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Duquesne University Duquesne Scholarship Collection Electronic Theses and Dissertations Spring 5-6-2016 Kant With Foucault: On The aD ngers Of The Theoretical Reification Of The ubjecS t To Freedom And The eedN For A Practical Psychology Matthew Gordon Valentine Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd Recommended Citation Valentine, M. (2016). Kant With Foucault: On The aD ngers Of The Theoretical Reification Of The ubjS ect To Freedom And The Need For A Practical Psychology (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1527 This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. KANT WITH FOUCAULT: ON THE DANGERS OF THE THEORETICAL REIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT TO FREEDOM AND THE NEED FOR A PRACTICAL PSYCHOLOGY A Dissertation Submitted to the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts Duquesne University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Matthew Valentine May 2016 Copyright by Matthew Valentine 2016 KANT WITH FOUCAULT: ON THE DANGERS OF THE THEORETICAL REIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT TO FREEDOM AND THE NEED FOR A PRACTICAL PSYCHOLOGY By Matthew Valentine Approved April 4, 2016 ________________________________ ________________________________ James Swindal, Ph.D. Fred Evans, Ph.D Professor of Philosophy and Dean Professor of Philosophy (Committee Chair) (Committee Member) ________________________________ Jay Lampert, Ph.D Associate Professor (Committee Member) ________________________________ ________________________________ James Swindal Ronald Polansky, Ph.D Dean, The McAnulty College and Chair, Philosophy Department Graduate School of Liberal Arts Professor of Philosophy Professor of Philosophy iii ABSTRACT KANT WITH FOUCAULT: ON THE DANGERS OF THE THEORETICAL REIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT TO FREEDOM AND THE NEED FOR A PRACTICAL PSYCHOLOGY By Matthew Valentine May 2016 Dissertation supervised by Doctor James Swindal, Ph.D, Dean and Professor In this dissertation I consider the question, “Is it possible to think the subject qua subject or must any theoretical attempt to understand the subject necessarily reify it?” To answer this question, I appealed to Immanuel Kant’s distinction between theoretical and practical reason, noting that practical reason could think the subject as a free soul rather than as a naturally- determined object. I then divided the sciences of the subject into four general types to determine which science could think the subject qua subject. Three sciences were shown to necessarily reify the subject: empirical psychology, rational psychology, and heteronomous ethics. I then paralleled Kant’s insight with Michel Foucault’s analyses of the human sciences, showing the concrete consequences of objectification. Using Foucault’s work on ethical practice and askesis as a guide, I returned to Kant and explained how practical reason can think the subject qua subject only insofar as it considers the subject as something to be made rather than a theoretical object to know. I then posed the question, “What are the necessary conditions for someone to be a subject of possible experience?” which led into a Kantian-inspired theory of love and intersubjectivity. Finally, I concluded that contemporary psychology is mired in an impasse between happiness and freedom, insofar as therapeutic practice is no longer an ethic. I suggest the need for a practical psychology to solve this impasse. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to acknowledge the members of my committee individually: Ever since the summer of 2007, so many years ago, Doctor James Swindal has taken me under his wing. I was his teaching assistant my first year at Duquesne and was his assistant when Duquesne hosted SPEP Fall of 2008. Much has changed at Duquesne since those days, but Doctor Swindal’s guidance and support has remained a constant. No words are adequate to express my gratitude to him. My interest in Michel Foucault was sparked by Doctor Fred Evans back in the spring of 2008. Fred and I both share a love for both philosophy and psychology, and I found myself, semester after semester, taking his offered courses. Many of the papers I wrote for him were papers that expressed thoughts I still treasure as most mine, and I am grateful to have had the opportunity to study with him, as well as work for him as a Fellow for the Center of Interpretive and Qualitative Research from Fall of 2014 to Spring of 2015. It wasn’t until the Spring of 2008 that I was introduced to the work of Alain Badiou by Doctor Jay Lampert. It may not be evident, but this project was fundamentally shaped by an engagement with Badiou and was originally about Kant