Turkish-Cypriote : in general, a resistance against the idea of Enosis, and eventually an insistence that the Turkish-Gypriot community had an equal right of union with Turkey (Taksim), to be carried out by means of partitioning the country. Thus not only the United Kingdom as the colonial power and one with strategic interests in the island, but also Greece and Turkey claimed a vital stake in the outcome. These interests brought to the Cyprus question a complexity of issues going beyond any immediate question of the well-being of the Cypriot people. These issues included, in particular the relationships between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom; the future of the British bases, which involved not only British national interests but also those of the military alliance in which the three powers were associated; and the concern of-Turkey, again from both a national and an international viewpoint, about the strategic aspects of the internal situation in an island close to her shores.

20. The extent to which it was agreed that these interests should be reconciled was indicated at the London conference-/ by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom when he said that Cyprus was a problem which could only be resolved by agreement between his country, Greece and Turkey, as well as with Cyprus

• • •/ »«•

I/ Conference on Cyprus t Final Statements at the Closing- Plenary Session at Lancaster House on February 19th, 1959 H.M.S.O., London (Cmd. 680) - 12 -

itself, and that:- "This settlement is one which recognizes the right of the people of Cyprus to an independent status in the world* It is one which recognizes the Hellenic character of the majority of the Cypriot people. But it is also one which protects the national character and culture of the Gyp riot-Turkish community. It is one which preserves to the United Kingdom the defence facilities which are essential not only for our narrow national purposes "but for the greater alliance of which we are members." 21, The settlement envisaged Cyprus "becoming a Republic with a regime especially adapted both to the ethnic composition of its population (approximately 80 per cent Greek and 18 per cent Turkish) and to what were recognized as special relationships between the Republic and the three other States concerned in the agreements. In the former respect, the agreements sought to recognize and preserve constitutionally a distinction between the two communities and to maintain a certain balance between their respective rights and interests. In the latter respect, they were intended to provide, by means of treaties, a multilateral guarantee of the maintenance of the state of affairs to be established by the basic articles of the proposed Constitution. They also permitted the United Kingdom to retain sovereignty over two areas to be maintained as military bases,

of the Constitution 22. It will be useful, in the light of later events and the positions now taken by the parties concerned, to outline here the main characteristics of the Constitution which was

***/*•• - 13 - eventually drafted within the rigid framework of the Zurich and London agreements, and which "became effective on the date of the independence of the Republic. In essence, the Constitution consists of three main groups of provisions. The first group consists of those that recognize to each of the two communities a separate existence. The second consists of constitutional devices assuring the participation of each community in the exercise of the functions of Government, while seeking in a number of matters to avoid supremacy on the part of the larger community, and assuring also a partial administrative autonomy to each community. The third main series of provisions constitutes a complex system of guarantees of the supremacy of the Constitution,

23* Thus, among the first group of provisions, the two distinct communities are identified (Art.l) and defined (Art.2) "by the Constitution. An equal status is accorded to them in regard to the official languages of the Republic (arl£. 3 ancl 180), the choice of its flag and also the right to fly the national flags of Greece or Turkey as the case may be (Art.4)» and the celebration of the national holidays of the latter countries (Art.5). All elections take place on the basis of separate communal electoral lists (Art**. 63 and 94) and separate voting (Arts, 1, 39, 62, 86, 173 and 178)* Sound and vision broadcasting hours are allocated between the two communities according to a specified formula (Art. 171) • The communities - 14 - are accorded rights of special relationships with Greece and Turkey respectively, including that of receiving subsidies for institutions of education, culture, athletics and charity belonging to the respective communities and that of employing, if need "be, schoolmasters, professors and clergymen provided "by the Greek and Turkish Governments as the case may be (Art. 108)»

24* The political system itself continues this distinction between the two communities. The President, who must be Greek, and the Vice-President, who must be Turkish, are elected by their respective communities (Art, 1) and may thus be said to be their undisputed leaders and the guarantors of their rights in each case. They designate separately the members of the Council of Ministers (seven Greek and three Turkish Ministers) (Art.46), In the House of Representatives, also, the President must be Greek and the Vice-President Turkish, each being elected by his own communal group of members (Art. 72).

25* All of the organs of the State are designed to ensure the participation of the two communities in both their composition and their functioning. The basis of this participation, however, varies between different organs. In some it is represented by numerical equality, either with equality of functions (the judiciary as a whole) or without such equality (the President and the Vice-President) (Arts, 36-43)• A number of "Independent Officers", namely, the Attorney-General, the Audi tor-General and the Governor of the Issuing Bank (Art^.126- 128) and the Heads of the army, the police and the gendarmerie (Art. 131) may by and large be appointed from ••; ie - 15 - either community, "but each, must have a deputy appointed from the other community. In other cases participation is based on a fixed ratio : thus, the army of two thousand men is to "be comprised of Greeks and Turks in the proportions of 60 per cent and 40 per cent respectively (art, 129); this ratio also applies transitionally to the police and gendarmerie, A different ratio — 70 per cent to 30 per cent — applies to the composition of the Council of Ministers (Art,46), the House of Representatives (Art, 62), the Public Service (Art, 123) and eventually the police and gendarmerie (Art,130),

2? • Again, the Greek-Gypriot and Turkish-Gypriot Ministers are placed on an equal footing but are responsible, depending on their communities of origin, either to the President or to the Vice-President (Aarts. 48 and 49)* The Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot Judges are similarly equal in status, but in general they exercise their functions only in regard to members of their own communities (Art. 159)• Public officers and also forces of the Republic stationed in parts of the country inhabited in a proportion approaching 100 per cent by members of one community are required to belong to that community (Arts. 123 and 132). Moreover, the division between the two communities of the posts of the "Independent Officers" and other senior officials and their deputies has tended, according to my information, to serve as a pattern for the whole of the senior level of the public service.

28. There are a number of provisions in the Constitution which are designed to establish, in certain fields of action, an equality of function between the two communities even where their representation is unequal, I have given above the example of the House of Representatives as regards specific types of legislation of particular importance to the communal interests. A number of decisions within the authority of the President and Vice-President also require the agreement of both : for example, the choice of the flag (Art, 4); the promulgation of legislation (Art, 51) and of decisions of the Council of Ministers (Art. 46); the designation of the - 17 -

Ministers (Art, 47), of the members of the Supreme Constitu- tional Court (Art. 133), of the members of the High Court (Art. 153) and of certain public officials and heads of the forces (Arts. 112, 115, 118, 124, 126, 131, 133, 153, 186); the introduction of conscription (Art. 129); and increasing or reducing the strength of the army (Art. 130)*

29 • Both the President and the Vice-President also have the right to delay decisions in many matters and to veto them in others. Separately or conjointly, they have the right of final veto on any law or decision of the House of Representatives concerning foreign affairs, with some exceptions; certain specified questions of defence; and certain specified questions of security (Art. 50). Also separately or jointly, they may return to the House for its reconsideration any law or decision (Art. 51) and they may similarly ask the Council of Ministers to reconsider any of its decisions (Art. 57) : but in both cases they are bound, except in the fields where their veto applies, to accept the reconsidered decision of the organ concerned.

30. The general effect of these devices is to make most of the major affairs of State subject to the agreement of the representatives of both the Greek and Turkish communities either by joint decision or by the renunciation of the right of veto. The negative side of this situation is that it can invite deadlock on any of the questions concerned when the two

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communities have sharply differing views on them, and this has in fact happened in the case of tax legislation and the question of the municipalities. Recourse to the Supreme Constitutional Court does not necessarily provide a way out of such impasses, since the Court can only resolve problems of interpretation, and not political differences.

31« The Constitution provides for another level of political organs - those which are purely communal in representation and i function. The highest of these are the two Communal Chambers, each elected exclusively by its own community, and having control over such matters as questions of religion, culture and education, personal status, and communal institutions such as sports and charitable organizations, co-operatives, etc*, (Art* 87)• In these matters they have power to impose direct taxation on the members of their respective communities (Arts. 8? and 88).

•••/•** - 19 -

33. The third and last important group of constitutional provisions to which, attention should "be drawn are those which constitute a complex set of guarantees. These include, firstly, guarantees of a purely juridical nature : the establishment of a Supreme Constitutional Court which can annul any decision or law which it finds contrary to the Constitution (Arts* 137» 138, 139» 144, 146); the provision that, as far as concerns those articles of the Constitution which are capable of amendment, such amendment must be approved by a separate two-thirds majority of each communal group in the House of Representatives (Art. 182); the more practically important fact that the so-called "Basic Articles" of the Constitution — in effect, the foundation of the Zurich Agreement — cannot be amended at all (Ari?« 182); and the international undertaking of the Republic, under the Treaty of Guarantee signed with Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom — which itself is entrenched in the Constitution (Art* 181) — to respect the Constitution.

34* It should also be noted that the judiciary itself, which constitutes the normal means of guaranteeing respect for the Constitution and the laws, possesses certain characteristics designed to maintain a balance between the two communities. The Supreme Constitutional Court is presided over by a neutral judge, and consists otherwise of one Greek-Gypriot and one Turkish-Gypriot judge (Art* 133) • The High Court, although it has two Greek-Gypriot judges and only one Turkish-Cypriot judge, is also headed by a neutral president who may cast two votes (Art. 153)«

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35» Other guarantees of the Constitution are embodied in the international treaties entered into "by the Republic on the first day of independence — these having been, in fact, an integral part of the whole body of the Zurich and London agreements. Cyprus is committed by the Treaty of Guarantee with Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom "to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its constitutionj" "not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever;" and to prohibit any activity likely to promote either union with any other State or partition of the island (Art. I). The three other contracting parties also guarantee the Republic's independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as "the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution" (Art.llj, They undertake to consult together to ensure observance of the provisions of the Treaty, and insofar as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each reserves the right "to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty". (Art. IV).

36. The Treaty of Alliance between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, which, like the Treaty of Guarantee, has constitutional force, has the effect of providing an immediate military guarantee by establishing a tripartite military headquarters in Cyprus, to which Greece and Cyprus have sent contingents numbering 950 and 640 respectively. (Arts. Ill and IV and Additional

•••/••• - 21 -

Protocol No. 1)* [Finally, the existence of the military bases over-which the United Kingdom has retained sovereignty may -\ also "be thought to represent, to a certain degree, an additional military guarantee of the integrity of Cyprus and its Constitution,

The President's proposed amendments

37. On 30 November 1963, some three years after the Consti- tution came into force, the President of the Republic publicly set forth thirteen points on which he considered that the Constitution should be amended. The President did so on the grounds that in its existing form the Constitution created many difficulties in the smooth government and development of \ the country; that its many sui generis provisions conflicted with internationally accepted democratic principles and created sources of friction between G-reek and Turkish Cypriots; and that its defects were causing the two communities to draw further apart rather than closer together*

38. Several of the most important amendments proposed by the President reflected deadlocks which had actually occurred in the functioning of the Constitution, For example, in proposing that the right of veto of the President and the Vice-President should be abolished, he referred to the fact that the latter had vetoed a majority decision of the Council of Ministers /• that the organizational structure of the Cyprus Army should be - 22 -

be "based on mixed units comprising "both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Gypriots, since the Vice-President had favoured separate units,

39• Again, in proposing that the constitutional provisions requiring separate majorities for the enactment of certain laws "by the House of Representatives should be abolished, the President cited the failure of the House to enact an income tax law. Similarly, he proposed that unified municipalities should be established, on the grounds that the constitutional provision for'separate communal municipalities in the five main towns had proved unworkable, one reason being the failtire of the President and the Vice—President to reach agreement on the determination of the boundaries.

40* Difficulties in the functioning of the mixed Public Service Commission, where certain decisions required a minimum number of Greek and Turkish votes depending upon whether a Greek-Oypriot or a Turkish-Gypriot is concerned, led to the proposal by the President that all decisions of the Commission,• without exception, should be taken by simple majority vote. He proposed also that the ratios of Greek and Turkish representation in the Public Service (70-30), the security forces (70-30) and the army (60-40) should be modified over a period of £ime to bring them into line with the ratio of Greeks to Turks in the population as a whole (then expressed as 81.14—18.86),

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41. The President's proposals also included the following : the administration of justice to "be unified; the division of the security forces into police and gendarmerie to "be abolished; the numerical strength of the security and defence forces to "be determined by legislation; the Greek President and the Turkish Vice-President of the House of Representatives to be elected by the House as a whole; the Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished*

42. Whatever possibility may have existed at the time of calm and rational discussion of those proposals between thettwo communities disappeared indefinitely with the outbreak of disturbances between them a few days later. The Turkish Communal Chamber subsequently described as "false propaganda" the President's claim that the Constitution had proved an obstacle to the smooth functioning of the Republic. The Turkish view, as thus expressed, was that the Greek-Cypriots never attempted to implement the Constitution in full with sincerity and goodwill, and that the obstacles created were not due to the Constitution but to their determination not to honour those parts of it which recognized the Turkish-Cypriots1 communal rights. The latter maintained that the whole structure of the Republic rested on the existence of two communities (and not of a "majority" and a "minority"); they, therefore, refused to consider the amendment of any of the provisions of the - 24 -

Constitution since all of the amendments proposed by the other side were directed against those parts which recognized the existence of the Turkish community as such. They described the difficulties which had arisen over the questions of the structure of the army, the establishment of separate municipalities, the income tax legislation and the observance of the fixed ratios in the public services and security forces as being due to the Greeks' desire to discriminate against them and their own determination to protect their rights,

The London Conference (1964)

43* I have been given to understand that by the time of the London Conference in January 1964 the positions of the representatives of the two communities concerning the future structure of the Republic had greatly hardened and drawn much further apart. From the Greek-Cypriot side, there was a demand that the State should take an independent, unitary, integral form, with all legislative power in a parliament elected by universal suffrage on a common roll, the executive power in a cabinet responsible to the parliament, and the judicial power in an independent, unified judiciary. The Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance would be revoked. Nevertheless, there would be certain devices to ensure Turkish representation in the Parliament and the Civil Service; the Turkish community would have autonomy in religious, educational and cultural matters;

•••/#*• - 25 - universally accepted human rights would, "be maintained as integral parts of the Constitution; and there would "be a right of appeal to an international tribunal against violations of those rights.

44* The Turkish-Gypriot representatives, on the other hand, now reverted to a previously suggested concept of separating the two communities physically, by concentrating members of their•community in one or more large areas, and creating a new political and administrative structure on this basis. The Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee would continue in force.

45. The intervening period, and more especially the period since intervention by the United Nations was recommended by the Security Council on 4 March 1964, has seen these opposing positions elaborated in some detail, and I propose to deal with them in the next part of this report. It has also seen the Cyprus Government, apparently acting under the powers given to it under the Constitution but without the participation of the Turkish representatives required by that Constitution, purport to pass legislation and to make decisions of a most serious kind, including the formation of a national guard and the intro duction of conscription. Moreover, on 4 April 1964, the President of the Republic, stated that on the grounds of the failure of the Turkish national contingent to return to its barracks, the Government considered the Treaty of Alliance to have been violated and therefore to have ceased to be in force. - 26 -

PART III - THE PRESENT POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

The Greek-Gypriot Community

46* The present attitude of the Greek-Gyp riot community, as explained to me orally by many of its qualified representatives and as more formally stated on 13 May "by Archtd.sh.op Makarios, President of the Republic,—' starts from the argument that the Republic was founded on agreements (those of Zurich and London) which did not emanate from the free will of the people but were imposed on them. Archbishop Makarios has stated that the only alternatives open to him were either to sign the agreements as they stood or to reject them entirely, and that in view of the grave situation which would have ensued upon their rejection he had felt obliged to sign them,

47* Further, the Constitution based on these agreements was put into force on 16 August I960, and the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance given constitutional force in it, without being approved either by the people of Cyprus directly or in constituent assembly by representatives duly elected for the purpose*

I/ See Annex I: "Certain Aspects of the Political Problem of Cyprus", submitted to the United Nations Mediator by Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia, 13 May 1964. - 27 -

48. The Greek-Gypriot case cites the lesser numerical strength of the "Turkish minority", and its lesser ownership of land and contribution to public expenditure, as not justifying the Turkish community having "been "put on the same level with regard to the exercise of political powers in the State with the Greek majority". It rejects the argument that the Turkish-Gyp riots must "be treated differently from other minorities in other countries "because they form part of the Turkish people of the nearby mainland and "because their language, religion, customs and national aspirations are different from those of the Greeks of Cyprus.

49. The Greek-Gypriots maintain that besides the provisions based on the concept of "political communal segregation", the existing Constitution suffers from another fundamental defect in that its "Basic Articles" cannot be amended. They consider that while such a provision may have political significance, it is of no legal value because the present constituent power has no right to restrict the constituent power of the future. Moreover, the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance constitute an unacceptable limitation of the independence of Cyprus, in that they allow interference with its domestic affairs,

50. Prom these premises, the Greek-Cypriots argue that the whole concept on which the present Constitution is based is entirely wrong, and that "completely new foundations" must be

•••/••* - 28 - laid, For this purpose they put forward certain general principles, while insisting — since popular approval of the Constitution is one of those principles — that the details must Toe formulated "by a constituent assembly.

51» These general principles are set out in Annex I, together with the suggested "basis for the safeguarding of human rigrjts and certain communal rights. In summary, they envisage Cyprus "becoming "a completely independent, unitary, integral, sovereign state", unfettered "by any treaties and with all powers emanating from the people, who would he entitled to decide the future of their country on the "basis of "the internationally accepted principle of self-determination"^ The Constitution should "be founded on the principle that the political majority at any election should govern and the political minority constitute the opposition* Elections would he "by general suffrage on a common roll; all legislative power would "be exercised "by a single-chamber elected parliament, to which the executive power would be answerable; and the judicial power would be vested in an independent, unified judiciary*

52» Human rights should be safeguarded for all persons and entrenched in the Constitution. Some domestic judicial remedies would be established, as well as a right of individual appeal to the European Commission on Human Eights. All "communities and minorities" should have complete autonomy in religious matters and certain aspects of personal status, such as marriage and divorce, and in the administration of religious properties*

* • »/ • • * - 29 -

In the realm of education and culture they should also "be guaranteed certain rights, "but the general responsibility for education should lie with the Government*

53* Most amendments to the Constitution should require a two-thirds majority vote of the total membership of the Parliament, followed "by approval toy an atosolute majority (five-sixths majority in the case of communal rights) of the total membership after a new general election*

The Turki sh-Gypri o t communi ty

54 • The point of departure of the attitude of the representatives of the Turkish-Gypriot community, as reiterated on many occasions, and as formally stated in a memorandum handed to me toy the Vice-President of the Republic, Dr. Fazil Kuchuk-/, is that their greatest concern is the security of life and property of a people who are not a mere minority tout a distinct community in their own right. From this viewpoint they do not object to the existing Constitution as such, tout rather to the way in which it was, in their opinion, misapplied by the representatives of the Greek community,

55* They claim that the recent events have proved that the various contractual and actual guarantees provided in the past have not been sufficient to meet the needs of their community for security. Additional and more effective guarantees must therefore be

I/ See Annex II: "Memorandum by the Vice-President on Framework of Federal Constitution"* « 30 -

56. The additional guarantees, they maintain, can "best "be obtained by providing a geographical basis for the state of affairs created by the Zurich and London agreements. In short, they wish to be physically separated from the Greek community* Their first inclination was to seek this separation through the outright physical partitioning of Cyprus between the Turkish and Greek nations, of which in their opinion the Turkish and Greek communities constitute an extension. However, "considering that this would not be willingly agreed to by Greece and Gypriot-Greeks", they have modified this concept to that of creating a Federal State over the physical separation of the two communities*

57. The principles of a Constitution for such a Federal State are set out in Annex II, They envisage "a compulsory exchange of population" in order to bring about a state of affairs in which each community would accupy a separate part of the island. The dividing line is in fact suggested : to run from the village of Yalia on the north-western coast through the towns of Nicosia in the centre, and "Famagusta, in the east. An exchange of about 10,000 Greek families for about the same number of Turkish families is contemplated*

58. Each of the two separate communal areas would enjoy self- government in all matters falling outside Federal affairs. Each could have cultural and economic relations directly with Greece or Turkey as the case might be»

•••/**• - 31 -

59. To the federal authorities would "be reserved the subjects of foreign affairs, defence, the federal budget, customs, commerce, "banking, currency, standards of measurement, nationality, passport matters, post and telecommunications services and criminal legislation and jurisdiction. The federal legislature would consist of a House of Representatives composed of 30 per cent Turkish and 70 per cent Greek community representatives, and a Senate divided equally between the two* The federal President and Vice-President would be elected by the Greek and Turkish communities respectively. The 30-70 ratio would be maintained for the Council of Ministers and the Public Service, and the 40-60 ratio for a small federal army and a police force for customs, traffic and tourist affairs*

60. Among other general principles reflecting those of the existing Constitution, the union of the Federal Republic with another State, or the partitioning of the island, would be prohibited under national and international undertakings. The provisions of the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee would continue to form an integral part of the Constitution.

