FWS/OBS- 78/70 October 1978 Fish and Wildlife Protect;on in the Planningand Construction of the Trans-AlaskaOil Pipeline

by Thomas A. Morehouse, Robert A. Childers, and Linda E. Leask Institute of Social and Economic Research University of Anchorage, Fairbanks, Juneau

Project Officers Performed for Norval Netsch Fish and Wildlife Service U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service U.S. Department of the Interior 1011 E. Tudor Road , D.C. 20240 Anchorage, Alaska 99507 This study was conducted as Sumner A. Dole part of the Federal I nteragency Office of Biological Services Energy-Environment Research Fish and Wildlife Service and Development Program, U.S. Department of the Interior U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Washington, D.C. 20240 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 Stock Number 024-010·00470-3

ii Foreword

The discovery of huge oil deposits on Alaska's North Slope in 1968 resulted in immediate planning for rapid transport of oil to U.S. markets. Concurrent with consideration of alternative means for moving the oil, including preliminary design of a proposed pipeline, an aroused general public demanded earnest governmental evaluation of the environmental impacts of the project. This growing awareness and concern was reflected in the passage of the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act requiring an Environmental Impact Statement on any proposal for major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. These developments set the stage for subsequent court battles and Congressional actions. Many agencies representing various interests of the Federal Government, the State of Alaska, the private sector, as well as numerous individuals concerned with conservation of fish, wildlife and the environment, expressed frequently differing viewpoints and contributed a variety of recommendations. For most parties, the Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline project-one of the largest and most costly ever to be undertaken-entailed a new set of parameters and required novel analyses and approaches. Nonetheless, important decisions were reached regarding authorities, responsibilities, organizational structures, and relationships among govern­ ment agencies, and between government and private industry. From the outset of the project, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service recognized the unique opportunity it offered to gain insight into the complex developmental process characteristic of such an enterprise. From the beginning and throughout the process the Service conducted studies to help minimize the environmental impacts of construction of the pipeline. Among these, the present report, Fish and Wildlife Pmtection in the Planning and Construction of the Tmns-Alaska Oil Pipeline, focuses on fish and wildlife protection issues in the course of planning, establishing, and conducting monitoring activities. In addition, it explores the rationale behind the decisionmaking process and offers recommendations for improved environ­ mental management in future cases. The principal usefulness of the study comes from the guidance it offers for the conduct of future projects requiring similar monitoring efforts, such as the Arctic Gas Pipeline, or any other large scale enterprise in Alaska and elsewhere. As a study of significant environmental management issues, it will be of interest to a variety of users, including government agencies, private industry, resource managers, the environmental community, and the academic community.

LynnJ:~ . Greenwall~~~ Direct U.S. Fis Wildlife Service

iii Acknowledgements

We are indebted to many people for their cooperation and support in prepar­ ing this study. Norval Netsch and Sumner Dole of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service served as their agency's project officers for the study contract; they consistently supported the independence of our research while providing en­ couragement and assistance. Morris J. Turner, acting authorized officer of the Alaska Pipeline Office, helped assure the cooperation of APO central office and field staffs and per­ sonally contributed valuable information. State pipeline coordinator Charles Champion was similarly cooperative to the extent of our more limited work on the state's pipeline surveillance organization. We particularly want to thank Julius Rockwell, APO-Joint Fish and Wildlife Advisory Team fisheries biologist, for helping to guide us through some of the intricacies of his professional field. Jewell Darr of APO's administrative staff graciously and efficiently accommodated our rather extensive requests for file materials. James Hemming, federal coordinator, and Allan Carson, state supervisor, of the Joint Fish and Wildlife Advisory Team made it possible for us to look closely at JFW AT's experience. They and their JFW AT colleagues provided much critical information and many insights, and we are extremely grateful to them and to their support staff. We want finally to thank our institute colleagues-particularly Michael Scott and. Arlon Tussing-for their suggestions and interest in the project; Susan Yates for organizing the administrative support necessary to our work; and Marjorie Matlock for the care and patience with which she typed the vari­ ous drafts of our manuscript.

IV Table of Contents

Page List of Figures ...... v Executive Summary ...... vii Part 1-Introduction ...... 1 Chapter I-Introduction ...... 3 Chapter II-Pipeline Construction and Surveillance ...... 7 Part 2-Pre-Permit Phase ...... 15

Chapter III-Policy Development: An Overview ...... ! • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 17 Chapter IV-Pipeline Planning ...... 27 Part 3-Construction Phase ...... 41 Chapter V-Government Surveillance Organization and Policy . . . . . 43 Chapter VI-Government Surveillance Operations ...... 55 Chapter VII-Stream Crossings and Big Game Crossings ...... 71 Part 4-Conclusions and Recommendations ...... 85 Chapter VIII-Conclusions and Recommendations ...... 87 Appendixes ...... 93 Appendix A: Selected Portions of Stipulations ...... 95 Appendix B: The Jurisdictions of the Federal and State Governments Over the Construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, by H. Clifton Eames, Jr...... 98 Appendix C: Chapman and Sheep Creeks Crossing Histories ...... 107 Appendix D: Analysis of the Costs of Delay in the Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline Project, by Michael J. Scott ...... 115 List of Interviews ...... 123 References Cited ...... 127

List of Figures

Figure 1-Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline Route ...... 8 Figure 2-Government Surveillance Organizatioh ...... 38 Figure 3-Alaska Pipeline Office Organization Chart ...... 45 Figure 4-Joint Fish and Wildlife Advisory Team Organization Chart ...... 49

V Disclaimer

The opinions, findings. conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarilv reflect the views of the Office of Biolog1cal Services. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, nor does mention of trade names or commercial products constitute endorsement or recommendation for use by the federal government.

vi Executive Summary

Scope and Purposes led to the establishment of JFWAT and deter­ mined its place within the larger government Stretching from the 800 miles surveillance system. Second, it examines how the south to , the trans-Alaska surveillance system worked during the construc­ oil pipeline crosses hundreds of fish streams and tion period, concentrating on fish and wildlife habitats and migration routes of dozens of species protection activities. This is not an assessment of of animals and birds. How these fish and wildlife the environmental impacts of the trans-Alaska along the route were to be protected during pipe­ pipeline, but rather an examination of how the or­ line construction was a question State of Alaska ganization that was ultimately established to pro­ and U.S. government agencies began considering tect fish and wildlife worked during construction in 1969, when a group of oil companies proposed and what factors influenced its effectiveness. The to build the pipeline which would carry oil from report looks primarily at involvement of federal the recently-discovered Prudhoe Bay field. agencies in the pipeline planning and construc­ By 1974, when work on the pipeline system be­ tion processes, but also includes some discussion gan, the federal and state governments had estab­ of state planning and surveillance activities. lished environmental and technical standards the pipeline builders agreed to meet and had set 11p Planning Period: 1969-1973 separate surveillance organizations to oversee After a group of oil companies applied for fed­ construction along the route crossing about 550 eral approval to build a pipeline spanning all four miles of federal and 250 miles of state land. These of Alaska's major physiographic regions, three organizations-the federal Alaska Pipeline Office and the State Pipeline Coordinator's Office-were mountain ranges, and several earthquake faults, intended to concentrate, as much as possible, re­ national environmental organizations initiated a sponsibilities of various government agencies for court suit that held up the start of construction regulating projects affecting public land and until after the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authoriza­ thus to increase efficiency of government pipeline tion Act was passed in late 1973. During this four­ surveillance. year delay, government pipeline planning and Although forming separate surveillance agen­ policy making was dominated by two basic cies, the State of Alaska and the Department of forces-conflicts between energy development the Interior agreed on establishment of a joint or­ and environmental interests and objectives; and ganization to advise both surveillance agencies on jurisdictional claims and counterclaims among how best to protect fish and wildlife during pipe­ government agencies at both state and federal line construction. The resulting Joint Fish and levels. Also involved were questions of the rela­ Wildlife Advisory Team (JFW AT), made up of tive extent and limits of federal government and biologists drawn from several federal and state state government authority and differing philos­ ophies of government responsibility for the regu­ agencies, often clashed with the broader surveil­ lation of private industrial development. The lance organizations during construction, largely general outcomes of this complex of forces were: over whether the pipeline builders were protect­ ing fish and wildlife as they had agreed to do and 1. Energy development objectives had priority whether priority should be· given to quick com­ over environmental protection objectives pletion of the pipeline or protection of resources but not to the exclusion of the latter. along the route. 2. Agencies at both federal and state levels This report looks first at how government sur­ whose capabilities and interests were most veillance policy-particularly policy toward fish consistent with the development priority and wildlife protection-evolved in the years be­ tended to dominate in the pipeline planning tween the Prudhoe Bay discovery and the start of and later the construction surveillance proc­ pipeline construction, discussing the forces that esses.

vii 3. The federal government effectively asserted best equipped to deal with technical problems. primary control over pipeline surveillance Also, assuring pipeline integrity came to be seen matters, and the State of Alaska played a as the best means of protecting the environment secondary role-except in the area of fish in the long run. This shift in emphasis resulted in and wildlife protection. fish and wildlife agencies in Alaska having less 4. Government responses to the oil companies' opportunity to play active and direct roles in the interests in pipeline construction tended planning process than they had had in 1969 and overall to be facilitative, but government 1970, before engineering problems overshadowed also demanded assurance of the structural more subtle environmental concerns. integrity of the pipeline, which, in turn, During thi's planning period (and later in the helped assure longer-run environmental construction period), the State of Alaska's role integrity as well. was secondary to the federal government's; the pipeline project was of national interest, was in­ Early on, the Department of the Interior be­ volved in interstate commerce, and depended pri­ came the lead agency for pipeline planning. And marily on federal policy actions. Also, the state Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM), government had taken an early, strong position­ with its responsibilities for land and resource con­ primarily for economic reasons-in support of servation and management and its jurisdiction pipeline construction and left formulating an en­ over federal lands along the prospective right-of­ vironmental surveillance policy mainly in federal way, began working in 1969 in Alaska with oil hands. companies planning the project. By the end of the year, BLM had established a pipeline division in Alaska, headed by an engineer. Fisheries and Construction Period: 1974-1977 wildlife biologists had joined the pipeline division by 1970, and the division's fisheries biologist In late 1973, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Author­ helped organize the Interagency Fish and Wild­ ization Act was passed, calling for "expeditious life Team, an informal group of federal and state construction" of the pipeline. This clear congres­ biologists who shared information and coordi­ sional directive for quick completion of the line nated efforts on a series of environmental studies and the emphasis on technical-engineering prob­ that had been initiated along the proposed route lems that had evolved during the years of pipeline by various agencies. planning became the mainstays of government Reflecting an early federal government em­ surveillance policy during pipeline construction. phasis on protection of the environment during But environmental concerns were by no means pipeline construction, the BLM's resource man­ ignored in the 1973 act; federal officials were di­ agement staff led an interagency effort in 1969 to rected to insure environmental impact was held prepare environmental "stipulations'' the pipe­ to a minimum, and the act outlined broad protec­ line builders were to meet in construction and op­ tive and remedial measures the pipeline builders eration of the line. Representatives of fish and were to take. wildlife agencies were involved in writing these When construction of the pipeline was approved stipulations and in the next several years also by the federal government, the Interior Depart­ took part in preparing the environmental impact ment created a surveillance agency, the Alaska statement required for the pipeline project under Pipeline Office, outside the BLM and under the the National Environmental Policy Act. Office of the Under Secretary. The s.tate also es­ But even as the environmental stipulations tablished the State Pipeline Coordinator's Office were being written, the seriousness of permafrost, to oversee construction across state lands. In seismic, river crossing and other technical-engi­ early 1974, the state and federal governments neering problems became ever more apparent, and the oil companies making up Alyeska Pipe­ and Interior's U.S. Geological Survey was drawn line Service Company signed right-of-way agree­ increasingly into pipeline planning. In 1970, it was ments for construction of the pipeline; these determined that a set of technical stipulations agreements. outlined broad environmental and should be developed in addition to the environ­ technical standards ("stipulations") the pipeline mental stipulations, and government emphasis builders were to meet. Before and during con­ shifted to basic technical problems affecting struction, the federal and state surveillance or­ pipeline integrity, with planning initiative and ganizations established, based on biologists' rec­ influence moving to those agencies and officials ommendations, several specific standards the

viii pipeline builders were to meet under the broad JFWAT was influenced by several factors: requirements of the environmental stipulations for protection of fish and wilrllife-major river 1. Broad government surveillance policy that crossings were to be constructed during certain placed priority on assuring pipeline integ- periods when biologists judged effects on fish rity and completing the project quickly. would be least; speed of water passing through 2. Alyeska's failure to establish an effective en­ ctilverts was not to exceed specified rates affect­ vironmental quality control program dur­ ing fish passage; standards were set for construc­ ing pipeline construction, placing unantici­ tion of buried and elevated big game crossings. pated burdens on small government moni­ The Alaska Pipeline Office and the State Pipe­ toring staffs. line Coordinator's Office were to enforce those 3. Inconsistent stipulation enforcement among standards through both office and field staffs, all government field monitors, due largely and the heads of both organizations had broad to lack of training in stipulation interpreta­ authority to approve variations from the stipula­ tion and application and inadequate direc­ tions if the pipeline builders could show the need tion from heads of surveillance organiza­ for them. tions. The state and federal governments also signed 4. Inexperience of many JFWAT biologists in a cooperative agreement calling for joint protec­ monitoring large construction projects and tion of fish and wildlife along the route; this provi­ insufficient engineering expertise within sion in the cooperative agreement led to the JFWAT. formation in May 1974ofth~JointFishand Wild­ 5. Unwillingness of some government engi­ life Advisory Team (JFWAT), made up of biolo­ neers to accept biologists' assessments of the gists detailed from the Alaska Department of significance and urgency of situations af­ Fish and Game, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv­ fecting fish and wildlife. ice, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and the Bureau of Land Management for the con­ 6. General lack of understanding of each other's struction period. professions among biologists and engineers. JFWAT was to advise the two broader surveil­ But the major finding of the study is that lance organizations on how best to protect fish despite the surveillance system priorities and and wildlife during construction. The team's of­ other factors that affected JFWAT, the team's fice and field staffs made recommendations to the unique position "inside and outside" the separate Alaska Pipeline Office and State Pipeline Coordi­ government surveillance organizations and the nator's Office, but had no authority to direct Al­ statutory authorities members brought with yeska to take action. All positions of authority in them, strengthened JFWAT by giving it a degree the Alaska Pipeline Office during construction of independence within the larger surveillance were held by engineers who determined if Al­ system. In a more clearly defined hierarchical yeska was meeting required standards, and if system, it is doubtful that fish and wildlife inter­ not, what actions Alyeska should be directed to ests would have had the influence they had during take. pipeline construction; despite efficiencies to be Although advisory to the broader surveillance gained by concentrating government surveil­ organizations, the biologists detailed from sev­ lance authorities within a single agency, there eral agencies brought with them some statutory are clear advantages-particularly for agencies authority of their home agencies, and this author­ representing nondominant interests, as did the ity-particularly the Alaska Department of Fish fish and wildlife agencies in this case-in allow­ and Game's authority to restrict activities in ana­ ing for the exercise of independent authority as dromous fish streams-together with the team's well. unique joint structure that placed it somewhere The study recommends that with improved between the separate surveillance organizations, training for fish and wildlife and other govern­ gave the team a degree of independence from ment monitors and more clearly defined stand­ those it advised. ards for applying government requirements and other modifications, a joint federal-state advisory Major Findings and Conclusions group similar to JFW AT should be established to protect fish and wildlife during future large con­ This report finds that the effectiveness of struction projects.

ix

Fish and Wildlife Protection in the Planning and Construction of the Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline

Part 1 - lntrodu-ction

Chapter I - Introduction

We view our work as being a job to make sure this line is built as quickly as possible, with a minimum of disturbance to the environment. -Andrew Rollins, authorized officer Alaska Pipeline Office October 19741

Due in no ~mall part t~ surveillance e.[forts, the pipeline project has been fair(}' successful in avoiding adverse env,ro~men~al unpacts .. Ho.wever, when compared with the ideal, or with the degree o_fimpact that would be possible wuhout cert am llme and money constraints, success in avoiding those impacts has been only partial. Robert LeResche, chief, habitat protection section Alaska Department of Fish and Game April 19762

How the environment was to be protected dur­ dealt with in the processes of planning and building the ing trans-Alaska pipeline construction was a trans-Alaska pipeline; question government officials considered before 2. explain why decisions and outcomes affecting fish and and during construction, and broad-ranging re­ wildlife protection occurred as they did; and quirements for safeguarding the environment 3. draw conclusions and make recommendations for gov­ ernment surveillance of future development projects in were established by the federal and state govern­ Alaska and elsewhere. ments before work on the pipeline project began. But as the above comments indicate, there were This is a study of government environmental differences among government officials over surveillance policy, organization and process, what priority should be given quick completion focusing on the fish and wildlife aspects of pipe­ of the project as compared with protection of re­ line planning and construction between 1969 and sources along the route, and what constituted 1977. It is not an assessment of the environmental "minimum" environmental impact. The question impacts of the trans-Alaska pipeline or even of its of most concern in this study is: how and to what effec~ on fish and wildlife, except as these enter extent were fish and wildlife protection objec­ into descriptions of how the pipeline monitoring tives in particular accommodated in the planning and building of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline? An process worked. This study instead assesses the answer to this more limited question may provide planning and decision making by government grounds for broader conclusions concerning how agencies that established the framework and set far the art of environmental protection was ad­ the rules for environmental surveillance, empha­ vanced and how effectively government per­ sizing its fish and wildlife aspects. The report formed its environmental surveillance functions concentrates on involvement of federal agencies in this case. but also includes some discussion of activities of state government before and during pipeline con­ struction. We are concerned with how and why Scope and Objectives certain decisions were made, who made them The objectives of this case study are to: and with what results. ' 1. describe how fish and wildlife protection values were Many government agencies at federal and state levels participated in pipeline-related activities bet:veen 1969, when Alyeska submitted its appli­ cat10n for a federal right-of-way permit, and ,. 1 Ar!=tic ~nvironmental Council. ReJiorl 011 tlw 011-Sifi, Vi,-:ilto f/w Tr1111:-:-,-1/wdm I '.f!~'l111!'."i!fi;fn11, October 1974. p. 10. 1977, when oil began to flow through the finished - I est1rnon~ of Rouert l~. Leltesche uefore the Federal Power Commission ( no date. approximately April 197H). line. The first five years were devoted primarily 3 to planning work by government agencies and veillance at the Valdez terminal and looks only Alyeska, although there was an early flurry of de­ briefly at surveillance on the 360-mile haul road velopment activity-road and camp construction built in conjunction with the pipeline. and materials transport-before all such activity In the planning phase, from 1969 to 1974, most was effectively halted by court action in early of the involvement of the fish and wildlife agen­ 1970t when national environmental organizations cies occurred through their work with the Bureau challenged the authority of the Department of the of Land Management's pipeline division in Interior to grant a right-of-way permit. Alaska. And once construction was underway, The ensuing four-year delay provided time for from 1974 on, it occurred primarily through the planning and, particularly,for dealing with basic Joint Fish and Wildlife Advisory Team (JFW AT) technical and engineering problems of pipeline which advised federal surveillance authorities in construction in Alaska's arctic and subarctic en­ the Department of the Interior's Alaska Pipeline vironment and through its active earthquake Office (APO) and state authorities in the State zones. These problems may have delayed full­ Pipeline Coordinator's Office (SPCO). scale construction activity in any case, but the en­ vironmentalists' court suit ensured that time Approach and Methods would be available for confronting such prob­ lems. In addition to involvement with Alyeska's The principal study design task was to select a design and engineering activities, planning work consistent "study path" through the universe of by government agencies during this period in­ events, issues, actions, and decisions comprising cluded development of technical and environ­ pipeline planning and surveillance between 1969 mental stipulations, preparation of an environ­ and 1977. Our chief concern was with how fish mental impact statement, and environmental re­ and wildlife protection interests fared through­ search necessary to support pipeline planning out the entire process of project planning and sur­ and, later, general surveillance and construction veillance by government. At the same time, we monitoring activities by government. wanted to ensure that in breaking out "fish and Construction began in early 1974, after Con­ wildlife aspects," we did not artificially sever gress had cleared a way the legal blocks by enact­ them from many other aspects of the process on which they depended and with which they inter­ ing authorizing and related legislation in late acted. In other words, in focusing on the fish and 1973. "Surveillance" officially began with the wildlife elements, we sought to keep them in per­ construction start and, as used here, the term re­ spective as parts of a much larger planning and fers to the full range of government design re­ surveillance system. Only with such perspective view, field monitoring, and technical evaluation .would it be possible.to reach any significant con­ activities during the 1974-1977 construction pe­ clusions about the status and meaning of fish and riod. "Monitoring" refers primarily to specific wildlife matters, how effectively they were ac­ field-level oversight work of government agen­ commodated within the system, and what, if any­ cies during the construction period. The surveil­ lance and monitoring activities consisted of tech­ thing, might be done to strengthen their part in nical-engineering and environmental protection future development-surveillance projects. components, and central to the environmental We designed the research as follows: surveillance activities were the fish and wildlife 1. We viewed the 1969-1974 pre-permit years protection elements that are principal concerns as a policy development and planning phase of this study. The object of all these planning and in which basic decisions and commitments surveillance activities was project construction, were made that determined not only how which included access roads, work pad, airports, effectively fish and wildlife values were in­ camps, pump stations, communication sites, and corporated into the planning process, but the Valdez terminal as well as the pipeline itself. also strongly influenced the place they would Within the larger universe of the pipeline proj­ have in subsequent construction surveil­ ect, this study focuses on federal fish and wildlife lance activities as well. agency involvement in planning and surveillance 2. We identified and analyzed elements of pol­ activities surrounding mainline construction icy development that appeared to have most problems, with limited discussion of involvement significance for assessing the fish and wild­ of state. agencies responsible for protecting fish life aspects of this case. These included fed­ and wildlife. The report does not deal with sur- eral policies on energy development and en- 4 vironmental protection, the interests and vestigation. Other sources included congressional objectives of federal and state agencies di­ hearings and reports, periodicals, and various rectly concerned with the project, and the published and unpublished papers and reports by allocation of authority among agencies for other participants in and observers of pipeline pipeline project planning and regulation. surveillance. 3. We then focused on federal and state fish All interviews were conducted between March and wildlife agencies' participation and and October 1977 as pipeline construction opera­ their interests in specific parts of the plan­ tions were winding· down and essentially com­ ning process. These parts included pipeline pleted. In some instances, this limited our sources routing and alignment decisions, technical as the surveillance staffs began dispersing to and engineering design work, stipulation other jobs and locations, but in general this was development, environmental impact state­ not a serious limitation. Most of the interviews ment preparation, and fish and wildlife data were with Alaska Pipeline Office (APO)andJoint collection and analysis. Fish and Wildlife Advisory Team (JFWAT) offi­ 4. We similarly approached the 1974-1977 con­ cials and staff members, including central office struction phase-that is, we moved from the and field personnel. There was also substantial general to the specific, looking first for interviewing of informants in Washington, D.C., broader policy and organizational factors and Alaska who were participants in the policy affecting fish and wildlife protection inter­ development and planning phase of the project. ests, and then concentrating on critical In all, about 100 separate interviews were con­ problem areas of fish and wildlife-related ducted with about 70 different informants. surveillance operations. APO and JFW AT files provided the largest 5. JFW AT provided an explicit organizational amount of documentation available to us during focus for the analysis of construction sur­ the course of the research project. Although De­ veillance, but we attempted to assess partment of the Interior files in Washington, JFW AT's role within the general context of D.C., were not accessible, APO's files, which ex­ surveillance policy, organization, and op­ tended back to the beginning of the planning pe­ erations. For this purpose we included within riod, together with extensive interviewing, pro­ the scope of our analysis the full range of vided information essential to reconstructing and surveillance-monitoring functions potentially analyzing pre-permit developments of concern to affecting fish and wildlife protection values this study. and interests; from the design review /notice Because the analysis depended heavily on inter­ to proceed process, through construction views, the researchers endeavored always to ob­ monitoring, to the uses of environmental tain the independent recollections and viewpoints surveillance enforcement authority and of at least two or more individuals who had direct sanctions in the field. know ledge of an issue or event of concern. Fur­ 6. Finally, in order to show in some detail how ther, during the course of the study, the re­ the process of fish and wildlife monitoring, searchers periodically met to check and test their including enforcement of stipulations, perceptions and understandings of how things worked in the field, we selected two major happened and why, given both the interview and areas of environmental problems-stream file information collected and analyzed to that crossing construction and big game crossing point. Interview reports were prepared in all construction-and, within them, concen­ cases and distributed to each researcher within a trated on specific cases and recurrent issues. few days of an interview. Similarly, file docu­ Primary :.-murcesof data for filling in the above ments were frequently exchanged and commented study framework were the files of government upon by each researcher. Throughout this on­ agencies and interviews with participants in going analytical work, the researchers progres­ planning and surveillance activities. Secondary sively refined and clarified the pathway they sources included surveillance evaluation reports were taking through the study u~iverse. prepared in-house by surveillance personnel or In the final stages of analysis and report writ­ by contract consultants and evaluation reports by ing, each researcher concentrated on those as­ external parties such as congressional committee pects of the study to which most of his or her own staff, the General Accounting Office, and the De­ interviewing and file searches were directed dur­ partment of the Interior's Office of Audit and In- ing the course of the project. However, since each

5 had previously shared and evaluated materials arni wildlife, protection during- the 1974-197 and checked each others' perceptions regularly construction phase. Chapter V describes the 01 throughout the research period, each was also ganization of government surveillance effor1 able to check, supplement, and revise the prod­ and explores the policies and assumptions upo ucts of the others in writing the report. which they were based. Chapter VI assesses ho~ the process of protecting fish and wildlife rE sources worked, and identifies several critici Organization of the Report factors that conditioned the effectiveness of thos This chapter and the next constitute Part 1 of efforts. Chapter VII further develops and illm this report, which describes the nature of tht trates the analysis of earlier chapters in the cor study, the principal subjects of analysis, and the text of day-to-day surveillance operations throug questions it attempts to answer. Chapter II ex­ a close examination of how government monitor tends the introductory discussion of this chapter dealt with problems during construction a by describing the pipeline system, the general stream crossings and at elevated big game crosf characteristics of the fish and wildlife resources ings. potentially affected by the pipeline, and the sur­ Conclusions and recommendations are pn veillance organizations. sented in Part 4. Chapter VIII summarizes crit: Part 2 deals with the pre-permit phase of the cal factors affecting fish and wildlife protectiu pipeline project. Chapter III discusses the broader objectives in pipeline planning and surveillancE political-historical context of pipeline policy and it presents recommendations for improvini making at federal and Ala.ska levels. It attempts to future surveillance programs, emphasizing fis: to show the significance of energy-environmental and wildlife aspects. issues and government jurisdictional conflicts for Most of this report describes and explains wha fish and wildlife protection objectives. Chapter happened in the past, but its underlying purpos, IV then focuses on pipeline planning, discussing is to shed light on what may be for future project~ the evolving pattern of government agency re­ Accordingly, we have not attempted to differenti sponses to the pipeline proposal between 1969 and ate in every case those shortcomings that prob 1974, and indicating the extent to which fish and ably could have been avoided from those tha wildlife protection interests were accommodated could not, given the realities of the pipeline proj in the planning process. ect and the conditions under which it was planne< Part 3, the major part of the report, addresses and built. That would require an omniscienc, how federal surveillance agencies met their re­ that is not available to us as well as a much longe: sponsibility for environmental, particularly fish report.

6 Chapter II-Pipeline Construction and Surveillance

Pipeline System these are bei·ng·used during; operation of the line. North of the Yukon River, six miles of permanent In June 1977, crude oil began moving through access roads werP hui IL the world's most publicized pipeline. On its course from Prudhoe Bay on the Arctic Ocean 800 The federal Comptroller General's office esti­ miles south to Valdez on Prince William Sound, mated in 1975 that elements of the construction the trans-Alaska hot oil pipeline crosses habitats project-including the pipeline and accompany­ and migration routes of dozens of species of ing gravel work pad, the haul road, 30 camps along wildlife and spans hundreds of fish streams. the route, pump stations, the Valdez terminal and Built by Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, a several hundred material and disposal sites-would corporation formed by eig·ht oil companies, the affect 50 square miles of Alaska's 586,000 square 3 pipeline system cost an estimated $8 billion and miles. (See Figure 1.) was largely completed within three years. 1 In May 1978, the pipeline was delivering· nearly 1.2 Fish and Wildlife million bar1·els of oil to Valdez daily. The system The territory affected by the pipeline is spread covers roughly 12 square miles and includes the across 800 miles in a state one-fifth the size of the 48-inch diametel' pipeline, 12 pump stations, continental but with a population maintenance sites and a 1,000-acre terminal at of less than one-half million and the "largest Valdez. About 422 miles of the pipe are above i-emaining wilderness and semi-wilderness in the gTound; another :345 miles are buried, and there United States." 4 Along the pipeline that spans all are 32 miles of above- and below-ground river four of the state's physiographic regions, several and stream crnssing·s. A aG0-rnile gTavel haul earthquake faults and three mountain ranges are road from the Yukon River to Prudhoe Bay was habitats, migration routes, movement zones and also built by Alyeska before the start of pipeline lambing and calving areas of many kinds of construction. This road was used by Alyeska and wildlife. Brown and black bears, caribou, , its contractors while the pipeline was being built, , , mountain goats, . , but is owned by the State of Alaska. , hares, marmots, and other small In April 1974 work on the haul road began, and mammals live in or pass through the area of the in March 1H75 the first pipe was laid. The pipeline corridor. An estimated 194 species of pipeline builders used approximately 62 million resident and migratory birds, many of these cubic yards of gTavel in constructing the haul waterbirds, have habitats or nesting areas along road, laying a gTavel work pad_the length of the or near the pipeline route. 5 pipeline route, and placing protective gravel The pipeline :and 360-mile haul road cross layers under other elements of the system;i about 500 fish streams populated by more than 40 permafrost lies below about 80 percent of the species of fish, and another 500 streams where no terrain the pipeline crnsses. South of the Yukon fish have been found. Another estimated 500 River, about 120 miles of access roads to the streams and rivers ,:vith and without fish pass pipeline right-of-way and pipeline facilities were near the pipeline and haul road or other elementr built during pipeline construction, and some of of the system.(>

'U.S. l 'mnpti-olk•r t ;l'l1l•ral. ( ;t•twral ,\l'eounting- O[fil'e. '/'/'II 11x-. l/r1.'· t-::-.x1111l'ipt•li11,• ~u.s.Department of the Interior, Final E1111 iro11me11talIm paet Slate111e11t,Pro­ t '11 11pan,1·, \Jul.ii .\la,-1,a l'i1wlit1t• l ·u:11pall>"· l'11illip,, l'L'lrolt•11:11I 'o,1111a11y. :,111li11 poxed Tnrnx-Alaska Pipeline, Volume 1. 1972, p. xxi. l'ipP Lim· 1·11·11p:t11y,t·111011 .\la.,,-.1 l'i1n·linv 1·1111pa11.1·.and ltl' l'ipl'li11t•,;. l11e. ··thid .. p. lliL ·11akt• lip .\l.1·L·,ka l'ip1•li1w :,t•n·in• 1·un11,a11.1·, "Sln•am e,;ti1mltl•,; fr0111 /,ix/ 11(.'i/JT11111.<1111r/I >tlwr 11·1111-r/J,,,/i.-x,t/111111//11' Tn111><· 0 Tell•phorw inlL·n·1t•11·with ;\I .-\Ison. Alaska l'ipditw Offil'l', divbion of land,; . llasl.-11/Ji/ l'i1wfi111·/{1111!1·, frnll;lh n•,·i;;ion, .Jul.1·1!177. Ii,,· l{idi:ml L. .iol111c\ot1and and 111i1wntls.. \ pl'il 0, 11177. .Julius lfot·bn•ll. ·

7 Arctic Ocean

Beaufort Seo

\ I \ \ \ \

C:i CONSTRUCTION CAMP P.a. • PUMP STATION

FIGURE 1: TRANS-ALASKA OIL PIPELINE ROUTE

Pipeline Debate quality of life depended upon the maintenance o unspoilt areas of wilde1~ness where man coulc In mid-1968, following discovery of an esti­ find aesthetic and spiritual inspiration." 8 mated 9.6 billion barrel oil reserve at Prudhoe When the pipeline project was proposed Bay, Atlantic Richfi~ld Company and Humble spokesmen for Friends of the Earth, th, Oil Company (now Exxon Corporation) set up a Wilderness Society, the Environmental Defense 'crude pipeline task force to commence field Fund and other national conservation group: investigations and engineering feasibility studies questioned whether a trans-Alaska pipeline wa: on using a pipeline to transport the oil from the best way to transport North Slope oil, anc Prudhoe Bay across Alaska." 7 By 1970, six other what effects such a pipeline would have on lands oil companies had joined the first two, formed fish and wildlife in a state known as the "las Alyeska Pipeline Service Company as their frontier" and largely unoccupied and undevel common agent, and proposed a pipeline that oped by man. As Harvey Manning of Friends o· would carry oil from the North Slope to the ice­ the Earth wrote in his 1974 book, Cr11Crisi:..;, "I: free port of Valdez. the pipeline-supertanker route is indeed the onb Also during the late 1960's, as one author noted way to bring the oil out at present, then the natior in 1973, " ... along with the discovery of oil in the should insist that the oil stay in the ground unti Arctic came something else, the environmental a better way is found ... there is no way to predic1 revolution. Steadily gathering a momentum that the range of the pipeline's environmental conse· is now worldwide, was the thought that the quences .... "9

7Terrv F. Lemmer, The Jfo1rnue11H·11/,l'la1111i11u 11111/ Co11xtr11cfio1111f th1• Tni11x­ Alirnl.-11mu/ lfH Wildlifi• (: Viking Press, 1973), p. 25. A.ltmk11· l'ipeliue Suxte111,Report to the Alaska Pipeline Commission l>y the "Harvey Manning, Cry Cri.~i.~(San Francisco: Friends of the Earth, 1974), p. Commission's Special Counsel, August 1. 1977, p. 11-2. 1a(i.

8 Court actions filed by these national environ­ zations that are necessary for or related to the mental groups opposed to the pipeline project as· construction, operation and maintenance of the )Utlined by the oil companies held up the start of trans-Alaska oil pipeline system .... " 15 In early pipeline construction until after the federal 197 4, seven oil companies and the State of Alaska Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act was and the federal government agreed on right-of­ passed in late 1973. One writer has called the way pacts permitting the companies to build and project "the most monumental confrontation ever later operate a hot oil pipeline across 800 miles of between industry and the conservation move­ federal, state and private land in Alaska. 16 An ment."rn eighth oil company later signed agreements with There is general agreement among biologists federal and state governments. 17 in Alaska that detailed information about many The state right-of-way lease and the federal of the species of wildlife and fish and their agreement and grant of right-of-way specified habitats along the proposed pipeline corridor­ that all work on the pipeline system would meet particularly north of the Yukon River- was existing federal and state laws governing lacking when Alyeska selected the route. As one construction and welding techniques, safety of government biologist involved with the project workers, erosion and pollution control and before and during construction explains, "No­ protection of fish and wildlife. In addition, the body had the reason, the means or the manpower pipeline builders agreed to meet construction to get that kind of information before" along a standards and requirements for protection of corridoi- running from the Arctic coastal plains to Alaska's lands, waters and fish and wildlife as an ice-free port 800 miles to the south. 11 During outlined in the state and federal documents. those years between the discovery of oil and the These requirements were in the form of a series of start of construction, biolog·ists working for state technical and environmental "stipulations" that· and federal agencies in Alaska pooled their were nearly identical in both agreements. The efforts in collecting information about resources right-of-way pacts also specified how the owner along the pipeline route. 12 Alyeska also made companies of Alyeska and the federal and state biological studies along the route, and together governments would assure themselves that with BP Alaska and the U.S. Bureau of Sport existing laws and the stipulations were enforced r.,isheries and Wildlife, sponsored an experiment during pipeline construction. One of the stipula­ to test the reaction of caribou to elevated pipe. 1a tions called for the pipeline builders to "provide The federal Department of the Interior issued a for continuous inspection of the Pipeline System six-volume environmental impact statement construction to ensure compliance with the which included a summary of known fish and approved design specifications and these Stipu­ wildlife resources along the route. 1·1 lations."1H Before the start of pipeline construction, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company hired Fluor Rig ht-of-Way Agreements Alaska, Inc., to act as construction management contractor for construction of the pump stations When the Congress passed legislation in late and the Valdez terminal, and Bechtel, Inc., as 1973 directing that the pipeline be built construction management contractor for the ··promptly without further administrative or pipeline and other elements of the project. These judicial delay or impediment,,, the Secretary of two construction management contractors were the Interior and Hother appropriate federal responsible for establishing quality control · officers" were directed to .. issue and take all programs that would provide "continuous inspec­ necessary action to ad minister and enforce tion" of work being done by execution contrac- rights-of-way, permits, leases and other authori- . tors. In the summer of 1975, Alyeska assumed

t;Tn111.-;-Aft,,-;/;11l'i/ldi1w A11tlwriz11fill11 Art. Public Law 93-153. sections 203 {a) w~age. A/1/xlm /111(Ifl:-1 ll'ildl(fr. p. 2-1. and (b). HSummary based on interviews with Alaska Uepartmcnt of Fish ,ind (;ame. "'..\are1;11w11J11ml Umut ,if Uiyht-1!f:Wn11 .f,w Tn111.-;-..\/tt.'{kttl'i1wli11<' between the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 8ctviec, and Bureau of Land Management biologists who Umtcd States of America and Amerada Hess Corporation. ARCO Pipe Linc began studies of resource" along the pipeline route in 1mm. Company, h:xxon Pipeline Company, Mobil Alaska Pipeline Company. Phillips t0 See ChaJJler IV for more information about work of the Interngenev Fish and Petroleum Company, Sohio Pipe Line Company, and Union Alaska Pipeline Wildlife Team. · Company, January 197-1; Niyltl-1tf-lF1111/,1•11;;1• for Ilic Tr1111x-Al11sk11l'ifll'fi11<' n[,'indi ngs of Prudhoe Bay studies compiled in 1'lw Umc!ioux ,~{1/111-re11-( ;,-,11111d between the State of Alaska and jsamc as above/, May 1974. { '11rilm,1 lo Si1111daf1·df'i1wli111: 11ml /'ipl'li,w { 'rox.~ill!f Slrnd11rcx al i'rmfl11w /Juy, r,BP'Pipelines Inc. did not sign the original rig-ht-of-way agreement;;. but later Alw1l.-a, prepared uy Kenneth N. Child, Alaska Cooperative Wildlife lfoscarch signed agreements: information from telephone interview with MorrisJ. Turner. Unit, University of Alaska. June :m, Hl7H. APO. acting authorized officer, Septembe1· 1977. 11U.S. Department of the Interior. Fiuul 1~·11,•ir11111111·1111tfl,111mrl S/uln1w11t. 18Agreement and Grant of Right-of-Way for Tmns-Alaksa Pipeline, Exhibit D, l'ro11,mcil Tmu;;-,4/t,.~/m l'i1wli1w. 197;!. stipulation 3.2.2.4.

9 some of the functions previously handled by request for such a deviation. APO was responsiblE Bechtel, Inc., but Bechtel continued to providE for overseeing matters of pipeline integrity or quality control for pipeline constrnction. both federal and state lands the pipeline crossed The ~00-mlle pipeline route was divided into and monitoring environmental protection or six and later five construction sections, with federal land::; along the route. diffe!~ent execution contractors carrvi11g out The Department of the Interior also contractec worn iu eacn section. (See Figure 1.) In each of with Mechanics Research, Inc., an engineering these construction sections and· at the Valdez consulting firm, as a technical support contractm terminal and the pump station sites there were to to APO. Mechanics Research was to providE be quality control inspectors. To monitor the "support staff, expertise and services in thE quality control program, Alyeska established a scientific, technical and administrative areas," 2: quality assurance organization that was to and in turn contracted with Ecology and "provide adequate confidence by Alyeska man­ Environment, Inc. and Gulf Interstate Engineer· agement that the pipeline system will meet all ing Corporation to provide needed knowledge ir permit stipulation requiremeuts." 19 environmental and engineering fields. The authorized officer's chief representative~ at the site of construction were the authorizec Government Surveillance System officer's field representatives (AOFRs) assignee to each section of the pipeline. These fielc Federal and State Organizations representatives were delegated the same author The federal agreement and grant of right-of­ ities as the authorized officer to halt construction way also directed the Secretary of the Interior to but could not shut down an entire section of tlu appoint an "authorized officer" to enforce terms pipeline without approval from the authorizec of the federal agreement, approve the builder's officer. During construction, all AOFRs wer( pipeline designs, and monitor the work of the engineers. The technical support contract01 builder's quality control/quality assurance pro­ provided field staffs to work with and provid( grams. This authorized officer was to head a new information to the authorized officer's fielc federal agency-the Alaska Pipeline Office, representatives. which was created solely to monitor pipeline The state rig·ht-of-way lease established ~ construction and operation. Placed under the similae monitoring organization to enforcE Office of the Under Secretary, the Alaska stipulations on state lands the pipeline crossed Pipeline Office (APO) was established in and Alaska's governor appointed a "pipelirn Anchorage in early 1974 and marked initiation of coordinator" to head the State Pipeline Coordi a new level of government monitoring of the work nator's Office (SPCO) set up in Anchorage ii of industry. 1974. The pipeline coordinator had authority t< The authorized officer held the authority to halt construction on state lands. The pipelirn "order the temporary suspension of any or all coovtlinator's representatives at the site o construction, operation, maintenance or termin­ consfruction were field surveillance officer! ation activities of Permittees, their agents, (FSOs) who also had authority to stop construe employees, contractors or subcontractors (at any tion on state lands; not all FSOs were engineers::! tier) in connection with the Pipeline System, including but not limited to the transportation of oil." He could use this authority if he judged the Joint Fish and Wildlife Advisory Team pipeline builders were causing ''irreparable In 1974, the federal and state governments alsc damage" to the environment along the pipeline signed a cooperative agreement noting that bott route, endangering lives, or failing to meet governments "regard fish and wildlife protectior provisions of the right-of-way agreement or a as a special responsibility of the surveillancE directive of the Alaslrn Pipeline Office.20 The effort" and calling for "the formation, to thE chief rederal mumtor also had authority to extent practicable, of a cooperative effort for suer approve deviations from many of the stipulations protection, sharing the fish and game personne if he felt the pipeline builders had justified a

01 .111r )1·1.,-1·frw S/111/!f ll'il/1 ft1·.~1w1·//111~:0i·di1·n11·.s.s 11(/l,1· .'iti1,,if11lio11x /h1ri,111fl, 1•Tn111N·Alaslw Pipeline Quality A.~.rnrance D11ri11r1Construction, Alyeska 1·1111s/r11diu11/'/,rt.~,·. hy Termitrns Limited .. \tt!,(USl fH77. n. 8-J·! · Pipeline Service Company, February 1975, introduction. ""Tl'lephone eon,·er,mtion 11·ith ( 'y l'rin•. Sl'l 'l) dt•put.1· PIJH:lllll' cuonlinalm '".lyn·,·,111·ii111,tJ Umul ,f /(iyhl-,ir 11';,11:/,11· Tmui<·, l/;1.4.-ol'iwliiw. p. 17. .\nchorag-t•. Octohcl' 1!177.

10 and information rf'.l",CmY~P.8of hoth the Rtate and largely with protection of anadromous fish federal governments, and the applicat10n of this streams. Aside from this authority, the JFWAT cooperative effort over both state and federal field monitors were advisors, without authority to lands." 28 direct the pipeline builders. The JFWAT This clause in the cooperative agreement led to monitors provided information and advice to the establishment in May 1974 of the Joint Fish those government monitors who had authority to and Wildlife Advisory Team (JFW AT), an make decisions in the field, but were not under organization made up of biologists detailed from the. supervision of those they advised. Thus, the the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Alaska team was part of, but in some degree independent Department of Fish and Game, the National of, the larger federal and state monitoring Marine Fisheries Service and the Bureau of Land agencies. Management. One fisheries engineer from the · · National Marine Fisheries Service was also Environmental Stipulations assigned to JFWAT. This team of federal and state biologists was to advise the Alaska Pipeline The federal and state stipulations for environ­ Office (APO) and the State Pipeline Coordinator's mental protection during construction of the Office (SPCO) on how best to protect fish and pipeline system were nearly identical. The wildlife along the pipeline route during construc­ pipeline builders agreed to "avoid or minimize" tion, using the stipulations in the right-of-way erosion, degradation of air, land and water and agreements as guidelines. 24 disturbance of vegetation along the pipeline The advisory team was headed during con­ route. Alyeska and its contractors were to struction by a federal coordinator who supervised "provide uninterrupted and safe passage of fish" the federal biologists and a state supervisor who when construction crossed rivers and streams, headed the state biologists. The federal coordi­ and "assure free passage and movement of big nator was responsible to APO, and the state game animals" during construction and after the supervisor was responsible to the Alaska above-ground pipe was in place. 25 Department of Fish and Game. Other federal and state stipulations cal1edfor The advisory team was set up with both an restoration of vegetation in areas affected by office staff-separate from the office staffs of construction, establishment of buffer strips when APO and SPCO-and a field staff. The office staff construction passed near public interest areas, was to review the builder's plans and designs thai protection of fish ·spawning beds, construction of could affect fish and wildlife or their habitats, fish passage structures when necessary, screen­ and to analyze fish and wildlife-related problems ing of pump intake devices to prevent harm to that arose during construction. fish, and plugging of any abandoned water­ diversion structures. Workers were to keep JFWAT field monitors were assigned to each mobile ground equipment out of lakes, streams construction section, and were to advise AO FRs and rivers unless they had written approval from and FSOs on how to minimize effects of planned the government monitors. 26 construction on fish and wildlife and their The state pipeline coordinator and the federal habitats, and to spot check Alyeska's compliance authorized officer were also given power to with the stipulations for the protection offish and restrict pipeline activity in designated fish and wildlife. Although JFWATfield monitors advised wildlife areas "during periods offish and wildlife the field representatives of APO and SPCO, the breeding, nesting, spawning, lambing or calving advisory team members were supervised by the activities and during major migrations of fish state and federal heads of JFW AT rather than by and wildlife."27 APO and APCO field chiefs. How these broad requirements for protection The state members of JFW AT had authority to of fish and wildlife outlined in the environmental issue permits for in-stream construction work stipulations were to be met in design and under provisions of Alaska Statute 16, deal{ng construction of the trans-Alaska system was a

25 23 Stip11/atio11.<;forthe A!lreeme11ta 11dGmnt. of Ri(lht-of-Wuyfiu- the 'l'ra11s-Aloska Coopemiive Af1reeme11tbetween the Umred Sf(lfes Department of the Interim Pi}Jeline; Stip11latio11.~for the Rigid-of Way LeuHefor the Tm 1111-AlaHkaPipeline, and State ofAlaska Re1;arding th.eProposed Trews-Alu ska Pipeline, January 1974, stipulations 2.2.1.1, 2.4.1.1, 2.4.1.2, 2.5.Ll, and 2.5.4.1. See Appendix A for a list of E-1 E-4, R p. and p. Section II, stipulations applied for protection of fish and wildlife during construction. 24JFWA'I' was disbam.1tu 1n-Dec~moer 1977, stveral months after oil began moving through the pipeline. The APO and SPCO, however, are continuing 2611Jid.',stipulations 2.4.4.1, 2.3.1.1, 2.5.2.2, 2.5.2.3, 2.5.1.1, 2.5.1.2, 2.5.1.3, 2.2.2.2. survt:illance of the pipeline operation. 27 11Jid., stipulation 2.5.3.l.

