Promoting IDPs’ and Women’s Voices in Post-Conflict Georgia

Columbia University

Women’s Political Resource Center

M a y 2 0 1 2

Promoting IDPs’ and Women’s Voices in Post-Conflict Georgia

May 2012

Authors: Alexandra dos Reis Drilon Gashi Samantha Hammer Marissa Polnerow Alejandro Roche del Fraille Janine White

Completed in fulfillment of the Workshop in Development Practice at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, Spring 2012. In partnership with the Women’s Political Resource Center, Tbilisi, Georgia.

Cover images (clockwise): Newly constructed IDP housing in Potskho-Etseri; Old-wave IDP women focus group in Tbilisi; New-wave IDP men focus group in Karaleti IDP settlement. Cover image sources: Keti Terdzishvili, CARE International, and Alejandro Roche del Fraille Other photos: Alejandro Roche del Fraille

Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs 420 West 118th St New York, NY 10027 www.sipa.columbia.edu

View of Tbilisi, Marissa Polnerow 1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are grateful for the support of our client organization, the Women’s Political Resource Center (WPRC), and WPRC’s President, Lika Nadaraia, who has extended this unique opportunity to our team. We would also like to thank the supportive staff members of WPRC, including Keti Bakradze, and Nanuka Mzhavanadze. We hope that our project will contribute to the valuable work undertaken at WPRC, and its newly-launched Frontline Center in Tbilisi.

At Columbia University, we were privileged to work with Professor Gocha Lordkipanidze, our academic advisor, who shared with us a wealth of insight and guidance. His knowledge on Georgian society, governance, international law, human rights, and conflict resolution helped advance our research and inform this report. Jenny McGill, the Workshop in Development Practice Director, and Ilona Vinklerova, the Economic and Political Development Concentration Manager, have provided extraordinary support that cannot be measured simply by the time they contributed. We would also like to thank Kristy Kelly, Sara Minard, Lincoln Mitchell and David Phillips for sharing their expertise and enthusiasm.

We very much appreciate the time that the many NGO, government, and international organization representatives set aside to share their expertise with us in Georgia, as well as in New York, Washington, D.C., London, and Switzerland. We would especially like to thank the staff of Association Gaenati who kindly hosted us in Zugdidi and helped connect us with other stakeholders in the region. We would like to also thank Dalila Khorava of Georgian Support for Refugees, Vakhtang Piranishvili of CARE International, Nino Shervashidze and Eliko Bendeliani at Sukhumi University, for their help in organizing focus groups that significantly enhanced our research. Some of our interviewees also participated in our roundtable discussion, so we would to thank them for engaging in a discussion with other stakeholders and helping us formulate our recommendations. Nino Khelaia, Zita Baslandze and Kate Terdzishvili also provided valuable support as interpreters.

Our research would not have been possible without the assistance of individuals across Georgia who bravely shared their very personal experiences of displacement with us. Overall, we were incredibly touched by the generosity of all our interviewees, who were quick to extend helping hands and provide support to our project.

2

CONTENTS

Acronyms and Abbreviations 4 Executive Summary 5 Introduction 6 Women’s Political Resource Center 7 Country Profile 8 Methodology 16 Avenues of IDPs’ and Women’s Political Participation National Level 22 Local Level 32 Policymaking 36 Findings: Factors Impacting IDPs’ and Women’s Political Participation 53 Psychosocial Factors 54 Institutional Factors 69 Political Factors 79 Economic Factors 90 Recommendations for Promoting IDPs’ and Women’s Political Participation 96 Appendices A - Consolidated Recommendations Table 105 B - List of Interviewees 106 C - Human Rights Documents Relevant to IDP Rights and Participation 110 Bibliography 114

3 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child DRC Danish Refugee Council ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council EU European Union EUMM European Union Monitoring Mission EWMI East-West Management Institute GEAD Gender Equality Advisory Council, Parliament of Georgia GAF Gender Analysis Framework GEL Georgian lari GFSIS Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies GIPA Georgian Institute of Public Affairs GYLA Georgian Young Lawyers Association HRBA Human rights-based approach ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICESC International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ICG International Crisis Group IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre IDP Internally Displaced Person INGO International Non-government organization MDG United Nations Millennium Development Goals MRA Ministry for Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Refugees and Accommodation NAP National Action Plan NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NED United States National Endowment for Democracy NDI National Democratic Institute NGO Non-governmental organization NRC Norwegian Refugee Council OSAGI Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women OSF Open Society Foundation OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe P2P People-to-people (diplomacy) PTSD Post-traumatic stress syndrome SIPA Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs TI Transparency International UNDP United Nations Development Program UNFPA United Nations Population Fund UNHCR The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women UNM United National Movement UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia UN Women United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women USAID United States Agency for International Development WPRC Women’s Political Resource Center

4

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Georgia, many living in protracted displacement since the early 1990s, face a number of challenges in participating in politics and peacebuilding. Using a human-rights and gender-based approach, this report assesses the extent to which displaced women and men are involved in policymaking regarding their needs and interests. We focus on policies that promote the durable solutions as defined in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: return, resettlement, and local integration.

Avenues of Participation Structures and processes supporting IDPs’ participation certainly exist, particularly through civil society, in which women are disproportionately more active. Policymaking has also become more inclusive, but significant improvements are needed in implementing policies to ensure IDPs’ effective participation and enable them to choose among the durable solutions. A main challenge for achieving this objective lies in connecting locally-based problems with a coherent national policy approach that IDPs have helped to formulate.

Factors Influencing Engagement Interconnected psychosocial, political, institutional and economic issues limit IDPs’ engagement in decision-making and public life more generally. For example, shifting gender roles have affected how men and women deal with displacement, creating burdens and opportunities for participation of both genders. Political divisions within IDP communities also pose barriers, in addition to a lack of consistent political will, institutional capacity, and coordination among key stakeholders. Finally, poverty can promote a vicious cycle, hindering participation while the lack of political voice also serves as a key obstacle to promoting efforts that address this marginalization.

Recommendations IDPs as rights-holders and the state and other relevant duty bearers hold different levels of responsibility in addressing this situation. We conclude with recommendations for the Government of Georgia, international organizations, NGOs, and IDP communities can enhance IDPs’ voice in policies that affect them. Systematic inclusion of this group, improved governance, and increased cooperation among stakeholders can support IDPs in becoming more active individually and organizing collectively to advocate for their needs and interests. These efforts thereby promote more inclusive governance and peacebuilding processes in Georgian society.

5 INTRODUCTION

August 2012 marks the 20th anniversary of the open conflict between the Republic of Georgia and the breakaway region of Abkhazia, which led to the displacement of approximately 251,000 internally displaced persons.1 Another wave of 40,000 people fled the Upper Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia in 1998. The conflict over Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia also displaced about 60,000 people in the early 1990s and an additional 26,000 IDPs after the August 2008 war. IDPs, comprising about 5% of the Georgian population, remain the group in society most affected by Georgia’s frozen conflicts.

International human rights standards mandate the Georgian government, together with civil society and the international community, to ensure that IDPs are able to exercise their right to participate in public life. In particular, according to the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, IDPs have a right to participate in decision-making regarding their specific needs and interests as IDPs. While progress has been made, IDPs continue to face difficulties in participating in civic life – with some of these difficulties being unique to IDPs, and others shared with the Georgian population as a whole. The web of factors influencing IDPs’ political participation must be more fully understood in order for IDPs to be able to realize this right.

The Women’s Political Resource Center (WPRC) has tasked the SIPA consulting team with assessing these factors through a gendered lens in order to see how displaced women and men function in public life and the political arena. The consulting team conducted qualitative research in Georgia and the United States, employing human rights-based and gender-based approaches to analyze issues of governance in Georgia within the context of binding international law and legal norms.

The final report presents the landscape of avenues and processes of women and men IDPs’ participation in policymaking around the durable solutions of return, resettlement, and local integration. However, several psychosocial, institutional, political and economic factors significantly limit opportunities for IDPs’ engagement. Women IDPs in particular, although being quite active in civil society, in most cases face additional challenges in being politically active as a result of pressures to conform to traditional roles. This report contributes to the understanding of IDPs’ engagement in Georgian civic life by examining these factors, with the aim of expanding opportunities for displaced women and men to participate in governance and peace processes.

The report concludes with recommendations for the Georgian Government, civil society actors, international donors, and the IDP community in order to empower action in pursuit of these aims.

1 Georgia. Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees of Georgia. “IDP Issues – General Information.” Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees of Georgia, N.d. Web. 30 Nov 2011.

6

THE WOMEN’S POLITICAL RESOURCE CENTER

This project aligns with the Women’s Political Resource Center’s broader goal of supporting women’s and vulnerable populations’ political participation. Originally founded as the Feminist Club organization in 1998, WPRC has since developed into a coalition of non-governmental organizations and individuals. The WPRC’s main objectives are to politically empower women in Georgia and to achieve gender equality in the country. WPRC is headquartered in Tbilisi and has three regional offices, in Mtskheta (Mtskheta-Mtianeti region), Poti (Samegrelo region) and Kutaisi (Imereti region).2

In 2005, the organization was granted Consultative Status of the United Nations Economic and Social Council and has as a result expanded its partnerships to a worldwide network of NGOs involved in inclusive relationships. WPRC initiated the creation of an international foundation in 2006, which, “provides technical assistance to women politicians and develops strategies to foster women's empowerment and gender equality in democratic governance.”3 In addition, WPRC is a member of the Gender Advisory Council to the Georgian Parliament. The Gender Advisory Council brings together government and non-government representatives to discuss and make recommendations on gender issues and to ensure that the voice of women is equal to that of men in formulating public policy at both the national and local level.4 In the region, in 2010, WPRC led the launch of the Caucasian Feminist Initiative, which incorporates organizations and individuals from Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Center is part of a network of 40 regional and Tbilisi-based women’s organizations.5

WPRC works for women’s human rights through conducting studies on women's issues and advocating legislative recommendations promoting gender equality. Besides providing technical assistance, conducting research, consulting and engaging in other analytical and educational activities, the WPRC is active in conducting forums, lectures, media campaigns and public actions.6 WPRC works closely with different international NGOs and donors on forming public opinion regarding the participation of women, ethnic minorities and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in political processes in Georgia.7 Prior SIPA consulting teams have worked in cooperation with WPRC on projects concerning domestic violence and trafficking in Georgia and on gender equality within the Georgian education system.

2 "About Us." Womens Political Resource Center. Web. 03 Dec. 2011. 3 Ibid. 4 "Gender Advisory Council under the Chairperson of the Parliament of Georgia – the First Institutional Mechanism." Parliament of Georgia. Web. 03 Dec. 2011.. 5 "Women's Political Resource Center (WPRC)." Peacebuilding Portal. Web. 03 Dec. 2011. 6 "About Us." Womens Political Resource Center. Web. 03 Dec. 2011. 7 "Women's Political Resource Center (WPRC)." Peacebuilding Portal.

7

COUNTRY PROFILE

Political Context Georgia has seen a turbulent past two decades. The country regained its independence in 1991 and shortly thereafter lapsed into civil conflict over Abkhazia; embarked on a program of accelerated state- and democracy-building with the Rose Revolution in 2004; and suffered a major setback when war with Russia erupted in 2008.

Establishing a democratic Georgian state following the fall of the Soviet Union presented an enormous challenge and continues to be a work in progress. Over the past eight years, current President Mikheil Saakashvili has embarked on ambitious political and economic reforms, including re-making the Georgian police, virtually eliminating everyday corruption, de-regulating the economy, and arresting oligarchic business figures. However, concerns have been raised over state-supported limitations on freedom of speech, state control of the Georgian media, and centralization of power, which has strengthened the presidency at the expense of the legislature.8 Issues of territorial integrity have compounded the challenges of state building and retain great importance in political discourse.

Georgian civil society proved its ability to have political and social impact in 2003 through its central role in the Rose Revolution. Since then, however, it has lost much of its national influence due to political, social, and economic circumstances. UNDP’s Georgia Programme Country Action Plan sums it up: “the civil society sector is yet to become systemic and influence players in policy development and decision- making. At the moment, the organizations lack concentration, capacity, and resources and often entertain donor-driven interest.”9 Also, the Georgian Government appears to be generally reluctant to involve civil society organizations in the policymaking process, although it has recently made certain improvements in this area.

Public confidence in civil society institutions other than the Georgian Orthodox Church is quite low. While relatively few Georgians participate in NGOs and other civil society groups, non-institutionalized participation (in neighborhood or community groups, etc.) is quite high, at 7.1%.10

Media freedom in particular continues to be a concern, as it seems to be decreasing in Georgia. Global Integrity found in 2009 that Georgian media, especially broadcast media, faces obstacles to producing

8 Mitchell, 70. (“Georgia Postbellum”); De Waal, 6,9. 9 Government of Georgia and United Nations Development Programme, Georgia. Country Programme Action Plan Between the Government of Georgia and the United Nations Development Programme, 2011-2015. Tbilisi: United Nations Development Program, Georgia, 2011. Web. 26 Nov. 2011. 10 Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development and CIVICUS, 42

8 fair reporting on politically sensitive topics. As most media outlets were highly sympathetic to the new government following the Rose Revolution, the government was readily able to shape reporting in its favor. Today, citizens believe that media outlets are biased, and they largely do not trust their reporting.11

Georgia’s current political environment lacks accountability, with divisions among the opposition and marginalization of other civil society institutions making it difficult to check the power of the governing United National Movement (UNM) Party. More recent political debate has focused on two main issues for Georgian politics: how the new 150-seat parliament will be formed —whether the UNM Party will again win 71 of the 75 single-seat constituencies by a single majority— and whether Mikheil Saakashvili will become the prime minister after the upcoming elections, thereby remaining the most powerful man in Georgia.12 Regarding public perception about democracy, there is a sharp division between UNM supporters and supporters of the main opposition leader, Bidzina Ivanishvili. Among the former, 69.8% think that there is democracy in Georgia, while among the latter only 12.5% agree.13

Economic Context Georgia has experienced significant economic growth in the last decade, with GDP growth in the 9–12% range in 2005–07, and 6.8% GDP growth in 2011.14 The International Finance Corporation’s “Doing Business 2011” study ranked Georgia’s economy as number one among improvements in 174 countries over the past five years on the ease of doing business.15

In spite of these improvements, Georgia is still considered a developing country according to the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Report.16 Georgia’s GDP per capita in 2011 was $5,491, ranking 112th in the world.17 Post-Soviet reconstruction, two civil conflicts and the global recession have contributed to the impoverishment of a large section of the Georgian population. About 11% of the population remains poor according to World Bank’s standards.18

Unemployment has been a persistent problem in Georgia ever since the country gained independence in 1991. According to the National Statistics Office of Georgia, unemployment rate stood at 16.3% in 2010.19 This is by far the highest level among the former Soviet Union countries.20 The official statistic also does not reflect the vast discrepancies between urban and rural areas of the country. The methodology used to keep track of unemployment produces relatively low unemployment rates for

11 Global Integrity. Global Integrity Scorecard: Georgia. Global Integrity (2009). Web. 24 Nov. 2011. 12 Ibid, 21; Economist Intelligence Unit, Geoegia – Politics. n.d. Web. 28 Nov. 2011. 13 Institute for Policy Studies. Electorate profile: Report of the survey. Tbilisi, 2012. 32. 14 International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Report. April 2011. Web. 30 April 2012. 15 International Finance Corporation, “Georgia Shares Experience to Improve Business Regulation Environment in Region,” Web. 21 May 2012. 16 International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Report. April 2011. Web. 30 April 2012. 17 World Economic Outlook Database – April 2012. International Monetary Fund. Web. 28 April 2012. 18 The World Bank. Georgia: Poverty and income distribution. Web. 30 April 2012. 19 Employment and unemployment. National Statistics Office of Georgia. Web. 28 April 2012. 20 Statistical yearbook of Georgia. Web. 28 April 2012.

9 rural areas (4.8% as 200621). By contrast, the average unemployment rate in cities is 26%22, while in Tbilisi unemployment is reported to be reaching 40%.23

Foreign aid plays a prominent role in Georgia’s annual budget. More than US $1.5 billion (approximately GEL 2.1 billion) were delivered annually by donors between 2009-11. The state’s annual budget in each of those years was 6.75, 6.97 and 7.35 billion GEL, respectively.24 In addition, foreign direct investment has significantly declined in Georgia since the late-2000s global recession, not least due to conflict in the country. Since the 2008 war, inflation has risen substantially and the country faces problems in generating revenue. Georgia has also suffered substantial infrastructure damage from the 2008 war and has faced the burden of providing for several thousand IDPs from conflict areas. With all of Georgia’s challenges, perhaps its greatest —especially according to the Georgian people— is to create jobs.25

Conflicts and Peace Processes The conflicts between Georgians, South Ossetians, and Abkhaz have deep-seated roots. The breakup of the Soviet Union provided a catalyst for civil wars, with Georgia fighting to contain South Ossetia and Abkhazia within its borders, and the latter entities seeking self-determination.26 Hostilities erupted in South Ossetia in 1990, and despite a cease-fire two years later, the region has remained unstable. President Saakashvili has repeatedly sought autonomy for South Ossetia inside Georgia, while Ossetian leaders continue to call for the reunification of North and South Ossetia.27 Paralleling South Ossetia’s story in many ways, war broke out in Abkhazia in 1993. The parties achieved a cease-fire in May 1994 but the contradiction between Abkhazia’s unrecognized de facto independence and Georgia’s de jure territorial integrity28 continues to shape the dynamics of the conflict.

These unresolved conflicts inflamed tensions between Georgia and Russia, finally resulting in war between the two countries in August 2008.29 The war caused hundreds of casualties on both sides, in addition to a new wave of Georgians becoming displaced. The parties reached a preliminary ceasefire agreement after five days, but Russia has yet to fully implement the six-point plan, maintaining troops in the conflict regions and preventing the return of IDPs. In the effort to resolve the broader conflict, Georgians —including the Abkhaz governments-in-exile and representatives from South Ossetia—, and Russians are currently engaged in peace talks in Geneva, which also include South Ossetian and Abkhaz participants and EU, US, UN and OSCE mediators.30 However, the talks remain stalled with the major issues of territorial integrity, sovereignty and return of displaced persons unresolved. So far, limited

21 Employment and unemployment. National Statistics Office of Georgia. Web. 28 April 2012. 22 Ibid. 23 Widespread unemployment takes its toll – World Vision. Web. 28 April 2012. 24 Transparency International. Web. 6 May 2012. 25 de Waal, 2011. 10-14; Economist Intelligence Unit. Georgia – Economy. n.d. Web. 28 Nov. 2011. 26 Cornell, Svante E, and S F. Starr. The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia. Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2009, 5. 27 Gahrton, Per. Georgia: Pawn in the New Great Game. London: Pluto Press, 2010, 60-63. 28 Ciobanu, Ceslav. Frozen and Forgotten Conflicts in the Post-Soviet States: Genesis, Political Economy and Prospects for Solution. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2009, 113. 29 Cornell and Starr, 143; Ciobanu, 118. 30 Gahrton, 74.

10 people-to-people diplomacy efforts have not effectively supplemented Track I efforts at conflict resolution.

Russia claims to be just a peacekeeper, but its military and economic support to Abkhazia and South Ossetia make Russia a key actor in the conflict. While the two countries have not reestablished diplomatic relations since the 2008 war, a senior Georgian government official emphasized that they must engage Moscow in working towards a solution, since Russia has the last word in all major decisions regarding security, troops or return of IDPs.31 This fact, coupled with Russia’s military power — especially compared to Georgia’s — makes any potential solution to the conflict dependent on Russia’s interests in the geopolitical context. Moreover, the United States and the European Union are also key players in the effort to reach a sustainable deal.

IDPs’ Social, Legal and Political Situation The government of Georgia legally recognizes “internally displaced persons – persecuted” as citizens of Georgia or stateless persons who permanently reside within Georgia and who were forced to flee from the conflict regions.32 The Law on Forcibly Displaced Persons – Persecuted from the Occupied Territories of Georgia, last amended in 2011, defines and regulates IDP status. The Law also sets out in general terms the specific rights of the internally displaced in their places of temporary residence and upon their return to their pre-displacement residences.33 The Law establishes the granting of the IDP status to children of IDPs, entitles IDPs to a monthly allowance and free health care and education, including secondary education.

The government recognizes the presence of 251,000 IDPs in Georgia as a result of conflicts in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia in the beginning of 1990s, comprising the “old wave.” In addition, about 26,000 people displaced from Tskinvali region/South Ossetian as a result of the August 2008 war form the “new wave.” UNHCR estimated in 2011 that 54% of IDPs were female, 24% were children and 17% were older persons.34 The majority of the IDPs live in the municipalities of Tbilisi, Kutaisi, or Zugdidi. About 39% of “old wave” IDPs live in government-owned collective centers, many of which are run- down. The remaining 61% live in private accommodations either on their own or with another family.35 The number of IDPs living in collective centers has decreased in recent years due to efforts by the Georgian government to resettle IDPs into private accommodations, particularly through a privatization plan for collective centers. The assumption behind this decision is that those IDPs living among the local population will more easily become socially and economically integrated. However, unemployment

31 Senior Government Official (Government of Georgia), Personal Interview, 3 February 2012. 32 Georgia. Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees of Georgia. “IDP Issues – General Information.” Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees of Georgia, N.d. Web. 30 Nov 2011. 33 Brookings. National and Regional Laws and Policies on Internal Displacement – Georgia. Web. 28 April 2012. 34 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Georgia: Partial progress towards durable solutions for IDPs. A profile of the internal displacement situation. 21 March, 2012. 55. 35 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 56.

11 estimates among IDPs in Georgia remain in the 35% to 45% range, which is substantially higher than the estimated 16% for the non-displaced population.36

The situation of IDPs in Georgia is similar to other cases in the region, such as Azerbaijan, where IDPs are also a particularly vulnerable group. Like in Georgia, a large part of the IDPs in Azerbaijan are living in collective centers characterized by insufficient housing conditions and have limited access to the labor market. Government initiatives to target IDP needs in both countries are also very similar: they are often limited to cash and in-kind benefits such as social assistance, free usage of healthcare or free provision of electricity, gas and water.37 Moreover, the IDP issue has been politicized in both countries, as IDPs’ integration has been forestalled in the effort to continue to lay claim over the conflict regions.

More than 200 legislative acts and bylaws have been issued regarding the legal and social protection of IDPs, and an ad hoc ministry —the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation, now officially called Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees (but in shorthand still referred to as the MRA)— was set up in 1995. In accordance with the Law on IDPs

36 Mitchneck, Beth, Olga V. Mayorova and Joanna Regulska. “Post-Conflict Displacement: Isolation and Integration in Georgia.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers. 99.5 Feb. 2009: 1022-1032. Web. 21 Nov. 2011. 37 European Commission. Social protection and social inclusion in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. 2011. 13.

12 and the Guiding Principles, in February 2007, the Georgian government approved the State Strategy for Internally Displaced Persons – Persecuted. In May 2010, it subsequently approved the Action Plan for the Implementation of the State Strategy on IDPs during 2009-2012.

The State Strategy on IDPs and the Action Plan for the Implementation of the State Strategy serve as the basis for the Georgian government’s policies on IDPs. Before the drafting of the State Strategy, there had been no comprehensive approach to addressing IDPs’ specific rights and needs. In fact, prior to February 2007, when the State Strategy on IDPs was adopted, the government actively worked against IDPs’ integration, as their presence as internally displaced persons symbolized Georgia’s claim to the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The State Strategy represents a paradigm shift in this discussion by countering the idea that return and integration are mutually exclusive. It outlines two main goals: (i) “to create conditions for dignified and safe return of IDPs and to support IDPs who have spontaneously returned to their places of permanent residence,” and (ii) “to support decent living conditions for the displaced population and their integration in all aspects of society.”38

Regarding the Georgian government’s duties to its population to enable their participation, as a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it is required under Article 25 to permit every citizen, without unreasonable restrictions, the right and opportunity to: (i) “take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives,” (ii) “to vote and be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors,” and (iii) “To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.”39 As a State Party to the European Charter on Human Rights, Article 3, Protocol 1 also obligates the state to hold free elections.

IDPs in Georgia have an interest in participating in political and civic affairs, especially because of the support they rely on from national authorities. Their needs include shelter, food, health care, and security. Women and children IDPs are vulnerable to abuse and sexual exploitation and particularly rely on authorities to provide security. More expansive IDP participation in elections will better address IDP needs, and also opens up avenues to address societal inequities to promote reconciliation. The State Strategy for IDPs recognizes the importance of IDPs’ election-related rights to help facilitate their integration into Georgian society.40

Particularly in the years following the initial displacement in the early 1990s, Georgian political forces have attempted to use the IDP community as leverage in the peace process. The Abkhaz government-in-

38 Georgia. Web. 30 Nov 2011. 39 United Nations. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 25, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966) 40 Solomon, Andrew. “Election-Related Rights and Political Participation of Internally Displaced Persons: Protection During and After Displacement in Georgia Prepared by Andrew Solomon.” Brookings Institution, Nov. 2009: 1-3. Web. 28 Nov. 2011.

13 exile seemed to represent a revanchist group that could pose a political threat to Abkhazia.41 In many ways, the IDP community’s marginalization in Georgia results in the challenge of contributing more varied and nuanced perspectives to both the formal peace process and more informal peace building efforts within Georgia, including in Abkhazia, and South Ossetia.

Women and Gender Legislation A continued stream of legislation has been passed since 2006 to address women’s issues in Georgia, reflecting the perspective that Georgia seems to aspire towards gender equality. Reports have cited differences in approaches to these issues across the South Caucasus, with Armenia and Azerbaijan more oriented towards traditional gender roles than Georgia.42 However, several important issues remain concerning women’s empowerment. Georgia ranks 86th out of 135 countries on the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap index. Interestingly, Armenia and Azerbaijan have comparable rankings at 84th and 91st place, respectively. Georgia’s ranking has remained stagnant since 2006, with political empowerment and economic participation remaining virtually unchanged:

Evolution of Key Gender Gap Sub Indexes43

Of particular significance to this report is Georgia’s low score on the political empowerment indicator: only three of the 19 ministers in Georgia’s government are female, and nine of the 140 members of parliament, while women hold under 11% of seats on local assemblies. These numbers amount to the lowest level of female participation in Georgian politics since the country’s independence in 1991.44

Women’s low political participation can be partially explained by cultural gender stereotypes that place women and men in certain societal roles. More specifically, an Open Society Georgia study of public values conducted in 2006 showed that Georgian men and women do not view women as politicians.45 In

41 Ibid., 16. 42 Caucasus Research Resource Center, “How Does the South Caucasus Compare?,” 5 October 2011. Web. 21 May 2012, 2. 43 From the 2011 Global Gender Gap Report - Georgia Country Profile 44 Shorana Latatia. Women Losing Out in Georgian Politics. Institute for War and Peace Reporting. 18 Mar. 2011. Web. 19 Nov. 2011. 45 Ibid.

14 an effort to address these stereotypes and increase the number of women in politics, leading activists advocate for party and parliamentary quotas.46

In March 2010 the Parliament of Georgia passed the Gender Equality Law, which put in place institutional mechanisms to improve gender issues at the legislative level. The legislation provides for the establishment of a national women’s machinery, the enhancement of women’s security, equality in the labor market and the strengthening of women’s political participation. The law also encourages gender-responsive planning and budgeting on the part of the government.47 Georgia has also ratified the UN Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1994, but the CEDAW Committee flagged several human rights concerns. These include limited sex-disaggregated data, trafficking in women and girls, and underrepresentation of women in public and political life.

Although current reforms seek to address these problems, significant gender gaps persist at all levels of society, particularly for rural and IDP women. In many ways, women IDPs face even more marginalization in Georgian society and have had minimal influence over national policymaking and conflict resolution processes.48 However, the effort to promote women’s involvement has received attention with a number of initiatives around the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and its sister resolutions (1820, 1888, 1889, and 1960) on Women, Peace and Security. This set of resolutions calls for adopting a gender perspective and recognizing the needs of women and girls in post-conflict settings.49 In 2010, a Gender Equality National Action Plan was drafted for the implementation of Resolution 1325 and was approved by the Parliament of Georgia in December 2011.50 NGOs founded by and for women have also contributed extensively to developing the State Strategy on IDPs in 2007, and following the August War, they mobilized to provide humanitarian assistance to the new wave of IDPs. The upcoming sections will present our findings on the important role of women’s NGOs, particularly IDP NGOs in promoting the political participation of these groups.

46 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Georgia - Gender Equality Indicators 2007. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 2007. Web. 22 Nov. 2011. 47 Shiolashvili, Neli. Statement to the United Nations General Assembly Third Committee on Agenda Item 28(a), Advancement of Women. United Nations. United Nations Headquarters, New York, NY. 11 Oct. 2011. Web. 20 Nov. 2011. 48 Women’s Information Center. Women, Peace and Security: Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1325 in Georgia. Tbilisi: Women’s Information Center, 2011. Web. 21 Nov. 2011. 25. 49 United Nations. Security Council. Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). 31 Oct. 2000. Web. 15 Nov. 2011. 50 Ibid.

15

METHODOLOGY

Research questions

Our research aims to promote more inclusive governance and peacebuilding around IDP issues in Georgia. Therefore, we seek to answer the following three-part question:

1. To what extent are internally displaced men and women involved in policymaking regarding their needs and interests as IDPs?

2. What factors affect women and men IDPs' participation in and influence over policymaking regarding their needs and interests as IDPs?

3. What opportunities exist to promote effective, inclusive and gender-balanced IDP participation in these processes so that they will better address IDPs' specific rights, needs and interests?

Key Concepts and Definitions

Internally displaced persons (IDPs)51: We use the Georgian government’s definition of: “internally displaced persons – persecuted” as citizens of Georgia or stateless persons who permanently reside within Georgia who were forced to flee their places of residence due to threats to a “family member’s life, health or freedom due to the aggression of foreign country, internal conflicts or mass violation of human rights.”52 We have also compared this definition with the more general definition presented in the UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, discussed more in detail below. Adopting the convention of previous studies, we use the term “old wave IDP” for those who were displaced during the conflicts of the 1990s, while “new wave IDPs” were displaced during the 2008 conflict.

Our research design and process considers two central ideas generally regarding IDP populations:

 IDPs are entitled to enjoy, equally and without discrimination, the same rights and freedoms under international and domestic law as do other persons in their country.53 Individuals are identified as such so that they can be granted legal protection, due to the vulnerability that members of this population face.

51 Our research considers only conflict-affected IDPs currently residing within Georgia proper. Due to a lack of information and access, our research does not include IDPs who have returned to the conflict regions since displacement or who were displaced within the conflict regions. 52 Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees of Georgia. Web. 4 Dec. 2011. 53 UNHCR, Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, 2008.

16  The identities, perceptions, and relationships linked to individuals falling under the formal definition of “IDP” are fluid and often situationally-determined as distinguished from the more static, legal definition.

Throughout this paper, we question the logic and efficacy of conceptualizing Georgian IDPs as a discrete and unified interest group. IDPs’ needs and interests are highly conditioned by factors such as period of displacement, place of origin, gender, living situation, socio-economic status, age and other aspects of identity. Therefore, we conclude that discussions of the needs and interests of IDPs as a discrete group, IDP unity and social and political power must be grounded in a specific context or issue.

Gender: UN Women defines this term as “social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men…Gender is part of the broader socio-cultural context.” As a result, “these attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed…In most societies there are differences and inequalities between women and men in responsibilities assigned, activities undertaken, access to and control over resources, as well as decision-making opportunities. Other important criteria for socio-cultural analysis include class, race, poverty level, ethnic group and age.”54 Specifically, we consider how gender and other aspects of identity influence women’s and men’s experiences of displacement and opportunities for participation in public life.