The other parties

61. Of the other parties whom my terms of reference require me to consult, the Government of Greece gave me to understand, and indeed has made public its views,-/that it considers the Zurich and London agreements to have proved in practice to be

I/ Statement by Premier George A. Papandreou, Prime Ministerrs Office, Athens, 13 April 1964* - 32 -

unworkable. In its view, the only possible and lasting solution is the application of the principles of international justice and of true democracy, with the full safeguarding of the right of the majority to rule and of the minority to criticize. In addition, on account of the special conditions of the case, and in order that there should be no fear of any possible abuse of the power of the majority, it would be possible to arrange that the rights of the Turkish minority should be safeguarded by the United Nations. The Government stated further that full and untrammelled independence allowing the Cyjariot people in free exercise of their sovereign rights to decide their future was the only solution.

62. The Government of Turkey, for its part, indicated to me that it considered a solution to the Cyprus problem to lie along the lines of a federated State, and it communicated to me an informal note containing general principles similar to those which I have referred to above in dealing with the position of the Turkish-Gypriot community.

63* The Government of the United Kingdom indicated to me its support for my endeavours to help to promote a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem, in accordance with my terms of reference, and its desire to support such a settlement. - 33 -

PART IV - CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS

Incompatibility of the parties' views

64. Between the extreme and rigid positions held throughout this period "by the leaders of the Greek-Cypriot community on the one side and those of the Turkish-Cypriot community on the other concerning the future of their country, I regret to report that it has not "been possible for the two sides to find sufficient common ground to provide a "basis for discussion. They have chosen to adhere to "solutions" that are wholly irreconcilable, because their points of departure are entirely different; and, at least under the prevailing circumstances, they have chosen not even to meet together to discuss their differences*

65» In essence, the Turkish-Gypriot representatives see Cyprus as an island off the shores of Turkey and themselves as an extension to it of the Turkish population. They tend to regard it as a country which has become a State but not a nation, and has become so by the deliberate design which is represented by the Zurich and London agreements and the Constitution and Treaties based upon those agreements* They point to this design, and to the unique character which it gives to the Constitution, as proof that their people in Cyprus are recognized as constituting not a minority in the ordinary sense of the word, but one of two distinct and - 34 - separate communities, neither of which has supremacy over the other in matters of fundamental concern. And they claim, in the light of recent events, that the only feasible way of maintaining "both the identity of their community and a real guarantee of the safety of the persons and property of its members is that they should "be physically separated from the Greek-Gypriot community.

66« In presenting this argument the Turkish-Gypriots declare themselves to have renounced previous demands for the most radical kind of separation — namely, the partitioning of the island between Greeks and Turks in a way that would permit either or both parts of it to unite with the respective "homeland", ttat is to say, Greece or Turkey as the case may be. They have substituted for this the conception of geographical separation of the communities under the umbrella of a federal type of Constitution*

6?» On the Greek-Cypriot side there is clearly a strong body of opinion which similarly sees the Greek community as an extension of the population of Greece, and which has not renounced the conception of Enosis, or union with Greece, as the final solution. The similarity, such as it is, ends there : for the proponents of Enosis envisage the whole of the island and its population being unified with Greece, and they flatly reject partition, on the grounds that the whole of Cyprus is a Greek island* - 35 -

68. In any event the general principles put forward officially "by the Greek-Cypriot leaders do not refer specifically to Enosis. On the other hand, they do not close the door to it. The insistence that the people of Cyprus should "be entitled "to decide the future of their country on the "basis of the internationally accepted principle of self-determination", and the intention to avoid any inhibitions such as the Treaty of Guarantee imposes against "either union with any other State or partition of the Island," obviously would leave the way open to union with G-reece if that should "be the wish of ffn.e majority of the citizens. Whether that would indeed "be their wish is not a matter for me to speculate upon; "but'it is certainly a possibility on which the Turkish-Cypriot representatives largely paEtijc base their objections to the Greek-Cypriot conception of a basis for settlement.

69 • Likewise, the official Greek-Cypriot attitude towards the Turkish idea of a federal republic is that this would be a confederation rather than a federation, and would lead eventually Sf to the "annexation" by Turkey of the Turkish area of Cyprus* Since the Turkish conception of federation includes the maintenance of the Treaty of Guarantee — and therefore the prohibition against union or partition — this attitude can hardly be said to argue the point in a serious way. However, the Greek-Gypriots have other and more substantial arguments against a formula which must involve the compulsory movement

•*«/••* - 36 -

of people and require the solution of formidable economic and social problems. Even if they did not, the combination of the geographical splitting of the island with a federal constitution retaining most of what they regard as the objectionable features of the existing constitution would take Cyprus, in their view, in exactly the opposite direction from the one in which they seek to go,

70. From all the evidence at my disposal and from all the arguments adduced before me by either side, I have come to the conclusion that the possible basis for an agreed solution lies neither in the federal regime suggested by one community nor in the system of what might be called "uninhibited democracy" suggested by the other. It does not fall to me to 4udSe the merits of either case : the plain fact is that neither side is prepared to accept the otherrs view as a basis for discussion, and without an agreed basis for. discussion there can be no agreed solution. Other possibilities have been mentioned, notably those of an exchange of territories and/or populations between Cyprus, Greece and/or Turkey, all of them designed to convert the population of Cyprus into one of virtually purely Greek extraction. Hone of these ideas has been put forward, however, by any of the parties directly concerned; they,all have inherent objections, especially in regard to the compulsory movement of peoples; and I do not see in them any realistic basis for a solution*

*••/•**• 37

Proposals for action

71• We are confronted, therefore, with an impasse in the political situation in Cyprus. Earlier in this report I have drawn attention £o the day-to-day circumstances in which this situation has developed, and I cannot emphasize too strongly how gravely these circumstances have affected the capacity of e'ach side to think seriously a"bout the future of their country* The political attitudes of the leaders of "both communities have rested too heavily upon and in fact have been made rigid toy their quasi-military postures* Regrettably but clearly, an influential body of Greek-Cypriot opinion believes that the Greek-Gypriots have achieved a better bargaining position vis-a-vis the Turkish community — and also the international community — than they have enjoyed before, and there is a deplorable determination to maintain and even increase this political advantage by improving their armed forces. The pretext commonly put forward is that Turkey has not renounced its right to unilateral intervention and that the Greek-Gypriots must therefore continue to prepare themselves against such intervention, which would find its natural allies in the Turkish-Cypriot community. The latter on their side justify their own military measures on the grounds that they are being besieged by the Greek-Gypriots; at the same time they have been encouraged to believe that Turkish intervention is justified by the Treaty of Guarantee and that it may yet take

#••/»•• - 38 - place; and these considerations purport to oblige them not to retreat in the slightest from their present attitude towards a political solution,

72. This deadlock must "be broken. I am confident that it can be, by the combined effect of a number of factors : your own appeals and those of the Security Council to all parties concerned to exercise the utmost restraint; the further success of the United Nations Force in developing the techniques and confidence necessary to stop the shooting and to help to restore an atmosphere of security; the further efforts of your Special Representative towards the interim objectives which you have proposed, including the imperative need to disarm the irregulars on both sides; and new initiatives of mediation that I now propose to take.

73. My intention, in summary, is as follows: (a) to propose and negotiate an agreement that the parties concerned should return, immediately but as a purely transitional measure and under the presence and supervision of the United Nations, to the full application of the • existing Constitution; (b) to propose to the parties a set of general principles and guidelines as the basis for discussion between them, with the assistance of the Mediator, of an acceptable formula for the solution of the problem of Cyprus. - 39 -

Return to the existing Constitution

74* There is only one instrument which can serve "both as the foundation of a full restoration of; order and the rule of law in Cyprus, and as the starting point for the negotiation of an agreed settlement* That instrument is the existing Constitution of the Republic, and the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance which form integral parts of the Constitution.

75» However short the Constitution falls of providing a suitable permanent framework for the peaceful life of the people of Cyprus, and however much it has been distorted and misused in recent times, for the United Nations there can be no doubt whatever that it remains legally in force. Both parties must be made to understand and accept that there can be no return to the law and order expected by the Security Council unless there is a return to the Constitution. The absolute necessity for this transcends their political differences. Nor are they being asked to turn back the clock of history to the positions from which they plunged themselves into violent hostility* The full application of the Constitution will this time take place in unique and special circumstances : that is to say, in the presence of the United Nations and, I strongly recommend, under its close supervision* - 40 -

76. The Constitution and the Treaty of Guarantee have never "been suspended, abrogated or amended in any other way. The conditions under which this can be done are perfectly clear, and they have not until now "been fulfilled. As far as the Constitution proper is concerned, they are determined by Article 182, This deals with the provisions of the Constitution in two distinct groups. In the first group there are those articles, or parts of articles, which derived from the Zurich Agreement and were specifically designated as "Basic Articles"; under Article 182 (which is itself a "Basic Article"), they "cannot, in any way, be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal". The second group consists of the remaining provisions of the Constitution; these may be amended by means of a law passed by a majority vote comprising at least two-thirds of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives belonging to the Greek community and at least two-thirds of those belonging to the Turkish community, R« such law has ever been passed. It should be noted, in any event, that it is the "Basic Articles" which in fact govern the structure of the Republic? and that these are entrenched in the Constitution*

77 • IPurthermore, the Treaty of Guarantee signed on the one hand by the Government of Cyprus and on the other hand by the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, contains in its first article a commitment on the part of Cyprus to

•*•/••* - 41 - ensure "respect for its constitution". And this provision carries, under the Constitution itself, the "constitutional force" of a "Basic Article" (Art. 181),

78. .-. In the present situation of Cyprust the Head of State and the Government established on the "basis of the Constitution have continued to exercise the powers conferred on them "by it, even if, "because of the circumstances, they have not done so in full respect for the provisions of the Constitution as a whole. At no time, to my knowledge, has this fact "been questioned "by either the President or the Government. On the contrary, they have on several occasions criticized the Vice—President and the Turkish-Cypriot Ministers (who for their part maintain that, for the sake of security, they must stay on the Turkish side of the "green line" in Nicosia) for not having carried out their constitutional responsibilities; and they have described themselves as obliged, "because of this failure, to put Greek-Cypriot Ministers in charge, ad interim, of the Turkish Ministers' functions — Tout not to replace them, which the Constitution would not permit*

79 • In other respects, too, the President and the Government have endeavoured, at least formally, to do as little harm as possible to the Constitutional provisions. It is true that the Government haS purported to abrogate the Treaty of Alliance : its right to do so is at least open to argument, and in my view it is an argument which should be presented to an -42 - international tribunal. But the integrity of the Constitution, and — from the point of view of the rule of law within the country — the more important Treaty of Guarantee, remains intact. It can be said that the constitutional regime has been distorted or suspended in certain respects, but only temporarily and only because of the force of circumstances*

It is imperative that this temporary disruption should be brought quickly to an end. The Turkish Vice-President and the Turkish Ministers, the Turkish members of the House of Representatives and the Turkish officials of the Public Service must be enabled to resume their functions. All other organs of the Republic must be enabled, progressively and promptly, to return to their normal operations*

81* There will be difficulties in bringing this about. There will be special difficulties in regard to the police and the other security forces. But in a spirit of reason and responsibility they can be surmounted. And the United Nations Force and its civilian officers should provide the security and the supervision needed to get the life of the Republic moving peacefully again*

Towards a new Constitution

82* The present Constitution, however, is clearly inadequate to the unique character of Cyprus and its people, and the only purpose of a return to its full application can be to - 43 - restore the rule of law while the parties concerned are helped to find a new basis on which to "build their future.

83. Before I give my own suggestions as to the principles on which this new "basis may be sought, I think it useful to examine the question of the procedure to be followed in modifying the present Constitution. I have already indicated that the ordinary articles of the Constitution can be amended by the House of Representatives according to the procedure laid down in the Constitution itself. The real difficulty arises in the case of modifying "the basic articles", which are fundamental to the constitutional regime and which clearly will have to be amended for the purpose of a long-term solution of the problem of Cyprus. The Constitution itself forbids any modification of these articles. However, this prohibition stems in the first place from international agreements, namely the Zurich and London Agreements, confirmed by the Treaties signed at Nicosia, and in particular the Treaty of Guarantee, which is its§.f incorporated into the Constitution,

84* According to the rules of international law it can be agreed that these agrements and treaties, which in fact constitute a whole, can at any time be modified by a new agreement among the same parties, i.e. the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey- and the United Kingdom. At the same time it must not be overlooked that the Zurich and London agreements > were also signed by Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kuchuk, acting - 44 - as representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities respectively, at a time when the Republic of Cyprus did not exist. For this reason it would appear necessary that the signature of a representative of the Republic of Cyprus to a new agreement should be authorized "by the qualified representatives of the two communities.

85* There remains the question of internal law. Since the Constitution prohibits absolutely any modification of the "Basic Articles", any such modification might be considered to be a violation of the Constitution. The redeeming fact, however, is that the juridical basis of the prohibition against amendment arises from an external source, namely the agreements and treaties mentioned above. Therefore, if these treaties were to disappear or be amended, it could be considered that the relevant provisions of the Constitution had been deprived of their basis, and that this would also allow "basic articles" to be amended. By analogy the same procedure of amendment as for the ordinary articles could then be followed*

86, Taking the foregoing into account the most appropriate procedure might take three stages. In the first stage proposals for an amendment of the existing constitution or an entirely new constitution could be formulated by some ad hoc procedure agreed upon by the representatives of the two communities and, if they so wish, under the auspices of the Mediator. The second

»•*/••» - 45 - stage would be to negotiate, among the four Governments which signed the existing treaties, a new international agreement authorizing the amendment of the Constitution, and, as far as this may be necessary, defining on some new basis the future relationships between the Republic and the three other countries. In the third phase the House of Representatives would adopt the new constitution, or the amendments to the existing one, in conformity with the procedure 'laid down in Article 182.

87 • It may also happen that the need will arise to enact detailed legislation in certain fields in order to assure most effectively the protection of the smaller of the two communities, The existing Constitution, in fact, envisages such legislation particularly in the field of the Public Service, the armed forces and the municipalities. It might therefore be agreed that these laws could be drafted and enacted during the interim period before the amendment of the Constitution, so that the body of law would be complete from the moment when the political life of the country could start again on a new basis. These laws could be designated as "fundamental" or "organic" legislation, whose amendments would require the same procedure as for amendments to the Constitution itself*

88. If it should be considered desirable, a final step in the approval of the Constitution could take the form of a refe- « rendunu This could take place after the House of Representa- tives had voted the Constitution.

• • • /# • * - 46 -

A suggested basis for discussion

89« In considering what general principles and guidelines might "be put to the parties as a basis for discussion by them towards an agreed solution, I have had to take many factors into account. These include not only the actual positions taken by the parties and the apparent reasons for those positions, but also those elements which the Security Council has recommended as being necessary to "a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem". To refer again to the resolution of 4 March 1964: the solution should be in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; it should take into account the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole; and it should contribute to the preservation of international peace and security,

90. Setting these criteria against the recent history and present circumstances of Cyprus and its people, I have concluded that any acceptable basis for a solution must have the following main characteristics: •- it must safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus; - it must reassure all citizens of the country as to the security of their persons and property and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms;

•••/•** - 47 -

- it should recognize the distinct cultural differences "between the two main communities and not force upon them a premature measure of integration, but at the same time it should not preclude the progressive development of closer relations "between them and the evolution of a political regime in which the need for political distinction between them will become less and less;

- accordingly, while not perpetuating the artificial constitutional and political devices which have caused difficulties in the past, it must be capable of satisfying each community of a fair share in the affairs of government;

- it must satisfy Greece and Turkey, as the two other parties most directly concerned with the problem, that it will help to restore and maintain friendly relations between them,

91* The problem is to devise a set of principles and guidelines to meet the foregoing requirements* And the crux of this problem is the difficulty of reconciling the present separate nature of the cultures and lives of the two communities, which has been made more acute in the last few months, with the desirability of fostering a more democratic existence for the population as a whole. There is a double danger of error* The .mistake may be made on the side of caution, by contriving too intricate and rigid a series of constitutional devices, as the results of the Zurich and London agreements have shown.

*••/••• But it is equally possible to err on the side of an unrestricted application of the principle of majority rule, which could lead the smaller of the two communities to fear — with justification in the light of recent events — that they would be numerically overwhelmed "by the larger one and that this would expose them to discriminatory treatment* Besides the injustice of such treatment, there would "be a risk of setting "back even further any hope of the development of enlightened relationships "between Greek and Turkish Cypriote.

92, In the principles and guidelines set out "below, I have sought to help the parties concerned to avoid these dangers, Among the aspects to which I attach particular importance, I have suggested that they should agree to a large emphasis on practical safeguards of human rights and non-discrimination, "by the use of new institutions and also "by the continuation, at least temporarily, of certain forms of United Nations presence. The recent history of Cyprus has in my opinion made such special measures absolutely necessary for the security and just treatment of all its citizens and, I am "bound to say, of those who belong to the smaller community in particular* I have also suggested a new form of control of the police, as well as a decentralization of certain police and other responsibilities to the district and municipal levels, aimed at more direct participation by the communities in their own local affairs. I have thought also that the Turkish community may wish to continue to have a communal council*

»#»/•»# - 49 -

93« As far as concerns the central organs of government, I have suggested that the Republic might continue to have a President and a Yice-President, one to "be Greek and the other Turkish; and I also see a need to maintain some minimum ratio of Turkish to Greek Cyp riots in the Public Service. At the same time, however, I have suggested that the parties should consider the desirability of having a political system in which the Government would be answerable to the Parliament and the Parliament would be elected from a common roll, using a. system of proportional representation which would naturally assure both communities of adequate representation. The special merit of this latter system, as I see it, would be that it would not preclude a more healthy political life in the future, when political movements would find themselves crossing the present line between the two communities*

Among several other points, I have also suggested the desirability of enacting organic statutes on certain subjects; and the usefulness of negotiating a new treaty of friendship and good-neighbourliness between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey in place of the existing Treaty of Guarantee* I have appended to my suggestions a list of the legal texts which would need to be prepared if my suggestions are accepted by the parties, and a schedule of the various steps which would need to be t taken* - 50 -

95* I attach importance to the question of the procedure of amendments to the future constitution. To avoid the difficulties existing in the case of the present Constitution, the parties should contemplate including in the future text provisions which will allow it to "be changed in the light of circumstances and the normal evolution of the political system*

At the same time, howevert there should be safeguards to prevent such constitutional guarantees as may "be assured to the smaller community from being abolished by a unilateral vote of the larger community. It would be a question of devising a guarantee according to which the Constitution could not be modified except by a regular procedure determined by the Constitution itself* If an international guarantee of respect for the Constitution also needs to be given, it should take a different form from that provided in I960, Such a guarantee would, in my opinion, be much more effective if given by the United Nations rather than by foreign governments. The United Nations would have better opportunity than an individual state to introduce an appropriate procedure to ensure the practical application of the guarantee.

96, Moreover, it would in general be wise to abandon for the present the absolute prohibition against the amendment of certain articles of the Constitution, At the most this prohibition might be maintained only for one or two fundamental provisions. The suggestions which I give in the guidelines take this view into account* - 51 -

97* My suggestions as a whole are set out below:

A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

(i) Cyprus, as an independent and sovereign State and a Member of the United Nations, has the right to decide upon its constitution and its future, with due respect for. the Charter of the United Nations, for international law and for the treaties by which it is bound,

(ii) The population of Cyprus is composed of two main communities of different national origin and culture, unequal in numerical strength and living on the same territory. In view of this special situation neither of them has acquired the right to dispose of the future of the country without the agreement of the other*

(iii) In accordance with democratic principles, the political majority is entitled to rule the country, ,with respect for the rights of the political minority*

(iv) Each community is entitled to preserve its distinctive character and accordingly to enjoy rights of self-administration in matters of special concern to .it. Furthermore, in view of the circumstances now prevailing in the country, the less numerous community must be given special safeguards for the security of its members and their fair participation - 52 -

in political life, in addition to the human rights and fundamental freedoms that must be granted for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

(v) The gravity of the recent political crisis and of the disturbances which accompanied it has shown the desirability of reshaping the constitution on the lines of the principles stated above. Until the constitution is amended or replaced, however, it remains valid. The complete restoration of law and order requires that it be applied until the new or amended constitution enters into force*

(vi) The present constitution, having been enacted in accordance with treaties incorporated in it and still in force, can only be amended with respect for the international obligations deriving from these treaties and in conformity with the principles governing the procedure established by the constitution for its amendment: that is to say, with the agreement of the other signatories and the concurrence of the demo- cratically elected representatives of the two communities*

*••/*** - 53 -

(vii) The continuation., abrogation or replacement of the treaties presently in force can only be determined by agreement between their signatories* If the question of the validity of the Treaty of Alliance cannot otherwise be settled, it should be referred to the International Court of Justice for judgment.

(viii) Grave tension and mistrust between the two communities have resulted from the events of recent months. This renders necessary the special assistance of the United Nations for a transitional period with a view to the full restoration of trust and cooperation among all members of the Oypriot people. This special assistance would be provided, inter alia, bjr a commission of three members, entitled to receive petitions and investigate them; to examine with the parties concerned and help to conciliate any difficulties arising from the implementation of the Constitution; to make representations, as appropriate, to the Government of Cyprus; and to report periodically to the Secretary- General.