11 question considered by government biologists the culverts would not exceed four feet per and Alyeska. In the early 1970's, state and federal second. An environmental stipulation required biologists in Alaska worked together to develop that the pipeline builders install all permanent recommendations for crossings that would allow culverts to withstand calculated 50-year floods. "free passage and movement of big game In addition to culverts, the pipeline builders animals" in areas where the pipeline was installed low-water crossings and bridges_ tq elevated. Based on information collected before move men and equipment across smaller construction, government wildlife.biologists took streams, and spanned 17 large rivers along the the position that most caribou probably would not route with bridges. The pipeline builders' quality cross under an elevated pipe, and that therefore control and quality assurance workers were to pipeline crossings in areas of known caribou insure that design criteria agreed to by Alyeska movement would have to be buried. Also, the were met during construction. The APO and biologists told the pipeline builders-and in later SPCO field monitors and their JFW AT advisors months APO and SPCO reaffirmed these as were to make "spot checks" of work being done. standards for construction of big game cross­ ings-that based on information available at the JFWAT Organization time, crossings a minimum of 60 feet long and With construction of the pipeline system with 10 feet of clearance between the bottom of essentially complete, biologists who worked with the pipe and the top of the work pad had the "best the Joint Fish and Wildlife Advisory Team or chance" of allowing free movement of moose and other government agencies in recommending bison in all seasons. 28 design features to protect fish and wildlife and Addressing the problem of how to provide "free their habitats along the pipeline route do not and continuous passage offish" along the pipeline know how well those protective measures have system, government biologists again made worked. Biologists report it will require years of recommendations based on limited information. observation to determine if the pipeline is As one fisheries biologist who studied resources affecting wildlife migration. Fisheries biologists along the pipeline route before construction say that in areas where detailed information noted, "Our knowledge of water systems along about size of fish runs, productivity of streams the pipeline was with some exceptions very gross. and other factors was not known before In many cases we didn't know before construction construction, it will be impossible to say precisely that certain streams existed, let alone whether what the effects of construction were; in areas they had fish in them, or what kinds of fish they where pre-construction information was more were ... "29 complete, it will require years of ·study to But based on information collected by Alyeska determine what long-term changes may have and government biologists in the years before taken place. 32 construction, the Joint Fish and Wildlife Advisory But how well the organization that was set up to Team outlined to APO and SPCO certain monitor protection of fish and wildlife worked "critical" periods when construction would be during construction is a different question. With most harmful in specific streams. 30 The APO and its unique position "inside and outside" the larger SPCO in turn directed Alyeska to bury pipe at government monitoring system, and its combina­ major river crossings only during winter, and to tion of federal and state biologists responsible to limit all other in-stream construction to certain their own supervisors rather than APO and designated "windows"-periods when biologists SPCO field representatives, JFW AT stirred judged construction would be least harmful to much controversy within the government moni­ fish and habitats. 31 In addition, Alyeska agreed to toring system while the pipeline was being built. install all temporary and permanent culverts in For this report, office and field staffs of APO and streams along the pipeline system so that at JFWAT · were interviewed concerning how calculated 5-year flood levels, the flow through JFWAT had worked within the monitoring system, 33 why it had worked the way it did, and ;,,A more detailed dh;cussion of big-game crossings and how standards for these how fish and wildlife protection functions might were developed appears in Chapter VIL ""Interview with APO-J FWAT fisheries biologist. Anchorage, August 12, 1977. 1'11rfit1/U.st •tf /(1•11/•'i.s/111111/ll'ilt!l(fr A1·1w;A/o11uf/11•'l'm11.s-Afa.slm l'i1wli1w :r1Interviews with J FW AT wildlife and fisheries biologists. July, August and With ( 'ritic11/a111l /,{'.~.s Crilii-11/ l'l'l'iml.s Jdruti(i<·d,,Joint Fish and Wildlife September, 1977. Team, November 15, l!J75. · ·"A.S WilS noted eal'liel', this study focuses pf'ima1·iJy on fish and wildlife 11lnfonnatiun from interviews with APO's acting authorized officer and rwotection policies and activities of federal agencies, but does include limited cunstniction coordinator, August and September. 1977. discussion of slate surveillance activities as well.

12 be strengthened in future large construction was unable to make field engineers understand projects. the reasons why certain actions were harmful to One Alaska Pipeline Office official saw the fish and wildlife habitat. government monitoring system-with APO, A JFW AT fisheries biologist felt uthere would SPCO and JFW AT-as a "three-headed monster" have been nothing wrong" with the system under that decreased the efficiency of government which biologists advised those in authority in the monitoring during the project. One long-time field, except some of those with authority "were Alaska biologist who worked as a JFW AT not administrators; they weren't capable of monitor saw the team with its authority to making the best use of our advice" in many cases. enforce provisions of Alaska Statute 16 as "the A former field surveillance officer said a joint most effective system" for protecting fish and federal-state advisory team was "a dandy idea" habitat he had seen on any construction project in that did not work during construction "because the state. the advisors wanted the authoritv." 34 An authorized officer's field representative The following chapters examine vreconstruc­ said the government monitoring system could tion planning by government agencies th'-1.t have been improved if the JFWAT field advisors ultimately led to the establishment of J fi'WAT, had "reported directly to me and not to office and how JFW AT worked within the larger supervisors" who could not be aware of field government monitoring system during construc­ conditions. A JFW AT monitor felt he had to tion. Part 2 reviews the historical background of "learn strategy"-including taking problems to surveillance policy and organization, and focuses higher authority than the field representatives­ on specific problems of pipeline planning as an advisor who had no authority to make field government agencies faced, with emphasis on decisions. roles played by fish and wildlife interests. Part 3 A government engineer interviewed said discusses how the government monitoring system JFWAT field monitors with little construction that grew out of earlier planning dealt with experience were unable to distinguish what the matters of fish and wildlife protection during real problems were, and "spent their time construction. tromping on ants when the elephants were "'Above quotations from interviews with A PO, Sl'CO and ,Jl,'W AT personnel; a running loose." A JFW AT field monitor said he list or persons interviewed for this report appears at the end or the report.

13

Part 2 - re-Permit Phase

Chapter Ill-Policy Development: An Overview

This chapter reviews the broad political-his­ and later the construction surveillance torical context of pipeline surveillance policy processes. making from the time of the oil discovery at Prud­ 3. The federal government effectively asserted hoe Bay in 1968 to the passage of the Trans­ primary control over pipeline surveillance Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act by the U.S. matters, and the State of Alaska played a se­ Congress in 1973. The following is not a detailed condary role-except in the area '.lf fish history of this extremely active "pre-permit" and wildlife ·protection. phase of pipeline decision making by government 4. Government responses to Alyeska's inter­ and industry. It is rather a discussion of the high­ ests in pipeline construction tended overall lights of pre-permit developments, and includes to be facilitative, but government also de­ characterizations of the major actors and inter­ manded assurance of the structural integ­ ests that have special significance for under­ rity of the pipeline, which, in turn helped standing the place of fish and wildlife and related assure longer run environmental integrity environmental protection values in the entire as well. process of pipeline planning and construction. The next chapter deals with this same pre-permit phase in greater detail, focusing on specific prob­ The Pipeline Act lems of pipeline planning and the relationship of Ending four years of administrative and legal these problems to fish and wildlife protection delays to pipeline construction, Congress passed interests. Two basic sets of issues dominated the pre-per­ the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act in mit phase of pipeline planning and ·policy mak­ November 1973. In doing so, it declared that"The ing. One grew out of the encounter between early development and delivery of oil and gas energy development and environmental objec­ from Alaska's North Slope to domestic markets is tives and interests in the Alaska pipeline case. in the national interest because of- growing The other, in part a bureaucratic reflection of this domestic shortages and increasing dependence political encounter, concerned jurisdictional upon insecure foreign sources," and further that claims and counterclaims among government "The earliest possible construction of the trans­ agencies at both federal and state levels. Also Alaska oil pipeline from the North Slope of involved were questions of federalism-the rela­ Alaslfa to Port Valdez in that State will make the extensive proven and potential reserves of low­ tive extent and limits of federal government and sulfur oil available for domestic use and will best state government authority-and differing phi­ serve the national interest." 1 losophies of government responsibility for the reg­ The following .is a brief chronology of events ulation or promotion of private industrial devel­ leading to enactment of the pipeline law: opment. The general outcomes of this complex of forces, June 1968-Atlantic Richfield Company an­ which are discussed in this chapter and the next, nounces discovery of"one of the largest petro­ can be previewed in summary: leum ~ccumulations known to the world today" 1. Energy development objectives had priority near Prudhoe Bay on Alaska's North Slope. over environmental protection objectives, February 1969-0il companies decide to apply but not to the exclusion of the latter. for right-of-way permits to construct a pipe- 2. Agencies at both federal and state levels whose capabilities and interests were most consistent with the development priority 1T1·1Jm1-A/1wkt1Pipeline AutlwtiZfltiou At'i. Title II of Public Law 93-153, tended to dominate in the pipeline planning November 16, 1973, sections 202 (a). (c).

17 line from the North Slope to a port on the Gulf Secretary sufficient new discretion on the ques­ of Alaska. tion of right-of-way widths. while the pipeline June 1969-Atlantic Richfield, Exxon, and authorization prevented further administrative British Petroleum, the principals in the pipe­ delays and closely restricted any further litiga­ line consortium, file a formal application with tion based on NEPA requirements. The environ­ the Department of the Interior's Bureau of mentalists chose not to renew their challenge to Land Management for a trans-Alaska pipeline the line in the courts, and the Secretary issued the right-of-way. permit. January 1970-National Environmental Pol­ The four-year delay was not due exclusively to icy Act (NEPA) comes into effect requiring the legal blocks, however. 2 There were in addition preparation of an environmental impact state­ serious technical deficiencies in Alyeska's pipe­ ment (EIS) on proposals for "major federal line plans, and these problems surfaced soon after actions significantly affecting the quality of the rig·ht-of-way application was filed in mid- the human environment." 1969. Government scientists and technicians, March 1970-Wilderness Society, Friends of based primarily in the U.S. Geological Survey of the Earth, and Environmental Defense Fund the Department of the Interior, were particularly file a suit in federal District Court to enjoin the concerned with the problems of burying a hot-oil Secretary of the Interior from issuing a pipe­ pipeline in permafrost and under riverbeds, and line haul road permit without complying fully designing a line to withstand Alaska earth­ with EIS requirements. and right-of-way quakes. These and other deficiencies affecting width limitations of the Mineral Leasing Act of the physical integrity of the line, and therefore 1920. posing severe risks of major environmental dam­ April 1970-District Court agrees with the age as well, also had to be resolved before con­ environmentalist plaintiffs, issues a prelimi­ struction could be permitted. nary injunc~ion and, citing NEPA, orders the -Moreover, Congress and the Administration Secretary to consider all aspects of the project were not dedicated single-mindedly and at any before approving any part of it. cost to the rapid development and transport of January 1971-Department of the Interior North Slope oil through a trans-Alaska pipeline issues draft EIS on the proposed trans-Alaska and tankers. Environmental protection was also pipeline project. a national policy, as reflected in NEPA, the grow­ March 1972-Department issues final EIS. ing array of air, land, and water anti-pollution May 1972-Secretary of the Interior an­ statutes, and in government agencies and interest nounces decision to grant pipeline right-of­ groups that explicitly represented environmen­ way permit pending District Court orders. tal values and interests. Thus, although the pipe­ August 1972-District Court lifts preliminary line act effectively circumvented further admin­ injunction against issuance of permit. istrative and legal barriers posted by NEPA and Feb·ruary 1973-Court of Appeals reverses placed clear priority on "the earliest possible District Court, finding that issuance of the per­ construction" of the trans-Alaska line, the act mit would violate the right-of-way width lim­ also included environmental protection provi­ itations of the Mineral Leasing Act; Appeals sions that had to be met in the processes of pipe­ Court does not rule on the NEPA issue, which line construction and operation. 3 remains for future litigation. Recognition of environmental qualifications, April 1973-U.S. Supreme Court declines to however, does not diminish the primary thrust of review Appeals Court decision. the congressional "mandate," strongly supported Noveniber 1973-CongTess passes legislation by the Administration, to get on with the con­ amending right-of-way provisions of Mineral struction· of this giant project and to do so quickly. Leasing Act, declaring the final EIS sufficient The fuel shortages of the winter of 1972-73 were for NEPA purposes, authorizing construction all too real, as was the growing U.S. dependence of the trans-Alaska pipeline, and directing the for oil imports on the Arab states. And the Arabs Secretary to issue the permit. The leasing act amendments and the pipeline authorization thus removed at one time the two "'i'hese also included the Alaska Native land claims issue and itsaltendant "land remaining legal blocks to construction of the freeze" until Congress passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act in 1971. 3'/'raIIB-Alw;/w Pipeline A 11tlwrizatio11Act. Title II, section 203(c); also see Chap­ trans-Alaska pipeline. The amendments gave the ter V below. 18 used their control of oil as a weapon in interna­ pipeline construction and environmental protec­ tional politics, imposing an embargo on exports to tion. Rather, the construction objective emerged the United States at the very time that Congress as the primary one, while the expressed concerns and the President were completing action on the for environmental protection appear as quali­ authorization legislation. Indeed, much of the fications or conditions placed on the overriding congressional resistance to the authorization act purpose of authorizing construction. The envi­ was not directed at pipeline construction, per se, ronmental provisions serve to indicate the but at proposals for construction of a trans­ nianner in which the mandated actions were to be Alaska line as opposed to an alternative line carried out · by responsible federal officials. through Canada which could deliver Alaska's oil Development and environmental values were more directly to states in the midwest and east thus placed deliberately in tension with each where fuel shortages appeared most threatening other, a tension that was already structured into at the time. The question before Congress was not the federal and State of Alaska bureaucracies whether a pipeline should be built, but which one having statutory authorities affecting the plan­ could be built as soon as possible. ning and construction of the trans-Alaska pipe­ The Senate Interior Committee's report on the line.6 pipeline legislation indicates how the committee balanced the many considerations surrounding the competing alternatives, and where they Federal Agencies and Interests finally came out. After considering a broad range of environmental, economic, and political issues, During the 1969-197 4 planning phase, the roles the committee reached the conclusion: and statuses of the several federal agencies involved with the pipeline project were affected Any assessment based solely upon the foregoing considera­ by shifting definitions of the problem: Did the tions regarding the relative merits of the two pipeline project represent mainly a technical engineering routes clearly must depend heavily upon subjective judg­ and design problem to be solved by government ment. There is however, one consideration in favor of the Trans-Alaska pipeline that the Committee found compell­ officials working with Alyeska? Or did it ing. This consideration was the additional delay and represent mainly an environmental protection uncertainty associated with the Trans-Canada pipeline. problem whereby government would assume Regardless whether the 1969 decision of the owner com­ that technical design tasks were strictly panies in favor of the all-Alaska route was the wisest or the Alyeska's business while the potential environ­ most consistent with the national interest at that time, and regardless whether the Admiuistmtion's endy co11unit­ mental effects of given designs were the me11tiu fa1•or ,dthat route [emphasis added) was made on government's? Depending on the relative em­ the basis of adequate information and analysis, the Com­ phasis placed on these concepts of the problem, mittee determined that the Tmns-Alaska pipeline is no1u agencies whose main capabilities and expertise clearly prefemble, because a could be on stremn two to sfa­ were either on the engineering· or the environ­ yeani earlier than a com.pam.ble overland pipe-line across Ccinada [emphasis in original):! mental side would play larger or lesser roles. An agency could, however-and Interior's Bureau of So Congress passed the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Land Management did-acquire the kind of Authorization Act, but at the same time required expertise it needed in order to strengthen its that federal officials impose stipulations includ­ participation in and assert its authority over the ing "requirements designed to control or prevent project. damage to the environment," and referred In general, as government's planning activities specifically to the protection of fish and wildlife began in early 1969, the real complexity and habitat. 5 magnitude of the p1~oject were only dimly It would be misleading if not a direct perceived by virtually everyone concerned in misrepresentation of the pipeline act (including both government and industry quarters. At that the related leasing act amendments) to say that it time, government reviewers tended to emphasize had the "dual"-as if "equal"-objectives of the potential impacts of the project on the land,

•U.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Federal Lawfa Riuhtof "In addition to the explicit pro\'isions or the authorization act and leasing Way Ad of 197:J, Report 93-207 to accompany S. 1081, 93 Cong., 1 Sess., June 12. amendments. pertinent existing laws remained in force. Section 20:{(c)of the act 1973, p. 21. I<'ora discussionofthecostsof delay to Alyeska owner companies, State states that "all authorizations is;;ued uythe Secretary and othei· federal officials orAlaska, Nation, and , see Appendix D below. and agencies pursuant to this title shall include the term;; and conditions required 51lfineml Ll!a.~in{I Ad A1111!1Hl111e11f:{,Title I of Public Law 93-153, section 28 (h) . .. by the provision of law that would otlwrwise be applicable if this title had not (2). been enacted . . . "

19 water and fish and wildlife of Alaska. The related often not clear which agency was in charge, 7 even activities of government agencies, such as the though the Interior had the lead and, within the development of the initial draft stipulations in department, BLM had direct authority over most 1969, reflected the dominance of this concern. It of the lands the oil companies needed for a was not long, however, before serious technical pipeline right-of-way. Still, the shifting em­ engineering problems surfaced in Alyeska's phasis between integrity-engineering and envi­ early plans; these had primarily to do with the ronmental protection questions introduced some permafrost question. It was at that point, in late ambiguity into the situation, and encouraged the 1969, that the roles of the technicians and fish and wildlife people, among others, to seek engineers began to grow rapidly toward the pre­ periodically to expand their roles in project eminence they achieved during the planning planning decisions. Similarly, from outside of period and which the engineers in particular Interior, the Army Corps of Engineers made a maintained through the construction phase. bid for lead status in the engineering aspects of The trend of government activities and the the project. character of government agency roles were not, The Interior Department was the "logical1'lead of course, simple or single-dimensional. The agency for the pipeline project for several "resource men" in the Bureau of Land Manage­ reasons, including its authority over the affected ment (BLM) and the biologists and wildlife federal lands, its mineral resource development managers in the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service policy and program responsibilities, and the (FWS) and other agencies did participate inten­ expertise of several of its bureaus in related sively, for example, in environmental impact state­ physical science and land resource management ment (EIS) preparation, an effort that began in fields. Interior became the def acto lead agency 1970 and was not completed until early 1972. for the pipeline project at the time the oil These resource and fish and wildlife staffs also companies first applied for permits to conduct conducted a wide range of important surveys and pre-construction exploration and survey work on studies that helped make pipeline alignment and federal public domain lands in Alaska. design decisions more environmentally sensitive. This lead role was formalized in May 1969. By These and other fish and wildlife-related memorandum to the Secretary, the President activities, and their relationship to technical officially recognized the Interior Department's engineering efforts, will be discussed further in North Slope Task Force, which had been Chapter IV. It is intended here only to suggest an established earlier that year to develop policy overall pattern of government planning activity guidance for the project, and he requested that in which technical-engineering definitions of the the task force be enlarged to include representa­ problem dominated for the most part, especially tives of other departments, specifically Com­ after the first year of project activity. But the merce, Defense, Health, Education and Welfare 8 efforts to insure the physical integrity of the and Transportation. Moreover, the President pipeline were at the same time considered made the Administration's interest clear, stating fundamental means of assuring an environ­ "it is urgent that we consider now the ways in mentally safe project in the long run. This overlap which we can explore and develop, without of pipeline integrity and environmental protec­ destruction and with minimum disturbance, the 9 tion interests, together with the "mixed mission" oil resources of northern Alaska." The federal of an agency like BLM, which is charged with Task Force on Alaska Oil Development was thus both protecting and developing resources, pre­ established and, like the previous North Slope cludes easy labeling of agency roles in pipeline Task Force, it was chaired by the Under planning and surveillance. Secretary of the Interior. Most of the prospective right-of-way lands for Jurisdictional claims of federal agencies both the pipeline were under the jurisdiction of the within and outside of the Department of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which was Interior, however, are easier to trace. Armed with their own specialized mandates and 7Interview with Russell Train, former Under Secretary of the Interior, competencies, these agencies competed for Washington, D.C., August 25, 1977. sMemorandum to Secretary Hickel from President Nixon, May 9, 1969. varying degrees of authority over project Eventually, the task force also inelude_d repres~ntatives of the DepartmE;nt of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Science and Technology, Office of activities throughout the planning period and Management and Budget, Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Protection Agency, and the National Science Foundation. into construciton. Especialy during 1969, it was 9lbid.

20 therefore the government's first point of working tions and to deal with a progressively wider range contact with the oil companies' pipeline consor­ of technical design problems. tium. Consistent with an emphasis on environ­ The "technical'' efforts were organized under a mental issues, BLM had broad responsibilities Technical Advisory Board established in early for land and resource conservation and manage­ 1970 as an arm of the Task Force on Alaska Oil ment, cutting across many of the areas of concern Development. The board's first chairman was the presented by the project. At the same time, BLM director of USGS, and later it was headed by a was an agency charged with promoting and technical assistant in the Under Secretary's managing resource development under a "multi­ office. A Menlo Park Working Group had been ple-use" philosophy, and this, too, was generally established at the California base of USGS in consistent with the Administration and depart- 1969 and later, in rriid-1971, an Ad hoc Review ment interest in the development and transport of Group was established to review Alyeska's Alaska oil resources. project description. The board and its subsidiary Most working level relationships with Alyeska groups were interagency organizations in which took place through BLM's Alaska state office, and USGS had a leading role. A fourth committee the director of the state office acted as the under the task force was formed to deal Secretary's "authorized officer" for the project. specifically with stipulation revisions, and it was By the end of 1969, a pip~line division had been headed by the chief of BLM's pipeline division, established within the state office, and an who was also a member of the Technical Advisory engineer was recruited from the Corps of Board and the Menlo Park Working Group. Engineers to head it. During the next year, There was no fish and wildlife agency repre­ several more engineers were hired to expand sentation on any of these technical groups. BLM's base of experience and expertise, which By the end of 1970, the second year of pipeline had until then been limited largely to land planning work, a series of technical engineering and resources management fields. The pipeline problems was dominating the attention of division also hired a fisheries biologist and a wild­ Interior officials at both Washington and field life biologist. levels, and fish and wildlife protection interests now had to find their place within a much larger BLM thus expanded its capabilities in two set of more pressing concerns. This is not to say directions-environmental/fish and wildlife pro­ that fish and wildlife protection interests and tection and engineering/construction, with the broader environmental concerns were ignored. emphasis on the latter-and thereby strength­ Rather, it is to indicate the concentration ·of ened both its competence and its jurisdictional efforts on basic technical problems affecting claims over the pipeline project. But priority was pipeline integrity, and the consequent drift of clearly given to bolstering the agency's engineer­ initiative and influence to those agencies and ing competence for a project that was presenting officials best equipped to deal with such issues. ever more formidable technical problems. The Fish and wildlife agency representatives were pipeline division later transferred these capabili­ activ~ on other fronts. The principals here were ties, deepened and extended by the four years of officials and staff of the Interior's Fish and experience gained during the pipeline delay, to Wildlife Service and the National Marine its successor agency, the Alaska Pipeline Office. Fisheries Service (NMFS) of the Department of As the seriousness of permafrost, seismic, river Commerce. 10 In Alaska, they participated in crossing, and other technical-engineering prob­ development of the environmental stipulations lems became increasingly apparent in 1969, the and review of pipeline alignment plans poten­ U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) of the Depart­ tially affecting fish and wildlife resources. In ment of the Interior was drawn further into pipe­ these matters they made recommendations to line planning activities. In 1970, it was deter­ BLM's Alaska office. FWS staff also participated mined that a set of "technical" stipulations would in preparing the draft EIS; this draft was need to be added to the "environmental" stipula­ roundly criticized at public hearings in Ancho­ tions that had been developed in 1969 through an rage and Washington in early 1971. Because interagency effort headed by BLM's resource more extensive interagency participation was management staff. USGS was thus called upon to rieeded, and because overcoming the environ- contribute the scientific and technical expertisE necessary to develop adequate technical stipula- 111NMFS w.as the Bureau of Commercial I?isheries of FWS until mid-1970.

21 mentalists' suit depended in part on satisfying were vii·tually the final draft of that document as NEPA impact statement requirements, a "102 well. In May the Secretary of the Interior Statement" task force was established under the announced that he was ready to approve the Task Force on Alaska Oil Development. This trans-Alaska pipeline application. The problem effort was directed from the Under Secretary's now was a legal and political one that remained to level in Washington, and the EIS group, too, was be resolved in the courts and in Congress. And headed by an official of USGS. Representatives of these legal-political issues dominated attention at several federal fish and wildlife agencies at both the Washington policy level until the pipeline act Washington and Alaska levels participated act was passed in 1973. actively in the writing of the "living resources" During this last phase of planning before the sections of the final EIS that was issued in March permit was granted, officials and key staff 1972. members of the involved agencies began to focus Beyond making recommendations to the BLM on another question that became inc1·easingly pipeline division on alignment and related pertinent as the final obstacles to construction decisions, proposing environmental stipulations, were being overcome. This was the question of and contributing to the EIS, fish and wildlife how a construction surveillance organization agency staffs in Alaska devoted continuing efforts would be structured and how authority for to studies of fisheries and wildlife resources that surveillance would be allocated among the rn ight be affected by the construction and affected government agencies. operation of a trans-Alaska oil pipeline. These It was during this final pre-permit phase that studies were coordinated through an Inter­ FWS as well as other agencies made their bids for agency Fish and Wildlife Team organized by independent surveillance authority and were BLM in 1970, and they continued under that ultimately overruled at the department level. arrangement throughout the pre-permit period. BLM lost its line authority over the pipeline By the end of 1971, the third year of project project when the decision was made in the latter planning activity, two shifts of emphasis had part of 1973 to transform the pipeline division occurred. First, there was a shift from an initial into a separate Alaska Pipeline Office (APO) generalized concern with prospective environ­ headed by an "authorized officer" who would mental effects of pipeline construction to report directly to the Office of the Under concentration on more basic and sharply focused Secretary. A related decision was that a third­ technical-engineering deficiencies in the oil party contractor would be hired by the Interior companies' early designs. This shift of emphasis Department to fill most of APO's needs for had taken place by the end of the first year, not­ increased engineering and environmental exper­ withstanding the intensive effort in 1971 to tise and staff support for construction surveil­ prepare an acceptable EIS. The urgency of this lance. latter effort, in turn, reflected a second shift that These decisions concentrated authority for was already evident in 1970-a shift from what pipeline surveillance within Interior and blunted was primarily an Alaska-based operation cen­ the claims of existing agencies both within and tered in BLM's pipeline division to a Washington­ outside the department for independent surveil­ directed process based in the Under Secretary's lance authority, based on their special com­ office and covering a full range of engineering petencies. These decisions, and particularly the and environmental issues that demanded policy third-party contractor approach, effectively level attention as well as intensive analysis at a undercut the Corps of Engineers, which had been technical staff level. The pipeline division in bidding for control over the basic engineering Alaska continued and increased its level of aspects of the project. The decisions also operations during this period, but by the end of undermined the interests of USGS as well as of 1971 an elaborate super-structure, with a Menlo FWS, NMFS, and the Environmental Protection Park branch, had been established at the Agency -(EPA) in expanding their parts in the department level. prospective surveillance system and in insu­ Both the final EIS and the revised stipulations, lating such parts from control by the APO's now including separate "environmental" and authorized officer. "technical" components, were completed in early The fish and wildlife agencies nonetheless 1972. No additional hearings were held on the EIS, continued to assert their claims for special status and the stipulations published in February 1972 within the prospective construction surveillance

22 system. In this effort they ultimately did achieve generated during the three-year construction a significant measure of success when the Joint period. Further, state government financing Fish and Wildlife Advisory Team (JFW AT) was itself became dependent on the prospective flow established as a part of the surveillance of oil royalty payments and tax revenues structure. As later chapters will show, JFWAT following the North Slope lease sale of 1969. As provided both the conditions and opportunities stated by Alaska's Attorney General at the U.S. for the fish and wildlife biologists to play an Senate hearings on the pipeline act in 1973, the important part in the surveillance process, even problem was by then reaching crisis proportions: though they were formally limited to "advising" " ... the State of Alaska has significantly more at the federal engineers. stake in the deliberations on these bills than does any other state. Continuing delays on the Trans­ State Agencies and Interests Alaska Pipeline System are having a crippling impact upon its ability to plan coherently for the Although this study focuses on fish and wildlife future." 11 protection policies and activities primarily of Although the general position of the state federal agencies, it is important for present government in support of the earliest possible purposes to discuss the state's general posture construction of a trans-Alaska pipeline was toward the pipeline project during the planning unambiguous, there were significant differences period and the particular stance it took on the within the state administration on the issues of issue of organizing a surveillance system. surveillance policy and organization. And, as was Understanding of these aspects of the stctte role the case at the federal level, state agency will, in turn, shed light on fish and wildlife differences took perhaps their clearest form as a protection activities that were conducted jointly jurisdictional struggle. 12 The participants were by federal and state agencies in both pre-permit the commissioners of Natural Resources, High­ and construction phases of the pipeline project. ways, Fish and Game, and Environmental In general, the state role was secondary to the Conservation, and the Attorney General, who federal government's lead throughout the pro­ comprised a pipeline environmental committee ject. This was due in part to the circumstance that under a cabinet level pipeline task force. The task the state had jurisdiction over only about one­ force's underlying purpose was to promote third of the pipeline right-of-way, while the construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline. The federal government controlled the other two­ committee's function was to develop policy and an thirds. Moreover, the project was of national organizational scheme for state surveillance that interest, was involved in interstate commerce, would be acceptable to the various affected state and depended primarily on federal policy actions, agencies and consistent with the state admini­ as reflected in NEPA requirements and ulti­ stration's interest in pipeline construction with mately in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Autho­ minimum delay. rization Act and Mineral Leasing Act amend­ With one exception, there was agreement ments. Government initiative was thus at the among the committee members that the individ­ federal and not at the state level. Add to these ual state departments should contribute staff to a considerations the fact that the state government single state monitoring agency. The exception took a very early and very strong position in was the Commissioner of Environmental Con­ support of trans-Alaska pipeline construction, servation, who sought the lead status in the state's and it becomes clearer why the problem of construction monitoring effort. At the same time, formulating and implementing an environmen­ other departments, including Highways and tal surveillance policy was left mainly in federal Fish and Game, sought to guard their own hands. statutory powers, keeping them independent of The state interest, as articulated by the governor and other state officials, was in clearing the way as rapidly as possible for construction of a trans-Alaska line, and the motivation was H John g Havelock Attorney General for the State of Alaska, Stale111e1!fon S. 104.1, Title· IV, and o~ S.1081, ·before the U.S. Senate Committee on In tenor and primarily economic. In a state suffering from Insular Affafrs. March 27, rnn. chronically high rates of unemployment and 1:!'fhis summarv of state agency )JOsitions is based on interviews with the fo!lowi;1g past ai1d present state officials: John Havelock, former A,ttorney looking to the oil industry for its economic (ieneral, Anchorage, July 1, HJ77: Norman liorsuch, forme,r 1~ttorney l,ener~I. Juneau, ,July 27. 1977; Charles Herbert, former Comm1ss1~ner ~f ~atui al salvation, there were obviously high expectations Resources i\nchorage, July 13, 1977; Guy Martrn, former Comm1ss\oner of Natural l{esources. Washington, D.C .• August 22, _1977; and Jerry ,R~rnwand, for the employment and income that would be Deputy Commissioner of Envirnnmental Conservat10n, Juneau, July 26. 1977.

23 any new monitoring agency. Department of was little urgency to these negotiations until it Highway engineers in particular opposed any appeared that the legal obstacles to construction scheme that would place their pipeline haul road would finally be cleared away by congressional project under the surveillance of Environmental action in 1973. Consequently, during all but the Conservation or any similar staff. final months of the pre-permit period, little These interagency differences helped block progress was made between federal and state creation of a strong and autonomous state negotiators attempting to deal with a complex set surveillance organization, and the prerogatives of federal-state jurisdictional issues. of individual departments, including Fish and The final resolution of these issues was Game, remained safe. Another effect was that the incorporated in the federal-state cooperative Commissioner of Fish and Game remained free to agreement of January 1974, an agreement that pursue his own department's interest in estab­ registered the pattern of forces on both sides at lishing a joint fish and wildlife surveillance team the time. Both sides were interested in moving (JFWAT) with federal agency counterparts even quickly to construction under the terms of the after federal and state officials had decided to pipeline authorization act, prospective right-of­ create separate surveillance offices. As a result, way agreements with Alyeska, and the environ­ the state, through the Department of Fish and mental and technical stipulations. This common Game, introduced an independent base of interest provided the grounds for quickly coming statutory authority (fish and game laws) directly to terms on issues that had divided them for most into a federally-dominated surveillance scheme of the previous three years. Essentially, the that otherwise exhibited an unusual concentra­ federal and state negotiators agreed not to force tion of authority and degree of autonomy. 13 basic constitutional-legal issues that probably During the pre-permit period, the Department could not be resolved without prolonged litiga­ of Fish and Game emerged as the most active tion and the consequent threat of further pipeline state agency participant in the pipeline planning delay. 14 activities conducted in Alaska and led by BLM's The quickest way to agreement was for each to pipeline division. Department biologists were accept and refine major elements of the status especially active in the fish and wildlife studies quo. Thus, the federal government would work of the Interagency Fish and Wildlife Team. continue to concentrate monitoring authority in a The commissioner and key members of his staff successor agency to the pipeline division and also worked closely with their federal counter­ retain ultimate authority over pipeline engi­ parts in creating JFW AT, which assured an neering-integrity questions. Further, federal and effective state presence in the fish and wildlife state governments would continue to cooperate in protection activities of the federal surveillance fish and wildlife protection aspects of surveil­ organization. lance as they had through the Interagency Fish and Wildlife Team during the planning period. Federal-State Negotiations Apart from this cooperative arrangement, there would be separate and independent federal and Negotiations between federal and state rep­ state surveillance organizations. resentatives toward a cooperative agreement in Between 1971 and 1972, the state almost construction surveillance were shaped by polit­ completely reversed itself on construction sur­ ical, legal, and bureaucratic forces at work on veillance policy. Initially, the governor, whose both sides. On the federal side these forces primary interest was in seeing the line built as included a commitment to a relatively autono­ soon as possible, proposed that "the State of mous surveillance organization that would grow Alaska and the Bureau of Land Management out of BLM's pipeline division. On the state side enter into a cooperative agreement under which they included an overriding commitment to the BLM will supervise construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline construction at the same pipeline ·and related structures on State and time that separate state departments worked to private lands." 15 Within a year, the state had protect their individual prerogatives. But there withdrawn from this position of simply deferring

"'The environmental protection responsibilities of the State Department of 11See Appendix 13 below, "The ,Jurisdictions of the I•'ederal and State Environmental Conservation, on the other hand, were weakened in the area of Uovernments Over the Construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline." pipeline surveillance. DEC, having over-reached for authority, damaged its relations with othe1· departments as well as with the State Pipeline Coordinator's 10Letter from William A. Egan. (,overnor of Alaska. to Burton W. Sileock, state Office. director, Bureau of Land Management, March 20. 1H71.

24 to BLM. By early 1972, the state was more national politics of energy development and carefully protecting its own interests in disputes environmental conservation. And it posed new with the federal government over land ownership organizational problems both to the private and control and guarding its jurisdictional claims companies that proposed it and the government concerning the application of state police powers, agencies charged with overseeing it from its including fish and wildlife regulation on federal planning stages through to construction and lands in Alaska. The state apparently did not operation. want the pipeline surveillance case to set a prece­ If there were any constants in this evolving dent that might undermine its longer run claims complex of issues and events, one of them was that of land ownership and sovereignty vis-a-vis the government and industry officials were for the federal government in Alaska. What the state most part commonly focusing on the trans-Alaska now proposed was a joint surveillance organiza­ project proposed by the industry, and on how to tion with co-equal federal and state authority make it acceptable from engineering and covering both federal and state right-of-way lands. environmental standpoints. In retrospect, it is Until the pipeline authorization act was passed, clear that government's preoccupation was with however, the Interior Department negotiators TAPS and with the companies' interest in tended to press for more exclusive federal control building and operating it soon, notwithstanding over pipeline surveillance, and the head of BLM's the intensive, but relatively short-lived, attention pipeline division was viewed by some state offi­ given to a possible Canadian alternative. The cials as the most adamant and uncompromising basic and ongoing task before government and "federalist" of them all. 16 industry officials was to overcome, step-by-step, With the pipeline act, both sides agreed to lay the many political, legal, administrative, and aside their more basic differences for the time technical obstacles encountered by the project being and to compromise where necessary in during the entire course of its development. This order to avoid further delay. Most important in circumstance inevitably raised issues of govern­ the present context is that the federal and state ment responsibility for private corporate activi­ fish and wildlife agencies were permitted to ties affecting the public interest. Among these create their own niche in the surveillance system, issues were how far government can and should establishing a form of joint organization that go in substituting its judgement for industry's federal and state negotiators were unable to and where the balance should be between a agree on for the surveillance system as a whole. government agency's role as a regulator and its Moreover, it would be organized in such a way role as a facilitator of industrial development that the state fish and game members of JFW AT, activity. bringing their own statutory authority from the In the fall of 1969, the Secretary of the Interior Department of Fish and Game to which they informed the Senate Committee on Interior and remained responsible, could fortify the federal Insular Affairs that he intended to lift the "land members, who would be a formal part of APO freeze" affecting the proposed TAPS right-of-way and under its operating authority. in Alaska, and a public hearing was held on the matter in October. Under Secretary Russell Government and Industry Train, representing the Secretary, had the following exchange with Senator Gaylord Nelson Government agencies were confronted with during the course of Train's testimony, which was new challenges in the trans-Alaska pipeline in support of moving ahead with the TAPS system (TAPS) proposal. It was a proposal that project: cut deeply and broadly across a wide range of jurisdictional and even constitutional issues Senator NELSON. I suppose as usual I have a minority posi­ tion. I guess nobody has raised the question of why we ought to between federal and state governments and go in there and take the oil out at this time in any event. individual agencies at both levels. TAPS raised a Mr. TRAIN. Well, I certainly have heard the question asked, host of scientific, engineering, technical pro­ Senator, yes. If you were to ask me whether the Department blems associated with construction in the arctic has made a decision that the oil should come out, and I think and sub-arctic. The project was caught up in the that is implicit in what you have said-first, it is not a decision that is entirely up to the Department of the Interior. Certain commitments have been made by the private sector rnJnterview with Hod Pegues, assistant attm·ney general, Juneau, July 2H, 1977, in terms of development. I think something in the neighbor­ and Charles Herbert, former Commissioner of Natural Resources, Anchorage, July 13, 1977. hood of some $300 million of exploratory development activity

25 has already occurred on the North Slope. The companies have some very difficult environmental and technical recently paid spmething in the neighborhood of $900 million problems. At least in part, this was still the case for additional lease interests. in early 1974 when the project was finally I believe that there has already been an investment in the neighborhood of perhaps as much as $200 million in connec­ approved. The major difference was that, during tion with the pipeline and related matters, so that in a sense the four year delay, substantial progress had the private sector, at least, has made a decision that this is an been made by Alyeska and government agencies, important resource which it expects to develop, and this has particularly in resolving technical problems been a traditional way in which such decisions have been affecting the physical integrity of the line. Also made in this country. during that time, all affected government Senator NELSON. I am not raising the question that the oil will never need to be used. I am just raising the question about agencies, including fish and wildlife, had to the timing of it .... Now it seems to me we have a situation assume roles and responsibilities consistent with here where the private sector has made some decisions, but implicit and explicit priorities, imposed from the big controlling decision is still in the hands of the Federal departmental and Administration levels, to find Government, since these are public lands that they had to go solutions to these problems and thereby to across .... improve and facilitate the project as a whole. Mr. TRAIN. There is no question that the time frame within which we all find ourselves in the problem has been created in This was the context in which fish and wildlife substantial part by the timing of the company's own invest­ protection objectives and interests had to find ments and decisions. their "proper" place-a place in proportion to, I think that whether we would have moved in exactly the and in some balance with, a myriad of other same way and created a similar time frame is very much open factors that went far beyond fish and wildlife to question, but that really isn't before use. We are confronted values. The practical problem before the fish and with a situation which exists. 17 wildlife agencies was thus to accommodate The situation that existed in 1969 was that themselves to events, structures, and decisions in Alyeska had applied for a right-of-way for a which they had relatively limited roles, and then trans-Alaska pipeline project that presented to make the best of the limited resources of time, money, and expertise available in helping make 17U.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Trn111;-A./aNku the project more acceptable and potentially less l'iwlhw, lfmi·iuy.s, on the Status of the Proposed Trans-Alaska Pipeline. 91 Cong .. 1 Sess., October Hi, lHl>H,Part 2, p, 224. damaging to Alaska's environment.

