Meaning, Modality and Apriority

CEU eTD Collection A C ASE OF In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MA A T Supervisor: Professor Miš Nenad PRIORITY AND HE Central European University European Central Department of of Philosophy Department E PISTEMIC Budapest, Hungary S Mindaugas Gilaitis Mindaugas EMANTICS Submitted to Submitted 2011 By M T EANING WO þ -D evi ü IMENSIONAL : CEU eTD Collection the other hand, it loses its explanatory power if semantic internalism is hand,it other if the loses internalism assumed. its explanatory power semantic is since, problematic, on is onehand,itthe incompatible semantic with externalism, and,on semantics two-dimensional epistemic the by is proposed that apriority of conception semantic and adequate critical ofitits evaluations conception and of are valid,the apriority then is semantics two-dimensional epistemic the of interpretation an If explained. isbeing apriority supposed toclarify meaning the natureof assumptions theoretical about in of which terms is semantics two-dimensional to approach epistemic the of evaluation critical that way conception semantic the that evaluate critically to second, terms; issemantic in apriority beingground to aiming proposed by it. However,presuppositions andbroader theoretical commitments of is that semanticframework the both of the aimsepistemic are interconnectedThis in thesisa two-dimensional is devoted to an analysis of the conception semantics. of apriority that is proposed The by the aims of the thesis are two: first, to clarify A BSTRACT i CEU eTD Collection I dedicate this thesisD. to K. and J. D., without whom it would neither be possible, nor actual. being discussedhere. are issues that tothe are related closely that subjects on remarks critical debatesand numerous comments on topics that are discussed in this thesis and Professor Hanoch Ben-Yami for I would like Professor NenadMiš I would tothank mysupervisor, A CKNOWLEDGMENTS ii þ evi ü , for and conversations , CEU eTD Collection B C 4. 3. 2. 1. I NTRODUCTION IBLIOGRAPHY ONCLUSION D A I G 4. 4. 3. 3. 3. 2. 2. 1. 1. NTENSIONAL EBATING PRIORITY IN PRIORITY ROUNDS OF 2 1 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 4. 4. S S D T G T I T T NTENSIONAL 1. 1. WO WO HE HEORETICAL EMANTIC EMANTIC EFINING ENERALIZED 2 1 C -D A D S T ...... 39 ORE CCOUNTS OF CCOUNTS EMANTIC AND EMANTIC ETERMINATION OF ETERMINATION IMENSIONAL HE ...... 42 ...... 1 O T A P HE I E C NE AND PRIORITY T NTERNALISM AND NTERNALISM RIMARY XTERNALISM XTERNALISM AND ONCEPTION OF HESIS S E F K EMANTICS PISTEMIC EATURES OF THE OF EATURES APLAN ...... 15 T I S : W WO NTENSIONS E EMANTICS C PISTEMIC HAT P ONTEXTUALIZING -D ARADIGM T P ...... 7 IMENSIONAL WO A RIMARY A PRIORITY P PRIORITY OF PRIORITY -D P RIMARY RIMARY ...... 18 ...... 9 S IMENSIONAL T S TATUS OF TATUS ...... 13 EMANTIC ABLE OF I NTENSIONS M I S NTENSIONS I IGHT NTENSIONS EMANTICS T HE T P E HE S D B RIMARY XPLANATION OF XPLANATION iii EMANTICS E EBATE C E ...... 30 ...... 3 PISTEMIC ONTENTS ...... 35 ...... 7 ...... 24 I NTENSIONS ...... 3 ...... 13 T WO A PRIORITY -D IMENSIONAL ...... 24 ...... 5 S EMANTICS ...... 24 CEU eTD Collection of it. category meaning, andprovideddifferentof andtheoreticalvarious frameworks conceptions be can apriority of category epistemological the betweenconnection apriority A number and meaning. havemaintained of that philosophers apriority evaluateand to its assumptions and plausibility. analyzeis main aparticularconception inquiry,philosophical to of aimof thesis this the of status andepistemological clearerdespite character get wish the the about But to mostthe fundamental questions.philosophical Inthe words Peacocke,of Christopher is of oneof existence question the andscope apriority of isSometimes it the that proclaimed 1 apriority is being defined and on which itis being grounded. supposed toclarify meaning the natureof assumptions theoretical about in of which terms istwo-dimensional semantics in conception of apriority is that asemantic providing used of framework interpreted of the in evaluation critical a way that interconnected of aimsthe are both However, proposed. is being that conception semantic the evaluate critically to second, commitments of the semantic framework that is aiming to ground apriority in semantic terms; semantic conception of apriority that is proposed by the epistemic two-dimensional semantics. the narrower scope, it will be devoted to a discussion and critical analysis of one particular See Boghossian and Peacocke (eds.) (2000) for a well compiled book of the semantic accounts ofapriority. accounts semantic the book of compiled well a for (2000) (eds.) Peacocke and Boghossian See 1 However, it is beyond the limits of the thesis to do an analysis of all of them. Thus, in Thus, them. of all of analysis an do to thesis the of limits the beyond is it However, In the broader scope, the subject matter matter itis theof alleged subject scope, the to thediscussion In therelated broader of The aims of the thesis are two: first, to clarify presuppositions and broader theoretical broader and first, toclarify presuppositions are two: thesis the The aims of I NTRODUCTION understand as ourselves 2005:philosophers. (Peacocke 739) to are if we self-understanding, for essential isalso It in itself. interest understanding [...]Soapproach subject. to the is apriori the only not of for his is whole a atouchstone tothe priori attitude […] aphilosopher’s 1 grounded on , or explained by , the semantic the , CEU eTD Collection notion of apriority at all,it needs to be explained in a different way. plausible notion of apriority either.no be can Whatthere does that follow seemnot does to follow externalism though semantic of is that acceptance an iffrom there isFurthermore, to be a notion apriority of isbeingthat by proposed epistemicthe two-dimensional semantics. other hand,it loses its explanatory power ifsemantic internalism is assumed problematic, since, ontheonehand,itisincompatiblewith on the semanticexternalism,and, apriorityconception thatisproposed of bytheepistemic two-dimensional semantics is that follows it then valid, are apriority of conception its and it of evaluations used in asemanticproviding conception of apriority inis done fourth, last, chapter. the Critical evaluation and discussion of two-dimensional epistemic the framework that is being crucial thatare fortheoretical assumptions their conception beapriority of will highlighted. interpretationsFrank it. Jackson’s Relevantnotions of bediscussed,andsubstantial will semantics itsand conception apriority of will be by done relying on David Chalmers’ and two-dimensional of interpretation epistemic the of discussion and analysis a detailed chapter of semanticthe is conception of beingapriority in that analyzed thesis.third the this In proponents by is used that semantics worlds possible two-dimensional and one intensional of framework formal of notions the basic the of a discussion to bededicated will chapter Second indicated. be will apriority explain to attempt semantic of the features theoretical specific some Furthermore, context. in abroader bewill discussed that locate conception the to order in emphasized differences and be toexplain relevant attempts distinguished will apriority However, an acceptance of semantic internalism does notby toa itself one does commit internalism semantic anacceptance of However, If interpretation an epistemicthe of two-dimensional is semantics adequate and critical The thesis consists of four chapters. In the first chapter two kinds of theoretical 2 . the semantic CEU eTD Collection domain directly with the “eye of one’s mind”. As Miš only only upon domainthe of andclaimsreference apriority that is an ability to “referentialfocuses justification. accounts” oftheories –the ofa grounds – group One priori justification. such of possibility the what say also must one then above, described in sense the is a priori that justification is If of justification there believed. one propositions attain which facts the such can is not togive an explanation of feature of justification thatis not dependent on experience, or on checking how the world is, world. the to status justificatory its owe not does justification is abelief, proposition, ifof be a particular ifit or supposed a priori andto only checking world howthe is.Thus, apriority is usually as understood a feature ofjustification: from means independence generally experience” “independence of experience, where Usually itis maintained thata priori knowledge is knowledge is that does not depend on experience” (Dancy, Sosa &Steup (2010: 43)). 2 Or to put it alternatively: “S’s belief that p is justified apriori if and only if S’s justification for belief the that p NenadMiš 1. 1Two Accounts ofWhatApriority Might Be 2008: 236) domain is basic, whereas conceptual domain isbasic, is whereasconceptual derived.(Mišknowledge this referential knowledgethe of mind.approach typically claims Thethat is sensitivity the one: basicallyintuitional an to capacity perceptual of thenotion capacity toreferential domain, usedseeing, metaphorof the transferring which the “see” the in the objects domain to the sensitivity our of accounts tentative offered further directly andunderin domain consideration the on They reference general.of […] with the eye of propositions components the of domainreference the of […] upon of one’s 1. G þ evi ROUNDS OF ROUNDS ü (2008) distinguishes two kinds of theoretical attempts to explainkinds to oftheoreticalattempts the two (2008)distinguishes how A can can be there justification this say of kind or to in of virtue PRIORITY 3 : C ONTEXTUALIZING 2 However, to maintain that apriority is a þ evi ü puts it, referential accounts focus justified T HE see independently of independently D EBATE the referential þ evi ü grounds CEU eTD Collection accounts of apriority, since itdefines it, and groundsthus it, in meaning.terms of semantic the to belongs thesis this in be discussed to conception The a priori. being entails being justification conceptual semantic that groundsthe of and are a priori possibility the of employ different notions in explaining apriority, all of them tend to share the assumption that among others. 