Conflict Financing and the Recurrence of Intra-State Armed Conflict
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INSTITUT UNIVERSITAIRE DE HAUTES ÉTUDES INTERNATIONALES CONFLICT FINANCING AND THE RECURRENCE OF INTRA-STATE ARMED CONFLICT What can be done from the perspective of conflict financing to prevent the recurrence of intra-state armed conflict? THÈSE Présentée à l’Université de Genève Pour l’obtention Du grade de Docteur en relations internationales (Sciences politiques) Par Achim WENNMANN (Allemagne) Thèse Nº 753 Genève 2007 2 3 CONFLICT FINANCING AND THE RECURRENCE OF INTRA-STATE ARMED CONFLICT What can be done from the perspective of conflict financing to prevent the recurrence of intra-state armed conflict? © Copyright 2007 by Achim WENNMANN 4 5 INSTITUT UNIVERSITAIRE DE HAUTES ÉTUDES INTERNATIONALES CONFLICT FINANCING AND THE RECURRENCE OF INTRA-STATE ARMED CONFLICT What can be done from the perspective of conflict financing to prevent the recurrence of intra-state armed conflict? THÈSE Présentée à l’Université de Genève Pour l’obtention Du grade de Docteur en relations internationales (Sciences politiques) Par Achim WENNMANN (Allemagne) Thèse Nº 753 Genève 2007 6 7 Achim WENNMANN Sur le préavis de MM. Keith KRAUSE et Cédric DUPONT, Professeurs à l'Institut, et M. Mats BERDAL, Professor, School of Social Science and Public Policy, King’s College London, le Directeur de l'Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales, agissant au nom de la Commission mixte de l'Université et de l'Institut, composée des Doyens des Facultés de droit, des lettres, et des sciences économiques et sociales, autorise l'impression de la présente thèse sans entendre par là exprimer d'opinion sur les propositions qui y sont énoncées. Genève, le 3 décembre 2007 pour la Commission mixte: Professeur Philippe Burrin Directeur Thèse N° 753 8 9 To my family and Soledad Si la vida te da limones, haz limonada. 10 11 Table of contents INTRODUCTION 23 CHAPTER 1: Exploring conflict recurrence and financing 37 1.1. The Political Economy of Conflict 38 1.2. The recurrence of conflict 72 1.3. The financing of conflict 84 1.4. Conclusion 97 CHAPTER 2: The relationship between conflict financing and recurrence 99 2.1. Potential revenue sources to finance armed conflict 103 2.2. The cost to start and maintain armed conflict 113 2.3. Incentives to use armed force 139 2.4. Hypotheses 145 2.5. Conclusion 149 CHAPTER 3: Angola 151 3.1. Background 152 3.2. Conflict recurrence after the Bicesse Accords, 1992-1994 165 3.3. Conflict recurrence after the Lusaka Peace Process, 1995-2002 183 3.4. Risk of conflict recurrence in post-conflict Angola 205 3.5. Conclusion 210 CHAPTER 4: The Abkhazia conflict 215 4.1. Background 217 4.2. Armed conflict in Abkhazia, 1992-1994 230 4.3. The “Frozen Conflict”, 1994-2003 240 4.4. The Rose Revolution, 2003-2006 257 4.5. Conclusion 272 CHAPTER 5: Kosovo 277 5.1. Background 279 5.2. Parallel governance and non-violent resistance, 1989-1995 393 5.3. The rise of the KLA and armed conflict in Kosovo, 1995-1999 303 5.4. Kosovo under international administration, 1999-2006 314 5.5. Conclusion 330 CHAPTER 6: Analysis 335 6.1 Conflict financing and conflict recurrence 336 6.2. Implications for peacebuilding 356 6.3. Conclusion 367 CONCLUSION 369 APPENDIX 379 Appendix 1: List of interviews 379 Appendix 2: Maps 383 BIBLIOGRAPHY 393 12 13 Detailed table of contents Table of contents 11 Detailed table of contents 13 List of tables 17 Acknowledgements 21 INTRODUCTION 23 Conflict recurrence from the perspective of conflict financing 24 Towards a better understanding of conflict financing 25 A conceptual framework for the analysis of conflict dynamics 26 Methodology and case studies 29 Summary of the findings and contributions 31 Thesis overview 34 CHAPTER 1: Exploring conflict recurrence and financing 37 1.1. The Political Economy of Conflict 38 1.1.1. Globalisation, weak states and armed conflict 41 1.1.2. Economic agendas in armed conflict 49 1.1.3.