26 Chapter IV-Pipeline Planning

The term "pipeline planning" is used here in a "didn't even want to do a project design as a broad sense, referring to the process of govern­ preliminary step." 2 ment-industry relations revolving around the Suggesting more basic constraints on planni_ng trans-Alaska pipeline system proposal and the by government and Alyeska, the state pipeline many technical, environmental, and legal issues coordinator, at a congressional committee hear­ it presented during the pre-permit period. This ing in early 1975, assessed the effects of the court chapter selectively describes and assesses that injunction that blocked pipeline construction process, particularly as it involved fish and between 1970 and 1973: wildlife protection activities by fish and wildlife ... As we see it, the interpretation of this injunction by agencies. The focus is on critical points at which attorneys of the Department of the Interior and Alyeska fish and wildlife concerns interacted with other curtailed fol'mal and open substantive dialogue between elements of pipeline planning through early Alyeska's technical staff and their counterparts in the 1974. These occurred in the context of routing Department of the Interior's review group. This con­ straint, as well as funding limitations which inhibited and alignment decisions, design review, develop­ formation of a centralized Federal focal point for pipeline ment of stipulations, preparation of the environ­ matters until signing of the grant right-of-way, limited the mental impact statement (EIS), conduct of opportunities for the designers and Federal reviewers to pipeline studies, and the process of organizing the arrive at final resolutions of basic environmental and Alaska Pipeline Office (APO) and the Joint Fish engineering differences and to reach agreement on and Wildlife Advisory Team (JFW AT). Each of application of the proposed stipulations. In fact, this delay from April 1970 until November 1973 had largely the these will be dealt with in this chapter, following opposite result from that sought by the environmental a general discussion of the nature of the pipeline organizations; namely, that the delay could not be planning process. effectively used for the timely solution of the basic environmental and technical questions faced by the involved parties in this project.:' Planning: Responses to Uncertainty Regardless of this interpretation of the injunc­ Russell Train recalls that when he initially tion, the period of delay nonetheless did provide addressed the trans-Alaska pipeline project as essential time to address basic environmental Under Secretary of the Interior in 1969, he "was and technical questions presented by the project. groping, and had little experience with this sort But another recent assessment of pipeline of thing, nor did anyone in the department." planning suggests that, for their own reasons, the Moreover, there was no money in the department oil companies themselves failed to take advant­ budget for the activity, and no one knew quite age of the time available: how to deal with the budgetary problem. And the oil companies themselves appeared to him to be "a Although [the TAPS owner companies) created [Alyeska] bit losf' and "naive," especially lacking an to plan and construct the pipeline, Alyeska's officers appreciation of the problems posed by Alaska's recognized they lacked necessary planning and construc­ arctic and sub-arctic environment.1 Another tion management expertise .... It was not until late 1973-with construction scheduled to start within four federal official, who played a key role in the months-that Bechtel was brought onto the project and a Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) Alaska semblance of effective, albeit belated, planning began.-1 state office during the early planning period, similarly recalls how "massive" and "unbelieva­ 2Interview with Gerald Zamber, BLM, Anchorage, May i6, Hl77. 3U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, ble" the task became, emphasizing the difficul­ O/'ersiuht HeariuyH 011 Cons{ruetio11 qf 1~'£11/;;-A/askaPipeline, before the Subcommittee on Public Lands, 94 Cong., 1 Sess., Anchorage, Alaska, February ties of learning to work with Alyeskaofficials who 12, 1975, p, 59. 1Terry !•'. Lemmer, The Jl111111m,1111•11t,l'la1111i11y 1111rl C,mN/1•11l'fim1of tlw Al,u

6 5 See, for example, Memorandum from Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife, U.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Tr1w.N"1laslm Pi/iel i11e Parks, and Marine Resources to members of North Slope Task Force, Subject; Hrnriny.'!, on the status of the Proposed Trans-Alaska Pipeline, 91 Cong., 1 Sess .. "Proposed Action Program," April 30, 1969; also, the July HJ69 and September Part 2. October 16, 1969, p. 120. Also, at the congressional oversight hearing in 1969 drafts of the environmental stipulations, early 1975, a year after construction had started, Charles Champion, state pipeline coordinator, observed, "\Ve are convinced that the major env1mnmental issues 7The following descnption of the pipeline division is based on interviews with bave been basically resolved during the design and project permissions phase, several former BLM·division officials: Burton Silcock, Anchorage, May 11, 1977; which is essentially in its final stages. The Government's role should now be one of Gerald Zamber, Anchorage, May 16, 1977; James Hemming, Anchorage, July sufficient monitoring to asssure that the agreed-upon cdteria are met." (House 12, 1977; Morris J. Turner, Anchorage, August 16, 1977; and Henry Noldan, Committee on Interim·, 01:er,,iylil Hrnri1111x.pp. 60-61.) Washington, D.C., August 21, 1977. 28 course. In the first place were the inhibitions on There was, however, no apparent reduction in both government and Alyeska officials caused by the volume of work handled by the pipeline the court suit and other legal delays and the division. Division staff participated with repre­ reluctance of congressional appropriations com­ sentatives of other agencies, including FWS, in mittees to fund the division to requested staffing producing sections of the new EIS for the "102" levels. 8 The staff complement for the interdisci­ task force in Washington; continued work on the plinary process remained limited and was stipulations; reviewed Alyeska's project descrip­ weighted toward the engineering profession and tion submitted to DOI in mid-1971; conducted the more conventional BLM resource manage­ preliminary design reviews of Alyeska's plansfor ment staff. The division and other elements of facility locations, material sites, above and below DOI found it necessary to take an active part in ground modes, and related design elements; and pipeline design activities rather than just coordinated environmental data collection efforts reviewing Alyeska's work. As the pipeline in which several federal and state agencies alignment was being specifically located in 1970, participated throughout the planning period. relations between BLM and the fish and wildlife agencies began to become strained. 9 And Alyeska's desire for a single point of contact did Alignment: The Gulkana-Gakona Case not fit the realities of multiple agency jurisdic­ The trans-Alaska route was essentially the oil tions, particularly in government review and companies' choice, and BLM worked with oermitting of large development projects. industry representatives during the winter of The pipeline division nonetheless moved along 1968-1969 in determining particularly the route a step at a time, discharging its tasks as best it to be followed through the Brooks Range. 10 Later, could under the circumstances. The Alaska­ in the interagency review of specific alignments, based aspects of the project were under its care, the fish and wildlife participants began raising and di vision staff kept a focus on the trans-Alaska objections. One of the first and most important proposal that industry continued to develop with occasions concerned the Gulkana-Gakona River the division's participation and prodding during drainage re-route issue, which FWS officials the years of delay. characterize as "precedent setting," the "out­ Significant changes in the pattern of these standing river re-route case," and one in which planning activities have already been noted. "the battle lines were drawn" anrl FWS Jost.11 First was the shift from the generalized land and The issue reached the department level in early resource protection concerns reflected in the 1969 1970, after FWS staff in Alaska had unsuccess­ stipulations to an emphasis on specific engineer­ fully recommended a change in route (from the ing and technical problems and stipulations in Gulkana River to the Gakona River drainage) in 1970 and after. Second was the intervention of order to by-pass a highly productive Washington DOI officials in early 1971, after the spawning and sport fishing area in the Copper first draft of the EIS was found inadequate, and River Basin. The Assistant Secretary for Fish the establishment of department level EIS prep­ and Wildlife, Parks, and Marine Resources then aration and stipulations review groups. One result appealed to the Under Secretary: of these changes was that fish and wildlife agencies The desirability of a route change in the TAPS pipeline in in Alaska had less opportunity to play active and order to avoid the upper Gulkana River watershed, includ­ direct roles in the planning process than they had ing the Paxson Lake area, has been a subject of much dis­ had in 1969 and 1970. The head of the pipeline cussion .... division in the meanwhile had become part of the Washington-department level planning structure, serving as a member of the Technical Advisory Board and of the Menlo Park Working Group, and We believe that the proposed route change is one of the Chairman of the Stipulation Revision Group. major considerations in the pipeline routing-excepting the integrity of the pipeline itself. 12 8 At the end of 1970, the division had 25 personnel and a planned staff level of 70, which was never reached. When the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act became law in late 1973, the division still had only 18 professional level staff. (U.S. Department of Intei-ior, Bureau of Land Management, S10·1•eillmwe of the 1"lnterview with Burton Silcock. former state director. BLM Anrhorag-e. May Proposed Tran,~·Alaslm Pipeline S!Jstem, 1970 Annual Report, Anchorage, 11, 1977. Alaska, 1971, p. 9; and U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Alaska State Office, Division of Pipeline, Tnrn.,;-A/wd,a Pipeline 11Interviews with FWS officfal", May, Tune, and August, 1977. Project: Administration 1111d Ma1waen1ent Summary, October 1973, Appendix H.) 1~Memoranmnn from AsBistanl Secretary for Fish and Wildlife. Park,.;, and 9lnterviews with Burton Silcock, former state director, BLM, Anchorage, May ;\farine Re~om·ce:,; to Under Serrelary. Subject: "Pipeline-Sug-g-ei;ted Huute 11, 1977; and Gerald Zamber, BLM, Anchorage, May 16, 1977. Chang-eon Upper {;ulkana !{iver." February 2, W70.

29 By mid-1970, FWS was forced to back down. This episode is not a representative case of BLM had argued that soil stability factors, alignment review, if any such case exists. 18 It is together with use of existing terrain features and summarized here because it was referred to additional control structures, clearly made the repeatedly in interviews with FWS staff, and it Gulkana the safer route, while the TAPS seemed to symbolize to them their secondary companies claimed that "their contingency plan status in pipeline planning with BLM, Alyeska, for the Gulkana section would be their showpiece and the engineers who held prominent positions of good planning and the first developed." 13 The in both of these organizations. Further, it illus­ FWS officials acknowledged that they "lacked trates recurrent difficulties that biologists had in specific data to refute [BLM's] assertions since communicating with engineers throughout the they were presented as an engineering solution to pipeline planning and construction phases, and it our problem." 14 Futher, the Gakona route would suggests the problems the biologists had when have required two crossings of the , a either they lacked pertinent data or their data did major water course, as opposed to the several not mesh with that of the engineers. 19 smaller tributaries affected by the Gulkana Finally, the case provides some insig·ht into route. As a result, the FWS officials agreed to DOI's pipeline planning structure. When serious accept the assurances of BLM and the TAPS differences arose between agencies and appeals companies, providing that they could review and were made to higher levels, such as in this comment on both construction and oil spill instance, the Secretary's office acted as the final contingency plans for that segment of the arbiter. At the working level in Alaska, BLM's project. 15 pipeline division combined the roles of lead This, however, did not end the controversy. agency working directly with Alyeska, coordina­ FWS and National Marine Fisheries Service tor of interagency involvement, and first-level' (NMFS) staff saw no contingency plans until "arbiter" of differences and disputes. The chief of 1977, since the stipulations did not require such the division, however, at least during the two to plans until 180 days before "start-up," i.e., the three year period spanned by this case, was not date when oil started flowing through the line. required to report to higher levels through the Also, the construction plans before 1974 were state and national directors of BLM; he had direct preliminary only, and did not provide definitive access to the Under Secretary's office, where designs for agency review. Consequently, at least department disputes and appeals were generally until the end of 1972-two and a half years after resolved. 20 This suggests the real authority of the the conditional agreement to go with the Gulkana pipeline division within the department at the route-FWS staff felt it necessary to keep the Alaska level, and its advantageous position when issue alive, still viewing the Gakona re-route as differences with FWS had to be resolved at "the only feasible alternative." 16 But, despite higher levels. their continuing interest and their attempts to The structure of the planning process reflected hold BLM to the initial agreement for review department priorities and accommodated- the before construction started, they were frustrated basic' function of the pipeline division: to attempt by the complexities and discontinuities of a to balance and accommodate a variety of planning process over which they had little interests, including fish and wildlife protection, control. 17

11 :\lemornndu111 from dirc<:tot·. BSF\V and di redo!', BCF to As~islant Secretal'v L 8. 1977 and personal communication with James Fish and \Vildlife Service, BSFW, "A Report on Comparisons of the Fisheries Hemminp;. JFWAT, Anchorage, Octoher 11. 1977.} Resources Along Proposed and Alternative Pipeline Routes between Isabel Pass :t1tJnterview with Henry K. Noldan. former official of BLM pipeline division, and Willow Lake," Anchorage, Alaska, September, 1972. Washington, D.C., August 21. 1977.

30 while proceding as consistently as possible comments was made available for evaluation in mid­ toward final designs for a soundly engineered October. A team of ELM personnel, encompassing civil, structural, mechanical, hydrology, geology, and soil (and presumably, therefore, environmentally mechanics disciplines conducted a concentrated review of safe) trans-Alaska oil pipeline. material available. Comments were prepared and introduced at the working group meeting which was convened November 12, 1970. Subsequent to the Design Review November 12 meeting, technical stipulations were drafted in Washington on November 16-18 and reviewed with [Alyeska] on November 19. The technical stipulations The TAPS companies gave early indications were reworked and rewritten on December 15, 1970 and that they did not have answers to basic design submitted to [Alyeska] on December 16, 1970 problems, and there were serious doubts at first A formal submittal of criteria data, made by [Alyeska] at that they were even aware of the most critical the year's end, will be reviewed in the ensuing year. 22 problems. The outstanding instance was their The chief of the pipeline division, who was also plan to bury all but about 40 or 50 miles of a line a member of the Technical Advisory Board and that would cross 800 miles of a region mostly the Menlo Park Working Group, in mid-1973 underlain with permafrost. And this decision had referred back to this period, commenting first been made on the basis of a very limited core soil that "Since my involvement ... on the proposed sampling project, which was expanded only after trans-Alaska pipeline (some 40 plus months now) DOI forced the issue. USGS then brought the Alyeska has been striving to set [design] criteria construction mode (above ground-below ground) acceptable to Interior." He then discussed the problem to a sharp focus through its permafrost November-December phase of the 1970 meet­ studies. 21 But as critical and dramatic as this ings: issue was, it was still only a symptom of a larger In November 1970, a government/industry meeting was problem that would persist throughout the held in Menlo Park, California. At that ti me, because of the planning period: Alyeska's inability to develop failure of industry to come up with acceptable design acceptable design criteria except under the criteria (geotechnical and other problems peculiar to the continuous pressure of the government monitors, subarctic and arctic), [USGS Director] Pecora directed who themselves had to assume part of the burden that the Menlo Pad{ Working Group and the Technical of developing such criteria .. Advisory Board provide guidance in this matter. This was done and standards were set ... :la The following sequence of events in 1970 suggests the nature of the design problems and The "standards" referred to took the form of especially of the process of attempting to resolve technical stipulations, which in significant part them: are a direct outgrowth of government's dissatis­ faction with Alyeska's attempts to develop acceptable design criteria responsive to "geotech­ Alyeska Pipeline Service Company presented their design nical and other problems peculiar to the parameters for the Copper River Basin section of the pipeline [at a Menlo Park meeting on February 20.] subarctic and arctic." Plan, design, and construction procedure After thorough study of the material submitted by [Alyeska], the vvorking group reconvened on March 17 review problems from the large to the small through March 19 to discuss technical aspects of the data. persisted throughout the 1970-74 period, al­ It was the consensus of the group that much of the though the review process improved significantly information furnished seemed to summarize preliminary with time. 24 But the early days appear to have studies and did not present sufficient data for sound been particularly frustrating, probably as much generalizations, particularly applicable to a bury, no­ bury decision .... for TAPS officials as for BLM, as both [Alyeska] and the Technical Advisory Board working government and industry attempted to organize group met again on April 14-16 to discuss and clarify themselves in-house as well as rationalize their questions raised by [Alyeska] in interpreting the working relationships with each other. In May of 1970, for group's previous comments. example·, the state director of BLM chastised the [Alyeska's] informal response to the working group's TAPS organization:

21This problem attracted murh attention at public hearings eondurted bv DOI in Fairbanks in At1!1,'Ustof lllHH. and was emphasized by Undet' Secretary 1'rain at rongressional hearings in October, (Interview with Russell Train, Waghington, :12 JJLM, J!JN A1111111tl Nqwrl, p. -1::1. D.C.. August 25. 1~)77: Senate Interior Committee. 1'n111x-Af11xk11PiJWli/1/'. "'Memorandum from Morris J. Turner. member, Technical Advisory Board, to Hn1ri1111-~.pp. 81-125.) US

31 Generally, the document review of your plans has an adequate first· draft environmental impac1 [followed] rather than preceded [your work] effort. As statement. MorPover, most of the above listed examples,' we did not receive the ·plans and specifications items were either not completed, or completed in for the road design until after you had received bids. Similarly, this was the case with your first attempt at only a generalized and preliminary fashion, until conti·acting for the pipeline. Most recently, we had after the stipulations were essentially in fina] experienced a similar situation in the pipeline survey form, the final EIS had been prepared, the right· contract. Our job can best be accomplished by reviewing of-way permit was issued and construction waE these documents and working with you in advance of when underway. 28 you become conti·actually obligated. Variat10ns on these design-environmental data problems thus appeared repeatedly during the Your personnel have done an excellent job in the [haul] next three years ancl beyond. Review procedures road mobilization, yet it is our impression that the road is prompted a Washington-level meeting of an operating as an independent entity outside of the purview interagency technical advisory group in mid- of the pipeline and the pump stations considerations.Your 1972, two months after the Secretary of the road engineering firm does not appear to be concerned with where the pipeline ultimately goes .... 25 Interior had issued the final EIS and announced his intention to grant the pipeline right-of-way permit. In calling the meeting, the Deputy Under Haul road design and general construction Secretary (who also served as executive secretary procedure review problems were discussed again to the Task Force on Alaska Oil Development) by ELM-pipeline division and Alyeska officials in noted that Alyeska "has requested that we 26 Houston, , in October 1970. The chief of develop procedures to be followed in the pre­ the division ( then called the "project coordina­ construction and construction stages." The group tor") subsequently reported that "although the was charged with (1) identifying the kinds and meeting was beneficial ... we did not receive amounts of data required for design review and data in sufficient detail to pass any judgements as (2) developing procedures for assessing such to acceptability .... "And with special reference data. 29 This, it should be noted, was two and a half to data needed for assessing environmental years after the pipeline division had initiated impacts, he observed that: basic design review activities, although in a very This cannot be assessed until documents ... are available preliminary way, with TAPS-AlvPRk~L for review. For example: In May 1973, as Congress was considering the 1. Until elevated construction is located, we cannot right-of-way and pipeline authorization legisla­ assess its effects on game movem~_n1;s. tion, the Under Secretary called a meeting of the 2. Until stream crossing profiles are provided and Federal Task Force on Alaska Oil Development, construction techniques are finalized, we cannot which he chaired, noting that he was "hopeful that assess [their] effects on rivers and fish. 3. Until construction techniques are provided and a compromise bill can be adopted by the end of the sources of materials are determined, we cannot summer." Ori the subject of design review, he assess the effects on stream characteristics, effect on observed that fish, effect on forage for animals and erosion. 4. Until alignment is finalized, drainage patterns The companies face the practical problem of whether tc cannot be checked for effect on the pipe. keep their engineering team together in order to complet€ 5. Until final design is provided, we cannot assess design of the pipeline, even though construction may not the effects on the recreation potential of the area. 27 begin for a year to a year and a half, or whether to disband their engineering team now and complete design after a These comments indicate the direct dependence permit has been cleared through Congress and the courts. on environmental impact analyses, and especially They prefer to complete the design now, ... those aspects of concern to the fish and wildlife Th is will require . . . that the Task Force consider and agencies, on adequate and complete design and reach preliminary agreement on design criteria in certain construction data, which were not forthcoming at areas that have heretofore been the subject of concern and debate: seismic criteria, stress criteria, valve locations, the time. And it was during this very period that river crossings and flood plains, construction pad criteria, the pipeline division was attempting to prepare and methods of elevating the pipe; .... The companies have submitted detailed materials on the first three o1

25 Letter from Burton Silcock, state director, BLM, to David Henderson, Trans­ Alaska Pipeline System, Anchorage, Alaska, Mav IL 1970. 26Memorandum reporl of Morris J. Turner, µroJect coornmator, on "Road 28See Chapter VI below for discussion of the design review process during the Designs and Construction Procedure Review: Houston, Texas, October 7 through construction phase. 9, 1970." Turner noted in his report that "we have had no reply to date" to the ""Memot·andum from ,Jared Carter, executive secretary, l<'ederal Task Force on comments on the haul road included in the May letter quoted in part above. Alaska Oil Development, to [interagency groupJ. Subject: "Trans-Alaska t 7Ibid. Pipeline-Pre-Construction and Construction Procedures," July 12, 1972.

32 these subjects and informal interagency meetings have extensive above ground segments because of been held i~ Alaska to discuss some or all of them. 30 unstable soils, but found several alignment areas The Technical Advisory Board of the task force where they felt that designs were not adequate to met in July 1973 and reported its "conclusions" on accommodate big game. 33 two of the above sets of criteria with the following circumlocution: "Design criteria (pipe stess and Stipulations seismic design) were discussed, and to the extent that we are informed of Alyeska's work, we see no The first draft of environmental and general reason why their final designs would not be stipulations, completed in July 1969, was the acceptable if good engineering practices are· product of an intensive interagency effort, applied to these two criteria." 31And in December centered in BLM's Alaska state office. A second 1973, just weeks before the federal right-of-way draft was issued shortly after a public hearing permit was granted, a meeting of government· was held in Fairbanks in August. This early and industry officials was held in Houston to period was the high point of fish and wildlife discuss river crossing and flood plain and above agency participation in stipulation develop­ ground ("methods of elevating the pipe") designs, ment.34 topics of special relevance to fish and wildlife Initially, BLM's intention was to write rather agency interests. The chief of the pipeline specific stipulations that would guide and division summarized the views of the federal restrict pipeline construction affecting the land, and state representatives: water, and "living resources" of the corridor, but, as pointed out by the BLM official who was then Although we do not agree completely with all of the the leader of this effort, this was impractical proposed designs, we believe that, in general, they have because "we didn't know what we were dealing merit and represent an improvement over those previously with." 35 What he meant was that, first, pipeline reviewed. Final evaluation of the proposals must await more specific descriptions of the proposed actions and alignment, design, and construction modes and review of supporting documents when they become procedures were not developed in sufficient a vailable. 32 detail to permit anything approaching specific stipulations. A major problem in writing the Less than one month earlier, an interagency stipulations, then, was that TAPS provided too "check point" meeting was held in Anchorage to little to go on; "they said they would design it as assess project information recently submitted by they went." 36 Second, information about the Alyeska. Among those attending the meeting environment potentially affected by the pipeline were federal and state fish and wildlife agency was sparse at best, and certainly not adequate to officials who had special interests in at least two assess specific sites along an alignment that was of the topics under review, streams and flood itself still subject to significant shifts. So the. plains and construction modes (above-below stipulations had to be very general, taking the ground design). On stream crossing designs and form of broad standards rather than a specific set construction procedures, the fisheries-oriented of "do;s and don'ts." And this, in turn, meant that representatives at the meeting found that substantial discretion would need to be allowed "specific details upon which . . . judgements the officials who would ultimately enforce them. could be based were not included [in the Alyeska Technical stipulations were added to the materials]," and they went on to cite a lengthy list environmental and general provisions in 1970; of data deficiencies relating to field construction they were a product of the series of industry­ timing, methods of installation, identification of government encounters over design problems streams, and similar matters. Concerning the discussed above. The TAPS people had shown effect of elevated pipe on big game movements, a from an early point that they had not begun to wildlife group acknowledged the need for master permafrost, earthquake, and flood plain and river crossing construction problems. This

·"'Memorandum from .John C. Whitaker. chairman, to Federal Task Foree on Alaska Oil Uevelopnwnt !and others!, May t:t HJ7:L 11 "'"Memorandum of Record, cheek point meeting of November 19-20, 1973," · Memornndum frnm chairman. Technical Advison• Board. lo chairman, (BLi\'1 draft) and attached report "{;ruup Environmental Faetors." pp. 8-1..J. Federal Task Foree on Alaska Oil Developnwnt, Subject: "Technical Advi:,mry I. 11 Board Meetinl( held Oil .July rn. rnn." .July 20, l!l7:!, ' lnterviews with tiernld Zamber, BLM, Anchorage, May Hi. 1977: Burton :iiMemorandum from Morris J. Tm·ner,_chief, Division of Pipeline, BLM, to Silcock, former BLM state director, BLM. Anehorage, Mav 11. W77: and Kenneth technical advisor, Office of the Secretary, lJepa!'tment of the Interior, Subject: Roberts, NMFS, Washington, lJ.C .. August, 24. IH77. · "Draft Memorandum of Discussions of Flood Plain and Above Ground Design held c-,fnterview with (;erald Zamber, BLM. Ant:horage, May Hi, Hl77. in Houston. December 12 and 13, 1973," December 21. 1973, '"'Ibid.

33 was first evidenced in their answers to pertinent approve or disapprove proposals affecting al sections of the "79 Questions" that Under stipulations; this authority was concentrated ir Secretary Train had posed to them at the same its chairman.) The group approved of some rela time TAPS submitted its original application in tively limited and minor changes among thos, June 1969. It was further evidence by the "13 proposed by FWS, and a last round of further re Questions" prepared by USGS in March 1970, views and comments was conducted before th, and over which the TAPS engineers struggled for stipulations were issued in essentially their fina the rest of that year. The chairman of the form in February 1972.40 Technical Advisory Board, who was also director FWS officials continued to press for changes i1 of USGS, finally decided in November 1970 that the environmental stipulations after th, government should take on the task that Alyeska February draft was issued with the final EIS iI was not performing adequately: the development March 1972, but they were unsuccessful. Thos, of criteria and stipulations covering seismic, who were directly involved in these efforts tern mode selection, construction, and related techni­ now to concede, at least in retrospect and wit} cal problem areas. The USGS Menlo Park some qualifications, that more specific and re Working Group quickly responded, producing strictive stipulations might have been very diffi 37 the first draft before the end of the year. cult to apply, given the many uncertaintie: With the shift of attention from the environ­ involved in the construction process and the lacl mental to the technical stipulations in 1970, F.WS of site-specific environmental information. Thus and other fish and wildlife agency participation their major concern was with how effectively th1 in the development of stipulations was corre­ stipulations would be enforced and who woulc spondinglY--Jimited. But this did not end FWS exercise the extensive discretionary authorit: concern about the environmental stipulations. 38 built into them. Their hope in the end was tha FWS officials were especially concerned that FWS would have independent authority tt these stipulations gave too much discretionary monitor compliance with the fish and wildlife authority to the authorized officer, and that they related stipulations, and to shut down construe did not assure sufficient protection of the tion operations where serious violations occurred fisheries. These concerns flared up in August Although this was not to be, the stipulations none 1971, as the final EIS was being drafted and the theless provided fish and wildlife agencies wi tl stipulations were being· revised for issuance with substantial leverage in the surveillance proces: the EIS. 39 and, reinforced with certain independent statu FWS officials in Alaska informed FWS- Wash­ tory authorities for fish and wildlife protection ington that they had strong objections to the this leverage was exercised primarily throug] environmental stipulations, and they proposed JFWAT during the construction period. 41 some 70 changes in substance and wording. These were "screened" by Washington FWS officials, Environmental Impact Statement who then proposed about half that many changes to the Stipulations Revision Group. This group The first draft of the EIS issued in early 197: was headed by the chief of the pipeline division, met few if any tests of adequacy. There was littli who many thought would be the authorized disagreement among DOI officials, whatevei officer for the construction phase. Also compris­ their specific agency loyalties, that a new produc ing the group were two additional technical­ was necessary. 42 The initial draft was one of th, engineering experts and a lawyer from Interior's first, if not the first, major EIS document: solicitor's office. (This group was formed princi­ attempted after the National Environmenta pally to deal with affecting the technical Policy Act (NEPA) became law at +h1 stipulations, as discussed above, but had authority to beginning of 1970. There were, therefore, m

4"An official very close to this pr~cess, which ,~as conce,~1trated i_n the fina a,see discussion of these events above. This summary of how the technical months of 1971, stated that "everythmg was done m ~rush, aiJ

34 adequate precedents, experience, or guidelines, of the "living resources" sections of the document and this would still be the case in 1971 when the feels that the writers "probably" had sufficient final draft was prepared. 43 But since an EIS was information for "general predictions" but cer­ now a statutory prerequisite to government tainly not for site-specific analysis and predic­ authorization of the pipeline project, it was tions. 49 essential that an "acceptable" document be David L. Brew, the USGS official who headed produced. The Secretary's Office placed a high the 102 Statement Task Force, subsequently priority on preparation of a final EIS, designat­ discussed the relationship between information ing an official of USGS to head an interagency and decision making in the following terms: "102 Statement" task force. 44 ... The information available about a pipeline or any other The "environmental issue" was now a NEPA project varies with time, from a relatively low level in the question, and responsibility for the EIS passed conceptual stage to a high level in the final construction arid operation stages. Depending on the project, its from ELM-Alaska to the department level. location, the types of impacts possible, and other factors, Under the task force structure, however, FWS the pertinent environmental information may or may not and NMFS officials in Alaska were designated to follow a similar path. The determination that the available prepare the "living resources" sections of the EIS environmental information is adequate in scope and under the general supervision of a FWS editor in quantity to constitute an element in the decision process depends mainly on the value framework of those 45 Washington. responsible for the decision. As environmental awareness The final EIS, a six-volume report, together and conscience develop, certain critical elements of with a three-volume analysis of the economic and environmental information should become acknowledged security aspects of the pipeline proposal, was as requirements for just decisions, in the same way that predicted cost and profit data are now universally issued by DOI in March 1972. The department's accepted as critical factors in the analysis of economic press release emphasized that the document was feasibility. 50 massive, complex, and thorough, and that it was Brew seemed to be implying here that, in the the product of extensive study, hearings, and future, stricter standards were likely to be interagency participation "requiring 175 man­ applied in environmental impact analysis than years of work in the year since March 1971."46 were actually applied in this case. His meaning The EIS ultimately succeeded in fulfilling its became clearer in his next paragraph: primary function, which was to meet NEPA In the case of the proposed trans-Alaska pipeline, policy requirements, in this case to the satisfaction of makers in the Department of the Interior decided that the Congress as it deliberated on the Trans-Alaska available environmental information was adequate for Pipeline Authorization Act. In reporting out the impact analysis. This was determined before the environ­ legislation in July 1973, the House Interior mental data had been compiled, and it is therefore questionable to what extent the amount of environmental Committee referred to the EIS as "the most data actually available influenced the decision to proceed· comprehensive and exhaustive analysis that has [emphasis added]. 51 been prepared for any project. It was prepared Finally, Brew observed that "the baseline envi­ not by the Department of the Interior alone, but ronmental information available at the start of by an inter-departmental team with a wide rang·e the impact analysis was approximately compar­ of inter-disciplinary skills. Its cost is estimated to able in quantity and quality to data available on be in excess of $7,000,000 .... "47 the proposed pipeline project." 52 In the light of It should be recalled, however, that the final our previous discussion of the design review EIS was written with much less than complete or process and the project data problem, particu1ar- definitive information about either the project or 1y as early as 1971 when the EIS was written, this the environment. 48 The Washington FWS editor could not have been too reassuring to government analysts. l:3-414. to ""'Brew, 1~·111•ir1111111e11tall11111111·( .--11111/11.six, pp. 10-1 L 1 accompany !LR ~H::lO93 Cong., l Sess.,d ,July 20, 197:~. p. 19. •• Iuid., p. l l. For a much stronger t-1tatenient and critical analysis of'this issue, 1'See David L. Brew. E11l'im111m'11/u(!,111111rt A1ml11-~1x: Tlil' E.1·11111pfr•l tlw Hee Henry R Myer~, "Federal Ueci~ion-making and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline," l'ropu:wrl Tn111.,-."1/m;/;o/'ipdi11i-. Geological Survey Circular G95, ll .S. (ieologiral 1._,·,·0/01111L11w ()11t1rll'l'lfl, Vol. .J.: Hl5 (l!l75), !)48 ff. Survey, Heston, Virginia, 197,1, especially p. U. ··"Brew, f._,'!ll'iro111111•11t,r/lll11ml'I A,111/11.si.,, p.l l.

35 response to a statutory requiren:ient that had to be ers their best entry into the pipeline planning met before the project could proceed. Since the process, resulting· ultimately in the establish­ EIS was written after the environmental ment of JFW AT as a special entity within the stipulations were essentially completed, and construction monitoring system. Further, the because awareness of the basic problems to which four-year delay in pipeline construction pro­ the stipulations were directed (erosion, siltation, vided the biologists with time to close some of the fish passage, big game passage) did not depend on more critical gaps in resource data along the information from the EIS, the EIS could have had TAPS route. But, given the scale and complexity little effect on the stipulations. The FWS editor of of the studies required in extensive areas where the "living resourcesn sections of the EIS states so little work h~d previously been done, together that there were no changes in the pipeline with funding and staffing limitations that alignment as a result of the information and handicapped the biologists throughout that analysis contained in these portions of the impact period, the fish and wildlife information base was statement. 53 Perhaps the EIS requirement did far from complete when construction was force Alyeska to accelerate preparation of a authorized in late 1973. project description, but it is not evident that the By construction time, however, the biologists of EIS, per se, substantively influenced project FWS, NMFS, ADFG, and BLM had effectively designs. crossed agency jurisdictional lines, formed a The EIS very likely had other effects, however, close working subgroup within the planning that tended to reinforce one of the basic currents process, and demonstrated the value of their of the pipeline planning process: Since there were work. They were thus able to sustain their so many uncertainties and information gaps, momentum, arguing effectively that now that which preparation of the· EIS helped to construction was about to begin, their expertise emphasize, it followed that the stipulations had to would be all the more essential in applying what be general and allow a wide range of discretion,· they knew in making judgements about the with ample waiver authority. In this way potential impacts of construction, particularly monitors would have the flexibility necessary to where hard data on fish and wildlife resources deal with many unpredictable problems when remained inadequate or absent. they arose at the time that project designs were In 1969, when it still appeared that a permit actually implemented and adapted to specific would be issued by the end of the year, a group of sites in the field. Beyond spotlighting data gaps in FWS biologists was assigned to compile data and knowledge of impacts and fish and wildlife conduct limited ·studies of the pipeline route, resources, however, FWS and NMFS involve­ assess potential impacts, and make recommenda­ ment in EIS writing seems primarily to have tions for stipulations. All this was to be done in served the purpose of helping to clear the way for less than one year's time, 55 even though virtually authorization and construction of the trans­ no fisheries studies had been done north of the Alaska pipeline. Yukon River, and there were still substantial gaps in knowledge of the fisheries south of the Fish and Wildlife Information Yukon ,as well. 56 And the more site-specific the information needed-which would be the case in From an early point in the planning phase, the assessing the pipeline alignment, material sites, ELM-Alaska staff was aware of the need for specific stream crossings, and nesting areas, for massive amounts of information about both the example-the greater were the inadequar.ies in environment and project as a basis for developing the existing fish and wildlife data base. adequate stipulations and related design and con­ A year later, in 1970, as it became apparen1 struction review criteria. Fish and wildlife agen­ that there would be a grace period of indetermi· cy staffs were eager to respond to the need for nate length before construction, a more deli information about the distribution and charac­ berately organized cooperative effort was initiat 54 teristics of fish and wildlife resources. ed among the handful of biologists working or It was the demand for this information that gave the fish and wildlife biologists and manag- :,,tnlel'view \\'ilh David Spencer. former FWS cool'dinalor of pipeline studie, Anchut'aJ{e, ,June B. W77. One of this FWS gToup . .Janws Brooks. hl•cam, Com,nissioner orthe Alaska 1Jep:1rlement of Fbh and< ;amc in 1!17::!. '''lntei·vicw with Kenneth Roberts. Washing-tun, O.C. August ::!4. 1977. :,"Interviews with ,Julius Hockwell, APO. Anchorage, .July 7. Hl77; Nurva Netsch. FWS. Anchorage, .June~. W77; and ;\lelvin ;\lunson, FWS, Anchurag, "See Memorandum of Gerald Zamber, assistant pipeline project coordinator, May 27. I H77. One of the areas for which adequate information did exist was th pipeline division, BLM, to files, Subject: "Meeting with BCF and BSFW on Copper River Basin. including the t;ulkana and Uakona drainages, wher Pipeline Study Coordination," April 24, 1970. biologists made their majur stand in an aliiwrnent dispute and lost.

36 pipeline studies. BLM's fisheries biologist called data in design review and construction monitor­ together his counterparts in FWS and the Alaska ing, it is not surprising thatBLM-APO'sfisheries Department of Fish and Game, a group of three biologist would conclude that perhaps only 20 to who set out in mid-1970 as the "Interagency Fish 30 percent of the "needed" data base was Working Team" to produce a catalogue of fish developed during the planning period. 62 This streams, giving priority to streams north of the assessment is generally reinforced by BLM­ Yukon. 57 By the end of 1970, this coordination APO's wildlife biologist, who recalls IFWT's effort was expanded and organized into an "several years [of] sheer panic" in attempting to "Interagency Fish and Wildlife Team" (IFWT), catch up with information demands, a situation which eventually included representatives of that he feels improved only in 1976, when the Alyeska and the University of Alaska as well as pipeline project was already half built. 63 On the all federal and state agencies having relevant other hand, virtually all of the fish and wildlife study and related program responsibilities. 58 The specialists interviewed about the environmental team operated under the general direction of an data base problem believed that the pipeline executive committee chaired by the state director delay made it possibletodevelopamuch better, if of BLM and consisting of federal and state not fully adequate data base, and that for some agency heads and Alyeska and university repre­ areas even an "excellent" base was compiled. 64 In. c;entatives. any case, much remained to be learned about fish The IFWT was not a formal organization, and wildlife resources along the pipeline route however, in that it had no budget or staff of its during the construction process itself. own. It was completely dependent on what In addit10n to developing information, lFWT individual agencies were able to incorporate into also served as a vehicle for transferring their own pipeline studies programs, the most information from the fish and wildlife specialists substantial being those of FWS, NMFS, and into pipeline design and construction planning BLM. Funding problems were endemic through­ work by Alyeska and BLM. IFWT opened out IFWT's existence, right up to 1973 when channels of communication not only among fish pipeline authorization was imminent. 59 BLM's and wildlife biologists and managers in differ,:;irit fisheries biologist, who was the prime mover of agencies, but it also provided lines from the iisi1 IFWT, in retrospect refers to it as a "bootlegged" and wildlife agencies to Alyeska and BLM effort, and one necessarily aimed only at "broad, pipeline division staff. Although the extent to quick" coverage of the most critical information which these lines were used is not clear, the problem areas. 60 At both federal and state record of IFWT deliberations suggests that there government levels, it proved difficult to increase was much interchange of data on stream agency budgets for pipeline work in the absence crossings, big game crossings, and. nesting, or the prospect of a permit. Further, Alyeska was breeding, and other critical habitat areas, and not required to reimburse agencies for their that much related discussion of design and pipeline-related work until after the right-of-way construction criteria took place among IFWT agreements were signed. 61 As a result, most member~. agencies were unable or reluctant to increase In the end, IJ:t·WTdissolved as construction be­ funds for environmental studies, and their gan in early 1974 and agency staff became absorbed contributions w the pipeline studies coordinated in more immediate pipeline related work. through IFWT had to be limited accordingly. Although individual agencies-FWS and NMFS Given the comparatively primitive state of in particular-would continue pipeline studies knowledge about the hundreds of Alaska streams that had been under the IFWT umbrella, no crossed by the pipeline and related roads, and the equivalent of IFWT served during construction requirements for site-specific fish and wildlife to promote and coordinate pipeline studies on a broad interagency basis. For fish and wildlife

:.~lnteragency Fish Working Team Meeting, "Minutes." July :n. 1970. :,,see Memorandum from Morris .J. Turner, pipeline coordinator, BLM. to Helnterview,.;with Julius Rockwell. l,i ..,f ri(Str,·11111xaml Utlwr ll'ufl'r /Judi1•sulu1111 Burton Silcock. state direetor, BLM, Subject: "Interagency r'ish and Wildlife '(mus-.!la.-,/;tl l'ipl'li111' /l1111lr.fourth rev°b;ed draft. July l. 1977. in which the Team." December 4. HJ70. mtroduction states that 'Less than a score of the !JOO+streams listed can be :,•see lnteragency Fish and Wildlife Team. Fisheries Section, ''Minutes of corrnidered to be 'known' and of these probably less limn five are known well." \foeting.'' October 16. 197:t ~tterview with James Hemming. APO-J FW AT, Anchorage, May 12. '"Interview with Julius Rockwell. APO. Anchorage, .July 12. 1977. 19 •ilf3LMhad an early ag-reement with Alyeska that pre-permit work woulcl be ·eimbursed after agreemenl.!'i were signed. FWS subsequently l{ot a similar '"Specific examples mentioned were N MFS Valdez terminal studies and FWS agreement before construction started. (Interview with Julius Rockwell. APO, Prudhoe (fay water Cowl studies. (Interview with Melvin Monson, FWS. July 12. 1977.) Anchorage, May 27. Hl77_)

37 matters, the initiative passed to JFWAT, and since their experience and judgements would bE attention shifted from the general development of needed especially when adequate information a data base to implementation, enforcement, about environmental problems and potential and evaluation of field experience. solutions to them was not already ~vailable. There was probably as much, if not more Organizing APO and JFWAT infighting between FWS and BLM over the issuE of who should have what authority for construe· Uncertainties were inherent in a project where tion surveillance as there was over any other issm neither the engineering nor the environmental­ during the planning period. Essentially, BLM'~ biological elements could be completely account­ objective was to keep surveillance authority a~ ed for or predicted in advance, given the concentrated as possible under the authorizec limitations of the information developed during officer (AO), who was at that time expected to b( the planning phase. One possible response to this both a BLM official and an engineer. FWS aimec problem, as it carried over into the construction for independent surveillance authority. One earl~ phase, would be to concentrate authority in the FWS version would have split the federa engineers, who would "balance" the known and surveillance organization under the AO into dua the elusive and try to arrive at a single, clear-cut engineering and environmental sections. Later decision, recognizing that it might not always FWS sought only to keep its surveillance staf prove to be the "right" decision. Besides, good positions independent of authority. engineering would be essential to avoiding major AQ environmental damage in any case, and most of The Alaska Pipeline Office (APO) plan tha the planning effort was directed, with substantial finally emero-ed combined some elements of thi success, at engineering and related technical' FWS pos1t10n with mat of BLM, although th1 questions. A second possible response would be to pipeline division, out of which APO was built provide some measure of authority to biologists, was removed from BLM line authority anc

SECRETARY OF GOVERNOR INTERIOR

FEDERAL OTHER UNDER FEDERAL TASK FORCE ON ALASKAN ----• SECRETARY AGENCIES OIL DEVELOPMENT I TECHNICAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANT SECRETARY ADVISORY -- ASSISTANT BOARD LANDS a WATER RESOURCES I I I BUREAU OF LAND l I MANAGEMENT I I I I I I STATE DIRECTORl I { {ALASKA) I I I AUTHORIZED 4- --- ...1 L------• OFFICER STATE PIPELINE OTHER (AO) 4 ------COORDINATOR STATE ($PC) DEPARTMENTS r------,.------'' t____ _ I AUTHORIZED JOINT 3rd PARTY ..,__ TECHNICAL OFFICER'S FIELD FISH a WILDLIFE CONTRACTOR STAFF REPRESENTATIVES -1----.... ADVISORY TEAM - (AOFRS) ,, {JFWAT)

ALYESKA PIPELINE ------PROVIDE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE, SERVICE CO. ADVICE AND/OR COORDINATION

SOURCE: ALASKA PIPELINE OFFICE

FIGURE 2 : GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE ORGANIZATION

38 placed directly under the Secretary's Office. The cannot have someone al ways second guessing, APO scheme concentrated authority in the AO rather thev need to be part of these decisions)." 67 and the engineers in both central office and field, Similar proposa1s were made again by FWS in and FWS monitors were olaced under the AO's Alaska and Washington throughout the fall and the engineers' operating authority. (See months of 1973, although the "dual authority" Figure 2.) But, unlike previous ELM plans, one approach appears to have had a shorter life than version of which might have dispensed with FWS the independent FWS monitor scheme. 68 Each monitors altogether, FWS (and NMFS) monitors time, the proposals met similar oppositio·n and, were placed in JFW AT, an entity located ultimately, they were rejected at the department "somewhere between," and therefore partially level. What FWS officials did obtain was independent of both, the federal and state recognition of their right to select and screen monitoring organizations. their own people for assignment to the surveil­ A ELM statement of how to approach the lance team, and the FWS monitors would general issue of organization in pipeline planning maintain administrative ties to FWS while they as well as construction monitoring was formu­ were under the formal operating authority of the lated in May 1972: AO. Some last skirmishes occurred over the issue of how many FWS monitors would be hired and Basic to pipeline related cooperative arrangements must be a recognition of: when. These questions were not finally resolved 1. The Secretary's being the responsible federal until early 1974, but, by then, the fish and wildlife official under NEPA. agencies had already scored their best points 2. The authorized officer's paramount role, subject when agreement was reached that a joint federal­ to ultimate authority in the Secretary. state fish and wildlife monitoring organization 3. BLM's responsibility for administration of the would be estahlished. public lands. The Joint Fish and Wildlife Advisory Team 4. One project head and one direct channel of (JFW AT) proposal had to overcome another form official communication with the permittee, the of opposition, however. During the summer and Congress. anrl th;:> press ... 1,5 fall of 1973, Interior-ELM officials were moving Later m 1972, following discussion with Alaska toward a version of APO that might have left out FWS officials aboutthe prospective structure of FWS and NMFS altogether. The plan was to the construction surveillance organization, the retain a relatively small team, primarily from state director of BLM in effect applied the above BLM's pipeline division, to oversee a larger general principles to some current FWS propos­ third-party contractor group that would supply als. The FWS officials had proposed that any DOI with both the engineering and environmen­ FWS people on the AO's "team" should report to tal monitoring expertise needed during the the FWS director and not to the AO. They also construction phase. FWS was not alone in suggested that a FWS person have a "position perceiving this plan as a potential means of similar to assistant chief. Division of Pipeline, to dispensing with interagency participation in assure a direct voice in project management; construction surveillance. It undercut the Corp of ••• " 66 The state ELM director strongly opposed Engineers' interest in supervising pipeline these proposals, stating among other things, that engineering, a prospect that the Corps had been "From a management standpoint we cannot negotiating with Interior for more than a year, 69 expect [other] Departments to cooperate as part and it sounded some alarms in Alaska state of the AO team ... if intra-Interior agencies do government, where there was already concern not operate as a single entity," and further, "We about the federal-state negotiations, which must have control within the A O's team; separate intra-Interior agencies will not facilitate our task of environmental protection (in other words, we '"Ibid. Similar prolJlems were presented by concunent USGS proposals. 68This summary of the FWS position is based primarily on interviews with Gordon Watson, FWS, Anchorage, May 19, 1977; Joel Greenstein, Office of Administration .and Management Policy, DOI, Washington, D.C., August 23, 1977; Lynn Gl'eenwalt, Director, FWS, Washington, D.C., August 25, 1977; and LeRoy Sowl. FWS Anchorage, September 13, 1977. Also see Memorandum from 65 Memorandum from associate director. BLM, Washington, D.C., to Deputy deputy area directol', FWS, Anchorage, to director, BSF&W. Washington, D.C., Unde1· Secretary, Subject: "EPA Involvement in Trans-Alaska Pipeline Project," Subject: "Draft Proposed Pipeline-Road Surveillance Team.'' November 3, 1972; May 19, 1972. This statement was precipitated by a meeting between DOI-BLM Bureau of Sport F1sh!;ries and Wildlife, Alaska Area, "Briefing Statement­ and EPA officials after the latter expressed the desire to increase their Construction Monitoring for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline," December 19, 1973; and involvement in design review, permit drafting. and other project activities. Department of the Interior, Office of Management Consulting, Tra1m-Ala.~k<1 '''Memorandum from state directol', 13LM, Alaska. to director, BLM. Pipeline Management Hnmlbook, l<'ebruary 1974, pp. 18-20. Washington, D.C.. Subject; "BLM-US(;S and 13LM,BSF&W Pipeline Involve· '"'Interview with Burton Silcock, forn,er llil'ector, 13LM. Anchorage, May 11, ment Discu,sion," NovemlJer 2. 1972. 1!)77.

39 remained stalled until after the Trans-Alaska biologists, regardless of their different federa Pipeline Authorization Act b~came law. 70 and state agencies of origin, wanted to extenc An FWS "briefing statement," prepared in the their IFWT experience into the constructim Alaska Area office in December 1973, linked the phase. And a key member of the biologist grou1 contractor issue to a more fundamental FWS was BLM's own wildlife biologist. As stated bJ interest: one of the biologist founders of JFW AT, th( concept "was approved because too many peopl( Delaying the construction until we have all the answers is were behind it."74 Moreover, the ground had beer neither practical nor possible. Therefore, it is critical that people well grounded in wildlife t·esource training and prepared for such an organization at the end o: experience be present to examine what happens. It is 1973, when federal and state negotiators, partl~ critical that these people be in-house personnel rather than at the urging of the state Commissioner of Fisl contractors so that their experience can be fully evaluated and Game, incorporated a provision into th( and applied to future pipelines and other construction. 71 federal-state cooperative agreement calling f01 Despite persistent opposition from within the joint federal-state protection of fish and wildlifE pipeline division-APO group, 72 the JFW AT pro­ along the length of the pipeline route durin1 posal was finally .adopted by Interior, and the construction. 75 third-party contractor scheme was revised to It was nonetheless clearly established that ir make room for fish and wildlife monitoring by the federal monitoring organization the author FWS, NMFS, ELM, and Alaska Deparment of ized officer was to have full operational authoritJ Fish and Game biologists. The fish and wildlif within the organization as well as budge­ staffs of federal and state agencies, includin 5 authority over all pipeline-related work o: ELM, had formed an alli'ance, and critical federal agencies in Alaskq..76 Very early on, "Th( pressure was brought to bear, particularly from authorized officer made it clear the he [would the state side of the group. 73 have a low tolerance for [JFWATJ personnel whc The state Commissioner of Fish and Game go running back to their parent agencies in an~ wanted to assure an effective state voice in fish attempt to go around finished decisions." 77 It and game protection activities along the entire response, two of JFW A T's founders "anticipatec right-of-way, regardless of land ownership; the decisions which will not be to our liking and .. recently designated state pipeline coordinator, asked ... that biological considerations be give1 just beginning to build an organization, saw a fair weight in the decision making process." 7t JFW AT as potential staff support to him; and the

1 • Interview with LeHuy Sowl, l•'WS. Ancho1•age, July 7. 1977. •'"'I low UL:\I Wants to Police Pipeline,"Audwm111· IJ11ifu .V1•w.s, August 22, l!:ln, 7 anti A. Came1·on ~umondson, "Thil'd-PartySupervision for the Pipeline'?".4.htxktt 5Cooperative Agreement between United States Department of Interior an ludustru (Octoi)er W7:H.pp. :tJ-:35. State of Alaska regarding the proposed Trans-Alaska Pipeline, provision II.6 January 8, 1974. • 1B::WW,Alaska. "Briefing Statement," p. :t •"U.S. Ueµa1·t1!1en~ or the I!ite1:ior, Office of the Sec!'etary, Order Nu. 29(i( 7~:\-lemorandumfrom super\'isory fish and wildlife biologist, Special Studies. "Trans-Ala."ikaP1pelme-Orgamzatlonal and Functional Responsibilities." Januai F\VS. Anchorage, to file, Sui)ject; "Meeting on Biological Monitoring Team," 23, 1974; Memorandum from Under Secretary to director, BSFW Subjec February 20. W7..t. "Personnel and Budgeting Procedures for Trans-Alaska Pipeline," March 7, 197. 1 •· This account of ,J1-'\V AT\; orhdn is based on interviews primal'ily with Jame:; and Memorandum from Under Secretary to Assistant Secretary for Fish an !lemming, BL:\l-J!•'WAT, Anchorage, :\fay 12, 1!!77:Michael Smith. former chief Wildlife and Parks, Subject: "Alaska Pipeline," April 23, 1974. of habitat. AlWU, Anchorage, May 17 and 19. l!l77: (;ordon Watson. FWS, May 77Memorandum from activity leader, EDS, FWS Anchorage to File HJ. 1977: LeHoy Sowl, 1-'WS.. July 7. lH77: Hod Pegues, assistant attorney generaf. Subject: "Meeting with Authorized Officer," April 12, 1974. ' State of Alaska, Juneau, July 26, 1977; and Norman Gorsuch, former state attor­ ney general, Juneau, July 27, 1977. 78Ibid.