Political participation: We view political participation as encompassing a wide variety of intentional and coordinated, as well as unintentional and uncoordinated actions, behaviors, and modes of thought aimed at influencing governance. Forms of political participation include voting, civil disobedience, media campaigns, and other legally permitted practices. They can be coordinated by individuals, through communities, through civil society, political parties, and other channels. Policymaking also reflects political participation from different angles, including the groups that contribute to its formulation, negotiation, passage and implementation. When examining policymaking, we pay special attention to which stakeholders are informed and consulted, and which are represented in, contribute to, and have authority over decision-making. We have narrowed our focus to only include IDPs’ participation around policymaking concerning opportunities to choose among the three durable solutions, return, resettlement, and local integration. As these policies are distinct to IDP needs and interests, this group should have the most influence over their content and its implementation.

Peacebuilding: We understand this concept as long-term conflict resolution/transformation that necessarily includes both Track I and Track II approaches. We examine both, as well as the connections between them in the Georgian case. Track I involves formal peace talks, currently underway in Geneva, while Track II addresses grassroots and civil society efforts that may both influence and be affected by official processes.

54 UN Women. “Gender Mainstreaming – Concepts and Definitions”. Web. 15 Dec. 2011.

17 Civil society: The Civil Society Index defines civil society as “the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market where people associate to advance common interests.”55 This definition incorporates nongovernmental organizations, religious institutions, community groups, media, political parties, trade unions. Taking civil society as a broad concept provides a wider lens with which to examine routes to enhancing gender-balanced political participation of IDPs.

Research Approach and Methods

Our research and analysis is grounded in a human rights-based approach (HRBA), looking specifically at the rights codified in international human rights norms and standards related to participation in public life as affected by IDP status and gender. HRBA, as defined by the United Nations Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, is a “conceptual framework for the process of human development that is normatively based on international human rights standards and operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights.”56 It seeks to analyze “inequalities which lie at the heart of development problems and redress discriminatory practices and unjust distributions of power that impede development progress,” with the ultimate goal of empowering individuals to participate in politics and influence governance57. Following the HRBA, we assume that a participatory approach leads to policies that are more reflective of rights-holders’ needs and interests. Therefore, we have conducted our analysis with an eye to opportunities to expand the scope and quality of IDPs’ political participation.

HRBA requires the identification of a set of rights-holders endowed with certain rights codified in international human rights standards, and corresponding duty-bearers, whose role is to provide the conditions that will enable rights-bearers to claim their rights. We consider IDPs as a whole to be our primary rights-holders of concern. We find this approach to be useful and appropriate in this context because it helps to clarify IDPs as possessing specific rights as residents and citizens of Georgia, as men and women, as displaced individuals and displaced communities.58 HRBA is most often used to construct a framework for development or humanitarian interventions. This assessment tool is appropriate for this project given our goals of empowering IDPs to enhance their capacity with a view of greater representation in policymaking.

The HRBA is especially meaningful in the context of internal displacement in Georgia because it underscores the need to shift perceptions of IDPs (from within the IDP community and without) from passive beneficiaries to capable actors. HRBA identifies them as agents of their own empowerment and asks how they can claim their inherent rights. This understanding of IDPs differs significantly, and we believe positively, from the perception of IDPs as dependents with needs that must be fulfilled. This view is common across Georgian society and among some members of the international community and

55 Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development and CIVICUS, 16. 56 United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Frequently Asked Questions on a Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Cooperation, HR/PUB/06/8 (2006), 15 57 Ibid. 58 Although we consider IDPs to be a single rights-bearing group in this context, as noted above we purposely examine IDP heterogeneity under the HRBA framework as well.

18 even IDPs themselves. The HRBA seeks to counter this perspective, while also linking IDPs as rights- holders with the Georgian government and other stakeholders as duty-bearers.

Gender equality is a central consideration within HRBA. In this case, we seek to promote men’s and women’s equal access to opportunities for participation, so a gender-based approach is also a foundation of our research. UNDP defines a gender-based analysis as the “collection and analysis of sex- disaggregated information” based on the assumption that women and men have different experiences, knowledge, talents and needs.59 Gender analysis systematically explores these differences as expressed through avenues such as participation, resources, norms and values, and rights so that policies, programs and projects can identify and meet the different needs of men and women.60 Moreover, they should ensure that non-discrimination in access to resources based on different aspects of identity.

In this context, it was crucial to consider that men and women may experience displacement differently due to their gender; they may also face different needs, opportunities and barriers when it comes to participating in civic life. Therefore, we have mainstreamed consideration of gender throughout our research and analysis.

To employ both of these approaches, the following international human rights instruments (to which Georgia is a party or accepts as the UN Member State) and some of their relevant articles provide a framework for our analysis:61

 Universal Declaration of Human Rights o Article 2: Non-discrimination

 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights o Article 2: Non-discrimination o Article 3: Equal rights of men and women o Article 25: Right to vote o Article 26: Equal protection without discrimination

 European Convention on Human Rights o Article 14: Non-discrimination o Article 3 (Protocol 1): Right to hold free elections

 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women o Article 2: States need to enact policy to eliminate discrimination o Article 5: Modification of social and cultural norms to support gender equality o Article 7: Support for women’s involvement in political and public life

59 UNDP. Quick Entry Points to Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality in Democratic Governance Clusters. 2007. 4. 60 European Commission. A Guide to Gender Impact Assessment. 1998. 5. 61 See Appendix C for a more detailed list of the relevant articles in these instruments.

19

 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security o Article 1: Increase representation of women at all decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes o Article 8: Adopt a gender perspective in peace agreements

 The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement62: This document provides the cornerstone of our analysis of the participation of IDPs in Georgia. The Guiding Principles comprise an internationally-recognized (though non-binding) standard of rights specific to IDPs and corresponding duties of governments and other actors “providing assistance and protection to IDPs.”63 The Guiding Principles define three “durable solutions” to displacement: integration in the place of displacement,64 resettlement to another part of the country, and dignified safe return. The Guiding Principles name national authorities as the primary duty-bearers with responsibility to “establish the conditions, as well as provide the means” to make each of these solutions available for IDPs to choose freely.65 Central to our project is the provision that national authorities and other duty-bearers make special efforts to “ensure the full participation of displaced persons in the planning and management of their return, resettlement and integration.”66 The Government of Georgia notes the relevance of the Guiding Principles in its policies documents. However, it narrows the Guiding Principles’ definition of IDPs failing to include people displaced by natural disasters, focusing only on those from the conflict regions.

Research Process

We determined that a qualitative research strategy would allow us to gain the most nuanced understanding of factors influencing IDPs’ political participation. While our findings cannot be taken as proving causation or as being representative of all IDPs in Georgia, the scope of our analysis supports greater understanding of opportunities for greater and more effective inclusion of IDPs in policymaking. In addition to desk research, our assessment is based on original source materials gathered through roughly 70 semi-structured and spontaneous personal interviews and five focus groups. Team members conducted two field visits to Georgia totaling 24 days, with fieldwork done in Tbilisi, Zugdidi, Koda,

62 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Brookings – LSE Project on Internal Displacement. Web. 15 Dec. 2011. 63 Ibid. 64 We adopt an understanding of the term “integration” that is specific to the Georgian context. The discourse in Georgia on this topic ranges from viewing integration as mutually exclusive with IDPs’ return to their former home, while the more recent view presented in the state strategy suggests that these two concepts can also be complementary.64 We also differentiate between integration and assimilation. The former term usually refers to migrant groups both adjusting to life in their new environment and maintaining their identity, while the latter generally refers to a process whereby the distinguishing markers between migrant groups and host societies fall away.64 These issues become relevant when considering the current situation of protracted displacement in Georgia and its effects on the ways in which integration and assimilation play a role in IDPs lives. These issues also relate to the extent to which the broader society views displaced persons as a distinct social group. 65 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 2004. 14. 66 Ibid.

20 Karaleti settlement, and Potskho-Etseri. The team also conducted interviews with experts in New York and Washington, D.C., along with stakeholders based in Europe.

Interviewees included development and human rights practitioners and academics with expertise on IDPs, women’s rights, political participation, governance, and peacebuilding in Georgia. During our field visits, we spoke with a wide variety of relevant stakeholders, including government officials and other political figures, such as representatives of the Abkhaz government-in-exile; analysts and academics; staff of local and national IDP and women’s NGOs; and representatives of international organizations and donors.

Throughout our research we have sought to include the perspectives of IDPs themselves as key informants. Therefore, a particular focus of our research has been gathering insight from differentiated groups of IDPs, representing men and women, both conflict regions, both waves of displacement, and various socio-economic backgrounds and levels of integration into Georgian society. We prioritized interviewing IDPs representing demographics that are currently underrepresented in the literature, in particular IDPs living in private accommodations.

Additionally, team members organized a stakeholder roundtable discussion on our preliminary findings at the end of our second field visit. The roundtable brought together individual IDPs, IDP activists and other representatives of civil society. They discussed challenges around empowering IDP political participation that our research identified and debate recommendations for addressing the situation. Insights from this discussion have informed this report as well.

The majority of interviews were conducted in English, with local interpreters providing language support when necessary. A list of all interviewees who agreed to be identified in this report can be found in the Appendix.

21

AVENUES OF IDPS’ AND WOMEN’S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

National Level Participation There are several avenues and processes that exist for IDP participation in public life and peacebuilding at the national level, including through the government, Parliament, political parties and particularly through civil society. However, IDP participation varies through the different avenues, more limited in influence in government, and more active in civil society, which seeks to represent their interests but serves as a far less influential avenue. Among civil society, women are more represented than men. However, men yield more influence and are more represented in government and political office.

IDPs have experienced different and often limited opportunities for participation and forms of representation over the past two decades. During the first years of their displacement, they were largely dependent on the Abkhaz government-in-exile for a political voice, an essentially ineffective representative body.67 Following the Rose Revolution in 2004, Georgia’s new ruling party, the United National Movement, restructured the representation of displaced persons. They broadened the mandate of the MRA by assigning it primary responsibility for dealing with the displaced community.68 The government’s decision effectively took away most if not all of the national power and influence of the Abkhaz government-in-exile.69 Some perceived this national level political restructuring as promoting IDPs’ integration by no longer treating them as a separate political entity. However, it has resulted in the current situation, where, “in general IDPs' voices are not heard...They don't have a party…Very few [are] able to convey their messages to the decision-makers.”70

As for the Georgians displaced from Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, they did not have government-in- exile institutions that came with them to Georgia proper.71 However, the Provisional Administration of Tskhinvali region controlled a sizable territory of the region until 2008. Ossetians and Georgians were elected to this body in a parallel process to separatist elections in November 2006. They have played a less visible role than the Abkhaz government-in-exile but still represented IDPs from this region.

Gendered Participation of IDPs IDP men and women also experience different access to avenues of participation, in addition to engaging in the public sphere in different ways. More generally, women and men have dealt with

67 “Out of the Margins: Securing a Voice for Internally Displaced People: Lessons from Georgia,” Conciliation Resources, 2009, Print, 16-17. 68 Ibid, 16-17. 69 Erin, Mooney. “From Solidarity to Solutions: The Government Response to Internal Displacement in Georgia,” From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement,” Brookings Institution – London School of Economics Project on Internal Displacement, November 2011, 203. 70 Senior Fellow (Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies), Personal Interview, 20 March 2012. 71 Out of the Margins: Securing a Voice for Internally Displaced People, 15. This community was much smaller than the one from Abkhazia and did not represent the majority in the Soviet autonomous institutions of the South Ossetian autonomous region.

22 displacement differently, with men often being more psychologically vulnerable.72 In general, women IDPs have taken a more active part in the family and community, while men are often seen to be more passive.73 From the point of view of the MRA, women have been considered “more proactive and stronger than men.”74 Representatives from international NGOs also noted the difficulty of including men in their programming.75 Many women have also started NGOs to improve the displaced community’s living conditions, contributing to the significant number of women’s NGOs in Georgia.76

Although women often participate more actively in community affairs and peacebuilding through NGOs, compared to men, a low percentage of women engages in politics. 77 Especially since most women’s NGOs are locally based, “there is a tremendous disparity between the number of women active and playing these roles at the local level when compared to the political level.”78 Analyzing trends of women’s involvement at the national level has brought up two important factors. Firstly, Georgia is considered to be a patriarchal society79, and therefore polity. A Member of Parliament also argued that “there is lack of interest in politics among women,” although they are active in the media and in NGOs.80 The factors influencing women’s and men’s participation will be discussed more in later sections.

Elections and Voting Rights During the 1990s, national legislation in Georgia had restricted the rights of IDPs to vote in parliamentary and local elections.81 However, in 2001 and 2003, with amendments made to the Unified Election Code of Georgia, IDPs could exercise the right to vote and stand for elections.82 IDPs were first eligible to vote in the parliamentary proportional representation elections, whereas their right to vote in local elections, and for parliamentary majoritarian candidates, depended on whether they registered their current locality as their place of permanent residence. National regulations initially maintained that an IDP who registered their residence in Georgia proper as their permanent residence would revoke his or her IDP status, along with the entitlements and benefits that went along with it. Faced with this choice, most IDPs chose to remain disenfranchised in order to maintain their IDP status.

IDP communities and civil society advocacy efforts led the campaign for IDPs’ voting rights.83 They channeled their efforts in challenging the national voting legislation through the Constitutional Court of Georgia. The concerted national effort, with the support of international organizations, led to the

72 IDMC, Georgia: Partial progress towards durable solutions for IDPs, 99, 129. 73 Ibid., 129. 74 Georgian Official (Government of Georgia), Personal Interview, 14 March 2012. 75 Tina Gewis (Protection and Advocacy Adviser, Norwegian Refugee Council), Personal Interview, 21 March 2012. 76 Tamar Tchelidze [Deputy Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia (former)], Personal Interview, 14 March 2012. 77 Julia Kharashvili (Chairperson, IDP Women’s Association “Consent”), Personal Interview, 30 January 2012; Gaenati Conference, 20 March 2012. 78 Stan Veitsman (Peace and Development Advisor, UNDP), Personal Interview, 12 March 2012. 79 Marina Guledani (Managing Partner, CFS Legal Guledani & Partners), Personal Interview, 23 March 2012. 80 Magda Anikashvili (MP, Parliament of Georgia), Personal Interview, 21 March 2012. 81 Mooney, 211. 82 Georgia: Partial progress towards durable solutions for IDPs, 123. 83 Georgia: Partial progress towards durable solutions for IDPs, 123.

23 eventual removal of the restrictions on voting rights of IDPs. As a result, IDPs could vote at all levels of elections, while maintaining their permanent residence in their places of origin in order to not give up their IDP status.84 This served as an important example of IDPs organizing and advocating for their rights through the judicial system—in this case, to provide themselves with a political voice through voting.

Although IDPs can legally vote and stand for office, their voter turnout remains at levels much lower than that of the national average.85 IDPs still lack information on their voting rights and some claim that they can still only vote in the presidential elections.86 There are also other issues such as inaccurate lists of IDPs who are eligible to vote and a lack of capacity by Georgian electoral and government officials to enable IDPs to exercise their voting rights. IDPs also rarely stand for office, due to factors such as limited financial resources and access to political networks, discussed in more detail in further sections.87

Parliament IDPs currently experience limited direct representation in Parliament. Prior to 2004, their representatives came from the Abkhaz government-in-exile. The Parliament decided to end the mandate of the 11 parliamentary deputies from the government-in-exile in April 2004 until parliamentary elections, organized by the Georgian authorities, can be held in Abkhazia.88 Although no formal structure exists within Parliament for members to represent IDP issues, this issue is apparently within the scope of the Parliamentary Commission on Territorial Integrity Issues, headed by Shota Malashkhia.89 Interestingly, only one interviewee mentioned this commission, 90 and an IDP MP and a member of the commission did not refer to it at all during his interview. Currently, only about two or three IDPs sit in Parliament.91

Similar to there being only few IDP MPs, women comprise only six percent of the Georgian Parliament. Deputy Chairperson Rusudan Kervalishvili summed up the significance of this low statistic, arguing that this is “not [a] democracy when 50% of the population are women.”92 In the effort to address such issues and promote women’s voices in policymaking, the Deputy Speaker leads the recently established Gender Equality Council.93 More specifically, the council,

“brings non-governmental and governmental representatives [together] to discuss and issue recommendations on gender issues, to help ensure that women’s voices are heard

84 Mooney, 212. 85 Ibid., 213. 86 David Chochia (Office Manager/Researcher, International Crisis Group), Personal Interview, 20 March 2012. 87 Mooney, 213. 88 Mooney, 212; Out of the Margins: Securing a Voice for Internally Displaced People, 16-17. 89 Georgia. Parliament of Georgia. "Temporary Commission on Territorial Integrity Issues.” Web. 28 April 2012. 90 Khatuna Gogorishvili (MP, Parliament of Georgia), Personal Interview, 22 March 2012. 91 Kornely Kakachia (Professor, Tbilisi State University), Personal Interview, 30 January 2012. 92 Rusudan Kervalishvili (Deputy Chairperson of the Parliament of Georgia), Personal Interview, 22 March 2012. 93 The council was established as a permanent body in 2009 (IDMC, 128)

24 on an equal footing with men in formulating public policy and decision making at the national and local levels.”94

The Georgian government’s other efforts to address gender issues include the Gender Equality Law, adopted in 2010, a Law on Elimination of Domestic Violence, Protection of and Support to its Victims in 2006 (amended in 2009), and a Law on Combating Trafficking in Persons in 2006.95 The Gender Equality Council’s engagement on gender issues in legislation and the recent process around the adoption of the National Action Plan for United Nations Security Council 1325 on women, peace and security are promising developments.96 At the same time, a Georgian NGO leader argued, “really there is not much attention from the top…[Gender] is not considered an important issue.”97

The recently approved financial incentive for political parties to include females in their party candidate lists presents an opportunity for promoting women’s political involvement. According to the amendments to the Law on the Political Unions of Citizens, parties will receive additional funding of ten percent from the state budget if they include two women among every ten candidates in the party list. Parties thus benefit if women candidates make up at least 20 percent of their party lists. The amendment applies to national and local elections.98 The measure will first be implemented in the coming parliamentary elections of this year.99

Political Parties Various experts characterize IDPs’ voting habits as generally supporting the ruling party and current government. Nana Sumbadze of the Institute for Policy Studies, a Tbilisi-based think tank, generally regards IDPs as more trusting of Georgian institutions compared to the broader population. As a result, IDPs tend to vote more for the government and less for the opposition, in comparison with non-IDPs.100 A reported shift in this voting trend occurred in 2008, however, as opposition candidates in oppositional electoral districts in Tbilisi won in all electoral precincts with high populations of displaced persons.101

The European Democrats currently form the only IDP party in the Georgian Parliament,102 which belongs to the Unified Opposition bloc. This group holds 17 seats in Georgia’s 150-seat Parliament.103 Paata Davitaia, an IDP from Abkhazia and presently a Deputy Speaker of Parliament, leads the European

94 Georgia. Parliament of Georgia. "Gender Equality Advisory Council Under The Chairman Of The Parliament Of Georgia.” Web. 28 April 2012. 95 Georgia: Partial progress towards durable solutions for IDPs, 128. 96 Anonymous Interview. 97 Marina Tabukashvili (Deputy Director, Taso Foundation), Personal Interview, 14 March 2012. 98 “The representative of Georgia made a report on women’s status in New York on UN Commission 56th Session,” Gender Information Network of South Caucasus, Web, 3 March 2012. 99 Magda Anikashvili, Personal Interview. 100 Mooney, 210; Nana Sumbadze (Co-Director, Institute for Policy Studies), Personal Interview, 15 March 2012; Out of the Margins: Securing a Voice for Internally Displaced People, 26. 101 Ibid., 26. 102 The slogan of the party is still “On Our Own”, which is the party’s former name (Paata Davitaia (MP, Parliament of Georgia), Personal Interview, 21 March 2012.) 103 Georgia. Parliament of Georgia. "Members of Parliament.” Web. 28 April 2012.

25 Democrats. The party presents itself as a vocal critic of the government’s approach to IDP issues, which make up 60 percent of the party’s platform. While Davitaia mentioned several policy ideas for IDPs in an interview, he also stated that the government did not address them. He emphasized the difficulties of communicating with IDPs, since “they have a negative attitude towards all politicians, regardless of ideology, no matter if you are part of the government or parliament” (referring to the opposition in parliament).104 IDPs and activists interviewed noted Davitaia’s lack of connection to the IDP community and stated that it seemed as though IDPs did not vote him into power or give him a mandate.105

Other political parties, such as Our Georgia – Free Democrats, have an organization within their party for IDPs from Abkhazia. The organization is made up of about 500 members and the Free Democrats have plans to create a similar organization for IDPs from Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia.106 The Christian Democratic Movement also has a special wing for IDPs. Representatives from this party mention this is “very active” and that “they visit collective centers.”107 Although other parties, including the ruling United National Movement, may have similar organizations for IDPs, none of our IDP interviewees and focus group participants mentioned these as avenues of participation.108 In this sense, it is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of these organizations in enabling IDP political participation. It is also unclear whether the government and opposition adopt different approaches to displaced persons. One expert on the subject noted that the leader of the opposition Georgian Dream Movement, Bidzina Ivanishvili, has taken, in her words, a more “realistic” approach to IDPs, saying that return “won’t happen in the near future, that it’s impossible.” The nascent political movement has not yet offered a plan for IDP integration, but some experts argue that a new leader could present an opportunity for a new approach to IDP issues that better reflects their needs and interests on this important issue.109

Regarding women’s participation among political parties, several parties have recently signed NDI’s Win with Women Global Action Plan. They have recently created women’s wings and organizations within their structures.110 Interestingly, these women’s wings are not political structures per se although they are organized by political parties. Women who are involved do not necessarily want to run for office although they support the party. In interviews regarding the women’s wings of Our Georgia – Free Democrats and the Christian Democratic Movement, representatives of both parties mentioned significant female involvement in the organizations, with participants preferring to be involved in non- political activities.111

104 Paata Davitaia, Personal Interview. 105 Nino Kalandarishvili (Director, Institute for the Study of Nationalism and Conflict, Member of Synergy), Personal Interview, 30 January 2012; David Chochia, Personal Interview. 106 Alex Petriashvili (Our Georgia – Free Democrats). Personal Interview. 23 March 2012. 107 CDM Woman Leader (Christian Democrats). Personal Interview. 21 March 2012. 108 The IDPs who participated in this study do not comprise a representative sample, however. 109 Nana Sumbadze, Personal Interview. 110 Teona Kupunia (Women's Political Participation Program Officer, National Democratic Institute), Personal Interview, 13 March 2012. 111 Thea Tsukuliani, Personal Interview; CDM Leader, Personal Interview.

26 The Ministry for Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Refugees, and Accommodation In the current context of national level political participation, internally displaced persons mostly interact with the MRA, seen as the ministry “that looks after IDPs.”112 With a staff of over 170, the MRA is made up of two departments on IDPs—one for internal displacement issues and the other for migration, repatriation and refugee issues. The ministry has four regional offices, a reception center for IDPs in Tbilisi and other reception centers that are due to open around Tbilisi in the coming months. The MRA also has a telephone hotline to enable IDPs to contact MRA officials.113

As a senior Government official confirmed, the MRA has “the mandate of protecting the interests of the IDPs—not politically representing them abroad or domestically.”114 The MRA creates an indirect avenue of political participation by informing IDPs on their rights and entitlements and gathering information from IDPs on their needs. However, they lack a mechanism to gather “coherent representative feedback” that could influence the policy development process. As MRA representatives are faced with a broad array of individual and community problems, the ministry faces the challenging process of “trying to structure that voice and make it more representative.”115 In addition to the concern of how to aggregate and structure information from IDPs, they also face a “disconnect…[with]…the rest of government,” with the MRA not having much access to or support from other ministries or state agencies.116 They are thus generally faced with implementing plans largely on their own.117 As for IDPs themselves being involved in government ministries, the only senior official from the conflict regions is the Minister of Economy of Georgia, Vera Kobalia.118 We were unable to find any data on the number of IDPs working in the current government, to provide a more accurate depiction of IDP participation within government bodies.

The Steering Committee This body serves as a main effort to counter the challenges that the MRA faces in developing and implementing IDP-related policies. The Georgian government established the Steering Committee on the State Strategy for IDPs was established by the government in March 2009. As a decision-making and advisory board, the steering committee is mandated with coordinating the efforts of the Georgian government and international organizations in implementing the State Strategy and Action Plan. The committee brings together a wide range of government ministers and includes UNHCR, representatives

112 International NGO Representative. Personal Interview. 22 March 2012; Dalila Khorava (Georgian Support for Refugees), Personal Interview, 22 March 2012. 113 IDMC, Georgia: Partial progress towards durable solutions for IDPs, 155-156; From Responsibility to Response, 95. 114 Senior Government Official, Personal Interview. 115 International NGO Representative, Personal Interview. 116 Tina Gewis, Personal Interview; Caroline Stampfer (European External Action Service, Tbilisi), Personal Interview, 20 March 2012. 117 Mooney, 205. 118 Georgia. Government of Georgia. "Members.” Web. 28 April 2012. .

27 from other development and donor agencies, one representative of an international NGO and one representative of a national NGO.119

IDPs have to this point only been indirectly involved in the Steering Committee. The first local NGO representative to be included in the committee was the Georgia branch of Transparency International (TI). TI channeled relevant information from the Steering Committee to about 30 local NGOs working on IDP issues, but this process relied on TI’s goodwill and was not institutionalized.120 TI rotated off the Steering Committee in 2011. More recently, some national NGOs proposed that the Georgian Young Lawyers Association (GYLA) should take the national NGO seat, but there is no formal process for GYLA’s accession. As of the time of writing, GYLA’s nomination remained uncertain and the MRA had yet to take up the issue.121 While both TI and GYLA are respected NGOs that address IDP issues in their programming, neither is an expressly IDP-focused NGO, nor are they led or staffed by primarily IDPs. Therefore, the extent to which either can be considered to represent the IDP community is limited. International NGO representatives have suggested that an IDP NGO should sit in the national NGO seat or that another space should be made for an IDP NGO in order to better represent the IDP community; however, no IDP NGO has yet stepped forward to assume the seat.122

The Office of the Public Defender Through its monitoring and reporting role, the Office of the Public Defenders serves as another indirect avenue for IDPs in representing their needs and interests. Recent support from UNHCR and the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights has strengthened the capacity of the Office of the Ombudsman. Headed by Giorgi Tugushi, the Office has established an IDP unit and human rights monitors in five regional offices and now more actively reports on IDP issues through public statements and press releases. Previously, the Office had a special chapter on IDPs in their annual report on human rights in Georgia, but since 2010, they have issued a special report on the human rights of IDPs and conflict-affected people.123

The Office includes IDPs in its monitoring through administering questionnaires during their site visits. For its last special report, the Ombudsman included 10% of the families of each collective center it visited.124 The Office of the Ombudsman considers itself the best advocate of systematic issues that internally displaced persons face. The Office also acts as an intermediary between IDPs and the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation. IDPs can go to the Ombudsman’s Office to address their concerns, especially if they fail to receive a reply from the MRA on these issues.125 In this case, the Ombudsman’s takes advantage of the MRA’s public commitment to “actively cooperate with the PDO (Public

119 Mooney, 199-200. 120 Ibid., 199. 121 Caroline Stampfer, Personal Interview. 122 Tina Gewis, Personal Interview. 123 Georgia: Partial progress towards durable solutions for IDPs, 157. 124 “Report on the Human Rights Situation of Internally Displaced Persons and Conflict-Affected Individuals in Georgia,” Public Defender of Georgia, July 2010, Print, 6, 7. 125 Staff member (Office of the Public Defender of Georgia). Personal Interview. 15 March 2012.

28 Defender’s Office) and leave no recommendation or letter of the PDO without a response.”126 The Office of the Ombudsman, however, does not always receive timely replies from the MRA. Also, the Office identifies communication as a main issue hindering better cooperation between the MRA and IDPs. Lastly, Ombudsman representatives remarked that while the MRA’s data collection regarding IDP needs is not disaggregated based on gender, it is women IDPs who have been more open to discussing their issues and needs with monitors.

The Abkhaz Government-in-Exile The Government-in-exile has faced a turbulent history over the past two decades playing different roles in the effort to represent IDPs. The Abkhaz government of the early 1990s was reconstituted in Georgia proper following the mass displacement of 1993-1994 from Abkhazia. The Abkhaz government-in-exile supported the state level response to displacement and closely cooperated with the Government of Georgia. The government-in-exile mainly engaged in activities including: distributing monthly stipends to IDPs, allocating shelter to them, facilitating family tracing, providing humanitarian assistance, and providing education and health services.127

However, the exiled structures had no mechanism or processes in place to channel IDP concerns, even though they may have been able to voice these concerns at the national level.128 Instead, some corrupt members were seen to instrumentalize IDP issues to promote their own interests, rather than those of the broader displaced community.129 Their ineffectiveness in representing IDPs also relates to its sole focus on return and hard line stance on conflict resolution with Abkhazia. This perspective limited their will to represent IDP livelihood and accommodation needs within their communities, as they were considered aspects of local integration, seen as efforts mutually exclusive with promoting the right to return.130

The government-in-exile lost most of its influence at the national level in 2004, especially with the repealed mandate of their deputies in the Georgian Parliament. As a result, “No longer ‘represented’ by ineffective but nonetheless highly vocal government-in- exile bodies…[IDPs] also lacked preparation and training in how to relate with national politicians, parliamentarians or political parties.”131

The government-in-exile currently plays a minimal role. A government-in-exile representative underlined that “our first goal is to inform others about our problem and make it a global problem.” The structure continues to exist more as “a symbol. We need it. You have the government to go to once that

126 Georgia: Partial progress towards durable solutions for IDPs, 157. 127 Mooney, 203. 128 Georgia: Partial progress towards durable solutions for IDPs, 124. 129 Ibid., 15. 130 Mira Sovakar (Caucasus Projects Manager, Conciliation Resources), Personal Interview, 7 March 2012. 131 Out of the Margins: Securing a Voice for Internally Displaced People, 4.

29 land [Abkhazia] is ours again. It's also a symbol of hope.”132 Apart from being a symbol nationally of attempting to restore territorial integrity, it also works to promote the durable solution of return as one option for internally displaced persons. They have also shifted away from a revanchist attitude, becoming ardent supporters of confidence-building and a peaceful resolution to the conflict. However, in many ways they have proven their lack of effectiveness as a political conduit for IDPs. Their failure to issue a public statement regarding the Georgian Government’s recent evictions of IDPs presents just one example.133 Referring to the government-in-exile, an IDP in Zugdidi commented: “They have nothing and how can they help me? They are my friends but how can they help me?”134

Civil Society, NGOs, and Activism Civil society offers the main avenue for IDPs to participate in the policymaking process, advocating for the rights of their community to the government and to international organizations, namely donors and NGOs. Officials from the Office of the Ombudsman highlighted that “civil society is the best lobbyist” of IDPs and that “many IDP NGOs that are quite active.”135 While civil society’s efforts are generally considered to be donor-driven, it is also vibrant, with well-developed financial and human capacity.136

Civic organizations, political parties, newspapers and television stations, think tanks and advocacy groups thrived during Eduard Shevardnadze’s rule, enabling them to peacefully oust this leader in 2004.137 However, since the Rose Revolution, the perception is that many Georgian NGOs now play a decreased role as influential government critics or watchdogs. Many of the previous civil society and NGO community leaders joined Saakashvili’s government, Parliament, or the private sector, and their successors have often been apprehensive in criticizing the government. Civil society is generally weaker also due to reduced democracy assistance support—most notably from the U.S. Previously, significant American donations focused on civil society but have now shifted to providing more support to the government, in effect supporting its centralization of power. Some also argue that this has reduced democratic freedoms.138

Both national level NGOs and IDP NGOs support IDP advocacy and the monitoring of IDP rights. Especially since 2006, the wider NGO community in Georgia has come to address IDP issues.139 The Georgian Young Lawyer’s Association (GYLA) and Transparency International’s (TI) Georgia chapter TI serves more as a watchdog for the MRA whereas on GYLA’s role involves studying legislation, raising awareness about related problems, offering free legal aid, and providing information for IDPs on bringing their cases to court.140 Charity Humanitarian Centre “Abkhazeti” (CHCA) is also an example of a

132 Ibid. 133 Lawrence Sheets (International Crisis Group), Personal Interview, 13 March 2012. 134 Internally Displaced Persons (Collective Center, Zugdidi). Personal Interview. 19 March 2012. 135 Staff member (Office of the Public Defender of Georgia), Personal Interview. 136 Mira Sovakar, Personal Interview. 137 Lanskoy, Miriam and Giorgi Areshidze. "Georgia's Year of Turmoil." Journal of Democracy October 19.4 (2008): 154-68. 157. 138 Mitchell (Democracy in Georgia Since the Rose Revolution), 673; Mitchell (Democracy Bound), 73-74. 139 Mira Sovakar, Personal Interview. 140 Vakhushti Menabde (Georgian NGO Representative), Personal Interview, 21 March 2012.