2006,2003, 2004, 2007,forthcoming-a,forthcoming-b), and Frank Jackson(2000,2001), 1998, 2000),Paul 2003),DavidBoghossian (1996,2001, Chalmers(2002a,2002b, 2002c, (1993, Peacocke campinclude Christopher Some conceptualists’ of of the representatives the is apriority of of feature semantic accounts central thatthe maintains conceptualists, Paul of one 2000: 264). the Boghossian, involved” natureof the (Peacocke concepts the to be traceable must theory rationalists’ moderate this so on reference, and not sense, level of at the is a phenomenon “apriority conceptualists for the accounts, referential contrary to So apriority are conceptual, or semantic: or are conceptual, apriority and(1991) Laurence (1998,2001, 2005). BonJour Brown include Robert James accounts referential the of defenders Some of contemporary the In spite of the fact that different theorists offer different theoretical frameworks and frameworks theoretical different offer theorists different that fact the of spite In The other group – the so-called group–the The “conceptualists” –maintains other grounds of thatthe evidence-gathering faculty?evidence-gathering 1996: 363) (Boghossian statement couldfactual a is:How Thequestion terms. insatisfactory described postulatehaving […]aspecial to faculty,has that never one been S be […]known a desire a priori to explain by T,the without possibility the helpof a priori of a specialknowledge without idea thatbeing conceptual entails being a priori. (Miš forto account itinfrom fashion, accepted starting an austere generally the butto try preserve apriori, interestingphilosophically substantial isand to notion of a priori beingas grounded in “relations ideas”. of point […]Its The opposite philosophical have conceptualists, from team, our started the 4 þ evi ü 2008:236-237) CEU eTD Collection “foundational theory a of and meaning” (2010: § theory” 1). “semantic a between distinction Speak’s Jeff ff.), 573 (1989a: “metasemantics” and “semantics” between“theory a of languages” and a“theory of (1975),language” David Kaplan’s distinctionbetween 3 theory. of a semantic lies descriptive atthe part compositionality of assumption of principle shared theoretical the expressions are a function expressions of language,the explainshow the and semantic values complex the of of the semantic “assigns theory that itis adescriptive-semantic Furthermore, values of their parts” (Ibid.). Hence, the widely theory semantics. “foundational” and he“descriptive” calls what between apriority,itmightbe useful tointroduce distinctionthe drawn by RobertStalnaker (1997) 2000:264). involved” (Peacocke concepts the be to traceable “must apriority accounts, semantic on the proposal that Peacocke’s meaningfixed, resembles is waythat aboutthe meaning, or this specialway” it must Asuggestion(Boghossian that 1996: 366). besomething the about meaning, about the way or meaningmust that isfixed, its is explain how truth in knowable sentence’s aboutthe answerto this“clearly, hastobesemantical: the something question be grounded derivedfrom, or in, of semantic properties that Boghossian sentences? suggests can sentences by are expressed that truths the of justification of epistemic properties how But Fora similar kind of suggestion, although made using different terms, see also David Lewis’ distinction The question asked by foundationalthe is semantics following:the of accounts semantic of the features about theoretical picture get aclearer to In order 1. 2Theoretical Features of theSemantic Explanation ofApriority What is it about the situation, behavior, or mental states of a speaker that aspeaker of states mental or behavior, situation, the about itis What why semantics that is rightthe (Stalnaker one. 1997: 535) languageitis practicethe saying about usingthat thatexplains of what without is, language the for semantics the what says that theory is a […] 5 nature [italics mine – M.G.] of the of M.G.] – mine [italics 3 semantic values A descriptive-semantic to the to CEU eTD Collection depends uponthe if explanation apriority of of semantic the adequacy determined. Consequently, theoretical incompatible with it. with incompatible andproposed, examinekindto views what could of undermine itand thuswould be is being that apriority conception of the tovindicate in order framework semantic the analysis is disclosesupposed to kind what of meaning assumptions about are beingmade by provideapriority beanalyzed. semanticThe isbeingthat conception will the that of usedto framework semantic the of evaluation, andcritical a detailed analysis, to devoted are chapters successive determination,meaning natureits the the of and regardsto madebeing with depend beingmade upon assumptions infoundational part of semantics. also apriority would of explanation semantic the of adequacy theoretical determined, then concepts, dependsfixedconcepts get madeabouthowmeaning,or upon assumptions and language, then semanticthe explanation apriority of should use foundational namely,part of semantics: factsin the about virtue of which – in terms of which isapriority beingmight defined, depend upon assumptions madein the what apriority is. Butit seems that the nature of the descriptive semantic feature – namely, semanticwhatthe valuesoflanguage if are.So of both mustparts suchanexplanation of First, semantics. would say depend upon apriority Since explanatory Since explanatory burden semanticof of accounts apriority uponassumptions rests Given such a distinction, it seems that theoretical adequacy of a semantic explanation asemantic of adequacy theoretical that seems it adistinction, such Given (Stalnaker 1997:166-167) has? it that value semantic the has community, linguistic particular makes it the case that a particular [expression], as used by that speaker in a nature of the concepts involved, then if one’s conception of the nature of nature the of conception one’s if then involved, concepts the of 6 SV is a semantic value of an interpreted this value in its conception of conception its in value SV is being fixed or SV CEU eTD Collection words, “thewords, intension of is a sentence proposition expressedthe byit” (Carnap1947/1958: functions from possible worlds (orrather possible states of the world) to truth-values. Lewis Rudolf (1944) and Carnap (1947/1958),suggeststhinking of propositions asbeing propositions more precisely? of are whatcontents them. or But meanings which are the express sentences propositions of associating as that sees theproject and semantic conception be of apriority isdiscussed,to influenced byGottlob Frege (1892,1918), the of proponents by used being is that framework semantic the However, conditions. sentences by identifying the meaning of a sentence with extensionally individuated truth Davidsonaimed (1967)whogiving at apurely conditionsextensional of truth the treatment of ways of task. havebeendifferent approaching this there However, sentences. of conditions truth the of account a systematic giving of that as semantics of task discussedhere in began, tradition followsthe the19 which roughly, frameworkstheoretical different of variety wide a andbe, to continue still and approachesbeen, have there although to this subject.The general fieldtheoretical of is semantics usually seen asthe study linguisticof meaning, But the semantic conception of apriority to be approach, functions from possible worlds to extensions are called of a statement is a truth-value. 5 4 The extension of a singular term is an object, the extension of a predicate is a set of objects, and the extension the and objects, of aset is predicate a of extension the object, an is term of asingular extension The Possible states of the world, or possible worlds, are counterfactual alternatives to the way the actual world is. One way of thinking about them, which can be traced back at least as far as C. I. One major paradigm in truth-conditional semantics by inaugurated was Donald 2. 1Intensional Semantics 2. I NTENSIONAL O NE AND NE propositions 7 T WO -D with sentences. The general idea is that IMENSIONAL th century, and defined the intensions S EMANTICS . 5 In Carnap’s 4 On this On CEU eTD Collection necessity)” (Nimtz 2008:2). and possibility to (i.e. modality to linked intimately is meaning follows: conclusion meta-semantical significant “a ideas these From contain. they terms the of intensions determined by extensionsthe of its and parts, the intension of a sentence is by determined the is a sentence of extension the expressions: the of intensions and extensions to applied that sentence is true. Fourthly, theoretical assumption of the principle of compositionality is which respectto with worlds by of possible a set isrepresented some sentence meaning of truth-conditions,that the representationalon contentthis of a sentence in encapsulated account, in its truth-conditions. Thirdly, are truth value distributions over possible worlds. So the can be equated with can be with asentencehow things equated represents asbeing. inmeaningall,it that sense isliteral the assumes thatthe meaning representation sentence of study of linguistic meaning. the to approach model-theoretic common a share that theories semantic of acluster of version is a and semantics”, worlds “possible or semantics” as“intensional known became theory what we mean by ‘meaning’ here, ‘meaning’ by we mean what are. […] The key pointperhaps some propersubset oftotality, that not denying are (I trust)that (most) sentences represent how things for us [and forhow it is used, or that the themeaning of a sentencepurposes is the totality of the inferences in which the sentence have figures, ofmeant, and or have thisproperly meant, by the term.paper Those philosophers who say– thatM.G.] the sometimesmeaning call ofwill it–is we one a sentence as thing people meaning, is haveis often meant representational bythe – ‘meaning’,that of ‘meaning’ it is obviously meaning this not the only “although therethat peoplething clear is it So theory. is no competition with8 7 proposition should apply to itor be true of (Lewisit” 1943:243). 6 27). represent how things are” (Jackson 2000:322-323). value the returns possible worlds, and is individuated by a set of them: namely, a set of worlds for which it There are many notions of ‘meaning’ and many ways ofwhattheoretical role it should play in one’s semantic Iam followinghere Nimtz (2008: 1-2). Lewis suggested that an intension “comprises whatever must be true of any possible world in order that the 6 Hence, the meaning of a sentence is an intension, which assigns extensions relative to relative extensions assigns which intension, an is asentence of meaning the Hence, In summary, one can say that intensional semantics is anchored in four ideas. in four is anchored semantics intensional that say can one summary, In true . Due to the commitment topossible worlds and intensions, this semantic unless these theories are being offered as ways of denying that sentences that of denying ways as offered being are theories these 8 8 Secondly, it is maintained it Secondly, 7 First of CEU eTD Collection 9 in oncontext dependenceworks by Richard Montague, David and Lewis DavidKaplan. found be also might framework the of use contemporary the of antecedents Other possibility. developapparatus to formal systems for representingvalidinferences abouttime and the using were Logicians Fraassen. Bas van and Segerberg, Krister Åqvist, byLennart logic a two-dimensional of account tense logic. The same framework has been appliedfor modal explanatory purposes. For example, Frank Vlach, building on work by Hans Kamp, developed using the same basicmodel-theoretic resources. values thanthoseavailable within standard while semantics, one-dimensional world possible justthan So one. the two-dimensional semantic provides framework finer-grained semantic semantics assigns extensions to expressions relative to two possible world parameters, rather it,puts which ordinary sentence intension is the traditional a frameworkhas one-dimensional way in been capture developed extendedto and the However, them. of construed are that sentences and expressions linguistic of meanings it. byintensions Intensionslanguage worlds. interpreted Thearethe to then gets assigning possible of set a and language a with starts one semantics intensional one-dimensional In For references to their works and details, see Davies & Stoljar (2004). & Stoljar Davies see details, and works their to references For The two-dimensional framework has been interpreted in different ways for different for ways in different interpreted been has framework two-dimensional The two-dimensional semantics, worlds possible one-dimensional standard with contrast In 2. 2Two-Dimensional Semantics have been different ifhavebeen had different facts 148) been the (Stalnakerdifferent. 2002: one says he –the proposition expresses–isitselfmight something that What ithas. that content an has the utterance fact is matter it that of […] a itself dependent upon dependentAsStalnaker upon a possible world. 