40 Part 3 - Construction Phase

Chapter V-Government Surveillance Organization and Policy

When Congress in late 1973 passed legislation established for protection of fish and wildlife calling for "the earliest possible construction of a worked during construction. trans-Alaska pipeline," it was also cognizant of the environmental issues involved: General Authority and Structures · The Secretary 01· agency head, prior to granting a right-of­ way or permit ... for a new project which may have a· Ripht of Way Agreements significant impact on the environment, shall require the applicant to submit a plan of construction, operation, and Governmental surveillance during the con­ rehabilitation for such right-of-way or permit which shall struction phase of the trans-Alaska pipeline was a comply with this section. The Secretary or agency head condition of both state and federal right-of-way shall issue regulations or impose stipulations which shall 2 include, but shall not be limited to: (A) requirements for agreements and was reimbursable by the restoration, revegetation, and curtailment of erosion of the permittee. 3 Attached to those agreements were surface of .the land; (B) requirements to insure that parallel sets of general, environmental and activities in connection with the right-of-way or permit technical stipulations. Intended to ensure system will not violate applicable air and water quality standards integrity and minimize environmental costs, the nor related facility siting standards established by or pursuant to law; (C) requirements designed to control or stipulations provided performance criteria to prevent (i) damage to the environment (including damage Alyeska for system design, construction planning to fish and wildlife habitat), (ii) damage to public or and execution, and established procedures by private property, and (iii) hazards to public health and which governmental review and surveillance safety; and (D) requirements to protect the interests of fnnctions would be exerc 1Red. individuals living in the general area of the right-of-way or permit who rely on the fish, wildlife, and biotic resources The federal right-of-way agreement also estab­ of the area for subsistence purposes .... "1 lished that "in the performance of [the] Agree­ It was this mandate for expeditious construc­ ment, the following principles shall apply: tion and environmental protection that provided (1) In the construction ... , operation, maintenance ... and the context in which government surveillance termination of the Pipeline System, Permittee shall took place and must be understood. The employ all practicable means and measures to differing nature of these goals meant that a preserve and protect the environment, as provided in major responsibility of governmental surveil­ this Agreement. lance organizations would be to determine how (2) The parties shall balance environmental amenities strongly environmental protection could be and values with economic practicalities and technical capabilities, so as to be consistent with applicable pursued without compromising the goal of early, national policies ... completion. (3) Permittees shall manage, supervise and implement the consti'uction, operation, maintenance and termi­ This chapter describes the state and federal nation of the Pipeline System in accordance with governments' pipeline surveillance organiza­ sound engineering practice, to the extent allowed by tions, their structure, functions, and authorities, the state of the art and the development of 4 with particular attention to the Joint Fish and technology ... " Wildlife Advisory Team and to those state and federal statues important for the protection of fish and wildlife resources during construction of 2Federal Agreement .sectio,n 18. 1Public law 93-153, Section 101 (h) (2). 4Agreeme11tand Grant of Right-of-Way, p. l.

43 These "principles" are noteworthy in that they with approved designs and specifications. He was not only affirm Congress' intent that environ­ responsible for inter- and intra-agency coordina­ mental 1:esources be protected (subject to timely tion, including the review and approval of complet10n of construction) but they also admin­ operating plans of other government agencies istratively add two new limiting criteria. Envi­ who had responsibilities under the trans-Alaska ronmental protection was to be "balanced" pipeline agreement. He also maintained com­ against "technical capabilitiesn and "economic munications with Alyeska, federal and state practicalities." These criteria, together with the agencies, and the public. In practice, the AO requirement for timely completion and the ?perated largely in the political realm of inter/ administrative discretion provided for in the mtra-agency coordination, relations with the stipulations, meant the authorized officer and his s~a~ :3-nd Aly~sk~, and with decisions having representatives would have the very substantial s1gmficant policy implications. Day-to-day man­ responsibility for deciding how vigorously envi­ agement and supervision of APO was delegated ronmental protection efforts would be pursued. to the authorized officer's representative (AOR). APO's Office of Lands and Minerals was Alaska Pipeline Office responsible for coordinating the issuance of all temporary-us: permits, free-use permits, gravel The _Alaska Pipeline Office (APO) was officially sales, leases, disposal permits and amendments of established January 23, 1974, with the signing of pipeline system grants with the state or district the Agreement and Grant of Right-of-Way. That offices of the Bureau of Land Management same day, then Secretary of the Interior Rogers (BLM). In processing all land actions APO func­ C. B: Morton issued Secretarial Order No. 2960, 1 tio~ed in a review and advisory capac ity to BLM, settmg out the department's organizational and which has statutory authority for their issuance. functional responsibilities for the pipeline. That APO's technical staff during the construction order designated the Under Secretary as the principal official of the Department of the phase was a small (approximately eight profes­ ?ion~ls) multi-disciplinary group with expertise Interior for trans-Alaska pipeline matters 5 and 1 m fishery and wildlife biology, soils science, established the position of the authorized 0 fficer (AO), chief executive officer of the APO.6 geology, recreation, and engineering. Headed by the technical staff coordinator, the technical staff The establishment of APO under the Office of had as their main responsibility the review of the Under Secretary served to consolidate the Alyeska's designs, "notice to proceed applica­ enforcement of the right-of-way agreement tions" (NTPAs), and "design change requests" drawing specialists from different agencies into~ (DCRs) in coordination with APO's technical single organization which could fulfill the support contractor, the Joint Fish and Wildlife requirements of that agreement more efficiently Advisory Team (JFWAT), and other agencies. than several separate organizations. It was in They also provided support to the field surveil­ response to Alyeska's desires for "one-stop shop­ lance staff as needed for resolution of technical ping" in face of the potential for administrative field problems and coordinated and recom­ ?el~ys_ s?ould too many agencies have partial mended action on other project-related work Jurisd1ct10n over so large a project. involving technical issues. APO's technical The Alaska Pipeline Office consists of the support contractor, Mechanics Research, Inc., authorized officer, authorized officer's represent­ provided considerable manpower and expertise ative (AOR), administrative and realty branches to the technical staff in the exercise of these duties and two professional staffs: a technical support and was given technical direction by the group and the field surveillance staff. (See technical staff coordinator relating to these Figure 3.) services. During construction, the AO had overall The primary responsibility of APO's field sur­ responsibility for APO and for ensuring compli­ veillance. staff was to ensure that approved ance with the right-of-way agreement, stipula­ designs, work plans, specifications, stipulations tions, conditions of other federal permits, and and Code of Federal Regulations were complied with by the permittee in the field. The staff was headed by the construction coordinator and consisted of approximately fifteen authorized •u.. s. Department of the Interior, Order No. 2960, January 23, 1974, section 3(a). 6Ib1d., section 3(b). officer's field representatives (AOFRs) and

44 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

AUTHORIZED OFFICER (AO) I ALASKA PIPELINE OFFICE

1 AUTHORIZED OFFICER S REPRESENTATIVE (AOR) I

,------, I I FEDERAL TECHNICAL EXECUTIVE : STATE : CONSTRUCTION JFWAT ASSISTANT REALTY 1 JFWAT r---· ---· STAFF COORDINATOR L_.:I':_J COORD. COORD. (ADMINISTRATION) r------, I I AUTHORIZED FEDERAL : STATE I TECHNICAL OFFICER'S I JFWAT : JFWAT STAFF FIELD I STAFF I STAFF REPRESENTATIVES I I (AOFRs) IL------...J I

- - - - - INDICATES COORDINATION

FIGURE 3: ALASKA PIPELINE OFFICE ORGANIZATION CHART alternate AOFRs. One AOFR and one alternate based in Los Angeles and at the time a wholly· were assigned to each of the six construction owned subsidiary of System Development Cor­ sections and the Valdez terminal, and one AOFR poration. Services to be rendered included was assigned to the pump stations and control system and sub-system design reviews, sys­ systems. tematic "spot checks" of construction activities, AOFRs acted with delegated authority to make data gathering and special studies and reports as field decisions for the AO/A OR in the monitoring needed hy APO. of permittee compliance. In addition to this This "third party 11 arrangement had at least primary function, they also participated in three a9-vantages to offer the Interior Depart­ design reviews for notice to proceed applications ment: it provided needed expertise that was in and design change requests. AOFRs received short supply or unavailable within government; field staff support through the environmental it provided for a staff without the high turnover and engineering expertise of the technical and continuity problems common with tem­ support contractor and fish and wildlife expertise porary posts; and it allowed for the retention by through JFWAT, both of which functioned in a MRI of needed expertise on short notice by sub­ strictly advisory capacity to the AOFR. contract, thereby avoiding the more cumbersome and time-consuming requirements of federal procurement regulations. Technical Support Contractor MRI performed its contractual obligations with the help of two subcontractors: Gulf Inter~ In order to provide additional technical assis­ state Engineering Corporation (GIE), which tance to the Alaska Pipeline Office, the Depart­ provided technical pipeline engineering exper­ ment of the Interior entered into a contract on tise, and Ecology and Environment Incorporated February 1, 1974 with Mechanics Research Inc. (EEI), which provided similar support services (MRI), a private engineering consulting firm· in the environmental sciences, exclusive of

45 strictly fish and wildlife matters, which were the tor (SPC) was named on January 30, 1974. The responsibility of the Joint Fish and Wildlife, State Pipeline Coordinator's Office (SPCO) was Advisory Team. formally established on April 1 of that year and Generally speaking, design review functions of the lease was executed one month later on May 3. the technical support contractor in Alaska were The state nipeline coordinator and hi~ staff ,uPrP, coordinated through APO's technical staff coor­ formally part of the Department of Natural dinator, with field input coordmated by the Resources, but in order to "achieve maximum construction coordinator. Field surveillance coordination of, and emphasis upon, the state's functions of the third party contractor were surveillance activities" they were detailed to the directed by MRI's area engineers, who coordi­ Office of the .Governor. 9 nated with the AOFRs fn each section. The state pipeline· coordinator's duties essen­ At the end of the first season of pipeline con­ tially paralleled those of the authorized officer. struction (December 1975), the technical support Under the terms of the cooperative agreement contractor had about 60 employees in Alaska. the state right-of-way covered approximately 250 EEI's staff consisted of 10 professional "environ­ linear miles. On those lands the state pipeline mentalists" and a secretary. MRI had a field coordinator's approval was required for all monitoring staff of 11 professionals and a central notices to proceed (NTP) for pipeline c·onstruc­ office design review staff ·of 6 professionals, tion. The state also had exclusive authority on which included a senior project engineer as­ those lands to determine compliance with the signed from GIE. Theremainderofthestaffwere terms and stipulations regulating pipeline con­ GIE engineers, administrative and office support struction except those conditions directly related personnel and senior management. As suggested to system integrity which could be enforced by earlier, additional specialists were brought in either the SPC or the federal authorized officer when needed. Staff was also assigned to design (A0). 10 review functions in Houston and Los Angeles The state right-of-way also included the during the early stages of the project. streambeds of navigable waters,1 1 listing 29 rivers specifically claimed navigable by the state. State Pipeline Coordinator's Office Because what constitutes "navigability" has not Due to a large number of unresolved jurisdic­ been defined to the mutual satisfaction of both the tional issues and the mutual disinclination of the state and federal governments, the SPC and AO state and federal governme~ts to litigate those shared joint responsibility for approving river issues as they related to the pipeline,7 a coopera­ crossing NTPs on federal land for the 29 named tive agreement was negotiated and entered into rivers. on January 8, 1974 between the federal and state In the case of the Yukon River to Prudhoe Bay governments. 8 The cooperative agreement set out haul road, the state was both the permittee which lands were to be covered by state and (Alyeska being the state's execution contractor) federal right-of-way agreements; provided fot and also responsible for stipulation enforcement. cooperation and generally defined the jurisdic­ Haul road surveillance was carried out by Alaska tional responsibilities of state and federal surveil­ Department of Highways personnel. lance efforts; provided for the establishment of a Structurally, SPCO was broken down into joint state-federal fish and wildlife surveillance three groups-administration, technical staff of component; provided for the construction of the five professionals plus two consultants for fish Yukon River to Prudhoe Bay state highway and and wildlife and environmental matters, and three public airports and established the state's field surveillance staff of fourteen. Like APO, right and responsibility of enforcing during con­ they received fish and wildlife "advisories" from struction the Highway and Airport Stipulations, JFWAT and had the capability for purchase of which were attached to the cooperative agree­ outside e~pertise by contract, including arrange­ ment as Exhibit A. ments for limited use of APO's third party In anticipation of a right-of-way lease applica­ contractor. tion from Alyeska, the state's pipeline coordina-

9Memorandum of the Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Natural 7See Appendix B, "TheJurisdtctions of the J:<'ederaland State Governments Over Resources, March 11, 1974. the Construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline." · 1°cooperative Agreement betwee11U.S. Department of the lnterior and State of Alaska, January 1974, section II(2}. 8Cooperaiive Agreement between the United Stutes Department of the Interior and q r_tate of Alaska Regm·ding the Proposed Trans-Alaska Pipeline, January 8, 11Section 6(m) of the Statehood Act incorporates by reference the Submerged 97 La11ds Act of 1953, granting title fo these lands to the state.

46 Joint Federal/State Fish and Guard in issuing permits for bridges across Wildlife Advisory Team navigable streams. As a practical matter, the substantive require­ The Joint Fish and Wildlife Advisory Team ments of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (,JFW AT) was formed in May 197 4. pursuant to were largely exercised through the participation the Cooperative Agreement. 12 JFWAT was com­ of FWS and NMFS in JFW AT, which reviewed posed of biologists from the U.S. Fish and and commented on all relevant permit appli­ Wildlife Service (FWS), National Marine Fisher­ cations. ies Service (NMFS), Bureau of Land Manage­ The Act provides for the ment (BLM), and the Alaska Department of Fish protection of various species of fauna and flora and Game (ADFG). It had a professional staff of which are classified as either "threatened" or 31: 11 from FWS; 3 from NMFS; 2 from BLM, "endangered" and their habitats, and prohibits including JFW AT's federal coordinator; and 15 the taking or harassment of such species. irom ADFG, including the state supervisor. During pipeline construction, application of JFW AT's primary mission was to assure the the Endangered Species Act resulted in the protection of fish and wildlife resources during relocation of planned facilities on two occasions. pipeline construction. Its primary mode of opera­ In both cases, the facilities (a planned airstrip tion was in its capacity as an advisor to the and construction camp just south of Franklin authorized officer and state pipeline coordinator, Bluffs; and Pump Station 2 near Sagwon Bluffs) who had the responsibility for enforcing the were moved to avoid conflicts with nesting right-of-way agreements and stipulations. habitat of the endangered arctic peregrine falcon. Statutory Authorities · The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act pro­ In addition to this advisory function, the parent hibits the taking, possession, sale or purchase of agencies of JFWAT also had statutory obliga­ any bald or golden eagle, their nests or eggs. tions relating to the pipeline construction. Of Pursuant to this act, FWS and the U.S. Forest these, the most important were provisions of the Service entered into an agreement requiring Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934, buffer strips around eagle nesting trees. During Endangered Species Act of 1973, the Bald and pipeline construction along the Lowe River near Golden Eagle Act of 1940, and, most important, Valdez, a previously unidentified nesting tree sections of Alaska Statutes, Title 16.13 required a minor shift in the alignment to avoid The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act the nest. provides that any federal agency which issues a Title 16 of Alaska Statutes provides for the con­ permit authorizing the impounding, diverting, or servation, development and regulation offish and controlling of navigable waters must first consult wildlife resources within the state by the Alaska with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and/or Department of Fish and Game. In order to facili­ the National Marine Fisheries Service. Although tate the enforcement of the state's fish and game this requirement for consultation is mandatory, statutes, the Commissioner delegated significant FWS's and NMFS's comments are advisory and author1ty under this title to ADFG's pipeline may be excluded from the permits. surveillance supervisor. Specifically, the state The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act head of JFWAT was delegated the authority to applied to the permits of four separate federal manage, protect, maintain, improve and extend agencies during pipeline construction: BLM in1 fish, game and aquatic plant resources of the issuing its permit and right-of-way agreement state; the authority to require that every dam or and some additional permits; the Environmental other obstruction built across a stream fre­ Protection Agency (EPA) in issuing permits quented by salmon or other fish shall have a under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act fishway constructed to provide fish passage; and for discharges into navigable waters; U.S. Army the authority to determine, require, and issue Corps of Engineers in issuing permits for work on written approvals for activities affecting anad­ 14 structures or the disposal of dredged or fill romous fish. streams. This last delegaterl material into. navigable waters; and the U.S. authority-to issue approvals for activities

14Alaska Statute 16.05.020(2); 16.05.840; 16,05.870(c). Memorandum from James W. Brooks, Commissioner ADFG, to pipeline surveillance supervisor, 12Coopemtive Ayteement. Section II(6). June 26, 1974; interview with Allan Carson, state pipeline supervisor, JFWAT, HAJaska Statutes 16.05.020(2); 16.05.870; 16.05.840. September 12, 1977.

47 affecting anadromous fish streams-significantly did not have sufficient staff to monitor all cross· expanded JFW AT's otherwise advisory role and ings, and there was a general sense that a more greatly strengthened their bargaining position discrete policy of application was in order .18 vis-a-vis APO and SPCO regarding how strongly During the early 1970's, the Interagency Fish fishery protection efforts should be pursued. and Wildlife Team had begun work on a Alaska Statute 16.05.870 requires issuance of a catalogue of known fish streams along the separate permit for each crossing of an anad­ proposed pipeline route as part of the overall romous fish stream, 15 as well as for a number of effort at developing a resource inventory for the ancillary activities affecting those streams (e.g., project. Subsequently, JFW AT boiled that infor­ gravel removal from flood plains of those mation down to a list of streams and critical streams, waste discharges affecting subject periods in the life history of species known to streams). occur in each stream~ This list provided the basis This immediately ·raised two issues: Was for restricting construction activities in streams, Alaska Statute 16 to be applied to federal lands? during critical periods, including migration:, and What constitutes an anadromous fish spawning and egg hatching, as well as protection stream? Like other questions of federal/state of over-wintering areas, all pursuant to stipula­ jurisdiction, the applicability of AS 16 on federal tion 2.5.3.1. As working procedures evolved, the lands was not a question either the state or federal streams appearing on the fish stream list (as government wished to litigate, nor did they have updated by current information) also became, de­ time to do so.16 As a practical matter, the federal f acto, those streams for which an AS 16.05.870 authorized officer consented to its application on permit would be required. Although this may federal lands with the proviso that he did not, by have been a reasonable accommodation of the this action, intend to set a precedent in a legal realities of construction and field surveillance, sense.17 . meeting the intent of this law became thereby The question of which streams are anadromous critically dependent upon the adequacy of the under AS 16.05.870 was equally fraught with data base. During the 1976 construction season, difficulties. Prior to 1975, the application of thfs approximately 75 additions and 50 deletions were law differed in different regions of the state. For made to the list, and another 40 to 50 new fish the purposes of that act, every stream that flowed streams were discovered in the summer of 1977.19 into the and every tributary of In addition, designation as a fish stream was those streams was to be considered an anadromous limited to those streams in which the presence of fish stream. In the northern areas of Alaska, how­ fish had been documented, putting the burden of ever, the Commissioner of Fish and Game proof upon JFW AT. allowed designation on a stream-by-stream basis only. This approach was superseded in March Structure and Functions 1975 with the issuance of the Department of Fish On the federal side of the joint team, BLM em­ and Game'sAnadromous Fish Stream Catalogue, ployees were assigned directly to the Alaska which included all tributaries of designated Pipeline Office (APO) and detailed to JFWAT. anadromous fish streams in all parts of the state National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and as protected anadromous fish streams. This Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) employees modification of the anadromous fish stream list detailed to JFW AT were also under the opera­ resulted from increased information and data on tional control of the authorized officer (AO) for subject fish species' distribution patterns through­ day-to-day activities, with administrative author­ out the state. In effect, this made nearly every .ity (i.e., career development, hiring, firing) stream affected by the pipeline construction retained by the parent agencies. Generally speak- subject to Title 16 permit requirements. ing, APO's operational direction was exercised For a number of reasons, AS 16 permits were through JFW A T's federal com·dinator or assist­ not required for every stream crossing; the APO ant federal coordinator. was opposed to such blanket application, JFW AT State members of JFWAT were all employees of the Alaska DP-nartment of Fish and Game 15Anadromous fish species are defined as those which spend a portion of their (ADFG). They were headed by the surveillance lives in both salt and fresh water, i.e., all five species of Pacific salmon, Dolly Varden and rainbow (steelhead), arctic char, sheefish and whitefish. (Letter· I~o .rommissioner James Brooks to the Oil and Gas Association, September 17, 73 1sTelephone conversation with Allan Carson, September 26, 1977. 16See Appendix B. 19From a comparison of lists dated Novembel' 15, 1975 and February 16, 1977; 17Memorandum to AS 16 file from Allan Carson, December 13, 1974. and interview with Nancy Kavanagh, JFWAT, September 27. 1977.

48 supervisor who reported to the chief of the habitat fish and wildlife stipulations by the permittee protection section, ADFG. They coordinated with and its agents in the field. This function was exer­ and provided advices to the state pipeline coordi­ cised by the issuance of advices to the authorized nator and his staff in a manner essentially officer's field representatives (AOFRs) on federal identical to the federal side, although they land, or the field surveillance officers (FSOs) on enjoyed a greater independence. Internally, state lands. Most of this communication was JFW AT operated as a unit without significant verbal, but formal advices were transmitted by regard for agency differences. written advisory memos. In addition to this advi­ The JFW AT organization was divided into sory and support function for AOFRs and FSOs, four units: administration, office professional field biologists were responsible for issuing staff, field surveillance and technical evaluation. 'advisory memos giving notice that an AS (See Figure 4.) 16.05.870 permit would be forthcoming for in­ The office staff was primarily responsible for stream work (a function exercised by both state reviewing construction drawings and plans, and federal biologists), as well as various data notice to proceed applications, design change collection activities including providing field requests and other Alyeska submissions poten­ information to the design review staff.- tially affecting fish and wildlife resources. The third major JFWAT function was "tech­ Following review, JFWAT issued formal advices .nical evaluation." This consisted of a series of to the offices of the authorized officer (AO) and research projects designed to develop a qualita­ state pipeline coordinator (SPC) as to the poten­ tive and quantitative understanding of the effects tial effects of the proposed action and possible of pipeline construction on fish and game courses of action to minimize those effects. In resources; some of these are continuing during addition, this staff reviewed and commented on _pipeline operation, with results being published various state and federal permits and provided as they become available in a series of technical support services to field monitors when needed. evaluation reports. JFWAT's report series also JFW AT's field surveillance biologists had as includes reports documenting their monitoring their main function assuring compliance with experiences.

STATE PIPELINE COOROINA0UTHORIZED OFFICER I I ALASKA STATE FEDERAL DEPARTMENT SUPERVISOR COORDINATOR OF - (AOFG) FISH a GAME (APO) I I I I

CLERICAL/ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT ASSISTANT UNITED STATES SUPERVISOR COORDINATOR i--- FISH a WILDLIFE (ADFG) {FWS) SERVICE I I

FIELD DESIGN TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REVIEW STAFF EVALUATION STAFF STAFF

FIGURE 4: JOINT FISH ANO WILDLIFE ADVISORY TEAM ORGANIZATIONCHART

49 Surveillance System A$sumptions operation, maintenance, or termination of all or any part of the Pipeline System. Each of these government surveillance organi­ (3) Provide for component and systems quality through zations - APO, SPCO and JFW AT were adequate quality control management and planning, and designed and staffed around two major assump­ inspection and test procedures. tions: that Alyeska would have an effective (4) Assure that the selection of Permittees' contractors, subcontractors and contract purchases of materials and quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) pro­ services are based upon the above quality control gram in place which would only require a "spot procedures. check" level of monitoring by government; and (5) Determine quality performance by conducting surveys that government's (and Alyeska's) interest in and field inspections of all of the facilities of Permittees' early project completion would best be served by contractors and subcontractors. centralizing government responsibilities and (6) Maintain quality determination records on all of the authority in the Alaska Pipeline Office and State above procedures to insure satisfactory data identifica­ Pipeline Coordinator's Office and thereby pro­ tion and retrieval. viding, insofar as possible, a "single point of [Stipulation] 1.18.1 During the construction, operation, contact" for the permittee. maintenance and termination of the Pipeline System, Permittees shall conduct a surveillance and maintenance program applicable to the subarctic and arctic environ­ Quality Assurance/Quality Control ment. This program shall be designed to: (1) provide for The basic requirements for Alyeska's QA public health and safety; (2) prevent damage to natural resources; (3) prevent erosion; and (4) maintain Pipeline program were specified in Section 9 of the right­ System integrity. of-way agreement, and by stipulations 1.18.1, [Stipulation] 3.9.1 AH construction, operation, mainte­ 3.9.1, and 3.9.2: nance and termination activities in connection with the 9. Construction Plans and Quality Assurance Program Pipeline System shall be conducted so as to avoid or minimize thermal and other environmental changes and A. Permittees shall submit construction (including to provide maximum protection to fish and wildlife and design) plans, a quality assurance program and other their habitat, and people. All working platforms, pads, related documents as deemed necessary by the Authorized fil1s and other surface modifications shall be planned and Officer, for review and approval prior to his issuing executed in such a way that any resulting degradation of Notices to Proceed. permafrost will not jeopardize the Pipeline foundations. B. The quality assurance program shall be comprehen­ sive and designed to assure that the environmental and [Stipulation] 3.9.2 Acceptable plans, procedures, and technical Stipulations in this Agreement will be fully quality controls that ensure compliance with Stipulation complied with throughout all phases of construction, 3.9.1 shall be submitted in accordance with Stipulation 1.7 operation, maintenance and termination of the Pipeline (relating to Notices to Proceed, etc.). System. Thus, Alyeska's QA program has both policing C. The following criteria shall be included in the quality and documenting functions that affect all aspects assurance program, although Permittees are not limited to these criteria: of the project from vendor surveillance through (1) Provide adequate and appropriate means and proce­ pipeline termination. dures for the detection and prompt abatement of any From the early days of BLM's pipeline actual or potential condition that is susceptible to division, government construction-monitoring abatement by Permittees which arises out of, or could strategy was to field a relatively small team of affect adversely, the construction, operation, maintenance professionals to "spot check" construction as a or termination of all or any part of the Pipeline System and which at any time may cause or threaten to cause: (a) means of evaluating the effectiveness of Alyeska's hazard to the safety of workers or to pub lie heal th or safety quality program and, thereby, the project's (including but not limited to personal injury or loss of life compliance with the terms and conditions of the with respect to any person or persons) or (b) serious and right-of-way agreements. It was felt that "if irreparable harm or damage to the environment government [was] going to impose itself on (including but not limited to areas of vegetation or thrtber, fish or other wildlife populations, or their habitats, or any private industry for the benefit of [the] public, it other natural resource). should be efficient" and that this strategy would (2) Provide adequate and appropriate means and proce­ best meet" that criterion. 20 It also meant that the dures for the repair and replacement of improved or efficiency of government monitoring efforts, tangible property and the rehabilitation of natural including those of JFWAT, would in part be resources (including but not limited to revegetation, dependent upon the adequacy of Alyeska's restocking fish or other wildlife populations and reestablishing their habitats) that shall be destroyed if the QA/QC program. immediate cause of the damage or destruction arises in connection with, or results from the construction, 211lnterviews with Morris J. Turner. acting AO, Anchorage, August 3 and 5, 1977.

50 Government would not, after all, be able to for many more environmentally oriented quality con­ provide anything approaching 100 percent trol personnel.23 inspection of critical construction activities. Following corrective actions by Alyeska, includ­ Rather, its monitors would see a much smaller ing delegation of stop work authority to quality portion of construction, and, based upon their control personnel, the AO gave final approval to verification of compliance with applicable stand­ the quality assurance program on August 18, ards and stipulations, government could thereby 1975.24 ' reasonably presume substantial compliance line­ In spite of progress made in 1975, inadequate wide. On the other hand, should quality control QA/QC performance continued to be a problem prove chronically weak in one or more areas, a throughout construction. In January 1977, presumption of compliance line-wide would not looking toward the operations phase of the be justified. pipeline, the Alaska Pipeline Office's acting AO Alyeska submitted the first of its quality wrote the ptesident of Alyeska concerning the assurance (QA) manuals to APO for review in continuing inadequacies of its QA/QC program: mid-February 1974. Mechanics Research Inc. (MRI) was the only component of the government I do not intend to review the numerous discussions and monitoring effort with expertise in QA/QC correspondence which exists on this subject, but rather programs. MRI's review concluded in part " ... my comments are meant to restate my recent verbal discussions with you on January 27. I am not now the Permittees' quality assurance system is not convinced that Alyeska has a comprehensive quality adequate to insure compliance with the Permit assurance program that will fully assurn st-ipulcdion Stipulations. The magnitude of the deficiencies complfo:nce [emphasis in original]. are sufficient to warrant immediate action to improve the quality assurance system." 21 The The acting- APO chief went on to suggest that inadequacies of the program involved both Alyeska submit a revised QA plan by the structural problems as well as general lack of following month, considering these points: detail, including descriptions of the staffing, (a) Providing one quality assurance manager, not two as I planning and implementation of and environ­ understand currently exists .... mental protection organization. (b) Removing the quality control from the pipeline Following several months of negotiations and department. revisions, Alyeska's QA program was "tentative­ (c) Providing adequate staffing (i.e., quality, not neces­ ly approved" by the authorized officer on July 19, sarily quantity, to include interdisciplinary professional personnel). 1974, subject to certain revisions, "so that 22 (d) Developing a comprehensive work schedule to construction would not be delayed." complement the existing plans and specifications. The Over the next several months, Alyeska did schedule should be detailed, including all stipulated work little to correct the deficiencies in its QA/QC items, e.g., revegetation. I believe any quality assurance program. In June 1975 the congressional General program must include a detailed schedule for evaluating. Accounting Office took the matter up with the the work performance, i.e., timeliness. authorized officer, and the GAO later reported: (e) Changing the now fragmented QA/QC system that exists to one with overall responsibility and authority for In July 1975, the Authorized Officer, the State Pipeline project stipulation assurance. Coordinator, and Alyeska studied the quality assurance (f) Insuring adequate authorities for the quality assur­ problems to determine what corrective actions should be ance program personnel to timely and effectively insure taken. The study showed that many of the quality control that the environmental and technical stipulation require­ problems were similar to the concerns expressed by the ments are being fully complied with. 25 Authorized Officer ,vhen he tentatively approved the qua­ lity assurance program. The study showed the need During construction, environmental quality control was particularly deficient. 26 As one - to give quality control representatives the authority to halt nonconforming work; government inspector put it, for a closer interface between Federal and State monitors and Alyeska so that nonconforming work found by the monitors could be quickly corrected; and "'Ibid. Cl{btd., !). ::l5. "'Letter from APO acting authorized offirer to president Alveska S1~bject· ''Quality Assurance PrnJJ:ram," .January ;H, 1977. · · · · 21 Rr,1•iew1111!! ( 'ritiqm• ,~(Alasku l'iJ1elim' Co11xtr11diw1 !'hww ()1111/il!fA.~H11nwn· M11111wl1-1,MRI Repo1·t 32Itl-0l/1. April 30. 1974. t•U.S. Comptroller General, GAO, 7'1·11111!-,4/11;;/mOif Vipeli1w-ln(on1111iio11 011 Co11st1·11clio11..• August 23, Hl77; ,JFWAT narrative surveillance i·eports 1975- i~u.s.Complroller General Accounting Office, Trn11x-Af11.~J.-aOil Pipeline 77, numerous references; interview with Uon Keves, APO's construction - Pro.,,rri;s•!f Co11.~trndio11'J'lll'o11yh Nu1"1·11dwr. l!J75. February 17, 1976, p. 34. coordinator, April 8, 1977 and others. ·

51 Nearly every [report of non-compliance with stipulations] Throughout construction, APO was engaged written by the agencies results from inadequate inspection correspondence and negotiations with Alyesl by Q.C. Most probably, we have been negligent for not over the QA/QC program. Commitments l 27 writing many more ... based on poor inspection. Alyeska would be made to improve the syster Or, as Ecology and Environment, Inc.'s project "and they always did something," 34 but litt manager characterizes their experience, "EEI's would actually change in the field. feeling is that environmental QC was essentially APO took the position early on that one mu non-existent during the construction phase/' assume the basic honesty and integrity of tr explaining further that in the latter stages there people one deals with; when Alyeska sai were nominal environmental QC inspectors in something would be done, it was "tantamount ·, the field, but far too few, and that they frequently certification." 35 This position was elaborated in had other, primarily civil, QC functions to 1975 letter to Mechanics Research Inc.'s projei perform. 28 These comments reflect the unani­ manager in response to an MRI suggestion thl mous observations of government interviewees APO review either the job descriptions c who commented on Alyeska's quality program - statement of required qualifications for Alyeska that QA/QC did not fulfill its function during quality inspectors. The AOR's response reads, i construction. As a result, government surveil­ part: lance officers were put in the position ofhavingto assume a much larger role than was anticipated, I take exception to your suggestion that we requil 29 Alyeska to define the qualifications they are requiring fc or for which they were staffed. "In order to their personnel ... The permittees are some of the bigge1 assure that fish and wildlife resources were companies in the industry. Their agent, Alyeska, h~ adequately protected, surveillance biologists of personnel of reputable backgrounds and in their ow the Joint Fish and Wildlife Advisory Team were right are outstanding professionals. Their constructio forced into attempting to provide 100 percent management contractors and execution contractors ar inspection instead of the intended spot check noted among the best, if not the best, in this country ... role."30 The basic reasons for this failure were lack of JFWAT's federal coordinator also suggests th:: support for the quality program by Alyeska's Bechtel came with good credentials and th::: senior management and the inability or unwilling­ "everyone expected them to do a good job" in spit 37 ness of APO (and SPCO) to utilize their authority of weaknesses in the written plan. Havin and available sanctions effectively to compel adopted an accommodating posture early OJ compliance by Alyeska. 31 But, APO would have "when government did come down hard late1 38 needed a very substantive reason for shutting [Alyeska] bowed their backs." down a billion dollar project "and maybe no one This early optimism toward Alyeska's qualit would have supported such a decision but, control program was not, however, universal then, we weren't really worried about that." 32 MRI contended that the QA/QC plan was faulte, Notwithstanding this, APO's acting authorized in many respects - both organizational am officer takes the position that APO's actions were procedural. 39 APO's management disagreec tne only reasonable ones under the circumstances. 33 characterizing MRI's concerns as "dotting i's arn crossing t's" the authorized officer's represen tative (AOR) viewed the problem not a 21Memorandum from Blair Wondzell, FSO, to Vyrl Goff, Alyeska project manager, Section 3, October 13, 1976. perfecting the plan, but as getting a progran 28 lnterview with Roger Gray, EEi, Anchorage, July 12, 1977. implemented in the field. 40 'Z9Jnterviewwith Morris J. Turner, acting authorized officer. August 16, 1977; Donald Keyes, APO construction coordinator, April 8, 1977; and others. However reasonable APO's actions may hav, ~•Memorandum to AOR from technical staff coordinator, Subject:"Non Welding been, particularly in light of Congress' mandat Quality Control Concerns," May 28, 1976. See also: letter from DOI Under Secretary Kent f<'rizzell to Senator J. Bennett Johnston, Septembet· 17, 1976 responding to questions of Senator Ted Stevens in U.S. Senate, Committee on for early construction, the lack of an effectiv1 Interior and Insular Affairs, Th!' Co1rntructio11of th!' Tra11s•Almd.:aPiJJeliue S111,fem -Hem·ings, 94 Cong., 2nd sess.. July 26, 1976; U.S. Department of the Interior. Offic~of Audit and Investigation, St11d!Jofthe AlaHlm Pipeline O(ffre Mo11itori11{11tf Q,whty As1mr

52 QA/QC program placed a substantial surveillance in Interior and particularly APO meant that the burden upon JFW AT (as well as APO and SPCO) multiple purposes of government and specifically for which they were neither designed nor the goals of timely project completion and sufficiently staffed to perform. Most, if not all, of environmental protection would be internalized the environmental problems which characterized in a single entity. It is worth noting, in this construction, including the stream crossings and regard, that big game crossings discussed in Chapter VII, are, in part, directly or indirectly attributable to Studies of individual and organizational behavior have demonstrated that the alternative policies and programs the failure of Alyeska to field an effective quality that an individual or group considers relevant depend program. upon the experience and interest of the individual or group; an administrative agency dominated by individuals Centralized Surveillance trained in a particular profession or influenced primarily by one interest group (such as the petroleum industry) will The assumption that government's interests, therefore tend not to view as relevant alternative particularly in terms of early project completion, programs that would be considered desirable by an agency dominated by another profession or another would best be served by centralizing responsibi­ interest group. lities and authorities as much as possible was a It is clear that an agency that is run primarily by foundational concept for APO, SPCO and engineers will have a quite different view of the JFWAT. seriousness of environmental effects and opinions on Organizationally, the Department of the appropriate programs than an agency, for example, Interior was given "lead" responsibilities for which is operated largely by biologists. Of equal importance, an agency with close ties to fish and game pipeline planning and construction. Generally, interests will view program possibilities quite differently field level activities were coordinated through from an agency with close ties to electric power APO, while the Technical Advisory Board (TAB) generating companies. 42 of the Task Force on Alaskan Oil Development Every key decision making staff position in the coordinated and facilitated Washington, D.C. Alaska Pipeline Office (AO, AOR, construction level cooperation. 41 TAB was composed of coordinator, AOFR) was held by an engineer representatives of federal agencies having throughout the construction phase. (In the primary concerns with the project including: summer of 1977, three biologists were given Office of Pipeline Safety and the Coast Guard, AOFR authority, primarily for restoration Department of Transportation; Corps of En­ activities following construction.) By contrast, gineers; Environmental Protection Agency; and general environmental expertise was housed in the Geological Survey and Bureau of Land Ecology and Environment Inc., MRI's environ­ Management, Department of the Interior. JFW AT mental subcontractor, while fish and wildlife served as the focus of fish and wildlife interests of biologists served in an advisory capacity in the Departments of Commerce (NMFS) and In­ JFWAT. terior (FWS) as well as the State of Alaska, through JFWAT existed somewhere between APO and its Department of Fish and Game. JFW AT, in turn, SPCO, serving them both. Because JFWAT was was to operate in an advisory capacity to and un­ both a state and federal organization, it belonged der the general direction of APO and SPCO. to neither, but rather took on a life of its own. By Th1s inter-governmental strategy 6-Cconcen­ and large, its members were successful in trating functions was, by and large, successful in leaving their parent agency associations behind, decreasing inefficiencies inherent in situations identifying instead with JFW AT and its reponsi­ with multi-agency responsibilities. It must be bilities. It was a single purpose organization, able remembered, however, that it is precisely these to focus its attention on a narrowly defined set of "inefficiencies" which provide checks and bal­ goals. ances, and multiple · points of access and This de facto emergence of JFW AT as a authority, and thereby allow for the simultaneous separate entity, and its access, however limited, pursuit of multiple, sometimes conflicting social to the sanctions of AS 16 and other statutes did goals. The coalescing of federal responsibilities not fundamentally alter either the structure of authority among government monitoring organi-

41Testimony of John Latz, technical assistant to the Under ::iecretat·y, DOI, before the U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Public Lands, ;zu.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Panel R~pot·t on Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Oversight Hearings on Con:,trueiionon Institutional Mechanisms, Cl)/'liell Work.~lwp 011 E:11erm1Cllld the E111•1ro11me11t Trans-Alaska Pipeline, Washington, D.C., Mat·ch 11, 1975. (Februat·y 22-24, 1972). Committee Print, May, 1972, p. 168.

53 ations or the functional role JFW AT was to in-house staff component of APO or SPCO, di play-it remained essentially an advisory body greatly increase its independence and strengthE which operated almost entirely through and with its bargaining position within government, an the concurrence of A.PO and SPCO. JFW A 'l"s allowed for direct access to, and communicatic status as a separate organization, rather than an with, APO's and SPCO's senior management.

54 Chapter VI - Government Surveillance Operations

Government surveillance operations during .[preliminary design submissions and notice to proceed pipeline construction fell into two broad cate­ applications] .. .to assure that permittees' submissions and gories: design review and construction monitor­ applications shall be reasonable in scope, and filed in a reasonable time frame, i11Sofaras the ,vorkload thereby ing. Design review included evaluation of imposed on ... [state and federal pipeline office staffs] .. .is preliminary designs, quality assurance program concerned; plans, applications for "notices to proceed" 2. Submit preliminary designs for each construction (NTPS), and requests for design changes. segment to the appropriate state and/or federal pipeline Construction monitoring consisted of field re­ offices for review and approval; views of construction activities and related 3. Submit a time scaled Summary Netw01:k Analysis 1 documentation functions. Diagram for the entire project; This chapter discusses the processes involved 4. Submit for review and approval plans for a comprehen­ sive quality assurance program "designed to assure that in design review and construction monitoring, the environmental and technical stipulations ... will be including both the procedural requirements and fully complied with throughout all phases of construction, their execution by government surveillance operation, maintenance and termination of the Pipeline bodies, with particular reference to how they System"; 2 and affected fish and wildlife protection generally 5. Apply for a Notice to Proceed to the appropriate state and the role played by the Joint Fish and Wildlife and/or federal pipeline office(s) for review and approval. 3 Advisory Team. It explores the explicit and Preliminary Design Submissions implicit policies and other conditioning factors which shaped that effort and ends with an The first major design interface between account of major findings and conclusions. Alyeska and government pipeline offices was the submission for review of preliminary designs for Design Review each construction segment of the project. Preliminary design submissions were to be Although the process of review and approval of reviewed within thirty days and either approved Alyeska's designs officially began in 1974, or granted a waiver prior to submission of considerable interchange had already taken applications for notices to proceed (NTPs). 4 place by the time the federal Agreement and Grant of Right-of-Way was signed. Over the Preliminary design means the establishment of project criteria (i.e., construction, including design and operation­ previous several years, progress had been made al concepts) necessary to delineate the project to be toward a common understanding by industry and consti:ucted. As a minimum, it includes the following: government as to what would be required in design cl'iteria and pi-oject concepts; evaluation of field design. The . development of environmental data used to establish the design criteria; drawings performance criteria began in 1969, with early showing functional and technical requirements; reports of all test data compiled during the data collection and drafts of stipulations, and proceeded throughout preliminary design evaluation; design drawings (if the pre-permit period. This work in Alaska was applicable) or drawings to support structural design centered in the BLM pipeline division. The first concepts of each typical facility or structure; Proposed major integrated design document was the Construction Mode; outline of project specifications; project description, issued in July 1971, and it sample computations to support the design concepts and basis for project siting. 5 became the focus around which much of this early review work centered. The procedural and substantive requirements for design submissions were set forth in the right­ tStipulations 1.7.lA: 1.7.2.1; 1.7.:U. See Appendix A for a listing of stipulations applied for protection of fish and wildlife. of-way agreements. Prior to any construction ~Federal A11n•1•111e11tam! ,~( Niuld-q(-ll',111Section 9. paralleled by state activities, Alyeska was required to: Ri11hf-lit~ll'll11LmN!', Section 1Stipulation 1.7.l.1. 1. In cooperation with state and federal officers, "agree to 1Stipulations 1.7.2.l; 1.7.4.1. a schedule for the time, scope, and quantity of '•Stipulation l.Ll.2:t

55 Much of the preliminary design review for the review was largely proforma since the design w2 pipeline and roads took place in Houston, Texas, already well advanced - close to final design ii and in Los Angeles, California, for pump stations, several areas - and, consequently, governmen Valdez terminal, and communications system. review comments could not effectively be used a This ,vas due to the location of industry's design inputs to final design. 10 efforts in those cities, including libraries for Preliminary design review was essentially : supporting documents. negotiation process. Its aim was to demonstrate tc Preliminary designs consisted of Cn:terfo and government monitoring offices (and they, in turn Design Bases, formally submitted in March 1974, to assure) that the design concepts were adequatE and two preliminary design packages - one for to meet all technical and environmental stipula pipeline and roads, the other for pump stations tions. Much of the process occurred de facto prim and terminal - submitted in late May. Mechanics to 1974. Research Inc.'s (MRI) interim report on the An MRI-contracted study of the governmen1 preliminary design submittal for pipeline and monitoring experience concluded in part that thE roads was completed in mid-June and was design review process "did not put enougi; transmitted to the Alaska Pipeline Office (APO) emphasis on introducing environmental, and for continuing review. The package was "ap­ particularly ecological, criteria for impact proved except as noted" on July 12, 1974. "The abatement into the preliminary design concepts/ Approved Except as Noted concept expresses the and noted that the procedure did not allow Government's reservations to some special sufficient lead time to affect design implementa­ concerns which will be more closely scrutinized tion in those cases where implementation was in the ... Notice to Proceed packages ... "6 Says an "governed by long lead times for the supply and MRI official, "Our client [APO] saw the delivery of material and equipment." 11 The above requirement for preliminary design submission suggests that greater emphasis and lead time as being for the benefit of Alyeska. The real should be given preliminary design reviews for emphasis was to be on final design submissions." 7 future projects. Because JFW AT was not organized until late May 1974, review of preliminary design submis­ Notice to Proceed Applications sions for fish and wildlife concerns was largely A "notice to proceed" (NTP) was the basic the responsibility of APO's fisheries and game document issued by the authorized officer (AO) or biologists, although Ecology and Environment's state pipeline coordinator (SPC) authorizing (EEI) review covered numerous items of major construction for the particular construction importance to fish and wildlife resources. segment therein described 12 and was issued after In contrast to the interdisciplinary review of all the submission of a "notice to proceed application" items received in BLM's pipeline division during (NTPA). The governing NTP, together with all the pre-permit phase, preliminary design reviews applicable stipulations, constituted the control­ were highly compartmentalized with separate ling documents for both industrial and govern­ review groups seeing only those portions assigned ment ~urveillance efforts. to them. 8 Responding to the Interior Depart­ NTP A submissions consisted of: ment's "request for proposal" for a technical services contractor, MRI had anticipated making (1) a final design; a "systems study" of the entire project to identify (2) all reports and results of environmental studies critical environmental and technical areas that considered in that design; would later be subject to "spot check" design (3) any additional data required to demonstrate how stipulations would be complied with; review and/or field monitoring. Probably due to (4) a schedule of work and additional submissions for time constraints, APO management decided NTP As and other permits required in the construction against the idea. 9 segmeut (section); A number of technical services contractors and (5) a map; and APO reviewers state that preliminary- design (6) any other data required by the AOY~

"Alaska Pipeline Office, "Comments Preliminary Design Review" !for ll>!nterviews with Dwight Hovland, APO, August 20, l!l77; Richard Wolf. MRI pipeline and acce;;s roads} .. July 12, 1974. deputy project director, August ~:t l!l77: Robert King, EEI, August 2:3, Hl77. 7lnle1·view with Richard Wolf, MRI. Anchorage, August 2a, 1977. 11Terminus Limited. Tr,111.~-A/nHl.11Pipeline-SJ)l'ciaf Re}lurt. Updated Interim 'lnt<•rviews with ,James Hemming. ,Jl~\VAT federal cuordinator. August :n. Report, August 1977. (Hereinafter cited as Terminus Limited, Speciul Re}lorf.) 1!177;Bob Kin){, EEi. August ,m,1!)77; and othe1·s. !!Stipulation 1.7.U. "Interview with Richal'd Wolf. :mu.August 2:{, l!l77. 1'Stipulation· l.7.4.:3.

