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© 2016 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Original U.S. Government Works. 1 for Educational Use Only For Educational Use Only People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41 (1984) 468 N.E.2d 879, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706 case, however, the Court of Appeals should not readily interfere with the verdicts of jurors KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment who have had the advantage of seeing and Distinguished by People v. Morgan, N.Y.Co.Ct., June 19, 1998 hearing witnesses. McKinney's Const. Art. 6, 63 N.Y.2d 41 §§ 3, 5. Court of Appeals of New York. 7 Cases that cite this headnote The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. [2] Homicide Lemuel SMITH, Appellant. Miscellaneous particular circumstances July 2, 1984. Direct evidence that bite mark found on victim was made by defendant and other Defendant was convicted in the Supreme Court, Dutchess circumstantial evidence was sufficient to County, Albert M. Rosenblatt, J., of murder while serving sustain defendant's conviction for murder of a life term and was sentenced to death. The Court of a corrections officer. McKinney's Penal Law § Appeals, Kaye, J., held that: (1) evidence was sufficient 125.27. to sustain conviction; (2) expert testimony identifying bite mark found on victim as having been made by defendant Cases that cite this headnote on the basis of comparison with photograph of another bite mark made by defendant on another victim was [3] Criminal Law properly admitted; (3) defendant was not entitled to new Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence trial based on newly discovered evidence; (4) trial judge was not required to recuse himself; but (5) mandatory Testimony of police investigator was sufficient death sentence for homicide committed by person serving to sustain finding that defendant's confession a life term of imprisonment is unconstitutional. was not obtained in violation of his constitutional rights so that his confession Affirmed as modified and remitted. could be used to establish the fact that he had made the bite marks which were Simons, J., dissented in part and filed an opinion in which found on prior victim and which were used Jasen, J., concurred. for comparison purposes to establish that defendant had also made bite marks found on Cooke, C.J., dissented in part and filed an opinion. victim in the instant case. 1 Cases that cite this headnote West Headnotes (26) [4] Criminal Law Particular tests or experiments [1] Criminal Law Technique of identification of bite mark by Particular offenses and prosecutions photograph-to-photograph comparison with Court of Appeals examines the evidence to bite mark known to have been made by determine whether, in its judgment, it is defendant on another person has requisite sufficient to make out a case of murder scientific acceptability. beyond a reasonable doubt; Court must weigh 4 Cases that cite this headnote the evidence and form a conclusion as to the facts; it is not sufficient to find evidence which presents a question of fact; even in a capital [5] Criminal Law © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 For Educational Use Only People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41 (1984) 468 N.E.2d 879, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706 Purpose of admission Purpose of admission Probative value of photograph of prior victim Court did not err in admitting photograph showing bite mark which was compared with of bite mark made by defendant on prior that found on victim in the instant case victim for purpose of comparing that bite outweighed its potential for unfair prejudice mark with bite mark found on victim in the where photograph had been redacted to instant case on theory that court could instead show nothing other than the bite mark and have required defendant to bite himself to no circumstances surrounding defendant's provide a mark for comparison purposes. murder of the prior victim were admitted. Cases that cite this headnote Cases that cite this headnote [10] Constitutional Law [6] Criminal Law Requests for disclosure Showing bad character or criminal Criminal Law propensity in general Application, motion or request; affidavits Evidence of uncharged crimes, though Suppression of exculpatory evidence in the inadmissible to establish criminal propensity, face of a specific and relevant defense request is admissible if offered for some other relevant will seldom, if ever, be excusable but, where purpose. the defense makes only a general request or none at all, failure to turn over obviously 1 Cases that cite this headnote exculpatory material violates due process only if omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt [7] Criminal Law which did not otherwise exist. Other Misconduct Showing Identity 6 Cases that cite this headnote One recognized ground for admission of evidence of uncharged crimes is to prove the defendant's identity so long as identity is not [11] Criminal Law otherwise conclusively established. Newly Discovered Evidence Where defense request did not put prosecutor Cases that cite this headnote on notice that specific document existed and prosecutor could have reasonably concluded [8] Criminal Law that disclosure which