9 9 CEU eTD Collection “horizontal or (Jackson) proposition”“C-intension” (Chalmers), intension” “secondary called is proposition (Stalnaker). The other is technicalargument actual jargon of semantics,of it this world.two-dimensional In the kind of proposition the where intension atwo-dimensional of value the be would is proposition One world. the one that is true in inways two which the expression which dependson a possible extension the an of represent propositions, define different two be usedto can intension sentence Thus atwo-dimensional that suggests semantics, isis eachkindintension argument of afunction whose a possible world. Stalnaker in one-dimensional As intensions. secondary and intensions primary intensions, dimensional framework intensionsof inthe whicharetwo-dimensional two- abstract semantics: defined As Chalmers putsit, A possible world playing the second role is said to be a world world be a to said is role first the playing world a possible semantics, two-dimensional In false. is or is said true what determine mightwhether they Second, said –theproposition expressed. consequently rolestwo apossiblethat world canplay.worlds First, mightdetermineis what which extension the an expression of asentence depends or on a possible and world, considered asactual Following Stalnaker might (2001),one distinguish interrelated threekinds of The core idea of two-dimensional semantics is that there are two different ways in world inworld which expressionthe is evaluated. (Chalmers 2006:59) of counterfactual the thecharacter dependson expression of an extension Second, counterfactual is the in actual uttered. which an expression world First, the actual extension of an expression depends on the character of the or from or pairs of possible totruth-values. worlds (Stalnaker 2001: 145) sentence is intension from […] a function possiblepropositions, worlds to ordered pairan of taking possiblefunction worlds a as to extensions.intension So a two-dimensional atwo-dimensional of think can we […] ; naturally, worlds other than might actual the playworld role.this 10 considered ascounterfactual . CEU eTD Collection follows: worldplay. might matrix, be two-dimensional the dependence In can the as represented sentence example of Twin Earth thought experiment intension”proposed (Jackson) or “diagonal proposition” (Stalnaker). “A- by (Chalmers), Hilary intension” “primary is called and world, possible a on Putnam depends intension (1972). We have a world world facts in virtue of in of facts intensionswhich virtue language. getassigned thisthose However, framework to three kinds of intensions remain silent about the epistemic properties of intensions and about roles possiblethe worldmightplay. C). Thus, the matrix represents counterfactual (W-C- representThe worlds worlds consideredas horizontal upper row inthe how the extension of “water is in The worlds vertical the leftworlds on the asactual column considered (W-C-A). represent H x x Let me illustrate the above mentioned formal characteristics by aclassical using characteristics formal above mentioned the meLet illustrate It is clear that a purely formal characterization of the two-dimensional frameworkand two-dimensional the of formal characterization isa purely that It clear is true in world in true is “water is H “water if and only if the proposition that is the value of the two-dimensional intension in proposition (Stalnaker) ʊ proposition (Stalnaker) ʊ secondary intension (Chalmers) / C-intension (Jackson) / horizontal diagonal / (Jackson) A-intension / (Chalmers) intension primary 2 O”, and ask how its extension depends upon the two ways depends theapossible two how its extension upon O”, and ask W-C-A TWIN EARTH x . Thisproposition how specifies valuethe two-dimensional the of EARTH W-C-C 11 EARTH T F TWIN EARTH T F 2 O” depends upon the two uponthe O” depends CEU eTD Collection 10 DavidSidelle (1989), Lewis 1980, 1994), (1970, David Chalmers (2001 of advocates a priori figuresAlan like Bealerconceptual analysis include George (1987), verificationism,for could apriori abasis provide thus and conceptual analysis. Recent of formulate theit wouldthat counterintuitive consequences aconception avoid of over. Contemporaryhave in philosophers madedevelopments semantics philosophical to days fashion. are those wasoutof However, analysis meaning, apriori theories of conceptual priori couldthat apriority. ground itisolatecan be an arguethat andDavid ofmeaning Frank Jackson usedto aspect Chalmers has been moreused for ambitious philosophical purposes.Philosophers like David Lewis, to them, can show how semantics can be the source of a priori knowledge and truth. chapter and its sections will be restricted only a to discussion of theirmeans which, according by proposed Chalmers’ and Jackson’sinterpretation of two-dimensionalism, following the priori. epistemological status of this activity, thusaboutwhether and being conceptual entails beinga the is about Thequestion analysis”. call“conceptual andJackson philosophers other no problem isthat with 1998: 41).From activity the there of perspective thesis, the this (Jackson described inanother” bymatters made true are in vocabulary one described “matters since the laterrequires theso-called “location solving problem”: aproblem how of saying do if to serious metaphysics, wants isanecessary one a priori conceptual prerequisite analysis everything” believes of (LewisJacksonas apriori that 1994:291). an part about reductionism among(1998), “my others. Forexample, that mind Lewis claims reductionism about begins Co-authored withFrank Jackson. conceptual analysis. Mainly because of the inordinate ambitionsinordinate of verificationist because of the the Mainly conceptual analysis. Many of of proponents semanticthe accounts apriority are alsodefending anideaof Since this thesis is devoted to an analysis of the conception of apriority that is being 12 10 ) and Frank Jackson a CEU eTD Collection of of framework two-dimensional the toexplain wasintroduced the semantics two-dimensional intension. Itis important to indicate here, however, that Kaplan’s application a gets one Thus, toextensions. worlds from possible isafunction itself (intension) content the where content, to context from function a as is represented semantics formal in expressions such context-dependent of “character”) Kaplan calls meaning (what The particular occasion. some on used is it when it by said is what know to suffice not does means sentence this what example, here the sentence“Iam now”doesnotbyitself sayjust anything. Thus, knowing say. For to are used they occasion someof particular what on content the determine itself depend Themeaningby contain that context. of not upon such expressions sentences does – demonstratives and indexicals namely, – expressions context-dependent of content how interaction torepresent the of framework has two-dimensional Kaplan applied (1989a, 1989b) called “generalized two-dimensional (Schroeter semantics” 2010: § 2) “generalizedor Kaplan is sometimes literature philosophical inthe framework the of application their assumption, aspect meaning of of the represent animportant can be to used to be semantically competent when using a term. extension of an expression depends orwhich upon context, know inone wouldneed to order other expressionsbedo, since topersonal arightway this incontrast and pronouns seemsto demonstratives, to doexpressionsdependentnot of and not seem to have a systematic semantic rule that would say how 3. 1Generalized Kaplan Paradigm Chalmers and Jackson, however, believe that the formal two-dimensional framework two-dimensional formal the that believe however, Jackson, and Chalmers 3. A PRIORITY IN T every HE E linguistic expression expression in linguistic natural language. PISTEMIC 13 T WO -D IMENSIONAL all expressions. Due to this S EMANTICS only Prima facie of context- , CEU eTD Collection More specifically, More discussing their approach to natural kind terms, Christopher Nimtznotes that on their account, When (and context). by character is determined content Kaplan’s in which in way same the secondary intensionstheir arederivative account from and by intensions determined primary is on that itsurprise oflittle framework, of sameformal the Kaplan’s application of extension veridical. secondThe meaning. same the claimshare not do they then expressions, their with criterion same very requires thatThe first claim implies that ifa two speakers (or one speakercriterion on two occasions) donot share the which one associates with an expression would be 12 have intended (Chalmers 1996: 365-6, 25).n. 11 criterion plays two key theoretical roles: which as Aristotle count object orvixenin any possible where situation, animplicita grasp of exactly determines that criterion a grasp implicitly is to “vixen” or “Aristotle” like terms with 2003:208). paradigm” (Stalnaker Iam followinghere Schroeter (2010:§ 2.1). Forexample, Chalmers notes that he is using Kaplan’s frameworka more in general way thanKaplan himself Given that Chalmers’ and Jackson’s interpretation of two-dimensionalism is an two-dimensionalism of interpretation Jackson’s and Chalmers’ that Given 1996: 59) (Chalmers worlds. possible in all out is picked thing of sort same the that so evaluation this rigidifying then and world, actual the at intension primary the evaluating first by determined is intension secondary the […] w considered asactual considered kind terms. […] The secondary intension of a kind term kind a of intension secondary The […] terms. kind intensions asactual; of considered they secondary the determine also our intensions These for yield worlds [primary –M.G.] do notonly extensions 2. 1. in every in ascounterfactual. 2004:142) (Nimtz worldevery considered every possible situation. every possible in extension its into fall things which determines expression an with associates currently speaker a The criterion determination: Reference expressions. their with criterion same thevery in associate they case meaning just same share the occasions) two speakeron one speakers (or Two competence: Semantic w picks out what 11 So, according to this view, to be semantically competent be semantically to view, this to according So, 12 14 k ’s primary intension ’s primary k in some world some in singles out in out singles CEU eTD Collection by KripkeinSaul coincide. However, both of them are aware of the challenging examples that were presented necessity of meaning apriority and by picture where a traditional ismotivated semantics The conception of isapriority that by proposed Chalmers’ and Jackson’stwo-dimensional of apriority. conception semantic provide the be usedto can characterization, aparticular given intensions, these that believe Jackson and Chalmers intensions. secondary to worlds from possible functions intensions: thereareprimary framework of an expression or asentence, one must check what the world islike. But in two-dimensional vindicate anotion determine couldnot intension to of thesecondary inorder since apriority, is determined. actually 14 dthat 13 Kripke’s and examples, holdsis thatapriority must with necessity, coextensive an provide is plausibility of anyonethe Thus, if convinced of whoare necessary, true. butthat posteriori, a only knowable are truths whose propositions express that is Phosphorus” “Hesperus contingent. The most well known examples of the latter are the statements “water is H meteris is long” tobeknowable one proclaimed expresses that a priori,a proposition but that is S “stick statement is the former the of His example truths. a posteriori andnecessary priori is that intension is “rigidification” done of by The either a proposed evaluation attaching As done by Jackson(1998: 217, ft.12). Asdone by Chalmers (1996: 59). See Kaplan(1989a: 521-522; 1989b: 579-581) fora detailed analysis of operator. 