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Napoleon's Tragic March Home from Moscow: Lessons in Hubris

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Napoleon's Tragic March Home from Moscow: Lessons in Hubris Academy of Managemenl Executive. 2000. Vol, Ii. No. 1 Napoleon's tragic march home from Moscow: Lessons in hubris Mark J. Kioll, Leslie A. Toombs. and Peter Wright Executive Overview Throughout history, hubris has been cited as a common reason for leadership failure. One of the more famous examples of hubris at work was Napoleon's Russian campaign of 1812. in which he lost his army and empire. The authors examine (he consequences of both Napoleon's hubris and the hubris of contemporary business executives. Among the managerial behaviors that may reflect hubris are making unsound and over-priced corporate acquisitions, pursuing growth for its own sake, and knowingly violating the standards of acceptable conduct. Using historical material on Napoleon as well as contemporary business examples, we examine the causes of hubris and specific leader behaviors that are likely to result. Guidelines for reducing the incidence of hubris are suggested. Napoleon, supreme egoist that he was, ig- Hubris has been defined as exaggerated pride, nored the significance of the omens until he self-confidence, or arrogance, frequently resulting and his host were completely and irrevocably in retribution.^ Hubris may be blamed for the re- committed to an undertaking that was sounding failure of Napoleon's campaign because doomed. Never did the gods punish hubris Napoleon possessed all its symptoms: unbounded more severely. confidence given his past successes and the ac- companying narcissism, the adulation that fed M. de Fezensac, The Russian Campaign, that narcissism, and his callous indifference to- ward the rules that governed 19'^ Century geopol- In June of 1812, Napoleon Bonaparte was ruler of itics. the Empire of France, King of Italy, and master of As a result. Napoleon was able to convince him- the European continent. At the head of The self that, despite all of the obvious obstacles, he Grand Army, numbering over 500,000 men, the could, through force of will, succeed in bringing largest force ever assembled at that point in Russia and especially Emperor Alexander I, the history, he set out to conquer the one nation in sole power on the Continent that refused to pay Europe he had not yet subjugated—Imperial Rus- him homage, to their knees. His campaign was sia. In December of the same year, less than much less about the need to thwart the hostile 20,000 of those men would make it home alive, and as a practical matter, all that Emperor Na- intentions of a rival power, and more about the poleon had accomplished in his meteoric career need to satisfy a hubris-infected personality with would soon be lost. The tragedy of the Russian an arrogant confidence about what great feats campaign, the loss of life, and the horrible suf- could be accomplished. fering of those on the march back from Moscow One frequently cited explanation for hubris is have been a source of fascination for historians that leaders often hunger for reassurance and ap- ever since. Explanations for the disaster include plause from others. This hunger may first arise poor planning, unusually bad weather, insight- when a child's narcissistic displays are fondly re- ful leadership on the opposing side, and plain ceived by parents."" As such leaders grow and be- bad luck. But, as indicated by our epigraph, al- come a part of groups or organizations, however, most all accounts of the campaign include a they may seek the same adulation from organiza- recognition of the role played by hubris.^ tion members in response to their displays of skill. U7 118 Academy of Management Executive February Those who excel in select skills may receive posi- the securities markets provide accurate feedback tive feedback from others as they produce benefi- by doing a fairly effective job of valuing publicly- cial results. Napoleon clearly excelled in the skills traded firms.'^ The premiums executives sometimes of warfare, as he planned and implemented win- pay over target firms' prevailing market prices of- ning campaigns. Before the Russian attack. Napo- ten reflect a Napoleonic logic; "I will be able to leon had amassed a record of 35 wins versus only overcome all the obstacles and make the acquired 3 losses. The losses were either early in his career, business far more successful than its incumbent and then forgotten, or were only very temporary management; I can turn a profit on the deal in spite setbacks from which he quickly recovered. of the high price I am paying." Through these warfare experiences, he developed However, compelling research evidence shows a distinctive approach to command, along with that corporate acquisitions driven by managerial hu- considerable confidence in that approach. By the bris are often financially harmful for the sharehold- time of the Russian Campaign, however, this con- ers of acquiring firms.