30 prominent national level IDP NGO working on IDP-related issues. A European Union official made the following description of CHCA: “They come up with good proposals, they’re daring…they came up with a proposal to…do more research on private sector IDPs…They come up with very good ideas, they ask for meetings, they lobby for it.”141 Taken together, such organizations play an important role in advocating for IDPs at the national level.

In order to present a unified voice on common concerns, IDP NGOs are also involved in IDP networks. The Synergy Network, comprised of around 20 IDP NGOs, has been particularly active with political parties – trying to inform party platforms and policies, and working with IDP communities to encourage voting.142 Synergy Network meetings are valuable opportunities for local NGOs to involve themselves in discussions on national policies that affect them. For example, during the Synergy Network meetings held in January 2012, trainings were held to inform local IDP NGOs on the application process for municipal tenders, procurement, and contracting.143 Not only does this provide NGO leaders with necessary knowledge and skills to be better involved in these processes, it also ensures a monitoring mechanism to minimize corruption. Despite this valuable work, competition for limited international funding and the absence of strong leadership weakens the impact and unified message of the Synergy Network, discussed in further detail below.144

Geneva Peace Process The participation of IDPs in Track I Diplomacy is a rather limited, partly because the Geneva peace talks are at an impasse. The actors in this process include representatives from three international organizations, the UN, OSCE, and the EU, in addition to Georgia, Russia, the US and participants from the de facto and the de jure authorities from Abkhazia. A senior Georgian official outlined that the talks include representatives of displaced persons and the people that displaced them.145 The Action Plan on the State Strategy for IDPs foresees the involvement of IDPs in the peace process.146 However, this aspect of the action plan, on the right to return, has been described as “inactionable.”147

Whereas IDPs are involved in the Geneva talks through their representatives in the Abkhazian government-in-exile, there seems to be no mechanism through which IDPs are more broadly involved or represented. The government-in-exile as highlighted above also does not have the capacity to represent IDPs more comprehensively, while some IDPs may not want to be involved due to the politicization of the return issue. IDPs are more focused on the difficulties of their daily lives and therefore have less of an incentive to be involved in such efforts.148 In general, the Geneva talks have not been considered

141 Caroline Stampfer, Personal Interview. 142 Mira Sovakar, Personal Interview. 143 Synergy Network Conference. Tbilisi. January. 2012. 144 Eka Gvalia, Executive Director, Charity Humanitarian Centre ‘Abkhazeti’, Personal Interview, 18 April 2012. 145 Senior Government Official, Personal Interview. 146 Staff member (Office of the Public Defender of Georgia), Personal Interview. 147 International NGO Representative, Personal Interview. 148 Stan Veitsman, Personal Interview.

31 AVENUES OF IDPs’ AND WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION: POLICYMAKING

substantive, and there is much more interaction, and IDP inclusion, through Track II diplomacy or grassroots peacebuilding efforts.149

Local Level Participation

Local government Paralleling the landscape of participation at the national level, IDPs’ engagement at the local level also remains limited in many ways. Limits on their right to vote in national and local elections during their first decade of displacement could play an influential role in this. The 1998 Law of Georgia on Elections of Bodies of Local Government explicitly stipulated that IDPs were ineligible to vote in local elections in their place of residence.150 The revised Unified Electoral Code of August 2003 overturned this, affirming the right of every citizen to be elected to Parliament and representative of local government, without any apparent restriction, such as loss of IDP status.151

Despite these amendments, however, many were still concerned that by voting for representatives of the areas in which they resided, they would be accepting the de facto territorial situation and thereby relinquish their right to return.152 Although these concerns are currently unfounded, the Georgian government has not worked to dispel these rumors for political reasons, as they lay claim to the breakaway territories through the IDP population and their wish to return to their homes.153

This misconception partially explains the low participation of IDPs in elections as voters and as candidates in local elections. For instance, a survey on IDP voting that was commissioned by UNDP and undertaken by a consortium of Georgian research organizations determined that voter turnout among IDPs nationwide was only 35 percent, which was “much lower” than among the general population.154 Moreover, as one study on the situation of IDPs in Georgia highlighted, because “access to services (e.g., education) and employment opportunities often relies on ‘connections’ with the elected officials, IDPs are at a disadvantage compared to the general population.”155

Although IDPs generally face these barriers, women face additional obstacles to running and being elected for office at the local level. According to an IDP NGO participant, IDP women have run for office

149 David Phillips (Director, Institute for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University), Personal Interview, 8 March 2012. 150 Mooney, 211-212. 151 Brookings Institution, The Voting Rights of Internally Displaced Persons: The OSCE Region, Nov.2004, 44. 152 Ibid. 153 Simon Bagshaw, Internally Displaced Persons and Political Participation: The OSCE Region , Occasional Paper, The Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement, September 2000, 18. 154 Business Consulting Group (BCG) Research, Internally Displaced Persons and Their Behavior During the Elections (May 2004), 4. 155 Larry Dershem, Nana Gurgenidze, Steve Holtzman, Poverty and Vulnerability Among Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia: An Update of their Current Status and Circumstances, paper prepared for the World Bank, November 2002, 36.

32 in the past but none have yet to be successful.156 Reasons for this include being placed too low on party candidate lists, having fewer qualifications than male candidates due to family or work commitments, and traditional views about women and leadership. These challenges have contributed to very low levels of women’s local level political participation: As noted by a OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, only 10 per cent of elected councillors were women in the 2010 municipal elections, representing a decrease from previous elections.157 In addition, only 14 per cent of the elected councilors in Tbilisi were women. Overall, both women and men IDPs are underrepresented at the local political level.

Civil society, NGOs, and Activism NGOs seek to fill this gap in advocating for IDPs’ and women’s needs and interests. However, according to a USAID survey, civil society in Georgia is very weak, with only 6% of the population aware of civil society initiatives.158 According to one NGO leader, community mobilization is a new concept for Post- Soviet countries like Georgia. She notes that, “Georgians are more oriented on small groups, on small- centered approaches and on individual approaches.”159 Furthermore, Georgian culture is very family- oriented, and there is strong social pressure to support one’s family. This affects women in particular, who may be discouraged from engaging in the risky field of politics.160 This has translated into weak community mobilization and a lack of political participation on the part of Georgians in general.161

Civic-minded Georgians, particularly women, mostly participate in public life through NGOs to meet their needs and influence policymaking. With international NGOs and governments providing financial support, civil society groups are quite active at the local level as advocates for IDP rights.162 However, the participation of IDPs living in collective centers and private accommodations varies and in many cases is informal and based on personal networks.

The capabilities and commitment of government-appointed leaders in IDP communities, or mamasakhlisi, influence the level of IDPs’ participation. Depending on the size of the community, there may be several mamasakhlisi that act as liaisons between IDP groups and the municipal government. Unofficially, these community leaders may quell criticisms voiced in the IDP community, prior to visits from foreigners or prominent national figures.163 Currently, the self-governance law of Georgia dictates IDPs in settlements or collective centers cannot elect their own representatives within a municipality.164 In terms of gendered representation, men usually fill mamasakhlis posts.165

156 Taso Foundation Representative. Personal Interview. March. 2012. 157 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report Municipal Elections, 30 May 2010 (13 September 2010), 17. 158 Fron Nahzi [Director, East-West Management Institute (former)], Personal Interview, 21 December 2011. 159 Julia Kharavashvili, Personal Interview. January. 2012. 160 Marina Guledani, Personal Interview. 161 Eka Gvalia, Personal Interview. 162 Georgian Ombudsman Representative. Personal Interview. March. 2012, and Eka Gvalia, Personal Interview. 163 Vakhtang Piranishvili (CARE International), Roundtable Discussion at Women’s Political Resource Center, Tbilisi, 23 March 2012. 164 Ibid. 165 Focus Group with IDP Women from the New Wave of Displacement. January. 2012.

33 In general, IDPs communicate more immediate needs through their community leader, such as the need for a doctor at the local hospital, or for governmental support to pay for heating.166 Communication between IDP groups and their local governments have seen improvements in the past few years. Local MRA representatives and IDP communities meet regularly in many communities, although this is not systematic.167 NGOs have played an important role in bringing community leaders, local government officials, Abkhaz government-in-exile representatives, and other relevant actors who can provide needed information to IDPs and address some of their personal issues.168

In terms of the gendered involvement of IDPs in civil society, a representative from a Georgian IDP NGO noted that, “almost all women, especially in urban areas…do participate in the political process in some ways.”169 In lieu of running for office, IDP women establish and work for NGOs and participate as beneficiaries, primarily in western Georgia. These IDP-led NGOs have helped mobilize IDP women from hundreds of collective centers for both local initiatives such as municipal budgeting, as well as national policies like the National Action Plan on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325170 with the support of UN Women.171

Increasing IDPs’ and Women’s Community Engagement

Self-help groups, coordinated by NGOs such as the Taso Foundation, have also facilitated IDP involvement at various levels. Self-help group members receive technical, community mobilization, and leadership training, which encourage women in particular to become involved in political life. Members also conduct needs assessments within their communities, and present their findings to government officials at meetings organized by NGOs and international organizations. There are approximately 50 self-help groups currently meeting throughout Georgia, and many have been successful in having their concerns addressed by both local and national government officials.

Some IDP women who want to become more politically active also have access to women’s leadership programs such as the Women Leaders Club (WLC), established by the Zugdidi-based women’s NGO Gaenati in 2012. This program offers trainings to both IDP and non-IDP women on women’s rights, leadership, and strengthening their roles in peace building and policymaking processes. They work with women currently in positions of power in the community, such as school principals and municipal government officials, to encourage them to develop their political careers and support them in running for office. Ten of the most active women will be brought to attend a session at the Parliament of Georgia, and to meet the Deputy Chairperson of Parliament, Rusudan Kervalishvili.

166 Focus Group with IDP Men from the New Wave of Displacement. March. 2012. 167 Georgian Ombudsman Representative. Personal Interview. March. 2012. 168 Georgian NGO representative. Personal Interview. March. 2012. 169 IDP Woman. Personal Interview. March. 2012. 170 The full name is the “2012-2015 National Action Plan for Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions #1325, 1820, 1888, 1889 and 1960 on ‘Women, Peace and Security.’” 171 Marina Tabukashvili, Personal interview, and Elene Rusetskaia. Director, Women’s Information Center. Personal Interviews. March 2012.

34 Grassroots Peacebuilding Efforts Civil society organizations have played an important role in creating opportunities for IDP advocacy in Track II diplomacy, including for people-to-people (P2P) reconciliation with stakeholders from the contested territories. Many NGOs currently organize meetings between IDPs and professional groups from Georgia and Abkhazia. For instance, the Peaceful Business Caucasus Network based in Kutaisi (Western Georgia) organizes business trips for Abkhaz to visit Tbilisi. Abkhaz entrepreneurs work with small business owners in Georgia, with the purpose of developing a joint venture.172 IDP groups are also active in promoting contact between teachers from both sides to undergo joint training, as well as bringing children together for summer camps in the Gali region of Abkhazia, next to the border with Georgia proper.

IDPs are also active in peacebuilding initiatives organized and funded by international organizations, such as USAID and UNDP. For instance, UNDP is currently implementing the Confidence Building, Early Response Mechanism (COBERM). This program aims to integrate IDP communities divided by the conflict who were displaced to Gali and Zugdidi.173 This involves recreating relationships between the ethnic Abkhaz and ethnic Georgians and other communities by funding confidence, peace building and restoration projects proposed by IDP communities. Thus far, 40 projects have been funded.

USAID is also currently developing natural gas/water exchange initiatives between South Ossetia and communities along the Georgian border. 174 Much of its conflict resolution work is based on a bottom-up approach, and includes hosting workshops in Istanbul between South Ossetians and Georgians. Despite these promising initiatives, some donors question whether these small-scale projects will have a sustainable impact for IDP communities involved.175 Moreover, international donors are concerned with the apparent lack of support for P2P initiatives on the part of the Georgian government since 2008. According to an international donor representative, the government currently requires residents from the conflict territories to accept status neutral documents in order to participate in NGO-led P2P initiatives. This imposes significant conditions on civil society events, discouraging citizens from the conflict regions from participating.176

Regarding women’s participation in these P2P initiatives, once again NGOs created by and for women serve as their primary avenue. Fund Sukhumi and the Union of Wives and Invalids and Lost Warriors have formed close relationships with organizations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia respectively for conflict resolution purposes. As mentioned previously, Georgia’s network of self-help groups are also involved in grassroots peacebuilding initiatives. For instance, the Taso Foundation’s groups encourage dialogue on the “History of Friendship” between the Abkhaz and Georgians to counteract more

172 EUMM Zugdidi. Personal Interview. March. 2012. 173 Stan Veitsman, Personal Interview. 174 David Dzebisashvili (Program Development Specialist, USAID), Personal Interview, 1 February 2012. 175 Ibid. 176 Tina Gewis, Personal Interview.

35 aggressive messages in communities or in the media.177 These initiatives certainly present promising examples of avenues of IDPs’ and women’s engagement in local communities, but require extensive support in order to be truly effective.

AVENUES OF IDPs’ AND WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION: POLICYMAKING

Processes around Decision-making on IDP-Specific Policies

Decision-making around national IDP-specific policies is one avenue of participation in which some progress has been made in increasing IDPs’ engagement in policymaking. The three main examples of national policies concerning IDPs include State Strategy for Internally Displaced Persons – Persecuted, the Action Plan for Implementation of the State Strategy on IDPs,178 and the 2012-2015 National Action Plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325.179 These documents express a significant rhetorical commitment to increasing IDPs’ participation in policy-making processes. Moreover, the processes of developing these documents present some cases of IDP representation at the negotiating table, particularly through civil society channels. As previously discussed, women have largely been more involved through this avenue than have men, but clear gaps remain regarding their ability to exercise influence through NGOs.

Moving beyond rhetoric to consider concrete actions, implementation of policies concerning IDPs is a second key element of the policymaking process. Since the implementation process for the 1325 National Action Plan has only just begun, we focus on analyzing the current progress made in implementing the State Strategy and corresponding Action Plan. These policies seek to increase IDPs’ ability to exercise their internationally recognized right, as displaced persons, to choose among the three durable solutions: return, resettlement, and local integration. The Georgian government’s initiatives focus on housing, livelihoods, and awareness-raising on their policies in order to promote this goal. Despite some progress, an assessment of the implementation to date reveals that the extent to which IDPs can actually choose among the durable solutions remains significantly limited. Making return feasible requires a settlement in the Geneva talks and is therefore an option that the government currently lacks direct control over. Resettlement and local integration are thus the two durable solutions of main concern here.

We consider IDP involvement in these processes at two levels: (1) among individuals and families and (2) at the national level. At the individual and family level, IDPs’ opportunities to choose among

177 Taso Foundation Representative. Personal Interview. March 2012. 178 The current document in force covers 2009-2012. An updated Action Plan for 2012-2014 is currently in the process of being developed. 179 The full name is the “2012-2015 National Action Plan for Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions #1325, 1820, 1888, 1889 and 1960 on ‘Women, Peace and Security.’”

36 resettlement and local integration have expanded due to government efforts to provide these options. However, the disconnect between local problems and national policies remains, as it relates to the challenge of ensuring IDP representation and participation in articulating these approaches. IDPs’ lack of systematic involvement in implementing these policies may directly affect their current inability to effectively choose among them.

Developing the State Strategy In some ways, the process of developing IDP-related policies in Georgia marked a departure from previous efforts, presenting a new model of participation for the affected populations. The development of a concrete IDP policy, particularly one that supported integration, was an innovation itself. Previously the Georgian government’s focus on return of IDPs prevented them from engaging in practical and actionable programs for this population. The State Strategy, approved in 2007, thus represented the government’s first attempt to lay out a concrete, actionable approach to address IDPs’ direct needs and interests.

The efforts to put this policy together began in February 2006, with the creation of a government commission, led by the MRA. It included representatives from the main stakeholders working on and affected by these issues. Various government ministries, NGOs, international organizations, and IDPs participated in this effort.180 NGOs especially played a key role in the writing of the State Strategy, serving as the link between the Government Commission and the broader population of IDPs. They involved IDPs in focus groups to assess their attitudes towards the State Strategy, their social conditions, and to collect their opinions about how to improve their situation, resulting in suggestions for concrete measures that fed directly into the final document.181 Tina Gewis of the Norwegian Refugee Council evaluates the development of the State Strategy, calling it,

“one good example of involving IDP communities…[There] was a very broad consultation process where in every working group that was somehow contributing to the bigger strategy development, you had reserved slots for local NGOs, national NGOs…Most NGOs at that time…felt that they were being consulted and involved.”182

Overall, IDP NGOs felt “a real feeling of ownership”183 in this participatory process that sought to ensure that the strategy would meet IDPs’ needs and reflect their interests.

International organizations also significantly supported the State Strategy’s development by providing financial, material, and human resources.184 Gewis also notes in particular the strong effort of INGOs in pushing for an inclusive policy development process. Involving IDPs “can be done,” she says, “but it was

180 Bokuchava, 4. 181 Bokuchava, 5-6. 182 Tina Gewis, Personal Interview. 183 “Looking Forward: Extending the IDP Action Plan 2012-2014,” Conference Report, Danish Refugee Council, 15 June 2011, 18. 184 Bokuchava, 5.

37 lengthy and required outside resources.” Medea Turashvili of the International Crisis Group argues, “international organizations…played a huge role in the change of attitude of the government”185 regarding the level of participation in this process. The interest and involvement of these external actors calls into question the capacity and political will of the Georgian government in promoting this type of inclusiveness. This situation in turn could contribute to significant challenges in the effort to promote IDPs’ participation more broadly through the implementation of these policies.

Developing and Updating the Action Plan In contrast with the State Strategy, the Action Plan’s development did not involve this wide range of stakeholders.186 The document itself states that it “benefits from a broad consultation process.” However, only government agencies participated directly in this effort, leaving out international organizations, local NGOs and IDPs. The State Strategy charged the Commission with the task of developing the Action Plan within six months after its adoption, which became the grounds for the more limited participation, as a more inclusive process was argued to be more time-consuming. A further justification for this approach lay in the argument that “the final decision-making rests with the State.”187

After the participatory development of the State Strategy, it is interesting that a wider range of key stakeholders did not play a role in the development of the Action Plan. Members of the Abkhaz government-in-exile were involved in some thematic groups, but this type of representation of IDPs was significantly more removed than that provided by IDP NGOs. The lack of inclusion may have actually delayed adoption of the Action Plan because the process failed to engage them as supporters. IDPs more generally may also lack the sense of identification that many felt with the State Strategy as a result of being involved in its development. 188 IDPs’ skepticism regarding their actual ability to influence policy could decrease their buy-in regarding subsequent policies addressing their needs and interests. The government needs their support for both the State Strategy and the Action Plan if implementation is to be effective, highlighting the drawback of failing to include them in both policymaking processes.

The effort to draft an updated Action Plan for 2012-2014 has sought to address some of these concerns by adopting a more inclusive approach. The MRA’s Steering Committee members participated in Temporary Expert Groups (TEGs) that developed recommendations and concrete measures to contribute to the extended Action Plan.189 Local IDP organizations also participated in this process, which began in the spring of 2010.190 A Georgian NGO representative spoke a bit skeptically about IDPs’

185 Medea Turashvili (International Crisis Group). Personal interview. 13 March 2012.

186 “Looking Forward: Extending the IDP Action Plan 2012-2014,” 18. 187 Bokuchava, 12-13. 188 Ibid. 189 UNHCR Georgia, “Report on Participatory Assessments for the Extension of the IDP Action Plan,” December 2011, 3. 190 “Looking Forward: Extending the IDP Action Plan 2012-2014,” 18.

38 ability to contribute to the new Action Plan, however. She stated that while several NGOs worked with the MRA to develop recommendations, “many of the issues that we put into it were taken out,” such as “social issues like insurance.” She assesses the MRA’s efforts as just “declaratory meetings,” lacking real substance or will to incorporate their perspectives.191

International organizations have continued to act as strong advocates for participatory policymaking. One such example took the form of a conference entitled “Looking Forward: Extending the IDP Action Plan 2012-2014,” which DRC convened along with UNHCR, SIDA, the MRA, and the EU. The approximately 100 participants included international, national, and IDP NGOs, the MRA and other relevant ministries, representatives of local government, the Abkhaz government-in-exile, international organizations, and foreign embassies. IDPs were represented by NGOs and the government-in-exile. The conference report highlights the importance of “engaging all segments of IDPs and affected local population in a direct dialogue,” making a particular note to involve IDPs in private accommodations, as they are often overlooked.192 At the event itself, stakeholders discussed key issues and lessons learned and developed a list of recommendations for the new Action Plan, such as increasing opportunities for communication between IDPs and the MRA. Such efforts represent an important step forward for the MRA in taking various perspectives into account, but should become more systematic to ensure consistent inclusion of a broad range of IDP perspectives in policymaking.

One effort for the extended Aciton Plan to directly reflect IDPs’ voices lay in UNHCR’s participatory assessments. Arising out of a recommendation voiced during the DRC conference, the assessments sought to engage a broad range of IDP groups, provide them with information so they could participate in policy discussions and make recommendations for the updated document, and identify issues that may not have been considered in the original process. IDPs in both collective centers and private accommodations were involved in 75 focus groups held across the country. UNHCR worked with the MRA and various international and local NGOs, including IDP NGOs. The Age, Gender and Diversity Mainstreaming approach ensured that interviews with several age and gender groups were conducted at each location.193 Evaluating this overall effort, an INGO representative recognizes the importance of this more inclusive process, but states that the results need to are not “drawn out to be a clear policy conclusion.”194 This suggests that IDPs and others involved with the actual policy development process need to work together to mold individual and community concerns into a more concrete policy platform that could more effectively address this population’s broader needs and interests.

Observers expressed differing interpretations of the MRA’s participation in these efforts to promote IDPs’ involvement in policymaking processes. A staff member of the Office of the Public Defender argues that the MRA participated in the participatory assessments “because UNHCR initiated it.” This staff member says that the MRA officials believe they are aware of IDPs’ needs because they are in contact

191 Roundtable Discussion at Women’s Political Resource Center, Tbilisi, 23 March 2012. 192 “Looking Forward: Extending the IDP Action Plan 2012-2014,” 8. 193 UNHCR Georgia, 3-6. 194 INGO Representative, Personal Interview, 22 March 2012.

39 with individual IDPs on a daily basis, “so there is no extra need for another special mechanism for consultations.”195 However, an INGO representative says that the MRA has “moved significantly in the last four years in terms of…becom[ing] more interactive.”

This individual emphasizes that the absence of a national association that can legitimately claim to speak for IDPs faces adds a significant challenge to the MRA’s ability to effectively include IDP voices in these types of processes. One might also argue that a more participatory approach to policymaking is also more time-consuming, and the effort to consider various points of view could be one element that has delayed the approval of the updated Action Plan.196 All democratic societies must contend with this issue, however. IDPs must thus be effectively represented in policymaking processes so that their perspectives are included in a systematic manner.

As the Office of the Public Defender staff member suggested, official efforts to engage IDPs in policymaking most likely would not occur without international organizations. Moreover, as exemplified by their activities throughout the development of the policies in question, donors and international organizations have increasingly sought to play a direct role in influencing IDP-related policies. An INGO representative notes, “foreign money comes with demands from the people who cough up the money, for these issues like consultation, engagement, participation.”197 Donors’ calls for a “participatory approach” thus refer not only to including IDPs, but also international organizations, in policymaking.

While international organizations have provided a crucial impetus, as well as mechanisms, for opening space for IDPs’ engagement in policymaking, international involvement should also be viewed critically. A staff member of the Office of the Public Defender also stated, “When the MRA started updating the Action Plan, it was more the international organizations [and] NGOs that were lobbying for wider participation of IDPs in the decision-making processes.”198 This dimension of IDP representation in the Action Plan extension has also characterized other policymaking processes involving IDPs. It underlines the fact that international actors must walk a fine line between advocating for IDPs’ voices to be heard and speaking for them. Internationals’ efforts to include IDPs in policymaking, based on their own understanding of who best represents the IDP community, could result in token representation with international actors essentially dominating the discussion. This risks bypassing some of the deeper challenges of promoting broad IDP participation and effective representation.

Gendered and Women’s Participation The effort to promote inclusion in the development of policies aimed at IDPs has also addressed gendered participation, in particular the inclusion of women. Women’s organizations in particular have contributed significantly to the mainstreaming of gender issues within these policies. For example, UN

195 Staff Member of the Office of the Public Defender, Personal interview, 15 March 2012. 196 At the time of publication, the extended Action Plan for 2012-2014 is in its final stages of approval. 197 INGO Representative, Personal Interview. 198 Staff member of the Office of the Public Defender, Personal Interview, 15 March 2012.

40 Women convened a working group to analyze the Law on IDPs, the State Strategy and the Action Plan to ensure that they align with CEDAW and Security Council Resolutions. This inclusive process involved representatives of the MRA, Ministry of Health, Labor, and Social Affairs, UNHCR, women’s NGOs, and grassroots participants, including IDPs from Gori, activists, and academics. The working group compiled recommendations and delivered them to the MRA, which in turn included some of these suggestions in the amended Law on IDPs, adopted in late 2011. Tamar Tavartkiladze of UN Women notes that “one of our recommendations was to amend the definition of internally displaced persons and to add the concept of discrimination and gender equality, and that was accepted.”199 UN Women has also spearheaded efforts to include gender-sensitive language in the revised IDP Action Plan for 2012-2014:

“There we succeeded to have 2 objectives included…single women and women-headed households with multiple children…and other vulnerable groups who need special accommodation during the housing allocation. And also that women’s issues and rights should be taken into consideration while allocating the new houses and settlements to IDPs.”200

The involvement of women and IDPs in these processes thus seems to directly influence the inclusion of their specific needs and interests in policies affecting them.

Examining the broader role of women IDPs in policymaking, we see that they are significantly more directly involved than men at the local level. Mariam Esaishvili of the MRA observes that primarily women engage in the MRA’s efforts to include IDPs in policy development initiatives, “since they are generally more active in community organizing, NGOs and community groups.”201 A representative of DRC in Zugdidi echoes this point.

“In general, IDP women are very active, and when we…enter collective centers, and when we want to mobilize these people, I would say 70% of them are females. And when we had conferences in Tbilisi, IDP conferences, and DRC managed somehow to bring together government and IDPs and different international organizations and NGOs working on IDP issues, and we took many people from here…65% of them were females…because they are more active somehow.”202

The high level of involvement of women in such efforts is important given their overall lack of influence over official decision-making in Georgia. We have seen how it directly influences a greater awareness of their particular concerns within policy documents. However, this discrepancy between men’s and women’s involvement highlights the need to empower IDP men IDP to contribute to policymaking.

This issue also highlights two related issues regarding power structures in Georgian society. First, women’s significant level of local engagement in many ways fails to challenge men’s power in official structures. Second, IDPs face a challenge in connecting their local problems with macro policy

199 Tamar Tavartkiladze (Project Manager, UN Women), Personal Interview, 12 March 2012. 200 Ibid. 201 Mariam Esaishvili (MRA), Personal Interview, 30 January 2012. 202 Mzevi Jojua (Danish Refugee Council), Personal Interview, 20 March 2012.

41 approaches to addressing them. As women are generally more involved in activism on IDP issues, it follows that gender plays a role in limiting IDPs’ ability to influence higher-level policymaking processes.

Parliament’s Gender Equality Council may help address this issue. It focuses particularly on increasing the involvement of women IDPs, usually by engaging with female NGO representatives. For example, Julia Kharashvili of the IDP Women’s Association “Consent” sits on the Council as an IDP activist. The Council more generally conducts “meetings with the leading women IDPs,” who support programs “on finding women leaders and raising their awareness on political and economic activities.”203 Policy documents such as the action plans on IDPs and gender equality play an important role, in that they “make the executive accountable to these responsibilities.” Zurab Mchedlishvili, the council’s coordinator, also recognizes the limits of the Council: "The State has expressed its willingness to regulate the gender equality issues in the country. However, due to the lack of state resources, the support from donor organizations is crucial for the regulation of these issues."204 Broader attitudes towards the equal involvement of women alongside men in decision-making may also curtail the Council’s effectiveness. However, it remains an important step forward in women’s and particularly IDPs’ opportunities for participating in policymaking.

Developing the National Action Plan for Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 The Georgian government’s adoption of the UN Security Council Resolutions on “Women, Peace and Security” (1325, 1820, 1888, 1889 and 1960) and the National Action Plan for Implementation (NAP) present a positive model of women’s and IDPs’ participation in national-level policymaking. While the resolutions address conflict-affected women more broadly, IDPs are a key target population and the document explicitly references them in most of its objectives. The NAP, approved by the Georgian Parliament on 27 December 2011, promotes women’s participation in conflict resolution, eliminating gender-based violence, and addressing women’s particular needs in conflict and recovery.205

In many ways paralleling the development of the IDP State Strategy and updated Action Plan, the process of creating the NAP also involved a number of international, national, and local stakeholders. UN Women created an ad-hoc government commission that included civil society representatives. Most notably, however, it clearly engaged IDPs and conflict-affected women to contribute to the policy. A UN Women representative describes how both “the grassroots…rural women…in buffer zones…women living in collective centers, IDPs who have experienced all the consequences of conflict on their lives”

203 Zurab Mchedlishvili (Coordinator of the Gender Equality Council), Personal Interview, 15 March 2012. 204 Ibid. 205 Government of Georgia. “2012-2015 National Action Plan for Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions #1325, 1820, 1888, 1889 and 1960 on ‘Women, Peace and Security.’” 27 December 2011.

42 were involved, in addition to “women representing civil society – heads of NGOs and coordinators of different projects, [who] are...experienced leaders and advocates.”206

A Policy Document Promoting Participation

The National Action Plan for Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and others on ‘Women, Peace and Security’ includes five key priority areas and goals:

1. Participation of women at decision-making level in conflict elimination, prevention and management processes; 2. Consideration of women’s needs in conflict prevention and elimination of all forms of violence against women; 3. Prevention of sexual and gender based violence against women in the conflict and post-conflict period; 4. Protection of conflict affected women’s human rights; ensuring their physical, social, economic and political security; 5. Relief and Recovery – Addressing special needs of women in war/conflict and post- conflict situations.

These objectives promote IDP women’s participation on two levels:

1. Involvement in decision-making at the international, national and local level, primarily through the Gender Equality Council, various ministries and international organizations. The NAP seeks to increase women’s representation in the security sector, the official peace talks held in Geneva, the military and peacekeeping forces, and in people-to-people diplomacy initiatives.

2. Increased capacity to participate in public life through support for women’s basic needs. The NAP promotes women’s security, addressing sexual and gender-based violence through legal and social service support. The NAP also supports access to women’s and reproductive healthcare and psychosocial counselling, and vocational education.