56 Following submission by Alyeska, NTP As had JFW A T's design review staff of four began to be approved, rejected, or returned for war k on Criteria ancl Design,Base documents in modification or additional supporting data the summer of 1974, but switched their primary within 90 days. 14 effort to NTP As when the first submissions came The first NTP As for right-of-way clearing several weeks later. Initially, JFW AT was were submitted in September 1974, with some forwarded only those NTP As with obvious and river crossing NTPAs following in October and substantial fish and wildlife concerns. Later it most of the remainder submitted from November was discovered that other applications, which 1974, through January 1975.15 By the end of had escaped notice during preliminary screening, September 1975, 679 NTPs had been reviewed had significant implications for, or potential and approved by APO and SPCO. Average impacts upon, these resources. Subsequently, review periods were 70 days for APO and 65 days JFW AT requested and received all design for SPCO. 16 submissions for review. 19 Alyeska could, and frequently did, request JFW AT's review process, like many other variances from specific stipulations at the time elements of the project, took some time before it an NTP A was submitted. Such requests were to came "up to speed." In addition to the discovery include justification and any other back-up that many important fish and wildlife issues were information required by the state or federal frequently buried in apparently unrelated and pipeline officer. voluminous technical engineering documents, it NTPAs were sorted and distributed to staff took some weeks for JFW AT to develop a elements (including JFW AT, MRI, and its systematic review process and to gain an subcontractors) according to required expertise. understanding of what would be required. Following review by JFW AT, the technical Because the government requirements for big support contractor and the technical staff, APO game passage were explicit, relatively straight­ (or SPCO) attached any special conditions which forward and generally understood, JFW A T's were required and issued the NTP to Alyeska. NTP A reviews focused largely upon aquatic NTPs required a subsequent "turn on" in the field systems; including stream crossings, flood-plain by the authorized officer's field representative material and disposal sites, river training (AO FR) or field surveillance officer (FSO). This structures and others. requirement allowed for confirmation of expected Considerable time pressures were put on field conditions prior to commencement of work. reviewers (JFW AT a:s well as other monitoring Especially in the early stages, a large elements) to submit comments within specified percentage of NTP As were not deemed accepta­ times, which sometimes resulted in a more super­ ble. Problems included conflicts with approved ficial review than was desired. In some cases, this preliminary design criteria or data, inaccurate was caused by internal time frames which were construction scheduling, and insufficient detail more stringent than the 90 days allowed by the or back-up data. Particularly significant was the stipulations, but was also a result of an uneven lack of adequate hydrological profiles-espe­ flow of NTP As from Alyeska, with out a cially for meandering rivers with wide flood plains corresponding flexibility in review staff size.20 In - to support river crossing NTP As. 17 Alyeska's addition, problems with· NTP A approval were not limited to the early start-up period. Throughout 1975 The Permittees scheduled the filing of most of their NTP applications 90 days prior to the scheduled start of the Alyeska ,vas often required to alter or completely change various construction activities in the field. This approach the design of a particular site to insure pipeline integrity by the Permittees put extremely heavy workloads on the and protect environmental amenities, such as visual [governmental monitoring] organizations. Even when impact, soil erosion potential, and fisheries impact. filed, the NTP applications often lacked supporting information, which forced the AO to give conditional River crossing NTPs continued to be the pacing items in approvals and in turn increased the review effort and the the number of applications pending review and approval, paper w0.rk.21 mostly due to lack of sufficient back-up data to support proposed design construction. 18

llStipulation 1.7.4.5. 1~Interview with .James Hemming, JI•'WAT federal coordinator, August 31, t 5lnterview with Richard Wolf, MRI. August 23. 1977. 1977 1 ~"interviews with Nancy Kavanagh,J FW AT, AugustaO, 1977; Roger Post, EEI. ~U.S, Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, Tmns-Alrrnka ()if August 23, 1977: and others. See also Dave Norton. "Pipeline Surveillance from the Pipefi11e P1·oy/'1'N.~of C1111xlrul'lio111'h11J11{fli No1·1•111ber l!Fl:J, February 17, 1976, Inside," Alw,ka Co11x('rl'fllio11 Ne1•i1·w. XVI (2/:J). Summer-Fall W75; and -17Interviews with Richard Wolf. MRI. August 23, 1977, and others. Terminus Limited, S/leci11! Report. August Hl77. 1"8tate Pipeline Coordinator's Office, /!lt!i A.11111111/ Report, January 30, 1976. i 1Terminus Limited, 811l'!'ial R!'port. August 1977.

57 It should be noted that one of the stipulations inary and final design review process. This point, provided that the authorized officer (AO) could however, requires some qualification, as many of require additional data and, in such cases, the 90 the most important fish and wildlife criteria, day review period would begin upon receipt of including the establishment of big game crossings that data. This provision could be invoked when and culvert velocity standards, and particularly the AO felt the situation warranted it.22 On the the establishment of critical periods and areas for other hand, the congressional mandate for fish and game resources (i.e., construction "win­ prompt pipeline completion, and the highly dows") pursuant to stipulation 2.5.3.1, were sequential nature of pipeline construction, addressed somewhat outside the process described undoubtedly gave considerable leverage to such above. Furthermore, APO's reluctance to include tactics of the permittee. APO often gave tentative NTP conditions requested by JFWAT, while approval to NTP As that lacked adequate back-up indicative, perhaps, of a general attitude toward data. 23 In some cases, hurried reviews resulted in fish and wildlife interests, did not in and of itself NTPs being issued without providing for such constitute a repudiation of those concerns but things as required construction "windows," rather a deferral to the field level. Partly in which limited construction in certain areas (e.g., response to this situation, the state side of JFW AT fish streams) to non-critical periods, and they had decided to issue permits for activities affecting to be subsequently amended. 24 In spite of the anadromous fish streams at the· field level in foregoing, most interviewees believe sufficient conjunction with AOFRs' field turn-ons, instead of time was available to review NTP As in the attaching them to the NTPs as originally intended. majority of cases. This procedure allowed for a last-minute field Ecology and Environment Inc. (EEI) and assessment before issuance and for that reason JFW AT share the common perception that APO probably better served JFW AT's interests. Typi­ management gave major emphasis to technical cally, the JFWAT monitor would attach any and engineering questions during NTP A (and conditions he thought necessary to the permit at design change request) reviews and was generally that time. unresponsive to the comments and recommenda­ tions of environmental specialists. 25 JFWAT Design Changes recommendations for environmental conditions Alyeska experienced numerous occasions when to be attached to the NTP were frequently a final design for which an NTP had already been rejected, the reasons most frequently cited being: issued had to be changed. The reasons for those design changes fell into three broad classes: 1. the requested conditions were also project stipulations and, therefore, unnecessary and redundant; or (1) unanticipated field conditions required a 2. the requested conditions were within the discretion of variation from approved final design or the AOFR and should be requested in the field. 26 related specifications; In general, the design review process leading (2) what the execution contractor built in the up to issuance of notices to proceed was field was at variance ,:vith the final design accomplished under substantial time pressures as approved in the NTP; or and, at least in the case of preliminary designs, (3) Alyeska or their contractors encountered did not result in an entirely acceptable document. opportunities to increase cost effectiveness The design review process and related negotia­ (relatively rare). 27 tions were not able to secure an effective quality Amending an NTP by the design change pro· program from the permittees as discussed in the cess could be initiated either by Alyeska or by thE previous chapter. AO (or SPC), but in practice, design change~ Neither, it would appear, were fish and wildlife were usually initiated by Alyeska. interests effectively accommodated in the prelim- Reviews of design changes were based on one oj two controlling documents: field engineering ""'Stipulation l .7.-Ui. "·!Jnterviews with ~forris ,J. Turner, acting" AO, August 2H, Hl77: Larry change notices (FECN s) or design changE Brickman. EEi. August :{o, W77: and Hoge!' Post, EEI. August 2:1. 1977. st lnterview with Nancy Kavanag-h. ,JFWAT. August :!O, HJ77. requests (DCRs). Due to variable site conditions e·,1nterviews with Hoger liray. EEI project manager, .July 12, 1!)77; !fob King, Alyeska's field engineers were given latitude ir EEi. August 2:l. 1!)77; Naney Kavanag-h, JF\VAT, Auµ:u;;t :10. Hl77; and Allan Carta.on, ,J1"WAT, state supet·visor, October 17. Hl77. Also Dave Norton, "Pipeline adjusting final designs to actual conditions Surveillance from the Inside," Afaxktt Co11.,1·rmfir,11 U.c1·i1·11'.XVI (i/:3). Summer­ Fall Hl75. For historical perspective see Chapter IV, this report. ~"Interviews with Allan Carson, J FW AT state supervisor, Octooer 17, 1977; and Nancy Kavanagh, .n~wAT, August 30, 1977. ·Jifoterview with Morris Turner, AOR, October 20, 1976.

58 When a field evaluation resulted in a finding that screening process was not always sufficiently dis­ site conditions were inconsistent with the criminating to insure all items relevant to fish approved design and within discretionary au­ and wildlife resources were reviewed by JFWAT. 30 thority of field engineering to redesign, or if the In addition, review documents frequently lacked as-build condition was at variance with final sufficient information to thoroughly evaluate the design, Alyeska's field engineering submitted proposed action. 31 the redesign as a FECN to the government field After a period of receiving only those design chiefs for review and approval. When the AOFR changes obviously affecting fish and wildlife, determined (frequently after consulting the auth­ JFWAT requested and received all future DCRs orized t>fficer's representative or construction and FECN s so that less obviously related items coordinator by phone) that the FECN was accep­ could be reviewed. 32 JFW AT experienced some table, he gave approval in the field and construc­ difficulty in getting their comments included in tion continued. FECN s affecting fish and wildlife APO's responses as many as 40 to 50 percent resources (e.g., for work affecting streams) gen­ were initially excluded -and there were several erally resulted in advice from a JFW AT field APO-JFWAT meetings on the issue throughout biologist to the AOFR prior to his determination the construction phase. 33 It is uncertain whether of acceptability. If the AOFR determined that a the problem was a result of the sheer volume and FECN required a more thorough review, it was time constraints involved or if it was one of sent to the Alaska Pipeline Office for considera­ disagreement, but initially APO frequently cited tion. problems with receiving JFW AT comments In cases where the AOFR found a FECN within the allotted time. 34 Whatever the reason, unacceptable, or if the variance from approved JFWAT later stamped all design change design was beyond the authority or capability of documents with the date and time of receipt, field engineering to redesign, the issue was for­ thereby insuring and documenting that the 24- warded to Alyeska engineering in Fairbanks or hour turn around requirement was met. There­ Anchorage for resolution. Additionally, in some after, conflict over inclusion of JFWAT comments cases, design changes were initiated by Alyeska was reduced, but not entirely obviated. 35 before going to the field. Redesigns were then The design change request or field engineering sent to the government surveillance agencies as change notice, then, was an amendment to an design change requests (DCRs) for review and existing notice to proceed and was reviewed in a approval. similar manner, including JFWAT review, but APO review of DCRs and FECN s was compli­ in a much shortened time. cated by two important factors. Because of the JFW AT had trouble catching up with the sequential nature of pipeline construction, and demands of the design review process, both the generally close timing of construction activi­ internally and in its relationships with APO and ties, design changes required prompt review. SPCO. The process eventually proved useful to Secondly, in part due to highly variable site con­ JFWAT, however, as a means of identifying ditions, but for other reasons as well, the number inadequate design elements and bringing them to of design changes requiring review was much the attention of APO and SPCO, and for flagging larger than had been anticipated. 28 As of April 8, potential problems for subsequent field monitor­ 1977, APO had reviewed 2,841 design change ing. documents. 29 Like "notice to proceed" applications, DCRs Construction Monitoring and FECN s were initially screened by APO and routed to staff elements including MRI and In addition to review and approval of various JFWAT, according to i~equired expertise. Re­ design submissions for compliance with the viewers usually then had 24 hours to return com­ right-of-way agreements, stipulations and other ments for consideration before a response was requirements, government surveillance organ- sent to Alyeska. Because of the large number of documents and short time frames involved, the :w1nterviews with Richard Wolf, MRI, August 30, 1977; and Nancy Kavanagh, JFW AT, August 30, 1977. :nJnterview with Richard Wolf, MRI. August 30.1977. 2'This was affirmed in several intervie\\'s: James Hemming, JFW AT federal :itJnterview with Nancy Kavanagh, JFWAT, August 30, 1977. coordinatol'. August :~1. 1977: Nancy Kavanagh, ,JFWAT, August 30, 1977. See :i:lJbid. also SPCO .411111111/ llep11rlN.1975 and 1976. 2"Telephone communication, Arlan Kohl, APO t;,chnical staff coordinator. April "'lhid. 11, 1977. ;lSJbid.

59 izations were charged with monitoring construc­ necessary. The actual AS 16 permit was issued tion activities to assure compliance in the field. subsequently by JFWAT's state supervisor. The strategy employed was to "spot check" JFW AT field biologists also had the latitude of various construction elements as a means of recommending, through the state supervisor, monitoring the efficiency of Alyeska's quality legal action directly against Alyeska for viola­ program, which in turn had the primary tions of that act. In a few cases, such legal action responsibility of assuring compliance by the was taken by the state. 37 execution contractors. From May 1974 to mid-summer 1976, JFWAT Although Alyeska's quality assurance/ quality was organized around two offices - one in control, (QA/QC) program improved signifi­ Anchorage which handled most administrative cantly over the life of the project, the Alaska responsibilities, design review, and field monitor­ Pipeline Office (APO) never really succeeded in ing in the southern sections, and another in its attempts to make that program fulfill its Fairbanks which was the base for some field intended role. As a result, government monitor­ monitoring activities in the northern sections and ing agencies had to increase their level of field for several technical evaluation studies. Initially, coverage beyond that anticipated and for which the JFW AT state supervisor was also located in they were staffed. In the case of JFWAT, this Fairbanks. When this supervisor resigned in the amounted to virtually assuming the fish and summer of 1975, all management functions were wildlife QC function. 36 consolidated in the Anchorage office. In the sum­ mer of 1976, those administrative functions that Field Structure and Operatipn had remained in Fairbanks were also moved to Typically, a federal surveillance team in a Anchorage. Thereafter, the only official JFW AT construction section consisted of one authorized functions remaining in Fairbanks were certain officer's field representative (AOFR), one Mech­ technical evaluation studies. anics Research Inc. (MRI) area engineer, one JFWAT field biologists worked a 9-1-4 Gulf Interstate Engineering (GIE) engineer, and schedule nine days in the field, one day in the one Ecology and Environment Inc. (EEI) office and four days off. The office day was spen1 environmentalist. The AOFRs were advised on writing "narrative surveillance reports" of their fish and wildlife matters by JFW AT biologists field activities and attending a weekly stafl who were either state or federal employees. In meeting during which problems and develop· addition, each construction section with state ments in each section were discussed. These staff land had a state field surveillance officer (FSO) meetings served to keep JFW A T's management 1 who was advised by the same JFW AT biologists. technical staff and field staff informed of curren1 Only the AOFRs and FSOs were authorized to activities at both the Anchorage and field levelE communicate officially with Alyeska. They were and provided an opportunity to discuss policy and the sole spokesmen for the authorized officer and decide on courses of action. state pipeline coordinator, respectively, and all JFW AT's effectiveness in helping protect fish field level decisions were subject to their review and wildlife values was conditioned by the and approval. general hierarchy of priorities established by JFW AT field biologists served as advisors to APO management. Although we found no written the AOFRs and FSOs on matters involving, document explicitly outlining those priorities, directly or indirectly, fish and wildlife popula­ interviews with APO, technical support contrac­ tions and their habitats. All action requests and tor, and JFWAT personnel, as well as the overal] communications from JFW AT to Alyeska went tone of the documentation reviewed for thiE through the AOFRs or FSOs and were subject to study, consistently indicate that APO's priorities their approval. Under Alaska Stature 16.05.870, were: (1) system integrity, (2) expeditiom JFW AT representatives were responsible for completion of the project, and (3) environmental issuing advisory memos approving in-stream protection-. By contrast, JFW AT considered work, together with any conditions they considered environmental protection to be more importan1 than expeditious construction (but not morE

'••Memorandum from technical staff coordinatm·to AOR, Subject:"Non Welding Quality Control Concerns," i\fay 28, 1976; letter from Kent I<'l'izzell, Under Secre.tary, DOI, to Senator J. Bennett Johnston, September 17, 1976, responding to :nneau Bassett. Trustees for Alaska, "A Legal Analvsis of Major I<'edet·alan, questions of Senator Ted Stevens during U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and State Fish and Wildlife and Environmental Protection Statutes as Applied i Insular Affairs, The Cm1Htr11diu11 of flit' Tm11s-AhrnkaPipl'line s11Htem Hearinq Surveillance of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline," September 21. 1977. (Backgrouni 94th Cong., 2 Sess., July 21, 1976. · · • ·' paper prepared in support of this report.)

60 imp_ortant than system integrity). This contrast reviewed and approved by him before being reflects not only the differing nature of the two forwarded to the AOFR. Spot checks reporting organizations (JFW AT's charge was limited to non-conformances were to be monitored for the protection of fish and wildlife resources), but corrective actions. These repeat spot checks were also a differing philosophy toward stipulations called remedial action reports. Like JFW AT, enforcement. MRI and its subcontractors served in an advisory Generally speaking, JFWAT favored strict· capacity to the AOFR. enforcement of the stipulations both to provide JFW A'l 1 advisory memos served to keep the maximum protection for the resource and to AOFRs (and FSOs) informed of the status of impress upon Alyeska and its contractors that important fish and wildlife items, and to approve environmental protection was to be taken stream-related work subject to Alaska Statute 16 seriously. AOFRs, on the other hand, tended to permit requirements. 41 Advisory memos direct­ favor a more flexible policy of application, ed to Alyeska required the approval of the AOFR making allowances for both construction pro­ and were forwarded by him, usually attached to a gress and cost. In the end, JFW AT's federal field memo, which sometimes contained addi­ coordinator concluded that the biologists got tional comments or directions. most of the things "dearest to our hearts ... but it JFW AT had no overall or consistent policy for took more headaches than it should have." 38 writing non-conformance advisory memos, gen­ Government construction monitoring on fed­ erally known as non-conformance reports eral lands involved three distinct documentation (NCRs), and considerable variation was exhi­ systems: (1) AOFR field memos and daily logs, (2) bited among monitors in both the number technical support contractor's spot check written and kinds of violations cited. For reports/remedial action reports, and (3) JFW AT example, some monitors seldom wrote NCRs for advisory memos and narrative surveillance non-correctable violations (e.g., unauthorized reports. fording of a stream by construction equipment) Field memos were the o:fficiaf vehicle for unless the impact was serious; others handled communications from the AOFR to Alyeska smaller correctable problems verbally with the authorizing, directing, or requesting various AOFRs. On the other hand, some monitors felt actions, including notifications of non-confor­ that every observed violation should be docu­ mance with stipulations (NCR). In addition, mented and brought to the AOFRs' attention. AOFRs frequently communicated verbally with One JFW AT biologist estimated he wrote only Alyeska and, unofficially, with execution con­ one-fifth as many NCRs as some other monitors. 42 tractors. Interviews and documentation suggest -:iFWAT monitors also wrote narrative surveil­ there was considerable variation among AOFRs lance reports at the close of each tour of duty. The as to the degree to which they relied on verbal reports summarized the most significant con­ rather than written communications, including struction activities for fish and wildlife concerns, the issuance of non-conformance field memos.· commented on continuing problem areas, sum­ One AOFR wrote only two field memos marize~ important advisory memos issued, and for non-conformance with stipulations through­ noted significant fish and wildlife observations. out construction, while another wrote "two thick Copies of advisory memos were usually attached. stacks." 39 The reasons for such wide variations in Items addressed in the narrative surveillance the documentation record were not determined. 40 reports were usually elaborated upon during In addition to field memos, the AOFRs also kept JFW AT's weekly staff meetings, which were daily logs for each section, in which they summa­ recorded. rized significant activities in a diary format. The documentation systems employed by APO Mechanics Research Inc.'s area engineer in and JFW AT were not intended to, nor do they, each construction section generally directed the provide a full historical account of activities. It is monitoring activities of EEI and GIE in the field, usually impossible to reconstruct the history of, and spot check reports by subcontractors were for example, a particular stream crossing, unless there were .sufficient problems to attract 43 38 lnterview with James Hemming, JFW AT federal coordinator, August 31, considerable attention from monitors. The 1977. 11 9 As indicated elsewhet·e, the actual permit issued by JFW A T's state supervisor " 1nterv1ews with AOFRs, August 1977. for the Commissioner, Alaska Department of Fish and Game. WA number of AOFRs did, however, comment that verbal communications did 42 not engender as much resentment on the part of construction personnel as did Interview with JFWAT monitor, August 1977. written directives. HSee "8tream Crossing Histories," Chapter VU.

61 AOFR daily logs provide the fullest available surveys or audits were performed (e.g., welding account of construction, but suffer from insuffi­ certification, big game crossing surveys), statis­ cient reference detail-places frequently re­ tical summaries of conformances and non­ ferred to by names adopted during construction, conformances as a function of total documented for example. inspections are of limited value. Comparisons of The field-level documentation systems initial­ non-conformances by type of violation, however, ly were neither designed, nor managed, to can suggest the general distribution of problems. provide an auditable record. Among other JFW AT non-conformance advisory memos, by things, it was frequently difficult to "track" open type of violation, are shown below for the period non-conformance reports or verify their current of June 1974 through October 1976, in a chart status. This presented some problems for compiled by JFW AT~ monitors and even greater difficulties for those who have been charged at various times with Percent of C1<.n1ulaffue Type of Nonc01~fonnance N onconformances evaluating APO's operation. 44 Percent The scheduling of monitoring efforts was 1. Erosion, siltation 27.4 27.4 generally dictated by the daily progress of 2. Fish passage blocks 16.3 43.7 construction, with only limited opportunities to 3. Unauthorized in-stream 14.7 58.4 plan activities more than a day or two in advance. activities 4. Unauthorized disposal of 12.6 71.0 JFWAT monitors were essentially self-directed, waste; garbage and toxic their daily routine being determined by those substances construction areas and activities which they 5. Lack of restoration 7.4 78.4 considered to be most significant for fish and of disturbed areas wildlife. In addition, they were sometimes 6. Oil spills 6.1 84.5 7. Water use 5.8 90.3 directed by JFW AT's management to pay 8. Big game crossings 3.2 93.5 particular attention to one area or class of 9. Miscellaneous 6.5 100 problem (e.g., low water crossings, a particular river crossing) and were also expected to respond This chart represents 665 instances of noncon­ to AOFR (or FSO) requests for information or formance with stipulations, of which 215 (32 per­ monitorin~ coverage when possible. cent) were classed "noncorrectable" by JFWAT. JFWAT field biologists' primary job was to The most significant observation to be made monitor compliance with the project stipula­ from this table is that the three most frequent tions45 as they related to fish and wildlife classes of violations, accounting for 58 percent of resources, and to keep their AOFRs (and FSOs) all non-conformances (NCRs) issued by JFWA'f, advised of same. involved aquatic systems. Control of erosion and Day-to-day field monitoring and documenta­ stream sedimentation were major problems tion by JFW AT and other government inspectors during construction. These were identified not was neither systematic nor representative of only by JFWAT (and EEI) field documentation, actual construction practices in a statistical but also by a number of more general assessments sense. Monitors usually tried to focus their of construction. 46 "Much of the erosion and attention on those activities of greatest signifi­ siltation was caused by a lack of integration of cance for pipeline integrity and/or the environ­ basic erosion control techniques with construc­ ment. Likewise, there was a tendency to focus tion."47 Blocks to fish passage were usually the documentation efforts on violations or potential result of poorly placed or inadequately sized problem areas, rather than to divert limited culverts, improperly constructed low water resources to documenting compliance situations. crossings (reinforced fords), or degradation of Consequently, except in cases where systematic low water crossings resulting from improper use or lack of maintenance.

4'For a more detailed discussion of APO documentation see: Price Waterhouse and 6 Co., Alaska Pipeline Office: Reco111111e1ulation.,;for Impro11i11g the · icenes:;of ~ U.S. Comptrnller General, General Accounting office, Tn11m-A{w,;fm Oil the Sy:;tem.~De.~ianed to Monitor Alyesfm's Complimice with if-of-Way Pipeline-Pruares,q of Co11Htrnction throur,h Noi.•ember 1,975, February 17, 1976; Agreement, October 8, 1976. This study was contracted by MRI pursuant to APO r111d. TriwN-Aluska Qil PiJ1eli11e-I11for11111tionrm ConHtntcfion, Tedrnical am! Work Order 159 of August 27, 1976 and forwarded to APO via: Memorandum to Ew·ir1111@'11ta/Mutters thro11r1hSp1·i11,1, I!J'li. August 23, 1977. Also, APO Morris Turner from Michael Sullivan. MRImanager, administration, November Memorandum from technical staff coordinator to AOR, Subject: "Non-Welding 16; 1976; and U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Audit and Investigation, Quality Control Concerns," May 28, 1976; MRI, "Possible Reoccurring Non­ St11dttof the Alirnl.:a Pipeline Offiee Monitorino of Q1wlit11Ai;,mm11ce um/ Control Conformances," October 14, 1976. by /he Al!Jesl.-a PiJ1eli11eSerl'fre Compan!f, September 10, 1976. "l?rom statement of Allan Carson, J I~WAT, state surveillance supervisor­ 45 The stipulations relevant to the subject matter of this report are included as JFW AT, before the President's Council on Environmental Quality, Hearinf/S 011 Appendix A. N11/11mlGw1 Pipeli11efrom Pnu/Jwr: Bt1!f. Al

62 Both erosion/siltation and inadequate fish JFW AT advisory memos approving in-stream passage were chronic and diffuse problems work under Alaska Statute 16 permit require­ throughout construction. Individual violations ments. The use of field turn-ons is also noteworthy generally were undramatic, and their signifi­ in that, like design review, it was a point of cance for fish productivity was not widely appre­ control where government monitoring efforts ciated. Consequently, they did not demand quick could operate preventively by affording the corrective action by either AOFRs or execution AOFR and the JFW AT field biologist an contractors. By contrast, highly visible violations opportunity to identify potential problems prior such as oil spills or unauthorized in-stream use of to construction activities.Non-conformance field equipment usually received prompt attention. memos and stop work orders, on the other hand, This problem is not unique, of course, and it is a came into play after provisions of project truism that seemingly minor incidents would not conditions were violated and those violations usually receive the attention accorded more were brought to the AOFR's attent 10r1 obvious or less frequent events. It does, however, Violations of project conditions, includ.ing suggest that for future projects greater emphasis stipulations violations and deviations from should be placed on resolving chronic problems approved designs or specifications, were commu­ which, like siltation and fish passage, could have nicated to the AOFRs by means of non­ significant long-term impacts on fish or wildlife conformance spot check reports or advisory populations or on the productivity of their memos.50 If an AOFRconcurred with afindingor supporting systems. if he discovered such a violation and it was "correctable," he would contact Alyeska's field APO Sanctions representative orally to inform him of the problem and request remedial action. If the The Alaska Pipeline Office (APO) had five condition was not corrected to the AOFR's levels of control or sanction for the enforcement of satisfaction after oral notification, it became a project conditions: non-conformance. Notification of a non-confor­ 1. review and approval of design documents and the mance was to be by written field memo. 51 As power to impose conditions on notices to proceed; indicated earlier, there was enormous variation 2. the administrative requirement that notices to proceed in the use of NCR field memos by AOFRs. (NTPs) would be subject to AOFR approval by field memo Stop work orders were provided for by the ("field turn-on") prior to commencement of work; right-of-way agreement and could be issued "if, 3. authority of the AOFR to issue non-conformance field in the judgment of the authorized officer: memos and to require correction by Alyeska; 4. authority to issue stop work orders; and 1. An immediate temporary suspension of such activi­ 5. authority to have outside contractors perform remedial ties is necessary to protect: (a) public health or safety work at Alyeska's expense. (including, but not limited to, personal injury or loss of life with respect to any Person or Persons); or(b) the In addition, the Secretary of the Interior had at environment from immediate, serious, substantial, least nominal legal authority under the Mineral and irreparable harm or damage to areas of Leasing Act of 1920, to terminate the right-of­ vegetation or timber, fish, or other wildlife popula­ way for "non-compliance with any provision of tions or their habitats, or any other natural resource); or [Section 28 of· that Act],"48 however improbable 2. Permittees, their respective agents, employees, its application. contractors or subcontractors (on any tier) are failing The use of field turn-ons served "to ensure that or refusing, or have failed or refused, to comply with the conditions stipulated [were] met and to or observe: (a) any provision of this Agreement similarly ensure that the AOFR [was] appraised necessary to protect public health, safety, or the 49 environment; or(b)anyorder of the authorized officer of all current on-going activities." In addition, implementing any such provision of this Agreement field turn:ons assured the AOFR an opportunity or of any other agreement, permit, or authorization to confirm that field conditions reaso:r~' ly that shall have been duly approved, issued, or granted approximated those anticipated in the.? · by the Scretary in connection with all or any part of 52 final design. They also served as vehh · A' the Pipeline System. 50General procedures for non-conformances are outlined in Memorandum to AOFRs from construction coordinator, Subject: "Spot Checks-NCRs," May 1, 1975; memorandum to AOFRs, MRI, JFW AT from construction coordinator, Subject: "Field Surveillar~e Procedures," April 30, 1975. 4~Public Law 98-153, Title I, section 101 {0) (1). 51 •aLetter from Andrew Kollm,;. AO, to Alyeska Pipeline Service Company and the Memorandun; to AOFRs from construction coordinator, Subject: "8pot Commissioner. Alaska Department of Highways, Subject: "The authorities of checks-NCRs," May 1, 1975. A01''Rs," June 10, 1974. 02Auree11w11tand Gmnt of Ri[lhf-of-Woy, Section 25A.

63 If, however, a stop work order would shut down Mechanics Research Inc. in early October 19'i construction in an entire construction section and concluded in part: was to be issued under (2) above, the authorized officer also needed the prior written appproval of [T]he actions taken by personnel appear to have be( appropriate, as envisioned in the policy guidelines, wi1 53 the Secretary of the Interior. the exception of the use of the Stop Work Order. We four It is unclear what authority AOFRs had to that the Stop Work Order was not always utilized as issue stop work orders without prior clearance result of "urgent" non-compliance reports. We also four from Anchorage. A letter from the AO to Alyeska that the timeliness of Stop Work Orders and other actio1 59 written in 1974 stated an AOFR "has the could be improved. authority to shut down segments of the work, but These findings were also echoed by tl not an entire construction subdivision, without congressional General Accounting Office's 19~ the express consent of the AO and/or AOR." 54 A report on pipeline construction. The GAO foun subsequent directive in the APO Employees that: Manual, however, reads: Federal monitoring data shows that many nonconforr The AOFR should review Section 25 of the Agreement and ances occurred during the 1975 and 1976 constructic Grant of Right-of-Way before recommending the Author­ seasons because of inadequacies in Alyeska's quali ized Officer approve a temporary suspension be issued. 55 assurance program and the Authorized Officer's unwi ingness to use proper authodty to assure compliance. Tl Interviews with members of APO's construction Authorized Officer brought these nonconformances Alyeska's attention but the corrective action was n monitoring staff were also contradictory on this always initiated in a timely manner. 60 point, suggesting a lack of sufficient guidance to monitoring staffs by management. However, in sharp contrast to the findin1 APO's general policy was to use its stop work quoted above, another study contracted t authority sparingly. As of mid-August 1977, Mechanics Research Inc. stated: APO had issued 88 field memos classified as "stop It is the conclusion of this analysis that, even though tl orders." 56 A r~view of those memos, however, re­ "power to shut down" is a necessary power, there were fe vealed that several were in fact merely threats to if any instances during the construction of the Tran stop work if a specified problem were not Alaska Pipeline where the intent of the Agreement wou have been better met or the public and the national intere corrected, while the vast majority directed only better served if the AO had exercised his power to sh1 that specified non-conforming activities be down. The approach generally taken by the AO was halted. Only one stop work order addressed a work out acceptable remedial action. 61 chronic problem directly relating to fish and When JFW AT identified field problems n< wildlife resources. 57 requiring immediate attention, they were assen A number of reviews of APO's operating proce­ bled in "punchlists" and transmitted to Alyesk dures have found that, while the monitoring sys­ for remedial action. Transmittal of environmen tem as a whole was generally adequate, sanctions, al punchlist items was a biannual occurrenc1 and particularly stop work orders, were not used with work to be accomplished either pre-freezeu to the extent they should have been to assure ade­ or pre-breakup when remedial activitiE .quate compliance with project stipulations and would, have minimum impacts upon fisheriE :other conditions. For instance, a survey by a resources and construction activities. Typicall~ certified public accounting firm 58 submitted tc Alyeska would make commitments that the wor listed would be accomplished, but a substantil portion would not get done. APO would then ha v to put those items not completed on the nel punchlist, Alyeska would commit itself t 53lbid:; ~ubsection B (b). MAPO lette1· to Alyeska Pipeline Service Company and Commissioner, Alaska completion and the work would not be corr Department of Highways, from Andrew Rollins, AO, Subject:" Authorities of the AOFRs," June 10,1974. pleted. 62 This pattern was repeated from the prE 55 Memorandum to AOFRs from construction coordinator, Subject: "Spot Checks-NCRs," May 1, 1975. breakup punchlist of Spring 1975 through the pr( 56Alaska Pipeline Office, "APO Stop Orders," August 12, 1977. freezeup punchlist for Fall 1976. 57 Field Memo rnu3, March 25, 1975. Issued in Section 4. That memo directed Alyeska to terminate the use of 55 gallon drum-type storage for culvert thaw devices due to repeated instances of oil contamination of fish streams. 59 {bid., p. 4. 60 58 U.S. Comptroller General, GAO, Trans·Alm~ka Oil Pipeline - J11Jonnatio11c • Pric.e Waterhou~e ~nd Company, Al~ska Pipeline_ Office: Recolill!Wildutimm/01· lmproi•mg the Efjectwenesii of the SyNtem.~ Des1y11edto M0111torAl11e,q/w','i Co11siruclio11, Technical, mui E1wir01111umtalM.atters through Spring, 1977, p. 1 Compliam·e 11iiththe Rif1ht-of-Way Agreement. October 8, 1976. This study was 61Terminus Limited, S1Je

64 Authorized officer's field representative limited to environmental concerns. One AOFR AOFR) logs cite four frequent explanations why who had written "two thick stacks of NCRs" told mnchlist items were not completed on time: (1) us that when he put deadlines for remedial action \.lyeska civil engineering did not direct on field memos, Alyeska met only about half of ixecution contractors to do the work, (2) there them. 66 Similarly, the state pipeline coordinator vas more important, production-related work to felt that Alyeska was adept at avoiding >e done, (3) required equipment was not government's wishes and also at playing state and Lvailable, and (4) there was insufficient beds pace federal monitoring efforts against each other. 67 n construction camps available. That is, Alyeska Problems also occurred because Alyeska did tnd its contractors did not want to divert not always have adequate control over construc­ ·esources away from construction to do remedial tion activities. 68 And, there was always the ;vork, particularly for environmental and other problem of lengthy official lines of communica­ 10n-production related items. tion - (JFWAT-AOFR-Alyeska site representa­ Finally, in mid-March 1977, the acting tive-execution contractor-foreman-workers; with a.uthorized officer wrote to Alyeska's president, additional steps common) which frequently isting a number of APO concerns- half of them resulted, like a parlor game, in significant ·elating to remedial work. The letter stated: differences between the original intent and final execution. Indeed, many field engineers regular­ The most critical current scheduling item from our standpoint is that effort associated with pre-breakup work ly communicated with executi"n contractors ... we want a satisfactory schedule within a week .. .it must unofficially, finding it much more efficient and provide the mechanism where your quality assurance effective. manager, et al, can in fact judge the progress and There were two additional factors strongly acceptability of the work. If we do not receive such a affecting how successfully AOFRs could influ­ schedule and assurance of pre-breakup work accomplish­ ment, I have no alternative but to shut down all pipeline­ ence Alyeska's actions: (1) the general policy that related construction except backfilling of the fuel gas Alyeska was to design and build the pipeline, line.63 while the role of government was limited to Although this elicited a credible response by review and approval or disapproval, and (2) the A.lyeska, the letter was sent just a month before closely-related question of potential liability breakup and work crews were able to address should an AOFR's actions "unreasonably" cost a mly JFWAT's first-priority punchlist items. 64 contractor money. The most important conse­ Subsequently, the Fish and Wildlife Service quences of these factors for fish and wildlife was ~ontingent of JFW AT, having obtained a in relation to stream crossings. It was much more ~ommitment from their area director to take the likely and reasonable that an Alyeska engineer issue to the Assistant Secretary's Office if would, in the face of uncertainty, choose, for n.ecessary, went with JFWAT's federal coordina­ example, the smaller of two culvert sizes; or, tor to APO's management in late May. They more generally, the least expensive solution to insisted that Alyeska be required to correcf any given problem a solution which engineers, :mtstanding fish and wildlife related problems on including AOFRs, by training consistently found federal lands, arguing that it was the last chance more acceptable than biologists who, also by to effectively compel remedial action. The acting training, were predisposed to err on the side of AO responded by delegating to two federal the fish. Nevertheless, there were occasions when JFWAT biologists AOFR authority to monitor an AOFR might be convinced an approved stream-related remedial work. He also contacted crossing or other structure or proposed remedial Alyeska and directed that remedial work be action by Alyeska would probably not be undertaken immediately. and that all necessary satisfactory. In such cases, the AOFR might manpower and equipment be made available. 65 advise Alyeska of this; but if Alyeska insisted, Problems in getting adequate responses from there was little the AOFR could do until the Alyeska on non-conforming items werP not structure~ proved inadequate. In some cases, a

66lnterview with AOFR, August 1977. 67lnterview with Charles Champion, state pipeline coordinator, March 18, 1977. 6.!~tter to Willia!ll Darch, president, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, from ~orris Turner, acting AO, March 16, 1977. ""Terry f. L_enzner, The i\fu1wt1eme11t,Planning and Co11structio11of the Tm1115- Afaskq f:1p;lwe S!fstem, Report to the Alaska Pipeline Commission by the sirnformal discussions with James Hemming, JFWAT federal coordinator Commissions Special Council, August 1, 1977. Also interviews with James \llan Carson, JF\V AT state supervisor, late October 1977. ' ~emming,_JFW f\.T fe_deral ~oordinator, August 31, 1977; AOFR, August 1977; 65Ibid. mformal d1scuss1on with Keith Morehouse, July 1977.

65 single crossing was reworked several times JFW A T's biologists were generally unfamili: before it met established performance criteria. with large-scale construction projects and h~ By way of illustration, in the spring of 1976, one little or no understanding of engineering and i AOFR made the following entry in his field log: limitations. As a result, some JFW AT monito Discussion with [an Alyeska engineer] on Sheep Creek. damaged their credibility in the eyes of enginee Apparently the pooling and filling of the stream channel is by (1) being insensitive to costs in their advices preferred by [him]. I'm tired of this one and intend to let AOFRs (whose professional training emphasiz the crossing go through as APSC wishes. If it doesn't hold, cost minimization), and (2) being either unable I suppose we start again (for the 4th time)!69 discriminate or unwilling to let minor 1 Several AOFRs interviewed also indicated that "technical" problems pass and to concentra even in some situations where they had authority instead on more significant violations. to direct that certain actions be taken, they were On the other hand, AOFRs generally had lit1 cautious because if something an AOFR directed appreciation for the subtleties of biologic did not work and resulted in extra costs to the systems and were uncomfortable with t] contractor the AOFR could be held liable. apparent subjectivity of biological assessmem AOFRs did, however, feel free to make verbal which had to be made under conditions "sugg·estions" to Alyeska, and this was often an uncertainty. Biologists had difficulty convinciJ effective mode of communication. 70 AOFRs of the importance of (1) minimizi1 APO had adequate sanctions to achieve erosion and siltation, (2) protecting very smi substantial compliance with project stipulations. but productive fish creeks and (3) maintaini1 Notwithstanding this, APO was unsuccessful in fish passage particularly for non-game fish its efforts to get Alyeska to field an adequate and especially during high flow periods. quality control program. As a result, JFW AT Not surprisingly, this mutual lack of undE was placed in the position of having to provide standing resulted in significant differences much more intensive monitoring coverage than how JFWAT monitors and AOFRs interpret1 had been anticipated or for which they were stipulations, such as those calling for continuo· staffed. Furthermore, as a result of the priority fish passage. Several interviews and reviews of tl APO gave to expeditious construction, fish and daily field logs indicated a willingness on the pa wildlife related non-conformances were not of some AOFRs to substitute their judgment f corrected in a timely manner. Particularly that of JFWAT monitors in evaluating t significant in this regard were chronic problems significance of problems such as erosion/siltatio related to aquatic systems - e.g., violations of high-water velocity blocks to fish passage, siltation/erosion control and fish passage require­ inadequate fish passage in very small strearr ments. Nevertheless, APO, at JFWAT's urging, Indeed, several AOFRs explicitly indicated th did move aggressively to correct fish and wildlife how they handled reports of violations of fish a1 related problems once pipeline construction was wildlife stipulations was in part dependent 1 substantially complete. who submitted them. In addition, many biologiE felt that some AOFRs took such reports Biologists and Engineers person'al affronts, interpreting them as reflE Animosity develooed between many biologists tions on how adequately the AOFRs were doii and engineers-JFW AT monitors and AOFRs their jobs. - during the course of pipeline construction. JFW AT was a single-purpose organization This resulted from two distinct but parallel facts: its sole mission was to protect fish and wildli (1) that APO and JFWAT had two essentially populations and their habitats. Furthermm different monitoring roles and philosophies; and JFW A T's perception of the role of governme (2) that biologists and engineers had little monitoring organization could fairly be chara understanding or appreciation of each others' terized as being limited to protecting tl disciplines and professional concerns. 71 environment and assuring system integri1 viewing Congress' mandate for early proje 69 Dennis Schroeder, AOl?R daily field log, Seetion 5, April 14, 1976. See also completion as basically an industry responsib history of Sheep Creek, Appendix C, this repm·t. 70 Interviews with six AOFRs, Anchorage, August 1977. The AOFRs who ity which government must accommodate co discussed this liability of government inspectors were largely referring to past projects monitored by government inspectors of the Corps of Engineern. sistent with environmental protection. 71 Discussion of biologist/engineer positions in this section is based on interviews APO on the other hand, was a multi-purpo with AOFRs and JF\VAT personnel, Anchorage, August and September 1977. A list of persons interviewed appears at the conclusion of this report. organization that viewed its charge as being

66 assure system integrity and prompt construction, of one AOFR, representatives of the technical as well as to keep environmental and construction support contractor and JFWAT monitor. If state costs to a minimum, consistent with the first two land was involved, there would also be a field criteria. Although only a matter of emphasis, surveillance officer (FSO). these two viewpoints reflect essential differences JFW AT monitors served in an advisory between JFW AT and APO throughout design capacity to AOFRs and FSOs, and all official review and construction surveillance. communications to Alyeska were directed through them and were subject to their approval. Conclusions Several factors conditioned the effectiveness of JFWAT's field monitoring efforts: Government surveillance operations were 1. The overall priority of monitoring efforts set by APO conducted in two distinct processes: design placed greater emphasis on timely construction than review and construction monitoring. Design environmental protection. review consisted of two major, separate submis­ 2. Alyeska did not field an effective quality assurance sions preliminary designs and notice to and control program, particularly with respect to proceed applications (NTP As). Preliminary environmental quality control. As a result, JFWAT designs were reviewed for fish and wildlife field monitors had to assume a much larger role than had been anticipated, and environmental protection, aspects by APO's game and fisheries biologists which should have been accommodated through and this process was well advanced by the time preventative QC action, had to be accomplished JFW AT became operational. NTP As followed in through remedial efforts in many cases. the fall of 1974 and were reviewed by all 3. JFW AT's location "betvveen" and, therefore, apart surveillance organizations, including JFWAT. from APO and SPCO significantly strengthened its In general, JFW AT's efforts to get special bargaining position and effectiveness. conditions attached to NTPs were only moderate­ 4. JFW A T's lack of greater in-house engineering expertise and its members' minimal construction ly successful. Following NTP issuance, responsi­ experience weakened its credibility with APO and bility for monitoring Alyeska's efforts for work SPCO and, thereby, compromised its effectiveness. It approved in the NTPs shifted to the field. also placed a burden upon AOFRs to bring technical Although everyone involved in government realism to JFW AT advices. surveil1ance activities considered the design 5. The orientation given APO and JFW AT field staffs review process a valuable one, APO found it was grossly inadequate to prepare them for field necessary to give less than full approval to several assignments. 6. JFW AT and APO management did .not exercise critical submissions. This was because the adequate controls over their field staffs to assure congressional mandate of the Trans-Alaska reasonably consistent application and enforcement of Pipeline Authorizatio·n Act for expeditious environmental stipulations, with supporting docu­ construction was considered sufficiently proscrip­ mentation. In addition, AOFRs were without tive that, unless there was a clear threat to system clerical/administrative support and spent valuable time on routine tasks that could have been performed integrity, APO could not jeopardize the construc­ by a technician or administrative assistant. tion schedule for possible problems encountered· 7. APO personnel did not have knowledge or apprecia­ in the review of Alyeska's plans. As a result, tion of the subtleties of biological processes and were preliminary design packages were "approved unwilling to take agressive or timely action on except as noted"; Alyeska's quality program was important environmental problems, particularly "tentatively approved"; and several NTPAs were chronic, diffuse, and undramatic problems. JFWAT "conditionally approved.H monitors were frequently unable to convince AOFRs of tbe importance of some problems not only There was one other class of design documents because they were not obvious, but also because of requiring review - design change requests inconsistencies in JFW AT's field efforts. This (DCRs). These were essentially amendments to resulted in AOFRs havingtomakeassessmentsofthe biolgical significance of a violation if they were not approved NTPs and numbered nearly 3,000 conr'ident of advisors' judgment. during construction. Because they were usually 8. Finally, certain government actions made dramatic submitted just prior to the subject construction contributions to the protection of environmental activity, reviewers typically had only 24 hours to values. These included the establishment of perform­ respond. ance criteria - e.g., fish and wildlife construction ·Government field monitoring was organized "windmvs" and culvert velocity standards; require­ ments for big game and fish passage; APO's decision around the six government surveillance sections, to disallow about one-half of the material sites with one "team" on duty in each section at any one Alyeska originally requested; and the relocation of time. A full monitoring contingent would consist Pump Station Two. 67 1. Elevated pipeline section under construction. Grav el work pad protects and underlying permafrost from erosion - Near Arctic Ocean, August 1975.