B. GUIDELINES FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION (i) Preamble a» Affirmation of the supremacy of the Charter of the •'• • United Nations, specifically in the fields of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,

* » • / * • • - 54 -

b* Maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic.

c. Declaration of intention to carry out a peaceful policy in conformity with international law and with a view to maintaining friendly and good- neighbourly relations with other States.

(ii) Human rights and fundamental freedoms

a. Description of the rights to "be granted and affirmation of the principle of non-discrimination.

b, Administration of justice : — the Subordinate Courts to be unified; — a Supreme Court to be established:- Oornposition : — a president appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice (or the President of the European Court of Human Rights); — Judges jointly appointed by the President and Vice-President of the Republic; - guarantees of independence for judges. Chambers; The Supreme Court to have three Chambers:- - the Constitutional Chamber, composed of the President, one Turkish judge, one Greek judge; - 55 -

- the Chamber of Appeal, composed of three judges posted to it "by the President; - the Administrative Chamber, composed of three judges posted to it by the President; - if an ombudsman (see below) requires it for the judgment of a case, the judges of the Chamber of Appeal and of the Administrative Chamber to be composed of one Greek and one Turkish judge and the President of the Court* c» Two ombudsmen, one G-reek 'and one Turkish, to be appointed by the House of Representatives, each nominated by the representatives of his community; the ombudsmen to be empowered: — to investigate any situation giving rise to criticism on the ground of discrimination or unfair treatment, and to try to settle it; - to bring any case before the Court and present conclusions on it; - to have the right to present conclusions in any other case, with the permission of the President; provided that, if both ombudsmen require such permission, their conclusions must be jointly made or they must renounce the right; - to maintain contact with the United Nations Commission*.

*•»/• •» - 56 -

d* The Republic to make the declarations provided by the European Convention on Human Rights (articles 25 and 46) with a view to accepting the jurisdiction of the European Convention for individual recourses and the obligatory jurisdiction of the European Court.

(iii) Political Regime a*. It is for the Cyprus people to decide what kind of political regime they wish to have* Since the Cyprus society is a pluralist one, however, preference should be given to a parliamentary regime, where the government would be answerable to Parliament*

b. The Republic to have a President and a Vice- President, it ibeing understood that one of them must be Greek and the other Turkish; the Vice—President having the right to replace the President in case of absence or vacancy. The President to have the competence of a Head of State, but to be required to take some decisions jointly with the Vice-President, particularly in regard to the appointment of Ministers and of senior public servants and in regard to the exercise of the right of mercy.

*••/••• - 57 -

c» Electoral legislation: - to be established by an organic statute; - the elections to take place on the basis of a common role; - the electoral system and the constituencies to be defined with a view to ensuring the right of the minority to representation in a proportion at least equal to its numerical strength, and without being overwhelmed by the majority in the choice of its representatives*

(iv) Admini s trati on a* Police: - all police forces to be administered by a Police Commission under the authority of the Prime Minister, without any interference by the Minister of Interior, if there is to be such a Minister. The Commission to be composed equally of Turkish and Greek Cypriot members, presided

over for a transitional period by a person put at the disposal of the Cyprus Government by the United Nations; - As far as the activity of the police is concerned, the police forces to be divided according to districts and placed under the authority of the District Commissioner;

**•/•** - 58 -

- in the main towns, the municipal police to "be employed under the authority of the municipality;

— the criminal police to act under the authority of the Attorney-General* b* Administration of the districts: — all the administrative services functioning in a district to "be placed under the authority of a District Commissioner, assisted by a council elected by means of proportional repr e s ent at i on;

— an organic statute to define the districts and to determine in which districts the District Commissioner should be Turkish (or to fix a certain percentage of Turkish District Commissioners). c* The municipal administration: - the principles of the municipal administration to be established by an organic statute;

-the main towns to be divided into several sectors, each with municipal organs elected by proportional representation and having authority over the local services and municipal police;

- each town as a whole to be administered by a town council elected by proportional representation; the council to have authority over - 59 -

the services of common interest and. to "be entitled to impose taxes and distribute the revenues among the sectors in proportion to the strength of their respective populations; — the members of each town council to have a right of individual recourse against decisions of the council before the Administrative Chamber, in cases of alleged discrimination; - other towns and villages to be administered by councils, these to be elected by proportional representation in mixed areas, d, Public Service:

- a Public Service Commission to be established with a fair representation of both communities, but the number of its members to be less than that of the existing Commission. It should be presided over by a judge to be chosen from among the members of the Supreme Court; - a technical adviser provided by the United Nations to be appointed as a member of the Public Service Commission for a temporary period; - the participation of the communities in the Public Service to be assured by means of a ratio and by an equitable distribution of posts. The number of posts filled by members of the smaller community to comprise not less than 20 per cent of the total. .- 60 -

(v) Education, religion and personal status a» A Turkish. Communal Council to "be elected by an electoral "body composed of all the persons of Turkish origin who are members of the House of Representatives, of the municipal and town ] councils, and of the district councils. Except for the legislative power, the Communal Council to have the same power^ and competence as the present Communal Chambers. It should be empowered to impose personal taxes and fees on members of its community within the limits established by an organic statute,

b» Special provisions to be enacted concerning the ? composition of the Courts for the judgment of cases relating to questions of personal status or religion,

c* The schools to be administered in the same way as under the present Constitution, except for the competence of the commission of cultural cooperation,

d« A commission of cultural cooperation to be composed of an equal number of qualified personalities belonging to each of the two communities. This commission to have its own budget, provided by a State subsidy. It would have the ~ 61 -

right to receive gifts and subsidies (including, with the authorization of the Governmentj assistance from international organisations and foreign governments). The commission should have a consultative function and rights of initiative. It would advise the government in cultural matters* It should advise the school authorities, particularly on questions of text-"books, curricula and syllabi. It should encourage all private and public activities and organizations aimed at improving friendly relations and mutual understanding between the two communities. It should act against any propaganda aimed at or having the effect of setting one community against the other. The commission could be the National Cyprus Commission of UNESCO, and UNESCO could be asked to undertake a programme of technical assistance for the improvement of the cultural relations between the two communities,

(vii) General provisions a* Provisions to be established in the Constitution in order to guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic*

•»•/»»* - 62 - b» Provisions to be established to regulate the questions of languages (English, could be an optional working language), the flag, the national anthem and holidays*

c« Amendments to the Constitution: - the Constitution to "be amended "by a statute adopted Toy the House of Representatives by a two-thirds majority; provided that for the articles relating to the rights of a community, no amendment could be adopted against the vote, of the majority of the representatives of the community concerned?; - the organic statutes should be modified only according to the above procedure.

d» International law to prevail over domestic laws - treaties to be declared immediately enforceable in domestic law, even if they provide for transfers of sovereignty; - the Republic to accept the procedures of peaceful settlement of international disputes (obligatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, the European Convention on the peaceful settlement of international disputes)« - 63 -

(vii) Transitory provisions a* With, a view to the appeasement of minds and the improvement of relations "between the two communities, the Republic should undertake to submit, for conciliation, to a commission to be appointed by the United Nations, any difficulties which might arise from the implementation of the Constitution and pertaining to the relations between the two communities, whenever it has been impossible to settle these difficulties by the application of the procedures provided for in the Constitution, b. When all arms held irregularly by individuals have been surrendered, the bearing and possession of arms should be strictly prohibited, as also the setting up of military or para-military formations - other than those provided for by law. ' c* A general amnesty should be declared for all offenses committed in relation to the abnormal events since December 1963* The Public Servants to be re-integrated; this measure to include all police officers, except if they have coimiitted crimes*

•*•/*•• - 64 -

d* A commission on civil reparations to be set up with the assistance of the United Nations* This commission should be empowered to? — examine claims made in connexion with damages and losses caused during the eventsj - draw up an inventory of the damages and losses and establish,a plan of indemnification; - facilitate the resettlement of refugees and any voluntary transfers of population,

C, LEGAL TEXTS TO BE PREPARED

(i) The Constitution*

(ii) Organic statutes, which should contain only the outline or guidelines of the legislation concerned. These organic statutes should be prepared and enacted for the electoral law, the district administration, the municipal administration and personal taxes and fee® in the matter of school and religion*

(iii) Treaties* a« The Treaty of Guarantee, and possibly the Treaty of Alliance, should be replaced by a treaty of friendship and good-neighbourliness between Cyprus, Turkey and Greece*

**»/••* - 65 -

This Treaty of friendship and good-neigh"bourliness should contain: - a renunciation of intention to "bring about any union or partition of the island; - a pledge of non-aggression, and, possibly, on the part of Cyprus, a pledge of disarmament; (the treaty should also provide for the maintenance or the suppression of the Turkish and Greek contingents on the territory of Cyprus); — a machinery to maintain close relations between the three parties by regular consultations and other means; - financial assistance from Greece and Turkey for any voluntary transfer of population outside the island; - a procedure for settlement of disputes which could arise from the implementation of the treaty, b* Cultural agreements between Cyprus and Greece and Cyprus and Turkey*

c.« Agreements with the United Nations concerning the United Nations Commission, any special technical assistance, and the temporary maintenance of a civilian police force.

»•«/*•• t /

- 66 -

D. SCHEDULE FOR STEPS TO BE TAKEN

(i) A round-table conference "between the representatives of the four Governments and of the two communities, under the chairmanship of the Mediator, Its task would be:

- to approve the general principles of the settlement;

— to approve the guidelines that the President and Vice-President of the Republic would give to a Constitutional Commission;

- possibly to prepare the work of the inter-governmental conference (see below).

(ii) a* The Constitutional Commission, established by the House of Representatives, and sitting with the assistance of the Mediator or his representative, to prepare a draft of a new constitution*

b. The House of Representatives, at the same time, to adopt the organic statutes.

(iii) An inter-governmental conference to approve and sign the treaties which would replace the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance* - 67 -

(iv) a* The House of Representatives to adopt the new Constitution in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 182, and to auth orize the Government to ratify treaties,

ID, Ratification of the treaties and promulgation of the Constitution*

(v) Elections to "be held in conformity with the new Constitution and the new electoral law* UNITED NATIONS NATIONS U N I E S

Geneva, 28 August 1964

Dear Sir,

As you know, the serious illness by which the Mediator was stricken at Geneva on 16 August 1964 has prevented him from actively resuming his mission, and our advice from the doctors attending him is that even in the best possible circumstances he would not be able to do so for many weeks, if not months. You will also recall that the Mediators terms of reference, as set out in the Security Council's Resolution of 4 March 1964, require him to report periodically on his efforts to the Secretary-general. He had accordingly kept you informed, by correspondence and personal consultations, of each principal phase of his activities. During the last few weeks before his illness, he had also concluded, in consultation with us as his advisers, that the point was approaching at which he would have felt it appropriate to submit to you, and through you to the parties concerned, a comprehensive report which would contain his own proposals for the basis on which a settlement of the Cyprus question could and should be negotiated. Whether and when he should formally submit such a report to you, however, still depended at the time of his illness on two main considerations ; firstly, the advice which he intended to seek from you on the matter during your visit to Geneva at the end of August, and, secondly, the outcome of the talks which have been taking place in Geneva since early July. On this second point, he had made it clear that he would not have wished to prejudice the outcome of the "Geneva talks" by submitting, while they were still going on, any alternative proposals of his own. On the contrary, his clear intention was that only in the event of the Geneva talks coming to an end through failure to achieve agreement would he recommend to you that he should submit a report containing

His Excellency TJ Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, NEW YORK. European Office of the United Nations - Office European des Nations Unies Page

his own proposals. He envisaged them as not necessarily leading to an immediate solution but as at least providing a basis for further negotiations among the parties, and a basis which, if need be, the General Assembly might also be inclined to encourage them to use in those negotiations. He intended to explain to you that all of the parties concerned have indicated to him at one time or another their belief that, should consultations fail to bring about an agreed basis for a solution of the Cyprus problem, it would be expected of him that he should put forward his own proposals. He would have been prepared, if that were your wish and that of the parties, to put himself at their disposal at the appropriate time in order to help the negotiations which he hoped would be based on his proposals.

Under the Mediator's instructions and in close consultation with him, his advisers had prepared for him the draft of his report. He had studied the draft on several occasions and indicated that in general and on all major points of substance it properly reflected his views. There were a few matters of detail among his actual recommendations to which it was agreed that further consideration should be given on return to Geneva from the projected visits to Athens, Ankara and Nicosia.

The draft was revised pending that final review. In its present form it represents our best understanding - and in all essential respects, we believe, an accurate understanding — of the views and intentions of the Mediator, in a form approved by him in every essential respect. Since it is now sadly improbable that the Mediator will be able to place on it his final stamp of approval, or, if necessary, to defend and explain his points of judgment and recommendations, we feel it our duty to present it to you as our most faithful possible expression of his thinking at the time he was taken ill, in the belief that it may still be of some use in the further efforts of the United Nations to help to solve the problem of Cyprus.

¥e therefore respectfully present to you the draft report.

Tours sincerely,

Political Adviser CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT REPORT TO TUB SECRETARY-GENERAL BY THE UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR ON CYPRUS

PART I - GENERAL

Introduction

1. In accordance with the resolution of the Security Council dated 4 March 19M, you designated me on 25 March as the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus, in agreement with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

2. After a brief visit to Headquarters for consultations I took up my duties in Cyprus on 2 April 19&4» My terms of reference as set out in the resolution mentioned above require me to report periodically to the Secretary-General on my efforts, As you know, I have kept you fully informed and consulted you from time to time on my activities. These have now reached a stage at which I feel it appropriate to submit a comprehensive report. In it I give an account of my activities; an outline of the circumstances prevailing in Cyprus which have had a bearing on my efforts at mediation; an explanation of the existing constitution and of the present approaches of the parties towards a settlement of the problem; and finally, my carefully considered conclusions and suggestions as to the next steps which should be taken*

Functions and activities

3» The function of the Mediator on Cyprus, in the terras of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 19&4, is to use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the

« • • * • / ~ 2 -

United Kingdom^ "for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security".

4* I conceived the first phase of my task to be that of securing the fullest possible understanding and appreciation of the Cyprus problem as it now stands; of the historical, political and other circumstances under which, in years of calm as well as in periods of disturbance, the problem has developed; of the opinions of the parties concerned, both internal and external, as to the roots of the problem; of their aspirations for the future, and of the means by which they believe that these aspirations can be achieved in a manner which will accord with the considerations set forth in my terms of reference,

5* To that end I based myself in Cyprus for the first two months of my mission. I had a very large number of discussions with members and officials of the Government of Cyprus and with other representatives, both official and unofficial, of the Greek- Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities. These included, on the official side, the President of the Republic, the Vice-President, the members of the Council of Ministers, the leaders and members of the House of Representatives and of the Greek and Turkish Communal Chambers, judges of the courts and senior public servants, On the non-official side my talks were with delegations from commercial, professional and other societies and interests and with a large number of individual citizens.

6« Since my mandate required me to apply my endeavours also to the three external Governments which have been directly concerned with the problem of Cyprus, I also visited the capitals of Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom. In Ankara (17-18 April and 4 June) I had meetings with the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other officials of the Government of Turkey; in Athens (26-27 April and 3 June) with His Majesty the King of Greece, his Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and other officials; and in London (30 April, 4 May and 12 June) with the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Secretary and Deputy-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and other officials* I also maintained frequent contacts with the diplomatic representatives of those countries in Cyprus. In addition, and in view of the wider international interest in the Cyprus problem signified "by the present action of the United Nations on it, I made myself available for consultations, as appropriate, with the diplomatic representatives of other States.

7* Although, as you know, my mission was quite separate from that of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, whose creation was also authorized by the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964j I felt it necessary while in Cyprus to maintain close relations with the Force Commander. This was because the progress made by the Force, as well as the difficulties encountered by it, in carrying out its functions of helping to prevent a recurrence of fighting and to contribute to the maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions, self-evidently bore directly on the problem of bringing about those circumstances in which the process of mediation could most fruitfully be undertaken. For similar reasons I also kept in touch with the Special Representative whom you designated on 11 May to help solve the non-military problems of the immediate situation.

8. At the beginning of July, after further consultations at United Nations Headquarters and elsewhere with yourself and, among others, the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey and representatives of the United Kingdom and Cyprus, I undertook at the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva a further series of talks with representatives of the parties concerned. The Governments of - 4 -

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom appointed special representatives for this purpose. I also had meetings there with the Foreign Minister of Cyprus and the Minister of Defence, one of the Turkish Cypriot members of the Council of Ministers, and I had an understanding with them that the authorities whom they represent would arrange further visits to Geneva by their representatives as and when required or alternatively that I myself would return to Cyprus for further talks with them.

9» My endeavours in Geneva covered the period from 5 July 1964 to the present date.

10. In all of the consultations and relationships which I have outlined above, I have'unfailingly encountered the utmost courtesy and goodwill, for which I express my gratitude,

The general situation in Cyprus

11• What I have to report on the aspirations of the parties concerned and on the prospects of finding common ground between them as a basis for agreement can be fully appreciated only against an understanding of the prevailing situation in Cyprus. Your reports to the Security Council, with particular reference to the functions and operations of the United Nations Peace- keeping Force, have set out the facts of the situation as it has evolved over the past several months, and I shall only emphasize here those elements which seem to me to have borne directly and significantly on my own mission,

12, The normal conditions which might be regarded as conducive to, or even a prerequisite of, any successful effort to find an agreed settlement did not prevail in Cyprus at any time during the period upon which I am reporting. From the first day to the last, the most conspicuous fact of life in Cyprus was that large numbers of armed men, in and out of uniform and apparently under widely varying degrees of control, were facing one another

• • • • •/ -. 5 -

from fortified positions in many parts of the island. Their numbers had "been greatly increased and their armament greatly enlarged, especially on the Greek-Cypriot side, by the end of the period, While, as you have stated, the United Nations operation could claim no small credit for having contained several situations which might have led to major military clashes, almost every day of the period saw one or more incidents of one kind or another. These incidents, which as you know reached their peak of violence as recently as the first days of August, when they brought about intervention from outside, prolonged and compounded the atmosphere of tension, insecurity and fear which had seized many members of the population since the outbreak of disorder last December.

13* There have been two kinds of "green line" in Cyprus, and few people dared to cross either kind. There were firstly the physical "barriers, constructed out of road-blocks, strongpoints, fortified houses, sandbagged walls and trenches. These were the barriers which at many places in the island kept the two communities apart either by force or by the fear of arrest, abduction or gunfire. They prevented the normal flow of traffic for purposes of both business and pleasure, and became indeed, part of the machinery of what was regarded as an economic blockade by the

Greek-Cypriots against the Turkish-Cypriots. Thet/ curtailed the functioning of Government services and development plans. They prolonged the abandonment by many people of their houses, farms, businesses or jobs on one side or the other. And especially in Nicosia, the capital, the "green line" added a physical dimension to the breaking down of the Constitution: it barred, even if political motives alone might not have done so, the Turkish Vice- President and the Turkish Ministers from their offices and from meetings of the Cabinet, the elected Turkish parliamentarians from the sessions of the House of Representatives, and both Turkish- Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot public servants from their duties on the other side of the line. - 6 -

14« The second kind of "green line" was the psychological kind. The long months of life in a situation in which violence and the means of violence increased rather than diminished, and which placed the larger community increasingly in a mood and in a position to dominate the smaller, could only "breed distrust and intransigence where trust and compromise were needed if an agreed settlement were to be found. The physical impediments to normal contacts between the communities were serious enough; hardly less so was the psychological suppression of the healthy movement of ideas, and the substitution for it of slogans and counter-slogans shouted by propaganda machines across the dividing lines in uncompromising, provocative or hostile tones.