NGOs, and two national-level organizations in particular, played a key role in convening women, and among them IDPs, to contribute to the policymaking process. Working through their self-help groups, the Taso Foundation and Women’s Information Center facilitated workshops in which women participants discussed their key concerns regarding issues related to peace and security. Marina Tabukashvili of Taso notes that these women also then took the initiative to organize on their own, convening a number of self-help groups.207 WIC then conducted several meetings during which they collected recommendations, which NGO leaders presented to the government commission. Some of the

206 Tamar Tavartkiladze, Personal Interview. 207 Marina Tabukashvili, Personal Interview.

43 recommendations appeared in the final policy.208 A self-group community worker describes her experience in participating in this process: “At first, women were surprised to be taking part in this process, but they’re glad that their opinions were taken into account.” She references this experience as one of the “best results” of a self-help group initiative.209

This case serves as a positive example of translating individual and localized interests into a coherent national policy affecting a diverse population within one constituency. NGO leaders played a key role in funnelling these concerns and issues through coherent communication with government officials. As a result, the NAP directly reflected the needs and interests of women across the country and empowered the women participants to become more involved in decision-making processes.

Again, this case demonstrates the significant influence of international actors. Unlike the IDP Action Plan, based on the Strategy created within Georgia (although influenced by the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement), the NAP is based specifically on resolutions developed by the UN. Second, international donors, particularly UN Women, played a key role in supporting this participatory process, again raising the question of whether such a process would have occurred without their influence. According to a staff member of the Office of the Public Defender, UN Women “push[ed]…the Parliament to adopt this action plan.”210 On the other hand, a view from within UN Women suggests that political will did exist within Parliament, beyond Rusudan Kervalishvili’s support as the head of the Gender Equality Council, to support this initiative. Tamar Tavartkiladze highlights David Bakradze, Chairman of Parliament, as a key “gender-sensitive” advocate for the 1325 NAP.211 This successful advocacy suggests that the support at high levels for policies promoting women’s and IDPs’ participation may be increasing, while international donors still play a key role in highlighting gender issues.

A few achievements in 1325 implementation have already been made regarding women’s inclusion in the Geneva talks. Tavartkiladze optimistically noted that the NAP “process, even before adoption, prompted the government to include more women.” Specifically, the number of women on the 12- person Georgian delegation has recently increased from two to four.212 At least one Georgian and Abkhaz women have been included on each side in Incident Prevention Response Mechanism meetings.213 The broader effect of this recently approved Action Plan remains to be seen, however.

NGO Advocacy on IDP-Related Policies As we have seen, women’s, IDP, and international NGOs play an important role in raising awareness about IDPs’ individual- and community-level problems and direct the government’s overall approach

208 Ibid. 209 Taso self-help group community worker, Personal Interview, 19 March 2012. 210 Staff member of the Office of the Public Defender. Personal interview. 15 March 2012. 211 Tamar Tavartkiladze, Personal Interview. 212 Ibid. 213 International Organization Representative, Personal Interview, 16 March 2012.

44 towards addressing this population’s needs and interests. IDP NGOs work specifically to raise this population’s voice at multiple levels. These organizations themselves are important channels for IDP participation in public life, as IDPs comprise most of the staff of these organizations. Such organizations have direct knowledge of IDPs’ situations that should feed into the government’s decisions about how to allocate resources. Eka Gvalia of Charity Humanitarian Centre “Abkhazeti” (CHCA), an IDP NGO based in Zugdidi, discusses her organization’s role: “We present the voice of IDPs to the government. Because a lot of our concerns and considerations are based on the feedback of our population, of our beneficiaries.”214 However, as Dalila Khorava of Georgian Support for Refugees, a Tbilisi-based IDP NGO, points out, “There needs to be more collaboration between government and NGOs.”215

Specifically, NGOs organized community-based self-help groups for IDP and conflict-affected women to advocate for their needs and interests at both the local and national levels. The Women’s Information Center (WIC) and Taso Foundation form these groups and provide training and resources for community organizing.216 WIC convenes meetings between IDPs and local government officials “to include IDPs’ voices in this process”217 of lobbying for their rights among municipal and national government.

These organizations, along with others such as CARE International, promote the broader goal of general IDP community mobilization. Self-help group membership fees help fund “useful activities for the well- being of their communities,” such infrastructure and media projects.218 CARE’s “Stabilization and Integration of IDPs into Mainstream Georgian Society” (SIIMS) project focuses on new wave IDPs living in settlements, forming groups with local communities to enhance social capital and promote IDPs’ integration. They also seek to “strengthen the advocacy capacity of IDP groups” so they can better claim their rights. Working with authorities has fostered increased communication and better relationships between IDPs and local government.219 Tabukashvili explains how addressing local needs builds IDPs’ political consciousness and ability to participate:

“The point is that when you mobilize them, you mobilize them for everything. It's not just mobilizing them for cleaning the road...it's for mobilizing them for participation in drafting the plan on 1325, which we did...for participation in local budgeting… for having small researches in their communities on priority needs...bringing their voices to the municipal level (participating in roundtables, discussions, etc)... And all the events that are important to let people know (about)...the rules...law of public participation in local decision-making, communities knew nothing about this.”220

International donors continue to serve as the main supporters in facilitating these efforts, while INGOs such as DRC and CARE also play concrete roles in increasing IDPs' ability to contribute to discussions on policy. DRC Zugdidi, for example, conducts “mobilization at collective centers…[and] private

214 Eka Gvalia, Personal Interview. 215 Dalila Khorava, Personal Interview. 216 Elene Rusetskaia (Director, Women’s Information Center), Personal Interview, 15 March 2012. 217 Ibid. 218 Marina Tabukashvili, Personal Interview. 219 Khatia (Taso self-help group community worker), Personal Interview, 19 March 2012. 220 Marina Tabukashvili, Personal Interview.

45 accommodations…[to] get information about…how [IDPs] want to participate in the decision-making process.” DRC then compiles this information and develops recommendations for the MRA so they can incorporate suggestions on participatory approaches into their policy. According to Mzevi Jojua, DRC conducts this work because,

“After [a] survey… done by different local IDP NGOs, it turned out that they have quite high motivation and willingness to be involved in the process related to them and in their future perspectives and government policies…And it’s not fair as well to have this decision about their future life and their accommodation without knowing what is their wish and…their willingness.”221

Working with local actors, international organizations further support advocacy on IDPs issues by financing capacity-building for local NGOs. They seek to enable them to become stronger advocates for IDPs, thereby supporting an avenue for IDP participation in policymaking.

IDPs’ Participation in Policy Implementation While the State Strategy and Action Plan certainly promote IDPs’ participation, assessing their implementation highlights the progress that the Georgian government has made but also the remaining gaps in translating policies into reality. As an INGO representative notes, “the issue of involving IDPs in the policies that affect them is part of the Action Plan. It’s a formal aspiration of the Georgian government...[but what] this means is open to interpretation.”222 Currently, IDPs’ involvement in the implementation process occurs through their direct interaction with the MRA, in addition to their local engagement in the process of making available each of the three durable solutions: return, local integration, and resettlement. However, issues remain in communication with the MRA, minimal support for peacebuilding initiatives, a lack of transparency in housing allocation, and most significantly, the evictions of IDPs from collective centers. These aspects of the implementation of the durable solutions highlight the lack of consistent IDP participation in these processes.

Peacebuilding as a Means Toward IDPs’ Right to Return Peacebuilding efforts to promote IDPs’ right of return to their former homes serve as one avenue of participation related to implementation of policies on durable solutions. However, these opportunities are limited in a number of ways. Peacebuilding as a means to return is a particularly salient issue, as a large portion of the IDP population identifies return as their preferred durable solution. No country-wide survey of IDPs’ settlement wishes has been conducted,223 but, a number of smaller-scale studies and our own original research has identified return as the preferred wish for the majority of IDPs from both

221 Mzevi Jojua, Personal Interview. 222 INGO Representative, Personal Interview. 223 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 134.

46 waves.224 A Conciliation Resources survey of 1,000 IDPs found that almost 90% support return.225 UNHCR also found that men and women equally express this desire, so return does not seem to be a gendered interest.226 Older generations seem more connected to this idea, but age is hardly an absolute determinant.227 Given their enduring desire to return, IDPs should have the opportunity to engage in efforts to make the option a reality.

As described above, the policy of promoting return is explained in significant detail in the State Strategy, but finds few mentions in the Action Plan. This discrepancy mirrors the disconnect between rhetoric and reality in Georgian society regarding the issue of return of IDPs. While the government continues to promote this idea, a political resolution to the conflict stands in the way of IDPs being able to exercise their right to organized, safe and dignified return. The government’s efforts to promote it have been limited to the stalemated Geneva talks. As discussed, IDPs have been involved in this Track I diplomacy process. The Abkhaz government-in-exile, an already weak body, serves as their representative but fails to do so adequately.

IDP involvement needs to become more systematic to ensure that any agreement accurately represents IDPs’ needs and interests. The efforts promoting implementation of UNSCR 1325 work in this direction by encouraging women’s involvement in the peace talks. A similar mechanism should be established to ensure IDP participation as well.

IDPs, and IDP NGOs, have also been a key force behind people-to-people diplomacy, so-called Track II diplomacy, as described above. They may be more strongly represented among people-to-people initiatives in comparison with the broader Georgian population. However, limited government support for these efforts limits their opportunities to participate in the process of promoting the right to return to their former homes, as will be explained in further detail later in this report.

The return of approximately 40,000-50,000 IDPs to the Gali region of Abkhazia, on the border with Georgia proper, highlights the circumstances under which some return has taken place.228 This remains officially unrecognized as returnees’ security cannot be guaranteed.229 An unemployed IDP stated that more job opportunities may exist in Gali than in his home in a remote area of western Georgia.230 However, those who do return to Abkhazia largely live in an insecure environment, facing a number of

224 New wave men IDPs, Focus Group, 13 March 2012; New wave women IDPs, Focus Group, 2 February 2012; Old wave men IDPs, Focus Group, 12 March 2012; Old wave women IDPs, Focus Group, 3 February 2012. 225 “Displacement in Georgia: IDP attitudes to conflict, return and justice.” Conciliation Resources. April 2011. 226 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees cited in Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 134. 227 Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies cited in Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 134; Old wave men IDPs, Focus Group, 12 March 2012. 228 An international organization representative cited this figure but stated that she has reason to believe the number is actually much lower. No official statistics exist as the returns are not officially recognized. International Organization Representative, Personal Interview, 19 March 2012. 229 Senior Government Official, Personal Interview; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 134-5. 230 IDP in Potskho-Etzeri, Personal Interview, 17 March 2012.

47 human rights concerns regarding their freedom of movement, education, and other political and economic rights.231

With its emphasis on the right to safe and dignified return of IDPs, the government has also done little to support these returnees, again countering a commitment made in the State Strategy.232 The government’s lack of engagement in this area most likely stems from its inability to exercise any influence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, by failing to support this population in any way, they may be missing an opportunity to consolidate their right to return.

International organizations have filled some of these gaps in providing assistance to returnees in Gali. For example, UNHCR, NRC, and DRC, among others, conduct shelter and livelihood projects in Abkhazia.233 However, they could also play a larger role in supporting their participation in peacebuilding efforts. Gewis states, “NGOs that run assistance programs aren’t the ones interested in the peace process, and vice versa.”234 The lack of general support for this population overall prevents their ability to engage in efforts to secure their right to return. Returnees are a key group that should become more engaged in peacebuilding as the right to safe and dignified return affects them most directly. Overall, as true access to durable solutions requires conflict resolution,235 IDPs in general need to be more engaged in these processes at both the official and grassroots levels.

Implementing Integration Policy: The Example of Housing The Georgian government has recently made progress in supporting integration efforts that enable IDP participation. In this way, IDPs have engaged in the implementation of the State Strategy and Action Plan on an individual level, as these programs relate to their own lives. Their aim is to increase IDPs’ self- sufficiency and reducing their reliance on the state, thereby promoting their ability to participate in society.236 However, they have fallen far short of their projected goals in the Action Plan.

Housing initiatives that promote integration include privatization and rehabilitation of collective centers, providing IDPs with ownership over renovated dwellings. By the end of 2010, up to 10,000 old wave IDP families living in 278 collective centers in Tbilisi and about 7,000 families in 286 collective centers outside of the city had received renovated apartments. The MRA has also begun the process of transferring them into private ownership for these IDPs.237 Representing this population, the Georgian Young Lawyers Association lobbied for female spouses to be able to co-own their property. The organization also took care of other legal issues, such as a purchase agreement and regulations

231 Human Rights Watch, “Georgia/Abkhazia: Back Home but in Limbo,” July 2011. 232 Government of Georgia, State Strategy on Internally Displaced Persons – Persecuted, 6. 233 Mzevi Jojua, Personal Interview; International Organization Representative, Personal Interview, 19 March 2012. 234 Tina Gewis, Personal Interview. 235 Nadine Walicki, “Part Protracted, Part Progress: Durable Solutions for IDPs through Local Integration in Georgia” in Resolving Internal Displacement: Prospects for Local Integration. Elizabeth Ferris (ed.). Brookings Institution – London School of Economics Project on Internal Displacement. June 2011. 62. 236 Mariam Esaishvili (MRA), Personal Interview, 30 January 2012. 237 Ibid., citing the Government of Georgia, June 2011, 158.

48 governing shelter requirements.238 They thereby played an important role in enabling IDPs to participate effectively in the privatization process.

One concrete example of IDPs’ engagement took the form of Housing Action Groups (HAGs), begun by an INGO. These groups, mostly including women, were formed in collective centers and involved trainings for participants so they could advocate government institutions and ensure that their rights were being respected in this process. NGO partners helped to coordinate HAG representatives, who gathered on a regional and national basis, as part of an effort to “strengthen some kind of representative voice.” This effort shows an important example of IDP participation. However, it faced a challenge in that discussions often revolved around individual problems and failed to translate into coherent policy approaches. Issues of the government’s responsiveness to individual and collective concerns certainly played a role here as well.239 Such issues would have to be addressed in adapting this model in other collective centers.

Although the MRA’s housing program represents another step forward for the Georgian government in addressing IDPs’ concerns, IDPs did not participate in the process at the level stipulated in the Action Plan. IDPs were not consulted on how the government should prioritize its housing initiatives or its privatization plan. The most vulnerable IDPs did not receive priority. The government clearly continues to have other interests in its housing programs, as these “programmes are not implemented based on the needs of IDPs but rather on which buildings can most easily be privatized, sold or refurbished.”240

While some IDPs “get very nice rehabilitated buildings,”241 many generally lacked crucial information about the process, which was executed in a confusing ad-hoc manner. Many privatization agreements contain inaccurate information, challenging the legitimacy of these important documents. In addition, few IDPs are aware of opportunities to establish condominiums, a positive option available to them.242

The implementation process has also largely failed to include a significant sub-sector of the population, IDPs living in private accommodations, who comprise almost half of the IDP population. This group has generally been overlooked in efforts to address IDPs’ housing needs, which have focused on those living in collective centers who are much easier to access. Overall, the lack of IDPs’ participation and consultation in the process clearly limited the effectiveness of this housing program in meeting this population’s needs and interests.

The Challenges of Resettlement IDPs have also been involved to different extents in the resettlement process, with some expressing satisfaction, while for others, rights to participate in decisions that affect them have been blatantly

238 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 157. 239 INGO Representative, Personal Interview. 240 Walicki, 62. 241 INGO Representative, Personal Interview. 242 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 84.

49 disregarded. Although the State Strategy was first approved in 2007, it was the humanitarian crisis involving 20,000 new IDPs from South Ossetia after the war in 2008 that first catalyzed the government’s efforts to provide IDPs with durable housing solutions. In an “unprecedented step towards…durable resettlement and viable integration,”243 the government constructed settlements for this new wave of IDPs. In addition, about 4,000 IDP families have received refurbished or purchased apartments or financial compensation of $10,000, for those who reject the housing offer.244 About 18,000 IDPs, or 90% of the new wave, have thus received assistance.245

For old wave IDPs, the MRA has constructed apartment blocks in “economically viable and fast-growing areas,”246 such as Poti, Zugdidi, Tskaltubo, and Batumi. These accommodations are offered as alternative housing for IDPs living in collective centers. These buildings are not offered to them for privatization because they are either too dilapidated to be rehabilitated or are of interest to the state for sale to private investors or for another purpose.247

While the government has clearly made significant strides in providing resettlement options for both old and new wave IDPs, they have done so with minimal consultation of IDPs. No application process occurred for receiving this housing, and visits to their possible new homes were only rarely organized before IDPs were relocated.248 The allocation process also lacked transparency. According to a UNHCR representative, it is not clear how IDPs are selected for resettlement. The process is based on guidelines, not a law, which makes it difficult to lodge complaints. She suggested that in reality, MRA officials seem to arrive at collective centers and present the option to move as if it is IDPs’ only opportunity to receive government assistance.249 Another INGO representative offered another perspective on this issue, stating that IDPs have three opportunities to accept the government’s offers.250 Either way, a lack of information seems to continue to plague IDPs as they are also unaware of the eligibility requirements for resettlement.

Evictions from collective centers also present a clear example of the lack of consultation and choice that IDPs have had in the resettlement process. The three waves of evictions in June 2010, January 2011, and July 2011 have involved significant controversy, as IDPs received notification days and sometimes just hours in advance. A number of IDPs from Tbilisi were faced only with the option of moving to rural areas where they lacked job opportunities and access to schools and medical care. IDPs experienced limited choice in the matter and also have limited tenure over their new dwellings. Data on the total number of IDPs who accepted resettlement was not available, nor has systematic monitoring occurred of the

243 Transparency International Georgia, “Cottage Settlements for Georgia's New IDPs: Accountability in Aid and Construction,” 27 April 2010, 15. 244 Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees, “Durable Housing Strategy as a part of the Action Plan for implementation of the State Strategy.” 245 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 146. 246 Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees, “Durable Housing Strategy as a part of the Action Plan for implementation of the State Strategy.” 247 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 87. 248 Ibid., 84. 249 International Organization Representative, Personal Interview, 19 March 2012. 250 Mzevi Jojua, Personal Interview.

50 results of eviction on those who did not resettle in government housing.251 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre describes opportunities and challenges in this process:

“The state has a legitimate interest to close down collective centres housing IDPs, as this has the potential to increase the integration of IDPs into their local community and further develop the country. However, there was no survey of IDPs who were to be evicted to determine their needs, housing offered as an alternative was often inadequate and legal protections were not explained to IDPs.”252

The lack of genuine consultation and information on alternatives serve as two of the key shortcomings with the resettlement process regarding IDP participation. The government’s Standard Operating Procedures require authorities to share information with IDPs, but they are not obligated to officially consult them on alternatives to evictions or choices in the resettlement process. Without this information, they were unable to make an informed decision regarding their housing options. As a result of these deficiencies, Amnesty International argued “that the eviction of people without genuine consultation and adequate notice constitute forced evictions.”253

The experience of evicted IDPs aligns with this assessment, as they have largely not supported this process. Those who accepted the relocation offer said they did so because they had nowhere else go. On short notice, they lacked another means of obtaining a private home.254 This situation in turn clearly posed a significant threat to any integration that had occurred over the past two decades. Sources have even referred to the eviction process as causing a “second displacement” for IDPs.255 In addition to the myriad challenges that IDPs often face in their new homes, the experience of being evicted and sense of being sent to another part of the country as a last resort may promote alienation from the government, decreasing the likelihood that they will interact with authorities in the future. The violation of human rights highlights how the lack of consultation and participation of IDPs clearly results in adverse consequences for this population, with negative implications for further participation in public life.

251 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 146. 252 Ibid., 87. 253 Ibid., 90. 254 Ibid., 88. 255 Government-in-Exile Representative, Personal Interview, 19 March 2012.

51 Case Study: Potskho-Etseri

The case of Potskho-Etseri presents a specific example of resettlement’s unintended consequences for IDPs. IDPs living in collective centers in Tbilisi were resettled to a remote village in western Georgia, next to the border with Abkhazia. In some cases IDPs reported not knowing where their new home would be. One woman IDP said, “They didn’t tell us that we were going to Potskho-Etseri. They said we were going to Zugdidi…When they told us that we’d go to Potskho-Etseri I was very sorry about it; everybody was.” Another woman IDP said that her family “found out a week before we came” that they would be relocated to this town.

IDPs received apartments in newly constructed or renovated buildings, but little else. There seem to be almost no viable employment opportunities for the resettled IDPs. Those interviewed indicated that international organizations have offered some livelihoods support, but that overall their situation was dire. The government has said it plans to build new infrastructure and development in the area, so IDP resettlement is part of an expansion and repopulation plan.1 However, in the short-term the newly resettled IDPs generally continue to lack access to social services, including schools and healthcare. IDPs’ isolation in this remote part of the country significantly limits any opportunities to participate in public life. This resettlement option does not seem to be a durable solution, as it largely does not reflect the wishes of IDPs who moved there.

IDPs do participate to some extent in decision-making processes regarding the implementation of the State Strategy and Action Plan. Moreover, the MRA has shown an increased effort to improve communication and consultation with IDPs so that they can play a more active role in making decisions that affect their own lives. While their ability to choose among the durable solutions has increased, continuing issues with the lack of access to information, support for return and peacebuilding efforts, and fair housing allocation, along with the eviction process, represent examples and results of the failure to truly involve IDPs in the policies that affect them.

This engagement plays a key role in ensuring that IDPs can choose among the durable solutions. It can promote a positive cycle of empowerment in which IDPs participate more actively in society, supporting their own integration process, which can then continue to enhance their involvement in public life. This approach is ultimately in the government’s interest as it aligns with their argument that local integration (with the resulting increased economic strength) actually supports IDPs’ ability to return to their former homes, should that option become available to them. Strengthening IDPs’ participation in one durable solution can thus lead to the realization of another.

52

FINDINGS

SIPA team member Drilon Gashi interviews a man displaced from Abkhazia at a collective center in Zugdidi.

53 FACTORS INFLUENCING IDPS’ AND WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION

Psychosocial Factors Looking internally at IDPs as individuals and members of communities, psychosocial factors play a unique role in influencing IDPs’ participation in public life. Issues range from shifting gender roles to trauma to passivity. For many IDPs, these factors influence their sense of identity, as do changing socioeconomic dynamics within IDP families and communities. Displaced women in Georgia have assumed new responsibilities within their families and communities, opening up space for their increased participation in the public sphere. As a result of the traumatic experiences of the wars in 1991-1994 and 2008, many IDPs also face problems related to their physical and mental health.256 Years of displacement, marginalization and uncertainty about the future have exacerbated these problems. Despite psychosocial barriers, IDPs have proven their resilience and support for one another. Recent cases of IDPs mobilizing to address issues such as domestic violence and conflict resolution highlight that

256 UNIFEM, “Rapid Needs Assessment of Internally Displaced Women: Findings and Recommendations,” Institute for Policy Studies, Oct 2008, 19.

54 unique opportunities exist for them to mobilize around causes related to their IDP and gender identity. Their efforts to exercise agency in this way shows the resilience of these women and men.

Shifting Gender Roles and Family Structure The body of research on men and women in conflict and displacement suggests that gender plays an important role in structuring their experiences of displacement, with implications for their participation in public life as IDPs. On a related note, psychosocial issues affect men and women in different ways “due to different identities, needs, roles, and norms.”257 An expert on the issue adds, “of course the needs were different...I would say that both men [and] women were vulnerable…in their own way.”258

For many men and women, a significant challenge in their lives as IDPs has revolved around shifts in gender roles. In prewar Georgia, “gender roles were clearly delineated,” as men lead the family’s socioeconomic activities while women ran the household.259 Experiences of war and displacement have caused IDP women to increasingly become the primary breadwinners of their households.260 This trend runs across Georgian society, but may be more pronounced among IDP communities.

Shifts in gender roles have adversely affected many male IDPs, resulting in many men’s lack of engagement in society. In the aftermath of displacement, many IDP men lost not only their homes, but also their livelihoods and roles as traditional heads of households, suffering also from the loss of status in and outside the home. Protracted unemployment upended the identities of many affected IDP men. A general sense of “hopelessness among men” exists within IDP communities, as do increased incidences of depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. 261 These psychological factors have impeded many IDP men’s capacity to work and participate in communities as they had done before displacement. Male IDPs are reluctant to assume the low-skill jobs, and traditionally held by women, that are most available to them. Men in this situation may suffer from identity crises and feelings of shame and guilt for not fulfilling their traditional breadwinner roles.262 Many express feelings of humiliation over having to depend on others. According to a UN Women staff member, men need positive role models demonstrating IDP men’s shifting responsibilities within the household and across Georgian society in a positive light, encouraging a greater sense of self-worth that could promote their public participation.263

257 Peter Kabachnik, Magda Grabowska, Joanna Regulska, Beth Mitchneck, and Olga V. Mayorova , “Traumatic Masculinities: The Gendered Geographies of Georgian IDPs from Abkhazia,” May 2011, 1. 258 Manana Gabashvili (Deputy Dean, School of Social Sciences, GIPA), Personal Interview, 2 Feb 2012. 259 Thomas Buck, Alice Morton, Susan Allen Nan, and Feride Zurikashvili, “Aftermath: Effects of Conflict on Internally Displaced Women in Georgia,” United States Agency for International Development Working Paper No. 310, Sept 2000, 5. 260 Tina Gewis, Personal Interview. 261 Manana Gabashvili, Personal Interview. 262 Lela Tsiskarishvili, “Effects of Chronic Trauma on Internally Displaced Persons,” The Georgian Center for Psychosocial and Medical Rehabilitation of torture victims – GCRT,” Living in Displacement Conference. Tucson, Arizona. March 2011. 263 Tamar Sabedashvili (Gender Advisor for Georgia, UN Women), Personal Interview, 27 Jan 2012.

55 Women in all domains of Georgian society generally face barriers that discourage their participation in politics: their traditional roles as mothers within the family structure, financial instability, lack of female role models, negative attitudes about involvement in politics, the male-dominated political and business structures, lack of public support and demand for women’s inclusion in politics, and high levels of domestic violence.

However, in contrast with their male counterparts, many IDP women have faced both challenges and opportunities as a result of displacement, which has influenced their participation. According to a USAID report, “women [in Georgia] have been much more successful at adapting to the difficult conditions and strains of every day life in the IDP community.”264 Displaced women in Georgia continue to face the burdens of displacement and traditional gender roles, but they have exhibited flexibility and resilience as many of them have become leaders of socio-economic activities within families.265 Women IDPs, in general, have been more successful than their husbands at finding alternative income sources. Donors and organizations working within IDP communities have indicated that up to 75 percent of income- generating programming participants have been women.266 An expert presents a possible explanation: “Maybe because the women were mothers and had children too and had to feed their own family, they became breadwinners… The mother adapted while the man was very painfully reacting [to displacement], so they are not the leaders in the family any more in the sense that they are not earning any money.”267

Many women’s increased sense of leadership within the family has presented an important opportunity for their participation beyond the home. Many women who were assuming caretaking or advocacy roles in their families and communities experienced a new sense of autonomy that provides the women with “the opportunity to reveal their potential.”268 As discussed in previous sections, women comprise a significant portion of the NGO sector in Georgia, including the staff of IDP NGOs, so civil society serves as an avenue for their increased participation in public life. These women face new and significant demands on their time, but many have learned to manage their new roles in and outside the home. While displaced women express a desire to return to their homes in the breakaway regions, many also say that they do not want to return to the positions they held within the family structure before their displacement.269

However, displaced women’s involvement in socioeconomic activities and civil society does not necessarily translate into formal representation in decision-making bodies. The norm still remains that women’s place in Georgia is in the home and in civil society rather than politics. While NGOs represent

264 Thomas Buck, Alice Morton, Susan Allen Nan, and Feride Zurikashvili, “Aftermath: Effects of Conflict on Internally Displaced Women in Georgia,” United States Agency for International Development, Working Paper No. 310, Sept 2000, 6. 265 Stan Veitsman, Personal Interview. 266 Thomas Buck, Alice Morton, Susan Allen Nan, and Feride Zurikashvili, 7. 267 Manana Gabashvili, Personal Interview. 268 Ibid. 269 Eka Machavariani, Gaenati Presentation/Personal Interview, 20 March 2012.

56 an important opportunity for women to participate in public life, their strong representation in this sector may result from their lack of access to politics, while also further reinforcing that women belong mainly in this sphere. According to experts, gender stereotypes thus lead to a “de facto curtailing aspirations for other roles.”270 As civil society in Georgia has relatively low influence over the government, women’s enhanced visibility has not increased their overall influence in society.

Traditional gender roles are also still pervasive within IDP households, and across Georgian society. Women may participate more in the workforce, but within the home the “division of labor is not changing much.”271 Women continue to be the primary caretakers of their children and responsible for running the household, resulting in a double burden in caring for the family both in and outside of the home.272 In most households, women are also still not free to spend the income they earned, as their husbands manage the money.273 Women’s new responsibilities, while expanding their opportunities for work outside the home, have increased their levels of stress. A 2000 USAID study revealed that “the role of displaced women as leading family income earners has not led to a growing sense of empowerment within the family or IDP communities in general.”274

Nevertheless, families in Georgia are tight-knit and IDPs communities tend to support one another, serving as an important source of resilience for men and women IDPs to deal with stress. One old wave IDP male stated, “IDPs support each other because they have a lot of difficult problems in their lives and nobody helped them.”275 According to an IDP living in a collective center in Potskho-Etseri, “The strength of Georgians is that they stay together: if they have one loaf of bread—they divide it amongst each other. This is how we grow up and how we raise our children.”276 This cohesive community structure can thus increase IDPs’ capacity to become more involved within their local communities and in politics.

Trauma and Victimization Trauma related to conflict and displacement have resulted in significant psychosocial burdens on entire IDP communities in Georgia, which in turn also negatively impacts their level of participation in public life. 277 Many IDPs witnessed, experienced, or were victims of military combat, physical or sexual violence, torture or hostage-taking.278 They continue to suffer from psychological distress from the trauma they experienced and their current conditions of displacement.279

270 Juliet Schofield, Steven Schoofs and Hema Kotecha, “Building Inclusive Governance: Women’s Political Participation in Conflict-Affected Georgia,” International Alert, Nov 2010, 15. 271 Tamar Sabedashvili, Personal Interview. 272 Ibid. 273 Gender Research, Personal Interview, 21 March 2012. 274 Thomas Buck, Alice Morton, Susan Allen Nan, and Feride Zurikashvili, 9. 275 Old Wave IDP Male, Focus Group, 12 March 2012. 276 IDPs from Potskho-Etseri Collective Center (Georgi and couple from Kodori Valley), Personal Interview, 16 or 17 March 2012 277 Tsiskarishvili. 278 UNIFEM, 20. 279 Ibid., 7.

57 Trauma is a complex issue for IDPs and has historical, “individual, communal, societal, legal, economic, political” dimensions.280 As a result, many IDPs live in a state of “permanent victimhood” that influences a range of aspects, from intra-psychic (such as personality changes) to physical, crossing generations and placing heavy burdens on families.281 Trauma-induced psychological disorders observed in IDPs include but are not limited to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, anxiety and somatoform disorders, along with somatic and psychosomatic diseases. 282 In addition, IDPs suffer high rates of heart and cardiovascular diseases, chronic migraines and sleep disorders.283

Trauma affects both IDP women and men of the now multiple generations of displaced Georgians. A young female student from the old wave of IDPs stated that apart from social welfare problems, “one of the most important issues [for IDPs] is the psychological trauma.” She noted that “we are not the generation who experienced [trauma and loss] first-hand…but we heard about it from our parents…the trauma is important to us even though it was delivered to us by our parents.”284 This experience of secondhand trauma may in turn also have negative implications for the participation of those younger IDPs who grew up in displacement.