“Greed and Grievance” 52 The Collier-Hoeffler Model on Civil War Onset 53 Achievements and limitations 56 The case study project on civil war onset 59 1.1.4. Beyond “Greed and Grievance” 60 Contextualising and broadening the analytical framework 61 Natural resources and armed conflict 64 The intersection of need, creed and greed 67 1.1.5. Elements for a framework of analysis 68 1.2. The recurrence of conflict 72 1.2.1. Empirical analysis of conflict recurrence 72 1.2.2. Conflict recurrence and perpetuation 76 1.2.3. Explaining conflict recurrence 79 The legacies of previous armed conflict 79 The post-conflict period 80 The failure of peace agreements 82 1.2.4. Conflict recurrence and financing 84 1.3. The financing of conflict 84 1.1.1. Historical aspects of conflict financing 85 1.1.2. The economy of insurgencies 89 1.1.3. Conflict financing after the end of the Cold War 93 1.1.4. Towards a comprehensive approach of conflict financing 96 1.4. Conclusion 97 14 CHAPTER 2: The relationship between conflict financing and recurrence 99 2.1. Potential revenue sources to finance armed conflict 103 2.1.1. Centralized war economy 104 2.1.2. Conflict goods 105 2.1.3. External assistance 108 2.1.4. Other methods 110 2.1.5. Potential revenue sources in post-conflict areas 112 2.2. The cost to start and maintain armed conflict 113 2.2.1. Conceptual and empirical aspects of the cost of armed conflict 114 2.2.2. Establishing cost drivers 116 2.2.3. Estimating the cost of armed conflict 120 CER 1: Weapons for the start-up of conflict 122 CER 2: Ammunition for the start-up of conflict 123 CER 3: Salaries for the maintenance of conflict 125 CER 4: Weapons for the maintenance of conflict 127 CER 5: Ammunition for the maintenance of conflict 130 2.2.4. Possibilities and limitations 133 2.3. Expected future benefits and opportunity costs of using armed force 139 2.3.1. Agency and the recurrence of armed conflict 139 2.3.2. Expected future benefits 141 2.3.3. Opportunity costs 143 2.3.4. Researchability 144 2.4. Hypotheses 145 2.5. Conclusion 149 CHAPTER 3: Angola 151 3.1. Background 152 3.1.1. The colonial war, 1961-1974 153 3.1.2. Civil war, 1975-1991 156 3.1.3. Renewed armed conflict, 1992-1994 159 3.1.4. Armed conflict renewed again, 1998-2002 160 3.1.5. Post-conflict Angola, 2002-2006 162 3.1.6. The role of oil and diamonds in Angola’s wars 164 3.2. Conflict recurrence after the Bicesse Accords, 1992-1994 165 3.2.1. Available revenue sources 165 3.2.2. The cost of conflict 171 3.2.3. Expected benefits and opportunity costs 179 3.2.4. Assessment 182 3.3. Conflict recurrence after the Lusaka Peace Process, 1995-2002 183 3.3.1. Available revenue sources 184 3.3.2. The cost of conflict 193 3.3.3. Expected benefits and opportunity costs 200 3.3.4. Assessment 202 3.4. Risk of conflict recurrence in post-conflict Angola 205 3.5. Conclusion 210 15 CHAPTER 4: The Abkhazia conflict 215 4.1. Background 217 4.1.1. The rise of nationalism in Georgia 218 4.1.2. The years of armed conflict, 1991-1994 219 4.1.3. Post-conflict development in Georgia and Abkhazia, 1994-2006 223 4.1.4. The role of external actors 225 4.1.5. Parallel economies and the Abkhazia conflict 229 4.2. Armed conflict in Abkhazia, 1992-1994 230 4.2.1. Available revenue sources 231 4.2.2. The cost of conflict 234 4.2.3. Expected benefits and opportunity costs 236 4.2.4. Assessment 238 4.3. The “Frozen Conflict”, 1994-2003 240 4.3.1. Available revenue sources 240 4.3.2. The cost of conflict 248 4.3.3. Expected benefits and opportunity costs 252 4.3.4. Assessment 256 4.4. The Rose Revolution, 2003-2006 257 4.4.1. Available revenue sources 258 4.4.2. The cost of conflict 263 4.4.3. Expected benefits and opportunity costs 266 4.4.5. Assessment 271 4.5. Conclusion 272 CHAPTER 5: Kosovo 277 5.1. Background 279 5.1.1. The demise of Yugoslavia 280 5.1.2. Repression and non-violent resistance in Kosovo, 1989-1995 282 5.1.3. The rise of the KLA, 1995-1998 285 5.1.4. Armed conflict, 1998-1999 286 5.1.5. Post-conflict Kosovo, 1999-2006 288 5.1.6. The diaspora and the Kosovo conflict 293 5.2. Parallel governance and non-violent resistance, 1989-1995 293 5.2.1. Available revenue sources 294 5.2.2. The cost of conflict 297 5.2.3. Expected benefits and opportunity costs 301 5.2.4. Assessment 301 5.3. The rise of the KLA and armed conflict in Kosovo, 1995-1999 303 5.3.1. Available revenue sources 304 5.3.2. The cost of conflict 307 5.3.3. Expected benefits and opportunity costs 310 5.3.4. Assessment 312 5.4. Kosovo under international administration, 1999-2006 314 5.4.1. Available revenue sources 314 16 5.4.2. The cost of conflict 320 5.4.3. Expected benefits and opportunity costs 323 5.4.4. Assessment 328 5.5. Conclusion 330 CHAPTER 6: Analysis 335 6.1. Conflict financing and conflict recurrence 336 6.1.1. Conflict financing and the feasibility and viability of rebellion 337 6.1.2. Understanding conflict financing 339 Revenue capture 339 Revenue management 340 The financial potential of revenue sources 341 6.1.3.