15* Tou will recall that when you formulated, with the assistance of the Force Commander, a programme of steps and objectives directed towards the restoration of freedom of movement and other immediate requirements for a return to normal conditions, you reported-'to the Security Council that "in the prevailing climate of mistrust and hostility, the communities concerned in the Cyprus problem are themselves often inhibited from taking the kinds of initiative which might lead to a substantial reduction of tension and conflict, and when proposals are put forth they are likely to be rejected, less on their merit than on the fact of their origin in one group or the other." l6« This same phenomenon which helped to delay a return to normal life in Cyprus worked with no less force, during the period of my report, against the prospects of a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem in the longer-term sense. There was no direct discussion between the parties of each other's proposals, and neither of them sought or would unequivocally agree to such a discussion. There was little calm and rational consideration by one party of the other's point of view. And there was the same tendency as you

I/ S/5671, para. 12. - 7 ~

described for one side to reject the other's proposals out of hand on the basis not of merit but of suspicion and mistrust, and to close the door even to a discussion of possible compromise lest it be taken as a sign of weakness*

17» It could hardly have been otherwise in a situation where the force of arms had openly been adopted by both sides as the principal instrument for the d'efence of their interests. In the capital, where most of those who claimed to lead opinion in both communities were gathered on one side and the other, the Turkish-Cypriots purported to regard themselves as being under actual siege by the Greek-Cypriots, and to feel obliged to place before everything else the armed protection and defence of their political claims as well as of their persons and property. The Greek-Cypriots, on their side, where since December they have in effect had exclusive control of the central organs of the Republic, continued to regard the other community in general as being in a condition of rebellion, with designs on the security of the State, and with the actual or potential support of military intervention from outside. Their decision towards the end of May, through the Greek members of the Council of Ministers, to bring about the enactment of a law to establish a national guard by means of conscription, and the subsequent large expansion of their forces, were openly "justified" on such grounds. The result on both sides was that their reliance on the force of arms served to make even more rigid the positions which they had taken on the political future of their country and even on the question of their ability to share it in peace. - 8 -

The external effects of the problem

18. It is necessary also to mention, although not to dwell upon, the effects of the continuing crisis in Cyprus on international relationships, and more particularly on those between the two external governments most directly concerned, namely those of Greece and Turkey. The special interests of each in the Cyprus problem and its solution, and the fact that each tended to support the position of the Cyprus comr- munity to which its own people were ethnically related, led to differences "between them hardly less acute than those which separated the Cyprus communities. I am glad to say, however, that these differences did not prevent the Governments of Greece and Turkey from making a serious effort, by exchanging views through me and through diplomatic channels, to find between them a basis for settlement capable of being supported by the other parties as well* I revert to this effort at a later point in my report. On the other hand, their differences were such as to make it impossible to persuade both governments to agree that their representatives should consult directly together, either with or without the presence of the Mediator. PART II - THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

The Zurich and London Agreements

19» The present Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, which dates from the first day of independence (16 August I960), has its roots in the agreements reached between the Heads of Govern- ments of Greece and Turkey at Zurich on 11 February 1959> which in turn were incorporated in the agreements reached between these Governments and that of the United Kingdom at London on 19 February of the same year. On that date also the representatives of the Greek-Cypriot community and of the Turkish-Cypriot community accepted the documents concerned, and accompanying declarations by the three Governments, as "the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus", Eventually these agreements were embodied in the Treaties and Constitution signed at Nicosia on 16 August I960, and thus became the legal framework for the independence of Cyprus.

20. I shall mention only briefly the circumstances which dictated those agreements. Although Cyprus was at the time a British colony, its arrival at independence did not follow the more familiar pattern of a territorial nationalist movement winning its sovereignty by negotiation with or by a struggle against the colonial power alone. The strongest internal political pressure, which led to armed revolt in 1955 ^n^ which had been that of the Greek-Cypriots, had been directed not at independence as such but rather at Enosis (union) with Greece. This had produced a counter- pressure from the side of the Turkish-Cypriots: in general, a resistance against the idea of Enosis, and eventually an insistence that the Turkish-Cypriot community had an equal right of union with Turkey, to be carried out by means of partitioning the country (Taksim). Thus not only the United Kingdom as the colonial power

.. * • •/ - 10 -

and also one with strategic interests in the island, but Greece and Turkey as well claimed a vital stake in the outcome. These interests "brought to the Cyprus question a complexity of issues going "beyond any immediate question of the well-being of the Cypriot people. These issues included, in particular, the relationships "between Greece and Turkey and between them and the United Kingdom? the future of the British bases, which involved not only British national interests but also those of the military alliance in which the three powers were associatedf the concern of Turkey, again from both a national and an international viewpoint, about the strategic aspects of the internal situation in an island close to her shores; and, by no means insignificant, the considerations of national honour, pride and other emotionally charged elements arising from the close ethnic ties between Greek and Greek-Cypriot and Turk and Turkish-Cypriot.

21 The settlement of 1959 envisaged Cyprus becoming a Republic with a regime especially adapted both to the ethnic composition of its population (approximately 80 per cent Greek and 18 per cent Turkish) and to what were recognized as special relationships between the Republic and the three other States concerned in the agreements. In the former respect, the agreements sought to recognize and preserve constitutionally a distinction between -li-

two communities and to maintain a certain balance between their respective rights and interests. In the latter respect, they were intended to provide, "by means of treaties, a multilateral guarantee of the maintenance of the state of affairs to be established by the basic articles of the proposed Constitution. Both the union of Cyprus with any other State and the partitioning of the island were expressly forbidden. The settlement also permitted the United Kingdom to retain sovereignty over two areas to be maintained as military bases*

Outline of the Constitution

22« It will be useful, in the light of later events and the positions taken by the parties concerned, to outline here the main characteristics of the Constitution which was eventually drafted within the rigid framework of the Zurich and London agreements, and which became effective on the date of the independence of the Republic. In essence, the Constitution consists of three main groups of provisions. The first group consists of those that recognize to each of the two communities a separate existence. The second consists of constitutional devices assuring the participation of each community in the exercise of the functions of Government, while seeking in a number of matters to avoid supremacy on the part of the larger (Greek-Cypriot) community, and assuring also a partial administrative autonomy to each community. The third main series of provisions constitutes a complex system of guarantees of the supremacy of the Constitution.

23* Thus, among the first group of provisions, the two distinct communities are identified (Art.l) and defined (Art.2) by the Constitution. An equal status is accorded to them in regard to the official languages of the Republic (Arts.3 and l8o), the choice of its flag and also the right to fly the national flags of Greece or Turkey as the case may be (Art.4)j and the celebration of the national holidays of the latter countries (Art.5)< .«.../ - 12 -

All elections take place on the "basis of separate communal electoral lists (Arts. 63 and 94) and separate voting (Arts.l, 39 j 62, 86, 173 and 178). Sound and vision "broadcasting hours are allocated "between the two communities according to a specified formula (Art. 171). The communities are accorded rights of special relationships with Greece and Turkey respectively, including that of receiving subsidies for institutions of education, culture, athletics and charity "belonging to the respective communities and that of employing, if need "be, schoolmasters, professors and clergymen provided "by the Greek and Turkish Governments as the case may "be (Art. 108).

24. The political system itself continues this distinction between the two communities. The President, who must be Greek, and the Vice-President, who must be Turkish, are elected by their respective communities (Art. l) and may thus be said to be their undisputed leaders and the guarantors of their rights in each case. They designate separately the members of the Council of Ministers (seven Greek and three Turkish Ministers) (Art.46). In the house of Representatives, also, the President must be Greek and the Vice-President Turkish, each being elected by his own communal group of members (Art. 72 )•

25. All of the organs of the State are designed to ensure the participation of the two communities as such in both their composition and their functioning. The basis of this participation, however, varies between different organs. In some it is represented by numerical equality, either with equality of functions (the judiciary as a whole) or without such equality (the President and the Vice-President) (Arts. 36-43). A number of "Independent Officers'1, namely, the Attorney-General, the Auditor-General and the Governor of the Issuing Bank (Arts. 126-128) and the heads of the army, the police and the gendarmerie (Art. 131) may by and large be appointed from either community, but each must have - 13' ~

a deputy appointed from the other community. In other cases participation is "based on a fixed ratio: thus, the army of two thousand men is to "be comprised of Greeks and Turks in the proportions of 60 per cent and 40 per cent respectively (Art.129)? this ratio also applies transitionally to the police and gendarmerie. A different ratio — 70 per cent to 30 per cent — applies to the composition of the Council of Ministers (Art.46), the House of Representatives (Art. 62), the Public Service (Art. 123) and eventually the police and gendarmerie (Art. 130).

26. Except for the President and the Vice-President, who may act separately on a large number of matters, these organs and institutions are in principle integrated, in the sense that their members may take part in them, as a general rule, without distinction as to their community of origin. In practice, however, several of them may divide, and in some cases are even required to divide, into two separate communal groups. Thus, although the laws and decisions of the House of Representatives are in general to be passed by a simple majority vote of all those members present and voting, an amendment to the electoral law, and the adoption of any law relating to the municipalities or imposing duties or taxes, requires a majority in each communal group taken separately(Art. 78). Separate two-thirds majorities are required for the amendment of those relatively less important articles of the Constitution which are in fact capable of amendment (Art. 182). 27. Again, the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Ministers are placed on an equal footing but are responsible, depending on their communities of origin, either to the President or to the Vice-President (Arts. 48 and 49)• The Turkish-Cypriot and Greek- Cypriot judges are similarly equal in status, but in general they exercise their functions only in regard to members of their own communities (Art. 159)« Public officers and also forces of the Republic stationed in parts of the country inhabited in a

• * • • • / proportion approaching 100 per cent by members of one community are required to belong to that community (Arts. 123 and 132).

Moreover5 the division "between the two communities of the posts of the "Independent Officers" and other senior officials and their deputies tended, according to my information, to serve as a pattern for the whole of the senior level of the public service,

28. There are a number of provisions in the Constitution which are designed to establish, in certain fields of action, an equality of function between the two communities even where their representation is unequal. I have given above the example of the House of Representatives as regards specific types of legislation of particular importance to the communal interests. A number of decisions within the authority of the President and Vice-President also require the agreement of both: for example, the choice of the flag (Art. 4)> the promulgation of legislation (Art. 51) an of the members of the Supreme Constitu- tional Court (Art. 133), of the members of the High Court (Art.153) and of certain public officials and heads of the forces (Arts,112, 115, 118, 124, 126, 131, 133, 153, 186); the introduction of conscription (Art. 129), and increasing or reducing the strength of the army (Art. 130)»

29» Both the President and the Vice-President also have the right to delay decisions in many matters and to veto them in others. Separately or jointly, they have the right of final veto on any law or decision of the House of Representatives concerning foreign affairs, with some exceptions; certain specified questions of defence; and certain specified questions of security (Art. 50)» Also separately or jointly, they may return to the House for its reconsideration any law or decision (Art. 51) and they may similarly ask the Council of Ministers to reconsider any of its decisions (Art. 57)' but in both cases they are bound, except in the fields where their veto applies, to accept the reconsidered decision of the organ concerned.

30. The general effect of these devices is to make most of the major affairs of State subject to the agreement of the representatives of "both the Greek and Turkish communities either "by joint decision or by the renunciation of the right of veto* The negative side of this situation is that it can invite deadlock on any of the questions concerned when the two communities have sharply differing views on them, and this in fact happened - with results that contributed largely to the present crisis - in the case of tax legislation and the question of the municipalities. Recourse to the Supreme Constitutional Court does not necessarily provide a way out of such impasses, since the Court can only resolve problems of interpretation, and not political differences,

31. The Constitution provides for another level of political organs - those which are purely communal in representation and function. The highest of these are the two Communal Chambers, each elected exclusively by its own community, and having control over such matters as questions of religion, culture and education, personal status, and communal institutions such as sports and charitable organizations, co-operatives, etc., (Art, 87). In these matters they have power to impose direct taxation on the members of their respective communities (Arts. 87 and 88),

32. In the same category are the Subordinate Courts, and the provision in the Constitution for separate municipalities to be established in the five main centres of the country, with a co-ordinating body in each case (Art. 173). It is worth noting that these municipalities are the only organs under the Constitu- tion which are specifically designed to be based on the territorial separation of the two communities* 33, The third and last important group of constitutional provisions to which attention should be drawn are those which constitute a complex set of guarantees. "These includer firstly, guarantees of a purely juridical nature: the establishment of a Supreme Constitutional Court which can annul any decision or law which it finds contrary to the Constitution (Arts. 137 j 138, 139j 144 j 146); the provision that, as far as concerns those articles of the Constitution which are capable of amendment, such amendment must be approved by a separate two-thirds majority of each communal group in the House of Representatives (Art. 182); the more practically important fact that the so- called "Basic Articles" of the Constitution — in effect, the foundation of the Zurich Agreement — cannot "be amended at all (Art. l82)| and the international undertaking of the Republic, under the Treaty of Guarantee signed with Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom — which itself is entrenched in the Constitution (Art. l8l) — to respect the Constitution.

34* It should also be noted that the judiciary itself, which constitutes the normal means of guaranteeing respect for the Constitution and the laws, possesses certain characteristics designed to maintain a balance between the two communities. The Supreme Constitutional Court is presided over by a neutral judge, and consists otherwise of one Greek-Cypriot and one Turkish-Cypriot judge (Art. 133). The High Court, although it has two Greek-Cypriot judges and only one Turkish-Cypriot judge, is also headed by a neutral president who may cast two votes (Art. 153).

35* Other guarantees of the Constitution are embodied in the international treaties (Nicosia, 16 August I960) entered into by the Republic on the first day of independence — the principles of these treaties having been, in fact, an integral part -1? -

of the whole "body of the Zurich and London agreements. Cyprus is committed by the Treaty of Guarantee with Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom "to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its constitution;" "not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever;" and to prohibit any activity likely to promote either union with any other State or partition of the island (Art. l). The three other contracting parties also guarantee the Republic's independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as "the state of affairs established "by the Basic Articles of its Consti- tution" (Art. Il)» They undertake to consult together to ensure observance of the provisions of the Treaty, and insofar as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each reserves the right "to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty". (Art. IV )„

36. The Treaty of Alliance between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, which, like the Treaty of Guarantee, ha,s constitutional force, has the effect of providing an immediate military guarantee by establishing a tripartite military headquarters in Cyprus, to which Greece and Cyprus sent contingents numbering 950 and 640 respectively. (Arts. Ill and IV and Additional Protocol No. l)» Finally, the existence of the military bases over which the United Kingdom has retained sovereignty under the separate Treaty of Establishment may also be thought to represent, to a certain degree, an additional military guarantee of the integrity of Cyprus and its Constitution.

The Presidents proposed amendments

37* On 30, November 19&3, some three years after the Consti- tution came into force, the President of the Republic publicly set forth thirteen points on which he considered that the Constitution should be amended. The President did so on the grounds that in its existing form the Constitution created many - 18 -

difficulties in the smooth, government and development of the country; that its many sui generis provisions conflicted with internationally accepted democratic principles and created sources of friction "between Greek and Turkish Cypriots; and tliat its defects were causing the two communities to draw- further apart rather than closer together.

38, Several of the most important amendments proposed "by the President reflected deadlocks which had actually occurred in the functioning of the Constitution.. For example, in proposing that the right of veto of the President and the Vice-President should fee abolished, he referred to the fact that the latter had vetoed a majority decision of the Council of Ministers that the organizational structure of the Cyprus Army should he "based on mixed units comprising both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish- Cypriots, since the Vice-President had favoured separate units.

39» Again, in proposing that the constitutional provisions requiring separate majorities for the enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives should be abolished, the President cited the failure of the House to enact an income tax law. Simi- larly, he proposed that unified municipalities should be established, on the grounds that the constitutional provision for separate communal municipalities in the five main towns had proved unworkable, one reason being the failure of the President and the Vice-President to reach agreement on the determination of the boundaries.

40. Difficulties in the functioning of the mixed Public Service Commission, where certain decisions require a minimum number of Greek and Turkish votes depending upon whether a Greek-Cypriot or a Turkish-Cypriot is concerned, led to the proposal by the President that all decisions of the Commission, without exception, should be taken by simple majority vote. He proposed also that the ratios of Greek and Turkish representation in the Public Service (70-30 per cent), the security forces (70-30 per cent) and the army (6(3-40 per cent) should he modified over a period of time to hring them into line with the ratio of Greeks to Turks in the population as a whole (then expressed as 81.14- 18.86 per cent).

41. The President's proposals also included the following: the administration of justice to "be unified; the division of the security forces into police and gendarmerie to "be abolished; the numerical strength of the security and defence forces to "be determined "by legislation! the Greek President and the Turkish Vice-President of the House of Eepresentatives to "be elected "by the House as a whole; the Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished,

42* Whatever possibility may'have existed at that time of calm and rational discussion of those proposals between the two communities disappeared indefinitely with the outbreak of violent disturbances between them a few days later on 21 December. The Turkish Communal Chamber subsequently described as "false propaganda" the President's claim that the Constitution had proved an obstacle to the smooth functioning of the Republic. The Turkish view, as thus expressed, was that the Greek-Cypriots had never attempted to implement the Constitution in full with sincerity and goodwill, and that the obstacles created were not due to the Constitution but to the Greek-Cypriots1 determination not to honour those parts of it which recognized the Turkish-Cypriots* communal rights. The latter maintained that the whole structure of the Republic rested on the existence of two communities (and not of a "majority" and a "minority"); they, thereforej refused to consider the amendment of any of the provisions of the Consti- tution since all of the amendments proposed by the other side were directed against those parts which recognized the existence of the Turkish community as such. They described the difficulties which had arisen over the questions of the structure of the army,

... •. j the establishment of separate municipalities, the income tax legislation and the observance of the fixed ratios in the public services and security forces as being due to the Greek's desire to discriminate against them and their own determination to protect their rights.

The London Conference (1964)

43. I have been given to understand that by the time of the London Conference in January 19&4, at which a new attempt was made to reach a settlement, the positions of the representatives of the two communities concerning the future structure of the Republic had greatly hardened and drawn much further apart. From the Greek-Cypriot side, there was a demand that the State should be allowed to take an independent, unitary, integral form5 with all legislative power vested in a parliament elected by universal suffrage on a common roll, the executive power vested in a cabinet responsible to the parliament, and the judicial power vested in an independent, unified judiciary. The Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance would be revoked. Neverthe- less, there would be certain devices to ensure Turkish representation in the Parliament and the Civil Service; the Turkish community would have autonomy in religious, educational and cultural matters; universally accepted human rights would be maintained as integral parts of the Constitution; and there would be a right of appeal to an international tribunal against violations of those rights.

44» The Turkish-Cypriot representatives, on the other hand, now reverted to the previously suggested concept of separating the two communities physically, by concentrating members of their community in one or more large areas, and creating a new political and administrative structure on this basis. The Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee would continue in force,

* • • • • / - 21 «

45* The intervening period, and more especially the period since intervention "by the United Nations was recommended "by the Security Council on 4 March 19^4) has seen these opposing positions elaborated in some detail, and I propose to deal with them in the next part of this report. It has also seen the Cyprus Government and House of Representatives, apparently acting under the powers given to them under the Constitution "but without the participation of the Turkish representatives required "by that Constitution, purport to pass legislation and to make decisions of a most serious kind, including the formation of a national guard, the introduction of conscription, the acquisition of large quantities of arms and other military equipment, and changes in the structure of the judiciary. More- over, on 4 April 19&4, the President of the Republic informed the Government of Turkey that on the grounds of the failure of the Turkish national contingent to return to its "barracks, the Government considered the Treaty of Alliance to have been violated and therefore to have ceased to be in force,, PART III ~ THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PARTIES AMD THEIR LACK OF COMPATIBILITY

The Greek-Cypriot Community

46^ The attitude of the Greek-Cypriot community towards the future of Cyprus, as explained to me orally by many of its qualified representatives and as more formally stated on 13 May by Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic,!/ started from the argument that the Republic was founded on agreements (those of Zurich and London) which did not emanate from the free will of the people but were imposed on them. Archbishop Makarios stated that the only alternatives open to him were either to sign the agreements as they stood or to reject them entirely, and that in view of the grave situation which would have ensued upon their rejection he had felt obliged to sign them.

.4y,8 Further, the Constitution based on these agreements was put into force on 16 August I960, and the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance were given constitutional force in it, without being approved either by the people of Cyprus directly or in constituent assembly by representatives duly elected for the purpose.

48. The Greek-Cypriot case cited the lesser numerical strength of the "Turkish minority", and its lesser ownership of land and contribution to public expenditure, as not justifying the Turkish community' having been "put on the same level with regard to the exercise of political powers in the State with the Greek majority". It rejected the *•»»•/ -/See Appendix I: "Certain Aspects of the Political Problem of Cyprus", submitted to the United Nations Mediator by Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia, 13 May 1964. - 23 -

argument that the Turkish-Cypriots must be treated differently from other minorities in other countries because they formed part of the Turkish people of the nearby mainland and because their language, religion, customs and national aspirations were different from those of the Greeks of Cyprus,

57» The Greek^Cypriots maintained that besides the provisions based on the concept of "political communal segregation", the existing Constitution suffered from another fundamental defect in that its "Basic Articles" could not be amended. They considered that while such a provision might have political significance, it was of no legal value because the present constituent power had no right to restrict the constituent power of the future. Moreover, the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance constituted an unacceptable limitation of the independence of Cyprus, in that they allowed interference with its domestic affairs.

58. From these premises, the Greek-Cypriots argued that the whole concept on which the present Constitution is based was entirely wrong, and that "completely new foundations" must be laid. For this purpose they put forward certain general principles, while insisting - since popular approval of the Constitution was one of those principles - that the details must be formulated by a constituent assembly* 59. These general principles are set out in Appendix I, together with the suggested basis for the safeguarding of human rights and certain communal rights. In summary, they envisaged Cyprus becoming "a completely independent, unitary,

*•*••/ - 24-

integral, sovereign state", unfettered by any treaties and with all powers emanating from the people, who would be entitled to decide the future of their country on the basis of "the internationally accepted principle of self-determination". The Constitution should be founded on the principle that the political majority at any election should govern and the political minority constitute the opposition. Elections would be by general suffrage on a common roll; all legislative power would be exercised by a single—chamber elected parliament, to which the executive power would be answerable; and the judicial power would be vested in an independent, unified judiciary.