Regarding experiences of psychosocial concerns among men, a USAID study finds that IDP men were “double traumatized” by war and its aftermath, according to their wives. Men have largely felt responsible for losing the war and guilty for being unable to provide for the family. This issue highlights again how gender roles influence experiences of conflict and displacement, as in both cases, men’s traumatic experiences connect with their sense of having failed to fulfill their duties as protectors and breadwinners for their families, communities, and country.285

For some men, drug and alcohol use seems to serve as a coping mechanism to deal with trauma and stress.286 According to a UN Women representative, ”IDP men tend to be more depressed and often choose more deviant behavioral models to cope, such as resorting to alcohol-drinking.”287 One psychologist also noted that: “Psychologically it was painful for [men] that they were no longer leaders of the family. They are without jobs. I noticed in the settlements they were idling around. They became vulnerable to risky behavior, such as alcohol and drugs, especially in the settlements where they are living together all of them. What I had witnessed in the

280 Tsiskarishvili. 281 Ibid. 282 Ibid. 283 Thomas Buck, Alice Morton, Susan Allen Nan, and Feride Zurikashvili, 5. 284 Young Woman Old Wave IDP student respondent [named Iada], Focus Group, 22 March 2012. 285 Ibid., 6. 286 Although concrete statistics are not available, a wide range of our informants indicated a strong prevalence of alcohol abuse among IDP men. 287 Tamar Sabedashvili, Personal Interview.

58 early morning…when I was going to my job, they were sitting in an open area drinking from 9 o’clock in the morning.”288 This response highlights the challenges that many IDP men face in coping with displacement, which in turn works against their capacity to participate in public life.

On the other hand, many displaced women have adopted a unique approach to dealing with trauma that may have the opposite effect. According to Dr. Shelley Taylor, women’s response to stress cannot be reduced to the traditional “fight-or-flight” stress response, because women’s stress response is more frequently marked by a “tend-and-befriend” pattern.289 Taylor and her team concluded that biologically, women in stress are more likely than men to assume nurturing activities and to create and maintain social networks in efforts to protect themselves and their children.290 The response to stress could also offer one explanation for the general argument that IDP women have integrated better than men, which in turn bodes well for their participation, at least within their families and communities.

Domestic Violence IDP women may also face the additional trauma of being a victim of domestic violence. Women are generally disproportionately affected by gender-based violence compared with men. Rape and domestic violence are underreported in Georgia, and their incidences are difficult to assess given the taboos about coming forward as a rape victim or seeking treatment.291 These issues relate to both the conflict itself and life in displacement. In the Abkhazian conflict in the early 1990’s, “rape was systematic and wide-spread” as a tool of ethnic cleansing on both sides of the conflict.292 Domestic violence is also a significant issue affecting IDP communities. Statistics on rates of domestic violence in Georgia are varied. In 2005, the Caucasus Women’s Research and Consulting Network conducted a random survey of 1,000 women married for at least one year and found that “every fourth or fifth woman (22.2%) admits they have experienced physical abuse. And for 5.2% of women this experience was very frequent.”293 The UN Population Fund conducted a wide-scale study in 2009-2010 revealing that one out of every 10 or 11 women in Georgia suffers domestic violence in her lifetime.294 These statistics, not disaggregated by displacement status, show that domestic violence is an issue across Georgian society.

However, as domestic violence risks increase amidst conflict, displacement and unemployment, IDP women may also be disproportionately affected in comparison with the general population.295 A negative cycle arises, as the psychological impact from being displaced by conflict may result in higher

288 Manana Gabashvili, Personal Interview. 289 Shelley E. Taylor, Laura Cousino Klein, Brian P. Lewis, Tara L. Gruenewald,Regan A. R. Gurung, and John A. Updegraff, “Biobehavioral Responses to Stress in Females:Tend-and-Befriend, Not Fight-or-Flight,” Psychological Review 107: 3 (2000), 411. 290 Ibid. 291 Ibid, 5 292 Thomas Buck, Alice Morton, Susan Allen Nan, and Feride Zurikashvili, 5. 293 United Nations Universal Periodic Review, 6. 294 Ibid., 7 295 Juliet Schofield, Steven Schoofs and Hema Kotecha, “Building Inclusive Governance: Women’s Political Participation in Conflict-Affected Georgia,” International Alert, Nov 2010, 14.

59 incidences of domestic violence as an outcome of the increased burdens on families.296 Men who turn to alcohol and drugs as a coping mechanism may also be more likely to commit violence acts. IDP women in turn must deal with violence that may compound the trauma they may have already experienced during the war. A rapid needs assessment of displaced communities from the 2008 war revealed that 3.6 percent of men and 8.6 percent of women had witnessed violence within the family.297

IDP women have shown resilience by rallying around this important issue. They have addressed problems related to domestic violence within their communities, through civil society, and to some extent, through politics. One IDP male cited “family violence” as an example of a problem that IDPs approach community leaders for assistance in finding a resolution.298 Women work through NGOs to speak out in their local communities about domestic violence issues.299 These efforts have gained momentum with the passage of the Law of Georgia on Elimination of Domestic Violence, Protection of and Support to Its Victims was passed in 2006.300 Women’s and IDP organizations played a significant role in drafting the law. In addition, a number of IDP NGOs within the Synergy Network currently work to address violence against women and children. However, even in the process of getting domestic violence recognized in law, women did not participate to the fullest extent. According to one IDP activist, the passing of the domestic violence law “was politically motivated [and tied to] ratification of Euro regulations, CEDAW, 1325 and other documents. So it was not initiated from the grassroots level.”301 The law itself also remains constrained by “stereotypes prevailing in the society [that] lead to problems in applying to law-enforcement mechanisms.” In addition, “legal measures for the protection of victims are not sufficient.”302 There are fewer applications to court cases compared with police applications, which is indicative of the fear that women in Georgia have to come forward and pursue legal recourse.303 One expert explains the influence of these social attitudes: “There are issues of domestic violence, gender-based violence in the local communities, and there is no proper response to this for two different reasons – the society around you doesn’t perceive this as violence, and even if they do they say it’s none of their business.”304

Given the sensitivity of the issue and its continued pervasiveness, domestic violence seems to inhibit participation among IDP communities more than it inspires it. A representative from the office of the Ombudsman said, “they don’t want to talk [about domestic violence]. It’s too personal and it’s hard for

296 Western Diplomat, Personal Interview, 1 Feb 2012, also cited in UNIFEM, 20. 297 Ibid. 298 Old Man New Wave Respondent, Focus Group, 12 March 2012. 299 Tamar Tchelidze, Personal Interview. 300 Nino Kalandarashvili, Personal Interview, 30 Jan 2012. 301 Ibid. 302 The United Nations Universal Periodic Review, 7. 303 Ibid. 304 Tamar Tchelidze, Personal Interview.

60 our office to investigate these issues.”305 Displaced women suffering from abuse and violence may experience the insecurity of having lost their homes and also may associate their current places of residence with feelings such as “fear, danger, and lack of control.”306

Overall, experiences of domestic violence, in addition to other forms of trauma, have significantly influenced the extent to which IDPs participate in Georgian society. However, a number of displaced persons also espouse resiliency and self-healing capacities to “bounce back and successfully adapt to adversity.”307 Much like stress leads to patterns of either “fight-or-flight” and “tend-or-befriend,” people can undergo “post-traumatic growth”308 as a result of conflict and displacement. “Psychosocial rehabilitation and trauma management” enables certain IDPs to overcome adversity.309

Psychosocial Effects of Life in Displacement

“Our generation of IDPs is lost, because they are not involved in society. They lost everything…I have contact with the young generation, and I think that we are lost.”310

A pessimistic view of the present and future can directly influence IDPs’ integration process, thereby impacting their engagement in society and leading to lower levels of participation. IDPs currently face uncertainty about some of their greatest priorities. 311 These include their current security conditions, the well-being of their loved-ones, the status of the property they left behind and their prospects for return.312 After the 2008 war, experts observe that “return of most of the displaced becomes a more distant possibility and Georgian property claims will in all likelihood remain ignored.”313 One woman speaks of how this situation personally affected her family: “10 years ago, my father would say that we would return to Abkhazia next year, and my family members would start packing…Family members and neighbors would go through cycles of packing and unpacking. There was this hope of return. But now…this is also related to the disappointment, especially after 2008.”314

Difficult living conditions in the present thus overlap with desires to return, as hope and disappointment play powerful roles in influencing IDPs’ attitudes. Uncertainty has fueled marginalization and a negative

305 Ombudsman Representative, Personal Interview, 15 March 2012. 306 Peter Kabachnik, Joanna Regulska and Beth Mitchneck, “Where and When is Home? The Double Displacement of Georgian IDPs from Abkhazia,” Journal of Refugee Studies (2010)23 (3): 315-336.doi: 10.1093/jrs/feq023First published online: August 5, 2010, 319. 307 Tsiskarishvili. 308 Ibid. 309 Tamar Tchelidze, Personal Interview. 310 Young Old Wave IDP Male, Focus Group, 12 March 2012. 311 Ibid. 312 UNIFEM, 19. 313 Peter Kabachnik, Joanna Regulska and Beth Mitchneck, 321. 314 Gender researcher, Personal Interview, 21 March 2012.

61 outlook about the future, promoting IDP passivity and ultimately discouraging integration and participation.315

Elderly IDPs especially suffer from this uncertainty. As they have shorter life spans after experiencing such significant losses in the middle of their lives, older IDPs “don’t have time to adapt again.”316 These people were “preparing themselves for a different life, then it turned out completely different.”317 With less access to avenues of integration, such as education and employment, compared to younger generations, older IDPs have had a more difficult experience adapting to life in displacement, thereby limiting their engagement in public life.

Overall, past loss and current economic instability and uncertainty results in IDPs’ living “very much in survival mode.”318 Many live day-to-day, struggling to maintain a livelihood and feed their families. This lifestyle directly impacts their opportunities to participate: “They don’t have time, energy, and motivation, to network with others, to engage in protests…They are very passive, they became very passive being dependent on someone else (government, NGOs, etc). It’s very hard for them to self-mobilize and try to pursue their own agenda.”319

Many IDPs experience this passivity in their own lives regarding their integration process, forestalled as they wait to return. This lack of engagement translates into low participation in local communities and especially national politics. A vicious cycle arises, as IDPs’ challenging living conditions may result in them becoming demoralized and less motivated to integrate. The lack of integration may reinforce itself. For some IDPs, the longer they remain in dilapidated collective centers, a symbol of their difficult life in displacement, the harder it is to arise out of these conditions. This passivity in turn directly counters efforts to engage in public life.

For IDPs from the first wave, two decades of poverty and neglect have weakened their decision-making agencies within the broader Georgian society. It is important to distinguish IDPs’ passivity from dependency, and to recognize the role of poverty that for many IDPs has fueled their dependency on others. Conditions of displacement were worsened by the fact that there was “no social protection,” so agency fell “on the shoulders of the population” of IDPs themselves.320 IDPs receive a monthly stipend of 22-28 GEL from the government, a sum of approximately $15/month.321 One IDP from the first wave stated, “the government gives us about $20 and they tell us we should exist…Tell me how we can exist

315 Peter Kabachnik, Joanna Regulska and Beth Mitchneck, 316. 316 Marina Guledani, Personal Interview. 317 Ibid. 318 Senior Fellow, Personal Interview. 319 Ibid. 320 Marina Guledani, Personal Interview. 321 David Chochia, Personal Interview, stated that “IDPs get into debt with supermarkets, pledging their 23 lari every month.”

62 on this? It’s impossible.”322 In addition to limited government assistance, humanitarian aid has also helped to keep IDP families afloat. This may also increase their passivity, however: “Most of the time because they’ve been on the humanitarian assistance for some time in Georgia, IDPs really became passive receivers of aid. And you have to work a lot to transform them from passive receivers to the active advocate[s].”323

Dependency is an important socioeconomic challenge that has discouraged IDPs from participating in social life as well as in policymaking.

This dependency has also influenced IDPs’ perspectives on the government’s limited role in their lives. According to a young male from the old wave, “there were a lot of demands but the government never addressed them…if they are going to make something, they have to ask us, what is better for us.”324 Feelings of neglect began for both old and new wave IDPs in their first moments of displacement, when they had to unexpectedly flee and leave behind loved-ones, homes and personal possessions. Immediately following the war in 2008, new wave IDPs stated that they “were not warned about security threats, and did not receive timely advice or assistance to leave.” 325 In addition, they “have not been involved in decision-making processes concerning their current lives or futures.”326 The earliest government policy, according to one research organization, was based on “isolation, not integration…[IDPs] are kept isolated, dependent on the government.”327 These factors have weakened IDPs’ faith in government and, in turn, the extent to which they actively seek to influence policies that concern them.

According to one humanitarian worker, IDPs who have lived in collective centers for several years have a relationship with the government that is based on expectations that the government makes the decisions and administers place of residence and electricity.328 A young female student and member of the old wave of IDPs corroborated this perspective: “A stereotype was formed in our minds that as IDPs that not me but somebody else has to solve our problems.”329

Attitudes toward the government may be shifting as a result of their new housing policy, with potential positive implications for IDPs’ participation. On the one hand, their low expectations of the government have “created quite a lot of confusion and misunderstanding for IDPs” regarding how they can and should engage in the process of receiving new housing options.330 On the other, these policies generally seem to counter some of the negative attitudes that the government neglects IDPs:

322 Old Wave IDP Male, Focus Group, 12 March 2012. 323 Tamar Tavartkiladze, Personal Interview. 324 Old Wave IDP Male, Focus Group, 12 March 2012. 325 UNIFEM, 19. 326 Ibid. 327 Nana Sumbadze, Personal Interview. 328 Tina Gewis, Personal Interview. 329 Young Women IDP Student (Old Wave), Focus Group, 22 March 2012 330 Tina Gewis, Personal Interview.

63 “The fact that in the recent period, the government started to privatize the collective centers to those people is encouraging since the people would have a sense of ownership of their property and hope for the future that something will change for the better.”331

This sense of hope could motivate some IDPs to more actively engage in the process of choosing among durable housing solutions.

IDPs’ personal stories also highlight how they have overcome the inertia of poverty and other significant obstacles, taking agency in their own integration processes.

“We moved from one location to another…humiliation was endless…and as a young adult, teenager, you wanted to participate in social life but you didn’t have shoes to wear, you don't have money, or even friends...it was not easy and there were no jobs and the only job I could get was with International Rescue Committee because they were doing this kind of work.”332

This displaced woman was able to find a job despite the significant challenges she faced. IDP families’ emphasis on their children’s education also serves as one example of how parents confront passivity by actively looking to the future, in spite of a less than hopeful outlook regarding their present situation. According to a younger IDP, “our parents make a big [investment] for us to receive education.”333 Education and employment serve as important avenues to provide hope and opportunity for IDPs, in addition to exhibiting how they take action to promote their own integration.

However, many IDPs continue to have limited access to employment, which can also can result in a pessimistic approach that makes it difficult to look for a job. IDPs, and particularly men, are less eager to take on jobs that are lower skilled than the jobs they left behind before the war. Also, IDPs who reside in locations that are isolated from employment opportunities may be discouraged from working. A representative from the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) in Zugdidi, Mzevi Jojua, provided an example of their efforts to provide new jobs to 150 IDPs in approximately 100 collective centers. Almost all of the IDPs refused the 38 low-skilled positions that were created (such as positions as drivers or cement mixers).334 IDPs mainly rejected these jobs because they lived too far from the business locations, and also that they risk losing their monthly government stipends if they get a job. This case reveals that passivity may actually be a practical response to the inadequacy of opportunity available to IDPs.

In larger Georgian society, IDP passivity sometimes translates into perceptions of IDP needs being an extra burden on an already resource-strained Georgian society. Much of the population grapples with

331 Young Woman IDP Student (Old Wave), Focus Group, 22 March 2012 332 NGO Leader, Personal Interview (Thea Masuradze, Coalition for Justice) 333 Young Old Wave IDP Male, Focus Group, 12 March 2012 334 Mzevi Jojua, Personal Interview.

64 high levels of unemployment and poverty, just as IDP communities do.335 However, these issues hit vulnerable groups like IDPs most acutely.336 While there is sympathy across Georgian society for the plight if IDPs, it does not necessarily translate into sustained support. Experts argue that IDPs should be perceived as a resource rather than just “passive receivers of assistance.”337 It seems that IDPs have a key role to play in the effort to shift this perception.

The NGO community has approached IDPs in order to help transform passivity into mobilization. Taso Foundation Director Marina Tabukashvili discusses her organization’s initiatives to engage IDPs by first expanding their “understanding of the importance of participation.”338 Experts note that this population is primarily mobilized around issues directly concerning IDPs, such as housing and social assistance. Rather than actively engaging on other political issues, “as a group, [IDPs] are not seen as participating in usual political life.”339 Organizations such as Taso therefore work to promote IDPs’ participation at various levels, from community development projects to national policies.

Some extreme examples of IDPs protesting their situation also do exist, countering the image of them as passive members of society. In a case of self-immolation, an IDP woman named Nina Pipia protested the government’s neglect of IDPs.340 Paata Davitaia of the parliamentary party ‘European Democrats’ (formerly the ‘On Our Own’ Party) described this situation: “The woman…went to the ministry to inquire about accommodation...The [MRA] Deputy Minister told...[her] to eat grass, and the woman burned herself in front of the ministry. “341 A gender researcher noted that “it was like a suicide for her.” She also commented on the lack of mobility following Ms. Pipia’s death: “I can’t see many IDP women active…Maybe there are singly persons who are doing something, but not so many. But this is a problem not only with IDPs, but in Georgia generally.”342 This example serves as perhaps the most radical case countering the idea that IDPs are passive. Moreover, it highlights that Georgian society in general seems to lack significant engagement in political life. The failure here to inspire the IDP community and broader society to mobilize and achieve tangible changes could promote further lack of faith in the efficacy of political protest, thereby encouraging passivity.

IDP Identity and Status Identity serves as a fundamental psychosocial factor influencing IDP participation. The experience of displacement is often one that indelibly impacts a person’s view of his- or herself and relationship to different communities in post-displacement life. IDP identity may connect with painful memories of loss and displacement. Life in displacement also imbues a status that influences IDPs’ day-to-day needs, in

335 Maria Guledani, Personal Interview. 336 Ombudsman Representative, Personal Interview, 15 March 2012. 337 Manana Gabashvili, Personal Interview. 338 Marina Tabukashvili, Personal Interview. 339 Nana Sumbadze, Personal Interview. 340 Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, “Self-Immolation Incident Highlights Desperation of Georgian IDPs,” 29 Oct 2012, accessed 7 May 2012, 341 Paata Davitaia, Personal Interview. 342 Gender researcher, Personal Interview, 21 March 2012.

65 addition to their longer-term rights. It involves some privileges, such as access to a small monthly stipend, housing support, and social services. IDP identity is also directly tied to the right to return - many IDPs hold on to their status because it symbolizes their claim to their property left behind in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This approach has arguably deterred the integration process for some IDPs, an attitude that the government has in many ways also supported. The politicization of this group’s identity over the past two decades has proved a challenge for the group as a whole to escape the inherent association with political interests around the conflict.

These various individual and collective issues make identification with IDP status a complicated concern. The extent to which IDPs identify with this term is unique to each person. Some IDPs speak collectively about IDP interests, while others prefer to speak about individual needs. This is a choice that each displaced person has the right to make based on his or her own needs and interests. These choices directly influence the extent to which IDPs feel and promote solidarity as a group.

The decision to understand IDP identity as a personal characteristic versus a label for a group has significant political implications related to IDPs’ integration and participation in society. On the one hand, some IDP advocates make the argument that members of this population should rally behind this identity in order to build a more significant lobbying group that can promote IDPs’ particular needs and interests. Others question whether identifying IDPs as a separate group in fact hinders their integration process, as it reinforces their distinction from the broader population. While it is clear that displaced persons’ opportunities for participation are lacking, efforts to remedy the issue must address this key question. Only in this way can they support IDPs in participating as they see fit: as individual members of society or as members of an IDP constituency.

The fact that it is impossible to speak about one IDP identity further challenges efforts to rally behind a unifying concept of what it means to belong to this group. IDP identity is fragmented by gender, by two different waves of displacement, and by living situation, and these fragmentations all contribute to psychosocial divisions within IDP communities. By and large, IDP identity in Georgia seems to connect more to individual and family conditions rather than a sense of collective solidarity. This influences the choices that IDPs make in participating within their communities or though broader coalitions to strengthen their voices on local and national levels.

IDPs’ strong social networks imply that there is at least some sense of unity within IDP communities. One IDP noted the untapped strength of IDP networks: “Generally people living in collective centers have been a community for many years, so there’s very strong social network connections among those IDPs, and then they might have a family connection with a community in another collective center not far away.343” Such networks have led to the creation of unique initiatives. IDP solidarity has been capitalized, for instance, through local initiatives like the Taso Foundation’s self-help groups. These

343 Tina Gewis, Personal Interview.

66 groups do not differentiate between IDPs and other conflict-affected populations, however. They thereby present an example of an advocacy effort that increases IDPs’ participation but not by rallying around their identity as IDPs.344

Also mentioned in a previous section, IDPs have the right to decide how they want to emotionally manage their displacement and identity. They also have important choices about whether to act individually or a collective group. Yet discrepancies exist between their identities as individuals and as members of an IDP community. One informal study conducted by Manana Gabashvili with the Norwegian Refugee Council demonstrates this tension, and highlights opportunities for new thinking on IDP identity. A group of 25 old-wave IDP women with jobs were asked to use words to identify themselves and to identify IDPs as a group. Individually, the women would identify themselves with words such as, “teacher,” “journalist,” and “strong.” Yet the same women would identify IDPs as a group with words such as “helpless,” “hopeless” and “victims.”345 Gabashvili’s survey illustrates how IDPs’ more positive individual identities differ from their less optimistic perception of IDPs as a group. This example sheds light on how these women see themselves and whether they would identify with this group, which in turn influences how they choose to participate in public life.

Closely related to IDPs’ contested personal and social identities is their fractured political identity. IDPs as a whole do not currently agree on one platform or one body to represent them politically; they do not represent a single constituency or voting bloc. There is no known study of IDPs’ political beliefs, but given the diversity among this population, we see no reason to believe that IDPs would necessarily share a political ideology. Although IDPs do certainly share common interests in seeing a resolution the conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region that would allow them to return and ensuring they are provided with adequate support in their places of displacement, when it comes to specific policies, it seems they have different interests even within these broad areas of agreement. The major division in this respect seems to be between old wave and new wave IDPs, but our overall findings suggest that IDPs in different geographic areas and different living situations would have different political interests as well.

An old wave IDP from Abkhazia who has spent the majority of his period of displacement in a collective center in Tbilisi but now lives in private accommodation described the lack of political connection he feels with new wave IDPs. Even after visiting a new wave IDP settlement, he said, although he saw the similarities between old wave and new wave IDPs trying to adapt to displacement, he did not feel a strong personal connection or solidarity with the new wave IDPs. “We are all refugees, we have one view that we all have to go back to our homes, but what else?” he asked.346

344 Caroline Stampfer, Personal Interview. 345 Manana Gabashvili, Personal Interview. 346 David Chochia, Personal Interview.

67 Those outside the IDP community agree that among IDPs, self-interest and concern for one’s immediate family reigns over collective political consciousness. One international NGO staffer linked this to the overall low level of social solidarity and volunteerism in Georgia.347 A representative from the Georgian Ombudsman’s office noted that it is (understandably) much easier to mobilize IDPs around issues related to their immediate self-interest than it is to organize them around abstract political goals.348

In general, it seems that IDPs living in private accommodations may be more likely than those living in collective centers to dissociate from this identity. One IDP living in private accommodation in Tbilisi considered this result to be all but inevitable and seemed to be resigned to it.349 Another IDP from Abkhazia said, “People who are like me - educated, good jobs - they don’t work on these issues. They have made a conscious choice not to work on these issues...It’s so depressing.”350 The relationship with the trauma of displacement may influence this resistance to supporting an IDP political identity.

Because of this lack of overarching unity and connection, IDPs have trouble building platforms around common causes rather than advocating based solely on personal or local experiences. Many young IDPs interviewed in focus groups expressed a higher level of optimism about the potential for IDP political solidarity than their older counterparts; however, studies show that IDP youth as a whole feel less connection to the IDP identity than the older generation.

Opportunities to Encourage Political Participation While these identified psychosocial influences on IDP political participation present many barriers to IDP inclusion, they offer some opportunities as well. Some observers working on these issues believe that it is too late to build overall IDP solidarity that could translate into unified political action. This choice about if they should organize and how remains up to IDPs themselves. However, IDPs’ interest in being active in their own communities suggests that it may be most productive to work on building IDP unity and political consciousness at the local level through tangible community improvement projects.

Institutional Factors Government Institutions: State Capacity to Involve and Represent IDPs Although the Georgian government has increased its efforts to include IDP and women’s voices in policymaking in the past few years, it continues to face capacity constraints that inhibit the full inclusion of IDPs and women in the political process. The MRA in particular has begun to shift its approach from focusing solely on accommodations to providing more support to livelihoods initiative. Despite the continued goodwill on the part of MRA staff, a number of stakeholders agree that the ministry lacks the

347 Tina Gewis, Personal Interview. 348 Representative of the Office of the Ombudsman of Georgia, Personal Interview. 349 David Chochia, Personal Interview. 350 Thea Maisuradze, (IDP Woman), Personal Interview, 15 March 2012.

68 funding and influence to implement needed reforms.351 Moreover, as noted by a representative of the EUMM, “worse is they have an uphill battle, the rest of the government doesn’t really care. They [the MRA] have to compete with other ministries for funding in the budget. They are dependent on the government.”352 According to a Brookings Institution report, the planned state budget allocation for the MRA in 2010 was equivalent to the allocation for the Ministry of Agriculture; considering that agriculture is a major sector of the Georgian economy, this comparison gives some indication of the relative weight given to IDP issues.353 The same year, the allocation to MRA was more than double the amount allocated to the Ministry of Environmental Protection and nearly four times greater than the allocation to the Ministry of Energy.354

The MRA has largely depended on international donors to finance its budget. One reason for the current lack of financial resources is that, after a burst of funding directly following the 2008 war, international aid from the EU, USAID, the World Bank, and other major donors has continued to fall.355 This has significantly impacted the MRA’s budget, decreasing from a high of approximately $74 million in 2008 to about $24 million in 2011. 356 This has meant cuts in IDP integration, housing, and infrastructure projects. In particular, a cut in support from UNHCR, a major donor, has sparked concern for the important programs that will necessarily be cut.357

Information and Communication Issues Financial constraints have also created important implications for the MRA’s ability to gather and maintain accurate data on IDPs and their needs. For instance, database information on IDPs living in private accommodation is currently not up-to-date. This dearth of statistics negatively impacts the ability of the Ombudsman, the most influential advocate of IDP rights in the Georgian government, to research and monitor IDP issues. For instance, the 2010 Special Report did not include private IDP housing issues due to outdated addresses that prevented researchers from including the concerns of this group of IDPs into their findings.358 This constraint is worrisome given that, according to representatives of the Ombudsman’s office, “housing is the number one problem for IDPs in the private sector. People make estimates that those in collective centers are worse off than those in private accommodations but I would say that IDPs in private sector are even worse—they don’t have anything provided by the government.”359 IDPs face a number of unique barriers that inhibit their ability to participate politically, one of the most important being lack of suitable accommodation, as elaborated on in a following section.

351 UNHCR Zugdidi. Personal Interview. March. 2012. 352 EUMM Representative. Personal Interview. January. 2012. 353 Brookings.“From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement.” Brookings. November 2011. Print. 224. 354 Ibid. 355 Mariam Esaiashvili (Official, Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation), Personal Interview, 30 January 2012, and Stan Veitsman, Personal Interview. 356 Brookings Institution. “Responsibility to Response,” November. 2010. 224. 357 Tamar Tchelidze, Personal Interview. 358 Georgian Ombudsman Representative. Personal Interview. March 2012. 359 Ibid.

69

The MRA’s limited financial and human resource capacity also negatively impacts its ability to provide and respond to IDP requests for information – a vital component of political activism for any group. As stressed by an Ombudsman representative, “one of the serious problems that we hear from IDPs is that…[they] do not really receive the information from the MRA.” As a result, IDP groups appeal to the office of the Ombudsman for assistance, or to IDP NGOs in their area.360 Once the complaint is filed by the Ombudsman or NGO, however, the time delay in receiving a response from the Ministry can be very long. Certain stakeholders attribute this poor communication to “bad management, no capacity, no resources, and no willingness to change and try something different.”361 Others, however, have a more favorable view of the MRA’s goodwill toward IDP groups.362 The ministry’s increasing effort to provide information to IDPs, as described in the draft of the new IDP Action Plan certainly serves as an example.

Due to these constraints, NGOs have become vital facilitators of communication between the Georgian government in general and IDP groups. As noted by an NGO leader, “It’s very important to use as much [sic] resources as possible and involve as much [sic] NGOs and actors as possible. Government resources are not enough.”363 IDP NGOs have stepped in to fill the institutional void caused by a lack of governmental resources, and using their comparative advantage through strong ties with the local population. This has resulted in a number of successful initiatives to address individual IDPs’ and IDP women’s needs and include their voices in government policies, such as the 2011 National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325. Not only did this process strengthen communication channels between these stakeholders, but also helped inform the government’s IDP Action Plan on gender equality issues that would otherwise not be represented.364 The following section will further discuss the factors that strengthen and inhibit the political participation of IDPs through civil society avenues.

Civil Society and NGOs As noted in previous sections, NGOs represent the most accessible avenue currently available for IDPs to advocate for their needs and be represented, especially for women. However, NGOs face a low level of coordination and communication among one another. They also experience similar constraints as government entities in terms of access to sufficient resources, resulting in competition for donor funding. In addition, many NGOs also lack strong leadership. This section will discuss these barriers, as well as highlight potential opportunities to address these challenges.

Lack of Communication and Collaboration Among IDP Organizations A wide spectrum of interviewed stakeholders agrees that IDP NGOs lack sufficient coordination.365 This can partially be explained by the relative inexperience of many IDP NGOs which, for example, have only

360 Ibid. 361 Florian Delaunay. UNDP. Personal Interview. March. 2012 362 Vakhtang Piranishvili (Project Director, CARE International), Personal Interview, 2 February 2012. 363 Elene Rusetskaia, Personal Interview. 364 Ibid. 365 Mira Sovakar, Personal Interview.

70 been in operation for two years or less. The great diversity among IDPs themselves also presents a challenge for NGOs in connecting with one another. The differences between old and new waves, along with IDPs from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, result in weak networks among NGOs that represent these various groups. For instance, certain member IDP NGOs in the Synergy Network were established as early as the 1990s, with the majority operating for a handful of years before they connected through this network.366 NGO leaders also express different levels of motivation to communicate a concrete strategy and unified message to government actors, as some prefer to focus on their individual concerns. Certain NGO leaders also act out of self-interest to benefit from their personal contacts with government officials.367

While self-interested NGOs are not the norm, many well-meaning organizations may fail to adequately prepare for important multilateral events with concrete suggestions or recommendations, which may cause them to miss an opportunity to leverage access to policymakers. Several international donor representatives highlighted that although they advise IDP NGO staff to prepare for conferences to which they are invited by reading relevant background documents, they instead “come with very harsh feelings” about not having been included in previous meetings.368 According to one donor representative, “what they don’t see is that it requires a bit of input and preparation. And if they feel they need support to be better prepared, there are ways to get that support from donors.”369

Other stakeholders highlight the important role of the media in facilitating advocacy efforts. Currently, IDP organizations have limited access to electronic media in Georgia due to expensive prices for airtimes, and a lack of political will on the part of those controlling media outlets. Having greater access to national media outlets can also help address gender inequality issues, and highlight messages of women’s leadership in a positive manner. 370

In 2002, UNIFEM (the predecessor of UN Women) attempted to create a coalition of women’s IDP NGOs, but this effort was unsuccessful.371 Instead, it was found that many NGOs claiming to work on gender issues were not in fact doing so. These organizations were attempting to acquire donor support, as this was a ‘sexy topic’ for the international community.372 Nevertheless, international donors are optimistic that IDP NGOs can yet strengthen relations with one another and form a coalition to communicate a more unified message.373 However, reconciling donor demands for greater unity and the reality of achieving this with limited financial support, a lack of leadership and coordination will remain difficult for the NGO community.