3. 2 The Core Thesis3. 2The they world, actual in the out turn things how on depend intensions secondary Since 14 operator to the primary intension. Thus secondary intension is a disguised primary a disguised is intension secondary Thus intension. primary the to operator rigidified Naming andNecessity after its extension relative to a possible world considered as actual considered world a possible to itsrelative extension after (1972). If Kripke is right, then there are contingent a 15 dthat 13 2 O” and or an CEU eTD Collection = B’is a priori” (Chalmers 2006: 64). necessary 1-intension” (Chalmers 2004: 165) and “Two expressions ‘A’and ‘B’ have the same 1-intension iff ‘A 16 Thus, for the sake of brevity and convenience, Chalmers’ definition will be used throughout the thesis. 15 H apriority that is given in (CT) satisfies this requirement. meanings of expressions and sentences that are construed of them,the semantic conception of represent the primary aresupposed to intensions sameframework, application the of Kaplan’s of is ageneralization which two-dimensionalism, of interpretation Jackson’s values in interpreted. Sincelanguage of terms thatgets of semanticthe Chalmers’ and on would it in language,conception it of that features define of i.e. of terms descriptive-semantic Thesis Core the of necessity examples framework, andis onemust it addthat the two-dimensional coextensive with the Kripke’s necessity,is given however, idearetaining with the thatapriority coextensive single intension say that can one Thus, possibility). and necessity “metaphysical” so-called cases (the secondary intensions with domain the andnecessity of possibility is that for relevant Kripke’s whereas aposteriority, and apriority with be associated might then intensions Primary Kripke’s conclusions. reinterpret to in order intensions those can use one intensions, two so. do to in order semantics two-dimensional of Kripke’s interpretation of alternative and cases.Chalmers Jackson frameworkuse theformal Alternative formulations Equivalent,although not so explicit and definitive characterizationof is also provided by (1998:Jackson 52). the Core Thesis are the following: “For any sentence S, S is apriori iff S has a 2 O” does not have a necessary primary intension. This seems to give an intuitively right intuitively an give to seems This intension. primary necessary a have not does O” The two-dimensional matrix depicted in section 2.2 shows that a sentence “water is Since language associated andthoughton frameworkgets this with not with one, but As it was suggested in section 1.2, a semantic conception of apriority As itsuggested insection must conceptionofapriority a 1.2, asemantic was propose intension. A (CT) statementis a ifpriori and only if it has a necessary primary primary is both necessary and a posteriori or contingent and a priori. This allows 15 : 16 , and not and , (Chalmers 2006:64) secondary , intension. This is what Chalmers does by proposing 16 no CEU eTD Collection 17 H is “water as (such world the about information contingent deliver that sentences Even truths. a posteriori necessary irreducible express that arenosentences there framework, dimensional as actual. Furthermore, this implies that on Chalmers’ and Jackson’s interpretation of two- 325) is apriori: their view, the following “application conditional” it whetherknow Chalmerson is investigation to true. empirical agree. However, and Jackson do to needs one priori: a justified not is expresses it proposition the that namely, – result standards of standards – namely,of (CT) this by the be must necessary intension its primary then is a priori, is stuff” watery “water the form ‘If my environmentcompetence is thus and puts so, onethen inisit by noted Schroeter, epistemicthe on of two-dimensionalism, account “conceptual watera position = H to have a prioriisstuff”. “water the watery knowledge of conditional claims of the way: following in the answers Jackson priori? a justified is it that but true, only not is conclusion the that know one does then what of in virtue But form. Example from Jackson (1998: 82). 2 O” or “Hesperus is Phosphorus”) will be reduced to a truth that is knowable a priori andis So conditionalthe “If (1) and(2),thenis (3)” apriori due tothe concealed premise It is clear that the conclusion of this conditional does not follow purely in virtue of (1) (2) (3) the watery the stuff acquaintance’.our of (Jackson 1998:82) together with (2) to (3) is a priori in view of the a priori status of ‘Water is Although (3) isfrom passagefrom passage the the a (1) to (1) posteriori, H H Therefore, water covers most of Earth. most covers the of water Therefore, 2 2 O covers most of the Earth. O is the watery stuff of acquaintance. O is stuff our watery the of The of truth this itpremise, is maintained,is justified a priori. As sentence must be true withmustall betrue respect to consideredworlds 17 (term due to Chalmers Jackson 2001: & (term due to 17 2 O’” (Schroeter 2006: 562).But if CEU eTD Collection have will be a matter they valuesthat semantic the have expressions particular fact that the of context), in expressions contingent fact. with (or its expressions with If associates language for a theory a semantic are that meanings one put it in the framework of possible worlds which he calls “metasemantic”. framework the of interpretation contextualistic Stalnaker’s using by them assigns and intensions primary defines of two-dimensionalism contextual the mehow account Let briefly present is following: framework of the interpretation the of contextual essential feature the the intensions, of primary of characteristics the in of differences spite the However, expressions. being to assigned are andway they this accountthe on be characterized thatmight65-75) intensions (Chalmers 2006: types primary different of of detailed variety a wide of analysis semantics. When the discussing contextual interpretation of two-dimensionalism,he givesa two-dimensional of understanding “epistemic” and “contextual” he calls between what In “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics” (2006)Chalmers makesa distinction (Chalmers 2006:64). the intensionsCoreThesis“can – M.G.]sothat is [primary we define 1-intensions true?” defined in of terms necessitythe of intensions,primary the crucial is thefollowing:question contingent(as (2)). isis is but atruth stuff”), as“water and that a posteriori necessary thewatery knowable (such Stalnaker’s account of two-dimensionalism begins by noting that whatever the whatever that noting by begins two-dimensionalism of account Stalnaker’s 3. 3Defining Primary Intensions is apriority two-dimensionalism of interpretation Jackson’s and Chalmers’ on Since context-dependence utterance possible represent dimension first in the involved possibilities the semantics, two-dimensional of understanding contextual the On , and the intension involved in the first dependence represents the represents dependence first in the involved intension the and , of of an expression’s extension. 2006:65) (Chalmers 18 contexts of CEU eTD Collection interpretation of two-dimensional framework. expressions. Chalmersand dothis Jackson byproviding an alternative –epistemic – to assigned be should they how and are intensions primary what of account a different offer obviouslyfalse”For (Chalmers2006:67). thisvindicate in reason, to (CT),oneneedsorder to the string “bachelors are unmarried” means that horses are cows” and thus “the Core Thesisis in“there which view, are worlds on Thesis” 2006: this satisfy 75), since (Chalmers Core the a linguistic a linguistic expression world other possible worlds considered as actual, depends upon what intension it wouldhave expression an extension what approach, this on that implies This formally similar bit machinery”of (Stalnaker 2007:259). a of use complementary) (though a different but semantics, Kaplanian the of extension an not “is interpretation metasemantic ones, secondary from arederivative intensions Since primary whereas intension, a is just occasion of one-dimensional use) particular framework, meaningsin (semantic values) possibledifferent worlds. Onthisinterpretation of the it is different have assumedwill a sentence or expression linguistic a given that imply would it semantics, that one kind of semantic value that an expression has (on a . And the intension that it would have in that world is determined by an interpretation of interpretation an by determined is world in that have would it that intension the And . Chalmers claims that “there is no way to define contextual intensions so that they that so intensions contextual define to way no is “there that claims Chalmers As Schroeter notes, As Schroeter used inthatworld and (ii) that the expression is assigned an extension on the basis of expression must be within target consideredas located world actual, the isof a token the approach (i) what’s of that a contextualist distinctive […] (Stalnaker 2001:149) worlds. possible different in the have expressions those that intensions M.G.] – [one-dimensional secondary the from derivative are expressions of intensions primary so-called and intensions two-dimensional […] as itis used in thatworld [italics mine – M.G.]. (Schroeter 2010: § 2.3.2) 19 . would have with respect to how it's in that in CEU eTD Collection supposed to represent the dependence of an expression’s extension when their argument is an argument their when extension expression’s an of dependence the represent to supposed are asactual them involved considers one when have if some epistemic possibility in question is actual. determine intensions andassign primary by extensionexpressions upon reflecting what means to andJackson’s Chalmers’ itresembles respect this In scenarios. counterfactual what about determined extensions term’s Carnap, subjects are byasking to intensions, according So 2009:437). obtain” (Soames to circumstance possible were certain claims about what apredicate about claims sentences. As expressions and to intensions assign one shouldhow of procedure (1955) Carnap’s resembles Scott Soames notes, primary intensionsdetermined get and with associated expressions and sentences strongly “Carnap’s defense of intension rests heavily on modal precisely? andChalmers Jacksonsuggest thinking it of in followingthe way: ismorewhat dependence” “epistemic But 2004:176). expressions” (Chalmers of our extension the of dependence epistemic the represent dimension M.G.] – [primary first the in of intensionsinterpretationprimary with on this starts a proposal “theintensionsthat involved properties in of an 2007:§5).Thus, theexpression actual (Chalmers characterization world” “turnthebut epistemic rather propertieslinguistic on of counterfactual expressions, tokens dimensionalism, of value the primaryintension the is by (its extension) not determined some It is clear that on the epistemic two-dimensional semantics, possibilities that are It is interesting to note here that the above described means, or procedure, by procedure, which means, or above described the herenote is that It to interesting Contrary to the contextual interpretation, on the epistemic understanding of two- Jackson 2001:324) & is in actual. question (Chalmers epistemicpossibility the hypothesis that know possibility an epistemic about information sufficient Then possibility. […] toan epistemic of worldthe corresponds total state the