60. Human rights should be safeguarded for all persons and entrenched in the Constitution. Some domestic judicial remedies would be established, as well as a right of individual appeal to the European Commission on Human Rights. All "communities and minorities" should have complete autonomy in religious matters and certain aspects of personal status, such as marriage and divorce, and in the administration of religious properties. In the realm of education and culture they should also be guaranteed certain rights, but the general responsibility for education should lie with the Government.

61. Most amendments to the Constitution should require a two-thirds majority vote of the total membership of the Parliament, followed by approval by an absolute majority (five—sixths majority in the case of communal rights) of the total membership after a new general election.

The Turkish-Cypriot community

62. The point of departure of the attitude of the representatives of the Turkish-Cypriot community, as reiterated on many occasions, and as formally stated in a

•••••/ - 25 -

memorandum handed to me by the Vice-president of the Republic, Dr. Fazil Kuchuk,—' was that their greatest concern was the security of life and property of a people who were not a mere minority but a distinct community in their own right. Prom this viewpoint they did not object to the existing Constitution as such, but rather to the way in which it had been, in their opinion, misapplied by the representatives of the Greek community.

55. They claimed that the recent events had proved that the various contractual and actual guarantees provided in the past were insufficient to meet the needs of their community for security. Additional and more effective guarantees must therefore be secured. 56. The additional guarantees, they maintained, could best be obtained by providing a geographical basis for the state of affairs created by the Zurich and London agreements. In short, they wished to be physically separated from the Greek community. Their first inclination had been to seek this separation through the outright physical partitioning of Cyprus between the Turkish and Greek nations, of which in their opinion the Turkish and Greek communities constituted an extension. However, wconsidering that this would not be willingly agreed to by Greece and Cypriot-Greeks", they modified this concept to that of creating a Federal State over the physical separation of the two communities. 57. The principles of a Constitution for such a Federal State are set out in Appendix II. They envisaged "a compulsory exchange of population" in order to bring about

_!/ See Appendix II: "Memorandum by the Yice-President on Framework of Federal Constitution". - 26 -

a state of affairs in which each community -would occupy a separate part of the island. The dividing line was 'in fact suggested: to run from the village of Yalia on the north- western coast through the towns of Nicosia in the centre, and Famagusta, in the east. An exchange of about 10,000 Greek families for about the same number of Turkish families is contemplated.

58, Each of the two separate communal areas would enjoy self- government in all matters falling outside Federal affairs. Each could have cultural and economic relations directly with Greece or -Turkey as the case might be.

§>?« To the federal authorities would be reserved the subjects of foreign affairs, defence, the federal budget, customs, commerce, banking, currency, standards of measurement, nationality, passport matters, post and telecommunications services and criminal legislation and jurisdiction. The federal legislature would consist of a House of Representatives composed of 30 per cent Turkish and 70 per cent Greek community representatives, and a Senate divided equally' between the two. The federal President and Vice-President would be elected by the Greek and Turkish communities respectively. The 30-70 ratio would be maintained for the Council of Ministers and the Public Service, and the 40-60 ratio for a small federal army and a police force for customs, traffic and tourist affairs.

6'0, Among other general principles reflecting those of the existing Constitution, the union of the Federal Republic with another State, or the partitioning of the island, would be prohibited under national and international undertakings. The *•»•«/

I/ Some of the Turkish-Gypriot leaders maintained that the movement of population would in fact be less expensive because large numbers of their people had already moved, under duress or voluntarily, into Turkish-Cypriot areas on their side of what would be the dividing line. - 27-

provisions of the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee would continue to form an integral part of the Constitution.

The other parties

61, Of the other parties whom my terms of reference require me to consult, the G-overnment of Greece gave me to understand, and indeed made public its views,- that it considered the Zurich and London agreements to have proved in practice to be unworkable. In its view at that time, the only possible and lasting solution was the application of the principles of international justice and of true democracy, with the full safeguarding of the right of the majority to rule and of the minority to criticize. In addition, on account of the special conditions of the case, and in order that there should be no fear of any possible abuse of the power of the majority, it would be possible to arrange that the rights of the Turkish minority should be safeguarded by the United Nations. The G-overnment stated further that full and untrammelled independence allowing the Cypriot people in free exercise of their sovereign rights to decide their future was the only solution.

'&2* The Government of Turkey, for its part, indicated to me that it considered a solution to the Cyprus problem to lie along the lines of a federated State, and it communicated to me an informal note containing general principles similar to those which I have referred to above in dealing with the position of the Turkish- Cypriot community.

^3-. The Government of the United Kingdom indicated to me its support for ray endeavours to help to promote a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem, in accordance with my terms of reference, and its desire to support such a settlement. •••••/

I/ Statement by Premier George A. Papandreou, Prime Minister's Office, Athens, 13 April 1964, and subsequently reaffirmed. — 28 -

.Incompatibility of the parties' views 64. Between the extreme and rigid positions held throughout the period by the leaders of the Greek-Cypriot community on the one side and those of the Turkish-Cypriot community on the other concerning the future of their country, I regret to report that it was not possible for the two sides to find sufficient common ground to provide a basis for discussion. They chose to adhere to "solutions** that were wholly irreconcilable, because their points of departure were entirely different; and, at least under the prevailing circumstances, they chose not even to meet together to discuss their differences* 65. In essence, the Turkish-Cypriot representatives saw Cyprus as an island off the shores of' Turkey and themselves as an extension to it of the Turkish population. They tended to .regard it as a country which had become a State but not a nation, and had become so by the deliberate design which was represented by the Zurich and London agreements and the Constitution and Treaties based upon those agreements. They pointed to this design, and to the unique character which it gave to the Constitution, as proof that their people in Cyprus were recognized as constituting not a minority in the ordinary sense of the word, but one of two distinct and separate communities, neither of which had supremacy over the other in matters of fundamental concern. And they claimed, in the light of recent events, that the only feasible way of maintaining both the identity of their community and a real guarantee of the safety of the persons and property of its members was that they should be physically separated from the Greek-Cypriot community.

66. In presenting this argument the Turkish-Cypriots declared themselves to have renounced previous demands for the most radical kind of separation - namely, the partitioning of the island between ...../ - 29 -

Greek and Turkish Cypriots in a way that would permit either or both parts of it to unite with the respective "homeland", that is to say Greece or Turkey as the case might be. They substituted for this, as I have already explained, the conception of geographical separation of the communities under the umbrella of a federal type of constitution. 67. The incompatibility of the Turkish-Cypriot approach with the Greek-Cypriots* insistence on a unitary form of constitution based on the principle of rule by the majority will be self- evident. Moreover, the Turkish-Cypriot leaders maintained that the proposed formula of "unfettered independence and self- determination" was no more than a facade to hide the true intention of the Greek-Cypriot leaders to bring about, when freed from the restraints imposed by the existing constitution, the union of Cyprus with Greece by wielding their numerical majority. 68. Somewhat similarly, the official Greek-Cypriot attitude towards the Turkish-Cypriot idea of a federal republic included the suspicion that this would be a confederation rather than a federation, and would lead eventually to the "annexation" by Turkey of the Turkish-Cypriot area of Cyprus. Since the Turkish-Cypriot conception of federation included the maintenance of the Treaty of Guarantee - and therefore the prohibition against union or partition - this attitude could hardly be said to argue the point in a serious way. However, the Greek-Cypriots had other and more substantial arguments against a formula which must involve the compulsory movement of people and require the solution of formidable economic and social problems. Even if they did not, the combination of the geographical splitting of the island with a federal constitution retaining most of what they regarded as the objectionable - 30 -

.features of the existing constitution would take Cyprus, in their view, in exactly the opposite direction from the one in which they sought to go. 69. From all the evidence at my disposal and from all the arguments adduced before me by either side, I came to the conclusion that the possible basis for an agreed solution lay neither in the federal regime suggested by one community nor in the system of what might be called "uninhibited democracy" suggested by the other. I did not think it fell to me to judge the merits of either case: the plain fact is that neither side was prepared to accept the other1s view as a basis for discussion, and without an agreed basis for discussion there could be no agreed solution. Other possible solutions 70. In view of this impasse between the views of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaders, whose positions were more or less supported by the Greek and Turkish Governments respectively, 1 felt it my duty to discuss with the parties such other possible foundations for a settlement which might at the same time appear practicable, capable of producing common ground for negotiation, and consistent with the principles on which the Security Council, by its resolution of 4 March 1964, would wish to see a solution based. 71. A number of such possibilities had been raised in the past or were put forward in the course of my activities. One group of them included various combinations of exchanges of territories and/or populations as between Cyprus, Greece and/or Turkey, designed solely to convert the population of Cyprus into one of virtually purely greek ethnic origin. None of these ideas, however, was either put forward or taken up seriously by any of the ...../ - 31 -

parties concerned} none of them appeared likely to command the support or meet the wishes of any large section of the Cyprus population; they all had inherent objections, especially in regard to the compulsory movement of peoples, or at least their movement under duress; and I therefore did not see in any of them a realistic basis for a solution. 72. There remained only one other possibility for which any claim could be made that, at some time in the recent history of Cyprus, it had been both a well-recognized political objective and also one which might have had the support of a majority of the people and be capable of being put into effect without a compulsory disruption of the present structure and distribution of the population. This was the conception of Enosis, or union with Greece, which had been the theme of the resistance to United Kingdom rule but which had also been - at least formally and in fact constitutionally - set aside, as I have recalled earlier, by the agreements of 1959-60. 73. There could be no concealing the fact that the "prohibition" of the Enosis idea did not suppress it in Cyprus. It continued to be discussed and advocated (as well as opposed), in and out of the institutions of government, long after the date of independence. It was impossible for me to escape the impression that for a large body of the Greek-Cypriot leaders1 following, and for many of the leaders themselves, the official demand for "full independence and self-determination" had no other meaning than this: that Cyprus should be released from the treaty and constitutional obligations which limited her freedom of choice, whereupon she would opt by some acceptable democratic procedure for union with Greece, this union to take place by agreement exclusively between Cyprus and Greece. That there apparently remained a strong body of popular - 32 -

.opinion in favour of Enosis was further confirmed to me by the fact, as I have already mentioned, that the Turkish-Cypriot leadership openly and repeatedly accused the Greefc-Cypriot leadership of still having Enosis as its real objective. 74. The possibility of majority support for Enosis - together with the serious likelihood that it might only be achieved by being forced on an unwilling Turkish-Cypriot minority - led to a search among a number of the parties concerned in the Cyprus problem for a formula of union between Cyprus and Greece which might prove acceptable to them all. It would clearly need the agreement of all of them, for juridical as well as political reasons. In principle, it would need not only to satisfy the aspirations of a numerical majority of the population of Cyprus but also to avoid the resistance en bloc, or nearly so, of the Turkish-Cypriot community and assure them of the reasonable protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms; and it would need in addition to satisfy the legitimate interests of the other parties to the problem, namely the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

75. The search for such a formula was undertaken most seriously during my presence at Geneva and in the first instance with the three parties external to Cyprus. I was kept regularly informed by each of them of the course of these discussions, about which I was assured that if they arrived at an agreed result, any such agreement would remain subject to that of the parties in Cyprus itself. I felt able to assure the parties concerned that if by this means they could arrive at "a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement" of the problem, consistent with the criteria indicated by the Security Council in the resolution of 4 March, the purpose of the process of mediation recommended by the Council would be served.

76. ^Paragraph to be inserted concerning outcome of the Geneva talks/ - 33 -

PAST IV - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

77« More than eight months after the beginning of the present crisisj and six months after the Security Council decided that action should he taken by the United Nations to end it, the problem of Cyprus remains unsolved. The "peaceful solution and agreed settlement" envisaged by the Council in its resolution of 4 March 1964, and requiring to be consistent with the Charter, the well- being of the people as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security, have yet to be achieved.

78. Cyprus, instead, continues to be the centre of a dispute which endangers not only the security of its own population but also the peaceful relations of its neighbours and perhaps of the world. An excessive number of its people either live by the gun or respond to it with fear. Force prevails over law. Human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as they exist, end at the barriers between the communities. And, in place of a willingness to compromise, the leaders of those communities rest their widely differing political ideas rigidly and menacingly on the amount of military force at their command.

79« This impasse must be broken; and towards this end I consider that I have a further duty to perform. I feel it to be well established in diplomatic practice that the process of mediation does not entrust the Mediator only with the task of undertaking negotiations with the parties concerned and of exploring the possibilities of their reaching agreement among themselves. It requires him also (and in this respect it differs from the application of "good offices") to propose to them those conditions for a settlement which in his opinion would allow them to go as close as circumstances permit to their legitimate objectives.

. • •. »/ - 34 -

80» In elaborating ray proposals, I have had to take account of three closely related sets of considerations. In the first place I have, of course, teen "bound by the terms of reference given to me "by the Security CouncilTs resolution of 4 March 1964. Secondly, "both in my capacity as a person acting for the United Nations and in the terms of the resolution itself, I am "bound to "base myself upon the principles of the United Nations Charter. Thirdly, I feel that I am also obliged to consider the terms of a possible settlement within the framework of the existing legal situation,

Resolution of the Security Council

8l. The resolution of 4 March 19^4 made the designation of a Mediator by the Secretary-General subject to the agreement of the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The naming of these particular Governments can clearly be explained only "by reference to the treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August I960, for they are the parties to the treaties. More- over, the treaties themselves are mentioned in the preamble of the resolution. The Mediator is also charged with seeking a solution of the problem "with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments", The inclusion of "the representatives of the communities" among the interested parties obviously was justified by the political situation, but at the same time it lends itself also to a reference to the agreements of Zurich and London, which were signed not only by the representatives of the four Governments but also by the representatives of the communities. I feel it can be said, therefore, that in its resolution of 4 March the Security Council took into consideration the series of agreements which governed the attainment by Cyprus of its independence and whose implementation was at the root of the crisis brought - 35 -

before the Council* This interpretation is in fact supported "by statements made before the Council by the representatives of the parties concerned during the discussions which led to the adoption of the resolution. I have therefore felt obliged to take fully into account the position of the Council in this respect, and I will examine below the juridical implications which I see in this position*

82. The task entrusted to the Mediator by the Council is to "use his best endeavours.... for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus". The key expression appears to me to be the phrase "agreed settlement". The resolution does not specify the parties among which this agreement should be brought about, but this is also clear from the same considerations which identify the parties to be consulted by the Mediator. The settlement to be arrived at must therefore be accepted by the four Governments which signed the treaties of Nicosia and which cannot modify these treaties except by means of a new agreement among them. At the same time, a settlement must have the approval, by some means to be defined, of the representatives of the communities which took part in the agreements of 1959 on which the treaties were based.

83. Finally, the Council's resolution prescribes that the settlement must be in conformity with the United Nations Charter and must bear in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security, I will discuss the consequences of these provisions when I come to explain my proposals.

The Juridical Situation of Cyprus

84. It seems to me imperative at the outset to clarify the existing juridical situation of the Eepublic of Cyprus. The country acceded to independence on 16 August I960 through the application and within the framework of the treaties signed at Nicosia on the same day, which in turn represented the implementation of the agreements of Zurich and London dated 11 and 19 February 1959 respectively. During the discussion in the Security Council last February and March, the representatives of some of the parties concerned criticised certain of the provisions and other aspects of these treaties and agreements, and disputed the interpretation given "by other parties to one or another of the articles of the treaties, in particular the Treaty of Guarantee. None of the parties, however, questioned the validity of the treaties and the fact that they were in force. Moreover, as I have pointed out above, the Security Council, in its resolution of 4 March, explicitly and implicitly made reference to them.

85. Since that date, however, the President of the Republic of Cyprus and also the Minister of Foreign Affairs have reaffirmed on several occasions that the Treaty of Guarantee does not confer upon Turkey any right of military intervention and that- even if it did such a provision would be rendered null for the fact of being contrary to the United nations Charter, which in accordance with article 103 must prevail over a,ny other international agreement. This problem of interpretation, however, has no bearing on the validity of the treaty itself, and indeed it could be said that the validity of the .treaty has been indirectly confirmed by the existence of a dispute over the extent of the powers which it confers on the parties.

86. On the other hand, in the case of the Treaty of Alliance, the President of the Republic notified the Turkish Government on 4 April 1964 that he considered it as terminated. For its part, the Turkish Government replied that it considered this denunciation of the treaty to have been illegal and to be of no effect. - 37 -

87* It is o"bvious, therefore, that the most that can "be said is that on these two points there have arisen, "between two of the Governments which signed the Nicosia treaties, differences of a clearly juridical nature. I am not called upon to express an opinion on these differences; they could "be settled, if need "be, in the appropriate manner, "by recourse to a qualified judicial authority such as the International Court of Justice or an arbitration tribunal. Fortunately, they have only an incidental bearing on the function of mediation.

88. What is important is to recognize that the international juridical position of Cyprus remains governed by a series of agreements and treaties whose validity has not been called into question except in case of the Treaty of Alliance. The Security Council itself has taken account of the existence of these agreements and treaties. It follows, therefore, that any change that must be made in the juridical position of Cyprus in order to arrive at "a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement" (in the words of the resolution of 4 March) can only be brought about by means of an agreement to be freely signed by all of the Govern- ments which subscribed to the treaties of Nicosia.

89. There is obviously need for such a change. The problem of Cyprus cannot be solved by trying to implement fully the Nicosia treaties. The succession of events, as well as the points of view held by the parties concerned, have left no doubt that the existence of these treaties and the difficulties encountered in applying them constituted the origin of this crisis and have governed its development. It is of no great importance to try to determine whether the treaties were in fact incapable of being applied or whether their application was made impossible through the fault, deliberate or otherwise, of one or more of the parties concerned. It is enough to observe that the difficulties in implementing the treaties began almost at once and became in- - 38 -

creasingly serious. The events which have taken place in Cyprus since December of 1963 have created a situation which makes it psychologically and politically impossi"ble to return to the statu quo ante. Moreover, the very act of appointing a Mediator in order to help "bring about "an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus" can be said to indicate the conviction of the Security Council that some new solution would have to be found in order to bring an end to the existing crisis*

90, I therefore feel that the Cyprus problem is one of those frequently encountered in international relationships, in the sense that the necessity has arisen for "peaceful change" in a situation which, although it has a clearly established juridical basis, cannot for practical reasons be maintained. In a case of this kind, in which States Members of the United Nations are involved, it is incumbent upon these States to heed their obligations under the Charter, and in particular their commitment under Article 1, para. 1 "to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace". I hardly need emphasize that this is one of the first purposes of the United Nations, to which all its members have subscribed. The obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means is, moreover, laid down again in Article 2, para. 3 of the Charter. Meeting that obligation in the case of Cyprus seems to me to require on the part of the States concerned that none of them should adopt a completely rigid position, either for the sake of maintaining intact the juridical effects of treaties which circumstances have shown to be in need of change, or of establishing a new situation conforming entirely to their own points of view, without taking any account of the legitimate interests of the other parties. This is all the more necessary because the in- •• 39 "•

terests of the parties are recognized in the existing treaties, even if in the form of provisions which have proved inadequate.

The Principles of the Charter

91* I should now like to define those principles of the Charter which have a "bearing on the problem of Cyprus, in view of the fact that the Security Council expects the settlement to be in accordance with the Charter. Three principles have "been especially insisted upon, either by the parties concerned or by the Security Council itself. These are the principles of the self-determination of peoples; respect for human rights and fundamental freedom for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion; and the preservation of international peace and security.

92. The principle of self-determination has been most frequently invoked in the past in cases of non self-governing peoples demanding the attainment of independence. Cyprus could be said to have constituted such a case at the time when a large part of its people were struggling against colonial rule. It may, therefore, appear somewhat surprising .to see this same principle put forward once more on behalf of Cyprus, even after it has been proclaimed an independent and sovereign State and admitted to membership of the United Nations. The position of the Cyprus Government in this respect is explained, however, by the fact that it considers that the treaties which accompanied, and in fact made possible, the accession of the country to independence are of such a nature as to restrict its sovereignty and therefore to be contrary to the principle of the "sovereign equality" of all members of the United Nations, as laid down in Article 2, para. 1 of the Charter. On their side, leaders of the Turkish-Cypriot community have insisted that if the right of self-determination is recognised to one of the two communities, it must equally be recognised to the other. - 40 -

93* The impression which I have gained from my discussions is that the claim that the sovereignty of Cyprus has "been im- paired is based essentially on the fact that the Cypriot people are forbidden from amending their own constitution. This prohibition, which relates to the "basic articles", derives from the constitution itself (Art. 182) but was established in principle by the agreements of Zurich and London, the Zurich agreement being itself referred to in the relevant article of the constitution. It is also the subject of an international commitment undertaken by the Republic and is guaranteed by external Governments in the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee, which in its turn is incorporated in the constitution by means of a "basic article", namely article l8l. The same treaty furthermore prohibits the union of Cyprus with any other State and forbids also the partitioning of the country. This double prohibition is again to be found in a "basic article" of the constitution, in this case article 185. There is no doubt that the President of Cyprus, when he demands for Cyprus an unrestricted independence which would allow the population of the island to determine freely its own future, had in mind securing the right to set these provisions aside. It is therefore relevant to consider to what extent they do in fact conflict with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

94« It is not uncommon in contemporary constitutional practice to place certain provisions in a constitution outside of the scope of the procedure for amendment. This is particularly the case with articles relating to the nature of the political system or to the integrity of the territory of the country concerned. One such example is to be found in the Greek constitution of 1 January 1952, in which article 108 forbids the amendment of provisions determining the structure of the State as well as the fundamental provisions of the constitution. However, what is

ft • • • •/ - 41 *•

exceptional in the case of the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus is firstly the num"ber (4? articles or parts of articles out of a total of 199)? and secondly the importance, of those provisions which have been excluded from any possibility of amendment. The entire structures of the political, administrative and judicial institutions of Cyprus are accordingly completely frozen in their essential features. It is therefore certainly true to say that the people of Cyprus are not able, by any normal juridical process, to change their own institutions, even should the two communities agree on such changes.