and Badiou rather than Kant and Foucault. Without Badiou’s distinction between the True and the veridical, for example, I would likely not have considered Kant’s distinction between theoretical and practical interests of reason, nor the epistemological role of affect, nor considered the possibility that ethics could take on forms other than that of bioethics. Jay has been a consistent source of constructive criticism and has no qualms challenging my arguments, which makes me all the more confident that I have produced a work of merit. I am grateful that he has engaged with my work so thoughtfully and so patiently. But I would like to acknowledge others just as responsible for this work as well: There have been some who were with me as I committed the first words of this dissertation to page. There were some who sat across from me in coffee shops as I pushed through the over four hundred pages of this work. There are those who were with me, in person and in spirit, as I applied the finishing touches to this behemoth. I couldn’t have finished this dissertation without you and will always have a special place in my heart for you. But there are those who were with me and supported me before I ever took up the pen, my parents Deborah and Gordon, and my sisters, Heather and Megan. There are those I grew up with who were like family, David, Mike, and James. Without that bedrock, I would not have ever set out on this unlikely path. Thank you. v Table of Contents Chapter One 1.1 The Ego that is Not: Kant’s Rejection of the Empirical Ego and its Pleasures 1 Introduction 1 Sciences of the Self 2 Kant’s Critiques of Empirical Psychology 3 The Formal Limitations of Inner Sense 6 The Material Limitations of Inner Sense 15 Methodological Limitations of Empirical Psychology 16 Contradictions: Kant’s Position on Empirical Psychology in the Critique of Pure Reason 17 Possible Motives behind the Rejection of the Empirical Ego 20 What is the Empirical Ego? 23 The Status of the Transcendental Ego 28 1.2 Overview 32 Rational Psychology 32 Heteronomy of Choice 38 Chapter Two 2.1 The Faculty of Reason: An Introduction to the Paralogisms 40 2.2 The Predicates of the Soul and Their Derivation 49 2.3 Background Material on the Paralogisms 52 2.4 Background on the Paralogisms in General 56 Christian Wolff 56 Martin Knutzen 59 Alexander Baumgarten 62 Christian August Crusius 68 Leonard Euler 72 Marcus Herz 74 Johann August Eberhard 76 Johann Nicolaus Tetens 79 2.5 Discussion of the Specific Paralogisms and Relevant Background Material 81 The First Paralogism 81 Thinkers Addressed by the First Paralogism 84 The Second Paralogism 86 Thinkers Addressed by the Second Paralogism 88 Christian Wolff 89 Martin Knutzen 90 Alexander Baumgarten 91 Christian August Crusius 91 Marcus Herz 92 The Third Paralogism 93 Thinkers Addressed by the Third Paralogism 94 Johann August Eberhard 95 Johann Nicolaus Tetens 96 The Fourth Paralogism 96 vi Thinkers Addressed by the Fourth Paralogism 99 2.6 Final Words on the Paralogisms 101 Chapter Three 3.1 Heteronomy of Choice: Introduction to the Task of the Chapter 103 3.2 Subjective-External Material Practical Principles 109 Michel de Montaigne’s ‘Education-based’ Moral Theory 112 Bernard Mandeville’s ‘Civil Government’ based Moral Theory 117 3.3 Subjective-Internal Material Practical Principles 122 Epicurus’ ‘Physical Feeling’ based Moral Theory 125 Francis Hutcheson’s ‘Moral Feeling’ based Moral Theory 131 3.4 Intermezzo: From the Subjective to the Objective 146 3.5 Objective-Internal Material Practical Principles 149 The Stoic Perfection-based Moral Theory 150 Stoicism 150 Early Stoicism: Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus 151 Later Stoicism: Seneca and Epictetus 154 Seneca 154 Epictetus 156 Kant’s Account of the Ethical Systems of Antiquity 159 General Reflections on Stoicism as Heteronomy 165 The Wolffian Perfection-based Moral Theory 165 Conclusions regarding Objective-Internal Material Practical Principles 167 3.6 Objective-External Material Practical Principles 167 Crusius’ Divine Command Moral Theory 168 3.7 Final Remarks on Heteronomy and Its Threat to Freedom 169 Chapter Four 4.1 The Table of Heteronomy as Architectonic for Foucaultian Forms of Control 173 4.2 Objective-Internal Forms of Domination: The History of Madness 181 Criteria for the Objective-Internal Form of Domination 181 Foucaultian Epistemology in The History of Madness 182 A History of the Experiences of Madness 184 Renaissance 184 Renaissance Literature: Erasmus and the Humanists 186 Tragic Experience vs. Critical Consciousness 187 The Ship of Fools 189 The Classical Age (The Enlightenment Period) 190 The Domain of Confinement 191 Madness and Bourgeois Standards
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