characterizing hypothesis possible epistemically an that say us Let [italics mine – M.G.] what a concept’s extension will be, under the under be, will extension a concept’s what M.G.] – mine [italics would apply to, or what truth value a sentence a value truth what or to, apply 20 epistemic , and that primary intensions are enables asubject to would be would in some would have, CEU eTD Collection possibility would verify it: namely, that with respect to every epistemically possible world its world possible epistemically every to respect with that namely, it: verify would possibility is the watery stuff” is a priori. If it is a priori, then one should expect that every epistemic that claims Chalmers intensions, primary of conception a such Given intension”. “epistemic called sometimes isit worlds, possible epistemically various to relative determines extensions it and since “water”, of bemeaning partof to the issupposed interpretation andJackson’s Chalmers on intension this is that here is crucial what extensions relative to various counterfactual scenarios when they are considered as actual. But somethingshowto else issupposedto thethat term “water” has intension determines an that not is and XYZ) in Earth Twin that a substance to “water” a term apply would a subject that rather XYZ (or itrefers to XYZ.fact that The to refers “water” then world, is actual an Earth For example, itis epistemically possible that Putnam’s Twin Earth is an actual world. If Twin characterization it: Chalmers understands how of characterization informal the is Here possibility”? “epistemic is an what But possibility. epistemic So epistemic possibility represents many ways the world might be for all we know. Recall that according to the proponents of the epistemic two-dimensionalism, “water two-dimensionalism, of epistemic the proponents tothe according that Recall scenarios). (Chalmers 2006:77-78) atall is true that (one intension epistemic a necessary iffShas priori there is a when is notapriori,S isscenario ~S epistemically sowewouldpossible, expectthat And verifies S. scenario every that is would expect When a priori,we S that verifies Thesis. Core the satisfy they that facie case prima isstrong a there […] ~S. If these claims hold true, then S is a HesperusPhosphorus. is not (Chalmers 2006:75-76) possible Hesperus and that isPhosphorus, that epistemically possible andis H water that possible is epistemically it it Then a priori. out ruled not is epistemicallyus say that a claim is epistemically possible toepistemicallybe in sense. correspond abroad hypotheses, possible Let (inmight the world broad the ways sense)These not. might it when or itstar ismorning the to identical possible that water is XYZ. It is epistemically might contain H contain might even more ways the world mightThere be, arefor many all wayswe know the a worldpriori. might The be, oceans for all we know. And there are 2 O or they might contain XYZ; the evening star might be might star evening the XYZ; contain might they O or 21 2 O, CEU eTD Collection 19 Stalnaker(1999: 210). competently is to associate withit the referent. Semantic competence the and onthis description view is amatter definite of the the firstbetween part in theof “fit” sense arelation that to use second, a term description; definite some to equivalent its referent is factorable into to parts: first, a relationbetween the expressionand apurely general concept thatis 18 extension would be generated by considering these worlds as actual. A statement is a priori isifA a as by priori generated worlds statement these if itactual. and only has a considering is that extensions to worlds possible epistemically from function the is intension primary determination isimplicitthat in the description theory of meaning reference. and two-dimensional semantics shares the same conception of meaning and reference “water” (or any other term) is equivalent of to somemeaning the description, two-dimensionalism, of which interpretation shows thatepistemic the theon epistemic that implies This Unsurprisingly isthis confirmed by Chalmers: possibilities if and onlyifthe what extension of a particular expression particular a of what extension candetermine is given, asubject world a possible about information way: sufficient once abilityproposed any determines epistemic, expression’s or primary, intension in thefollowing refer to andexpressions their what whether about judgments rational make to a position in are they then their world, utterances are actual the of the character about true” information is given “onceenough asubject that proclaimed (Chalmers 2007: is intensionssemantics definesmeans bywhich and the get determined.they It primary § 3.4). In other words, the new version of descriptivism. asa semantics of two-dimensional account call epistemic the interpreters this iswhysome Forexample, see Nimtz (2004),Petitt (2004), Schroeterand & Bigelow (2009). Description theory of meaning and reference maintains that the that maintains reference and meaning of theory Description Let me briefly summarize how the epistemic interpretation of two-dimensional of interpretation epistemic the how summarize briefly me Let world. (Chalmers 1996:57) oceans and “water” –M.G.] picks outthedominantlakes;clear, drinkable liquidin the or more intension primary [of wemightsay As arough approximation the that briefly, that it picks out the true . But such a statement can be true with respect to all such epistemic 19 right meaning descriptive concept ordefinite description. (Iam here following of “water” and “the watery stuff” coincides. and“the watery “water” of would 22 be if actual. possiblethat world were The explanation for a relation between a term and term a between relation a for watery stuff in a 18 Arguably, CEU eTD Collection epistemically possible world. is extension its when is, that intension: primary necessary 23 true with respect to every to respect with CEU eTD Collection Similarly, one does not need to know precisely what it takes for something to count as, say, as, count to something for takes it what precisely know to need not does one Similarly, forrequired the use of a name pick to relevant the person in out every world.possible being semanticallyreference-fixing foridentifying description in in count aperson as anypossibleorder to world indexicalcompetent or counterintuitive meaningdescription Contrary to andreferencegenerates results. theory of withdemonstrative a name.names Moreover, expressions, and naturalProper determination. andreference competence of semantic picture unrealistic yields an no suchonekind does meaningof argue such an that account to Putnam 1972)) usedavariety examples of (1970, knowledgeterms not needwere toused seemsknow as anytoexamples specificbepossible situation. in ruleorder speaker associates with an expression determines which fallthings into its inextension orevery toa intension demonstrate primary the and expressions, their with intension primary same the associate they how if meaning only same share the occasions) onespeakertwo speakers (or on two terms. Thus, the meanings of intensions which are the areprimary reference-fixing descriptions account, isin implicit the description theory of meaning and On reference. Chalmers and Jackson’s to someis anidea equivalentdescription: condition that that grasp aspecific reference-fixing implicitly must one of one’s expressions, determineand reference to competent semantically inbe to order that idea an aredefending Kaplan thus and paradigm”, “generalized As it was shown in section 3.1, Chalmers and Jackson are the proponents of whatis called a However, in However, 1970’s,semanticthe Kripke externalists(Donnellan (1972), (1970), 4. 1. 1 Semantic and Epistemic Status of Primary Intensions 4. 1Semantic Externalism and Primary Intensions 4. D EBATING T HE C ONCEPTION OF D IMENSIONAL 24 A PRIORITY OF S EMANTICS T HE E PISTEMIC T WO - CEU eTD Collection all epistemically possible worlds, and thus, given (CT), are not a priori. withnecessarily arenot true descriptions involvingto implyrespect to thatstatements those assumptions, about the subjectmatter that has been fixed by using them, then this would seem ifmeanings intensions only fallible primary But of terms. partial understanding,reveal and they associate with their terms are terms with their associate they that intensions primary if even meaning same the share might times, different at speaker same the or speakers, two ideathat vindicate acommonsensical to in order Thus, time. to from time samespeaker for the speaker and to speaker from might differ assumethey that to reasonable being fix.if usedto is But howprimary intensions that are it understood, then seems matter that they subjectare the about andpartial understanding assumptions speaker’s current externalist, the for Thus, them. of are construed that sentences or expressions of meanings represent to framework dimensional uses two- that paradigm” Kaplan “generalized the reject should semantic externalists that Chalmers’ and Jackson’s account of two-dimensionalism, is untenable. Moreover, it implies isin implicit that meaningandreference, of theory thenthe description areright, externalists one that explaining into inquiry the nature of whateveris one inquiringand about, vindicating anidea to is crucial intensions) primary (i.e. descriptions reference-fixing about error and ignorance H water in any possible world to be competent with using “water” or for that word to pick out 2 O in every possible world. In fact, it seems that making room for the possibility of So on externalists’ picture, primary intensions (reference-fixing descriptions) reflect descriptions) (reference-fixing intensions primary picture, externalists’ on So 2D matrices will not represent not will matrices 2D what her words andwhather represent. words (Schroeterthoughts 2010:§3.1) subject’s a of aspect one reflect merely matrices 2D interpretation, externalist an On sentences. for conditions inwhich figures acompositional theorythatdetermines semantic truth- linguisticis for and understanding orconceptual competence that required can refer tothings whosenature isnot fullyif Thus, understood. semantic not the same, externalists should deny that they are the 25 meanings partial semantic understanding – a specific aspect of of CEU eTD Collection not a better candidate either, since water might be impure. If mightbeimpure. water since either, candidate a better not the meaningthe 20 beingclearly But “water”. term the meaning of togive the supposed (Chalmers 1996:57).Recall Chalmers on that and primary account,Jackson’s intension is lakes” liquidindescription,clear,“picks theand drinkable dominant oceans outthe reference-fixing its or “water”, of intension primary the that maintained is It angle. as beingconditionals” should aposteriori. count “application from are drawn that conclusions maintain, Jackson and what Chalmers to contrary Consequently, experience. further of light inthe corrigible are thus and experience matter in might assumptionsquestion: include that evidence thatis originally based on wouldbe justified onthe basis of andtheoretical empirical thesubjectassumptions about conclusions that are drawn from what Chalmers and Jackson calls “applicationnecessary conditionals”primary intension. Consequently, itis not a priori. be false with respect tosome epistemically possible world, then this statement does not have a if might it part of But not of terms. meanings the vieware onexternalists’ primary intensions since “water”, term the meaningof a changeof be without might false it Moreover, be false. is “water