95• It appears even more noteworthy that this very special juridical situation should have been established by means of an international treaty, that it should have been the subject of an international commitment on the part of Cyprus, and that its maintenance should have been guaranteed by the foreign powers which signed the treaty. The result is that the Cypriot people themselves could not validly change the nature of their institutions even by revolutionary action. Ho doubt diplomatic history could provide examples of juridical situations in some respects comparable with that of Cyprus. There are certain other cases where provisions which normally belong to the internal constitutional affairs of States have found their way into treaties because they have taken on some international importance and it is considered proper that they should be safeguarded from any possibility of unilateral modification. A recent example of such a practice is the exclusion, under the State Treaty of 15 May 1955? of the Habsbourg family from the throne of Austria. More commonly, however, this practice has been applied to provisions assuring some special treatment for national minorities, of which many examples can be found in international treaties since the first ¥orld War. In fact, the "basic articles" of the Cyprus constitution are intended essentially, taken as a whole, to guarantee the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot minority, but at the same time - 42 -

they also determine, as I have explained above, the entire constitutional structure of the Kepublic. It is understand- able that in these circumstances the question should have been raised as to whether the principle of "sovereign equality" referred to in article 2, para. 1 of the Charter admits such serious limitations on the constitutional freedom of a Member State of the United Nations.

96. The double prohibition against the union of Cyprus with another State and against the partitioning of the country is a different matter. International practice has given a number of precedents in which similar prohibitions have been established by way of treaty, particularly in cases where a union between two States would tend to upset the political balance existing in the region concerned and consequently to threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. The best known example is that of the prohibition of any union (Anschluss) between Austria and Germany, which was imposed by the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain of 1919 and by the State Treaty of 1955. This provision, making inalienable the independence of a Member State, has never been considered as impairing its sovereignty or as contradicting any of the principles of the Charter. It is clear that the union of two States cannot be regarded as an act which concerns only the internal affairs of one of these States, as is usually the case in the choice of its political institutions. Union is intrinsically an international action; it cannot be re- alized unilaterally and it is susceptible of directly affecting the interests of neighbouring States, as well as the maintenance of international peace and security.

97. In the case of Cyprus, union of the country with Greece (Enosis) could not be carried out unilaterally by a decision of the people of Cyprus, even if they were entirely free to determine their future. The union would obviously require the - 43 «

agreement of Greece. However, Greece is a signatory with Turkey and the United Kingdom to the Treaty of Guarantee, under which it has undertaken to ensure the independence of Cyprus, and could not, therefore, properly accept any proposal for Enosis which might "be made to it "by the people of Cyprus, except with the agreement of the other signatories to the treaty. Moreover, it would clearly "be within the rights of these other countries to make their agreement to the union subject to conditions safeguarding their own legitimate interests as well as the maintenance of peace and security in the area.

98. The question of partition differs somewhat from that of union, since partition would, in theory, not necessarily involve the interests of other States. Yet, here again Cyprus presents a special case, While it is not very unusual for a country's constitution to exclude the unity or integrity of the State from any possibility of constitutional amendment, it is difficult to find examples other than Cyprus of such a reservation being guaranteed by international treaty arrangements. Yet even without such arrangements, it could still be said that the splitting of a State into two or more parts would inevitably have international consequences of some kind, and it is possible tc conceive of circumstances in which these consequences could include a change in the political equilibrium of the area concerned and an adverse effect on peace and security. Furthermore, the ethnic relationships of the two main communities with Greece and Turkey respectively, together with the context within which the idea of partition has generally been discussed, indicate that the partition of Cyprus could only be a prelude to the union of each of the parts with its respective "motherland" - the development that has commonly been referred to as "double Bnosis".

99» Another principle of the Charter which is of the highest relevance to any settlement of the Cyprus problem is that of

*••••/ 44 -

respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, without discrimination. The fact that the population of the island continues to consist of two principal ethnic communities, the further fact that they are unequal in numbers and finally the gravity of the conflict which has developed "between them - all these elements have given and must continue to give rise to serious difficulties in applying this principle.

100» The brief history of the independent State of Cyprus has "been marked "by persistent mistrust "between the two communities - or at any rate "between their leaders - who mutually suspect each other of not having sincerely accepted the political settlement of 1959 and of not having renounced the "national" objectives which that settlement put aside, that is to say, Bnosis on the one hand and Taksim on the other. This reciprocal distrust led the Greek Cypriot majority to seek systematically to diminish the rights conferred by the Constitution on the Turkish Cypriot community, on the grounds either that they were unworkable or that they constituted unjustified privileges. At the same time, the smaller community tended towards a strict and rigid application of its powers, not hesitating to go so far, when it saw fit, as to prevent the adoption of legislation or other measures necessary to the proper functioning of the public services. Since the time in December 19&3 when the political conflict between the two communities led to open hostility, there has developed between them an abyss of hatred and fearj and passions have been inflamed to such a degree that there can be little hope of calming them until a long time has passed after a return to an otherwise "normal" situation.

101. From that moment onwards, the Charter's insistence on "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion" will assume a capital importance in Cyprus. It will be an indispensable

o • o • • / - 45 -

condition for the progressive rebirth of confidence and the re- establishment of social peace. The obstacles against the full application of the principle cannot be over-estimated; and they are no less psychological than political. The violent sharpening of "national" sentiments over the months of crisis will for some time make it extremely difficult for officials at all levels to impose or even exercise strict impartiality and understanding towards all the citizens of the country, and without that impartiality and understanding there will be a constant risk of acts of discrimination, even if laws are respected in the formal sense. Furthermore, there are personal hatreds which will last "beyond any political settlement; not all of the too many weapons which are in too many hands are likely to "be surrendered readily; and these factors will, for a period whose duration can only be guessed at, create problems of personal security on a serious scale«

102. For all these reasons there is no doubt in my mind but that there must be established in Cyprus the most vigorous possible guarantee of human rights and safeguards against discrimination. For some time, in order to help the two communities to find their way out of the vicious circle of deep distrust between them, I am convinced, indeed, that certain international guarantees must be provided.

103. The fact that the population of Cyprus is divided into two communities gives rise to another special problem in regard to the application of the United nations' principles of human rights. Each of the two main communities is profoundly attached to the "national" traditions which were bequeathed to it by history, and each has always enjoyed a large degree of autonomy in what it has regarded as the essential fields of religion, education and personal status. However much it may be regretted in the light of widespread modern conceptions of the need for the integration and assimilation of differing peoples in the interests of national unity, the fact

••••*/ 46

remains that little was done under any of the previous regimes, ancient or recent, to bridge the separateness of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. Recent events have made these distinctions more rather than less acute, and to try to eliminate them now by drastic measures could only mean taking a distinctly backward step in the field of the protection of human rights as far as the minority community particularly is concerned. Since independence the Greek Cypriot community - being in the majority not only in terms of numbers but also in the governing- institutions of the State - has been in a position to deal freely with its own affairs of religion, education and personal status within the framework of the State: should it have the same powers in respect of the Turkish Cypriot community, the latter would feel itself deprived of some of the most fundamental of human rights,

104. The agreements of Zurich and London went to unusual lengths in trying to meet this situation by conferring on the Turkish Cypriot community, as such, a number of political rights designed to allow it to protect itself from being completely subjugated by the majority community. In this respect the Republic of Cyprus is probably a unique example of what has been called "functional federalisra" and it is, of course, this feature of the constitutional system which has been most severely criticised and which has given rise to the most serious difficulties of implementation. It would be difficult to justify maintaining this constitutional oddity against the will of the majority. Yet the problem behind it cannot be ignored, and that problem - the hard fact of the separateness of the two communities, sharpened by the recent events • requires that some special measures should be applied in order to ensure to the members of the minority community, without weakening the unity of the State, an equitable part in public life. Such measures will be a necessary condition for any settlement that must take account, as the Security Council's resolution requires,

•••••/ - 47

of the "well-"being of the people of Cyprus as a whole". They need only be transitional: indeed they should "be clearly understood by all sides to "be so; but they are in fact the only practical way to ensure, in the longer run, the political integration of the communities. Failure to provide a transitional means of ensuring a share by the Turkish Cypriot community in the political life of the State could only, I am convinced, have the opposite effect from accelerating their integration. It would only perpetuate their separateness, "because it is in the nature of things that the larger community should dominate and that the smaller should be dominated; and it is in the nature of things in Cyprus above all that this could only prolong the ferment of hostility between them and the risk of endless acts of violence. I cannot emphasize this matter too strongly; it is not at all the normal question of the right of a political majority to rule, but a question of the need to avoid the wilful dominance of one distinct community over another, to an extent and in a manner calculated to delay indefinitely the wholly desirable elimination of differences in treatment based directly on ethnic and religious factors*

105* Finally, I must return once more to that principle of the Charter to which the Security Council attached specific importance: that of the preservation of international peace and security. Con- siderations of peace and security between nations clearly played an essential part in the political settlement of 1959-60. In itself, the signing of the Zurich agreement ended for the time being the dispute which had arisen over Cyprus between Greece and Turkey and whose prolongation was likely to threaten the preservation of international peace and security. Both that agreement and those which are related to it - especially the Nicosia treaties of I960 - take largely into account the security needs of their signatories. The Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance are the key

•••••/ - 48 -

instruments in this respect. They guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus against its two more powerful neighbours, as well as against any external aggression. For their part, Greece and Turkey obtained an assurance that the territory of Cyprus would never be used for hostile purposes against them, and the juridical commitment of Cyprus in this respect is intended to he guaranteed "by the presence on the island of Greek and Turkish military contingents. It is not irrelevant to point out also that the Sepublic of Cyprus was created over an area which excluded the two military "bases kept under United Kingdom sovereignty "by the Treaty of Establishment.

106. The highest purposes of the Charter require that no lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem should fail to take into account the legitimate security needs of the countries concerned. Any attempt at a settlement which ignored them would without question worsen the tension which the Cyprus problem has already brought to the eastern Mediterranean region and would thereby endanger international peace. Provisions must be made, on the one hand to assure the safety of Cyprus against external threats, and on the other hand to guarantee to the neighbouring States that the Cypriot territory will not be used for hostile purposes directed against them.

The Approach to a Settlement

107. If the foregoing principles must be kept in sight in formulating- a possible basis of settlement, so also must, the roots of the Cyprus problem itself. The crisis came about, and reached the point of explosion, because the two parties on the island found it impossible - even if for different reasons and by different stages - to regard the agreements of Zurich and London as the final solution of the problem. As I have remarked earlier, with the development of the crisis almost every political action by the Greek-Cypriot leadership was suspected by the Turkish-

• • • • • / - 49-

Cypriot leadership as a move towards the forbidden but unforgot- ten objective of union with Greece, and the Greek-Cypriots similarly saw in Turkish-Cypriot tactics a counter-move towards partition, "With the explosion of the crisis into violence, the two sides again openly espoused those respective causes, and manoeuvred towards the attainment of them*

108. Any attempt at a settlement which would allow those attitudes to develop again on the part of the Cyprus communities would leave little chance for the harmonious evolution of political life within the framework of an independent State of Cyprus. It would again render insoluble such problems as apparently simple as that of enacting municipal legislation. It could only, in the long run, bring the communities once more into a hostile confrontation of each other. And it could not fail to rekindle the misgivings of the two other States which have close ethnic ties with the respective communities, and to erode again the friendly relations which should exist between them.

109. The first essential, therefore, is to break this disastrous chain of circumstances and to ensure that it cannot be restored. This can only be done, in my view, by causing the people of Cyprus to take, in full understanding and sincerity, a deliberate decision about their future which will leave no room for future dispute and will set the island on a course from which it cannot be deflected. The most appropriate, and perhaps the only, means of bringing about this decision seems to me to be the holding of a plebiscite which would allow the Cypriot people to choose freely their political future between those alternatives which are both reasonable and practicable. It is inherent in this proposal that the population as a whole should be called upon to participate in the consultation. To ascertain separately the wishes of each community would only lead to a deadlock if they expressed themselves differently — which would be likely to happen under present circumstances — since there is no present basis for their separate political existence* To create such a "basis would require a redistribution of population, which would mean allowing the will of the smaller community to prevail over that of the larger,

110. In my view there are only two possible solutions which are capable of commanding the support of a majority of the people and therefore of "being put into practical effect. These are (a) the existence of Cyprus as a fully independent and sovereign State, and ("b) the union of Cyprus with Greece. Such is the choice that, with the implications of each alternative agreed upon and understood in advance, I recommend to he put to the people of Cyprus. I recommend further that the plebiscite should "be held under the supervision of the United Nations.

111. It will be apparent, from the earlier section of my report, why I believe that the choice must "be limited to those two possibilities. The option of full independence needs no justification since it envisages Cyprus continuing its existence as a State, whatever changes in its treaty arrangements and its constitutional structure might be involved. It is also the formal aspiration of the present Government of Cyprus and there is no doubt that it com- mands a considerable body of support. Furthermore it is capable of being implemented. Of the alternatives that might be submitted to popular consultation, only that of union with Greece similarly meets these fundamental criteria in sufficient degree. As I have remarked earlier, the option of union with Greece is the only other solution which can pretend to be a well-recognized political objective, capable of commanding a majority,.and at the same time meeting the essential requirement of being applicable in practice in the circumstances of the island, including the structure and distribution of its population. Any proposal such as partition or federation which would involve the physical separation of the communities, would require a large transfer of people, and is opposed by the Greek-Cypriot community and therefore by the majority, clearly fails to meet these criteria. -51 ~

112. I have said that the implications of each of the alternatives will have to "be agreed upon in advance. They will be both juridical and substantive in nature. The holding of such a consultation is of course forbidden by the existing treaties. For this reason, and also because of the international significance of the choice to be made, the holding of the plebiscite must be the subject of an agreement among the signatories to the treaties of Nicosia of 16 August I960 - that is to say, the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom - and accepted also by the representatives of the two communities which signed the London agreement of 19 February 1959*

113» Moreover, while I firmly believe that it is in the interests of international peace and security that the parties concerned should agree to the holding of a plebiscite, I consider that they would be justified in making their agreement dependent on the steps to be taken to safeguard, in accordance with the principles of the Charter, their own legitimate interests. I feel a responsibility therefore to indicate the means by which this could be done: I do so at this point in terms of principle rather than in recommendations of substance,

114. A primary consideration must be that of overcoming or at least of reducing as far as possible the difficulties which, as I have already emphasized,arise from the division of the population into two ethnically distinct communities and which will present problems of an exceptional nature for their peaceful co-existence, whatever the result of the plebiscite may be. These exceptional problems require exceptional solutions in the form of special safeguards both for the safety and the individual rights of every citizen of Cyprus and also for the protection, within reason, of the "national" personality and the cultural patrimony of each of the communities. The basic safeguards in this respect must be established on a permanent footing; and in addition, as I have remarked earlier, they must be supplemented for a transitional period by others designed to allow the people to regain a feeling of security and to obtain their proper place in society. »•»> • j - 52

115* It is hardly necessary for me to say that while these safeguards would apply to all the people of both communities, in practice it is the Turkish-Cypriot minority which will stand most in need of them. They are justified not only by the need to re-establish a durable peace in the life of the island, nor only by the need to ensure that the settlement accords with the Charter of the United Nations, Simple equity also demands that these safeguards should be provided. It will need not to be forgotten that the Turkish-Cypriot community obtained from the Zurich and London agreements a series of rights greatly superior to those which can be contemplated for it in the future. In addition, it would be just and fair to recognize that however effective the safeguards that can be devised, any Cypriot who fails to find in them a basis for reasonable confidence in the new order of things, would have the right to resettle in Turkey (or even in Greece as the case may be), and should be assisted to do so. Appropriate assistance should also be provided, without discrimination, to rehabilitate all those whose property has been destroyed or seriously damaged as a result of the disorders*

116, It is imperative, too, to look further into the future and to make provision now for the progressive development of a situation in which the need will no longer exist for special guarantees and safeguards. A positive effort should be made to pave the way to a true reconciliation between the two communities and to encoura,ge action in this direction on the part of all persons of good will in both communities. It may well be in the cultural field that such endeavours would have the best chance of early success.

117. Finally, while the future of the relationships between the communities on the island is at the heart of the problem of Cyprus, its international dimensions must also be taken into account. The present crisis, besides causing bloodshed and disorders in Cyprus, has created extreme tensions between Greece

* o » • a / - 53 -•

and Turkey and done much harm to their relations, and a settlement of the problem must seek also to repair this damage. Con- sideration must "be given to the needs of security of each of the countries concerned. If Cyprus were to opt for continued independence, it seems to me that the most simple and effective method would be the negotiation among Cyprus , Greece and Turkey of a treaty of friendship and good neighbourliness. In such a treaty Cyprus would undertake to maintain its independence, but at the same time, and as a contribution to international peace and security, it would agree to 'disarm under the supervision of an international commission. In return, Greece and Turkey vrould undertake to respect and defend the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus against any external threat from any quarter. The United Kingdom should accept an analogous undertaking either by the same treaty or by a parallel one, Should the option of Cyprus be union with Greece, the same principles should be applied as far as practicable between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, including the demilitarisation of Cyprus.

Il8» In the hope that a settlement of the Cyprus problem will not only bring to an end the present period of tension in the eastern Mediterranean area but also malce possible a lasting- improvement in relations between the countries of the area, I should also propose that, should Cyprus remain an independent State, the treaty of friendship and good neighbourliness which I have suggested above should be supplemented by broad agreements on economic and cultural cooperation. In any event the treaty should contain machinery for regular consultations intended to promote useful cooperation between the signatories and also for the settlement, by a prompt and simple procedure, of differences arising among them.

On all of these matters the agreement of the parties concerned is necessary before the plebiscite can be held at all,

.... . / - 54 ~

and before the electors can make their choice in full knowledge of the implications. In the final section of the report I shall present my more specific recommendations *

Recommendations to the Parties

120. The proposals that I now intend to submit to the parties concerned in the light of the foregoing considerations relate essentially to the procedure which I recommend them to follow in order to arrive at a final settlement and also to the principles which I recommend as the basis for this settlement. It will be for the parties themselves to elaborate, in a free exchange of views and within the framework of the suggested procedure, the detailed texts which will be needed to put the principles into effect. I have thought it useful, however, to annex to these basic recommendations some complementary ones (*) relating to those fields where I believe the greatest difficulties lie, especially that of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

121. In any event it is my view that if the parties accept the general lines of the settlement which I propose, they will by that fact have undertaken to proceed in good faith and in the spirit in which I have formulated ray proposals, to implement them by way of agreements and legislation. In this respect I must emphasize that I have prepared my recommendations in such a way that they form a balanced whole. It is essential that this balance should be preserved in order to arrive at a just and therefore durable solution to the present problem of Cyprus,

122. Assuming the acceptance by all the parties of my proposals} a round table conference should be called as soon as possible, preferably under the chairmanship of the United Nations Mediator, which would bring together the representatives of the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom and in which would also participate representatives of the Greek-Cypriot and

(*) See Annexes I and II , * * • • * / Turkish-Cypriot communities. The purpose of this conference would "be to draft and agree upon the following:

(a) A draft treaty among the four Governments authorizing the holding of a plebiscite "by which the people of Cyprus would he asked to choose "between the full independence of the country and its union with Greece, and defining the juridical consequences to he drawn from the result of the plebiscite. It would "be agreed that if the majority should "be in favour of independence, the Republic of Cyprus would be freed from the obligations assumed under the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance signed at Nicosia on 16 August I960. It would then accede to full independence and would consequently be free to provide itself, by democratic means, with new political institutions. At the same time, however, the Republic of Cyprus would undertake to guarantee effectively, by taking all necessary steps to this end, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, as well as the rights to be assured to each community as such* It would be further agreed that if the majority should be in favour of union with Greece, the Government of Greece would give a comparable undertaking in regard to the population of Cyprus.

(b) A draft treaty of friendship and good neighbourliness among the Governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, providing in particular for the demilitarisation of Cyprus and the guarantee by the two other signatories of its independence and territorial, integrity, and also for a procedure for the settlement of disputes among the parties* The entry of this treaty into force would, of course, depend on the plebiscite producing a majority in favour of independence* - 56 -

(c) A draft treaty "between Greece and Turkey applying, mutatis mutandis, the same principles as in sub-paragraph (b) above in the event of a union of Cyprus and Greece as a result of the plebiscite.