he made satisfied the Purpose of admission request, new trial would be required on Where defense experts vigorously disputed the basis of newly discovered exculpatory identification of bite marks on victims as material only if it were obviously exculpatory having been made by defendant and where and created a reasonable doubt not otherwise testimony was elicited that human skin is the existing. ideal medium for bite mark identification, 4 Cases that cite this headnote photograph showing bite mark made by defendant on another victim was not merely cumulative and was properly admitted. [12] Criminal Law Newly Discovered Evidence Cases that cite this headnote Prison logbook which did not indicate that defendant participated in recreation on day on [9] Criminal Law which he allegedly made inculpatory remarks © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 For Educational Use Only People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41 (1984) 468 N.E.2d 879, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706 to a fellow inmate at recreation did not show Although it might have been better practice that defendant refused recreation on that for court to insure that defense counsel was day and did not show that he was not at aware of court's previous relationship with recreation as claimed by the other inmate special district attorney, whom he had hired so that posttrial discovery of the logbook as an assistant when he was serving as district did not entitle defendant to have verdict set attorney for the county, the association was aside because of newly discovered evidence. not so substantial that the court abused its McKinney's CPL § 330.30. discretion in presiding over the trial. 1 Cases that cite this headnote Cases that cite this headnote [13] Criminal Law [17] Criminal Law Discovery and disclosure; transcripts of Counsel for Accused prior proceedings Defendant did not show any prejudice Any error in prosecutor's nondisclosure resulting from delay in appointment of of prison report was cured when trial counsel who eventually represented him at court interrupted prosecutor's summation and trial or in disparate funding available for allowed defense counsel to recall a witness counsel's representation. and place the evidence before the jury and permitted him to address the jury on the issue Cases that cite this headnote before the prosecutor resumed his summation. [18] Criminal Law Cases that cite this headnote Time for making Trial court did not err in ruling that [14] Judges application for change of venue should await Nature and effect in general the results of voir dire. Trial judge's impartiality is not undermined merely by appointment of counsel for one 1 Cases that cite this headnote of the adversaries; fact that trial judge had appointed prosecutor whose conduct with [19] Criminal Law respect to submission of evidence to the grand In General; Necessity of Motion jury was being questioned did not require Defendant who made motion for change of recusal of judge. venue before voir dire but did not make it after 6 Cases that cite this headnote voir dire as trial court had suggested could not obtain review of trial court's failure to grant change of venue after voir dire. [15] Judges Bias and Prejudice 3 Cases that cite this headnote Trial court did not exhibit bias in ruling on defense pretrial motions. [20] Criminal Law Evidence in general 3 Cases that cite this headnote Failure of trial court to instruct that a hypnotized witness usually acquires a measure [16] Judges of confidence in the events recalled under Relationship to attorney or counsel © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 For Educational Use Only People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41 (1984) 468 N.E.2d 879, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706 hypnosis did not warrant reversal in the Offense committed while in custody or interests of justice. legal restraint Mandatory imposition of death penalty for Cases that cite this headnote homicide committed by inmate serving a lifetime sentence cannot be justified by the [21] Witnesses need for deterrence or the need for retribution Cross-Examination to Discredit Witness and protection of prison guards and the prison or Disparage Testimony in General population. McKinney's Penal Law § 60.06. Trial court did not abuse its discretion Cases that cite this headnote in prohibiting defense counsel from cross- examining witness more extensively than he did where counsel had already mounted a [25] Sentencing and Punishment substantial attack on the witness' credibility. Individualized determination Sentencing and Punishment 1 Cases that cite this headnote Provision authorizing death penalty Sentencing and Punishment [22] Constitutional Law Offense committed while in custody or Sentencing and punishment legal restraint Fact that defendant had not actually shown New York's mandatory death penalty for any mitigating circumstances did not deprive homicides committed by inmate serving a him of standing to attack statute calling for life term was unconstitutional because of mandatory imposition of death sentence on its failure to provide for consideration of person convicted of murder while serving a life individual circumstances and violates the term.
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