366 Ibid. 367 Caroline Stampfer, Personal Interview. 368 Tina Gewis, Personal Interview. 369 Ibid. 370 Senior Fellow, Personal Interview. 371 Ibid. 372 Manana Gabashvili, Personal Interview. 373 Tamar Tavartkiladze and Graziella Piga (UN Women), Personal Interview, 12 March 2012.

71 Competition for Donor Funding As the Georgian government provides minimal financial support to NGOs, many are overly dependent on international donors, resulting in fierce competition for these limited funds. According to one donor representative, this has led to women’s and IDP organizations working against each other, rather than strengthening collaboration to build up mutual capacities.374 Some argue that NGOs have the necessary capacity to coordinate their efforts, but they lack the willingness to do so and continue to compete with each other for funding. 375

A representative from the Institute for Policy Studies adds that there are in fact two NGO communities in Georgia: “One is small but strong because all money goes to them. The other one is bigger but without voice.”376 The first group has the support of the government because it remains connected to government officials who had participated in civil society prior to the Rose Revolution. This creates implications for the impartiality of the work that these NGOs undertake, as they have it in their best interest to avoid criticizing the government to maintain favorable relations.377

Stakeholders from the local NGO community also highlight the challenges they face due to unstable funding. They point to the lack of sustainability of their programs as a result of funding that is limited to one year, and urge international and local donors to support their work on a more long-term basis. 378 This would also help address the challenge NGOs face in gathering and providing quality information to their beneficiaries.379 This will require working closely with the MRA and other relevant Ministries who depend on NGOs to gather information on IDP communities.

Leadership in the NGO Community Although the IDP NGO community in Georgia is responsible for many valuable initiatives to promote IDP and women’s political participation, these organizations lack effective leadership at both the organizational and network levels. That is, many NGOs are characterized by an insular focus on beneficiaries’ concerns at the expense of connecting on collective issues. This results in a low level of collaboration among IDP NGOs, and thus a weaker collective voice to influence high-level policymaking. According to one interviewee, there is currently no clear IDP leader or leading organization to facilitate communication between IDP NGOs and other actors, or to take responsibility for representing IDP needs.380 This lack of leadership manifests itself into a weak lobbying capacity and perception of incompetence. For instance, a representative from the EU urged the Synergy Network to develop a strong lobby message and communicate it to the Steering Committee by requesting meetings with its international members. She noted that the ability to lobby effectively reflects a group’s level of

374 Tamuna Karosanidze (Deputy Chief of Party, G-PAC/East West Management Institute), Personal Interview, 30 January 2012. 375 Eka Gvalia, Personal Interview. 376 Nana Sumbadze, Personal Interview. 377 Ibid. 378 Eka Gvalia, Personal Interview. 379 Senior Fellow, Personal Interview. 380 Eka Gvalia, Personal Interview.

72 organization, and highlighted that Synergy Network members have the right to demand to be heard.381 Despite this encouragement, she “never heard from them again.” Overall, international donors want local NGOs to demonstrate a serious commitment by coming to multilateral meetings with concrete proposals for improvement, instead of taking an antagonistic approach to government officials.

International Donors Due to the low level of civil society involvement on the part of Georgians in general, advancements in the area of political participation of IDPs and women have largely come about because of pressure from international organizations, and not from a grassroots movement. At same time, some donor practices may also act as barriers to inclusive participation.

As detailed in previous sections, the international community’s influence and support has assisted the Georgian government in addressing human rights concerns related to inclusive governance, such as IDP voting rights and women’s underrepresentation in government. In addition to NGOs, IDP groups rely on the international community to advocate to the government for IDPs and women’s concerns, and to include IDP organizations in both the national and local policy process. UN agencies are considered to be particularly influential because “they work well with the government, and UN agencies can…influence…the government, whereas NGOs can’t.”382

UN Women’s role in pushing the government to develop their National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 and their monitoring of the government’s implementation of the Gender Equality Law serve as key examples. At the grassroots level, UN Women provides legal support to IDP women and men through legal clinics and finances a number of local NGOs’ women’s empowerment programs.

International donors’ lobbying the Georgian government to make the update of the IDP Action Plan a more participatory policymaking process serves as another key example of their support for inclusive governance. For instance, during the development of the National Action Plan on IDPs, international donors and NGOs lobbied for IDP groups to be consulted, and some even conducted their own participatory assessments with IDPs to later inform the MRA. 383 According to Ombudsman representatives, it is unlikely that the MRA would have approached IDPs on their own, because the latter would argue that they “consult IDPs every day when they come to the Ministry so they know what they (IDPs want), so there is no extra need for another special mechanism for consultations.”

Nevertheless, the Georgian government welcomes these donors because of the extensive support that they provide, in addition to the connection they offer to international organizations, thereby increasing Georgia’s presence on the international stage. A range of stakeholders acknowledges that Georgia’s civil

381 Caroline Stampfer, Personal Interview and Tina Gewis, Personal Interview. 382 Gvalia, Eka. CHCA. Personal Interview. March. 2012. 383 Georgian Ombudsman Representative. Personal Interview. March. 2012.

73 society would be much weaker without international support.384 It is also interesting to note that donors have much more say over where the funds are used than in the past.

Some NGO leaders express concern over this increased control over the disbursement of international funds, arguing that it prevents IDPs from being able to choose among the durable solutions or influence policy priorities regarding them. Rather, the “choice comes from the money and donor conditionality.”385 Moreover, they argue that the MRA wants to include IDPs and implement better programs, but cannot secure the funding. The money received from donors is earmarked for certain purposes, precluding it from being used for initiatives not aligned with donor interests.

Gender Focus of International Programs International donors and NGOs also promote the increased participation of women IDPs in politics, and gender equality more generally, through the programs they fund and implement. Their particular support for projects on women’s issues influences the high level of IDP women’s involvement in the NGO sector compared to their male counterparts. According to a former government official and NGO representative, in principle this is a positive trend, but the “level of general information and understanding of women’s issues is really still low, even at level of the NGOs.”386 NGOs primarily have experience with psychosocial rehabilitation, and women’s issues in displacement settings or accommodation, and not with women’s rights more generally in the country. In many cases, women face similar barriers whether they are displaced or not, and understanding the ‘big picture’ can help in coordinating efforts and building a strong movement for IDPs’ and women’s representation.

Furthermore, this lack of understanding of women’s issues more generally reflects an important barrier for increased women’s political participation. That is, despite recent legislative gains in the area of women’s rights, efforts to expand gender equality are often viewed as unnecessary, believed to be imposed by international donors and weaken traditional ways of life.387

In contrast to pushing a gender equality agenda, some donors may fund programs that lack any gender focus at all, which has negative implications for supporting this broad goal. According to an NGO leader, “there are some problematic assumptions within the international development sphere – development fails to realize that there are equal numbers of men and women and children (within international development) - practitioners can be more successful if they realize this point.”388 This exemplifies a general trend in development programming that tends to incorporate the needs of men, assuming they are the same for women.

384 Lincoln Mitchell (Associate Professor, Harriman Institute, Columbia University), Personal Interview, 9 December 2011 and Rusudan Kervalishvili, Personal Interview. 385 IDP Woman Leader. Personal Interview. March. 2012. 386 Tamar Tchelidze, Personal Interview. 387 Asatoorian et al. “Gender Mainstreaming in Education in Georgia: Analysis and Recommendations,” Columbia University. 2010, 5. 388 Kharavashvili, Julia. Personal Interview. January. 2012.

74 The Education System’s Influence on IDP Participation Another institutional factor that impacts the level of political participation of IDPs is access to quality and unbiased education. According to UN Women, education represents an immediate need for IDPs that must be addressed in order for them to both improve their employment opportunities and to have a greater voice in the political sphere.389 The Ministry of Education is responsible for the education of all Georgians, and IDPs have the right to equal access to educational opportunities.390 Due to the capacity constraints discussed above, however, partner NGOs and UN agencies such as UNDP also provide educational programming to fill some of the gaps in government support.391

Many IDPs, especially those living in remote areas, face particular barriers in terms of access to quality education. According to Nana Sumbadze, a think tank researcher, not only are IDP schools of poor quality, they also discourage integration with non-IDP communities. She argues that parents may actually prefer IDP schools because they are more conveniently located and may have a less challenging curriculum, enabling their children to score highly on exams. However, this approach disadvantages students in the long term.392 This is particularly worrisome in that education is highlighted as a primary means for social integration of IDPs in the government’s Action Plan. IDPs living in urban and rural areas differ in their access to education, thereby impacting their opportunities for employment and political participation.393

In the case of higher education, government representatives note that IDPs are particularly disadvantaged by limited financial resources to fund their education.394 Consequently, they cannot access employment opportunities, and subsequently cannot fund higher education for their children, resulting in a vicious cycle. As mentioned previously, Georgians depend heavily on networks and connections to find employment - support that IDPs lack. The fact that many IDPs lack equal access to education and economic opportunities also makes it difficult for them to learn about and advocate for their rights. According to IDP NGO leaders, this contributes to low levels of participation in trainings and other NGO programs that aim to increase their awareness of these important issues.395 On the other hand, focus groups conducted with IDP women from both waves of displacement highlight their strong interest in strengthening their professional and advocacy skills.396 IDPs from the first wave of displacement also point to the lack of opportunities to receive training and education, although they made contact with a number of donors to express their interest.397

389 Tamar Sabedashvili, Personal Interview. 390 Mariam Esaiashvili, Personal Interview. 391 Ibid. 392 Nana Sumbadze, Personal Interview. 393 Tamar Sabedashvili, Personal Interview. 394 Georgian Ombudsman Representative. Personal Interview. March. 2012. 395 Zugdidi IDP NGO leaders. Personal Interview. March. 2012. 396 Focus Group with IDP Women from the Old and New Waves of Displacement. January. 2012. 397 Focus Group with IDP Women from the Old Wave of Displacement. January. 2012.

75 Limited knowledge of their rights and access to the political sphere in general has serious implications for including the concerns of the most vulnerable IDP groups in policymaking. As explained by an international donor representative, the majority of IDPs involved in advocacy work with NGOs are educated: “And I don’t think that every single IDP should be involved in decision-making process[es]. Some of them, they simply don’t have knowledge for it [sic]. So, [those who are capable], they select them and they have this mandate to defend and fight for rights in front of parliament, government, international organizations.”398 Thus, international organizations and NGOs rely on educated IDPs to act as representatives for those who are less educated. This highlights the essential role of education in being given the opportunity to voice ones concerns to relevant decision-making bodies.

Unique Institutional Factors Influencing Women IDPs Regarding factors that specifically affect women’s political participation, recent research has shown that a nation’s education system plays a large role in perpetuating and reinforcing gender stereotypes, through teacher trainings, management decisions, curriculum design, textbooks and other factors influencing boys’ and girls’ attendance.399

A 2011 study commissioned by WPRC on the education system in Georgia found that most school teachers and directors responded that boys and girls were treated equally in the classroom, and that they had the same expectations for both male and female students.400 NGOs and gender advocates, on the other hand, believe that the Georgian education system is permeated with gender inequalities.401 Textbooks and school curriculums perpetuate gender stereotypes, and teachers promote traditional male and female roles both unconsciously and consciously.402 Additionally, women are often depicted stereotypically as care givers and men as breadwinners, further contributing to the society’s acceptance of these roles and what consists of ‘men’s or women’s work’.

Although both men and women have high school enrollment and literacy levels, women continue to dominate the fields of teaching, healthcare and social services.403 This suggests that the reinforcement of gender stereotypes in the education system is also contributing to the perpetuation of these gender norms at the political level. That is, the political sphere is perceived as more masculine and ‘dirty’ due to opportunities for corruption, and women are discouraged from participating in this sphere through socialization.

These perceptions are silent barriers to women’s political participation which must be addressed through greater support of women’s leadership, as highlighted in the previous section. The education

398 Mzevi. Danish Refugee Council Zugdidi. March. 2012. 399 Unit for the Promotion of the Status of Women and Gender Equality. May. 2000. 400 Asatoorian et al., 26. 401 E. Duban. Gender Assessment Georgia, June. 2010. 402 Asatoorian et al., 27. 403 Ibid.

76 system has an important role to play in introducing female role models to children to encourage women’s leadership. As noted by the 2011 study, there is a clear lack of attention given to highlighting the achievements of women in curriculum and textbooks.404 Women’s invisibility in this context may contribute to female students’ low self-esteem and lack of self-confidence.405 It is therefore imperative that women’s contributions to society, as scholars, businesspersons, politicians, and other influential roles are incorporated into curricula.

Opportunities to Encourage Political Participation In recognition of these challenges, various stakeholders have highlighted a number of opportunities to address barriers to IDPs and women’s inclusion in institutional governance processes. Regarding the local NGO community, a host of actors believe IDP women’s organizations could be more systematic in their advocacy efforts instead of maintaining an individualized and piecemeal approach. One suggestion to achieve this places the onus on international donors, whereby they would gather all donors to discuss promoting collaboration among NGOs. A forum could be created with the purpose of deciding upon and working toward an overarching policy objective, with each organization sharing in the responsibility.406

As noted previously, the international donor community was recently successful in pushing for legislative advancements in the area of women’s political representation. The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission’s recommendations407 on affirmative action, particularly those on party candidate lists, were instrumental in the Georgian Parliament’s adoption of the new ‘encouragement law.’408 While this law provides financial compensation for parties to include women candidates, it does not prevent parties from placing them at the very bottom of the candidate list. Furthermore, it is essential that women are made aware of this law and how they can access their rights. Recommendations on how to strengthen the encouragement law will be provided in the final section of this report.

404 Ibid. 31. 405 Personal interview undertaken by Asatoorian et al. with Vepkhvadze, S. March. 2011. 406 Manana Gabashvili, Personal Interview. 407 Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, “Joint Opinion on the Draft Election Code of Georgia,” CDL-AD(2011)043. 2011. 12. 408 Tamuna Karosanidze, Personal Interview.

77 Promoting Women’s Participation through Georgia’s Election Code

The European Commission for Democracy through Law, better known as the Venice Commission, is the Council of Europe's advisory body on constitutional matters. Established in 1990, the Commission is an internationally recognized independent legal think-tank.

The Commission currently has 58 full members who work on the following four key-areas: Constitutional assistance; Elections and referendums, Political parties; Co-operation with constitutional courts and ombudspersons; Transnational studies, reports and seminars.

In December 2011, the Venice Commission and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) provided recommendations on the draft Election Code of Georgia. One set focused on facilitating the participation of women in public life and the elimination of discrimination against women. The Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR made the following recommendations in this regard:  The electoral system could be revised, either through the use of quotas or other recognized methods for facilitating the election of women candidates, so that current percentages of women who are elected is increased substantially;  Minimum representation for both sexes in election administration, including in leadership positions, could be guaranteed;  Some portion of public funding for political parties could be linked to the proportion of women nominated as candidates by political parties and/or included on party lists.

On a similar note, influential women leaders can also help to combat negative stereotypes regarding women’s leadership, and create a dialogue on the issue of gender equality. As the Deputy Chairwoman of the Parliament of Georgia notes, “when Hillary Clinton came here, she called only women [to meet]. You cannot imagine, it was so interesting for our men because no men were there…[they were] very surprised. And these men asked themselves, what did the women discuss?!”409 Role models are needed in order to show IDP women, and women in general, that they can also be successful in the political arena. Unfortunately, although Hillary Clinton is well-regarded by Georgian IDP women, it seems that the few women civil servants in Georgia are perceived as representing the interests of IDP women.410

Finally, as noted by a representative of USAID, the executive requires greater women’s representation given that this body is responsible for monitoring Georgia’s adherence to CEDAW.411 While the Parliament of Georgia has a strong advocate for women’s rights through the Deputy Chairwoman, there is no equivalent advocate in the executive. Recommendations directed toward applicable stakeholders, and based on the opportunities discussed above, will be provided at the end of this report.

409 Rusudan Kervalishvili, Personal Interview. 410 Focus Group with IDP Women from the 2nd Wave of Displacement. January. 2012. 411 David Dzebisashvili, Personal Interview.

78 Political Factors Many elements of the political environment in Georgia affect the quality of IDP participation in policymaking that concerns their needs and interests. These factors range from the overall political will of government agencies and representatives, to rhetoric around the peace process, to international influence. While in many respects political factors represent significant barriers to more inclusive governance, there are several opportunities that offer improvement.

Political Will to Include IDPs in Policymaking The Georgian authorities continue to affirm that IDP issues are a national priority and that IDPs must have access to the three internationally recognized durable solutions for displaced persons.412 The question of political will to involve IDPs in the process of enabling and implementing these options, however, is a delicate one without a simple answer.

The current political climate in Georgia is not highly conducive to greater IDP inclusion in national-level politics. Georgia will be holding its first national elections in four years in September 2012 amid continuing economic difficulties and growing public frustration over social issues and level of democracy in the country. However, overall public approval exists for the current government.413 The ruling party continues to prioritize economic liberalization over social policy, including that which addresses IDPs’ social and economic needs.414

Georgian policy as written provides for IDP participation in decision-making around their needs and interests (generally in the form of consultation); however, we have seen that in practice direct participation of IDPs is low. There is no consensus on the extent to which the Georgian government, the primary duty-bearer toward IDPs, is interested in substantively and systematically including IDPs in policymaking. Some stakeholders interviewed were very negative on this issue; others were content that the government is genuinely interested in improving the process but lacks capacity or understanding of how to do it effectively. Internationals tend to believe that the government does indeed possess the will to involve IDPs but continues to have limited capacity to do so; IDPs interviewed have tended to be more mixed in their opinions on whether political will capacity play a bigger role.415 Interviews suggest that IDPs and IDP advocates feel that the government involves more IDPs in decision-making to avoid getting complaints later, not necessarily out of wanting to promote a democratic process.416 A balanced assessment shows that political will plays a complicated role as one of the constellation of factors influencing IDP participation in policymaking.

412 Brookings. “Responsibility to Response,” 183. 413 National Democratic Institute, Georgia. 414 Lincoln Mitchell, Personal Interview. 415 Stan Veitsman, Personal Interview; Nana Sumbadze, Personal Interview. 416 Eka Gvalia, Personal Interview.

79 While the government has shown willingness to involve IDPs in specific policy decisions, rhetoric and action has shown that the ruling United National Movement party has sought to limit IDPs’ capacity to mount a united political challenge to the UNM.417 This is perhaps best illustrated by the amount of support given to the MRA. Interviewees reported that that the MRA is consistently marginalized in terms of funding, along with cooperation and support from other government agencies, indicating that the MRA, and by extension IDPs, are granted a relatively low level of influence in policymaking. For example, the MRA’s central office is slated to move to Gori, at an inconvenient distance away from policymakers and donors. Perhaps most significantly, this decision also impedes access for the large percentage of IDPs who live in the capital and must visit the MRA’s office for essential services. The government’s relocation of the MRA thus seems to play a role in reducing their influence.418

Closely related to the question of the government’s interest in participatory policymaking is its manifest interest in quick and decisive policy design and implementation.419 Privileging action over deliberation is a hallmark of the ruling elite’s governing style in general, not only pertaining to policy regarding IDPs.420 Overall, the evidence suggests that the government feels it is most expedient to keep decision-making as the responsibility of a closed group of policymakers and not invite extensive participation. Still, as evidenced in the processes of drafting major policies regarding IDPs, the government has become more responsive to calls from civil society – particularly international NGOs – and the donor community to include IDPs in policy development to a greater degree. The government has also shown that it is willing to agree to stronger accountability measures regarding policy implementation – the proposed Action Plan for 2012-2014 on the State Strategy on IDPs, for example, includes more measurable outcomes that can be monitored by independent bodies. By nature, such provisions invite greater scrutiny - if not direct participation - from IDPs and IDP advocate groups.

Political Will Within the MRA Ministry representatives say that cooperation and consultation with IDPs is essential to the MRA’s work. However, we have seen the MRA’s mixed record on involving IDPs in its decision-making processes, as a result of multiple concerns.421 Observers of the MRA have said that the reasons for this range from capacity limitations to haste to overconfidence. Staff members from the Office of the Public Defender have summed up a common analysis of the MRA’s inclusion of IDPs in its decision-making: that the Ministry believes that wider consultation will be too time-consuming and will result in a multitude of competing priorities rather than a more focused picture of what IDPs need. Therefore, it is more efficient to allow only limited participation through a smaller group of liaisons (such as donors or other

417 Conciliation Resources (2009), 17. 418 “Georgia’s capital is on the move” Democracy and Freedom Watch. Web. 12 January 2012. 419 INGO representative, Personal Interview; NGO representative, Personal Interview. 420 de Waal, 3. 421 Mariam Esaishvili, Personal Interview.

80 international organizations working with IDPs).422 This assessment to some extent reflects the real limitations the MRA bears in interfacing with IDPs and gathering their feedback. However, staff members from the Office of the Public Defender also reported that the MRA has told them that it has the best understanding of IDP needs and interests because its staff members interact with IDPs every day.423 If this is the case, it indicates a flawed perception of participation on behalf of the MRA.

Interviewees who have worked closely with the MRA have observed that the Ministry has sought to circumvent even international involvement in decision-making in order to move quickly on implementing programs for IDPs – and that the results have suffered for lack of consultation. One INGO representative says that the MRA employs a “theater of engagement” – a show of cooperation to assuage internationals – to continue to execute its own decisions behind the scenes.424 However, Caroline Stampfer notes that in the past few years the MRA has become more capable and somewhat more willing to involve IDPs in decision-making, a sentiment echoed by a representative of an INGO as well.425 This greater capacity has in turn encouraged international actors to strengthen their cooperation with the agency. These efforts promote inclusivity as they often work to promote IDPs’ involvement in these processes.426

Fully acknowledging that the MRA faces enormous challenges regarding resources, capacity and support, the need for creative thinking about how it can better serve IDPs’ needs and interests remains. Increasing opportunities for IDPs to impact MRA activities and use the MRA as a channel to policymaking at the national level is a vital component in this.

Local Government We have limited information on political will and capacity to involve IDPs in policymaking at the level of local governments, but the available data suggests that building relationships between IDP advocates may be a fruitful and feasible way to improve IDPs’ ability to have a voice in local initiatives. One small IDP NGO successfully worked with a local government to establish a kindergarten for the resettled IDP community in Potskho-Etseri. They found that the key to impacting decision-making lay in persistent communication and relationship-building with local officials.427 A representative from this NGO noted that the local government may have seen the IDP-led initiative as a way to bring international donor money into the community, suggesting that international interest in supporting IDP participation may act as a carrot promoting inclusivity at both local and national levels.428 Newer civil society and

422 Office of the Public Defender, Personal Interview. 423 Office of the Public Defender, Personal Interview. 424 INGO representative, Personal Interview. 425 Caroline Stampfer, Personal Interview; INGO representative, Personal Interview. See also Brookings Institute, “From Responsibility to Response,” 203-4. 426 Brookings Institute, “From Responsibility to Response,” 205. 427 IDP NGO representative, Personal Interview. 428 Ibid.

81 international initiatives seeking to increase cooperation between IDPs and local governments could allow for greater IDP agency in local decision-making. However, a systematic analysis of such efforts remains to be done.

Interest in Greater Gender Balance in Political Representation Just as IDPs’ needs and participation do not occupy a central priority in current political discourse, nor does women’s greater inclusion in governance. Marina Tabukashvili of the Taso Foundation, which works on women’s political empowerment, noted that, “There is not much attention [paid to women’s political participation] from the top. It is not considered an important issue.”429 For one thing, gendered effects of policy do not seem to be ordinarily considered during the policymaking process. This is perhaps changing as the Gender Equality Council in the Georgian Parliament pushes for a gendered lens to influence policymaking and more political parties develop women’s wings and organizations. Tamar Tavartkiladze of UN Women, for example, notes the vocal support that the chairman of Parliament, David Bakradze, gave to the inclusion of women in peace processes through the National Action Plan on 1325, saying that his endorsement of the plan was “very powerful.”430 There is also evidence that political parties are increasingly willing to view women as leaders, as some have established women’s wings and other party structures promoting women’s involvement and leadership. Still, a senior fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies says that “there is a not a great social awareness among the general public of the meaning and importance of including more women” in politics. He added that “given the absence of strong pressure,” a lack of a corresponding political appetite for working to include more women in policymaking also exists.431 This analyst notes that given these circumstances, it is likely that financial incentives for political parties to include more women are likely to be the most important motivating force encouraging political parties to promote women’s leadership.432 For the time being, however, it can be said that in general women IDPs face a kind of double exclusion in having their voices and gender-specific needs considered in policymaking.

IDPs as a Constituency – Does the “IDP Vote” Matter? While politicians clearly seek to court the “IDP vote” – IDPs wryly report receiving a chain of political party representatives at their collective centers and settlements around election time – it is debatable whether or not IDPs currently represent a constituency that carries significant weight with politicians. Many political actors seem to feel that they do not need to make IDP issues a priority in their platforms.

IDPs’ lack of political clout results from a variety of factors. IDPs have a reputation for being both politically apathetic (as discussed previously) and firmly aligned with the ruling party. For many years, insofar as the limited data on IDP voting habits suggests, a solid majority of IDPs voted in favor of the

429 Marina Tabukashvili, Personal Interview. 430 Tamar Tavartkiladze, Personal Interview. 431 Senior Fellow, Personal Interview. 432 Ibid.

82 ruling party.433 There were some signs in 2008 that IDPs were beginning to shift their allegiances, but it will remain to be seen in the upcoming election if a majority of IDPs continue to favor the current government, or whether dissatisfaction over collective center evictions, remote resettlement and continued livelihood challenges will encourage IDPs to cast ballots in favor of the opposition.

One of the most significant limitations on IDPs’ political impact is the fact that they do not have a single representative party, lobby or even NGO coalition. As a result, no group can consistently communicate their needs and interests to political actors, deliver votes for politicians who champion IDP issues, or hold accountable officials who do not follow through on promises made to IDPs.434 IDP parties have found it difficult to survive on IDP platforms.435 The most high-profile and currently active IDP political party is led by a member of Parliament who is also an IDP from Abkhazia. However, IDPs and others interviewed expressed universal cynicism about this party’s genuine interest in representing IDPs and its efficacy in doing so.436

The lack of a visible IDP representative or lobby stunts advocacy efforts by established organizations and individual IDPs. As previously discussed, the lack of IDP representation may make the costs of including IDPs in policymaking too high for government bodies to engage in participatory processes. It also contributes to the sense of perpetual disenfranchisement among IDPs, while hindering coordination among IDP organizations.

In addition to preventing adequate representation in policymaking, the lack of IDP leadership at the national level further damages IDPs’ reputation in the eyes of IDP advocates. Over time, it also seems to discourage attempts at IDP organizing. Several representatives of international donors and NGOs express frustration that repeated attempts to foster IDP representation and political activity have failed as IDPs have seemed unwilling or unable to make a serious attempt at working toward common goals.437 As time passes without IDPs organizing, their credibility as political actors and a constituency diminishes.

Previous IDP NGO coalitions, including those facilitated by international donors, have collapsed or been marginalized, failing to have a sustained impact on the political scene. The executive director of an IDP NGO explained what an impact this vacuum of leadership has on IDPs’ ability to make their needs and interests heard by policymakers: “Honestly, that is why [IDP NGOs] don’t really influence government policies...because we don’t have a consolidated vision. And when it comes to simple meetings with the

433 Conciliation Resources “Out of the Margins,” 15. 434 Senior Fellow, Personal Interview. 435 David Chochia, Personal Interview. 436 Ibid.; Nana Sumbadze, Personal Interview. Some political parties have active IDP wings or organizations. This seems to be a rather new phenomenon, and we were not able to gather sufficient information on their activities and or membership at either the national or local level to analyze their efficacy in representing IDP issues. 437 Tina Gewis, Personal Interview; Caroline Stampfer, Personal Interview; INGO Representative, Personal Interview.

83 government, it always ends that there are a number of NGOs who can’t really share their feelings...so it always ends in little fights between different NGOs.”438

Along with organizational capacity, other factors already discussed, including the diversity of IDP needs and interests, lack of faith in the efficacy of political participation, lack of accurate information about how to participate, lack of financial resources, fear of government reprisals or cooptation, continue to impede the formation of effective bodies to represent IDPs politically. This situation thereby sustains IDPs’ overall political marginalization. The Synergy Network, a relatively new coalition of primarily small local IDP NGOs facilitated by the international NGO Conciliation Resources, may be developing into a body that can lead broad-based IDP advocacy efforts. At this time, however, the network seems to be relatively unknown, and its impact remains to be seen.439

Even without a central representative body, and despite the fact that IDPs may not be a decisive constituency for national politicians, Georgian political parties still actively court the IDP vote. The ruling party has put strong pressure on IDPs to support it,440 but the full extent of this pressure is unclear. For their part, opposition political parties are also reported to aggressively campaign in IDP settlements and collective centers seeking to win IDPs from the ruling party. The result is that some IDPs feel intimidated and forced into silence, as they perceive that criticism of the government will be punished. Still, Eka Gvalia of the NGO Charity Humanitarian Center “Abkhazeti” points out that political intimidation, insofar as it exists, is relatively new. On the other hand, IDP passivity has been a phenomenon for more than a decade, underscoring the complexity of factors influencing IDP political participation.441

General Public Opinion of IDPs Public interest in and awareness of IDPs reportedly spiked during and following the 2008 war, and briefly again during the evictions of IDPs from collective centers in 2010 and 2011. However, generally a low level of discernible public support for IDP issues exists. In fact, the opposite may be true – sources pointed to lingering public resentment over “special treatment” given to IDPs when Georgians can point to high levels of poverty and unemployment in the non-displaced population as well.442

Awareness and messaging help to explain this problem. The media plays a crucial role in shaping public opinion of IDPs, and according to multiple sources, IDPs have very little access to mainstream media,

438 Eka Gvalia, Personal Interview. 439 Very few interviewees, including representatives from IDP NGOs working in municipalities where Synergy NGOs were present, were aware of the Network. 440 Brookings, “From Responsibility to Response,” 210. 441 Eka Gvalia, Personal Interview. 442 Among other examples, IDP NGO leader Eka Gvalia cited the instance of the city of Poti, where the Georgian government directed the city hall to prioritize resettled IDPs over longtime city residents for employment. This situation fostered resentment among Poti residents toward IDPs. This example could not be independently verified. Eka Gvalia, Personal Interview.

84 especially highly-influential broadcast media.443 Georgian civil society actors in general share this problem. While events in Abkhazia are present in the daily news cycle, stories about IDPs usually are not. This enforces the public perception that the conflict is primarily about territory, rather than people.

These factors combine to marginalize IDPs in the minds of policymakers, adding little incentive to push to open more pathways for IDPs to be included in policymaking. This points to the need for IDPs to raise awareness about their situation and needs in a way that demonstrates solidarity and integration with the rest of the Georgian population. IDPs must draw attention to their cause so that the public sees their interest in improving life in Georgia for all, rather than as an indolent group seeking handouts.

Information and Understanding Regarding Political Tools As noted in the previous sections, many IDPs seem not to have acquired the habits of political participation in part due to the legacy of the Soviet system and previous voting restrictions.444 In addition to creating psychological barriers to participation, this history has practical impacted IDPs’ understanding of how to participate in civic life.445 It seems that new projects based around social mobilization theory may successfully foster leadership skills among IDPs, and in particular women IDPs, that will allow them to become leaders in their communities. Eventually, this skill set and experience may translate into leadership skills that could translate into the skills and impetus to become more regularly politically active.