(d) An agreement between the representatives of the two Cyprus communities concerning the provisional functioning of the institutions of the Republic pending the holding of the plebiscite and (in case of a majority for independence) the election of a constituent assembly,

123. The draft treaties formulated at the conference would require to be ratified by the Governments concerned in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. In the case of Cyprus, ratification should be approved by the House of Re- presentatives, with the participation of the members from both communities. The draft treaties should also be submitted to the Security Council to enable it to take note of the terms of the settlement and agree to carry out the functions to be entrusted to the United Nations,

124. Upon ratification of the treaties, and as soon as conditions in Cyprus permitted, the plebiscite should be held under the supervision of the United Nations. For the purposes of the plebiscite the adult population of Cyprus should form a single electoral college. Depending upon the results of the plebiscite, the -Security Council would be requested to take such further action as would be required to authorize the Secretary-General to carry out the functions to be entrusted to the United Nations,

125. I have set out in Annex I my more detailed recommendations on the principles on which, in my view, the parties should base themselves in formulating the first of the drs.ft treaties mentioned above. In Annex II I have set out what I believe should be the principles of the treaty of friendship and good neighbourliness. - 57 -

1OTEX I

PARTICULAR RECOfMEHDATIONS CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF HUMM EIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

Note: These recommendations have "been formulated more especially for the case of an independent State of Cyprus. The principles should equally apply, mutatis mutandis, in the event of Cyprus "being united with Greece.

1, Provision should be made for the esercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms not less than those set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to which Cyprus is a party, and should "be in conformity with those set forth in the United Nations' Uni- versal Declaration. The Constitution should declare these rights and freedoms to he immediately applicable in the internal law of Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus should accept the right of individual recourse to the European Commission of Human Rights and the obligatory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, under the conditions set forth in articles 25 and 26 of the European Convention.

2» The strictest respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons, regardless of race, sex, language or religion, should be guaranteed by judicial procedures permitting every aggrieved person to obtain by means of a simple and prompt procedure an equitable indemnity and, where justified, the revocation of any irregular action against him. The appropriate tribunals should be established and should function under conditions guaranteeing impartial treatment of every aggrieved person. For a transitional period, cases involving alleged discriminatory treatment should be subject to the right of final appeal to and judgment by a, chamber of the Supreme Court composed of an equal number of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot judges and a president, exercising a casting vote, who should either be a Greek-Cypriot or a Turkish-Cypriot judge sitting alternately or a neutral judge appointed by the President of the European Court of Human Eights. There should be appointed also by the legislature one or two "Special Commissioners" (Ombudsmen), of whom at least one should be a Turkish-Cypriot, having the authority to investigate any complaint of discriminatory or unjust treatment; to obtain the revocation or modification of any action not properly founded} to refer to the appropriate Court any illegal action, or the author of that action; and to report regularly to the legislature on his activities. For a transitional period the "Special Commissioners" should function in close collaboration with the United Nations commission (see para. 11)»

3* For a transitional period, fair representation of both of the main communities of Cyprus — that is to say, a representation in a reasonable proportion to their numerical size — should be guaranteed by appropriate procedures in the elected institutions of the State, in the government, in the central and local administrations and in the judiciary. The transitional nature of this arrangement should be specified, and its purpose defined as being to ensure that a community wholly or mainly identified by its ethnic composition should not be permitted by weight of numbers to exclude another community similarly identified from reasonable participation in public affairs. It should remain in force until a sufficient degree of integration exists between the communities as to make it no longer necessary. In particular:

(a) The electoral legislation of the Republic should provide, within the framework of a common-roll electoral system, and by such means as a method of proportional representation or the appropriate revision of electoral boundaries, for the equitable representation of the two main existing communities. (b) It should also be understood that the designation of the principal office-bearers of the political institutions and of the Government should be so carried out as to assure equitable representation to the two communities.

(c) In view of the particular difficulties which have arisen in regard to appointments and promotions in the various State and other public services, special provisions should be made for the equitable appointment and equitable treatment of persons of both communities at all the levels and in all the services of the administration, central and local, and including the police and the judiciary, and also in all para- statal organizations. Among these appointments, at least one district administrator should be a Turkish- Cypriot.

4» Having regard to the gravity of the existing problems of 'personal security and the importance of the role of the police in dealing with them, an exceptional disciplinary procedure should be instituted in order to deal strictly and promptly, but without prejudice to normal criminal procedure, with all wrongful or inadequate professional acts of commission or omission on the part of the police. The disciplinary procedure should be administered by a mixed commission presided over by a judge. The control of the police services within each administrative district should be entrusted to the administrator of the district concerned.

5» The legislation dealing with municipalities should contain provisions for the review and revision of any action of a municipal authority which appeared to be motivated by discrimination against one community or another or against a member of either. Super- vision of this power of review and revision should be entrusted to the "Special Commissioners". In the larger towns, provision should be made for a maximum decentralisation of the management - 60 ~

of administrative services to such, subdivisions of the towns as may request it*

6. Each of the main communities should "be permitted to continue to enjoy a "broad autonomy, to "be guaranteed "by the Constitution and by legislation, in specified matters of religion, education and personal status. At the same time, measures should be taken in the cultural field with, a view to fostering closer understanding and cooperation between the communities, for example by the establishment of a mixed commission for cultural cooperation composed of persons independent of the Government and endowed with adequate means.

7« A general amnesty should be declared in respect of all crimes and offences related to the events beginning in December 1963} except for certain expressly defined crimes in common law.

8. Financial assistance should be provided under appropriate procedures for the rehabilitation and resettlement of persons whose properties, occupations and other affairs have suffered damage as a direct result of the events, including the resettlement of persons in Turkey or Greece in appropriate cases0

9* For a transitional period, a United Nations commission should be appointed to assist the authorities of Cyprus, including the "Special Commissioners", in the application of all the foregoing principles and to help them to overcome such difficulties as might arise. The commission should have the right to make representations to the Government of Cyprus on any matter relevant to the terms of the settlement of the Cyprus problem, including those relating to the conformity of constitutional and legislative provisions with, the international engagements to be undertaken by Cyprus, and it should be required to report periodically to the Security Council on all these matters,

10, Disputes which might arise among the parties concerning the conformity with the international obligations of Cyprus of constitu- - 61 -

tional or legislative provisions covering the foregoing matters should be submitted to a procedure of arbitration established on a permanent basis, mutatis mutandis, such as is provided for by the European Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 29 April 1957 (Arts. 20-25, 31 and 39). - 62 -

AHHEX II

PARTICULAR EECOMMENDATIONS CONGEHHT]TO A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AID GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS

Note; These recommendations have been formulated in the case of an independent State of Cyprus. In the case of union between Cyprus and Turkey, their principles should apply, mutatis mutandis, to a treaty between Greece and Turkey.

1. Cyprus would undertake to 3,bstain, except with the agreement of the cosignatories, from any act which might directly or indirectly impair its independence. This undertaking would be without prejudice to its right to become a member of or associated with any international organization, including economic communities.

2. Cyprus would undertake not to enter into any military alliance or to allow on its territory any activity tending to impair the security of any of the other contracting parties* To this end Cyprus would in particular undertake tc proceed to an immediate and complete disbandment of all its military forces and dismantling of installations and the destruction of their weapons, these actions to be carried out under the supervision of a commission representing the contracting parties and the United Nations. Cyprus would further undertake not to maintain in the future any armed forces other than the police forces necessary to maintain public order and internal security, the implementation of this undertaking also to be super- vised by the commission mentioned above.

3. Greece and Turkey would undertake to respect the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Cyprus and to help defend it against any aggression or threat of aggression from any source. - 63 ~

4» The three Governments would undertake to pursue, in their mutual relations, a policy of friendship and good neighbourliness, and to establish machinery for regular consultations among them for the resolution of problems of common concern. To help give effect to this policy, Cyprus and Greece and Cyprus and Turkey respectively, would undertake to negotiate in the immediate future agreements on cultural and economic cooperation.

5» Any differences arising between the parties in the application of the treaty of friendship, or in that of the treaties or agreements to be reached in order to bring those of I960 to an end, or from any other cause, should be submitted to a process of conciliation established on a permanent basis, such as is provided by the European Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 29 April 1957 (Arts. 5~17j 3l)j except where another procedure is provided for, or "where the pa,rties prefer in a particular case to submit it to the International Court of Justice or to an arbitration tribunal. QF CYPRUS

Submitted to 'the. United Hat ion® Mediator-c

ty ^tok® and Oe^ W ©th@r®0 Th© holding of IaM t^''nuinbee':of holders i@ @if-e2^ Is Turks and 0*7^ Igrdthera; aad b^ ar®^^ It i© |9I> ty Ttufks aad 1.358 TJQT ©th@r©0 .The Irrigated land owaerslaip 1® 80«,6^ by <9re.e]CB, 1 S«2^ by Turks and 3o2^

through its l«sjag Ms toryg thoiigh occupied by maay conqueror® ^ never lost and' has\ maintained throughout 9 fl-inee t&» eeeond milleaitaa B«,C« when th© first fip©@k colonist into th®' island It B Greek .'" The last rulers ©? Cyprus were th© British,, .occupied th© islaadj, which had tseen under the'Ottoaaa

for .aljout three hundred year s8 ia 18789 a© present Turks * • • •,...-' . • . of' Cyprus "are: Ae:scl'ndanta of thos© wko ©EBB aad settled ia the- ieland during' th© Ottoman >ecttp®ti©a* l^r the Ta?eaty ©f ,Eftusann©f siga®d -''la 19i23V Turkey- F@c®giiis®dp intermatioaall and without any re serration ,'•' that it had sac right or el aim

Douplag the varlotis periods of foreigm ocoupatl@n ©f th® island^ the dypriot s revolted, in order t© free from foreign doaainat Ion, Bat all the liberation failed:*'. :-" ' • "•' ';:.': '. -:-, ", ..,'••

In April 1955 p the QreekOypr lots s after unsuccessful efforts over many years to attain their freedom by peaceful ieeaaiSp revolted sigainst th© British colonial : regime;,• , ; ' . - -' •..'.- . :.;.-.•'.' . •. • '^. . ••• ' •• After a four-year struggle Qyprus was proclairaeci. an independent State9 Such independence was notp however9 a full on®. The Hepubllc of Cyprus was founded on the of Zurich and ^London which did not esiaaat© from the' f£>©@ will Qt th® p®©pl© teat were iispossd on the®,* tEh® Agreements were sig&©d, by th© (JoveraBsiite of Great Britain^, QT&QQ® and- Turkey,/ by' Arehtoisbap lakarlaa on .feehalf of the Qreelt Qjrpriots and by Dr» mitelxuk on "behalf jf ;th@ Turkish Wh©s Archbishop Ma&arios was invited t© London in ^959p 3Tor th@' purpos® ©f ©igalag th® . Agreements on behalf of th® QreeK Qypriots$ h® expressed great miagivlngff and ralseil a nutaber ©f objeetlone to ssrtala provisions of th© Agreement@m He tried very hard to bring about at-least certain ©hang©s, but h© failed in fats efforts®

ia th© "circumstances9 the ©uly alternatives ©pea to him were either-to sigpi the A^reemeats as they stood or reject them entirely9 "In view of th© grave situation whi

...... , . ; "At tiie:saiue tins® when the Ooastitution was ©igiascl •-.,/• -. . . • th©'"'Er>ile:aty of Bstatolishment^ 'the Treaty of Guarantee and the treaty o£ Alliance tsrere also signal and .put into foro®« The last two ajfor9ra®n,tion®d Treat ies were giT@a

' la' •Bpit • e of it• ~s r atsmerica• . l strengtk• ' » its proportion In the land ownership and its contribution to public expenditure^ the Turkish minor ity-p against any prssedent and contrary to e-rery demoeratie prineiplep apajrt from having its minority rights fully safeguarded by the Gonstitution, was put on the same level with regard to the exercise of politleal powers in th® state with the Gteeefe majority, in many respects it was even put In a more advantageous positlonp as it was given the means to override the will of the major i'ty. " . - • ,.. .-..'.' • " ••• • • . :"• • "' . " ' '..• •""' '••'"' - ?.'" ": ... , • • The/ The frequently el ted argument that the Turks of Cjp must "be treated differently from other mii.or>! tl^s cs>cs they form part of the Turks of the && inland ani their v language,, religions customs' and national aspirations are different -"from" those' of the Greeks of CyprusP is not a valid argument since thoae differences are the usual characteristics of every -minority in any other country^ In TurK@y itself j> out of a population of 21 ,121 ,1 78 (on the census of 1955) "1 ,0504*462 are KurdSj, 3640404 are Arabs and 2700425 of Various other nationalities (such a® Glrcasi&nsj, Arm&aiansp Georgians g Greekss Bulgarians and J®w®)g tout Turkey' never contemplated granting suc& minorities separate political treatoseatp and the asw Constitution of th© Republic of Turkey of 1961 cokt&ins no such

Sypru&e One eoraes across similar situations in. many other countries in th© world „ The extraordinary proposition has nerer "been put forward 9 however 9 that such minorities should 'b® given a -privileged position with regard t© their 'participation in the 'exercise of the political power in the State or that they should be under the protection of 'the foreign country from which they derlr® their ethnic origin0 What is usually claimed in favour of minorities is protection of their minority rights and no discrimination in the matter of political rights . ' Prom the moment that a section of th© conanunity is singled out send treated differently from the restp that 11 section autosaatically aeguires a( "©©paratenes© wixish makes of it an olo^ect apart0 If ©uoh section is given different rights from those of the rest of the cornrauaityp as happened in the case of C?ypruss then artificial? unrealistic and therefor® unworkable means have to Ta© devised in order to irapiement and safeguard such rights*,

Such a system IB essentially unjust 9 in that citizens are given unequal treatment and the inevitable consequence is conflieto The majority feels unfairly treated^ and therefor© aggrlored? while the minority is forever suspecting the majority of endeavouring to take its privileges away*

•..••' .'•-'" -; ',•' \:,.'-' • Separate/ Separate treatment of $ minority prevent.;;, u. ' -irs'. ion

and the development of unity and of 9 pabu: 20(1.30 ien~^s accentuates differences ancL perpetuates ;onfi ijve v \|JB a result of the First World War and. under the league of Nations provisions were mad© in many treaties

whereby minority rights, were safeguarded0

' • • "-••>••--. • ; , • -' : ' .'. The special saJTeguar&s with regard to minority rights related to -' V. ..;'•.;'.:/- .'•'•,..'..'. . •. . • '

, (a) equality /bef ore .the law 9 that is to eayp equality

. oT" civil ; rights arid "political rights s especially with regard to access ion to the 'public service 5 (15 ) f ree use of the 'mother tongue in private and

ooiraB&rGial relations8 in matters connected with ' '. . the pr©ss9 puljllcatlonsp in meetings ^ and before : '•••• ": ' ' the ceurt * f.: ••/';.'.• ,f • ..-'-. . -•••'.' • ' • ' ' . - ^. ... (e) equal Fight with ©ther c It izena to maintain, at '• . their owa ©xpense ohapitable^ religl©uss 'social , . /'" and educatloaal institutions | (d) in districts wher^e the minority constituted a . . . coneidefafele proportion of the population the instruation -in the state primary schools was f : ' '- - ..-.• "•-•'•"•'give.n in" the' ' mothe• . r tongu- e of such minority and a part of the expenditure in the state or local "" .''..- .:" '"._..' Ll .„' ' ' . .,.'"' •'," " "., ,; ..'•.•., , • , ' "budget was reserved for the educational9 religious or eharlta'ble purposes of such minor ity» , *''' .""' . A similar policy has "been followed in the treaties concluded after the Second World War {ep* the treaties of peace srith l^ingaryjj Rumania9 Italy and the Spec Lai Statu tfv re gar ding frits a te ) « 1 The privileged treatraeat of the Turkish minority . regarding its participation in. the exercise of the political power of fords it the means not only .of overriding the will of the miority "but also of preventing the smooth. of ti^ country ^ Th© Constitution of the Eeputilic contains many ssul geaj^ris, pgoylsiona tjased on th© concept of political c " conommai 'segrega'tione Apart from all the separatist and ' ' •.>-••-•'•'.-•-_. . • . negatire eleaien.ta8 the Cons tltut ion suffers from a further 1 fundamental defeat,, A number of its Articles9 and especially !thb;s©' cfreatlng auch elements^ are declared to be u;aehB.:igeab L^? "be in..-, :or.^ i-ier-el 3. J 1 . Art i-.".1-2 o i,A.rt S ; lr. ' 6^} a S v : • a I '"-•' I ^.r-:. *:n , ';.'"• j . political aignifioan^-^j >ui it *_>? :•":' :.-.- ".-

. '.4 ' the" pre'sent constituent ].Qv/er has no rigir '; •> o-r: *. ''-, ' " ' ' the-constituent power, of the future,, Furthermore s to -1 . ,••'.-'. ".'.•-.'-.• ' , : preclude amendment, of. a Const! tut i Dn,, is to iw,—-^ re>..il*i . . •'• and.to:'''dehy .prbgreaso 1 . It is not only the aforementloried const i tutic-nal provisions which .fetter the .'-exercise of the sovereign ', power a. of the Republic of Cyprus „ L • • •,•• " •;•- . •". • ' • • ' . '•'".-••" : g\ ' \ • . :.:. •-.-:.-'. -ir ,': .''•' . -• ' __;_• '•* 5y 'the Treaty of Guarantee, an obi lotion was imposec . . , ,, pn'-.'the •Repu'blic not to alter the Basic Articles of the

"^ . Oonst i tut Ion 0 The same Treaty affords the Guarantee; Powers an opportunity to "interfere with the domestic & -• " '-'. "''•• • • . " ••'; ' - ' •'••: ' ,;• • % affalrm of Gyprusa Under the Treaty of Alliance Greek and Turkish .,, ....'"• contingents'were'permitted to be stationed 3.i Cyprue. C .: -..,"•••" '"-;. ' . . " ' ':'- ..:,. '. • ' , . " under a Tripartite.Headquarters for the purpose of

i*! .defending Cyprus against aggression. This Treatyg " was considered -aja"terminated "by the Government of the • Republic owing' to its violation by Turkey in an esse-n.ti«l

""..' . part9 and this fact was eoroimrdieated to the Turtcidi:. Prime Minister by a letter of the. President, of the Republic '< ' ... . ""••'"'":. ."dated 'ifth; Apr'lip ;-1''$6iv,».-..-- .'•." ' All .the afbrelgaid constitutional and treaty barriers .^ restrict-'the Reput>li@ of Cyprus froin exerciying iti full sovereign powers and better, its people from aeila.lfig its oum affairs and deterraialng its own future and destiny,

£ . The :Security Coui3,e11 '9 before which the problscc of 1 Cyprus was brought„ in two 're-solutions (3/5575 of the ^tn 1 . • and 'i3'th':ftlarch^ 19-5^)^ recognised the oontinurition of the existence of the Republic of Cyprus as a sovereign * . state and of its

. of Gpeecep furtosy and the United Kingdom « j .'•'•'" "for the :?UJ*PO'se of promoting a peaceful- ,", ' . solutloa Hiid an agreed settleinsnt of the-

probleiii ctit.frenting Cyprus e

haTing__li;:mind the we'll—being of the •peool saatrsiaauuHnieasa^ataa^^ f ,f »'•MttatM^sfftta^tivs^ttytaaaao f.1- 0

riitio-jî -Dca-:*. •.:'•,- •>'• • . If/iOTfli _T"rnrriT»'tniniiiii-|tTlft*ii.i«T-"rTir> -Vr'r- V'-" i, —t' T- - r- «,-«i*< r--- v Taa j*eseiit anomalous situation ir. "r;if *hr State, It Is- not oiil^1 certain elements of t}•>-•» C'->rj.,r;i*u ^Mcâ are fiefectiTeo (Phfe whole concept on which the Oonstitutlon is "based ie entirely wrong» For this reason. 1 it IB neoessary to lay eomplet®!^ new foimdatioase the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance constitute an ttnaccepta'ble limitatloft of the In-Joêrdence FV 1 of Oypru& In that tiêy allow interference with the detest i S ? 9 affairs of the EejKJtlalie of

^ Certain general p^ni?iplesp on which the solution of yp^^s pr&t3l$a sJaould "be "basedp are set out Ie"iow0 It will "be otos§rV6d that one of these principles Is that the Constitution must "be approved by the pec-pl^ cf Cypra^0 It 7/ouldp thereforep be contrary to this general principle to fofmulate details of th6 Constitution at this stage p sino© that would "be tUe worJc -of e Constituent Asseiribly8 ;¥'•/:£;- •'-''•' '".;•'; ••^yjêi '^WÊt^ •^fe;-d|ff|&i; : o^tKfei^^sQTit^y' 'ou the 't?m Kge^^^lif J§fe''W;'êif^d^ re;"- [;..:,

Ho freatlfes «Mth Greece or 1\^\^j or ,;v; ^her io form part of ?h-a solutior. of the Oy..,r,^ ^ which wottld In ais^r way limit the indepeacien: f or sovereigntj*Jof the State and whic>i v/ouid preterit the i "»ople of Cypf as from - T. no' i•.;/,, ^^ :.:...•..-• ..-- .;::-•:,. the Gonstitutio'n or frcn cie;;idi?'i . n ;':•.-•: '. • .. " upon th^ir iu^-t^re*,

:(5)/>Jl\ V '' ft&'Constitution of the State sr.s: be '^bp|:e ~'$f'";t^rHiS '61th.er in Cons t rt .-.ent '^':'vt&e':jie!&'p;ie:-br ia any other Irt^rri'iiAo -.a .1^ l|5|^^svî^;:^:-^ such as a r erereîdîi, ! : i : : ? ii SjJfeli;-«'-. !.U;-;'<^"'^:v» .'si' ^"::;'''^'':" .<^'^^1 -*'•' - •'.•rv--:--ci: v;-S"-'-".'->'.";""'.'.; 1 ; •'•-.•'>••?•' • ^.v :fl^;fevsU;,,::;/.;vfv-;*r.i:v;7;r;:.'';,^/;:r.;.:;,.;;::, ,.;;.; v-.v?.s'-,',*.v/r-'i.--y;. -;";-'-*."-•-'/•.••'•=;'-; -^-'.;•--•• . ; tjjlî?^^ the State to be base! or. tr^ bsT'tfiSt the political Siajoriiy a* arg? and the political

Sleet ioii$ to "be" by general suffrage or. r< --o-^ron

The ^sesuti^e Power to be answer able .to ?.->' l r--i-iie:it . * J , f "' ' (?) AU Legislative Pover to ba e^rriscd by a -* > • .

