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Lessons from New York's Recent Experience with Capital Punishment
BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU ASK FOR: LESSONS FROM NEW YORK’S RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT James R. Acker* INTRODUCTION On March 7, 1995, Governor George Pataki signed legislation authorizing the death penalty in New York for first-degree murder,1 representing the State’s first capital punishment law enacted in the post- Furman era.2 By taking this action the governor made good on a pledge that was central to his campaign to unseat Mario Cuomo, a three-term incumbent who, like his predecessor, Hugh Carey, had repeatedly vetoed legislative efforts to resuscitate New York’s death penalty after it had been declared unconstitutional.3 The promised law was greeted with enthusiasm. The audience at the new governor’s inauguration reserved its most spirited 4 ovation for Pataki’s reaffirmation of his support for capital punishment. * Distinguished Teaching Professor, School of Criminal Justice, University at Albany; Ph.D. 1987, University at Albany; J.D. 1976, Duke Law School; B.A. 1972, Indiana University. In the spirit of full disclosure, the author appeared as a witness at one of the public hearings (Jan. 25, 2005) sponsored by the Assembly Committees discussed in this Article. 1. Twelve categories of first-degree murder were made punishable by death under the 1995 legislation, and a thirteenth type (killing in furtherance of an act of terrorism) was added following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2003). Also detailed were the procedures governing the prosecution’s filing of a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, N.Y. -
Dying Twice: Conditions on New York's Death Row
Pace Law Review Volume 22 Issue 2 Spring 2002 Article 3 April 2002 Dying Twice: Conditions on New York's Death Row David S. Hammer Art C. Cody Risa B. Gerson Norman L. Greene Michael B. Mushlin Pace University School of Law, [email protected] See next page for additional authors Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr Recommended Citation David S. Hammer, Art C. Cody, Risa B. Gerson, Norman L. Greene, Michael B. Mushlin, and Richard T. Wolf, Dying Twice: Conditions on New York's Death Row, 22 Pace L. Rev. 347 (2002) Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol22/iss2/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Dying Twice: Conditions on New York's Death Row Authors David S. Hammer, Art C. Cody, Risa B. Gerson, Norman L. Greene, Michael B. Mushlin, and Richard T. Wolf This article is available in Pace Law Review: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol22/iss2/3 Dying Twice: Conditions on New York's Death Row' 1. This article is a report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and a joint effort of two of the Association's committees, the Committee on Corrections and the Committee on Capital Punishment. The two committees formed a joint subcommittee (hereinafter "the Subcommittee") to undertake this project. -
© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Original U.S. Government Works. 1 for Educational Use Only
For Educational Use Only People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41 (1984) 468 N.E.2d 879, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706 case, however, the Court of Appeals should not readily interfere with the verdicts of jurors KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment who have had the advantage of seeing and Distinguished by People v. Morgan, N.Y.Co.Ct., June 19, 1998 hearing witnesses. McKinney's Const. Art. 6, 63 N.Y.2d 41 §§ 3, 5. Court of Appeals of New York. 7 Cases that cite this headnote The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. [2] Homicide Lemuel SMITH, Appellant. Miscellaneous particular circumstances July 2, 1984. Direct evidence that bite mark found on victim was made by defendant and other Defendant was convicted in the Supreme Court, Dutchess circumstantial evidence was sufficient to County, Albert M. Rosenblatt, J., of murder while serving sustain defendant's conviction for murder of a life term and was sentenced to death. The Court of a corrections officer. McKinney's Penal Law § Appeals, Kaye, J., held that: (1) evidence was sufficient 125.27. to sustain conviction; (2) expert testimony identifying bite mark found on victim as having been made by defendant Cases that cite this headnote on the basis of comparison with photograph of another bite mark made by defendant on another victim was [3] Criminal Law properly admitted; (3) defendant was not entitled to new Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence trial based on newly discovered evidence; (4) trial judge was not required to recuse himself; but (5) mandatory Testimony of police investigator was sufficient death sentence for homicide committed by person serving to sustain finding that defendant's confession a life term of imprisonment is unconstitutional. -
An Overview and Analysis of New York's Death Penalty Legislation
Pace Law Review Volume 17 Issue 1 Fall/Winter 1996 Article 3 September 1996 When the Cheering Stopped: An Overview and Analysis of New York's Death Penalty Legislation James R. Acker Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr Recommended Citation James R. Acker, When the Cheering Stopped: An Overview and Analysis of New York's Death Penalty Legislation, 17 Pace L. Rev. 41 (1996) Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact [email protected]. When the Cheering Stopped: An Overview and Analysis of New York's Death Penalty Legislation James R. Acker* I. Introduction ....................................... 42 II. New York's Death Penalty Legislation ............ 46 A. First-Degree Murder ........................... 48 1. The Mens Rea Requirement ............... 48 2. The Minimum Age for Death-Penalty Eligibility .................................. 50 3. Twelve Forms of First-Degree Murder ..... 54 B. The Sentencing Provisions ..................... 86 1. Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty .................................... 86 2. Guilty pleas ................................ 92 3. The Aggravating Factors ................... 99 4. The Mitigating Factors .................... 112 5. The Sentencing Option and the Sentencing D ecision ................................... 127 6. The (Partial) Exclusion of Mentally Retarded Offenders ........................ 141. C. The Capital Jury .............................. 150 D. Defense Counsel, the Prosecution, and Their Resources ...................................... 160 1. Defense Counsel and Assistance for the D efense .................................... 160 2. Assistance for Capital Prosecutions ........ 175 E. -
THE FUTURE of NEW YORK's MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY for MURDERS COMMITTED YB LIFE- TERM PRISONERS Andrea Galbo
Fordham Urban Law Journal Volume 13 | Number 3 Article 5 1985 DEATH AFTER LIFE: THE FUTURE OF NEW YORK'S MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY FOR MURDERS COMMITTED YB LIFE- TERM PRISONERS Andrea Galbo Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj Part of the Criminal Law Commons Recommended Citation Andrea Galbo, DEATH AFTER LIFE: THE FUTURE OF NEW YORK'S MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY FOR MURDERS COMMITTED BY LIFE-TERM PRISONERS, 13 Fordham Urb. L.J. 597 (1985). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol13/iss3/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The orF dham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The orF dham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DEATH AFTER LIFE: THE FUTURE OF NEW YORK'S MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY FOR MURDERS COMMITTED BY LIFE-TERM PRISONERS Introduction The United States Supreme Court has been grappling with the constitutionality of state death penalty statutes since its landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia.' Although the Furman Court did not rule on whether the death penalty was a per se violation of the eighth2 and fourteenth 3 amendments to the United States Consti- tution, it did hold in a brief per curiam opinion that the imposition of the death penalty in the case at bar was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of those amendments. 4 In response to Furman, most of the states revised their death penalty laws in the years following the decision.5 Two basic types of statutes emerged: the "guided" discretion statute in which the sentencing authority was given factors to weigh in deciding whether to impose capital punishment6 and the mandatory statute in which 7 death was the automatic penalty for certain capital offenses.