2. Buri ed pip eline section und er construction. Near Littl e Tonsina River Crossin g, April 1975.

68 1..

3. Concrete blocks a1·e used to hold pipe in place-Tonsina River Crossing, March 1975.

4. Mining· gravel from Sagavanirktok River for pipeline and haul road construction-August 1974.

69 5. Pipeline crossing-Little Tonsina River, April 1975.

6. Rivers in were major source of gravel for pipeline construction-Atigun River i: Brooks Range, July 1975.

70 Chapter VII - Stream Crossings and Big Game Crossings

The trans-Alaska pipeline and the 360-mile sections 4 and 5 north of the Yukon River, North Slope haul road cross about 1,000 streams compiled from the records of the Alaska Pipeline and rivers, and roughly half of these are fish Office, the Joint Fish and Wildlife Advisory streams. 1 Because the pipeline, work pad, haul Team and the State Pipeline Coordinator's road, access roads and materials sites crossed or Office, are included. Office and field staffs of were near such a large number of fish streams JFW AT and APO were interviewed for more during construction, the field staff of the Joint information about the stream crossings we Fish and Wildlife Advisory Team (JFW AT) selected and stream crossings along the pipeline spent much of its time monitoring effects of in general. Because this report focuses primarily construction on water systems along the route. on fish and wildlife protection policies of federal The state supervisor of the advisory team has said agencies, these stream crossings discussed (with the "most common and difficult problems" 2 the one exception) occurred on federal land monitor­ fish and wildlife monitors faced when the ed by APO. One history deals with a crossing at pipeline was being built resulted from construc­ the state-owned haul road; surveillance on the tion crossing or passing near water. Fish and haul road during construction was the responsi­ wildlife advisors cite silting of rivers and bility of state monitors, but federal monitors streams, improperly constructed and incorrectly would become involved when situations at the used low water crossings, improperly placed or haul road affected resources off the road right-of­ inadequately sized culverts in streams, and way. erosion as common problems during construc­ Specific crossings were selected on the basis of tion.3 interviews with JFWAT and APO field person­ The 800-mile pipeline system also crosses nel. JFWAT monitors felt the histories of these habitats and migration routes of dozens of species crossings would illustrate a wide range of points: of large and small wildlife. Before the start of field probl~ms created by lack of information construction, Alyeska agreed to build several about streams north of the ·Yukon River; hundred buried and elevated crossings in areas of complexity and diversity of streams along the above-ground line to allow big game animals to route; kinds of problems that could occur when move across the pipe. Records. of the Alaska the pipeline system crossed complex water Pipeline Office (APO) and the Joint Fish and systems; difficulty of resolving some problems at Wildlife Advisory Team show that 34 percent of stream crossings; how individual AOFRs dealt these big game crossings were not built with stream crossing problems. 5 according to government standards in 1975, and The second part of the chapter discusses -huw 21 percent built in 1976 did not meet require- government monitoring agencies reacted when ments of the monitoring agencies. 4 more than one-quarter of about 550 big game The first part of this chapter looks at ·how the crossings along the pipeline route were not built government field surveillance systems worked according to government requirements. We when problems developed at river and stream studied records of the Alaska Pipeline Office. the crossinQ's during construction. Histories of five State Pipeline Coordinator's (Jffice and the Joint stream and river crossings in construction Fish and Wildlife Advisory Team. We also interviewed staffs of APO and JFW AT. This chapter examines some fish and wildlife­ iJulius Rockwell Jr. and Richard L. Johnson, List of Streams and Other Water Bodies along the T;·ans-Aluska. Oil Pipeline Route, (draft, fourth revision, 1977). related problems that occurred during pipeline This figure is an estimate. 2Allan Carson, JFW AT meeting with President's Council on Environmental Quality, May 12, 1977. 3Jnterviews with six JFWAT field monitors, August and September 1977. 5 ~Memorandum w the fiies·from Jame~ Hemming, APO/JFWAT, Subject: AOFRs interviewed who had worked in· construction sections 4 and 5 did not "Status, Big Game Crossing," December 21, 1976. object to the use of any of these stream histories.

71 construction. It is not meant to imply that the federal right-of-way agreements and told to base kinds of problems that occurred at selected field decisions on the provisions of these stream crossings happened at every stream documents. 8 A series of "fish and wildlife crossing, or that the crossings were in any way stipulations" within the environmental stipula­ "typical" of crossings along the 800-mile route. It tions in both agreements required that the is not meant to assess the severity or extent of pipeline builders provide freedom of movement kinds of problems documented. And finally, it is for and protection of fish and wildlife across the not intended to illustrate how well fish and pipeline system. Some environmental stipula-. wildlife resources were protected during con­ tions called for the pipeline builders to "avoid or struction. AOFRs emphasize that the trans­ minimize" effects of construction on resources Alaska pipeline was built with minimum impact along the route, and· government field monitors on the resources along the route, and they credit were often required to judge whether the pipeline government monitoring with doing much to keep builders were holding construction effects to a environmental damage at a low level. JFWAT minimum under varying field conditions. 9 monitors agree that government monitors played a significant role in lessening impact of the Deviations from many of these stipulations pipeline. As one monitor summarizes, "Some could be approved by the authorized officer or the people have said JFWAT is calling the pipeline state pipeline coordinator, if the chief govern­ project an environmental 'disaster.' We don't ment monitors felt field conditions justified such think it was a disaster; we think government deviations. These variations were to be approved monitoring made a real difference .... We only in writing by the heads of the government say that more could have been done ... "6 monitoring organizations. This chapter is intended to say: Here are some In addition to broad stipulations for protection important fish and wildlife-related problems of fish and fish habitat when the pipeline system that did occur during construction, and this is crossed or passed near streams, the pipeline how the government monitoring agencies han­ builders agreed to the specific government dled them. requirement that speed of water flowing through Field Monitors culverts in fish streams would not exceed four feet per second during calculated five-year flood When work on the trans-Alaska pipeline levels on given streams. This four-feet-per-second system started in 1974, the federal Alaska criterion was established in early 1975 and based Pipeline Office (APO) and the State Pipeline on studies of fish swimming capabilities funded Coordinator's Office (SPCO) assigned field staffs by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 1~ To meet to oversee daily construction of the 800-mile the stipulation requiring"uninterrupted and safe system. The authorized officer's field representa­ passage of fish," Alyeska proposed to build low tives (AOFRs) were responsible for enforcing water crossings 11 whenever possible rather than technical and environmental stipulations of the installing culverts when laying the gravel work federal right-of-way agreement, but, as noted in pad a~ross streams. The Joint Fish and Wildlife earlier chapters, their duties also included Advisory Team (JFWAT) and the Alaska assuring that the pipeline was built "promptly" Pipeline Office approve4 this plan because and weighing "environmental amenities and biologists felt low water crossings would offer values with economic practicalities so as to be fewer blocks to fish passage and require less consistent with applicable national policies." 7 maintenance than culverts. 12 The state field surveillance officers had similar The JFWAT fisheries engineer worked with responsibilities on state lands the pipeline Alyeska engineers to design low water crossings crossed. along the route. These low water crossings were These field chiefs anrt their fish and wildlife designed for use by light traffic rather than large advisors who went w the field at the start of construction were given copies of the state and 8Interviews with six AOFRs, one FSO and six JFW AT monitors, Anchorage, August and September 1977. 9A list of stipulations applied for protection of fish and wildlife and their habitat.'! during construction appears in Appendix A. •Interviews with six AOFRs and six JFW AT monitors, Anchorage, August and 10Interview, telephone, with N orval Netsch, FWS, Anchorage, October 12, 1977, September 1977. HI.rm-wot-Ar crossing: a reinforced ford. • 11'rm1H-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Title II of Public Law 93-153, 12Allan (farson;"An Analysis of Environmental Stipulation Compliance on the November 16, 1973, section 203(a). Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline," September 10, 1975, p. 8.

72 construction equipment, and many failed during Stream Crossings construction. The state supervisor of the fish and wildlife advisory team has attributed these Histories failures to improper construction of the crossings The following histories are summarized from and use of the crossings by heavy construction detailed field records of APO and JFWAT. 16 equipment; the acting authorized officer has Marion Creek Haul Road Cross,ing: The North called the low water crossing failures one of the Slope gravel haul road crosses this large stream clearest examples of the inadequacies of Alyeska's 13 about 125 miles north of the Yukon river and six quality control program during construction. miles north of Alyeska's Coldfoot construction camp. Described by a JFW AT fisheries biologist Government field monitors hired early in as "really more a river than a stream," Marion construction received little instruction on inter­ Creek averages 60 to 100 feet wide and flows west preting and applying the environmental provi­ to the Middle Fork Koyukuk River. This stream sions and stipulations of the right-of-way 14 flows roughly from May to OctJber; it is dry in agreements. winter. Grayling, Dolly Varden and slimy sculpin have been found in Marion Creek. The creek is lo­ As one authorized officer's field representative cated in construction section 4 of the pipeline (AOFR) explains, "Nobody knew enough to give system. us those kinds of instructions" on interpreting The 360-mile haul road is owned by the State of and applying stipulations that represented a Alaska; the state contracted with Alyeska to new level of government environmental monitor­ build the road. During construction, the state was ing. A monitor for the Joint Fish and Wildlife responsible for monitoring Alyeska's work on the Advisory Team recalls that when he was assigned haul road right-of-way. As the result of an to a construction section of the pipeline, "My boss agreement between the Governor of Alaska, the pointed to a map and said, 'You have this much of State Pipeline Coordinator's Office and the Alaska to minimize impact on.'" Therefore, Alaska Department of Highways, engineers from federal and state monitors responsible for the Department of Highways monitored work on overseeing daily construction used their own the haul road. JFW AT monitors directed their judgements based on experience in deciding advisory memos to these Department of High­ what constituted a "minimum" effect on fish and ways engineers. The federal Alaska Pipeline wildlife, what effects could be avoided, and what Office became involved with haul road monitor­ measures the pipeline builders should be ing when a situation at the haul road affected ·required to take to protect resources along the resources off the haul road. route. Large culverts were installed at this haul road crossing when the road was built in 1974. In 1975 The AOFRs and JFW AT field monitors JFW AT monitors began recommending removal attended regular meetings with their supervisors of the culverts and installation of a bridge at the in Anchorage to discuss questions of interpreta­ crossing, maintaining that velocity of water tion and applications of stipulations and to through the culverts often prevented fish from establish uniform policies, but AOFRs and fish moving upstream of the culverts. Department of and wildlife monitors maintain that individual Highways personnel, who were responsible for judgements played significant roles in monitor­ government surveillance on the haul road, also ing throughout construction. 15 The following recommended installation of a bridge. AOFRs in histories of stream crossings illustrate some of the area took an interest in the question because a the kinds of problems that occurred when the fish block at Marion Creek would affect resources pipeline crossed streams,· and how AOFRs and off the haul road. In April 1977, a bridge was their fish and wildlife advisors handled these installed after SPCO, the Department of High­ problems. wa:rs and· the Alaska Department of Fish and

13 ltllnformation on Marion Creek haul road crossing was also drawn fr(!m office lbid., p. 9; interviews with Jack Pisher, JFW AT/NMFS, Anchorage, August 9, files of SPCO. Records used to compile histories include: AOFR_daily flel!1 logs,' 1977 and Morris J. Turner, APO acting authorized officer, Anchorage, August 5, AOFR field memos JFWAT advisory memos, JFWAT narrative surve11la_nce 1977. reports. and office "Stream Crossing" files of APO, JPWAT and SPCO. Detailed ttGeneralization based on interviews with six AOFRs, one FSO and six JFW AT chronologies, containing all references from APO and_JFW~T recor!1s, of the monitors. Anchorage, August and September 1977. Chapman and Sheep Creeks crossing~ appear in Append1_xC ~s 11lustrationsofthe 10Ibid. kinds of field records used in preparmg the following h1stones.

73 Game directed Alyeska to do the work. The observed that "the urgency" of keeping the haul following is a chronology of government monitor­ road open "has long since passed and adequate ing actions at Marion Creek: time has gone by for the construction of a bridge." When the haul road was built in 1974, Alyeska The following month, JFW AT monitors re­ installed three 7-foot culverts as drainage ported water was flowing through Marion Creek structures. In June of 1975, a JFWAT field culverts at six feet per second. The same month, moni:::>rnoted in an advisory memo that "Marion the state pipeline coordinator wrote to Alyeska's Creek was a barrier to migrating fish for at least manager of engineering," ... it is imperative that six days" in late May and early June, and an a bridge be constructed at this site without AOFR /noted in his log at the time that fish had further delay" and that "despite all advice and been seen below the Marion Creek culverts but directives to the contrary," Alyeska had prepared not above them. At about this time, a hydrologist a plan showing "a rip-rapped" 17 version of the by­ with the Alaska Department of Highways pass as the permanent structure. recommended to Alyeska that a bridge be installed at Marion Creek. In August 1976, an AOFR assessed the Following reports of fish blocks at Marion situation at Marion Creek: "JFWAT had sug­ Creek, the APO authorized officer's representa­ gested/approved a by-pass. Now do not think fish tive told his field staff to "investigate to take are smart enough to take by-pass. Bridge not action at Marion Creek." In mid-June, a JFWAT answer because stream also flows faster than four fisheries engineer, employees of Alyeska and a feet per second ... " But that same month, the hydrologist from the Department of Highways Alaska Pipeline Office recommended construc­ agreed that a by-pass should be constructed at the tion of a bridge at Marion Creek. site to help move fish above the culverts. The In the fall of 1976, representatives of the State JFWAT fisheries engineer saw this fish by-pass Pipeline Coordinator's Office, the Alaska Depart­ as "a temporary, emergency-type structure" ment of Fish and Game and the Alaska justified by "the urgency of keeping the haul road Department of Highways met and agreed to open" during the 1975 season when many trucks require Alyeska to build a bridge at Marion carrying supplies for pipeline construction were Creek by May 1977. In April 1977, Alyeska crossing Marion Creek daily. removed the culverts at Marion Creek and In early August, a JFWAT monitor reported installed a 100-foot, one-lane bridge. that during low flows water was moving through the Marion Creek culverts at speeds greater than Chapman Creek Work Pad Crossing: During four feet per second. The fish by-pass washed out construction of the pipeline system, the work pac following heavy rains in late August, and the fish crossed this small stream about five miles north and wildlife advisors recommended installation of where the pipeline crosses the South Fork of a bridge. Koyukuk River. Averaging five to twenty feet In late 1975, the Alaska Department of wide, this low-gradient stream is part of the Highways again recommended that Alyeska Koyukuk River system and flows from about May 18 install a bridge at Marion Creek. Early in 1976, to October; it is subject to aufeising in winter. Alyeska proposed a plan for building a reinforced Sculpins, grayling and northern pike have been fish by-pass to solve fish passage problems at found in Chapman Creek. It is located in Marion Creek. The JFW AT field monitors construction section 4 of the pipeline system. disapproved of this plan, and an AOFR issued a Problems reported at this stream crossing field memo to Alyeska, directing the pipeline concerned temporary work pad drainage struc­ builders to submit "a definite plan of scheduled tures. A temporary culvert was installed in early activity for the physical resolution" of fish 1975, and was removed in the summer of 1976, passage problems at Marion Creek no later than after JFW AT monitors reported it was inade­ March 1976. This field memo recommended quate for high summer flows and winter installation of a bridge. aufeising. A bridge was then installed, and In June 1976, the JFW AT fisheries engineer noted that the fish by-pass at Marion Creek had 17Rip-rap: rock or other material used to protect stream banks. been reinforced under a plan not approved by 18Aufeis: "a sheet of ice on a river flood plain, formed in winter when shoals in the river freeze solid or are otherwise dammed so that water spreads over the flood JFWAT, and that speed of flows through the plain and freezes." U.S. Geological Survey, Dictionary of Alask" Place Names {Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967). Aufeis forms in successive culverts was blocking small grayling. He layers and can be several feet thick.

74 removed late that year when Chapman Creek was access across the stream at the work pad. closed to work pad traffic. The following spring The following spring, aJFWAT monitor noted JFW AT monitors reported vehicles were cross­ that vehicles had been driving across the block ing the creek at the block point. The following is a point at Chapman Creek. The AOFR receiving chronology of government monitoring actions at this memo replied that "No environmental Chapman Creek: damage is noted. Permittee will be directed to In February 1975, a JFWAT field monitor place barricades prior to spring runoff." In May wrote a nonconformance advisory memo noting 1977, Alyeska built berms to block traffic at that a culvert for the work pad crossing had been Chapman Creek work pad crossing. installed in Chapman Creek without an Alaska The same month, JFW AT monitors noted that Statute 16 permit, and asked for replacement of "work pad material from previous year's washouts the culvert with an approved structure within 30 at the pipeline station is present and areas days. The next month, JFWAT approved a plan unrestored." In October 1977, JFWAT reported calling for installation of temporary culverts to no unresolved nonconformances at Chapman be removed from the stream before critical fish Creek. periods. An AOFR then issued a field memo Kanuti River Piveline Crossing: The Kanuti authorizing Alyeska to install a temporary 24- River was the first major river crossed by pipe­ inch culvert at the work pad crossing. layingcrews north of the Yukon River. It is located That fall, a JFWAT momtor noted that the in construction section 4 of the pipeline system. temporary culvert was "insufficient to meet This major buried river crossing was preceded discharge during recent rains" and asked for by a crossing plan that was reviewed by all installation of a larger culvert. The following elements of the federal monitoring field staff. The February, JFW AT asked that a larger culvert be pipe was buried in a relatively short time during installed at Chapman Creek work pad crossing the winter. The following is a chronology of before breakup. government monitoring actions concerning the In May·1976, a JFWAT field monitor wrote a Kanuti River crossing: nonconformance advisory memo noting that the In August 1974,aJFW AT field monitor noted in culvert at Chapman Creek work pad crossing was a narrative surveillance report that the dates frozen shut and spring flow was eroding the work Alyeska had proposed for laying pipe under the pad. The memo asked that the culvert be removed Kanu ti and several other rivers north of the Yukon and replaced with larger drainage structures were "not acceptable. They conflict with spawning before pipeline construction equipment began or incubation periods." In September 1975, the crossing the stream. The AOFR receiving this Joint Fish and Wildlife Advisory Team identified memo noted that he had "told Alyeska to open this times when work could be done in the Kanuti and up and make a work crossing." other rivers with least damage to fish and InJune1976,abridgewasinstalledatChapman habitat. The period for the Kanuti was set from Creek, and a JFWAT monitor noted that the September 1 through April 30. natural channel was to be restored that summer. In October of that year, an AOFR noted in his In August 1976, a JFW AT monitor wrote a daily log that Alyeskahad devised a plan to "start nonconformance field memo noting that channel clearing and pre-river crossing ditching so as to restoration work at Chapman Creek work pad utilize cold weather to stabilize ditch banks and crossing should be completed "before freezing minimize extremely wide ditch excavations and conditions are encountered this fall. Glaciering, resultant environmental damage," and that the vegetative changes and fish passage problems are Alaska Pipeline Office felt this was a good plan. anticipated if this work isnotcompleted now."Ina In late October, a JFWAT monitor issued an field memo written the same month, an AOFR Alaska Statute 16 permit outlining requirements "authorized and requested" Alyeska to remove the for river crossings in construction section 4. The bridge at Chapman Creek and restore the original AOFR then issued a field memo authorizing stream channel "after the hydrotestand insulation "initial preparation" for the Kanuti crossing, and activities" on the pipeline itself. referred to the JFW AT advisory memo. In October .1976, a JFW AT monitor reported In January, an AOFR asked Alyeska for a that Alyeska had removed the bridge and cleared detailed plan of the Kanuti crossing, and JFWAT work pad materials from the stream channel and monitors reviewed the plan. In the same month, designated the stream a "block point," with no an AOFR directed a field memo to Alyeska,1

75 informing the pipeline builders ". . . it is crosses this small stream about 37 miles west of imperative that equipment and manpower be Chandalar Lake in the Brooks Range. Described mobilized expeditiously to complete the river by biolog·ists as a ''moderately high gradient crossings within the time frames noted ... " stream," Sheep Creek flows into the Middle Fork In February, an AOFR recorded in his daily Koyukuk River and averages between 4 and 10 log that several JFWAT monitors were "disgusted feet wide. Grayling have been seen in this stream with failure of plans to spell out exactly what that flows from about May to October. It is would be done .... Discussions with Alyeska located in construction section 5 of the pipeline engineers developed that the plans were in fact system. ambiguous, in that they did not want to In early 1975, an AOFR devised a plan to completely negate the experience and expertise improve fish passage and habitat between the of the professional pipeline builders by locking haul road and work pad crossings of this high­ them into definite activities at this time. The pre­ gradient stream. Over the next two years, the construction conference, 48 hours prior to actual pipeline builders made several attempts to work, is a more proper time/place to face the 'real implement various forms of this improvement world' and agree together on how to minimize plan. A meandered channel acceptable to environmental impact, protect the fish resources JFW AT was made in the fall of 1976, but in the and install the line within the windows if fall of 1977 JFW AT reported that the low water possible." crossing at the work pad crossing of Sheep Creek In mid-February, a JFWAT monitor issued an was blocking fish movement. The following is a Alaska Statute 16 permit for blasting in the chronology of government monitoring actions at Kanuti River during February and March, and Sheep Creek: Alyeska began excavating a trench for the pipe. There were frequent references in the daily log of When work crews laying the pipeline work pad the AOFR during this time to progress at the approached this stream in May 1975, Alyeska Kanuti River Crossing. proposed to install two 48-inch culverts with a 19 (While construction crews were lowering the letdown structure at the work pad crossing. pipe into the trench, an equipment failure caused This plan was approved by the fish and wildlife the pipe to drop into the trench. The AOFR advisors and the AOFR in construction section 5. directed the pipeline builders to inspect the pipe Then in June, the same AOFR wrote in his daily and certify that it was undamaged before log, "I am convinced that minimal effort would burying it. At this same time, the AOFR noted reestablish several miles of excellent fish stream that the execution contractor had used "the habitat," and he rescinded his approval of the wrong drawing to excavate the Kanuti River earlier plan. He recommended a new plan that crossing;" completion of the crossing was held up called for decreasing the gradient of this while the Alaska Pipeline Office reviewed a naturally high gradient stream by constructing design change request for the crossing.) short segments of meandered channel between the haul road and work pad culverts. (The AOFR In early March, a JFW AT monitor reported proposed this work to "mitigate damage to the that the crossing was complete except "large stream previously caused by the winter trail.") chunks of frozen silts which have been blasted The fish and wildlife monitors agreed with this from the pipe ditch were being included" in rip­ plan. rapping on the stream banks. The AOFR receiving this memo noted that "permittee That summer, a JFW AT monitor wrote a strongly notified" and that the chunks of silt had nonconformance advisory memo noting that the been removed from the rip-rapping. The same culverts at the work pad crossing of Sheep Creek month a JFWAT monitor noted in a narrative were perched, 20 and that the meandered channel surveillance report that the "first stage stream had not been excavated between the work pad restoration is complete on the Kanuti ... and the and haul road. In the fall of 1975, another work is well donP.." JFWAT nonconformance advisory memo said ln June, a JFWAT monitor reported that rip­ "despite continuous requests for plans and rehab rap at the Kanuti River had sloughed into the river and recommended repair of the rip-rap that 19Letdown structure: a device for moderating a drop in elevation between a summer. drainage structure outfall and the stream level. Sheep Creek Work Pad Crossing: The work pad 20Perched culvert: a culvert with its outlet end above the natural stream bottom.

76 from Alyeska, existing fish blocks ... have not Sheep Creek wrote "the best solution would be to been addressed at Sheep Creek." That October. establish natural grade" and suggested that traffic Alyeska submitted a plan for rehabilitation of be routed around the work pad crossing when Sheep Creek; the pipeline builders suggested construction of the pipeline was complete. He leaving in the existing culverts at the work pad added, "I see no chance of establishing any crossing and taking measures to alleviate the important fishery up this stream and am inclined to perch at the culverts. The AOFR and JFW AT question going on with rehabilitation ... " field monitor felt removing the culverts and In the fall of 1976, JFW AT monitors wrote installing a low water crossing at the work pad several memos asking for additional work at the would be "more suitable for fish passage and less low water crossing and the new channel. In costly in the long run." A few weeks later, November, a JFWAT monitor noted that "a Alyeska changed plans and said they would slightly meandered, rip-rap lined channel with remove the culverts and install a low water energy dissipators has been constructed at Sheep crossing. The fish and wildlife monitors recom­ Creek. The effectiveness of this solution will be mended this work be done before freezeup that evaluated after breakup." fall. In May 1977, JFW AT and EEI monitors noted An AOFR later wrote in an Alaska Pipeline that the low water crossing at the work pad Office record that "because of delays and more crossing of Sheep Creek needed to be rebuilt with pressing concerns, Alyeska requested and was a V-bottom to allow fish to move through the granted by the AOFR relief on doing this item ... crossing at low flows. By mid-October, on a list of until spring 1976. No environmental damage unresolved fish and wildlife problems along the could be cited, thus schedule was not critical." pipeline and haul road prepared by JFWAT for The following spring the same AOFR issued a the Alaska Pipeline Office, JFW AT monitors field memo to Alyeska, noting "Sheep Creek has reported the low water crossing at Sheep Creek been an issue since June 1975 when the existing did not meet fish passage criteria and required a -drainage structures were installed. In agreements V-notched bottom. between AOFR/JFWAT and Alyeska, this cross­ Union Creek W01~kPad C1·ossing: The pipeline ing is to be modified before breakup ... the work pad crosses this small stream about five commitment to complete this prior to freezeup miles north of Wiseman. Averaging several feet previously made by Alyeska was delayed by wide, the stream drains a marshy area and flows AOFR at Alyeska request and to the dismay of into the Middle Fork Koyukuk River. Grayling JFW AT representatives. The commitment then and round whitefish have been found in this made by Alyeska to AOFR is considered bind­ stream described by biologists as being "good fish ing ... " habitat." It is located in construction section 5 of In late March, Alyeska installed a low water the pipeline system. crossing at the work pad crossing of Sheep Creek Due to alignment restrictions, the pipeline work and blasted a new channel between the haul road pad was laid over more than 1,000 feet of this and the work pad. In several memos in April and small stream in September 1975. The pipeline May, the AOFR and JFW AT monitors noted that builders were required to construct a new more work was needed at Sheep Creek. In May channel which crossed the work pad; low water 1976, the low water crossing at the work pad crossings were built at these crossing points. In washed out during a high flow. In July, an AOFR the fall of 1976, improvements JFW AT had issued a nonconformance field memo to Alyeska requested earlier were done at the newly­ because "verbal requests have been made to constructed channel. In October 1977, JFWAT redesign and reconstruct the Sheep Creek low reported one of the low water crossings at the water crossing ... for the past month and to date work pad required rebuilding. the following is a no effort has been made to do so .... Please take chronology of government monitoring actions at the appropriate action to insure that the above is Union Creek: accomplished ASAP." In September 1975, a JFW AT monitor noted Later, the AOFR noted that the low water that staking for the work pad in the area of Union crossing had been repaired to the satisfaction of a Creek indicated the pad would be laid on top of JFW AT monitor. By July 1976, the AO FR who had the stream for about l,OOOfeet.The monitor asked felt fish passage and habitat could be improved for a hold on construction until representatives of between the work pad and haul road crossings of Alyeska and the AOFR and JFW AT monitors

77 could discuss alternatives to routing the pad over about what corrective actions Alyeska should the stream; the AOFR requested a meeting with be required to take and when. Alyeska. Following this meeting, the JFW AT 4. Individual AOFRs responded very differ­ monitor wrote that "mining claims east and west ently to problems noted byJFWAT. OneAOFR have apparently fixed the alignment" and that a worked with JFWAT monitors to resolve "tentative plan for conditional rerouting of the reported problems; one AOFR sometimes did drainage" would be reviewed by the fish and not seem to be aware of what remedial work wildlife advisory team. That same month, a had been done at stream crossings. JFW AT advisor approved the plan for ditching a new cha,nnel, but noted that the plan did not 5. Alyeska s_ometimes did not do remedial "compensate for loss of some 1600 feet of gray ling work within time set by JFW AT monitors or habitat which will be destroyed by pad overlay." AOFRs. In a field memo authorizing Alyeska to lay the 6. Low water crossings sometimes had to be pad over a portion of the stream, an AOFR noted rebuilt several times at the same location. Alyeska might later be required to take "mitigative" measures to compensate for loss of 7. Work approved by one JFWAT monitor habitat. That fall, a JFWAT monitor noted that was sometimes later reported incomplete by Alyeska had done "partial reconstruction" of a another JFWAT monitor. new channel at Union Creek. Two low water crossings were built at points where the stream Stream Crossing Problems now crossed the work pad. AOFRs and JFWAT monitors interviewee In the spring of 1976, JFWAT mo11itors asked were asked why so many problems occurrec for additional work to remove a perched area in when the pipeline system crossed small streamf the channel dug the previous fall. In July, another and why the problems took so long to solve. JFWAT advisory memo requested the same Federal and state biologists believe many of thE work; this was followed by a JFW At noncon­ common problems at stream crossings - witr formance advisory memo requesting the same inadequate drainage structures, for example - work in August. originally occurred because so little was knowr In the fall of 1976, JFW AT monitors reported about a number of the streams, particularly those the new stream channel had been meandered and north of the Yukon River. As one fisheriei deepened. The following spring, a JFWAT biologist who has studied streams along th( monitor reported the low water crossing at one of corridor since 1970 explains, "When we're the work pad crossings of Union Creek was too talking about Alaskan streams, we're talkin! high, and in May an AOFR issued a field memo to about an entirely different thing than streams iJ Alyeska, directing them to lower the crossing. In the Lower 48; coming here and dealing with thes1 mid-October 1977, JFWAT monitors reported streams is like landing on the moon and looking a this crossing still required rebuilding. streams .... " When Alyeska submitted, and APO (witl Stream Crossing Observations JFWAT review) approved plans for drainag1 From the specific stream crossings researchec structures at streams, the structures were basec we observed: on what limited knowledge there was abou 1. Most of the problems reported by JFW AT individual characteristics of hundreds of stream occurred when the work pad or haul road along the route. More information about thes 1 crossed streams, rather than when the pipe streams was gathered during construction. itself was installed across streams or rivers. But JFWAT monitors and AOFRs cite man; reasons why problems at some small strean 2. Problems with culverts and low water: crossings persisted throughout much of con crossings that JFWAT reported did not meet struction. - The following are reasons for th fish passage requirements on streams were delays most often cited by fish and wildlif sometimes not corrected for as long as two monitors. After that is a listing of reasons mos years. often cited by AOFRs. 21 3. JFWAT monitors and AOFRs often dis­ agreed about the severity and urgency of 2tThe following summaries of qJJinions of AOFRs and JF~AT monitors ar based on interviews with six AOFRs and six JFWAT momtors, Anchorag1 problems at smaller stream crossings, anu August and September 1977. 78 .TFWAT.· JFWAT monitors attribute continu­ 3. ObvimiS fish blocks usually got quick ng pronlems at smail stream crossings through­ attention from AOFRs; more subtle effects of mt construction to the following reasons: construction often did not. Several JFW AT l. Many AOFRs gave priority to pipeline monitors report that most AOFRs they had const1~ction and were unwilling to press worked with would direct Alyeska to take Alyeska to correctfish passage problems within some action "if they could actually see fish the time JFWAT asked. JFWAT monitors behind a culvert," whereas they would not report that each year the fish and wildlife press Alyeska "to remove work pad material advisors would prepare lists of items - that had eroded into a stream channel and drainage structures blocking fish passage, for altered the natural stream bottom." example that they recommended be 4. Pipeline builders· sometimes had to return to completed before breakup. The Alaska Pipe­ the same stream seve1·al times to correct line Office would pass these to Alyeska, but the drainage structure inadequacies. JFW AT pipeline builders often did not complete the monitors feel this situation occurred at some work by the designated date. Fish and wildlife streams because: JFWAT/APO and Alyeska advisors note that several AOFRs made originally had inadequate knowledge about frequent reference to the fact that "Congress what kinds of drainage structures would be had mandated" that the pipeline be built needed on some streams; Alyeska's quality "expeditiously" and would ask the JFWAT ~ontrol program failed to insure that culverts advisors to show that "irreparable damage" to or low water crossings were installed accord­ fish or habitat would occur if the work was not ing to approved designs; and some AOFRs did done by the designated time. Says a JFWAT not require Alyeska to correct drainage monitor, "We were always on the defensive, structures "in a timely manner" when it always being asked to 'prove' what damage became apparent ,they· were not installed would occur if certain work wasn't done in a according to approved designs. timely manner." Another JFWAT monitor reports, "One AOFR told me he felt the AOFRs: AOFRs attribute problems that pipeline should be built first, and drainage persisted at some small streams throughout structures corrected later." Explains another much of construction to these reasons: member of the fish and wildlife advisory team, l. If there was not "worsening environmental "Fish passage problems were elephantine to us degradation" or "irreparable harm" occu'trin.g .but they were ants to most of the other because of a problem J FWAT documented at a government monitors." small strearn crossing, wo,rk on that crossing 2. Size of a stream and kinds of fish in the could be deferred if Alyeska said work crews stream influenced how quickly many AOFRs were needed for critical pipeline work. As one would ask the pipeline builders to cor1·ecta fish AOFR explains, "Every year we would give passage block at a drainage structure. Several. Alyeska a list of items JFWAT recommended JFW AT monitors note that most AOFRs be completed before breakup, and Alyeska reacted more quickly to solve fish passage wouid say they would do it.Then they wouldn't problems in a stream that was known to be a do some of the items by breakup, and we would salmon spawning stream, than, for example, a tell Alyeska to do- the items before fall stream known to contain only slimy sculpin. freezeup. Alyeska would say they would do JFW AT monitors also believe many AOFRs them. Then they wouldn't ... Why did we let did not recognize the importance of very small them do this? Because we felt there was no fish streams as habitat. Explains a JFWAT worsening of environmental degradation, the monitor, "We had trouble convincing AOFRs pipeline had to be built, and we knew they that a stream maybe 18 inches wide and a few would be required to do the work when feet deep is excellent fish habitat" and that the construction slowed down." "better fish habitat" along the pipeline route is Several AOFRs note it was their responsi­ in the small streams rather than the large bility "to balance environmental amenities and rivers. Another JFW AT monitor notes an values with economic practicalities" in decid­ AOFR had expressed doubt that a stream that ing when Alyeska should be directed to do is dry during certain times of the year could be work at small stream crossings. One AOFR an important fish stream. says, "I had to decide, is it warranted to ask

79 Alyeska to bring a crew back from other happened at streams that presented tough to replace this culvert now, or if the situation is sima,tions ... the arcuc 1s a place with unique not worsening, to let them wait until later?" engineering problems." AOFRs note that they and JFWAT monitors At the end of this chapter-following a discus­ frequently disagreed about whether "irrepar­ sion of problems with big game crossings along able harm" to fish and habitat was occurring the pipeline route-we will draw a series of our because of these delays, but that as chiefs of the own conclusions concerning APO/JFWAT moni­ government monitoring staff, the responsi­ toring of fish and wildlife-related problems bility,; for making decisions about what reviewed here. Alyeska would be required to do and when rested with the AOFRs. Big Game Crossings 2. JFWAT rnonitor.s sometimes asked for replacement of drainage structures based on One of the environmental stipulations in the insufficient evidence that the structure did not state and federal right-of-way agreements re­ rneet governrnent requirernents. One AOFR quires that the pipeline builders "construct and notes that some JFW AT monitors "would maintain the Pipeline, both buried and. above­ measure speed of flow through a culvert fol­ ground sections, so as to assure free passage and lowing a heavy rain in an area of the pipeline movement of big game animals." 23 Before work where heavy rains happen only a couple of on the pipeline system began in 1974, state and times a year, and the high flows last one or two federal biologists in Alaska developed standards days. If you measure the speed of flow at that for construction of buried and elevated big game time, can you really say the culvert is too small, crossings in areas of elevated pipe. The Alaska that it's blocking fish?" Another government Pipeline Office and the State Pipeline Coordina­ engineer believes that the JFW AT monitors tor's Office required Alyeska to meet these would "take measurements of stream flows standards in constructing several hundred big during flash floods" and then press their "tech­ game crossings along the 800-mile route. Records nical but not practical" claims of inadequate of APO and JFWATshow that 88 elevated cross­ culvert size. ings of 224 buried and elevated crossings built in Several AOFRs also report that they were 1975 did not meet government standards, and 69 reluctant to direct Alyeska to replace a struc­ elevated crossings of 326 crossings built in 1976 ture that had been previously approved by fell short of the standards. 24 In this part of the APO and JFWAT, unl~ss JFWAT presented chapter we will look at how government biolo­ strong evidence that the approved structure­ gists established standards for the crossings and did not meet government specifications. They how the monitoring organizations reacted when had to decide, "Does the evidence justify asking they learned a number of the constructed cross­ Alyeska to spend $10,000 to replace that ings fell short of the required standards. culvert that we had approved?" Some AOFRs Crossir,1gStandards also note that they were cautious about direct­ ing Alyeska _totake an action that might later One of the most emotional issues debated by prove to have "unnecessarily cost the contrac­ national environmental groups and the oil indus­ tor time and money." The AOFRs explain that try, after a partially elevated trans-Alaska pipe­ in previous construction projects, government line was proposed, was whether the elevated pipe inspectors whose actions could be proven to would block movements of Alaska's big game have unnecessarily cost a private construction animals, particularly caribou and moose. The contractor money or time have been held liable Arctic, Porcupine and Nelcnina caribou hercts in courtR of law for damages. 22 now seasonally move across about 400 miles of the pipeline corridor. 25 Moose are found along all but 3. Sorne strearn crossings presented problerns· that were not easily solved, despite directions 23Agreement and Grant of Right-of Way for Trans-Alaska Pipeline Exhibit D frorn the AOFRs and atternpts by Alyeska. As "Stipulations for the Agreement and Grant of Right of Way for the T~ans-Alask~ Pipeline," stipulation 2.5.4.1. one AOFR explains, "Many of these problems 24Memorandum to the files from James E. Hemming, APO/JFWAT Subject· "Status Report, Big Game Crossing," December n. 1976. ' · • 25But , 1ldltte biologist Hobert Le.ltesche has noted that caribou" ... migrate long distances in patterns we still cannot predict .... Caribou do have some constants in their generally unpredictable lives: calving areas, migration rout.es and a very few 22The AOFRs who referred to this liability of government inspectors Wtffe :,vintering areas .... This pipeline's effect on present caribou population is less largely. referring to past projects monitored by government inspectors of the Corps important than its effect on the future potentials available for caribou." "The of Engineers. l<'nt.nre of Caribou in Alaska," Anclwmge Daily News, December 11, 1973.

80 about the most northerly 75 miles of the pipeline There was no specific information available route. Bison are found in the Delta area, and about how bears and bison might react to an ele­ brown and black bears have habitat in many vated pipe, but based on their general knowledge areas of the pipeline route. about those animals' reactions to man-made In 1971, Alyeska, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife structures, biologists assumed bears and bison Service and BP Alaska, Inc. sponsored two would pass under the pipe. studies of caribou reactions to mock elevated By November 1973, state and federal biologists pipelines at Prudhoe Bay. These studies were agreed on standards for construction of big game followed by another experiment with mock ele­ crossings they felt might meet the stipulation vated pipe near Nome. Sponsored by several state calling for "free pass?,ge and movement of big and federal agencies, the Nome study tested game animals." These included: reactions to the elevated structure. Largely on the basis of these studies, 26 biologists In areas occupied or traversed by moose or bison, pipe must be elevated to a minimum of 10 feet between the top from state and federal agencies in Alaska took the of the working pad and the bottom of the insulated pipe for position that "all evidence" showed "no elevated linear distance of 60 feet at intervals of approximately structure" would meet the stipulations calling for 1,000 feet. However, such elevated sectio.ns shall be free movement of caribou. 27 Alyeska maintained adjusted to coincide with those locations that are most that there could be "alternatP. interpretations often used by moving moose and bison. from results ofthe Prudhoe Bav experiments." 28 No formal experiments were conducted before In areas traversed by caribou pipe must be buried to accommodate caribou movements. 31 construction to test reactions of moose to elevated pipe. But in 1925, miners in the Chatanika Valley The biologists who established the standards near Fairbanks had built a partly elevated 48- note that they were not sure that big game would inch diameter pipe to carry water for gold mining in fact use these kinds of buried and elevated operations, and in the summer of 1971 the Alaska crossings, and that they did not intend to free the Department of Fish and Game began studying pipeline builders from their obligation to meet the effects of that pipe on moose movements. The the stipulation. Explains Jim Hemming, JFW AT state biologists concluded, "Pipe elevated to five federal° coordinator and one of those who helped and one half feet or more will probably pass develop the standards, "We only said the kinds of moose, providing minimum bents are spaced at crossings we recommended stood the best chance least 20 feet apart," but added" ... there is reason of meeting the stipulation, based on the knowl­ to believe that the present trails and tracks in and edge we had at the time." 32 Biologists also main­ around the Davidson Ditch maybe largely tracks tain that if in the future it becomes apparent the of female moose and calves; there is reason to crossings are not meeting the stipulations, then suspect that antlered males may not cross under Alyeska will be obligated to try other methods. 33 the pipe with only five to six feet of clearance." 29 These standards were formally passed to In a December 1972 meeting with Alyeska, the Alyeska in March 1974, and the APO and the Department of Fish and Game "suggested that an SPCO notified Alyeska later that the government eight-foot gap between the ground or snow level monitoring agencies would enforce these stand­ and the pipe would probably accommodate moose ards. Early in 1974, biologists from state and movements." 30 federal agencies and Alyeska's environmental protection department designated several hun­ dred locations in areas of elevated pipe where buried and elevated crossings would be needed. 26 Findings of Prudhoe Bay studies compiled in The Reactions of Barren-Gr01rnu Caribou to Simulated Pipeline and Pipeline Crnssi11gsStructures atPrudhoe Bay, .In August 1975, Alyeska issued a document Alaska, {lrepared by Kenneth N, Child, Alaska Coop_erative Wildlife Research Unit, Umversityof Alaska.June 30, 1973. FindingsofNomestudycompiledin The listing these designated crossings; 34 originally. ReactionB of Reindeer to a Pipeline Simulation at Pe1111yRiver, Alaska: Interim Report, by Kenneth N. Child and Peter C. Lent, Alaska Cooperative Wildlife about 445_crossings were to be built, but several Research Unit, University of Alaska, May 30, 1973. 21Memorandum from game biologist, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Fairbanks, to chief of habitat, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Juneau, Subject: "Alyeska/Fish and Wildlife Team Big Game Crossing Meeting," March 18, 1974. 31 Meeting Report from APO wildlife biologist to authorized office1·, Subject: 28Minutes of Meeting between Alyeska Pipeline Service Company and State of "APSC Action re Big Game Movements,'' March 22, 1974. Tbese criteria also Alaska, Subject: "Big Game Passage on the Trans Alaska Pipeline System," March called for revegetation of the work pad at big game crossings; this revegetation 15,·1974. work began in 1977 and is not dealt with in this report. 29 Letter to chief, BLM, pipeline division, from management coordinator, 32 Interview with James Hemming, JFWAT federal coordinator, Anchorage, division of ,rame. Alaska Dem1.rtment.of Fish and Game, September 12, 1973. August 31, 1977. "'";vieeting Report from BLM stat;- direcwr to BLM national du-ector, Subject: :!3lbid. "APSC Meeting on Big Game Movements, Copper River Basin,'' December 13, 1972. 34 Engineering Release 553, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, August 1975.