possible worlds liquidclear, in oceans dominant drinkable the might the and lakes” epistemically some to respect with that imply to seem would it then intensions, primary drinkable liquid andlakes”. inthe If oceans adoptsan one externalistic understanding of of isclear, reference-fixing “water” “thedominant intension, description, primary or is“water clear, dominantthe drinkable liquid inthe oceans and lakes”.Itis maintained that This is argued, forexample, by Byrne & Pryor(2006: 43). Let me elaborate an externalistic conception of primary intensions from different a from intensions primary of conception externalistic an elaborate me Let imply that also would intensions of primary conception an externalistic Furthermore, Letme illustrate how this works with a worn-out example. Say we have asentence of “water”, since then it would rule out water in its solid forms. Being forms. solid its in water out rule would it then since “water”, of 26 20 in the oceans andlakes in theoceans liquid cannot be part of be part cannot is part of clear is CEU eTD Collection “to effect a partition among the possibilities independently of how things actually are” actually things how of independently possibilities the among a partition effect “to and“definebe subject” possible our not to it would since otherwise mustbetrue, reference worlds. possible some epistemically to bemightrespect with false and thus mightbe defeated, that in assumptions, matter question: subject the about theoretical assumptions empirical and contain with terms, associated one’s one that intensions primary into enter that characteristics then right, are if externalists Thus, even that maintain Margolis andEric Laurence For example, Stephen operate. in to order criterions, or principles, implicitly notrequireviewknowable any does isthatcategorization not and haveand need forno excrete), or any substance in digest the air (so don’t respire)” don’t (Block(so & Stalnaker 1999:14). induction electromagnetic by energy their get locomote), don’t (so tree-like are that concept of life rules out the possibility that there could be living beings that are immortal, and don’t reproduce,knowledge about thefact thatany of the characteristics that is attached to it areessential to it: “Nothing in the of) “water” puts one in a position oneina to position puts “water” of) “concept” the perhaps term (or the of analysis” “conceptual or competence whether semantic foregoing” problemthe not (only) is (Jackson 1994: butwith “enough”,171). But with specification must intension ofprimary itmust besatisfied “enough – satisfy only of the 21 implausible. clearly the term “water” would meaningthe “water”,lives itjust then of anyone, entail by inadesert, who would that using be able to know that water is in the oceans and lakes, but that is Forexample, Block andStalnaker(1999) argue that understanding aconcept of be satisfied in order for somethingcount to as water. However, Jackson thinks that some sort of description theory meaningHowever,of Jacksonthinkssome and description sort of theory that Jackson claims that for something to be water, not Margolis 2003:267) & have hair.(Laurence say, longer that, women apriori analytic or not certainly it’s Yet etc. clothing, hairstyle, of basis the on sex people’s judgments about Similarly,form have features. other often these people songs, etc.,butallproduce isn’tanalytic sameitthe orapriori birds that […] it’s important tothe categorization birds they of fly, that lay eggs, know which of them are the ones that ones the are them of which 27 21 One of the main problems with this all features that go into the life does not give us a priori should or should CEU eTD Collection posteriori to fit the a target known are intensions, of primary the or search,descriptions, and reference-fixing then thusright, is theyKripke If represent not some implicit criterion of a reference-fixing it description that has, andit is thus that notconnected apriori with a term. epistemological side of the story: namely, that itis a contingent, empirical fact that a term has such a description, or primary intension, is known a priori. must haveadescription finda personinof to him,by order but doesnotthat itself imply that hunters bounty that is nodoubt it. It about knowledge apriori itreveals that or search, the handbill,aboutbut claim the such that isa description apply knownapriori to targetthe to of say to wouldfound becorrect him? they that he is, or for a person who is described in the description.a handbill, But are bounty hunters looking for aman who satisfies a anddescription, whoever that if someone brings one should say that itis not: the target of the search is, then primary“define intensions, subject”, or our conditions, description? If reference-fixing he if even person wrong the bring can one that possible it isn’t But handbill? a in provided fits thedescription whoever is or whatever of search the subject itmean the that Jackson uses an analogy with a handbill that describes that handbill a with analogy an uses Jackson (Jackson 1998: 53).Inhis brief discussion itof does meanwhat to“define subject”, our One of the lessons of Kripke’s critique of the description theory of reference was the was of theory reference description the of Kripke’scritique of lessons One the of no or description, some not is there is or there whether about not is question The But what does it mean to say that the handbill the that say to mean it does what But 1998: 30-31) some conception of what counts asa counts of what conception some world isfully by determined the Are there farvery like: get metaphysicians with questions not will search. Likewise, properties give them their target, or, if you Those person. wanted handbill like,the on of the representational properties define the to attend the to subject fail they if of far theirvery go not will they But a handbill. When bounty hunters gosearching, they are searchingfor aperson andnot K s? Are K s nothing above overand J 28 way the world is? in the absence of K , and what counts as a a wanted person: a wanted defines by definition J s? and, Is the K way the K way the Is and, s? the subject of the search? Does search? of the subject the and a priori J . (Jackson . , whoever fits whoever , him , fits the fits then it then CEU eTD Collection 22 Jackson’s and his to according Secondly, function. a is intension an if even description, dominant clear, drinkable liquidin oceansthe and lakes”(Chalmers 1996:57).Thisis a primary intensions with “primary intensiondescriptions: “water” –M.G.] picks[of the out being used to fix, and thus might be false with respect to some epistemically possible worlds. matter they whatever are subject about assumptions andpartial knowledge represent they only areright, if externalists since, of apriority, grounds they semantic are the that (ii) reference; its determine to someor term with be competent semantically in to order fixingdescription meanings the in of needsterms one to implicitly sensethat the aspecific reference- grasp reason toconcludesufficient (i) that: reference-fixing primary intensions, or are descriptions, be confident picksterm – M.G.] outwhatitdoes pick (Jackson out” 1998:82,ft. 36),and“we sothat can that there is a reference-fixingbe discarded. what the subject matter (orstory the target of one’s inquiry) is, but assumptionsto about it that mighttell” (Ibid.), that is not by itself a to get around to get of arguments the by externalists following: the proposing See Jackson(1997; 1998: 201). It is clear that Jackson is explicitly committed to descriptivism to committed explicitly is Jackson that clear is It other any [or ‘water’ that magic not is “it that Jackson with agrees one if even Thus, This argument, however, is not very compelling. First of all, Chalmers 4) be with descriptions,not andshould assimilated 2002a: § them. (Chalmers than basic more are epistemic intensions So […] in cases. specific results right the gives definition the whether how see to intension, definitions precisely by prior graspof deploying our a term’s epistemic intension.epistemic plausibility evaluatethe such of weusually Indeed, definition a such where Even definition. explicit of sort in any not possibilities, exists, of epistemic specific ina rational evaluation revealed subject's a subjectintension isa notadescriptionfunction, need notby a subject. of articulation a concept any descriptive of sort be able requires intension an epistemic grasping toto think is noreason that There articulate it to grasp the 29 [italics mine – M.G.]. It is It M.G.]. – mine [italics The epistemic 22 , but Chalmers tries does assimilate CEU eTD Collection be relevant for Chalmers’ and Jackson’s means of determining primary intensions. primary determining of means Jackson’s and Chalmers’ for be relevant might that commentary Quinean a here make me let Thus, other. the on standing Quone find extension is extension statement’s concludes that namely,a subject when intension: primary anecessary has § in 2007: (Chalmers expression the actual world” counterfactualChalmers emphasized, extensions of primary intensions are determined notby of properties tokens of expressions, but rather “turn on the epistemic properties of an extension some expression or sentence or expression some extension counterfactual scenarios which supposedly enables a subject to enablesasubject whichsupposedly counterfactual scenarios general idea is following: the primary intensions are determined by reflecting on primary intensions strongly Carnap’s procedure of resembles determining The intensions. As itwas shown in Chalmers’section 3.3, andJackson’s means determiningof expressions’ function does not help to evade them. known a priori. Thus, their arguments apply Chalmersto as well. The claim that intension is a not andare terms meaningsof arenotthe intensions, primary or descriptions, reference-fixing semantic grounds of apriority. But that is what semantic externalists deny. On their view, semantics, intensions arepart these of meanings the terms andof aresupposedtoprovide two-dimensional of interpretation epistemic the to according importantly, most and Lastly, acluster is it byof determined them) description of (or the a description theory reference. on by as them is reference determined isit that clear giveit” or definition”, an“explicit articulate beable“anot to subjectneed factthat the of irrespective andthus asactual, considered account, it is primary intensions that determine extensions with respect to all worlds If one finds Carnap standing on the one side, it is hard to imagine how one would not 4. 