Because few displaced persons hold prominent public positions, many IDPs lack role models that can provide them with guidance in becoming active and organized, as well as confidence to pursue their rights in spite of the limiting factors that many IDPs face. This is particularly true for women IDPs, as Georgian women in general have few role models serving as examples of successful and admirable women in politics. When asked, most of our Georgian women interviewees, IDP or not, had difficulty identifying female role models in politics; several named current Deputy Chairperson of the Parliament and Chair of the parliamentary Gender Advisory Council Rusudan Kervarishvili. Moreover, IDPs have access to limited networks to help them learn to be politically successful.

Relationship Between Civil Society and Government Disinterest, distrust, and at worst, antagonism seem to characterize civil society’s and government’s relationship. As a senior fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies explains, Georgia is still “very far from the ideal situation where cooperation between civil society and

443 In its 2011 “Freedom in the World” report, Freedom House noted that media freedom remains a challenge in Georgia. Freedom House. “Georgia.” Freedom in the World 2011. Freedom House, 2011. Web. Senior fellow, Personal Interview; Tina Gewis, Personal Interview. 444 Logically, this legacy would affect old-wave IDPs more than new-wave due to the timing of displacement. However, detailed analysis supporting this hypothesis is not available. 445 Eka Gvalia, Personal Interview.

85 government [exists].”446 A Georgian NGO representative observes that the government seeks to marginalize civil society and neutralize its influence by simply ignoring it. Several interviewees supported this observation, noting how difficult it is for IDP NGOs to obtain necessary information from government sources or to gain access to officials.447 The lack of open communication and partnership between all levels of government and civil society organizations representing IDPs severely limits IDPs’ opportunity to play a meaningful role in policymaking processes. It seems that the government fails to realize that NGOs hold vital expertise, knowledge and access that could help the government to improve design and implementation of policies related to IDPs. Moreover, government officials seem to perceive civil society as a threat to their power, preventing them from treating NGOs as essential partners.448

The other side of the coin is that IDP NGOs frequently do not address the government effectively or inspire the government’s confidence in their ability to act as substantive partners. Weaknesses in civil society – such as lack of unity, capacity, broad, well-defined policy goals, and other factors that have been discussed in previous sections – prohibit IDP civil society from building cooperative relationships with government institutions. Those NGOs who find themselves in the good graces of government officials or bodies also tend to blunt their criticism of government activities in order to maintain their favored status.449 In sum, critical lack of confidence exists between civil society organizations and government bodies, with the effect of marginalizing IDP voices in policymaking.

The Politics of Peacemaking Political considerations related to foreign policy, and particularly to the “frozen” peace process, sharply limit IDPs’ opportunities to participate in decision-making around one of the primary issues of importance to them – the right to return. Though IDP issues are less politicized than in the past, with greater space for discussion of IDP integration, the right to return remains inextricably tied to a political resolution with Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia. IDPs figure significantly in the official rhetoric defining the Georgian government’s approach to the peace processes with the two breakaway regions. Given the imperative of regaining territorial integrity, the current government seeks to control this rhetoric in the process of peacemaking. With so much at stake, the government is not eager to enlarge the group of stakeholders able to directly influence the peace process.

A senior government official affirmed that IDPs must participate in any discussion of the status of the peace talks.450 However, a staff member from the Office of the Public Defender remarked that IDPs have only been engaged with the peace processes in “very discrete initiatives but not at systematic levels.”451 A senior fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies presented the likely

446 Senior Fellow, Personal Interview. 447 Georgian NGO representative, personal interview. 448 Senior Fellow, Personal Interview; Georgian NGO representative, personal interview. 449 Eka Gvalia, Personal Interview. 450 Senior Government Official, Personal Interview. 451 Staff member, Office of the Public Defender, Personal Interview.

86 rationale behind the government’s (non)inclusion of IDPs in the Geneva process: the presence of IDPs is actually counter-productive to the goal of peace. “What can (IDPs) bring to the peace talks?...The Abkhaz…are against the IDPs being present in any format.” Having IDPs on the Georgian side thus “only hinders the potential for reaching a resolution.” The analyst said that IDP issues are on the sidelines of the talks, with the agreement on non-resumption of hostilities as the main issue.452

An international NGO staff member was more blunt in her assessment, saying that, “the Georgian government doesn’t think they need to ask [IDPs] what they want, because they don’t want to give...the agenda to anyone else. And this is all about the playing the game with Russia, and what do [IDPs] understand about Moscow politics?...For the government, it’s all about territory, it’s not about people, (despite what the State Strategy says about the importance of people-to-people peacebuilding).”453

The argument that the government – and indeed, much of the Georgian population – is more concerned with the issue of territorial integrity than with IDPs’ right to return was a common feature of several interviews.

Corroborating these perspectives, a recent survey of public attitudes by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) found territorial integrity to be the third most important issue in the country.454 The NDI study did not make a direct reference to IDPs, however. It is unclear how support for territorial integrity compares with support for IDP return or even general well-being, as such a question has seemingly not been included in recent surveys.

From the government’s perspective, it is important to recognize that the borders themselves – and not necessarily the people who live within those borders – serve as their primary focal points. This state of affairs discourages IDPs and officials from pressing for greater IDP inclusion in peacemaking. The political calculus behind the government’s prioritization is clear – its view is that the creation of a stable peace requires an agreement on territory as a first step. Furthermore, President Saakashvili has made the “wholeness” of Georgia a central plank of his platform from the beginning of his presidency.455 In this political environment, IDPs and their advocates face a significant challenge in finding points of leverage that would push the government to include IDPs more substantially in high-level peacemaking.

At the Track II level, the government faces less pressure to so tightly control conflict resolution efforts, allowing for more IDP involvement in grassroots initiatives. A senior government official describes the

452 Senior Fellow, Personal Interview. 453 Tina Gewis, Personal Interview. 454 “Public attitudes in Georgia: Results of a February 2012 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC,” National Democratic Institute, March 2012, Print. 455 de Waal, 5.

87 government’s support for people-to-people diplomacy: “Divided communities have to rebuild the bridges. This is the idea of the State Strategy on Engagement with Occupied Regions and Action Plan. Confidence-building, people-to-people relations come first. But this is not enough for the final settlement of the conflict.”456 He goes on to say that these efforts must work in concert with official peace talks with Moscow and the international community. Overall, it seems that a greater level of support for IDP engagement in grassroots efforts could promote links with Track I diplomacy, thereby contributing to the conflict resolution process. These efforts are certainly in the government’s interest, as they have focused on return of IDPs as a means to lay claim to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

International Influence on Georgian Domestic Politics It is well recognized that representatives of the international community significantly influence Georgian policymaking. International support for measures promoting gender equality, for example, may have played an important role in the government’s interest in adopting the National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325.457 Georgian political actors are for the most part eager to demonstrate that Georgia is building a dynamic modern democracy in line with contemporary Western political culture. More concretely, Georgia is focused on gaining NATO membership and building foreign economic support and investment, and is anxious to retain Western approval and support.

International actors therefore present an important source of leverage regarding IDP inclusion in domestic policymaking and the peace process – even though they certainly do not have the final say over Georgian policies regarding IDPs. International donors and NGOs, in their authoritative positions on the MRA Steering Committee, for example, to some extent are able to act as a conduit between IDP NGOs and government representatives.458 This is critical for IDPs because the politicization of policymaking around the durable solutions provides a challenge for civil society in successfully lobbying the government on its own.459

However, the role of the international community in supporting IDP rights may be changing somewhat as international donors and NGOs increasingly shift their focus.460 Currently, the international community does not seem to be holding out many sticks regarding human rights (and specifically, IDP rights) that would translate into significant pressure to strive for greater inclusion of IDPs in policymaking. The Georgian government consequentially seems to be satisfied that it is inclusive enough to retain sufficient international approval.461 Major international donors have also not always provided a good example of inclusive decision-making in their own activities supporting IDPs.462 According to one

456 Senior Government Official, Personal Interview. 457 Graziella Piga, Personal Interview. 458 Staff member, Office of the Public Defender, personal interview. 459 Staff member, Office of the Public Defender, personal interview. 460 Tina Gewis, Personal Interview. 461 Lincoln Mitchell, Personal Interview. 462 Caroline Stampfer, Personal Interview.

88 international working for a major donor, “IDP feedback is only indirectly influencing decisions made by donors on which priorities to finance.”463 Speaking specifically of the European Union’s agenda-setting process, however, she noted that cooperation with other international agencies working directly with IDPs plays a “decisive” role in funding decisions.464 Donors naturally have their own goals, and a universal complaint among local civil society dependent on foreign donors is that donor policy often reflects the needs and interests of the donor more than those of the beneficiaries. It is important that international actors seek to avoid this in their activities in Georgia. Moreover, they should continue to be proactive in using their leverage in favor of greater IDP inclusion in policymaking.

International Influence on the Peace Process and IDP Return In many ways, international organizations and donors fail to put explicit pressure on the Georgian government and other parties to the conflict to come to an agreement in the peace process. This directly impacts IDPs in that a lack of a settlement prevents their safe and dignified return to their places of origin, as the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement stipulates. International actors play a key role in influencing the peace process, however. Unseen backchannel dialogues between international actors and parties to the conflict have undoubtedly impacted the political calculations of those involved. However, the policies of the major international donors and organizations working on IDP issues – among them the European Union, UNHCR and other UN agencies – are avowedly apolitical, making it difficult for these international actors to vocally assert the need for greater inclusion of IDPs in peace processes as a means to conflict resolution.465

International organizations and local civil society have recently been successful in pressing for greater inclusion of women (and among them, IDP women) in peace processes at all levels. As previously mentioned, this culminated in the adoption of the National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325. It remains to be seen whether or not this action plan will provide the critical political leverage to have the role of women IDPs in peace processes supported at both the Track I and Track II levels.

Opportunities to Leverage Political Factors in Favor of IDP Participation We have described the significant role international actors, particularly major Western donors, play in Georgian policymaking. The international community should look to improving opportunities for IDPs, who are experts on their own needs and interests, to influence donor priorities. They should also work to create targeted incentives for the Georgian government to adopt a more systematic participatory approach to policymaking around IDPs. Displaced persons and IDP advocates should also seek to increase political pressure to include IDPs in decision-making by tying their concerns to issues facing Georgia as a whole (such as poverty and unemployment). Greater collaboration with a range of political actors on cross-cutting issues would help IDPs gain allies and secure a seat at the table. Both new and

463 Caroline Stampfer, Personal Interview. 464 Caroline Stampfer, Personal Interview. 465 UNHCR Representative, Personal Interview.

89 traditional media also present rich opportunities for IDPs and IDP advocates to “rebrand” IDP issues, increasing the public’s appetite for accepting their needs and interests as legitimate policy priorities and seeing IDP leadership in the public sphere. This could help change the political calculus among policymakers, incentivizing them to include IDP voices in decision-making.

Economic Factors IDPs in Georgia live under harsh socioeconomic conditions, posing a significant challenge to political participation. The lack of economic opportunities is a problem for most of the Georgian population. However, several factors indicate that IDPs are a particularly vulnerable segment of the population. The fact that they do not have their basic needs covered makes them focus on earning a living on a daily basis and makes political participation fall behind in the list of priorities.

Economic Situation of IDPs While poverty is a central concern for much of the Georgian population, circumstances related to displacement may increase IDPs’ risk. According to a recent assessment of IDP livelihoods in Georgia, the key dimensions of IDPs’ vulnerability include diminished household capacities to develop and sustain positive coping strategies; uncertainty with respect to their future; commonly poor housing conditions; low income and unemployment; disruption of social and economic networks; and traumatization.466

A recent survey find high rates of poverty among IDPs. Every sixth IDP household regards itself as extremely poor, claiming to be constantly starving, while approximately the same number of households would consider their economic conditions as so dire that they barely manage to feed themselves. Almost one half of IDP households state that their income (or their harvest) is enough only for self- consumption, while only 17% of households are more or less satisfied with their economic conditions.467

Although there is a lack of concrete research and disaggregated data on IDP unemployment does not exist, some estimates suggest that unemployment among IDPs in Georgia may range from 35-45%,468 which is substantially higher than the official statistic that cites a rate of about 16.5%. IDPs also face significant under-employment, partial employment and informal employment, which may also be higher among this population than for non-IDPs.469

466 Tarkhan-Mouravi, George. Assessment of IDP livelihoods in Georgia: facts and policies. February 2009. 21. 467 Ibid; 25. 468 Mitchneck, Beth, Olga V. Mayorova and Joanna Regulska. “Post-Conflict Displacement: Isolation and Integration in Georgia.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers. 99.5 Feb. 2009: 1022-1032. Web. 21 Nov. 2011. 469 “IDMC – Internal Displacement Monitoring Center – Georgia – Employment rate of IDPs”, Web. 11 April 2012.

90 Also, according to a World Bank report, the incomes earned and positions held by IDPs are generally lower than for the general population.470 A staff member of the Office of the Public Defender expanded on the particular vulnerability of IDPs linking it to a vicious circle:

“Unemployment is IDP-specific because IDPs are the most vulnerable. They are in a sense disadvantaged because they don’t have access to education because their families lack financial resources – it’s just a chain. They don’t have proper education, then they don’t have proper employment opportunities, etc.”471

Another differentiating factor that makes many IDPs more vulnerable in relation to the non-displaced population is the lack of ownership of a permanent residence. This is especially significant in a country like Georgia, where the rate of home ownership is traditionally very high. Owning a house is very important for people’s sense of security, because they feel protected from becoming totally destitute. Apart from the psychological burden this instability creates among the IDP community, it entails very concrete economic disadvantages, such as the impossibility to get mortgage loans. This sense of insecurity and instability relates to the psychosocial factors discussed earlier, challenging IDPs’ in their efforts to integrate and participate in society.

Relationship Between Economic Status and Participation Several interviewees – including Georgian political figures, internationals, and members of the displaced community representing a range of socioeconomic statuses cited poverty as a key factor affecting IDPs’ level of political activity. Poverty does not necessarily equal passivity in someone’s civic or political action, but being economically disadvantaged certainly creates certain barriers to participation.

Obviously the first priority for any person must be survival, so political participation becomes comparatively a secondary issue. The struggle of many IDPs to meet their and their families’ basic needs often takes precedence over political participation. Eka Gvalia, Executive Director of the NGO Charity Humanitarian Center “Abkhazeti,” explained the impact of socio-economic status on IDPs’ civic activity:

“In general, less active involvement among IDPs is somehow based on their hard socioeconomic conditions. Because of course everybody has priorities, and when it comes to their family, income is priority number one (to take care of the family) so they have really less time because they have to think of their priorities… we have to think of the socio-economic conditions.”472

470 Tskitishvili, Gocha; Dershem, Larry; and Kechakmadze, Vano. Social Capital and Employment Opportunities Among Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia. The World Bank, Tbilisi, May 2005. 34–36. 471 Staff member of the Office of the Public Defender. Personal Interview. 15 March 2012. 472 Eka Gvalia, Personal Interview.

91 IDPs’ ongoing fight for survival, as noted by one IDP woman,473 saps the time and energy of many, depleting resources that in different circumstances could be channeled into civic action. An INGO representatives echoed this perspective, stating that for these reasons, IDPs “care less about the decisions made by the state authorities.”474 Faced with a lack of tangible, immediate necessities, taking the time to be involved in comparatively abstract political processes is simply not a practical option.

In the case of women, they face a time burden that serves as a key socioeconomic factor influencing their participation. Many of them work to provide for their families, in addition to taking care of the house and the children. As a result, they have few hours left in the day for other activities. Women’s extensive responsibilities for their families therefore serve as an additional barrier to their participation and influence over decision-making processes, in comparison with men. The fact that NGOs provide stable jobs for many women so that they can provide for their families, in contrast with the volatility and risk involved in engaging in politics,475 could also explain why IDP women —and women in general— are so much better represented in the NGO sector rather than in politics. At the same time, the economic transition after the fall of Communism caused a major decline in the participation of women on the labor market. Large differentials between the wages paid to women and men, and the declining access women have to jobs, have coincided with a rising burden for women at home, due to shrinking social safety nets and child care provisions.476

It is important to note that this dimension of poverty has a similar effect on the entirety of the Georgian population struggling to make ends meet.477 However, the loss and acute vulnerability that many IDPs have experienced as a result of their displacement may make some IDPs more sensitive to the psychological impacts of poverty. In this sense, the ongoing symptoms of poverty exacerbate the underlying trauma of displacement. Tamar Tchelidze, former Deputy Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development who was displaced from Abkhazia, explained:

“[When you are an IDP], you don’t have a roof, you need to get a home, you need to get a job, and you need basics that everyone has... When you lose these things in such a painful manner, this kind of traumatic experience forces you to think about these things much more than other people would.”478

Her story reinforces the connection between socioeconomic and psychosocial factors influencing IDPs’ experiences, which in turn affect their opportunities for participation.

Poverty and the resulting reliance on the government for economic support also have fed the “dependency syndrome” that characterizes some members of the IDP community. IDPs may be less

473 IDP woman. Personal interview. 15 March 2012. 474 Chabrava, Eliso (Danish Refugee Council). Personal interview. 22 March 2012. 475 Teona Kupunia, Personal Interview. 476 UNDP. Enhancing Women’s Political Participation. Bratislava, 2009. 15. 477 Marina Tabukashvili, Personal interview. 478 Tamar Tchelidze, Personal Interview.

92 willing to challenge authorities that provide them with essential income and services, therefore supporting the current government through votes but otherwise exercising minimal efforts to promote their own needs and interests.479

Displacement also has enduring effects on IDPs’ ability to join networks that could help them access employment and gain greater economic stability. As an IDP from Abkhazia, noted, “In this country, a clan mentality remains and nobody gets hired from the street; it has to be some kind of connection…”480 IDPs’ living situations may also affect their access to networks. While IDPs living in collective centers may be less integrated with the non-displaced community, they are often more closely connected to one another than are IDPs living in private accommodation simply because of proximity. Those living in collective centers may therefore be able to form new networks among themselves that may help them access resources. For example, IDPs in one center “might have a family connection with a community in another collective center not far away.481 These networks often remain insular, however, limiting IDPs’ access to opportunities to participate in society among the broader population.

At the same time, these stronger ties among IDPs in collective centers enable community engagement. A senior fellow from the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, states, “they together could really mobilize better themselves. For example, they could stop the traffic on the street if their electricity was not supplied or if their pensions were not raised.” He expresses concern at the government’s effort to resettle IDPs in that it may adversely affect their opportunities to organize collectively: “Now they are dispersed physically, this also weakens their potential to influence decision- making.”482 The resettlement policies may in fact work against any effort that IDPs had developed to mobilize their communities, serving as an additional factor influencing participation.

On the other hand, IDPs living in private accommodations are more linked with the general population and have the possibility to build networks that go beyond the displaced communities. Medea Turashvili, from the International Crisis Group observed that “once [IDPs] are settled in private accommodations, they are more active, more outspoken. I don't know why, maybe because integration is higher, they are not stuck in this one building.483

Interviews with a number of displaced persons of a higher socioeconomic status supported this point of view. Many of them had overcome significant barriers, living in collective centers and states of poverty following their displacement. They have since taken advantage of economic and employment opportunities to integrate into mainstream society, and some of them have also purchased their own homes. IDP identity plays a different role for these IDPs – some of them actively identify with this status and have taken on this cause politically, while others find that it has become less relevant in their lives

479 Nana Sumbadze, Personal Interview. 480 IDP woman. Personal interview. 15 March 2012. 481 Tina Gewis, Personal interview. 482 Senior Fellow, Personal Interview. 483 Turashvili, Medea (International Crisis Group). Personal interview. 13 March 2012.

93 and prefer to identify in other ways. These latter cases suggest that poverty is not the only socioeconomic variable influencing IDPs’ participation, at least around issues concerning their specific needs and interests. Some more well-off IDPs also actively choose not to engage in advocacy to promote these efforts, perhaps because they prefer not to highlight their experiences as IDPs. Also, there is a lack of philanthropy efforts from those IDPs who have been able to attain a higher socio-economic status. While these people generally try to help their relatives and close friends, we have not come across any examples of high socio-economic status IDPs who have established foundations or projects to help the larger IDP community.

At the same time, poverty also does not preclude IDPs’ involvement. Despite the economic obstacles faced by many IDPs ––in the form of poverty, unemployment or underemployment, disruption of social and economic networks, poor housing conditions, etc.––, a significant number of them are still very active in their communities and in civil society organizations. In particular, those who were active before displacement tend to be more active afterwards. Moreover, in certain cases poverty can fuel action, as IDPs may rally around a certain issue facing their community, such as lack of electricity or heat. However, this action is often focused on solving specific, immediate problems in the local setting rather than national-level policy approaches to address IDPs’ interests.

Overall, poverty and unemployment among IDPs ––due to their more vulnerable situation–– is aggravated by the lack of a national development plan in the country that mainstreams the needs of the displaced communities. An INGO representative argues that the government, international organizations, and NGOs all struggle with proposing “a coherent model not of integration, but I think of mainstreaming IDP concerns within the overall development efforts.”484 Factors specific to IDPs that contribute to their protracted poverty must be taken into account in programs aimed at IDP livelihoods as well as initiatives seeking to raise the living standards of Georgians as a whole. In this way, the Georgian government can address some of the underlying issues limiting many IDPs’ in their efforts to engage both individually and collectively as active members of society.

Opportunities to Encourage Political Participation There is a cyclical nature to the relationship between poverty and political participation. Socioeconomic disadvantages hinder participation, but at the same time the lack of participation among IDPs is one of the factors that makes IDP issues absent from the public discourse, thus allowing the perpetuation of their underprivileged status. The fact that IDP voices are not heard in the public arena allows for their needs to be forgotten in the policymaking process and is one of the main factors that explain why the socioeconomic situation of IDPs has not significantly improved in the last two decades.

484 INGO Representative, Personal interview.

94 The lack of narrative connecting poverty and political exclusion may be partly to blame for the correlation between poverty and inaction. It is worth noting that IDPs do not necessarily relate political and economic marginalization. This fact points to an overall lack of confidence that political structures as an effective way for IDPs to improve their wellbeing.

A comprehensive development plan to address poverty reduction in Georgia in general —but with provisions to target IDP-specific issues— could be helpful to end the “dependency syndrome” that many IDPs experience, in addition to increasing their autonomy, removing obstacles related to their socioeconomic status, and ultimately increase IDP agency and ability to influence policy. However, taking into account the actual influence of the IDP community nowadays in Georgia, it seems unlikely that IDPs alone —without strong support and advocacy from the NGO sector and international actors— would have the clout to make their issues part of such a development strategy.

95

RECOMMENDATIONS

Roundtable discussion on IDP participation at the Women’s Political Resource Center, Tbilisi.

96

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT

 Include an IDP NGO on the Steering Committee for the State Strategy on IDPs (Immediate Term)

Institutionalize IDPs’ participation at the national level by including an IDP NGO in the MRA’s Steering Committee, after garnering the preferred choice of national and IDP NGOs. Including an IDP NGO will allow IDPs to take the lead in representing and advocating for their needs at the national level. Their lack of representation in this body currently serves as a critical gap in their avenues for participation. This involvement will be a key link to the IDP community and facilitate implementation of the State Strategy and Action Plan, along with future policymaking on IDP-related issues.

The MRA, with the support of international organizations, should strongly encourage IDP NGOs to take leadership and participate in the Steering Committee. They can incentivize these NGOs’ involvement by committing to include them as an equal partner in decision-making processes. The MRA should consider making support available to IDP NGO representatives that might need to travel to participate in Committee meetings. They should also engage in a participatory process to enable IDP NGOs to choose this representative. This involves enabling IDP NGOs to nominate themselves and structure a process by which they would elect their representative from the nominees. This effort seeks to address some of the challenges that IDPs face in gaining effective representation at the national level.

 Collect more systematic data on IDP populations (Immediate to Intermediate Term)

As a current dearth of data on IDP populations exist, the MRA, with the assistance of international organizations and national NGOs, should systematically examine the socioeconomic conditions in IDP communities. Anecdotal evidence exists on the differences between the IDP and non-IDP populations, as well as within the displaced population. Statistics on these issues should be collected to corroborate these assessments.

Specifically, the MRA should improve its knowledge base, beginning with an accurate census of the IDP population, their gender and age breakdown, a sense of professional skills, educational and income levels, along with participation in government programs. To highlight issues specific to women, it should also collect demographic data on women and families, including family size and composition (number of children, marital status), health, violence against women, and health and education of children.

Data should be disaggregated based on age, gender, old and new wave, and accommodation status. National statistics, such as those on unemployment, should also disaggregate for IDP status. Data collection should occur every 2-3 years in order to ensure that the data is up-to-date.

97 Accurate data is key in order for the MRA to understand which IDPs currently live in the most marginalized conditions so that it can effectively shift to a needs-based approach, a goal stated in the Action Plan. The MRA faces the challenge of allocating resources to this process while simultaneously meeting other commitments related to IDPs’ needs and interests. In the long-run, however, up-to-date data serves a key purpose in enabling the MRA and NGOs to better target their resources to support the most vulnerable IDPs. This approach may be more cost-effective in the long term.

 Systematically include IDPs in drafting and implementing IDP-related policies (Intermediate Term)

The Georgian Government’s inclusion and support of IDPs has notably improved in more recent years, and it should build on efforts to conduct participatory policymaking processes. The process on drafting the National Action Plan for Implementation of UNSCR 1325 provides a useful model for engaging all relevant stakeholders: IDP women and men, NGOs, government, and international organizations. With support from INGOs and donors, the government should create commissions or work through the existing Steering Committee to periodically update the Action Plan and revise the State Strategy, if deemed necessary. They should support NGOs in coordinating locals to discuss their ideas for recommendations, and then provide a platform from which NGO representatives can directly funnel these recommendations into national-level processes of drafting new policies. This involvement can ensure that IDPs are directly engaged in the process of setting priorities among efforts to promote the various durable solutions.

The government should also involve IDPs, through NGOs, in implementation processes to ensure that they are effectively addressing their needs and interests. The Office of the Public Defender should continue to monitor implementation of IDP-related policies. They should promote consultation with IDPs related to local integration and resettlement efforts, to support IDPs’s ability to choose among the durable solutions. They should particularly focus on ensuring that the MRA is upholding its commitments to improve communication with IDPs, as information is a key tool for them to become more engaged in personal and policy-level decision-making.

 Restructure and transform Abkhazian Government-in-Exile into a more effective representative body for IDPs (Intermediate to Long-Term)

Although currently ineffective, the Abkhazian Government-in-Exile serves as a structure that has the potential to represent IDPs. An IDP NGO activist suggested: “[The] Abkhazian Government…has to change into a more efficient or relevant structure deciding these problems or the guys that run this ministry have to change. They have to change their priorities.”485 The government-in-exile’s current structure should be analyzed and reorganized to more effectively utilize resources. At the same time,

485 IDP NGO Activist, Roundtable Discussion at Women’s Political Resource Center, Tbilisi, 23 March 2012.

98 the government also needs to commit to supporting this new role for the government-in-exile, namely enabling a significant portion of its population to be more represented. This serves its interest as government-in-exile structures would probably continue to support IDPs’ right of return.

The government-in-exile should also encourage IDP cooperation with NGOs and the Georgian Government on integrating and improving their livelihoods in Georgia proper. For its part, the Georgian Government should organize public discussions and focus groups with IDPs and government-in-exile structures to ensure a participatory approach at identifying a new purpose for the government-in-exile. These discussions should include IDPs from Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia. While it is currently not possible for elections to be held in Abkhazia and for the exiled structures to return to the role of legitimate political representatives, there should be a new role for these structures that serves IDPs’ needs and interests.

 Facilitate IDP involvement in grassroots and official conflict resolution efforts (Intermediate to Long-Term)

Although conflict resolution efforts are currently considered to be stalled and stagnant at the official level, they can be better encouraged at the local and grassroots level. Observers have commented that there have been instances of the government making people-to-people initiatives more difficult. The government should encourage and facilitate these initiatives, especially when they include IDPs, as means to create a perspective for conflict resolution for Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia. While the nature of the stalemate with the conflict regions is also due to national and geo-political factors, capacities for peace do exist between ethnic Georgians, Abkhaz and Ossetians, such as through economic initiatives that bring these groups together. Such efforts can be capitalized on in the effort to promote conflict transformation.

99 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

 Monitor new incentives and explore new opportunities for political inclusion (Immediate to Intermediate Term)

The recent financial incentive for parties to include women on party lists should be monitored in the upcoming elections. Collect data on the extent to which parties increase their number of women candidates as a result of this incentive. If successful, international actors should support a stronger incentive that requires women be included as one of every four or five candidates in party lists.

If positive, international can build on these results by supporting measures to include IDPs in a similar fashion. While IDPs are one of several categories of vulnerable populations in the country, the large IDP constituency would be better served with more direct political representation. Therefore, pending the incentive’s success for women, it should also be offered as a non-obligatory incentive to include IDPs, with IDPs having to at least make up one of out of 20 candidates on a party list, for example, proportionate to the size of this group among the general population. These measures should be considered in areas where registered IDPs make up a significant percentage. The specific aspects of both measures should be decided through consultation including international actors, women’s and IDP NGOs, and other relevant stakeholders.

 Increase funding to civil society and for governance reform in Georgia (Immediate Term)

The international community has provided strong support to the Georgian Government and less funding to civil society following the Rose Revolution. In order to promote a more active and inclusive political and public sphere for IDPs and Georgians more generally, the international community should increasing funding and support for projects that strengthen civil society capacity. This can be symbolized by first funding the most active and effective NGOs, both at the national and local level, but should be the beginning of a consistent trend of expanding this sector’s capacity.

The international community should also use its leverage to strongly encourage the Georgian Government to adopt a more inclusive approach to other political actors in the country, including civil society and the media. This will improve democratic governance and increase transparency in the country, especially in drafting and implementing policies. The inclusion of IDPs and women should be a particular focus, in order to address barriers to their participation that limit their ability to influence the policies that affect their needs and interests.

100

 Continue to support and expand local level IDP mobilization efforts (Intermediate Term)

International donors and INGOs should continue to contribute to local level mobilization efforts, complementing and expanding on earlier related work by organizations such as the Danish Refugee Council and the Norwegian Refugee Council. These efforts should target IDPs in settlements, collective centers and private accommodations, as they all have particular needs and different levels of engagement with stakeholders representing their needs and interests. Organizations such as DRC, NRC and CARE could lead these efforts, building off of their earlier experiences with community mobilization.

Existing local mobilization efforts should receive more consistent and robust donor funding. IDP issues are still important in Georgia, especially with ongoing resettlement processes in addition to efforts promoting integration and return. Mobilization programs directly involving IDPs can help them overcome confounding factors that have held them back from political participation. These opportunities can also support their ability to advocate for improvement of their lives and the general conditions and livelihoods of their communities, thereby addressing their marginalization in Georgian society. Working with local populations as well, they can also support IDPs’ integration.

 Support existing associations of IDP NGOs and promote cooperation among these organizations (Intermediate to Long-Term)

Networks of IDP NGOs have lacked longer-term sustainability and effectiveness, highlighting a general need for improving NGO cooperation. The international community should foster regular meetings and workshops with these NGOs to explore avenues of cooperation between them and the sharing of best practices. More frequent interactions can create new opportunities for joint projects and programming. Closer collaboration can also facilitate the strengthening of current networks and the creations of new ones. The Synergy Network is an NGO network that should be supported and more NGOs should be made aware of the activities of this network and its members. This effort could increase both its membership and enable Synergy to become more influential on IDP issues at the national policy level.