' the Judielfil Power to'b« exercieed 'by f,;;. ::vi-,r,en,;er,ts unified: ^tiilcfar^j, exercising the ,1-or ie.ii: • i^a -: :J~-i < ^t either by the Const Station or by laws Hrresp~'-"t ; -ve of language,.' or -soasmmlty of Ui?- 1. tlbar:.; s.«,

; : ; •co«taii^d ' ;lfe-'"ia^ "êâ*:atloa of Huaan iii&£.i$(, t>i^ 'Suôtiean :'&isv%ttti<î feii'Ifemaa .Right •$ an-u tne Suroân ':S&6ial' âi**^ "'to-;l?e î-orporated ir. the Coz-i-m^-Mc^ ; •:^%•i^SV^fVtlatf^'•-|^@ fIl^.io^s' on feuma.n r7&«u6 tc \*

ifWd'^^'Mi^Beas-iitutlo.-! a^i cl ts,r nianitr of 5' ' • - . their estreRclaiieiit .are given to thts paper under the &eadiag '^Kainaii Higfets Safeguarded for all Persons" « (to) ? 2& addition to any municipal remedies9 redress to lie by recourse by individuals to International bodies, such as tlajb Eardpean Coratnission and European Court of Human Eights.

- ltli ' ^raraml1iil^8''aiia' minorities to have complete autonoagr in rerligloue oatters and certain aspects of personal otatuaf such as marriage and divorce, and in ths a&miaiistratipn of properties "belonging to religious foundations or inetitutionGo Details of the above Tight 0 and of their entrenchment in the Constitution are given in this paper under the heading "

ft 2) The Constitution to contain provisions with regard

to the manner of constitutiona•" ** \e l amendments,, No constitu* tional ajnendmeUt to be possible unless the relevant Bill is passed by a two*-third majority of the total number of Member* of Parliament, The amendment not to , beeoffie eff««tire unless approved by an absolute majority •off the total aofflfoer of Members of Parliament after a general election, I. internationally recognized human rights ss ox-ov^d-d the European Comwatian

or any provision relating to human rights to toe made lay the same procedure JIB is applicable in of any ©thej* ameaadmeats of the Constitution*, • "- - Provided that iii the case of any amendment necessary in order to bring- the Human Kighta Provisions into conformity with any Amendment to the European Convention on Human, Sights^ the European Social 'Charter or with any obligation of Cyprus , as a member of the United nations* a two-third majority of the total nujafeer of Members of Parliament shall be sufficient to .mafce the amendment in o'uestion, effectives, without the necessity of approval by a subseguent Parliament after & General Election, l ' • ;jn res^eot of ^the, Human .Sights to be ^fefflia^rded in. the

£h<=a.e should be made fr$^'$ji^ by a competent pvt»K';r^p^^ of legislation .^yA^^^^^ in the •S4:-;#^^ . ^S^.;^??^ ;,: ' :^'^^^^^^^^&^^^.'i'0&. competent court. ;:'v^î'?cSfflpâ;3^^'1^^ an act or omission "••^ê^-^^^f'^^^^^'Q^ person, exercising any -•^Jl^îiW authorityîs contrary r ; ! :^ :C4^^ a$â^- -WSa^-'6f the Human Rights Provisions i.||&; .^fî|||||îo)|it:i Sill; ~* 'i- j provision to the effect that the Human Bights Provisions of "the Constitution aay be .raised

<>/ before ;x a»jr court in any proceedings in which , ,j .. - this may fte relevant to tM Issue to be '

latematioaal v , (a.) Cyprus^ tjbraugh b&ing a Contracting Party to the 1 J ^tif6peaJX C,03avention on Htiraan Rights and ita Protocols? to submit to the competences of the ' Bk??opean. ComiaiSfiion of Human Highta anfl the - .s • . European Court of Human Bights la respect of -»• - •

("i) State applieat&anft (as per Art0 24 of the European Cotwention on Hunan Rights) <> (11) Individual applications (as per Art* 25 of the European Convention on Hunan Rights).

; (Jt. is. -to be noted that there exists a scheme toy fr^e legal aid to individual

applicants iindei* At-t,25)6

0>) By becomizig a Contracting Party to the European Social 'Charter, 1561* Cyprus wo>aid submit to the 1= • international supervisory competence: provided , .

V, ^ -i (e) Cyprus „ "be Ins a member of the 'Jît-.-j >.,--", -.*• s 'is already gsi^bêct te aay super-? *«=•.' / î-h.'ri that may 'be appliâDle to respeot of the UTU

of HdHian Eight sw

- .-. ! •-. f V *»

sad O r -( £) PSu igicrfia aiattera «, a&t ;r> 1 - 1 -: -- * :. » ,. 1 • ' - property gsd certain assent*, of p-sr

II. (^} The general responsibility f:r- •?».;. %-•.;;• .**!>,/ft J of th& cltig$na of the Republic ah* 11 lie nith tte-

T&e Q^Ternmeat sMll proviit- fr«e eLe.^er for all the tsitissivs of the Rep-t iic«

^ n r , , for th*a ill their own language ar;d the c.vrri-, ff such se&$ol& Shallj, in Addition to ct}>er - ^:;~ • t>33 *- ' T **• : • .uts;?$&$& i?elatln^ to religicr;,, hi >.:....•:;., -•-.•»: -.•:- matters Approved by d. T;rfkl&!i ^d-'oeavicc,rtl 1 r to "be S'e» t up H224sr the Ccnstit^'- , or r 'to &e uja-da^with regard t- ';-..,-Xlar.

"educaties.? that there shnli be Jih e-ff&py jrsar a SUIE ttearlnt; the su;;..^ to the saai appropriated for 'JreeV s1. rcadsn Ut 8 'the pjt?op<63?t:$.ott ivhich the rrun'ver rf pv;p,'l; e or sfe'odentfe lêeeiTizig inslryctlon. ir. Tu.t-Ki Kr; & - .-•* ^rv or JUistitu'tlona tears to IK? r.-irrfber c.f rîi"- iFi^ £ ijCistTiiCt'Jors in i-jv£(."}" &or'c''.3,^Tiy ' > schools or Ija^tltutioriSp at the elope of the previous Ti33d«r the 'same oortdiUons (if arÔ as ^;a3/ t- thfe CkiverjiflieJit in mfeklng £r=,nte c-v -.-u^.-.: .:!• in respect &t Q^dek setjandarj*- schoole or f.:^1 i^.^loiss, (5) All persdaî actiBfi irtdividâlly^ in es?o/1> v-u or as a ooBWUiJtjr/ will he entitled re e5*ibi.i ^h ., mKi.: ipeiiage and ooritrdl at iheir OWR esprnsc-' -.,\.y •:•: .iv-at tcs*

Or'ettJLtu^ftl In6"t$t\jtio£r^9 atia any sc*".:,T-. »:-.rj;5 otv-.=.r

0firtaT&jl3 &fer-§Yi~&39 prov lie'."? ' hr>" ,.,'"'. scJic^ls and establie^ue-^'^ ---.'•: •.-..;. : .:.;.'.»• as tc b® eesapetlbXe with jahlic or-Sei' i.-v. .•(•;..: moVe,i~

with the right t?> ties th?»ir own ler ^., =-.k;.#- ^r.-: >. ?<^r.- their o$m pel! p^k'wv^m»S''^r'^ r ; v f --'.<•••. ."v ••,.'i;v:S vvrfej':^'-i'V';v":^-'"'" :-'W, ••:•-'' ""'• ' ''''V: '?-•";•; :'"{':-•'• 'i' .-f --.'-."•". "'•.',' l:^^^^^S^W^:î^ÂSS^^: !|-?. IliliiaiiiSIWiâiT^^

x%ltfi

^a*?*;*:^e^ diToroe to he governed ?^!?t^t^ ooamaiity and to "be K.^y^?-7>>:••-;v*^ or othsr pajnjiy Qourt ^^^Mi^^'KA^^K-'' ' • (3) Oonslil'ltiii'OHal provision to "be made for Councils elected Tsy the oonammitle^ concerned to legislate oja matters of marriage, divoroe, Faraily Courts and the of e^(5leslsstlcal or other religious

f Insofar afl til© Greek Orthodox^ the Ar-raenians the Maromites are coacer'nedj the Conatfrtution may 'the existing EcolearjL-astlcal Courts and church legislating on suefe niatters* ^ *• -> ' Insofar as parks' sr© eoncernedp In view of the fact that the aforesaid atatters are dealt with by civil authorities^ aA eleet4$ Oouaeil % the Turkish cctsmmlty to "be eet up t& deal with such .jfiatters,

of, €jp(pyu^.a)X Eighty .An. i^ae

propoearfoir'asty esonst.itutional amendment of i rigfet« as defined above to require to "be Tsy a tw«f*-thlrd majority of the total nweter of the Kemfoer>s of Paril«aieTit» The/'aotettdaaent not to becoms tat 11 It 'has tseen approTed ty a fl^e-sixth of thB total utifflfoer of "W»idber» of Parliament after a geiaeral 333SK® tesSSSSio

•'^'^^^'!m^^ji^^'_eM' the Turkish Cypriote, ^^t;'t^^^B^:-'''»ugge8t that the oaly

?1»^^ -Of the island into two ||j|^^ region, and then a ^^•^^^^^^^''•^^^M^^^eto^ that the Turkish f'^-^..i^l^ of tlie iaian^ K«:l%te^ ^ passing through

^^^^#^W ot Nicosia and ending Jg|fjp^t':* ^^^ of iSi^rrt^^ claim an area of Ipfjfii^ that is to say 3&<>2?£ of

fllptil^^^^ that area, laadp ; ; t|K|lf^wM ^'^- : -" '-%i^4h^ is owri^d 600^/« "by tjjjjj&$y&*'^^ fey others» It should "be ^^•M^ Vf.*<'?>';.-i^ owiusrship of Turks,

^''fr'&j&ati^^ only 1696%» by ar«?as and 13, 5^.:^-^- ^;--,v^;::^^^f^.,,.,:.,;,^.f,fcaX;^to^ ';. - K 1 ifgf ^•* ^'-^ ^ 11 ij. Greek villages with ; : r ' ' '"' ;;'•". ' a population of 86P9M| (out of the 392 Greek Tillage B of the whole IslaM) 53 Turkish irillages with a population of •••••••;"••' • • 18,02'8 '{out of t20 To3?Msh tillages of the whole Island) : : : *&:,,,•"•• •.•'•'-.'•:• • ^^••'Ii9-'i^êd ''irl i"ja^^~wi'tfi ^ of k6ft52:k Greeks ^t^'-;^ villages of the whole S;fe8îa^ fe included 1m that area ftf^75;r:ffi^ if a cojjjpijigsopy ^^^^w&^.'v'-^'^lv^^ as suggested, the B::^:;^>^^^ moved would be greater "'' ' than the whole Turkish population of tbs Islande Such a seheiae, e.W'tâs.l'fely proposed on the pretext of

the security of life'and property of the Turksp h'-.$ no .o,-•' •••" . 'Other-purpose''than tet.": promote the partition of the island, !i^:v:-' •.;Vr^>'-;;" -am^.;:;:t|^-'fOf^tt^;io^ ©ottf«deration (not -even a vN^—^i'>^ of the ejcpajasiosiat |i^';'V"'':-:3;-'.';: '• •:'-i^^^^^^j^/^^i^^^!^ of the Turkish region, !f&S-;:i;®?^^ that Turkey has aspired |p;=.:,^.^ Turkey's intentions

j^^jfv-^ paets trassplrsd thp«ugfe f|ff^^

The Turkish %prlots? at the insti^Htion of Asmara put forw-ard eiiallar ©ladras to lord' Redo 1.Iffe, the $035 stitut Serial O&mis&ianej'j, who was ,. |jy the British Government ^o report or the Cyprat auestioa, X**M Sadcltff^, In rejecting the claim of Cypriot to TWr accorded eqlial political representation,, that such a claira could not "be acceded to, as it was *a elalm of 15 per cent ©f a population to share political power egiftlly with 80 per cent" and that a federation ifct such a^ease was Incoseeiva'ble wae there was ao pattern of tej?S«itot!lai separation "between the two eoaanuaa.lt 10s and apart from other objections0 federation of corasuiiltlea wkloli'does not lairolire also federation of territories seems t& "be a very difficult constitutional foratt« He «Gueliade

Purthe*mo!re stieh a s0hetees involving compuls©.?:/ movement of" populations, offends against the. fundamental human right of freedom of movesaekt ' and residence and in against the spirit of the resolution of the Security Council as it destroys" the existence of the sovereign .Republic of Qyprue* ' ;•;.'. 31

T&Q greatest concern of Cypriot Turks is security* The various contractual and actual guarantees provided in the past could not prevent an attack against the Turks arid their "being treated inhumanly and in a most outrageous manner. This proves that even contractual and actual guarantees are not sufficient to meet the aim for security* Therefore, it is absolutely essential that additional more effective physical guarantees should Toe provided for the security of life and property of the Turkish Community«, These additional guarantees can best be obtained by providing a geographical basis for the state of affairs created by the Zurich and London Agreements which were based oa the principle of a type of federation of the two Communities,, in view of the situation that gave rise to a conflict between the two communities which constitute an extension of the Turkish and Greek nations and caused a pTOGQPious situation of tension an! friction ^tweea-Si convtoaed that partition is a definite GET! lasting which would ensure removal of such conditions. This would also be th@ most righteous application of the principle of self-determination in Cyprus, But considering that this would not be willingly agreed to by Greece and Cypriot Greeks we accept to try once again their living together as a new proof of our good will and conciliatory spirit* However, we consider, as a minimum prerequisite for the security of life and property of the Turkish Community, that the two Communities should live side by side in a federal state and not intermingled* This is not a proposal for bargaining, but is a proposal of good will which contains the minimum security conditions for the protection of life and property of Gypriot Turks that cannot in any circumstances be given up* -2-

The principles of the Federal Constitution of the Republic of Cyprust- (1) The Federal Republic comprises Turkish and Greek Communities inhabiting two separate aroas in foe island• (2) in the creation of G^eek and Turkish areas, a compulsory exchange of population shall take place, The Turkish area will follow a lira from the village of Yalia on the north-west coast and running through Nicosia and Famagusta, to include the Turkish sectors of "both towns* to the sea. The extent of the Turkish area will be equal to the total area covered by property owned by Turks plus their proportionate share of atate land, 3?or the creation of this Area about 10,000 QyQek familibii.will have to be exchanged for approximately the same nu&b@p of Turkish families* (3) The official languages of the Federal Republic will be Turkish and Greelc* (k) Turkish and Greek areas of Cyprus shall each have self •"government exercised through an administrative mechanism of legislative, executive and judicial organs in accordance with their own constitutions* (5) The Government of each area will have powers to administer all affairs that fall outside Federal affairs* (6) Turkish and Gx»eek areas can enter into international agreements with Turkey and Greece to regulate relations of neighbourhood such as the provision of a certain special pass system, between the two areas and Turkey and Greece respectively* -3-

(7) Turkish and Greek areas can receive economic and cultural assistance from Turkey and Greece respectively and can each conclude international agreements with the two Governments for this purpose. (8) Turkish and Greek areas can each accord most- favoured nation treatment to Turkey and Greece respectively in cotamercial matters « (Note concerning Articles 6, 7 and 8« in view of special relations toetweai the two areas and Turkey and Greece, the special powers envisaged in those three articles are similar to those in operation in certain Swiss cantons) • (9) The common affairs of th© Turkish and G^eek areas will toe conducted through the federal administrative mechanism possessing legislative, executive and judicial organs* (10) poreiga affaire, defence* federal "budget, customs^ commepce, "banking and monetary affairs, standards of measurement , nationality passport matt ere, •

legislation, and matters concerning return of criminal© are common federal affairs* (11) The Federal legislative organ, will comprise a House of Representatives composed of 30 percent Turkish and 70 percent Greek Community representatives and a Senate composed of equal number of members elected "by Turkish and Gpeek areas* The posts of the presidents of the House of Representatives and of the Senate will "be held toy a Turk and a Greek in rotation annually. The presidential councils and the committees of the two Houses will toe composed of Turks and Greeks in proportions as laid down in paragraph 1 of

(12) The Federal legislative organ shall "be empowered to promulgate laws only- in matters enumerated in Article (10)* Legislative Assemblies of the two areas wiU each have authority over all matters remaining outside Federal affairs. . . . _ ^WJS^^WIWIWU-l^rSW.^^

(13) Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate shall be aisle to submit "bills for federal legislation. Any such draft law shall first be discussed la one of the two'Houses of Parliament as requested "by the sponsoring member* Approval of "both Houses shall bo needed for a bill to become law. If a draft law.la'rejected or altered by either House after it is approved by one of the two Houses, it shall be discussed at a joint comnittee composed of an equal number of Turkish and Greek members. The draft as prepared by this joint committee shall then be submitted to both Houses where it will either b© approved or rejected. (li|.) Federal expend!tore shall be mot by revenue from Customs duties* (15) The Federal Executive organ is constituted according to •Sao presidential system. The Federal president and Vice-president are elected by the Greek and Turkish Comiaaniti@s respectively from amongst their own members* ; • (16) The president and vice-president separately have the. right of veto and return in respect of laws and decisions concerning Sorely affaires defence and the Federal budget* (1?) The president and th© Vice-president ar© assisted by the necessary number of Ministers. Seventy percent of Ifte Ministers shall be from fee Greek Community and thirty percent from the Turkish Community. The Ministry of the Federal Finance or -Qie Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall be entrusted to a Turkish Minister* (18) Compulsory Military Service can only be Imposed by the Joint decision of th© president and the VI ce-president • ^-S^H?^W.-SWIB-u."il4l>fW

(19) The Federal Republic shall have an army of 600 and a police Force of 200 for Customs, Traffic and Tourist Affaire, The Federal Array and the Federal Police shall be composed of sixty percent Greeks and forty percent Turks* (20) The Federal Court shall TDG the Court of first instance and the Court of Appeal in civil and criminal cases where the parties are Greeks and Turks, (21) The Federal Court shall be composed of one Turkish one o-reek and one neutral 3udge. The neutral judge shall be the president of the court. The Court shall make its own Rules of court,

(22) The Federal Constitutional Court shall have authority to deal with disputes of power between the Constitutions of the two arena and the Poderal Constitution, with cases concerning violations of these Constitutions, and with cases concerning .offences committed Toy the president, the Vice-president and the Federal Ministers and judges. The Federal Constitutional Court shall also be entrusted with the duty of controlling federal elections*

(23) The Federal Constitutional Court shall comprise one Turkish judge, one Greek judge and one neutral Judge, The neutral judge shall be the president of the Court. The Court makes its own rules* (2U) The President of the Federal Court and of the Constitutional Court can be one and the same judge. ! (25) The Federal public service shall consist of 30$ Turkish and of 7Q# Greek salaried or wage earning officials*

/(26) -6-

(26) The provisions of the Federal Constitution con "be amended "by a separate majority vote of at least two-thirds of tfee Turkish and GpOek members of the Federal Legislative organ.

.(2?) The l^ion of the Fede^alPepublic with another State or its partitfonis prohibited under national and international under talcing s. (29) The pro Vila ionipof the Treaties of Alliance and of Guarantee are reserved and form an integral part of the Federal Constitution, (29) Rights and liberties laid down in the European Convention for the protection of Human lights and Liberties will "be fundamental to the Constitutions of the two areas and to the Federal C ons ti tuti on , (30) The Federal Republic of Cyprus recognises the compulsory jurisdiction of the international Court of justice and of the Human Rights Committee of the Council of Europe and makes the necessary declaration enabling the citizens of the Federal Republic to have recourse to the Htoan Rights committee of the council of Europe,

in drawing up thes© constitutional principles use has been made of the basic principles of 12ie constitutions of UeSej> Canad© and Switzerland*