1.2 Determination ofPrimary Intensions true with respect to all counterfactual scenarios. all to respect counterfactual with would 30 have with respect to those scenarios. As to those respect have with 5). A statement is a priori if and only if it if only and if priori a is A statement 5). know and determine what CEU eTD Collection matters of fact and truths which are which truths and of fact matters 23 following: they are that show would it thus and necessary, be would intension primary its then meaning, same the with it used they If is true. it that claim who those than meaning adifferent with “water” the dominant clear, drinkable liquid in the oceans and lakes” is false, or rejects it, use the term is “water that claim who people So 1956). & Strawson Grice 5; § forthcoming-b: (Chalmers priori. a not is thus to at least one of them, then this statementwould be false: that is, withdoes respect to which a subjectnot would reject it. If haveit is false with respect a necessary primary which it to with respect intension, thenalwaysbescenario if isa counterfactual will there right, Quine and is“water dominantthe drinkable oceans clear, liquidin the and lakes”primaryintension. But of thus vindicating (CT). forhave Chalmers’andmeans intensions Jackson’s of determining expressions’ primary and Thus, Quine’s proposal will beonly considered with respect towhat consequences itmight plausibility of his suggestion, distinction. analytic-synthetic and of the rejection of a distinctionQuine’s suggestion is nostatementthat immunetorevision is based onhis rejection of the on which the thesis rests. Adistinction, as he puts, “betweentruths which are W. V.O.Quine in his “TwoDogmas paper of Empiricism”maintained the (1953) Sometimes itSometimes thatis Quineanscenarios suggested involve meaning achange of determine statement’s to suggestion andJackson’s followsone Chalmers’ Suppose a priori. Let me make two points with regards to this suggestion. Conversely, by the same token, same the by Conversely, make elsewhere enough adjustments […] drastic inthesystem… may, may.can beAnycome comeif we what heldtrue, statement what hold which statements, analytic and experience, on contingently hold which statements, synthetic seek aboundary between folly It becomes to mine –M.G.].(Quine 1953:43) synthetic 23 However, it is not the aim of this thesis to examine the , or grounded in fact” (Quine 1953: 20). no statement is immune torevision analytic 31 , or, grounded in meanings independently of [italics CEU eTD Collection have a necessary primary intension. Consequently,given (CT), it is nota priori. possibility is false. If it mightextension be false withof therespect statement to at leastdefer “arthritis one of them, thencan itoccur does not to he iswilling terms, itinin put Burge’s himself.Or, to thanhe is experts be better heto takes the thigh” with respect from who matter those this on accept acorrection Bert is willingto Moreover, in the thigh”. to some epistemic canoccur “arthritis who has with he express a beliefa sentence would Bert, which character epistemic them possibilities.assigning Burge’s respect to Consider with to extensions isfollowing adeterminesubject supposedto which intensions primary expressions’ by suggestedbyChalmers andJackson undermine procedure to materials the whichseem is that gettingdetermined. there wasachangeof something that suchcasesshow that not and necessary, not is intension primary its that entails scenarios counterfactual different that it is not a priori. In other words, the fact that its extension would vary with respect to lakes”, then this would this then lakes”, would thestatement reject “water is clear, thedominant drinkable liquidin oceansand the a speaker scenario someto counterfactual if respect Thus, with andstatements. expressions describing are Jackson in sinceuse and Chalmers asanobjection thiscase, this terms, one cannot if even of one Second, terms. meanings the of parts not are they which to according intensions primary of conception externalistic an “water”, then such scenarios do then scenarios such “water”, . Therefore, it is epistemically possible for Bert that his belief is false, and thus that thus and false, is belief his that Bert for possible is epistemically it . Therefore, Burge argued very that many expressionsof our aredeferential: provide by Externalist 1986) proposed another typeTyler arguments Burge(1979, of First, if “change of meaning” means change of the primary intension of the term the of intension primary the of change means meaning” of if “change First, It would be a mistake […] to think that incomplete understanding, in the understanding, incomplete that think to […] mistake be a would It means by which primary intensions meanings) (i.e. get show that its primary intension is contingent, and thus, given (CT), not involve meaning of if achange term of the assumes one assumes 32 that primary intensions are determined and the meaningsthe of assigned to CEU eTD Collection community community would deny her beliefs involving that concept. linguistic her of members other that aperson such for possible be epistemically always would itinvolvea priori,concept that since know not that truths deferentially does some concept So it seems to be a consequence of Chalmers’ view that a person who uses and possesses expressions. when using various competent in tobesemantically order matter however, is that one does not need to have a complete, or implicit, understanding of a subjectitWhat claim”. “unconditional whether shecanmake about an and not (Jackson 1998: 53).Theclaimis aboutthe things are how say can “we that or thinks, or says one what understand not does it uses who anyone that Burge’s proposal. The fact that a person possesses a concept “deferentially” a person aconcept possesses fact that The Burge’s proposal. followfrom not and does does whatI think remarks mehere about let But maketwo about. never has a has never Chalmers is aware of Burge-style cases and describes them in the following way: If he is right, then many (if not all) of our expressions are deferential and that one intension. 2002b: (Chalmers 35-36) [i.e. ascan secondary on subjunctive environment, a subject’s – M.G.] depend can extension concepts, deferential for that is clear It community. depends on the way extension the corresponding whose one term Bert: isfor used in a subject’sconcept linguistic deferential a expresses term this that say might We it. use community inthe others which for phenomenon for same the usethe word least to tacitly) (at intending deference, semantic with uses ‘arthritis’ Bert term the is that factor crucial Here, the thought experimentincludes quite ordinary, nondeviantphenomena. by required the understanding’ of of The sort patience. ‘incomplete cases. probably provideis the analogous list Continuing largely a matter known example), ‘gothic’,‘carburetor’, ‘pre-amplifier’, ‘fermentation’, awell-borrow ‘elm’ (to ‘deer’, ‘sonata’, ‘recession’, ‘contract’, ‘Brisket’, vocabularies expressionsa largenumbereven normal of inthecaseof inour (Burge 1979:35-36) phenomenon. deviant even or unusual an in general is requires, argument the that sense conditional complete on…, but can never make an unconditional claim about how things are” things how about claim unconditional an make never can but on…, [original italics – M.G.]. ‘Arthritis’ is a case in point. […] understanding What I have called ‘partial understanding’ iscommonor ‘partial understanding’ What Ihavecalled of of whatever subjectmatter one is talking or thinking epistemic 33 status of a subject’s claims and beliefs, and claims of a subject’s status does seem to entail, to seem does not entail CEU eTD Collection defer) cannot determine that its is extension determine that cannot defer) a subject’s (Chalmersenvironment” 2002b:36),then (andisBert everyone who willing to possibilities. However, since “itis clear that for deferential concepts, extension can depend on supposed beto justified apriori is not limited onlytodeferential concepts: beChalmers seems such sympathetic to to of reasoning, although beliefs scope the are that possible involve beliefsjustify concepts apriori. worlds,that andthuscould those Infact, they due to if limitations. Perhaps theirthey boundedwere not cognitive by limitations, cognitive deferential concepts and statements that contain them relative to epistemically possible worlds worlds. Bert then “arthritis”, it cannot. If that possible an is epistemically it and extension thigh, in the occur can arthritis that possible epistemically of this statementis it be true: might it or false be might thigh” in the turned occur can “arthritis knows, Bert all for on epistemic properties hypothesisthe in epistemicthe isBut that question possibility 2007: §3.4). actual” (Chalmers of the concept of be,under will know a concept’s extension whatto asubject enables an possibility epistemic world values intensions of primary turn on epistemicpropertiesthe expression in actual an of the could . Recall that the epistemic two-dimensionalism claims that “sufficient information about information “sufficient that claims two-dimensionalism epistemic the that Recall One might reason in the following way. Speakers cannot determine extensions of extensions determine cannot Speakers way. following inthe reason might One The Burgean thesis of “semantic deference” also seems to undermine the idea that the undermine that idea the to alsoseems “semantic deference” of thesis The Burgean M.G.] (Chalmers 2006:99) aprioricould be onidealized rationalreflection. justified justifya priori. thecorresponding thought priori ifeven the speaker’s a actual cognitive capacities aretoolimited be may to […] token A sentence limitations. cognitive contingent speaker’s […] the notion of apriority is understood so thatit idealizes away from a determine extensions of deferential expressions with to epistemically with expressions respect of determine extensions deferential would be able to determine its extension with respect to those 34 true What matters is thatthethought with respect to epistemically possible epistemically to respect with [italics mine – mine [italics CEU eTD Collection reflection”. Given (CT), this would entail that a statement that entail this would (CT), Given reflection”. rational “idealized on belief the justified and them from away idealized if one justified isit It that rather cognitive limitations”. “contingent by done using speaker’s the procedure suggestedby procedure the of proponents epistemicthe semantics by two-dimensional which scenarios, and thus, given (CT), would not count as being a priori. possible Secondly, if epistemically onesome followsto respect with be false to out turn might intensions primary involve that statements by them. Consequently, fixedusing has been matter that subjectthe terms and they represent only one’s partial andfallibleknowledge, current about assumptions, partmeaningsnot of of intensions the areFirstly,on externalistic primary understanding following the reasons. dueto semantics by two-dimensional epistemicis the that proposed apriority of conception the with is incompatible intensions primary of conception externalistic suggestthat andThe and seem insubsections provided criticisms 4.1.1 4.1.2 arguments to concepts), involve deferential they of whether beliefs justify(irrespective their to inorder capacities inevitably who toconcludebesubjects use their noreason that why idealization from them could be theoretically relevantfor such a theory, there seems to human beings that useactual cognitive capacities. Unless Chalmers can anargumentprovide beliefsof actual of justification of characterize nature the to is supposed theory knowledge, of it relative to all counterfactual scenarios. ifintension idealized awayfrom andone of limitations one’s extensions cognitive determine But this seems to be devastating. Epistemology, or proposition, 4. 