^ It also appears that as the fidence had turned into arrogance and a sense of level of managerial hubris rises, so does the likeli- invincibility. Worse, given his record, he appears hood that a firm will grossly overpay for an acquisi- to have believed that unique problems of a war tion.^ Compounding the problem of overpayment is with Russia were minor details that the force of the possibility that managerial hubris will under- will could surmount. mine the process of integrating the acquired and In the contemporary corporate arena, actions acquiring firms. There is the very real threat that the such as takeovers, corporate expansion programs, acquiring firm's management, imbued with a sense and blatant disregard of the rules of the game may of conquest, will treat the acquired firm's manage- reflect the presence of hubris. These actions some- ment and employees as conquered supplicants. This times suggest that the firm's management believes is especially likely if the acquiring firm is perceived that the world, and the major forces in it, including as having a better track record than the acquired financial markets, government regulators, and firm.^° The inevitable results are a failure to achieve competitors, are wrong, and that they are right, potential synergies and a loss of talent from the and are not governed by the same forces. As with acquired firm. Both outcomes will exacerbate the Napoleon's Grand Army, corporate hubris is often initial overpayment problem. punished severely. We will take a look at three An example of potential corporate hubris in an circumstances in which hubris may set businesses acquisition is the buyout of WordPerfect by Novell and their leaders down a perilous path—corporate in March 1994. Novell's CEO, Raymond Noorda, acquisitions, unbridled growth for its own sake, offered $1.4 billion for WordPerfect, in what indus- and disregard for the rules. Parallels are drawn try observers suggested was an attempt to build a with Napoleon's circumstances. software empire comparable to Microsoft's. Fol- lowing the acquisition, Novell reportedly ran roughshod over WordPerfect's management and As with Napoleon's Grand Army, culture, leading to a hemorrhage of managerial corporate huhris is often punished and technical talent and a significant deteriora- severely. tion in the performance of WordPerfect. In early 1996, Novell was forced to sell WordPerfect for about $124 million, or less than 10 percent of what Corporate Acquisitions it paid for the firm in 1994.'i Well before the invasion of Russia, Napoleon's top lieutenants argued that the chances of failure, and the cost in lives and materiel were high. Napoleon Unbridled Growth for its Own Sake rejected their warnings, pointing out that his plans Hubris can also manifest itself in a drive to domi- called for a quick, decisive, and therefore low-cost nate others and engage in empire building for its campaign. He had conducted such campaigns be- own sake. Napoleon's determination to invade fore, and saw no difference this time.^ Richard Roll Russia was driven not only by a desire to take over has suggested that all too frequently takeover at- that country, but also by a burning ambition to tempts result from an executive's belief that he or dominate Czar Alexander. The Czar was the only she can greatly improve the target firm's effi- European monarch Napoleon had not subjugated, ciency. The executive rejects feedback from others and by doing so Napoleon would have become the and, in particular, the wisdom of the financial mar- sole master of Europe. The same need for domina- kets,^ even though it is generally recognized that tion and empire building may surface in the cor- 2000 Kroll, Toombs. and Wright 119 porate world. It is generally recognized that indi- grabs were undertaken in spite of his earlier vidual executives infected with hubris have pledges of fidelity to the republic and its demo- narcissistic requirements that demand they control cratic ideals. He evidently concluded that obliga- fiefdoms of such large scale as to justify their own tions to the French people and living up to oaths importance.'^ An executive infected with hubris were for others to fulfill.'^ will likely see growth as a means of building a Managers afflicted with hubris can also create a bureaucracy of sufficient size to reflect his or her climate in which they and the organizations they prominence. For instance, the rise and fall of the govern do not play by the same rules as everyone Saatchi & Saatchi advertising empire in the 1990s else." For example, observers have remarked on the reflected the ambition of a pair of brothers who no indifference of the managers of Archer Daniels Mid- longer concerned themselves with building a prof- land Company to the laws they broke and how the itable advertising business. ^^ Instead, they aspired long-time CEO, Dwayne O. Andreas, allowed an for dominance by building an advertising empire anything-goes culture to develop.' ^ Such hubris- that was the very biggest, only to be forced out of prone personalities are likely to perceive themselves the business they had built.
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