101

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IDP COMMUNITIES AND NGOS

 Strengthen community organizing for IDPs to participate in politics (Immediate to Intermediate Term)

IDP NGOs should continue and expand social mobilization efforts around IDPs specific needs and interests in their communities, while at the same time purposefully making connections with IDP NGOS and communities in other municipalities and regions to establish a network to facilitate shared learning and cooperation. Once established, this network can attempt to address wider issues of IDP participation, providing a forum for IDPs to choose whether or not they think it appropriate or desirable to embark on more broad-based national advocacy campaigns.

Given conflicting issues with IDP identity, IDP NGOs should engage IDPs in broad discussions about the value, relevance, and opportunities for promoting a national identity-based movement as opposed to focusing on individual needs and interests at the local level. This effort should also include a discussion regarding the role of local populations in these efforts and ways in which IDPs can promote connections with other members of their communities.

The network should consider calling on and capitalizing on the resources and abilities of a wide range of IDPs, including those who already hold positions of influence in society, which they can leverage to promote IDP interests at the national level. This nationwide campaign of community organizing that could first target IDP collective centers and then expand to include IDPs in private accommodations who may initially be harder to reach. Such a project would require financial support and capacity building from international donors, and perhaps the Government, which could participate as well through the involvement of the MRA.

 Support capacity building for IDPs to participate in politics (Immediate to Intermediate Term)

NGOs should build on efforts to conduct workshops and trainings for IDPs that promote their capacity to engage in public life. Leadership and public speaking trainings, for example, could be modeled on efforts to promote women’s political participation while taking a gender-sensitive approach that addresses both women’s and men’s participation. NGOs should also engage in broader efforts and learning around community building. Immediate quantifiable outputs are important, but this programming can also significantly benefit from a long-term perspective. This should assess the overall effectiveness and sustainability of political skills-building in promoting IDP fellowship and self-esteem, with an ultimate impact of increasing participation and improving governance.

102  Address male IDP needs (Immediate Term)

In Georgia, there are numerous NGOs focusing on women’s issues. However, as many experts highlight, many men may be depressed and less active in Georgian society. There is a need for more programming that targets men’s issues and needs. NGOs should reassess and change their approach and package their initiatives differently to encourage men’s participation, often low in their programming. Gender- sensitivity, often understood to address women’s concerns, also needs to address men’s issues. NGOs should work with the MRA to promote their awareness and acceptance of this issue. They should also tailor their programs to specifically address the psychosocial factors that may particularly influence men – the fact that often times they are no longer the bread-winners of the family, their lack of professional opportunities, and the change in the social and familiar roles these situations entail. Livelihood initiatives and vocational training, along with men’s groups that provide them with the opportunity to connect with one another and discuss issues in their own way could serve as some examples of programming ideas.

 Reform local representative structures (Immediate to Intermediate Term)

Our field research revealed that the community leaders, or mamasakhlis, of each collective center are appointed by the government, and in many cases, they serve more as a kind of commissar that controls what people think and do, rather than serving as a true representative of the community. The local representative structure in the collective centers should be reformed so that community members can engage in the process of selecting the mamasakhlis.

The main obstacle in this sense is that Georgian legislation forbids holding elections in collective centers, settlements, or any other portion of territory that is not incorporated as a municipality. One solution would be to reform the law in order to take into account the unique case of collective centers and settlements. If legal reform to achieve direct elections in collective centers is not politically feasible, NGOs can launch community mobilization initiatives as a tool to designate leaders in each collective center. These leaders could be informally elected during one of the meetings ––including focus groups, trainings and workshops–– held in every settlement.

Once every collective center has a leader who represents the interests of the community, this new structure of local leaders could help strengthen advocacy initiatives within the centers, channel demands to the government by working with the mamasakhlis, and also serve as a first resort of communication when the national or local governments consult with IDPs from specific centers.

103  Improve communication and cooperation among NGOs (Immediate to Intermediate Term)

To increase coordination, NGOs working on IDP issues should create a general council or assembly of IDP NGOs. A conference could approve a document stating all common demands or objectives among the NGOs, a ruling body, and a spokesperson. The ruling body could hold monthly meetings, and an annual conference of all NGO representatives could convene to track progress and update the ruling body periodically. These coordination measures must acknowledge the diversity of needs and interests within IDP populations and incorporate them into the overall decision-making structure.

Alternatively, an increased number of informal meetings should be held to improve the coordination among the IDP NGOs. Their leaders should agree on a minimal set of common goals that would constitute a shared agenda for all the NGOs to pursue vis-à-vis their beneficiaries, the government and international donors.

In order to enhance the communications strategies of NGOs working on IDP issues, they should implement a user-friendly online mechanism for them to share best practices, either at the regional or national level. They could include all in one place: information about events and reports about their activities. Also, they could develop social media tools to target younger generation IDPs and educate them about voting and improving communication with government.

 Expand successful NGO programs (Intermediate Term)

In the effort to further improve communication and cooperation between NGOs, the NGO community working on IDP issues should come together to critically assess their most successful programs. This assessment would be useful to determine which regions, cities or settlements have less access to the work of these NGOs. The findings of such an effort would be very useful in order to establish which programs need to be improved upon and which programs have the potential to be scaled up to areas lacking attention. Working from an NGO council discussed in the previous recommendation, NGOs could develop a strategic plan discussing the programs they want to implement at the national level and the responsible organizations for each program. This way, NGOs could avoid duplicating efforts and would make sure that every NGO is responsible for a task that is consistent with its comparative advantage. This effort could also serve as a more effective way to allocate donor resources and reduce competition among NGOs, as they would receive funding implement different types of programming.

 Raise awareness of IDP issues among the general population (Intermediate to Long Term)

The national discourse on IDPs needs to change. This group should be viewed as citizens with dignity and rights, not as hungry hands, easy votes, or political symbols of a lost territory. A nation-wide public awareness campaign should be carried out in Georgia to open avenues for IDPs’ participation and for their needs and interests to be recognized.

104

The campaign should have a face, such as a successful IDP with a compelling story to speak to the nation (Tamar Tchelidze could be a good fit). A second idea is for a highly respected figure within the religious community to be the face of the campaign and carry the message. A third option for a face of the campaign is a local or internationally recognized star, like Georgian singer Katie Melua, or a celebrity advocate (Angelina Jolie’s promotion of refugee issues has been fairly successful and could be used as an example to replicate).

This campaign should be run by a coalition of NGOs (see previous recommendation on the need of better coordination among NGOs), but should also ensure the support of all other stakeholders. The international community can provide financial assistance, the government can help strengthen the scope of the campaign, and the Church ––the most prestigious and respected social institution in Georgia–– can also help by spreading the campaign’s message and legitimizing it.

IDPs who have been successful in their professional careers can engage in this campaign within IDP communities to help them realize that improving their lives is possible. Also, a network of gender and IDP-aware leaders can come together to give talks and conferences across the country and appear on media platforms in order to promote IDPs’ and women’s rights. The successful case of how the Georgian rugby national team has advocated against domestic violence can be used as an example of a campaign to increase public discourse on an important issue. The Gender Equality Council should also be involved in all gender aspects of the project to ensure that both women and men IDPs are included and represented fairly.

The campaign should focus on promoting the rights of IDPs, letting everyone know that the rights to return and integration are completely compatible and should be pursued at the same time. Also, the campaign should aim to support confidence-building efforts among IDPs, and strengthen their awareness on their rights. A high level politician and member of the parliament encapsulates the importance of this idea:

“Marginalization of IDPs is very bad, only talking about social problems is not right. We need good examples of IDPs who are involved. Always discussing how they are poor takes agency away; we must raise awareness of good examples (educated IDPs, engaged in communities). IDPs must know that they are in their country and have the same rights as others, they must know about their rights and must be stronger.”486

486 Rusudan Kervalishvili, Personal Interview.

105 APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Consolidated Recommendations

Government  Include an IDP NGO on the Steering Committee for the State Strategy on IDPs.

 Collect more systematic data on IDP populations.

 Systematically include IDPs in drafting and implementing IDP-related policies.

 Restructure and transform the Abkhazian Government-in-Exile into a more effective representative body for IDPs.

 Facilitate IDP involvement in grassroots and official conflict resolution efforts.

International Actors  Monitor new incentives and explore new opportunities for political inclusion.

 Increase funding to civil society for governance reform in Georgia.

 Continue to support and expand local level IDP mobilization efforts.

 Support existing associations of IDP NGOs and promote cooperation among NGOs.

IDP Communities  Strengthen community organizing for IDPs to participate in politics. and NGOs  Support capacity building for IDPs to participate in politics.

 Address male IDP needs.

 Reform local representative structures.

 Expand successful NGO programs.

 Raise awareness of IDP issues among the general population.

106 APPENDIX B

List of Interviewees

Local Civil Society Organizations

Ana Emukhvari Staff Mamber, NGO "Saunje" - Youth for IDPs Rights Dalila Khorava Director, Georgian Support for Refugees Elene (Maya) Rusetskaia Director, Women’s Information Center Eka Gvalia Executive Director, Charity Humanitarian Center “Abkhazeti” Eka Machavariani Chairperson, Association “Gaenati” George Khutsishvili Director, International Center on Conflict and Negotiation Gocha Gvaramia The Expert Club Iago Pasandze NGO “Saunje” – Youth for IDP Rights lali Grigolava Synergy Julia Kharashvili Chairperson, IDP Women’s Association “Consent” Khatia Dzadzua Self-help group coordinator for Zugdidi region, Taso Foundation Kornely Kakachia Professor, Tbilisi State University Lasha Gogidze Project Analyst, Transparency International Lia Mukhashavria Chairperson, Human Rights Priority/Caucasus Women’s Network Maka Gogokhia Psychologist, Atinati Manana Gabashvili Deputy Dean, School of Social Sciences, GIPA Marina Davitaia IDP NGO, Synergy Marina Guledani Managing Partner, CFS Legal Guledani & Partners Marina Pagava Synergy, NGO for Archives Marina Tabukashvili Deputy Director, Taso Foundation Mark Mullen Transparency International Board Member Minna Lundgren PhD Student, Mittuniversitetet University Sweden Mzevi Jojua Danish Refugee Council - Zugdidi Nana Lobzhanidze Communications Officer, Transparency International Georgia Nana Sumbadze Co-Director, Institute for Policy Studies Nina Khatiskatsi Programs Director, Transparency International Nina Tsihistavi Program Coordinator, Caucasus Women’s Network Nino Kalandarishvili Director, Institute for the Study of Nationalism and Conflict, Member of Synergy Nino Makhashvili Director, Global Psychiatry Initiative Nino Shervashidze Sukhumi University Alumni Nona Ubilava IDP NGO, Synergy

107 Senior Fellow Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies Thea Maisuradze IDP Woman Tina Gogeliani International Center on Conflict and Negotiation (ICCN) Vakhushti Menabde Georgian NGO Representative

Georgian Government/Political Officials

Georgian Official Government of Georgia Khatuna Gogorishvili Member of Parliament of Georgia Magda Anikashvili Member of Parliament of Georgia Mariam Esaiashvili Official, Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation Giorgi Tsereteli Member of Parliament, Gender Equality Council Nodar Tangiashvili Head of the Department for Relations with International Organisations and Legal Provision, Office of State Minister for Reintegration Paata Davitaia Member of Parliament of Georgia, Head of European Democrats Rusudan Kervalishvili Deputy Chairperson of the Parliament of Georgia Senior Government Official Government of Georgia Tamar Tchelidze Deputy Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia (former) Tamuna Basilia Officer, Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation Temur Yakobashvili Ambassador of the Republic of Georgia to the United States of America Thea Tsulukiani Deputy Chairperson, Our Georgia – Free Democrats Zurab Mtchedlishvili Coordinator of the Gender Equality Council, Parliament of Georgia

International Organizations, Donors and Stakeholders

Ana Lukatela UN Women Caroline Stampfer European External Action Service, Tbilisi David Chochia Office Manager/Researcher, International Crisis Group David Dzebisashvili Program Development Specialist, USAID David Phillips Director, Institute for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University Guguli Magradze Professor, Member of Georgian Dream Party Florian Delaunay UNDP Georgia Fron Nahzi Director, East-West Management Institute (former) Graziella Piga Project Manager, Women Connecting Across Conflicts project UN Women Human Security Team EUMM Jos De La Haye Conflict Prevention Specialist, UNDP

108 Kristy Kelly Postdoctoral Fellow, Columbia University Lincoln Mitchell Associate Professor, Harriman Institute, Columbia University Lawrence Sheets International Crisis Group Maia Bibileishvili UNDP Georgia Marie Wirde Kvinna till Kvinna Mira Sovakar Caucasus Projects Manager, Conciliation Resources Representative International NGO Representative UNHCR Sara Laginder Kvinna Till Kvinna Stan Veitsman Peace and Development Advisor, UNDP Georgia Tamar Sabedashvili Gender Advisor for Georgia, UN Women Tamar Tavartkiladze Project Manager, UN Women Tamara Sartallia Parliamentary Program Officer, National Democratic Institute Tamuna Karosanidze Deputy Chief of Party, G-PAC/East West Management Institute Teona Kupunia Women's Political Participation Program Officer, National Democratic Institute Timothy Blauvelt Country Director, American Councils for International Education Tina Gewis Protection and Advocacy Adviser, Norwegian Refugee Council Tinatin Tiabashvili GIPA Vakhtang Piranishvili Project Director, CARE International Walter Kälin Former Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons

Focus Groups New Wave IDP Women, Koda Settlement (February 2, 2012) Old Wave IDP Women, Tbilisi (February 3, 2012) Old Wave IDP Men, Tbilisi (March 12, 2012) New Wave Men, Karaleti Settlement (March 13, 2012) Old Wave Youth, Sokhumi University, Tbilisi (March 22, 2012)

109 APPENDIX C

Overview of Human Rights Documents and Articles Relevant to IDP Rights and Participation

Universal Article 2 – Everyone is entitled to all rights in the UDHR; non-discrimination Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)

International Article 2 – Non-discrimination; undertake necessary steps to realize rights; Covenant on Civil effective remedy and Political Rights (ICCPR) Article 3 – Equal rights of men and women Article 25 – Right to vote; access to public service

Article 26 – Equal protection without discrimination

International Article 2 – Use of maximum available resources to progressively realize rights; Covenant on non-discrimination Economic, Social Article 3 – Equality between men and women and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Article 4 – State may limit rights but only to promote general welfare of the society

Article 6 – Right to work

Article 11 – Right to adequate food, clothing, and housing (standard of living)

Article 12 – Mental and physical health

Article 13 – Education

Article 14 – Compulsory primary education

Convention on the Article 1 – Definition of discrimination Elimination of All Article 2 – States need to enact policy to eliminate discrimination Forms of Discrimination Article 3 – Ensure political, social, economic, and cultural advancement and Against Women development of women (CEDAW) Article 4 – Affirmative action (temporary special measures)

Article 5 – Modification of social and cultural norms to support gender equality, family education includes understanding of maternity

Article 7: Support for women’s involvement in political and public life

110 Article 10 – Non-discrimination in education

Article 11 – Non-discrimination in employment

Article 12 – Non-discrimination in health care

Article 13 – Non-discrimination in other areas of economic and social life (financial, recreational)

Article 14 – Support for women in rural settings

Article 15 – Equality with men before the law

Article 16 – Non-discrimination in marriage and family relations

European Charter Article 14 – Non-discrimination on Human Rights Protocol 1: (ECHR) Article 1 – Right to possessions

Article 2 – Right to education

Article 3 – Right to hold free elections

United Nations Article 1 – Increase representation of women at all decision-making levels in Security Council conflict resolution and peace processes Resolution 1325 on Article 2 – Secretary-General should implement action plan on this Women, Peace and Security Article 3 – Secretary-General should appoint more women as special reps Article 4 – Expand role of women in UN field-based operations

Article 5 – Incorporate gender perspective into peace-keeping operations

Article 6 – Member States should be trained on women’s protection, rights and needs

Article 7 – Member States should increase support for gender-sensitive training

Article 8 – Adopt a gender perspective in peace agreements for:

a. Special needs of women and girls in repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration, post-conflict reconstruction b. Support for local women’s peace initiatives, involve women in implementing peace agreements c. Protect and respect HR of women and girls in constitution, electoral system, police and judiciary Article 9 – Respect international law dealing with women’s rights in conflict

Article 10 – Protect women from GBV

111 Article 11 – States should end impunity for war crimes

Article 12 – Conflict parties should respect for refugee camps

Article 13 – Consider needs of men and women in DDR programs

Article 14 – Consider needs of civilian population when determining humanitarian exemptions

Article 15 – Security Council missions should take women’s rights and gender considerations into account, consult with local and international women’s groups

Article 16 – Secretary-General should study impact of armed conflict on women and girls, role of women in peacebuilding, gender dimensions of peace process and conflict resolution

Article 17 – Secretary-General should report on gender mainstreaming

Article 18 – Continue active engagement in this matter

UN Guiding Definition of an IDP: "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or Principles on obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in Internal particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human- Displacement made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border." (Introduction, paragraph 2)

Section I – General principles

Principle 1 – IDPs enjoy rights like anyone else in the country; non-discrimination

Principle 2.1 – All authorities have to respect these rights

Principle 2.2 – Guiding Principles don’t interfere with any other rights under IHRL or domestic law

Principle 3.1 – National authorities have the main responsibility to protect IDPs’ rights

Principle 3.2 – Right to protection and humanitarian assistance from these authorities

Principle 4.1 – Non-discrimination

Principle 4.2 – Certain groups need extra protection (children, elderly, female heads of household, etc.)

Section II – Principles relating to protection from displacement

Section III – Principles relating to protection during displacement

Principle 14 – Right to liberty of movement; freedom to choose residence

112 Principle 18.1 – Adequate standard of living

Principle 18.2 – Authorities should provide:

a. Water b. Shelter c. Clothing d. Medical services and sanitation Principle 22 – No discrimination in:

a. Freedom of thought b. Right to work c. “Right to associate freely and participate equally in community affairs” d. “Right to vote and to participate in governmental and public affairs, including the right to have access to the means necessary to exercise this right e. Right to communicate in a language they understand Principle 23 – Right to education

Section IV – Principles relating to humanitarian assistance

Principle 24 – Right to humanitarian assistance; no discrimination in how it is delivered

Section V – Principles relating to return, resettlement and reintegration

Principle 28.1 – State has to allow for voluntary return

Principle 28.2 – IDPs should participate in planning and managing return or resettlement and reintegration

Principle 29.1 – IDPs who have returned or resettled in another part of the country shouldn’t be discriminated against

Principle 29.2 – State should help IDPs recover lost possessions and property or provide compensation

113 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anikashvili, Magda (MP, Parliament of Georgia). Personal Interview. 21 March 2012.

Anonymous interview.

Bokuchava, Irakli. “The State Strategy for Internally Displaced Persons – Persecuted in Georgia and the Action Plan on Implementation of the Strategy.” Social Programs Foundation, Tbilisi. November 2008. Web. 4 Dec. 2011.

Brookings. “From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement.” Brookings. November 2011. Print.

Buck, Thomas, Alice Morton, Susan Allen Nan, and Feride Zurikashvili. “Aftermath: Effects of Conflict on Internally Displaced Women in Georgia,” United States Agency for International Development Working Paper No. 310, Sept 2000. Print.

Caucasus Research Resource Center. “How Does the South Caucasus Compare?” 5 October 2011. Web.

21 May 2012.

CDM Woman Leader (Christian Democrats). Personal Interview. 21 March 2012.

Chabrava, Eliso (Danish Refugee Council). Personal interview. 22 March 2012.

Tchelidze, Tamar [Deputy Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia (former)]. Personal interview. 14 March 2012.

Chochia, David (Office Manager/Researcher, International Crisis Group). Personal Interview. 20 March 2012.

CIA World Factbook. Georgia’s economy. Web. 30 April 2012.

Conciliation Resources. “Displacement in Georgia: IDP attitudes to conflict, return and justice.” Conciliation Resources. April 2011. Web. 5 Dec. 2011.

Conciliation Resources. “Out of the Margins: Securing a Voice for Internally Displaced People: Lessons from Georgia.” Conciliation Resources. 2009. Print.

Danish Refugee Council. “Looking Forward: Extending the IDP Action Plan 2012-2014.” Conference Report, Danish Refugee Council, 15 June 2011. Web. 18 April 2012.

Davitaia, Paata (MP, Parliament of Georgia). Personal interview. 21 March 2012. de la Haye, Jos (Conflict Prevention Specialist, UNDP). Personal Interview. 16 February 2012.

Dzebisashvili, David (Program Development Specialist, USAID). Personal Interview. 1 February 2012.

Employment and unemployment. National Statistics Office of Georgia. Web. 28 April 2012.

114 Esaiashvili, Mariam (Official, Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation). Personal Interview. 30 Jan 2012.

Freedom House. “Georgia.” Freedom in the World 2011. Freedom House, 2011. Web.

Gabashvili, Manana (Deputy Dean, School of Social Sciences, GIPA). Personal Interview. 2 Feb 2012.

Gaenati Conference. Anaklia, 20 March 2012.

Senior Fellow (Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies). Personal interview. 20 March 2012.

Gender researcher/old wave IDP, Personal Interview, 21 March 2012.

Georgia. Government of Georgia. "Members.” Web. 28 April 2012.

Georgian Official (Government of Georgia). Personal Interview. 14 March 2012.

Georgia. Parliament of Georgia. "Gender Equality Advisory Council Under The Chairman Of The Parliament Of Georgia.” Web. 28 April 2012.

Georgia. Parliament of Georgia. "Members of Parliament.” Web. 28 April 2012.

Georgia. Parliament of Georgia. "Temporary Commission on Territorial Integrity Issues.” Web. 28 April 2012.

“Georgia’s capital is on the move.” Democracy and Freedom Watch. Web. 12 January 2012.

Gewis, Tina (Protection and Advocacy Adviser, Norwegian Refugee Council). Personal Interview. 21 March 2012.

Gogorishvili, Khatuna (MP, Parliament of Georgia). Personal Interview. 22 March 2012.

Government of Georgia. “2012-2015 National Action Plan for Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions #1325, 1820, 1888, 1889 and 1960 on ‘Women, Peace and Security.’” Web. 27 December 2011.

Government of Georgia. Action Plan for the Implementation of the State Strategy on IDP during 2009- 2012. 11 May 2010.

Government of Georgia. Law # 335-IIS on Forcibly Displaced Persons (Persecuted) from the Occupied Territories of Georgia. 30 December 2011. Web. 20 January 2011.

Government of Georgia. State Strategy on Internally Displaced Persons – Persecuted. 2 February 2007. www.internal-displacement.org/.../State+Strategy+for+IDP+-+ENG.pdf

Government-in-exile representative. Personal Interview. 19 March 2012.

Guledani, Marina (Managing Partner, CFS Legal Guledani & Partners). Personal Interview. 23 March 2012.

115 Gvalia, Eka (Executive Director, Charity Humanitarian Center “Abkhazeti”). Personal interview. 18 April 2012.

Hausmann, Ricardo, Laura D. Tyson and Saadia Zahidi. “The Global Gender Gap Report 2011,” World Economic Forum, Geneva, Switzerland. 1 November 2011. Web. 15 December 2011.

Human Rights Watch. “Georgia/Abkhazia: Back Home but in Limbo." July 2011. Web. 23 April 2012.

IDP in Potskho-Etzeri. Personal Interview. 17 March 2012.

Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. “Georgia: Partial progress towards durable solutions for IDPs.” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. March 2012. Print.

Internally Displaced Persons (Collective Center, Zugdidi). Personal Interview. 19 March 2012.

International Finance Corporation, “Georgia Shares Experience to Improve Business Regulation Environment in Region,” Web. 21 May 2012.

International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Report. April 2011. Web. 30 April 2012.

Jojua, Mzevi (Danish Refugee Council Zugdidi). Personal Interview. 20 March 2012.

Kabachnik, Peter, Joanna Regulska and Beth Mitchneck. “Where and When is Home? The Double Displacement of Georgian IDPs from Abkhazia,” Journal of Refugee Studies (2010)23 (3): 315- 336. 5 August 2010. Web. 1 September 2011.

Kabachnik, Peter, Magda Grabowska, Joanna Regulska, Beth Mitchneck, and Olga V. Mayorova. “Traumatic Masculinities: The Gendered Geographies of Georgian IDPs from Abkhazia,” May 2011. Web. 2 February 2012.

Kakachia, Kornely (Professor, Tbilisi State University). Personal Interview. 30 January 2012.

Kalandarishvili, Nino (Director, Institute for the Study of Nationalism and Conflict, Member of Synergy). Personal Interview. 30 January 2012.

Karosanidze, Tamuna (Deputy Chief of Party, G-PAC/East West Management Institute). Personal Interview. 30 January 2012.

Kervalishvili, Rusudan (Deputy Chairperson of the Parliament of Georgia). Personal Interview. 22 March 2012.

Kharashvili, Julia (Chairperson, IDP Women’s Association “Consent”). Personal Interview. 30 January 2012.

Khatia (Taso Foundation). Personal Interview. 19 March 2012.

Khorava, Dalila (Georgian Support for Refugees NGO). Personal interview. 22 March 2012.

Kupunia, Teonia (Women's Political Participation Program Officer, National Democratic Institute). Personal Interview. 13 March 2012.

116 Lanskoy, Miriam and Giorgi Areshidze. "Georgia's Year of Turmoil." Journal of Democracy October 19.4 (2008): 154-68.

Lobzhanidze, Nana (Transparency International). Personal interview. 14 March 2012.

Machavariani, Eka. Gaenati Conference / Personal Interview, 20 March 2012.

Maisuradze, Thea (IDP Woman). Personal interview. 15 March 2012.

Mchedlishvili, Zurab (Assistant to the Deputy Chairperson of the Parliament of Georgia). Personal Interview. 15 March 2012.

Menabde, Vakhushti (Georgian NGO Representative). Personal interview. 21 March 2012.

Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees, “Durable Housing Strategy as a part of the Action Plan for implementation of the State Strategy,” December 2010. Web. 24 April 2012.

Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees. Draft: “Overall Assessment of the Resources Required for the Implementation of the IDP State Strategy Action Plan: 2012-2014.” Print.

Mitchell, Lincoln (Associate Professor, Harriman Institute, Columbia University). Personal Interview. 9 December 2011.

Mitchell, Lincoln. "Democracy Bound." The National Interest. May-June (2008): 73-74. Print.

Mitchell, Lincoln. "Democracy in Georgia Since the Rose Revolution." Orbis 50.4 (2006). 669-676. Print.

Nahzi, Fron [Director, East-West Management Institute (former)]. Personal Interview. 21 December 2011.

National Democratic Institute. “Public attitudes in Georgia: Results of a February 2012 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC.” National Democratic Institute. March 2012. Print.

New wave men IDPs. Focus Group. 13 March 2012.

New wave women IDPs. Focus Group. 2 February 2012.

NGO Representative, Roundtable Discussion. 23 March 2012.

Norwegian Refugee Council. “Georgia: Partial progress toward durable solutions – a profile of the internal displacement situation.” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Norwegian Refugee Council. 21 March 2012.

Old wave men IDPs. Focus Group. 12 March 2012.

Old wave women IDPs. Focus Group. 3 February 2012.

Ombudsman representative. Personal interview. 15 March 2012.

Petriashvili, Alex (Our Georgia – Free Democrats). Personal Interview. 23 March 2012.

117 Phillips, David (Director, Institute for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University). Personal interview. 8 March 2012.

Piranishvili, Vakho (Project Director, CARE International). Personal Interview. 2 February 2012.

Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty. “Self-Immolation Incident Highlights Desperation of Georgian IDPs,” 29 Oct 2012. Web. 7 May 2012.

“Report on the Human Rights Situation of Internally Displaced Persons and Conflict-Affected Individuals in Georgia.” Public Defender of Georgia. July 2010. Print.

Roundtable Discussion. Women’s Political Resource Center, Tbilisi. 23 March 2012.

Rusetskaia, Elene (Women’s Information Center). Personal Interview. 15 March 2012.

Sabedashvili, Tamar (Gender Advisor for Georgia, UN Women). Personal Interview. 27 Jan 2012.

Schofield, Juliet, Steven Schoofs and Hema Kotecha. “Building Inclusive Governance: Women’s Political Participation in Conflict-Affected Georgia,” International Alert. Nov 2010. Web. 20 December 2012.

Senior Fellow (Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies). Personal Interview. 20 March 2012.

Senior Government Official (Government of Georgia). Personal Interview. 3 February 2012.

Sheets, Lawrence (International Crisis Group). Personal Interview. 13 March 2012.

Sovakar, Mira (Caucasus Projects Manager, Conciliation Resources). Personal Interview. 7 March 2012.

Staff person (UNHCR Zugdidi). Personal Interview, 19 March 2012.

Stampfer, Caroline (European External Action Service, Tbilisi). Personal Interview. 20 March 2012.

Statistical yearbook of Georgia. Web. 28 April 2012.

Sumbadze, Nana (Co-Director, Institute for Policy Studies). Personal Interview. 15 March 2012.

Tabukashvili, Marina (Deputy Director, Taso Foundation). Personal interview. 14 March 2012.

Tarkhan-Mouravi, George. Assessment of IDP livelihoods in Georgia: facts and policies. United Nations High Commission on Refugees. February 2009. Web. 22 November 2011.

Tavartkiladze, Tamar and Graziella Piga (UN Women). Personal Interview. 12 March 2012.

Taylor, Shelley E., Laura Cousino Klein, Brian P. Lewis, Tara L. Gruenewald, Regan A. R. Gurung, and John A. Updegraff. “Biobehavioral Responses to Stress in Females:Tend-and-Befriend, Not Fight-or- Flight,” Psychological Review 107: 3 (2000). Print.

“The representative of Georgia made a report on women’s status in New York on UN Commission 56th Session,” Gender Information Network of South Caucasus. Web. 3 March 2012.

118 Transparency International Georgia. “Cottage Settlements for Georgia's New IDPs: Accountability in Aid and Construction.” 27 April 2010. Web. 26 April 2012.

Tsiskarishvili, Lela. “Effects of Chronic Trauma on Internally Displaced Persons,” The Georgian Center for Psychosocial and Medical Rehabilitation of torture victims – GCRT,” Living in Displacement Conference. Tucson, Arizona. March 2011.

Tskitishvili, Gocha; Dershem, Larry; and Kechakmadze, Vano. Social Capital and Employment Opportunities Among Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia. The World Bank, Tbilisi. May 2005. Print.

Tsulukiani, Thea (Deputy Chairperson, Our Georgia – Free Democrats). Personal Interview. 23 March 2012.

Turashvili, Medea (International Crisis Group). Personal interview. 13 March 2012.

UNHCR. Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons. 2008.

UNHCR Georgia. “Report on Participatory Assessments for the Extension of the IDP Action Plan.” December 2011. Web. 8 January 2012.

UNHCR Representative. Personal Interview. 13 March 2012.

UNIFEM. “Rapid Needs Assessment of Internally Displaced Women: Findings and Recommendations,” Institute for Policy Studies. Oct 2008. Web. 6 December 2011.

"United Nations Universal Periodic Review," Gender Informational Network of South Caucasus. 12 July 2010. Web. 24 April 2012.

Veitsman, Stan (Peace and Development Advisor, UNDP). Personal Interview. 12 March 2012.

Walicki, Nadine. “Part Protracted, Part Progress: Durable Solutions for IDPs through Local Integration in Georgia” in Resolving Internal Displacement: Prospects for Local Integration. Elizabeth Ferris (ed.). Brookings Institution – London School of Economics Project on Internal Displacement. June 2011. Web. 25 April 2012.

"Widespread unemployment takes its toll," World Vision. Web. 28 April 2012.

World Bank. Georgia: Poverty and income distribution. Web. 30 April 2012.

"World Economic Outlook Database – April 2012". International Monetary Fund. Web. 28 April 2012.

Young IDP Women (Sokhumi University students). Focus Group. 22 March 2012.

119