2Semantic Internalism and PrimaryIntensions itis passage ora thatathought, seemstosuggestthatnot The above quoted do is justify them a priori. actually justified a priori, since justification, one might reasonably assume, is assume, reasonably might one justification, since apriori, justified actually 35 could have a necessary haveprimary anecessary actual limited cognitive could be CEU eTD Collection determined purelyby internalsubject’s and states, thatitthus presupposes andinternalistic asitis byChalmers: thatis confirmed “narrow”, a content though of and speech represent determined, only by internalthe properties speaker.of the As itis indicatedby Schroeter, and fixed, being as them characterize would that in away namely, way: internalistic externalistic intensions primary and conceiving inan conception of of suggests them semantics. two-dimensional epistemic semantic is a externalism isincompatible with conception by that of apriority proposed the intensions and would beapriori by of standards the Consequently,(CT). it that entails primary necessary have would that statements have cannot one then externalism, semantic assumes if one that seems it Thus, distinction.. analytic-synthetic the in rejecting Quine vindicate (CT),if of“semantic theBurgeanthesis cannot andfollows accepts deference” one expressions,get determined one intensions andassigned to then supposed to primary are It isfrom primary clear areconceivedasbeing intensions that this paragraph If intensions internal by aredetermined purely then subject’s primary state, would they an rejects semantics two-dimensional epistemic the that surprise no is it Perhaps [italics mine –M.G.]. (Chalmers 2002b: §6) epistemic necessity is determined by the internal stateofthe thinker so, if priori; a justifiable be also will subject that of duplicate thought that isjustifiablein corresponding apriori, a intrinsic thought any ifproperties example,For areinternally determined. hasa one subject rational relevant the where thoughts, of properties rational the of terms More deeply,is– M.G.]. it bemay epistemic in defined because content andsoenvironment, is captures the environment a subject's any knowledge of way a thought'sis content epistemic athought’s because is surface, this Onthe narrow? –M.G.] intension [primary truth-value content is epistemic Why depends on the character of the her sentences. (Schroeter 2010: § 3.1) andin internal for turn determines truth-conditions states, which objective intension [primary diagonal the to corresponding intension (the – M.G.]expressions of a 2D matrix)Generalized that is fully2D semantics determined […] by a positssubject's an extra aspect of meaning for all independent of the environmentindependent of itself 36 [italics mine – M.G.]: it rationally priorto [italics mine [italics a thought's . CEU eTD Collection intensions should bedefinedRecall intensions determined. and were primary that Jackson’s and in Chalmers’ intensions primary of conception be needs explained. to that epistemicproperty the being defined in terms intension itselfof primary iswhich in defined a way thatpresupposes a priori. This shows thatis a ifpriori and only if ithas a (necessary) primary intension representsthat what is knowable the epistemic propertya statementimplyit would given that (CT), then, environment, of any a subject’s knowledge aboutto is prior what represent they justification that sense the in narrow are intensions primary that maintains – and namely, intensions, primary of conception internalistic an apriority adapts one If intension. primary – is conception Jackson’s apriority lose of semantic seems its explanatory to power. and Chalmers’ then apriori, knows thinker or a speaker what represents content epistemic be used asproviding presupposes the epistemic notion of apriority.is If that so, then primary intensions could not primary intensionsfrom considering ways the world might be, for all we know determine to order intensions,as and Chalmersassign primary Jacksonsuggested and functionsepistemically with the possiblemightworld forbe, all we knowapriori” (Chalmers and2006: 75-76), that something“is subset (in the broadof functions epistemicsense) when with it theis notsubsetpossibilities ruled of outepistemic a priori” possibilities (Ibid.). as So theirin which were range characterized “as ways the a priori: that is, what is is knowable what representing are they then way, internalistic inan understood are intensions prior toany prior is it that sense in a isnarrow content epistemic that claims Chalmers But them. of conception In fact, one might trace an implicit commitment to apriority internalistic and toapriority animplicitcommitment mighttrace one In fact, necessary hasa ifitif andonly is astatementa priori (CT), to according Recall that knowledge semantic of a subject’s environment. This seems to imply that if primary prior grounds for grounds apriority beggingwithout the question. to any knowledge 37 of what the world is like. But if narrow if But like. is world the what of a priori . Thus, characterization of characterization . Thus, suggestion of how such suggestion of defined starting as CEU eTD Collection knowledge andtruth. providebeseemsforproposed deeply to apriori cannot semantic grounds andproblematic, and since it loses its explanatory power if one assumes semantic internalism, the conception is externalism by two-dimensionalism, apriority conception of epistemic incompatible the the with proposed semantic that given following: the suggests apriority of conception semantic its notion. same that on basis maintains to providemaintains to proposed by the epistemic two-dimensional semantics would lose its explanatory power: it the follow that would from which terms epistemic (that is, if one assumes an internalistic conception of them), then they would be would they then them), of conception internalistic an assumes if one is, (that be narrow to if intensions aresupposed primary 2003:46).But epistemic (Chalmers terms” Chalmers maintainsunderstand that“to narrow content, onemust ground the notion in that perhaps might have nothing to do with apriority or epistemic properties at all. However, The rationale of critical evaluations of the epistemic two-dimensional semantics and Of course, there might be various ways to understand what narrow content” is: ways is: content” narrow what understand to ways various be might there course, Of semantic basis of the epistemic notion of apriority by grounding 38 semantic conception of apriority that is grounded that in CEU eTD Collection semantics – and semantic the is conception apriority of that beingsuggested of by proponents particularinterpretation –theepistemic ofthe framework two-dimensional two-dimensional toadetailedone of was analysis apriority.chapter devoted successivethirdthe Consequently, of conception semantic is discussed the proposing that framework by approached the indicate and clarify thatareassumptions made about way the linguistic meaningis in ofintensional werediscussedto framework semantics order andone two-dimensional anddetermined. way the get they explanation apriority of uponone’sassumptionswill nature of aboutthe depend such values adequacyof semantic the it thattheoretical was hypothesized Moreover, language. – namely,semantic (i.e. in values)of features interpreted terms of an descriptive-semantic terms initsemantic defines that notion a epistemic the of conception propose should apriority of explanation semantic the that was suggested It indicated. apriority were of explanation semantic the of features some Then, theoretical context. broader ina thesis in this analyzed was that conception locate the andto them between differences theoretical emphasize to in order discussed were justification apriori of nature the explain to aim – that semantic) semantics. two-dimensional epistemic the by proposed conception the to namely, it: of conception in terms of meaning, thedifferentinaccounts present are philosophicalthe literature that aiming atexplainingapriority scope of ofvariety the to theDue meaning. of notion thesissemantic the and apriority of notion epistemic was narrowed the between connection to proposed the about anclearer get to was thesis analysis this of aim main The of one particular In the second chapter the basic notions and methodological assumptions of the formal “conceptual” (or and –“referential” types two accounts of In thefirstchapter C ONCLUSION 39 CEU eTD Collection suggested by the epistemic two-dimensional semantics loses its explanatory sinceitssuggested by losessemantics power, explanatory epistemictwo-dimensional the the in terms values of conception internalistic an thus and ofinternalism, semantic assumes if one whichHowever, aprioritydistinction. analytic-synthetic the rejects or aredeferential concepts all)our not of (if is beingmany thesis that anexternalistic accepts one if apriority conception of suggested vindicate the defined,cannot one then determined, getting are values such which by semantics two-dimensional then the notionthey get associated; (ii) if one follows the procedure suggested by proponents of the epistemic of aprioritybeen fixed by using them, they and partare not of meaningsthe expressionsof with which that hasmatter a subject that about fallible assumptions, andcurrent partial representknowledge, has been defined by epistemicthe two-dimensionalism externalisticon understanding are supposedto due tothefollowing (i)values reasons: intensions) (i.e. primary interms which of is apriority is so This defined. is being it which of in terms values semantic of conception externalistic the thus and externalism, semantic assumes if one semantic two-dimensional epistemic bythe is that suggested of anotion apriority vindicate cannot one indicated that 4.1 in section were raised that andobjections arguments The chapter. fourth, last, in the done was apriority assigning intensions. of itwhich defined strongly apriority, of resembles Carnap’s determiningprocedure and of suggests framework two-dimensional the to determinevalues andassignin semantic terms interpretation epistemic the bywhich means thatthe itwas maintained Moreover, reference. application framework two-dimensional the of and(ii) description the theory meaningof and of isvirtue apriority, itKaplan’s acombination,which (i) of andextension, an defines in value characterize semantic is to that beingused framework the that and coincide necessity and apriority meaning where of bya picture motivated traditional is of apriority conception proposed the that showed Theanalysis the framework. of interpretation epistemic the Critical evaluation of the epistemic two-dimensional framework and its conception of andits conception framework two-dimensional epistemic the of evaluation Critical 40 CEU eTD Collection notion of apriority at all,it needs to be explained in a different way. conception could notbe vindicated. What does seem followto though is that if there is beto a upon a traditional ideameaning of according which and necessity to apriority coincide, such a a represent does not follow from of externalism an inshould acceptance be Second, semantic terms. epistemic grounded that theresemantic invalues, of terms which beapriority should defined, values presupposes those that can be no plausibleconceptionget ofapriority, it then off could internalistic not groundthe if an conception of notionsemantics, ofalthough two-dimensional epistemic by the apriority, proposed being is that resultsapriority of a notion to one commit of the itself analysisby not does internalism but semantic of an acceptance suggestFirst, ifinternalism/externalism. thatone if onewanted aims at providing to a of apriority beggingwithout question. the problematic:itbe either vindicated,or it be cannot cannot usedprovide to suggestedbeen has that apriority of conception the Thus, defined. being is it which of in terms byvalues proponents inthe isof epistemic presupposed characterization and determination notion apriority of of the epistemic two-dimensional semantic seems to be deeply Finally,melet make points two with toapriority regards and semantic semantic conception of it by using two-dimensional framework, then if it rested 41 semantic semantic grounds CEU eTD Collection — Chalmers, D.(1996). 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