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Schrenk. Ernst Mach on the Self Ernst Mach on the Self: The Deconstruction of the Ego as an Attempt to avoid Solipsism Dr. Markus Schrenk DFG Project Explanation and Causation Philosophisches Seminar Universität zu Köln Richard-Strauss-Straße 2 50931 Köln, Germany [email protected] www.clde.uni-koeln.de/schrenk 1 | 9 Abstract. In his Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations (Mach 1885) the phenomenalist philosopher Ernst Mach confronts us with a difficulty: “If we regard the Ego as a real unity, we become involved in the following dilemma: either we must set over against the Ego a world of unknowable entities […] or we must regard the whole world, the Egos of other people included, as comprised in our own Ego.” (Mach 1885: 21) In other words, if we start from a phenomenalist viewpoint, i.e., if we believe that t h e m a n i f o l d o f sensations we are confronted with is o n t o l o g i c a l l y fundamental —as Mach clearly does: “ F o r u s , c o l o r s , s o u n d s , s p a c e s , t i m e s , … a r e t h e ultimate ele- ments” (Mach 1885: 23)—then we are in danger to end up in solipsism. Unless, that is, we assume that some underlying t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f s u b s t r a t u m f r o m which matter, we ourselves, and all the others emanate. The only other alter- native seems to be— and Mach advertises it vehemently for he denies any “mons- trous notion of a Fig. 1 thing-in-itself” (Mach 1885: 6)1—that we get rid of the Ego. For, if there is no Self in the first place, then the question whether there are others dissolves. To put it the other way round, it is ok that the others do not exist because, really, I do not exist either. If the Ego is a Myth solipsism is not just wrong but nonsense. There are two questions this paper wishes to address: first, do we need independent additional support for the denial of the Self or is the avoidance of solipsism reason enough to assume the Ego’s non-existence? I will argue that we do need additional reasons and I will evaluate those that Mach indeed gives to prove that “the primary fact is not the I, the Ego, but the elements (sensations)” (Mach 1885: 19). Second, is the deconstruction of the I, even if further sufficient support can be found, really adequate to stop us from worrying about solipsism? The doubt I will put forward is that the illusion of a Self might conjure up enough of an Ego—just like feeling a pain is having a pain, even if it is located in a phantom limb—to start us wondering whether it also occurs elsewhere. 1 Needless to say, there are no souls or transcendental egos either. Fig 1.: Illustrations from Mach’s Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations; apparently drawn by himself. 2 | 9 (1) What is and how do we end up with a thesis like Solipsism? Solipsism is the doctrine, or, rather, the fear that only oneself exists. More precisely, for one might sadly be the only survivor of a nuclear war, a solipsist believes that everything is construed by him or her as part of the content of his or her consciousness. Solipsism often goes hand in hand with external world scepticism but it does not have to. In fact, all of the four following combinations of two affirmations and two rejections are possible: What we ordinarily believe is, I suppose, (1.1) that there is a mind independent external world and that there are also other minds, thus rejecting both external world and other minds scepticism. Bishop Berkeley thought (1.2) that there is no external world (or only one imagined by god), yet, he did not doubt the existence of other minds. The reverse is also possible, while, to my knowledge, never defended: (1.3) the world, including other bodies, but no other minds exist (this would be a world full of what has become known as “Zombies” within analytic philosophy of mind). Last but not least, we might believe (1.4) that there is neither an external world nor that there are other minds. This is the extreme combination—external world scepticism plus solipsism—I will be concerned with here.2 Further focussing on the epistemological side of things we see that the problem of solipsism emerges easily as a consequence of epistemic theories cum theories of perception that start with the assumption that the immediate objects of our experiences are sense impressions (sense data, ideas, percepts, and the like) and that the objects of the external world, including other persons, are at best mediate (if not inexistent). Arguments from hallucination, dreams, evil daemons, brains in vats, matrices, etc. attest to these confined epistemologies to which, for example, many empiricists, phenomenalists, phenomenologist subscribe in one form or another. (2) What can we do? Four orthodox answers. Before I go into some detail of one such theory, Ernst Mach’s phenomenalism, I first briefly sketch four known answers (or types of answer) to the solipsist. (2.1) God to the Rescue. As mentioned already, Bishop Berkeley thought the world exists in god’s imagination and all other minds participate in this divine resource. While Berkeley’s move is not directly countering solipsism but rather the fear of the in-existence of the external world it is granted that if an extra mental world is somehow secured, and should it only be in some transcendent being’s mind, then solipsism is less of a threat: if god accounts already for something external why should he not be so kind to also create other minds? Being methodologically agnostic as philosophers (if not proper atheists), we must, however, dismiss Berkeley’s and other religious answers to solipsism. Unless, of course, we come to believe that solipsism/scepticism can only be solved by a leap of faith, i.e., only if we are forced to derive the existence of god from the otherwise irresolvable problem of solipsism. Yet, for my part, I would not want to cross that bridge until we should come to it. 2 In fact, I will deal with the worst ontological form of it, for we might further distinguish the above metaphysical theses from (weaker) corresponding epistemic forms that formulate (1.2) - (1.4) only as contrived epistemic possibilities: for all we know (because all we know for certain is the content of our consciousness) (1.2) - (1.4) might be true, yet, fortunately, they really aren’t for it’s (ontologically) agreed that (1.1) is correct. 3 | 9 (2.2) Analogical Inference, Theoretical Entities, Behaviourism. Analogical Inference. In similar circumstances, other human bodies with the same physico- chemical composition behave like my body. So, I might conclude that they have a mind just like I do.3 Theoretical Entities. Like other (scientific) theoretical entities, the stipulation of other minds is a useful tool for predictions of other bodies' behaviour. I.e., other minds are the best explanation of other bodies' trajectories through space and time and, so, we may postulate their existence. Behaviourism. Adopt behaviourism as your theory of mind then there is no special problem to have access to other minds, for all there is to know about minds is anyway only their behavioural dispositions which manifest themselves in bodily movements (including, if you wish, the noises these bodies make with their tongues). These three similar solutions are, of course, only possible if you have already taken the existence of the external world for granted. In other words, they are answers to (or rejections of) the zombie-world as depicted in (1.3). Since this paper focuses on type-(1.4) solipsism, where also the external world is in peril, (2.2) cannot be a solution, at least not on its own. (2.3) Eliminativism Materialism. Likewise with eliminative materialism:4 sure, if there are no minds at all then the problem of other minds seems not to arise a forteriori. Yet, again, eliminative materialism presupposes, just like the answers given in (2.2), the existence of the external world and is thus, not a solution to our problem unless we supplement a proof that the external world exists. (Be that as it may, eliminative materialism foreshadows an aspect of the solution to solipsism Ernst Mach favours and which will later be the main focus of this paper.) (2.4) Others first. One further line of argument against other-minds-scepticism argues that to think of certain mental states as mine is, in the first place, to discriminate them from mental states that are not mine, and these latter are, by definition, the mental states of others. One way to argue for a position like this centres on language and says that language is essentially a public phenomenon. Very crudely put, the assumptions needed to start the sceptical/solipsistic argument are, if true, the very ones that make it false: to be able to entertain the thought that I am the only one or that there is no external world the concepts “world”, “exists”, “I”, “external” have to be known, and yet, their acquisition and/or meaning depends on worldly and interpersonal interaction.5 3 Ayer, in his Language, Truth, and Logic (p.136) acknowledges in a separate subchapter (which appears in the extended table of contents, yet, not as headline in the main text) that his phenomenalism gives rise to the problem of solipsism.
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