81 remodes of below- to above-ground pipe during feet high. Most of these substandard crossin construction increased that number to about 550. were r.eported by JFWAT monitors. 41 JFW AT attributes the incorrect constructi Crossing Construction of these big game crossings to failure of Alyesk: In the spring of 1975, a JFWAT monitor iden­ quality control program. 42 The Alaska Pipeli tified the first elevated crossing where the bottom Office cites insufficient quality control a: of the pipe was less than 10 feet from the top of the "many other field factors," including the fact th work pad. 35 According to APO and JFWAT actual ground elevations were sometimes not records, 88 elevated crossings of 224 buried and indicated on construction drawings. 43 In elevated crossings built that year fell short of the December 1975 audit, Alyeska's quality asst required 10-foot height. 36 ance department reported designated crossin In the fall of 1975, JFW AT drew up a plan out­ of "insufficient height" had been built due 1 lining how the pipeline builders could correct the "ground elevations not as depicted on plans; t crossings that were constructed too low. The plan computer program could not correct erroneo said: ground elevations; [the document listing t: crossings] was not transmitted to constructit All work must be covered by design change requests, until late in the effort; engineering allowed so11 either singly or in blocks. Thus, where changes are pro­ posed complete field and technical staff review are changes of pad and/or pipeline elevation that d possible. Original wildlife crossing siting is optimum for not consider wildlife crossing criteria; some we animal use. construction over sigh ts. "44 All errors of 0.5 feet or less may be corrected by excavat­ In September 1976, JFWAT reported "! ing the work pad. crossings still required remedial work," and a. Errors of 0.5 feet or greater require that the split ring December 1976, the fish and wildlife adviso be reset to specification, or noted the number needing remedial work h~ b. where consistent with environmental and technical decreased to 30.45 In the summer of 1977, co stipulations the work pad may be excavated to meet the minimum ... distance, or struction crews were excavating some crossinJ c. where necessary both a. and b. above. needing remedial work. Errors that are not able to be corrected by excavation and/or resetting of the split ring may require reconstruc­ Remedial Work tion of the big game crossing. 37 After the guidelines for remedial work on b In December 1975, APO forwarded these game crossings were forwarded to Alyeska, tl remedial suggestions to Alyeska, and SPCO JFW AT federal coordinator and the team's sta passed them to Alyeska in February 1976.38 After wildlife biologist 46 made periodic trips to the fie: receiving this notification from the monitoring to meet with representatives of Alyeska's em agencies, Alyeska replied, " ... there seems to be ronmental protection department to determi1 no factual information to substantiate the need to what remedial work would be done on individu maintain the arbitrary 10-foot criterion in every crossings. Most of the approximately 150 cros case" and asked for "selective waiving" of the 10- ings that were built less than 10 feet high we1 toot standard. 39 Both government agendes re­ corrected through excavation of the work pa plied that the standard would not be waived. 40 about 50 substitute crossings were designated. During 1976, 69 elevated crossings of 326 ele­ In a few cases, split rings on vertical suppo vated and buried crossings were built less than 10

nrnterview with James Hemming, APO-JFWAT, Anchorage, August 31,197 and Memorandum from APO technical staff coordinator to APO authoriz, officer's representative, Subject: "Non-Welding Quality Control Matters," May 2 !1)76. 35Narrative Surveillance Report, sections 1 and 2, Hank Hosking, JFWA T, July 42JFW AT Meeting with President's Council on Environmental Quali 1·9, 1975. Anchorage, May 12, 1977. UMemorandum to the files from James Hemming, APO/JFWAT, Subject: 43Interview, telephone, with Morris J. Turner, APO, acting authorized offic, "Status Report, Big Game Crossing," December 21, 1976. Anchorage, October 21, 1977. 37 Letter to Alyeska's manager, P,roject permissions, from APO, authorized 44"An Audit of Wildlife and Road Crossings, Pipeline Sections 1, 2, 3, 4," Aly es officer's representative, Subject: 'Corrective Action on Wildlife Crossings," Pipeline Service Company Quality Assurance, December 1975. December 23, 1975. 45Memorandum from JFW AT staff wildlife biologist to JFW AT federal coor< :islbid.; and letter from state pipeline coordinator to president, Alyeska, nator, Subject: "Remedial Action on B.G. Crossings," September 20, 1976; a February 25, 1976. Memorandum from JFWAT federal coordinator to files, Subject: "Stat Report-Big Game Crossing," December 21, 1976. 39Letter from Alyeska manager of environmental protection to authorized ~lf~i~r and state pineline coordinator, Subject: "Moose Crossings," February 7, 46James Hemming and Keith Morehouse, the two JFWAT members whom< regularly met with Alyeska representatives to resolve big game crossi: questions. 40Letttr from A-PO authorized oftlcer to Alyeska manager of environmental proteetion, Febmary 19, 1976; and letter from state pipeline coordinator to presi­ <1L1stof Designate,f. WilauJe (.,rossings Jin Ille irans-Alaska Oil Pipeli dent, Alyeska, February 25, 1976. JFWAT Speeial Report Number 11, August 1977.

82 members may have been raised before pipe was of Alyeska's environmental protection depart­ installed. 48 JFWAT reports no installed pipe was ment. 52 raised at any of the crossings. 49 The two JFW AT wildlife biologists who Crossing Excavation: When JFW AT wildlife worked closely with the big game crossing prob­ biologists and biologists from Alyeska's environ­ lems believe that public discussion of the need for mental protection department had decided which the crossings before construction began, and the crossings would be corrected through excavation publicity that appeared concerning the improp­ of the work pad, the question in the field erly constructed crossings in mid-1976, became-how would the excavation be done? strengthened their requests for remedial work on Should the pad be excavated only under the pipe, the crossings, particularly in 1976.53 or excavated the required amount under the pipe, with decreasing excavation across the width of Game Crossing Observations the pad, or should the required excavation be 1. Although the government monitoring agen­ done equally across the width of the pad, includ­ cies and Alyeska were aware that 88 desig­ ing the 15-foot driving surface to be maintained nated elevated crossings were built lower than during pipeline operations? the required 10 feet in 1975, 66 crossings were JFW AT took the position that unless geotech­ still constructed lower than the required nical considerations precluded it, specified height in 1976. excavation should be done across the width of the pad, to create a "window" for animals approach­ 2. Alyeska quality assurance auditors and ing the crossing. 50 APO and SPCO supported government monitoring agencies essentially excavation across the width of the pad wherever agreed that construction errors at big game possible. 51 crossings often occurred because of lack of There were d-isagreements in the field between effective quality control. JFW AT monitors and AOFRs and FSOs on 3. Al though "reconstruction of the crossing" methods of excavation. Some decision-making was one of the possible remedial actions listed state and federal monitors felt the need to estab­ in the monitoring agencies' guidelines to lish a 10-foot high crossing did not justify some­ Alyeska, installed pipe was never raised at a times substantial excavation of the work pad. crossing. JFW AT members indicate this may They felt this excavation might present hazards have been because government monitoring to the integrity of vertical support members and agencies took the position that directing pad driving surface at the crossings and that Alyeska to raise the pipe would have been "too some excavated crossings would require frequent expensive." 54 The acting authorized officer of maintenance during pipeline operation. Other the Alaska Pipeline Office believes the issue of AOFRs and FSOs supported the JFWAT cost in raising the pipe "had nothing to do with" position that the need to maintain the required the type of corrective work actually done at the 10-foot height rlid justify excavation that might crossings, but rather involved the question of require the pipeline bmiders to take protective how much discretion government should give and maintenance measures at the crossings, industry in determining how to meet govern­ except at those crossings where the monitoring ment standards.n 5 agencies' technical staffs advised againstexcava..: tion the width of the pad. Many of these questions 4. Remedial work on some crossings was done about method of excavation at the crossings were a year or more after it was discovered the ultimately resolved by upper level JFWAT, APO crossings did not meet the government and SPCO officials meeting with representatives standards.

48 Heightofsplit ririg on vm:ticaJ supp?t't me;nber determines height of installed pipe. One JFWAT field mom tor interviewed rn Achorage, September 19J7 noted 52 The preceding summary of field-level disagreements about work pad excava­ that split rings discovered to have been installed too low at big game tion was drawn from interviews with six AOFRs and six J FWA T field monitors in may have been raised before pipe installation. Anchorage in August and September 1977, and interviews with James Hemming 49JFW AT Meeting with President's Council on Environmental Quality, and Keith Morehouse, JFWAT, Anchorage, August 1977. Anchorage, May 12, 1977. 53lnterviews with James Hemming, JFWAT/ APO, and Keith Morehouse, WJnterviews with James Hemming and Keith Morehouse, JFWAT, Anchorage, JFWAT, Anchorage, August 1977. August 1977. 54Interviews with office and field staffs of JFW AT, Anchorage, August and 51Memorandum to files from APO authorized officer's representative, Subject: qentember 1977. "Project Review Meeting," December 10, 1976; letter from state pipeline coordina· 05 Interview, telephone, with Morris J. Turner, APO acting authorized officer, tor to president, Alyeska, October 28, 1976. October 21, 1977.

83 Comparisons and Contrasts-­ 3. There were disagreements among JFW A 1 Stream Crossings and monitors and AOFRs about whether methodf Big Game Crossings of correcting the low big game crossings wer iustified in light of construction and economic In researching these two aspects of fish and considerations, just as there were disagree· wildlife monitoring during construction, we have· men ts among the fish and wildlife advisors am: noted that there were similarities and differences other government monitors about whethe1 in the way problems that occurred with each of proposed methods of correcting problems a1 these were han

Chapter VIII-Conclusions and Recommendations

Participants in future development-surveil­ the mammoth project, especially the feeling of being in the lance projects will bring to their work a much forefront of attempting something unprecedented in history. In particular, many of us have been quite acutely higher level of awareness of potential prob­ aware of the potential for influencing patterns and lems and strategies for dealing with them as a standards that might be adopted for future oil and gas result of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System pipeline construction surveillance in Alaska, Canada, and (TAPS) experience. This study attempts to con­ elsewhere. 1 tribute to that awareness by identifying and Substantive accomplishments of the fish and assessing problems in the TAPS case. This does wildlife agencies show up as part of the general not necessarily imply, however, that the problems advancements made in incorporating environ­ were avoidable in their own context-that is, mental stipulations and criteria into the basic under the specific circumstances of trans-Alaska rules governing the design and construction of oil pipeline planning and construction between the pipeline project. Particularly significant 1969 and 1977. among the fish and wildlife-related elements of In framing conclusions and recommendations, these new rules were the "construction windows" we have kept in mind a range of other projects that specified permissible times for construction that are likely to present environmental surveil­ activity affecting particular habitats, standards lance problems comparable to those of TAPS, if for big game crossings, and stream-culvert not in its full scale: the Prudhoe Bay gas pipeline, velocity criteria. Notwithstanding the slippage OCS exploration and development, major hydro­ between standards and performance, the formal electric projects, and similar large-scale develop­ incorporation and application of these new rules men ts in Alaska and elsewhere. represents tangible progress in the state of the art, and they undoubtedly effected improvement TAPS Surveillance Accomplishments in design review and construction monitoring Because this study focuses on issues and prob­ process through the effort of JFW AT and other lems, a generaliy critical tone is inherent in the surveillance organizations. analysis. This should not obscure the fact, how­ Despite legal and political constraints on pipe­ ever, that the TAPS project represented a line planning before passage of the pipeline precedent-setting advancement in the art of authorization act, substantial work was done on integrating environmental values into a major criticaJ technical and engineering problems development project. The project presented an affecting the structural integrity of the line. The extraordinary· learning opportunity for all investments in resolving the permafrost, seismic, participants-in adapting to its size, complexity, and other geotechnical problems, and advances and uniqueness; in developing new criteria, man­ in cathodic protection techniques, yielded bene­ agement procedures, and organizational forms; fits from the environmental protection point of in adjusting professional and personal orienta­ view as well. tions, attitudes, and habits; and in resolving There is a positive as well as a negative side to conflicts of status, roles, and positions. The pres­ the problem of developing adequate environ­ sures of construction time and scheduling did, mental data and analyses for pipeline design however, impose severe limits and constraints on review and construction monitoring. The fish and these opportunities. But even harder critics of wildlife agencies were constrained throughout pipeline surveillance, who were also participants the planning and construction periods by limited in it, retained a positive sense of involvement: budgets and manpower for pipeline-related Despite the frenetic pace, physical strain.and a not always 1David W. Norton, "Effects of the Trans· Alaska Oil Pipeline Construction Phase cheery won-lost record, a number of JFWAT biologists, on Fish and Wildlife Management," Paper prepared for Commission Counsel, myself included, came around to enjoy the challenges of MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, March 24, 1976, p. 16. 87 studies, and coordinated efforts to undertake Role of Industry such studies sharply declined with the expira­ Major premises of the surveillance system we1 tion of the Interagency Fish and Wildlife Team that Alyeska would design the pipeline and mon once construction began. Major deficiencies tor its construction. Government's role could the remained in the data and analytical base despite be limited to reviewing Alyeska's designs an the study time afforded by the four-year delay in spot-checking the effectiveness of its quali1 pipeline construction. It is nonetheless also the assurance/quality control (QA/QC) progran case that systematic data collection and analysis Alyeska's performance was unsatisfactory hov work was accomplished, and substantial addi­ ever, in both design and monitoring pbase. tions ~ere made to the data base. Further, the Government planners found it necessary, ther4 work that was done-including the identification fore, to become deeply involved in Alyeska of critical data gaps, establishment of study design and engineering work prior to projec priorities, and development of strategies for authorization, and government monitors had t filling them-will likely influence the types of assume first-line environmental monitorin study programs considered essential for such responsibilities. The effects were to concentrat projects in the future. government's attention on technical-engineerin, elements of the project and to overextend.goverr Major Conclusions T?ent staff in all aspects of monitoring, but pa1 Fish and wildlife protection aspects of TAPS ticularly in fish and wildlife and other enviror surveillance were shaped by factors affecting mental protection activities. surveillance policy and organization generally. Multiple Agency Jurisdiction The most significant factors are discussed in this section. Multiple agency involvement in TAPS plar ning and construction was unavoidable, given th Priority on Construction existing statutory authorities and responsibilitie National energy development priorities de­ of several federal and state agencies in areas c fined by the Administration and Congress, fish and wildlife management, pollution contro together with the high costs of delay to industry land management, pipeline safety and other1 and to federal and state governments,2 empha­ Inefficiencies were mitigated, however, by cor sized the need to bring Prudhoe Bay oil to U.S. centrating authority in BLM's pipeline divisio markets as soon as possible. Although TAPS con­ during the planning period and in the Alask struction was not officially mandated until Pipeline Office (APO) during the constructio passage of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authoriza­ period. But the pattern of diverse, independen tion Act of 1973, there was a substantial de facto bases of authority, which legally and politicaU commitment to TAPS, and consequent momen­ could not be totally subsumed within a single lea1 tum behind the project, from an early point in the agency structure, served positive functions in th planning process. Further, apart from the legal case of the TAPS project: It forced Interior polic: blocks, the major obstacles to construction were makers (and Alyeska) to deal with and accommc technological; resolving permafrost, seismic, and date different values, interests, and objective other geotechnical problems, in turn, was represented by the various agencies, and helpe, considered a key to preventing environmental moderate the dominant technical-engineerini damage. Thus, environmental protection was and construction concerns. Fish and wildlif subordinated to the overriding construction goal, agencies among others, therefore, had to be take1 basic environmental problems were defined in into account and accommodated to a greate engineering terms, and government surveillance extent than might otherwise have been the cas1 authorities were reluctant to demand strict com­ within a more fully consolidated surveillanc1 pliance with environmental stipulations, partic­ system. ularly where this might result in construction It was ·a particularly significant accomplish delays. ment on the part of the fish and wildlife agencie that JFW AT. was established, developed its ow1 identity, and served effectively as a vehicle fo: introducing home agency authority (Alask= Statute 16 especially) and influence to beai _2Se~Appe~dix D belo:,v, "Analysis of the Costs of Delay in the Trans-Alaska Oil P1pehne ProJect," by Michael J. Scott. within the broader surveillance organization 88 H:aving the benefits and protective coverings of ment monitors. Even when adequate information ~heir home agencies, the JFW AT biologists were was available, different monitors assessed envi­ :l.t the same time remarkably successful in shed­ ronmental effects differently, depending on the :ling restrictive aspects of their separate agency relative weights they placed on protecting a affiliations and working together in a mutually particular habitat, saving time and money, or mpportive, close-knit group. Similarly, despite simply avoiding unpleasant encounters, among the frustrations attending their subordinate role other factors. The occasions of inconsistent and in pipeline planning, FWS officials remained contradictory applications of the stipulations persistel)t in promoting their interests, which might be reduced in future projects. Neither had to be taken into account if not accommodated biologists nor engineers were introduced to the as often as those officials would have wished, basics of each others' professional fields as during the planning phase. applied to project monitoring processes and prob­ In a more restrictive hiera'rchical system, with lems. Nor were they given adequate training or more concent?·ated attention to nwre exclusively guidance for enforcement of environmental defined development goals, it is unlikely that fish stipulations before they went into the field. and wildlife protection values and interests would Recommendations for monitor training are: have the influence that they did in this case. L Biologists and engineers should participate in a joint training program to iamiliarize each group with basic problems, processes, and techniques of the Recommendations others' profession as applied to environmental moni­ toring of construction projects (e.g., construction at Surveillance Organization stream crossings and effects of construction-related disturbances on fish streams). JFW AT was an organizational anomaly that 2. Monitors should receive training in stipulations worked. Its location "between" the federal and enforcement. This training should include explana­ state surveillance decision makers reinforced tions of rationales for stipulations, representative rather than weakened its influence, even though case applications, methods of interpretation and uses its formal role was advisory. JFWAT's jurisdic­ of discretionary authority, and relationships between stipulations and existing statutes. tion, however, was artificially circumscribed. 3. Monitors should be trained in methods of data collec­ Fish and wildlife protection is a special case of tion and analysis, including sampling and testing (e.g., environmental protection, and we found no ade­ water velocities, turbidity), necessary to demonstrate quate justification for the separation. JFW AT serious violations of environment.al stipulaticins.3 also lacked engineering expertise and construc­ tion experience. This weakened its credibility Monitoring Process and aggravated communication problems be­ .B'i:sh and wildlife ,,T1d other government tween the biologists and the engineers. monitors were sent into 1.hefield with little more Recommendations for surveillance organiza­ than the charge to "enforce the stipulations." tion are: With some exceptions, JFWAT monitors had L Organize the fish and wildlife protection functions little or no experience in construction projects, within a joint federal-st.ate team advisory to both and their knowledge of related physical processes federal and state surveillance authorities, as was done potentially affecting fish and wildlife resources in the TAPS case. was limited. There was great inconsistency from 2. Expand the joint team's jurisdiction to cover all section-to-section in defining problems, in scaling related environment.al protection functions, and the them for significance, and in determining what team should include st.a.ffmembers detailed from the Environmental Protection Agency and the Alaska actions should be taken to resolve them. More­ Department of Environmental Conservation. over, the biologists (as well as other monitors) 3. Make civil engineering, hydrologic and other appro­ were often perplexed and frustrated by the lack priate technical expertise available in-hous~ to the of clearly .defined roles, authorities, and proce­ environmental protection team. dures in the field. Lines of communication were 4. Include design review, technical support, environ­ unclear and often tangled; messages were fre­ ment.al monitoring, and technical evaluations in the quently distorted, delayed, or blocked as they joint environmental team's functions. were passed through the circuitous channels Training Stipulations were interpreted in different, 3See Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act of 1976, Public Law 94-586, inconsistent, and contradictory ways by govern- OctQber 22, 1976, Section 11. 89 from JFWAT monitor to AOFR to central office mation development program, including analysis of to Alyeska to execution contractor to construc­ trade-offs between nigher information levels and tion foreman to laborer. Ann thA rfocumentation expedited construction. of field activities reflected these erratic and 2. Within the framework of such a plan, set preconstruc­ tion research requirements as appropriate for addi­ inconsistent aspects of the monitoring process. tional stream surveys, studies of fisheries, character­ Recommendations relating to the monitoring istics of big game, habitat surveys of potentially process are as follows: endangered species and of related critical biological areas. L Develop field manuals for all monitors. They should il)clude basic information on mitigative techniques Industry Responsibility such as erosion control; types of soils; selection, uses, and maintenance of material sites; fish passage struc­ Effective government surveillance, in all tures; sampling and testing methods; monitoring aspects of design review and construction moni­ procedures; docu1nen.tatiun requirements; and back­ ground discussions of environmental concerns such as toring, depends on how well industry fulfills its sensitivity of fish to blasting at different life stages, responsibilities for designing a project and moni­ significance of culvert velocity criteria, and sensitiv­ toring contractor construction work in the field. ity of nesting, lambing, spawning, and other critical Industry's incentives to assure the structural biological habitat. integrity of a project are greater, however, than 2. 'Establish criteria and procedures for reportfog its incentives to assure additional degrees of violations of project stipulations and foliow-up action on such reports. environmental protection beyond that which 3. Authorize AOFRs (or their equivalents) to com­ follows as a by-product of structural integrity. municate directly and officially with execution Thus, government must impose reasonable contractors in the field to resolve immediate environmental protection requirements· on in­ problems that, in the AOFRs' judgement, require dustry and effectively enforce them. In these such direct action. matters, there was considerable slippage on both 4. All field monitoring documents including field logs government and industry sides in the TAPS case. should include reference to specific stations and alignment sheets for each entry; all field monitors Recommendations in the area of industry re­ should keep logs; and follow-up actions on reported sponsibility for effective design and monitoring violations should be fulJv documented. are:

Fish and Wildlife Information 1. Initiate project criteria and preliminary design development at the earliest possible time. Project and environmental information are 2. Government should provide detailed environmental interrelated elements of a comprehensive data criteria (such as the stream-culvert velocity, big base for a surveillance program. In the TAPS game crossing, and construction window standards case there were serious deficiencies in both of used in the TAPS case) to permittees atan early date, and require their inclusion in project criteria and these kinds of information. It is unrealistic to designs. expect that information will ever be complete for 3. Estal:ilish a complete reference library conc.aining all of the purposes it ideally serves in project supporting technical and environmental documenta­ planning and monitoring, and this is surely so in a tion for all design submissions early in the planniny project of the magnitude and complexity of phase and maintain this documentation throughout TAPS. What can be expected, however, is that construction. Locate the library in the city where the pre-construction planning identify the likely government surveillance organizations are based. 4. The right-of-way agreement or other authorizing range of information needs, determine what is instrument should require that a fully acceptable known and what is not known, and establish quality assurance/quality control program must be priorities for filling critical information gaps. approved before issuance of notices to proceed. In The environmental impact statement process is addition to those mandatory criteria listed in section the logical place to systematically assess the nine of the TAPS agreement, government should adequacy of project, environmental, and impact require: 4 information, to evaluate the benefits and costs of a. a QA/QC organization structurally separate higher levels of information, and to suggest from construction management at every ~evel; priorities for pre-construction, construction, and b. appropriately trained and adequately ppst-construction study programs. staffed environmental and technical QC Recommendations concerning fish and wildlife components; information development are:

1. Use the EIS process to plan a comprehensive infor- 4See also Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants (10 CFR 50). 90 c. field level stop work authority, with orders elements of the system and the conditions under issuable directly to execution contractors; which it operates. They. are affected by the basic d. establishment of varying but definite time priorities defining government involvement in frames for clearance of reports of stipulation violations including requirements for field the project, the premises and performance of checks of actual corrections; and industry's role, and the structure of surveillance e. periodic government audits of QA/QC organizations. These factors have therefore been organization and documentation, and noti­ included within the scope of this study as fication to AOFRs of all stipulation viola­ tions reported and stop work orders issued. necessary grounding for the analysis of more specific fish and wildlife-re)ated problems, Concluding Comment including information needs, surveiliance man­ agement, and the interaction of biologists and Fish and wildlife aspects of surveillance are engineers in office and field. dependent on and cannot be separated from other

91

Appendixes

Appendix A

1.7.2.2. In appropriate cases. the Authorized Officer mar Selected Portions of waive the requirement that a Preliminary Design be Stipulations for the Agreement and submitted. In the circumstance, Permittees may proceed to Grant of Right-of-Way for the Trans­ apply for a Notice to Proceed in accordance with Stipulation Alaska Pipeline 1. 7.4. 1.7.4.1. Permittees may apply for a Notice to Proceed for only those Contruction Segments for which the Preliminary 1. General Design has been approved in writing by the Authorized Officer or a waiver pursuant to Stipulation 1.7.2.2. has been 1.3.2. The Authorized Officer may require Permittees to issued in writing by the Authorized Officer. make such modification of the Pipeline System. without liability or expense to the United States, as he deems 1.7.4.2. Before applying for a Notice to Proceed for a necessary to: protect or maintain stability of geologic Contruction Segment, Permittees shall, in such manner as materials; protect or maintain integrity of the Pipeline shall be acceptable to the Authorized Officer, by survey, System; prevent serious and irreparable harm to the locate and clearly mark on the gi'ound the proposed centerline environment (including but not limited to fish or wildlife of the line pipe to be located in the Mapping Segment within populations, or their habitats); or remove hazards to public which the Construction Segment is to be constructed and the health and safety. location of aH Related Facilities proposed to be constructed in the Mapping Segment. .1.5.2. Permittees shaJI comply with each and every lawful order directed to them and that is issued by the Secretary. the 1.7.4.3. Each application for a Notice to Proceed shall be Authorized Officer or by any duly authorized representative supported by: of the Authorized Officer. (1) A Final Design. (2) AH reports and results of environmental studies con­ 1.7.1.1. Permittees shall not initiate any construction of the Pipeline System without prior written ~ermission of the ducted or considered by Permittees. Authorized Officer. Such permission shall be given solely by (3) All data necessary to demonstrate compliance with means of a written Notice to Proceed issued by the Authorized the terms and conditions of these Stipulations with Officer. Each Notice to Proceed shall authorize construction respect to that particular Construction Segment. only as therein expressly stated and only for the particular (4) A detailed network analysis diagram for the Con­ Construction Segment therein described. struction Segment, including: Permittees' work schedules; consents, permits or authorizations 1.7 .1.2. The Authorized Officer shall issue a Notice to required by State and Federal agencies and their Proceed only when in his judgment the construction interrelationships; design and review periods: data (including design) and operation proposals are in conformity collection activities: and construction sequencing. with the provisions of these Stipulations. The detailed network analysis diagram shall be 1. 7 .1.3. By written notice, the Authorized Officer may updated as 1·equired to reflect cunent status of the revoke in whole or in part any Notice to Proceed which has project. been issued when in his judgment unforeseen conditions later (5) A map or maps, prepared in such manner as shall arising require alterations in the Notice to Proceed in order be acceptable to the Authorized Officer. depicting to: protect or maintain stability of geologic materials; protect the proposed location in the Mapping Segment within or maintain integrity of the Pipeline System: prevent serious which the Construction Segment is to be constructed and irreparable harm to the environment (including but not of: (1} the boundaries of all contiguous temporary limited to fish or wildlife populations, or their habitats); or use areas, and (2) all improvements, buried or above­ remove hazards to public health and safety. ground, that are to be constructed within the Mapping 1.7 .2.1. Prior to applying for a Notice to Proceed for any Segment. The Authorized Officer shall not issue a Construction Segment, Permittees shall submit the Prelim­ Notice to Proceed with construction until he has inary Design for that Segment to the Authorized Officer for approved all relevant locations on the ground and approval. Where appropriate, each submission shall include temporary boundary markers have been set by the criteria which justify the selection of the Construction Permittees to the satisfaction of the Authorized Modes. The Authorized Officer shall expeditiously review Officer. each submission and shall do so within thirty (30) days from (6) Such other data as may be requested by the Author­ the date of his receipt of the submission. The Authorized ized Officer either before submission of the applica­ Officer may request additional information if he deems it tion for a Notice to Proceed or at any time during the necessary. review period.

95 2. Environmental 2.5.1.1. Permittees shall provide for uninterrupted movement and safe passage of fish. Any artificial structure or 2.2.2.1. Permittees shall comply with applicable "Water any stream channel change that would cause a blockage to with the Pipeline System in a manner that will avoid or fish shall be provided with a fish passage structure or facility minimize degradation of air, land and water quality. In the that meets all Federal and State requirements. The proposed construction, operation, maintenance and termination of the design shall be submitted to the Authorized Officer in Pipeline System, Permittees shall perform their activities in accordance with Stipulation 1.7. accordance with applicable air and water quality standards, 2.5.1.2. Pump intakes shall be screened to prevent harm related facility siting standards, and related plans of to fish. implementation, including but not limited to standards adopted pursuant to the Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U .S.C. 2.5.1.3. Abandoned water diversion structures shall be Section 1857 et seq., and the Federal Water Pollution Control plugged and stabilized to prevent trapping or stranding of Act, as amended, 33 U .S.C. Section 1321 et seq. fish. 2.2.2.1. Permittees shall comply with applicable "Water 2.5.1.4. If material sites are approved adjacent to or in Quality Standards" of the State of Alaska as approved by the certain lakes, rivers, or streams, the Authorized Officer may Environmental Protection Agency. require Permittees to construct levees, berms, or other suitable means to protect fish and fish passage and to prevent 2.2.2.2. Mobile ground equipment shall not be operated in lakes, steams or rivers unless such operation is approved in siltation of streams or lakes. writing by the Authorized Officer. 2.5.2.1. "Fish Spawning Beds" means the areas where anadromous and resident fish deposit their eggs. 2.3.3.1. The Pipeline System shall be located so as to provide three hundred (300) foot minimum buffer strips of 2.5.2.2. Permittees shall avoid channel changes in Fish undisturbed land along streams unless otherwise approved in Spawning Beds designated by the Authorized Officer; writing by the Authorized Officer. however, where channel changes cannot be avoided in such beds, new channels shall be constructed according to written ~.4.1.1. Permittees shall perform all Pipeline System standards supplied by the Authorized Officer. construction, operation, maintenance and termination activi­ ties so as to avoid or minimize disturbance to vegetation. 2.5.2.3. Fish Spawning Beds shall be protected from sediment were soil material is expected to be suspended in 2.4.1.2. The design of the Pipeline System shall provide water as a result of construction activities. Settling basins for the construction of control facilities that will avoid or shall be constructed to intercept silt before it reaches streams minimize erosion. or lakes. 2.4.1.3. The erosion control facilities shall be constructed to avoid induced and accelerated erosion and to lessen the 2.5.2.4. Permittees shall comply with any special possibility of forming new drainage channels resulting from requirements made by the Authorized Officer for a stream Pipeline System activities. The facilities shall be designec system in order to protect Fish Spawning Beds. Permittees and operations conducted in such a way as to avoid or shall repair all damage to Fish Spawning Beds caused by minimize disturbance to the thermal regime. construction, operation, maintenance or termination of the Pipeline System. 2.4.2.1. Surface materials taken from disturbed areas shall be stockpiled and utilized during restoration unless 2.5.3.1. Permittees' activities in connection with the Pipeline System in key fish and wildlife areas may be otherwise approved in writing by the Authorized Officer. Stabilization practices, as determined by the needs for restricted by the Authorized Officer during periods of fish and wildlife breeding, nesting, spawning, lambing or calving specific sites, shall include but shall not be limited to seeding, activity and during major migrations of fish and wildlife. The planting, mulching, and the placement of mat binders, soil Authorized Officer shall give Permittees written notice of binders, rock or gravel blankets, or structures. such restrictive action. From time to time, the Authorized 2.4.2.2. All disturbed areas shall be left in a stabilized Officer shall furnish Permittees a list of areas where such condition satisfactory to the Authorized Officer. Such actions may be required, together with anticipated dates of satisfaction shall be stated in writing by the Authorized restriction. Officer. 2.5.4.1. Permittees shall construct and maintain the 2.4.3.1. Permittees shall prevent or minimize erosion at Pipeline, both buried and aboveground sections, so as to stream and river crossings and those parts of the Pipeline assure free passage and movement of big game animals. System within flood plains, as defined in Stipulation 3.6. 2.6.2.1. Material site boundaries shall be shaped in such a 2.4.3.2. Temporary access over stream banks shall be manner as to blend with surrounding natural land patterns. made through use offill ramps rather than by cutting through Regardless of the layout of material sites, primary emphasis stream banks, unless otherwise approved in writing by the shall be placed on prevention of soil erosion and damage to Authorized Officer. Permittees shall remove such ramps vegetation. upon termination of seasonal or final use. Ramp materials shall be disposed of in a manner approved in writing by the 2.7.2.5. All debris resulting from clearing operations and Authorized Officer. construction that may block stream flow, delay fish passage, contribute to flood damage, or result in stream bed scour or 2.4.4.1. Seeding and planting of disturbed areas shall be erosion shall be removed. conducted as soon as practicable and, if necessary, shall be repeated until vegetation is successful, unless otherwise 2.8.1. All activities of Permittees in connection with the approved in writing by the Authorized Officer. All other Pipeline System that may create new lakes, drain existing restoration shall be completed as soon as possible. lakes, significantly divert natural drainages, permanently 96 alter stream hydraulics, or disturb significant areas of stream 3.2.2.2. All practicable means shall be utilized to mini­ beds are prohibited unless such activities along with mize injury to the ground organic layer. necessary mitigation measures are approved in writing by the 3.2.2.4. Permittees shall provide for continuous inspec­ Authorized Officer. tion of Pipeline System construction to ensure compliance 2.9.1. Permittees shall not operate mobile ground with the approved design specifications and these Stipulations. equipment off the Right-of-Way, Access Roads, State 3.6.1.1.1.1. The Pipeline shall cross streams underground Highways, or authorized areas, unless approved in writing by unless a different means of crossing is approved in writing by the Authorized Officer or when necessary to prevent harm to the Authorized Officer. any person. 6.1.1.1.6. The pipe trench excavation shall stop an adequate 2.11.1. Permittees shall submit a plan for use of explosives, including but not limited to blasting techniques, to distance from the water crossing to leave a protective plug the Authorized Officer in accordance with Stipulation 1.7. (unexcavated material) at each bank. These plugs shall be left in place until the stream bed excavation is complete and the pipe 2.11.2. No blasting shall be done under water or within laying operation is begun. The plugs shall not be completely one-quarter (1/4) mile of streams or lakes without a permit removed until absolutely necessary. The trench shall be from the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, when such a backfilled with stable material as soon as the pipe is laid. permit is required by State law or regulation. 3.6.2.1. Where necessary because of outfall erosion, stilling 2.12.1. Areas disturbed by Permittees shall be restored basins shall be constructed at the outflow end of culverts. To by Permittees to the satisfaction of the Authorized Officer prevent erosion, the pool sides shall be stabilized by appropriate as stated in writing. methods; e.g., by the use of riprap. 2.13.1. A discharge of Oil by Permittees into or upon the navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, 3.6.2.2. Slopes of cuts through stream banks shall be or into or upon the waters of the contiguous zone in violation of designed and constructed 'to minimize erosion and prevent the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, 33 slides. U.S.C. Section 1321 et seq. and the regulations issued 3.6.2.3. Erosion control procedures shall accommodate and thereunder, or in violation of applicable laws of the State of be based on the runoff produced by the maximum rainfall rate Alaska and regulations issued thereunder, is prohibited. and snow melt rate combination reasonably characteristic of the Permittees shall give immediate notice of any such discharge region. The procedures shall also accommodate effects that to: (1) the Authorized Officer; and (2) such other Federal and result from thawing produced by flowing or ponded water on State officials as are required by law to be given such notice. permafrost terrain. 2.14.1. It is the policy of the Department of the Interior that there should be no discharge of Oil or other pollutantinto 3.9.1. All construction, operation, maintenance, and ter­ or upon lands or waters. Permittees must therefore recognize mination activities in connection with the Pipeline System shall their prime responsibility for the protection of the public and be conducted so as to avoid or minimize thermal and other environment from the effects of spillage. environmental changes and to provide maximum protection to fish and wildlife and their habitat, and people. 3. Technical All working platforms, pads, fills and other surface modifica­ tions shall be planned and executed in su9h a way that any 3.2.2.1. The design shall also provide for remotely con­ resulting degradation of permafrost will not jeopardize the trolled shutoff valves at each pump station; remotely con­ Pipeline foundations. trolled mainline block valves (intended to control spills); and additional valves located with the best judgment regard­ 3.9.2. Acceptable plans, procedures and quality controls ing wildlife habitat, fish habitat, and potentially hazardous that ensure compliance with Stipulation 3.9.1. shall be areas. submitted in accordance with Stipulation 1.7.

97 Appendix B

The Jurisdictions of the Federal and State Governments Over the Construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline

by H. Clifton Eames, Jr. Trustees for Alaska

1. Introduction tions sites, temporary camps, storage sites, gravel pits, and This study of the federal-state jurisdictional issues pre­ access roads. 9 sented by the construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline is not The determination of land ownership, then, and the enforce­ meant to be exhaustive. Neither all of the issues that actually ment by each government of the terms and stipulations in th€ arose, nor all of the issues that might have arisen, will be ex­ various authorizations covering its respective lands, is one amined. The pipeline project was too immense, and the legal way that jurisdiction over the construction of the pipeline w~ questions are too complex, for this to be possible without tak­ in effect divided up. The failure of Alyeska to perform in ac· ing a great deal more time. In addition, a major desire of both cordance with any of these contractual provisions would sub­ the federal and state governments was to avoid getting bogged ject it to sanctions for breach of contract. 10 The first half of thi:5 down in court actions. 1 One of the reasons for this not un­ study, therefore, will be devoted primarily to the question oi natural reluctance was undoubtedly the wish to avoid need­ land ownership. less conflict and wasteful expenditures of time and money.2 But more important probably were the Congressional declar­ A very different jurisdictional issue concerns the enforce· ations in the TAP Act that "[t]he early development and de­ ment of the environmental protection laws of the two govern­ livery of oil and gas from Alaska's North Slope to domestic ments, through the imposition of civil or criminal sanctions markets is in the national interest because of growing domes­ for their violation. There is ordinarily little question of th€ tic shortages and increasing dependence upon insecure for­ power of the federal government to enforce its laws on stat€ eign sources" 3 and that "[t]he earliest possible construction of lands. The real issue, therefore, is the extent of the State's a trans-Alaska oil pipeline ... will best serve the national in­ police power jul'isdiction over the federal lands. (The power oj terest."4 The federal government, and perhaps the State as the State to regulate federal facilities or activities is a sepa­ well, undoubtedly felt bound by the Congressional mandate, rate question which was not a serious one in the construction clearly implied both in these declarations and elsewhere in of the pipeline since it was basically a private, not a govern­ the Act, to avoid all unnecessary delays. In any case, both gov­ mental, project.) The reach of the police power, though, doel:? ernments probably believed, in general at least, that the not in most cases (and virtually never did along the pipeline speedy construction of the pipeline was in fact in the interest right-of-way) turn on the determination of land ownership b;y of both the nation and the State of Alaska. Consequently, itself; the fact that land is federally-owned is generally impor· many problems were resolved, prior to the beginning of con­ tantonly in that it gives Congress an additional constitutional struction, through the negotiations that culminated in the basis for legislating. As a general rule, for the purpose of pro­ signing of the Cooperative Agreement.l 1 Those that arose sub­ tecting the health, safety and general welfare of its citizens a sequently were almost all handled informally, without resort­ state may regulate the activities of private parties, such ~ ing to the courts. As a result, some legal issues were probably Alyeska, on the federal lands. Where federal legislation never spotted, and of those that were, very few have been de­ exists, however, the state's regulations can be preempted. veloped and analyzed as fully as they would have been had Consequently, on the pipeline the crucial issue of state 6 they been briefed for judicial resolution. regulatory power over the federal lands was whether Alaska's What we have done, therefore, is examine the two general environmental protection laws were preempted by two pieces jurisdictional issues which encompass. virtually every other of federal pipeline legislation, the TAP Act and the such issue: the ownership of Alaska's publicly-owned lands 7 amendment to Section 185 of the Mineral Leasing Act of and the reach of the State's police power jurisdiction. The 1920.11 (Although the federal and state governments question of land ownership was basic to pipeline construction. attempted to resolve this issue contractually in the It determined whether the federal government or the State of Cooperative Agreement, they were unable completely to lay it Alaska would issue the right-of-way or other authorization for to rest since Alyeska was not a party to the Agreement and the particular geographic area involved, and through the consequently was not bound by it. As a result, Alyeska was terms and stipulations of the authorization have general con­ free to raise these issues in criminal prosecutions against it trol over construction activities in that area. 8 At issue was not brought by the State, to which the federal government was not only the land needed for the laying of the pipeline itself, but a party.) The second half of this study will be devoted to both land for related facilities such as pump stations, communica- that specific issue and the larger question of preemption. 98 II. Land Ownership Alaska would issue its authorization for most tentatively ap­ proved lands. 21 A. Surface Lands. Lands selected oy the State but not tentatively approved Land ownership would have been only a minor issue if the were to be treated specially. Although this is a considerable pipeline were to have been constructed in one of the older simplification of the actual procedure, basically both the fed­ states. Then the pattern of federal-state ownership would eral and state governments would include these lands in their have been for the most part established. But Alaska had only authorizations; the procedure for tentatively approving or relatively recently been admitted to the Union and the process patenting the lands would be expedited; and one or the other of patenting lands to the State was far from complete. of the authorizations would become effective based on the out­ Furthermore, additional uncertainties had been created by come of those expedited procedures. 22 the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act This left just one category of lands, those selected by the (hereinafter "Settlement Act").12 State, whether tentatively approved or not, which were later withdrawn by Section ll(a)(2) of the Settlement Act.23 That Section 6(b) of the Statehood Act provides that "the State of section withdrew for village selection lands that were con­ Alaska ... is hereby granted and shall be entitled to select .. tiguous to the villages even if they had been selected by the not to exceed one hundred and two million five hundred and State and tentatively approved. Alaska could plausibly have fifty thousand acres from the public lands of the United States argued that Congress without compensation had taken lands in Alaska .... "13 Section 6(g) then provides that "all lands duly of which the State was the equitable owner. In spite of this, it selected by the State of Alaska pursuant to this Act shall be agreed that the federal government would grant the right-of­ patented to the State by the Secretary of the Interior. way for these lands, 24 apparently acquiescing in the with­ Finally, additional language in Section 6(g) provides that the drawal. At that time, however, it was thought that passage of State may execute conditional leases and make conditional the Settlement Act would remove the major obstacle to con­ struction of the pipeline, which the State very much desired; sales of land that has been tentatively approved, even though a apparently it was willing to let the withdrawal go unchal­ final patent has not yet been issued. lenged in order to hasten the beginning of construction. In the early 1970s, as now, some land selected by Alaska had B. Lands Beneath Navigable Waters. not yet been tentatively approved; other land had been Rights-of-way and other authorizations were issued for sub­ tentatively approved but not yet patented. The status of these merged lands as well as for surface lands; consequently, two categories of unpatented land was unclear, and the whether the federal or state government owned particular q·uestion that presented itself was who owned them for the pieces of submerged land along the right-of-way was impor­ purpose of granting the right-of-way and other authorizations. tant for the same reasons. Under the Cooperative Agreement Alaska was to issue its right-of-way authorization for lands The cases do not provide a conclusive answer. First of all, the beneath navigable waters. The applicable definition of such ones that might otherwise be helpful deal with in place and in lands in the Submerged LandsAct, 25 however, contain two ex­ lieu grants, instead of quantity grants 14 (although one of the ceptions to the general rule that they are owned by the States statutes that was construed did govern both in lieu and (lands beneath non-navigable waters on federal land are gen­ quantity grantst 5). Since Alaska was given quantity grants, it erally owned by the federal government). could be argued that the in lieu cases are inapplicable. We feel First of all, Section 1301(f) excludes one rather technically that it is reasonable to conclude, however, that Alaska became defined category of lands which might otherwise seem to be the equitable owner of the lands it selected as soon as it had included. 26 More importantly, though, Section 1313 contains a done so and that the only power left to the federal government description of several additional categories of lands that were was the "judicial" one of determining whether the selection not confirmed to the States. These include "all lands expressly had been properly and lawfully made. 16 retained by or ceded to the United States when the State en­ tered the Union ... and any rights the United States has in Even if Alaska did become the equitable owner of its lands presently and actually occupied by the United States selections, however, until the final patent was issued the under claim of right.}! Lands beneath navigable waters, hO\v­ federal government was still the legal owner. Consequently, ever, are not automatically included in all such withdrawals. neither government had all of the incidents of ownership, and In fact, the general rule seems to be just the opposite. The in many cases a final determination of ownership would not be cases consistently hold that "[L]and under navigable waters in able to be made before pipeline construction was to begin. A acquired territory is generally held for the ultimate benefit of further complication was the uncertain effect of both future states and ... disposals by the United States during the tentative approval and the provision in the Statehood Act territorial period are not lightly to be inferred and should not providing for conditional leases or sales of tentatively be regarded as intended unless the intention was definitely declared or otherwise made very plain" (emphasis deleted). 27 approved land. 17 To determine which pre-admission withdrawal included Rather than go to court, these issues were resolved in the Co­ such lands, the order or statute which accomplished the with­ operative Agreement. Certain categories of lands were no drawal must generally be looked to. Two pieces of land be­ problem. Alaska would issue its right-of-way authorization neath navigable waters, though, that we know were retained for lands already patented to it and for lands beneath naviga­ are the land under Lake Tustemena in the Kenai Moose Range ble waters. 18 The federal government would issue its authori­ and the land set aside in Anchorage in 1915 for the Alaska zation for federal lands not selected by the State. 19 Further­ Railroad Terminal Reserve. 28 We do not know, however, about more, apparently since tentative approval would ordinarily the many acres of land in the northern half of Alaska that were be virtually, though not legally, tantamount to final patent, 20 withdrawn for national defense purposes during World War II. 99 Whether the lands beneath navigable waters in those areas that the haul road right-of-way was valid under that section;·u passed to the State is apparently not clear, nor is the effect of it said that the section acted "as a present grant which takes the revocation of that withdrawal after statehood. 29 effect as soon as it is accepted by the State" and that "[a]ll that is A more common question is when a rivei- is "navigable" for needed for acceptance is some 'positive act on the part of the title purposes. The United States Supreme Court, several appropriate public authorities of the state, clearly manifest­ 45 decades ago, held that federal, not state law, is controlling. 30 ing an intention to accept.' " Normally, said the court, it is "not even necessary for the builder of the highway to apply for The federal title test of navigability requires "navigability in 46 fact" and has six parts. 31 First of all, the body of water does not a right-of-way." The court never addressed the issue that have to have ever actually been navigated; it need only be sus­ was raised in United States ·v. Dunn four and a half months later. 47 ceptible to navigation. 3Z Secondly, it must be susceptible to navigation for not just any purpose, but for commerce.::iaThird, In Du:nn,the court argues in a footnote that Section 932 "was it must be susceptible to such navigation in its "natural and passed to protect persons who have already encroached upon ordinary condition/' although "occasional difficulties in navi­ the public domain without authorization but who have been gation" do not destroy navigability .:wFourth, tpe navigation can allowed to remain there with the knowledge and acquiescence be by any "customary mode" of trade or travel. 35 Fifth, the of the government and who should not in conscience be question of navigability is decided as of the time the State was deemed trespassers. It was not intended to grant rights, but admitted to the Union.36Finally, the water need not be a high­ instead to give legitimacy to an existing status otherwise de­ way for interstate commerce; 31 for example, it can be entirely fensible."48 If Dunn is correct, not Wilderness Society v. landlocked and entirely within one state. Morton, Alaska was not entitled to construct the haul road 49 Unfortunately, the test is not an easy one to apply. 38 One without first obtaining a permit from the federal government. reason is that many problematical fact situations have yet to The issue first arose, however, before either of these cases be dealt with by the courts. Another is that while the test of had been decided. The State contended that it did not need to navigability for title purposes is different, and less broad, obtain a permit, the federal government that it did. Should than the ones for admiralty and regulatory purposes, the the issue be tested in court, though, which both parties hoped Court has frequently in title cases cited admiralty or regula­ to avoid, and should the State prevail, it would be free to pro­ tory decisions. In spite of this practice, however, not all ceed unfettered by the environmental and other stipulations navigability decisions are applicable to title cases, and they attached to the issuance of a permit. Since under Section cannot be mechanically applied. For example, in 1940 the 203(b)50 of the TAP Act the federal government was probably Court held that if obstacles to navigation could be removed required to issue a permit anyway, a compromise was through the use or construction of artificial improvements, reached: the federal government agreed to issue all necessary the body of water was deemed to be navigable for regulatory permits and the State agreed to enforce a number of stipula­ purposes. 39 Since this is not true for title purposes, in cases tions that were attached as an exhibit to the Cooperative subsequent to this decision one must be wary of holdings that Agreement. 51 By participating in the drafting of those stipu­ "occasional difficulties in navigation" do not defeat lations, the federal government was able at least indirectly to navigability. influence the construction of the highway. 52 In any case, the Supreme Court's test of navigability was apparently used when title to the lands beneath navigable Ill. State Police Power Jurisdiction Over Activ­ waters along the pipeline right-of-way was determined for the ities on Federal Lands purpose of establishing which government would issue its authorization for particular water crossings. 40 A photo map of A. In General. each crossing was examined, and in those borderline situa­ Land ownership determined whether the federal or state tions where navigability was uncertain, the parties compro­ government would issue the right-of-way authorization, and mised.41The most difficult problems arose over the navigabil­ enforce the terms and stipulations of that authorization, for ity of braided rivers, since the Court has apparently never each parcel of land over which the pipeline passed. By itself, directly addressed that issue.42 however, ownership is not ordinarily conclusive as to the power of the state to enforce its environmental protection laws C. The Haul Road. on the federal lands. That issue will be the subject of this section. The haul road did not present the same land ownership The controlling principle in this area of the law, derived issues that the pipeline right-of-way did. It was not a private from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, 53 is that "the project requiring authorizations from the government land­ constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are owners along its right-of-way. Although the actual construc­ supreme; ... they control the constitution and laws of the re­ tion was to be contracted out to Alyeska, the haul road was to spective states, and cannot be controlled by them." 54 Itfollows be built by the State of.Alaska as a public highway. Conse­ from this, broadly stated, "that the states have no power, by quently, the only significant jurisdictional issue was whether taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any the State was required to obtain a permit from the federal ma".lner control, the operation of the constitutional laws en­ government for those portions that crossed f-ederal land, or acted by congress. . .. "55 whether it could proceed without a permit pursuant to On the other hand, the Tenth Amendment to the Constitu­ U.S.C. §932 (also referred to as R.S. §2477). 43 tion reserved to the state broad power to protect and promote Section 932, which was part of a statute passed in 1866, the health, safety and general welfare of its citizens. 56 State read: "The right of way for the construction of highways over environmental laws are enacted pursuant to this power (the public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted!' 43 "police power"), and the courts have often said both that envi­ In Wilderness Society v. Morton, decided after the federal and ronmental protection is an area which the States have "tradi­ state governments had come to an agreement, the court held tionally occupied" 57 and that the "historic police powers of the 100 States are not to be superceded" by federal legislation "unless to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations re­ that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." 58 specting the territory or other property belonging to the Finally, the concept of exclusive versusconcurrentjurisdic­ United States." tion is fundamental to this area. Where Congress has exclu­ The federal government's power over Article IV lands is sive jul'isdiction over either a subject matter or its land, quite broad, and legislation passed pursuant to the Property the States are prohibited from legislating. Where Congress Clause is fully capable of preempting state law.65 In Kleppe v. and the States have concurrent jurisdiction, absent congres­ New Mexico66 the State argued that the Property Clause gave sional intention to preempt the States they are free to Congress only two powers: the powers to regulate the disposal legislate as long as there is no conflict with federal of its property and to protect its property. 67 The Supreme legislation. Court rejected such a narrow interpretation and said that "'[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress B. The Fedeml Lands. is without limitations.' "68 "In short, Congress exercises the We have mentioned that in general the States are not pre­ powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature over the public cluded from regulating activities on federal lands by federal domain .... In our view, the 'complete power' that Congress ownership itself. The exception to this rule concerns what are has over public lands necessarily includes the power to regu­ termed "Article I lands." late and protect the wildlife living there." 69 1. Article I Lands. Although Kleppe v. New Mea:icomade it clear that Congress Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution ("Cession has broad powers to legislate under the Property Clause and Clause") gives the Congress exclusive jurisdiction over a rela­ to preempt state law thereby if it wishes, that does not mean tively limited category of federal lands. It provides that "The that the States may never regulate activities on federal lands. Cong1·ess shall have power ... [t]o exercise exclusive legisla­ This is true only where the federal government has exclusive tion ... over ... [the District of Columbia] ... and ... all places jurisdiction. 70 The general rule with regard to Article IV purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in property is that "[t]he police power of the State extends over which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, the federal public domain, at least when there is not legisla­ arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings." 59 The Ces­ tion by Congress on the subject." 71 Consequently, most ques­ sion Clause has been broadly construed and can include land tions of the extent of state police power jurisdiction, including used not just for military purposes, but for any legitimate gov­ most of those that arose during the pipeline construction, are ernmental purpose (a national park, for example). 60 answered by determining whether particular attempted ex­ One important qualification, however, is that the land must ercises of that power are preempted or prohibited by either be "purchased by the consent" of the state legislature. Fur­ the Constitution or, more commonly, by lawfully enacted fed­ thermore, in some cases a state will give a qualified grant of eral legislation. consent, reserving to itself either the full power of concurrent C. Preemption. jurisdiction, or something less than that, for example the This is a difficult area of the law to conceptualize. As many power to serve process within the enclave regarding acts com­ courts and commentators have said, a multitude of tests have mitted outside of it.61 In other cases it might withhold its con­ been formulated to determine when a state regulation has sent but make a cession with similar qualifications. 62 Conse­ been preempted. Furthermore, which of these are specific quently, some lands that, judged by their purpose, might tests and which are general rules is not always clear. Never­ appear to be Article I property are not in fact under the excl u­ theless, a broad sketch of the preemption doctrine can cer­ sive jurisdiction of federal government. The true extent of a tainly be made. To make it more understandable, and its state's jurisdiction, if any, cannot be determined without ref­ applicability to pipeline construction more apparent, we will erence to the actions of the state legislature at the time the integrate into it a discussion of two lawsuits that for conven­ property was acquired by th~ federal government. ience we will refer to as Alyeska-J 7:Z and Alyeslw-2, 7J (collec­ In Alaska, Section ll(b) of the Statehood Act reserved tively, the "pipeline lawsuits"). Both are actions involving authority in the United States for the exercise by Congress of alleged violations of certain of Alaska's environmental laws the Article I power of exclusive legislation "in all cases what­ found in Alaska Statutes Title 46, Chapter 03. In the first case soever over such tracts or parcels of land as, immediately Alyeska was accused of discharging oil in violation of Sections prior to the admission of said State, are owned by the United 710 and 740; in the second, with constructing a sewage system States and held for military, naval, Air Force, or Coast Guard or treatment works without submitting plans to the Depart­ purposes, including naval petroleum reserve numbered 4,"63 ment of Environmental Conservation, and without obtaining however acquired. There are three provisos to the section, how­ a permit, in violation of Section 720. ever, and the second one virtually emasculates it, in effect 1. Two Preliniinary Issues. authorizing the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by the Preemption, or something very much like it, can occur even State. 64 in the absence of federal legislation. For example, as we noted 2. Article IV Lands. earlier, unless Congress clearly and unambiguously permits Relatively few federal lands are Article I lands, since most it, federal facilities, agents, instrumentalities and activities of them have not been purchased (or acquired through the cannot be regulated by the States. 74 The pipeline presents an exercise of the power of eminent domain) with the consent of interesting question in this regard. Although Alyeska would the state. For example, apparently the only Article I lands over seem to be merely a private party, not a federal agent or in­ which the pipeline right-of-way passed are approximately 27 strumentality, and the construction of the pipeline a private miles of military land. The larger portion of the federal lands, project, not a federal one, the federal involvement was suffi­ and virtually all such land under the right-of-way, are gov­ ciently substantial that it might be argued that Alyeska had erned pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 ("Property some of the attributes of a federal agent, and the project some Clause") of the Constitution: "The Congress shall have power of the attributes of a federal project, and that consequently 101 they could not be regulated by the State. The grounds for the unconvinced. On the other hand, the State cited two provisiom argument would include Congress's declaration that "early from the Mineral Leasing Act which were at the very leas1 development ... is in the national interest because of ... in­ strong indications that in enacting that Act Congress did no1 creasing dependence upon insecure foreign sources"; 75 its intend to preempt state regulation. 9°Furthermore, case sup· authorization of the appropriate federal officers and agencies port exists for this interpretation of those provisions. 91 to issue and take all necessary action to administer and en­ Even when Congress has not expressly declared its in ten· force the authorizations necessary for or related to the pipe­ 76 tion to preempt the States, however, this intention may be im· line's construction, operation and maintenance; its authori­ plied. 92This was the crucial issue in the two pipeline lawsuits. zation of the waiver by those officers and agencies of any pro­ The basic test seems to be whether under the circumstances cedural requirements which they deemed desirable to waive 77 the state regulation" 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplish­ to accomplish the purposes of the Act; its virtual suspension ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con­ of NEPA, at least as,it regarded the Impact Statement re­ gress' "93or "whether both regulations can be enforced with­ quirement;78 and its virtual preclusion of judicial review of 94 79 out impairing the federal superintendence of the field." On the issuance of the necessary authorizations. Nevertheless, the other hand, Congress's intent, as we said earlier, must be the argument would probably not prevail and in fact does not unmistakably clear, 95 and this is especially true wnen the field appear to have been raised in either of the pipeline lawsuits. in question, like pollution control, is one which is traditionally Secondly, it might also be argued that to enforce certain of within the scope of the States' police power. 96Finally, Con­ the State's environmental laws would unconstitutionally bur­ gress itself has often said that the primary responsibility for den the flow of interstate or foreign commerce, 80 or interfere the control of pollution rests with state and local govern­ with Congress's powers over foreign affairs 81and the national ments.97 defense. 82 In both cases, the state laws need not run up against Several more or less specific tests have been suggested tc federal legislation or a federal scheme of regulation to be un­ dete1·mine whether Congress has impliedly preempted a par· constitutional. 83 Again, however, these issues appear not to ticular field. One is whether Congress's intention can be im· have. been raised in either of the pipeline lawsuits. plied from the language of the statute (which we will discusE 2. Preeniption fn Theory and -in Practice. later) or from its legislative history. 98 Although Alyeska as Whenever it is asserted that Congress has preempted state well as the State quoted liberally from the legislative histor_y regulation in a given area, the first issue, even if unstated, is of the federal legislation, Judge Blair was unable to find an,Y always whether Congress had the constitutional power to leg­ clear indication of a congressional intent to preempt state islate in that area. This will rarely provide a brake to federal regulation. action, however. Congress's authority under the Commerce Another test is whether a regulatory scheme is so pervasive 84 Clause at times seems virtually limitless, and as we noted as to leave no room for state action, 99although comprehensive· earlier, the scope of the Property Clause also is very broad. ness and complexity do not by themselves evince an intent tc Consequently, in neither pipeline lawsuitdid Alyeskacontend preempt since some subject matters necessarily require com· that Congress lacked the power to act. prehensive treatment. 100 In any case, in Alyeska-1 the cour1 Once it has been established that Congress is acting within virtually without explanation held that the federal scheme its authority, both the federal and state legislation must be was not so pervasive as to preempt state regulation. analyzed. Apparently Alyeska did not contend in either law­ The execution and interpretation of federal legislation by suit that the state environmental statutes were preempted by the executive branch may also be looked to in ascertaining their federal cou,nterparts. Insofar as it regarded preemption, Congress's intent. 101 Since Section II.3 of the Cooperativ<: the defense in both cases seems to have been that the State's Agreement indicates that the Interior Department felt tha1 regulations were preempted by the TAP Act and Section 185 the State's police power jurisdiction had not been preempted, of the Mineral Leasing Act. These two statutes, then, com prise the State clearly had the stronger argument in this regard, the relevant federal legislation for the purposes of this study. 85 The relevant language in that section reads as follows: "On One of the less murky rules of preemption is that if it is lands subject to the Federal right-of-way authorization. physically impossible for the person regulated to comply with where applicable statutes and regulations of the State provid­ both the federal and state regulations, the state's cannot ing for the protection of resources, the environment, or pub· stand. 86 The cases seem to hold that physical impossibility lie health, safety or general welfare, impose additional re­ does not result merely because one regulation is more strin­ quirements to, or more stringent standards than, thos<: gent than the other. The reasoning apparently is that if the required by the Federal terms and stipulations for pipelim person regulated is in compliance with the more stringent construction, operation or maintenance, the State law will one, he will also be in compliance with the other. 87 In any case, control." Furthermore, the Supreme Court has said tha1 Alyeska does not seem to have contended that it could not have [w ]here coordinate state and federal efforts exist within :i complied with both the two state regulations involved and the complementary administrative framework, and in the pur­ two federal statutes. suit of common purposes, the case for federal preempetion be· 102 The broadest rule of preempt ion is that if Congress intended comes a less persuasive one." Notice, however, that the Co­ to preempt state regulation in a given area, the state regula­ operative Agreement has been cited in this context only be· tions must fall. 88In the simplest case, the federal legislation cause it might indicate whether or not Congress intended tc preempt state action. Alyeska was not a party to the Agree· itself contains an express and unequivocal declaration of Con­ 103 gress's intention. 89 In both pipeline lawsuits Alyeska cited ment and is not bound by it. specific language in the TAP Act and in the Mineral Leasing Two tests which are perhaps just different ways of saying Act which it said amounted to such a declaration. The argu­ the same thing are whether "a subject by its very nature ... ment, however, was not persuasive, and in Alyeska-1, which [admits] only of national supervision" or "[demands] exclusivE has already been decided in Alaska's favor, Judge Blair was federal regulation in order to achieve uniformity vital to na· 102 tional interests"; 104 two final tests are whether the state regu­ the provisions in those federal laws which relate to lation has touched a field in which "the federal interest is so preemption. 112 dominant" that the state regulation. cannot stand, and a. Water Pollution-The federal water pollution scheme is whether the state regulation will "produce a result inconsist­ embodied in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as ent with the objective of the federal statute" and likewise amended. 113 The federal government has broad jurisdiction must be preempted. 105 (On the other hand, it has also been said under this Act. Its jurisdiction extends to the navigable that an exercise of a state's police power jurisdiction will only waters of the nation, 114 which are defined as "the waters of the be superceded "where the repugnance or conflict is so 'direct United States ... "116 Although the precise meaning of this and positive' that the two acts cannot 'be reconciled or consist­ definition has not been established, it has been held to have ently stand together.' "106 Since Alyeska's basic argument extended the federal government's jurisdiction beyond what might be relevant to any of them, we will consolidate our dis­ it was prior to the 1972 amendments. 116 cussion of these last, more general tests, and of the question whether an intent to preempt can be implied from the lan­ This does not mean that state regulation has been guage of the federal statutes. preempted, however. Besides being given a role to play in the federal scheme,m the States are free to enforce their own Alyeska contended that Section 1652(b) of the TAP Act, standards as long as they are not less stringent than the part of which we quoted earlier, implies that Congress in­ federal ones. 118 Federal facilities, though, need comply only tended to preempt state regulation. That section authorized with a state's substantive standards; that is, they cannot be and directed the Secretary of the Interior to take all necessary required to obtain a state permit. 119 Furthermore, regulating action to administer and enforce the Department's right-of­ the discharge of dredge and fill into navigable waters (as that way grant and other authorizations. The State argued, how-. term is defined in the Act and construed by the courts) is the ever, that while the Secretai-y was given the authority to take province of the Corps of Engineers; the States may not such action, and directed to do so, it does not follow that he was regulate such discharges. 12° Finally, the Act does not provide given exclusive authority. Judge Blair agreed with the State standards for the construction of all sewage systems or and cited against Alyeska Section 1653(b) of the TAP Act, treatment works. Its standards must be met only as a which permits the Secretary "in cooperation with other Fed­ condition for the obtaining of federal grants by state, eral, State, or local agencies" to control and remove pollution municipal, intermunicipal or interstate agencies for the by the holder of the right-of-way, at the holder's expense, construction of these facilities. 121 Consequently, they would when the holder fails to do so. The Judge also noted, perhaps not in any case be applied to private projects such as the oil irrelevantly, that dual environmental regulation increases pipeline. . the chances of adequately protecting Alaska's environment. b. Air Pollution-The applicable federal legislation in this One final argument is that because of its perception of the field is the Clean Air Act, as amended. 122 With regard to importance of the pipeline to the economic welfare of the na­ preemption, it is quite similar to the Federal Water Pollution tion, and of the foreign affairs and national defense ramifica­ Control Act. The States are to bear part of the responsibility tions of our not having a sufficient supply of oil and of having for the implementation and enforcement of the federal to depend on "insecure foreign sources," 107 Congress intended scheme; 123 they may enforce their own regulations unless they the federal government to have preemptive control over the are less stringent than the federal ones (except that state pipeline's construction. The primary statutory indications of regulation of certain moving sources is preempted); 124 and this strong congressional concern are the provisions of the federal facilities must comply with state substantive TAP Act that we cited earlier as evidence of the federal in­ requirements, but need not apply for and obtain permits from volvement in the project. ms the States. 126 Alyeska presented this argument under the "need for uni­ c. Solid Waste-A new piece of federal solid waste formity" rubric, 109 but without explanation Judge Blair held legislation was recently enacted, the Resource Conservation that the construction of oil pipelines did not demand exclusive and Recovery Act of 1976.126 For most kinds of solid waste, the federal regulation in order to achieve a uniformity vital to na­ standards established by the Act apply only to those states tional interests. Since the TAP Act dealt not with oil pipelines which have accepted the federal grants made available by the in general, but with a specific project, it might have been Act for the development and enforcement of state plans. 127 more persuasive for Alyeska to have argued that the federal Hazardous waste regulations, though, are applicable to all of interest was so dominant that regulation by the State was pre­ the States. 128 Again, however, as in the water and air acts, the empted, 110 or that state regulation stood as "an obstacle to the States are free to enforce their own regulations as long as they accomplishment ... of the full purposes and objectives of are not less stringent' than the federal ones. 129 Congress." 111 The Act departs significantly from the Federal Water Nevertheless, the basic argument was considered by Judge Pollution Control Act and the Clean Air Act, however, in Blair, and although he might have discussed itatmorelength, requiring federal facilities to comply with both substantive and procedural state requirements, specifically including his decision was probably correct. Whether the result will be 30 the same in Alyeska-2, however, or whether it would have permit requirements.1 One commentator has suggested that this might be a harbinger of similar amendments to the water been the same if the case had been tried in federal court, or if and air acts. 131 the federal government had been a party, is uncertain. 4. Federal En,vironniental Laws. d. Pesticides-The Federal Environmental Pesticide Con­ Although it was not contended in either of the pipeline trol Act of 1972132 is concerned primarily with the registration lawsuits that Alaska's environmental laws had been of sellers of pesticides and the labeling of containers; 133 the preempted by federal environmental laws, it might be helpful classification of pesticides for general or restricted use; 134 and to conclude by taking a very brief and general look at a few of the certification of applicators of restricted use pesticides. 136

103 (States may submit plans providing for the performance of concerned the power of the two governments to control their the latter function themselves.) 136 If the provisions of the Act respective lands by issuing their right-of-way and other are violated, the EPA may issue a "stop sale, use or renewal" authorizations and enforcing the terms and stipulations of order pertaining to the affected pesticide and may in certain those authorizations. The latter concerned the power of the situations confiscate it. 137 State to enforce its environmental statutes and regulations. The Act clearly delineates the authority of the States. They Most land ownership issues were resolved in the may regulate the sale or use of any pesticide in the state, but Cooperative Agreement, although the subsidiary question of may not permit sales or uses prohibited by the Act; 138 they title to submerged lands was decided by examining photo may not enforce requirements for labeling or packaging in maps of the water crossings. The haul road problem was addition to or different than those of the Act;139 and they may solved by the federal government agreeing to issue the provide for the registration of pesticides to meet special local necessary permits to the State, and the State agreeing to needs, subject to certain controls. 140 enforce stipulations desired by the federal government. e. Fish and Game-The States have traditionally regulated The federal and state governments attempted to resolve the the fish and game within their borders. Their pm:ver to do so, question of the State's power to regulate activities on the however, appears to be no greater than their general police federal right-of-way in the Cooperative Agreement. Alyeska, power over environmental matters and can be preempted by however, not being a party to that Agreement, raised the Congress according to the same rules. 141 Consequently, in question itself in at least two lawsuits. determining, for example, whether the Anadromous Fish Several things can be learned from those lawsuits. First of Act142 would be applicable to activities on federal lands, such all, the fact that land was federally-owned was not dispositi ve. as construction of the pipeline, the same analysis would be Secondly, an issue that was not presented by pipeline used. construction was whether the State could regulate federal This principle can be illustrated by a case decided by Judge facilities or activities. Finally, the real issue was whether the Carlson in 1974, AlaBka v. Nelson. 143 There the issue was State had been preempted from regulating private activities, whether Alaska's Anadromous Fish Act was preempted by not by federal environmental statutes, but by two pieces of several pieces of federal legislation governing the national federal legislation directly related to the construction of the forests. The case is analagous to the pipeline lawsuits in at pipeline: the TAP Act and the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. In least two ways. First of all, the preemption issue in that case the only decision thus far, the court held that the state was whether the Anadromous Fish Act was preempted by regulation in question has not been preempted. federal legislation concerning the national forests, not whether it was preempted by the federal statute protecting Footnotes anadromous fish. Similarly, in the pipeline lawsuits the 1. Meeting with William Moses, Department of the Interior, September 1. preemption issue was whether the State's environmental 1977: telephone con\'ersation with .John McHale. Department of the [nte· regulations were preempted by the TAP Act and the Mineral rior, September 7, 1977. 2. Cooperative Agreement between United States Departmentofthe Interior Leasing Act, not whether they were preempted by federal and State of Alaska Regarding the Proposed Trans-Alaska Pipeline§ IV.2. environmental legislation such as the Federal Water 3. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act§ 202(a), 42 U.S.C. § 165l(a). Pollution Control Act. 4. § 202(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1651(c). 4. Moses. 1:1uµranote 1. Secondly, in the pipeline lawsuits it was assumed, and in 6. It might also be noted that, so far as we know, the federal government has neither been a party to, nor filed a brief in. any of the lawsuits arising out of Nelson Judge Carlson found, that the fact that the activity pipeline construction that dealt with the issue of preemption. which the State sought to regulate took place on federal land 7. Right~of~way authorizations over privately-owned lands were the subject of negot1at10ns between Alyska and the private landowners and consequentlv was not dispositive since, unless preempted, a state's police did not present any federal-state jurisdictional issues. See. et.. Cooperative power extends to most federal lands. Agreement§ I.l. 8. See, e{f.• Cooperative Agreement§ II.1: " ... /!'/he Parties will establish and maintain separate organizations to assure compliance with the terms and Judge Carlson ultimately held, however, that Alaska's stipulations of their respective right-of-way authori-zations .... " statute was preempted on the ground that it was physically 9. The haul road did not present the same issues as did the pipeline right-of- impossible for the defendants, who had contracted to cut way and will be discussed separately infra. 10. Although this is an oversimplification, the basic principle is correct. timber in the North Tongass National Forest, to comply with lL Minei·al Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 185. both sets of regulations. 144 He said that if they complied with 12. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S C. §§ 1601-1627. state law, they would be in violation of their contract with the 13. Alaska Statehood Law, 48 U.S.C. Pree.§ 21. 14. ll'yoming "· United Stales, 255 U.S. 489 (1921); Payne I'. Ne111 Me.rieo, J.5.5 Forest Service; if they fulfilled their contractual obligations, U.S. :167(1,921). In µface {Jrant:?are meclwnicafly determi11ed qra11ts01•e1 they would be in violation of state law. What was perhaps 1!'/deha state has no control. (To take a totully ab.~unl e.wmple, a ;;fate mayb( granted the northeast qua rt<'I' of eaeh squm·e mile offedcml f1t11d.'I in the .~fate.) unusual about Judge Carlson's decision is that he considered In lieu urantsnl'e opport1111itiesfora11tateto make its own seleeiio1111'11e11<111in pfacegm11t happe111:1to (al/ 11,ithi11an area 11•hichi.~ not infuct amilable,.~uch not only the federal statutes and regulations, but the a.~a 1idlita1·yreserimtfon. QuantitygmntH, on the other hand. alloll'the11tufe, provisions of the contract between the defendants and the 1t'ithsome q11alificatio11H,io ili-.-elfselect its share of /a mis from all of those in the state that ure owned by the federal go11ernment. Forest Service, to be part of the federal scheme with which the 15. Lane r. New Me.rico, 258 Fed. 980, 981 (1919)(Payne 1•. Ne1c·Me.rico in the state legislation must be in harmony. The Judge did say, Supreme Com·t). however, that the legality of these provisions, that is, whether 16. Wyoming 1'. United State.<;at 497. Although equitable ownership is a complex concept, the simplest example of an equitable owner is the person they were authorized by the federal legislation, was subject to whose house is subject to a mortgage. He is the equitable owner; the holder ol the mortgage is the legal owner. Each type of owner has certain rights; each judicial review, perhaps suggesting the possibility that they is said to have some of the "incidents of ownet·ship"; but neither of them ha~ might not be upheld. al! of those incidents. 17. Our feeling is that they do nothing to change the status quo. JV. Conclusion 18. Cooperative Agreement§§ l.l(a) and (f), 1.2. 19. Cooperative Agreement §§ l. l(g), I.2. The two major federal-state jurisdictional issues on the 20. Apparently the primary reason that the interim step of tentative approval was necessary in Alaska was that so much the state was still unsurveyed. II pipeline were land ownership and the power of the State to seems, however, that before tentative approval was given, a determinatior regulate construction on the federal right-of-way. The former had been made that the land had been properly and lawfully selected. See 104 et.. 43 C.F.R. § 2627.3(d): "Said officer will notify the appropriate State 39. United Stale.-; "· Appalnehfon Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-408 official in writing of his tentative approval of a selection after determining (1940). that there is no bar to passing legal title ... other than the need for the survey 40. Telephone conversation with Rodger Peguep, Office oft he Attorney General of the lands or for the issuance of patent or hoth." of Alaska, September 9, 1977. 21. Cooperative Agreement§§ Ll(b), 1.2. 41. id. 22. Cooperative Agreement§ I.l(c) and (d), I.3. 42. Id. The Supreme Court, however, has discussed a similar question, that of 23. Cooperative Agreement§ l.l(e); 43 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2). shifting sandbars of a type that it called "crossing bars." U11itiid Sli!tes n 24. Cooperative Agreement § 1.2. at 85. It said that where these occur "there is generally more or Jess difficulty in ascertaining the course of the channel.as the stream may divide 25. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. This Act, which was made into several channels, or it may distribute itselfover the full length of the bar applicable to Alaska bv Section 6(e) of the Statehood Act, 48 U .S.C. Pree.§ so as greatly to lessen the depth of the water from that prevailing in thewell­ 21, and the "equal footing" doctrine. which provides that "new States ... defined channels .... " United Stales o. Utah at 85-86. lt went on to say that have the same rights. Rovereignty and jurisdiction ... as the originaf States "the mere fact of the presence of such sandbars causing impediments to possess within their respective borders," itlumfiml 1'. IV11rdwell, 6 Wall. 423, navigation does not make a river non-navigable," United Sfotes n. Utuh at 86, 436 (1867). quoted in Ore111me.r rel. Sta/(' Land Board 1•.Con·allfa Sand <111d and that a river mav be "navigable in fact, although its navigation may be Gn11·e/ Co., 7 E.L.R. 20137, 20139 (U.S. 1977), form the basis for Alaska's encompassed with difficulties by reason of natural barriers such as rapids ownership of lands beneath navigable waters. and sandbars." United Stnte.~ 1,.Uttth at 86-87. Unfortunately, the Court 26. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(0: "The t

105 70. It should be noted that a state may cede its jurisdiction with l'egard to 100. fJeCa11w,1·. Bim, 424 U.S. 351. 359·3H0 (1976). particular Article IV property and states apparently routinely do so for 101. Nrw York Dept. of Sm·ial Sen•ices 1·. JJ11Mi1w,413 U.S. -W5. 421 ( 1973). federally owned lands within the National Parks. Sax. :-mprn note 60, at 246. The best example of Article IV land in Alaska over which Congress has 102. Id. exclusive jurisdiction is Mt. McKinley National Park. 103. See Federal Agreement and Grant of Right-of-War§ 4.B; State Right-of 71. 011u11!l'hem;-ria 1•.Idulw, 246 U.S. 343, 346 (1918). Another qualification Way Lease§ 40.b.(i}. would seem to be that an exercise of the police power is invalid if it somehow 104. Viorida Lime at 14:i-}44. This will occasionally be found even though it invades an area reserved to Congress by the Constitution. See our discussion would not seem that Congress consciously had such an intention. iufra. 105. Rice at 230. 72. State 1•. Alye.~ka Piveline Se1Tie,• Co., No. 76-822 CR (Dist. Ct., Third Jud. 106. Kell!! 1•. Wwd1i11yt1111,302 U.S. 1. 10 0937). Dist.) 107. § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a). 73. State o. A{J!eska Pipeliue Srrofre Co. et al., No. 75-899 (Super. Ct., Fourth Jud. Dist., April 2, 1976). 108. Sec text accompanying notes 75-W. 109. S!'!' text accompanying note 104. 74, Hcwcack 1•. Train at 178-179. 75. 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a). llU. See text accompanying note 105. 76. 42 § 1652(b). 111. See text accompanying note ~):l.The Supreme Court has found. although in a u.s.c. different context, that state regulation is capable of presenting an 77. 42 U.S.C. § 1652(c). insurmountable obstacle to the accomplishment of federal objectives. In a 78. 42 u.s.c. §(d). case involving the regulation of federal facilities, the Court warned that 79. Id. allowing a state to enforce its permit requirements in effect gives it the power to eompletedly halt the regulated operation. H(/ nmd, ,·. Tm in at 180. 80. U.S. CONST .. art I., § 8, cl. 3: "The Congress shall have power ... [t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and 112. It might ue worth reemphasizing here the Court's reluctance to find that with the Indian tribes"; Hood & Sons 1'.DuMowl, 336 U.S. 525, 533( 1949); on state environmental regulations h:we been preemptc-d. uecause oft he strong all of the constitutional issues, see fll!llemfly B. Schwartz, A Com 111e11tal'f/ 011 tradition of state and local control of pollution and Congress's frequent the Cmrntiflltirm of the United States (Hl63). declarations that the state and local governments have the priman' responsibility for controlling pollution. · 81. United Slates 1•, Cw·tiss-lV;-iuht E.l'port Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (193B). 113. Federal Water Pollution Control Aet, as amended. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1:rn). · 82. Hfralmyashi I'. U11ited StateH 320 U.S. 81 (1943); :we !/1'/l·el'llil!I U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. 114. §§ 301(a), 502 (12)(A). 33 U.S.C. §§ l::lll(a), 1H62(12){A). 115. § 502(7). 3au.s.c. § 1362(7). 83. Regarding commerce, ii!:'!' Svutl1e11l?ue1jie Co. I'. Ariz1111a,325 U.S. 7Bl. 769 (1945); Coolefl ,,. Baard of Port 1Var-de1w, 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1851). lHi. Uuited Stain; r. Holl11ml. 37::3F. Supp. 6G5 (M.D. Fla. HJ7--l). Regarding foreign affairs and the national defense, 11eeU.S. CONST., art. I.· 117. Se!'. 1'ft.. § 402(b), ;3:3U.S.C. § Ia42(bl. § 10. 118. § iHO. 33 U.S.C. § 1370. 84. See, l'f/., Schwartz, Vol. 1, ,'IIIJJl'U.S. 20!1 (1H7(i). 85. We have not been able to see the memorandum!' in a law-suit arising out of construction on the Tolovana River. While we do not believe it to be the case, 120. § 404, ;3:3U.S.C. § 134-l; J/i1111cso/11 ,._ H1i(fowu11.7 KL.I{. 20!HiG(8th Cir. it is possible that the defendant there argued that the federal Anadromou8 197G). Fish Act preempted Alaska's Anadromous Fish Act. 121. See generally§§ 201·212. :33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1292. 86. Florida Lime a11d Al'orndo Growt'I".~,lne. 1•. Paul, 373 U.S. 132. 142-143 122. Clean Air Act, as amended. -l2 tJ.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a. (1963). 123. § 110. --12U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(ll. 87. State e.r rel. Andrus 1•. Click, 554 P.2d 969 (Ida. Sup. Ct. 1976). 124. § UH, 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1. 88. Nol'thcr11 Statex f'mi•er Co. I'. Mi1111e.~ota,447 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 1971}, 125. § 118. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f: Ha1H·t1r·kr. Tmiu. afj'd. mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). 12H. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1!)71i,-l2 U.S.C. §§ ti901-H987. 89. Rfre r. Santa Pe E:lemlor Corp,. :rn1 U.S. 218, 235·236 (1947); Northern Stafr.'I at 1146. 127. §§ 4001-4009. 42 u.s.c.§§ 1>941-69.J.!l. 90. 30 U.S.C. § 187. " ... None of such provisions shall ue in conflict with the laws 128. §§ 3001-3011. 42 U.S.C. §§ liH2Hi9:H. of the State in which the leased prnperty is situated"; 30 U.S.C. § 189. " ... 129. § 3009, 42 u.s.c.§ 6!)29. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the right of the States or mo. § 6001. 42 u.s.c.§ mJHL other local authol'ity to exel'cise any rights which they may have .... " 131. Watson, "State Control of Federal Pollution: Taking the Stick Away from 91. 1'e.rn.'IOil 111111Gas Corp. 1•. Phillips Prtmfe11111Co., 277 F.Supp. 366, 368-3(i9 the States," G gcoL. L.Q. 429, 446 note 87 (1977). (W.D. Okla. 1967), Hffd. 406 I<'.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1969). <·el'f.denied 39H U.S. 829 {1969). 1:32. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1!!72.7 U .S.C. §§ 1:m-Ia!ir. 92. Nor/he1·11Statex at 1146. Ia:-l. 7 U.S.C. § 18Ha. 93. Florida Lime at 141, quoting from Hiues 1·. /)ai1·rluwitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 l:-l4. 7 U.S.C. § 1:-lHa(d). (1941). This is sometimes treated instead as one of the several specific tests. 1:35. 7 U.S.C. § laHu. Northern States at 1147. 130. 7 U.S.C. § rnGu(a)(2J. 94. Plorida Lime at 142. 137. 7 u.s.c.§ l:36k. 95. Rfre at 230. 138. 7 U.S.C. § 136,•(a). 96. See, flt'll!'l'Hll!f, Florida Lim!' at 144, Huron l'urtla11d Cement Co., 362 U.S. 139. 7 U.S.C. § 1:-lG,•(b). 440, 442 (1960); Nor/hem Slate:-;at 1155 (dissenting opinion). 1-10. 7 U.S.C. § l:-l6v(c). 97. Se!'. efl., Section lOl(b)of the Pederal Water Pollution Control Act, :13 U.S.C. § 1251(b); Section lOl(a}(:H of the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(a)(3): 141. Sn·, l'{I •• Kfr11p1·1'. .Vl't1'.lfr.dm at 545-5-lti: '/im1111·1· ll'il-sl'if. ;1,1-lU.S. :385, Section l002(a)(4) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, -lOl ( Hl48J. 42 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(4). l.J.2. AS 16.05$IO-.H00: AS lG.l0.010-,050. 98. Nurllw1·11Stales at 1146. 143. Alrrnk11,· . .Vel.wm,No. 74·42 CH (Super. Ct., Virst ,Jud. Dist.. 197,0. 99. Hice at 230. 14-l. Sn' text accompanying notes 8G-87.

106 Appendix C

Chapman and Sheep Creeks Crossing Histories

Chapman Creek, Alignment Sheet 96, Pipeline rary structure is still necessary. Access roads exist on each Station 295 + 17 side of this stream. Stips. 2.4.3.1, 2.7.2.5." Action taken by AOFR: "Larger CMP - 60" installed." Jack A description of this creek and summary of government ·McCoy.August 23, 1976. monitoring actions at the crossing there appears in Chapter •February 20, 1976 JFWAT Advisory Memo #1979 VII. The following is a detailed chronology of those actions, Robert Hallock, JFWAT. "Other." drawn from field and office records of APO and JFWAT and "The following are _priority 1 (before breakup) items from the is included as an illustration of the kinds of field records Section IV JFWAT Pipeline punch list." includes: "AS 96, 295+17." used in preparing the Chapman Creek and other crossing his­ •May 18-26, 1976 Narrative Surveillance Report- Lewis tories summarized in Chapter VII. Pamplin, JFW AT. •February 28 1975 - JFWAT Advisory Memo #1505 "Similar problems to those which existed at Little Nasty have Julius Rockwell, JFWAT. "Non-Conformance" AS 96, Sta. occurred at two fish streams in A/S 96, Sta. 295+17 and 295+17. 417+80. The AOFRs have indicated to Alyeska field personnel Discussion of action: "Technical violation of AS 16; workpad that corrective actions, similar to those recently taken at the put across stream with culvert but without permit. Culvert Little Nasty, should be initiated immediately at the above was passing water and no immediate problem but culvert referenced streams." should be replaced with approved design within 30 days. This •May 22, 1976 JFWAT Advisory Memo #1795 - Lew is the 4th fish stream crossed without a permit of 4th in­ Pamplin, JFWAT. "Non-Conformance" AS 96 Sta. 295+17. spected. Recommend a QA report." "Due to the inadequate drainage structure installation in the Action taken by AOFR: "Not write F.M. without hyd. permit work pad (1(?) 36" CMP) at above referenced fish stream (HR if necessary." 3/2/75 Jack McCoy. has a multiplate) and resulting winter aufeising and spring •March 28-April 2, 1975-Narrative Surveillance Report­ melt, the work pad is eroding and the natural stream channel Keith Morehouse, JFW AT. is blocked with ice. This is very similar to the problem at Little "Advisory Memo No. 956 to J. McCoy dated 4/1/75. Response Nasty. Request, that APSC be required to immediately to FDCM No. CF-12, Location A/S 96, Sta. 295+50. A four­ remove the existing culvert and overexcava te 2' below CMP to part plan was requested which would utilize temporary cul­ restore stream channel and alleviate pad erosion. Recommend verts in lieu of the permanent design structure. Culverts a bridge or large multiplate be reinstalled prior to any would be removed prior to stream/fish critical periods. Ad­ equipment crossing this fish stream after runoff and visory memo stated that it appeared to be an excellent plan restoration." and was approved as outlined. Recommended fill materials Action taken by AOFR. "Told Aly to open this up and make a silt free, or essentially so, and effectively, cleaned out of chan­ work X-ing." nels when culverts are removed. Fish stream." Note on back: "Closed. Fish passage provided when •April 1, 1975 JFWAT Advisory Memo #956 - Keith restrictive bridge was removed week of 10/10/76. Pad now Morehouse, JFW AT. "Notice to Proceed" "Permit Action" closed."-Carl Burger, JFWAT 4+5. AS 96 Sta. 295+17/Sta. 415+50. •May 24, 1976 daily log- Jack McCoy, AOFR. "Appears to be an excellent decision approved as given. "Had a JFW AT concerns meeting ... work pad concerns ... Materials used for fill should be silt free or essentially so, and "3 Aufeis/stream crossing structures needed at A/S 96 Sta. effectively cleaned out of channels when culverts are removed. 417 & 295+17. Will be done." Fish stream channels (response to ADCM #CF-12)." •May 25 June 2, 1976 - Narrative Surveillance Report •April 7, 1975 - Field Memo, ref. FDCM CF-12- Herbert Robert Hallock, JFW AT. Kittler, AS 96, 295+17 Chapman Creek. "Notice to Proceed." "A bridge was installed at Sta. 295+17 and 417+25 in A/S 96. "Authority to install temp. 24" CMP is granted according to The temporary culverts at these stations were removed to provisions outlined in subject design change. Tern. CMP in­ prevent additional pad washouts this year. The channels are stallation for VSM installation will be coordinated with to be restored this summer." AOFR as advised by JFW AT personnel." •June 3, 1976 daily log Jack McCoy, AOFR. •July 19, 1975 - JFWAT Advisorr, Memo #1076 Dennis Ward, JFWAT. "Non-Conformance' -AS 96, 295+17, Chap­ "Both stream crossings, A/S 96, Sta. 295 & 425 are now man Creek. bridged and riprapped by structures which have alreadr, passed the bending machine, the heaviest piece of equipment. ' "This stream has been blocked with sand bags to raise water level for pumping. Barrier is impassable to fish up or down­ •August 16, 1976 JFW AT Advisory Memo Record, ref. stream. Remove this immediately or before 12:00 noonJuly20, A.M. #1505 Herb Kittler, JFWAT. A/S 96, Sta. 295+17. 1975. Violation of Stip. 2.5.1.1 fish passage." Problem: "Protocol." Action taken by AOFR: "Contractor notified through Alyeska Action requested by AOFR; "Oral approval given by AOFR staff bags removed." previously." •September 22, 1975 - JFWAT Advisory Memo #1650 Action taken by permittee: "Culvert installation completed; Robert Hallock, JFW AT. "Other" - AS 95, Sta. 295+17 fish culvert installation requested, required; and this requires stream. working in stream." "The temporary CMP was insufficient to meet the discharge •August 22, 1976 - JFWAT Advisory Memo Record, ref. during recent rains. As a consequence, it failed. JFW AT A.M. #956 - Jack McCoy, AOFR. recommends that a larger ( 60" CMP) be used if a tempo- "Action taken as per FDCM CF-R." 107 • August 23, 1976 JFW AT Advisory Memo #2343 - Robert mental and fisheries damage. JFW AT requests that APSC be Hallock, JFW AT. /(Non-Conformance" "Permit Action" -AS ordered to stop driving across Chapman Creek and that APSC 90 Sta. 1339700/ AS 96 Sta. 295+17. physically block the ROW on both sides of the creek to prevent "Channel restoration work should be completed at the above all vehicle access." stations before freezing conditions are encountered this fall. Action taken by AOFR: "No environmental damage is noted. These problem areas have been pending since 6 Feb. 1975. Permittee will be directed to place barricades prior to spring T~ey could not be completed this spring because of frozen run-off." Herbert Kittler. s01ls. • April 19-25, 1977 - Narrative Surveillance Report - Rober1 "Glacieririg,, ve~etat~ve cha~ges and fish passage problems Hallock, JFWAT. are antic1pai.:ed 1f this work 1s not completed now." "Equipment has been operating in the following fish streams . Action taken by AOFR: "Sympathized with JFW AT. Will this spring without authorization: Caribou Mt. Cr. Sta. 56+03 emphasize greensheet directed completion." AS 96, and Jackson's Slough Sts. 556+00 AS 97. These were all Note on back: "Work completed by 10/76 Closed." CB previously designated block points and they do not have •August 25, 1976 Field Memorandum #4023 Jack McCoy, drainage structures. All had natural or reestablished banks AOFR. "NTP" "Request for Service" - AS 90 and 96 fish and more positive blocking structures have been recommended." streams. •May 3, 1977 - Environmental Check Report #19-823 - "You are authorized and requested to remove the temporary Robert Gleason, EEL AS 96, Sta. 295+ 18. crossings and restore original thalweg elevation at A/S 90 Sta. 1339+00 and A/S 96 Sta. 295+17 and 417+25. These "Berms to be placed at both sides of stream block points AS 96, streams had serious aufeis accumulations in 1975-76 and will Sta. 195+18, and Sta. 417+61. These were a special request by be a continuing maintenance and fish passage problem. Work JFW AT to Aireska. Berms had been put up last year but the shall be as directBd on approved 'greensheets' prepared by. special 3 ft. high berms and signs were not done yet." Alyeska's restoration engineer. This work shall be scheduled Summary Recommendation: "The berms for AS 96, Sta. for accomplishment after the hydrotest and insulation 295+17 and 417+61 had not been done as requested by activities. The stipulations, Alyeska specs. ECPM and JFWAT.1' conditions of NTP 4RC-2 (Rev. 1-5) govern." •May 10-18, 1977 - Narrative Surveillance Report Lewis •August 31-September 7, 1976 Narrative Surveillance Pamplin/Lou Swenson, JFWA T. Report - Robert Hallock, JFW AT. "APSC indicates they will correct the drainage structure "Chapman Creek, AS 96, 295+17, HR 205+23. WCR #3315. deficiencies at Sta. 1339+00, A/S 90, the Little Nasty Creek, Haul road culvert is completely under water creating a Sta. 5708+00, A/S 87, Sta. 295+17 and 417+25, A/S96 and Sta. velocity barrier to fish migrating upstream. JFWAT recommends immediate steaming of culvert with subsequent 932+40, A/S 89, before freezing conditions prohibit work." installation of adequate drainage structures this summer. •September 14, 1976 note from Carl Burger to Jack McCoy Also restoration of work pad washouts upstream of haul road . on prefreezeup rehab priorities in Sec. IV includes: must be accomplished." " ... A/S 96 rehab. of channels from Sta. 295+17, (FM 4023) to 417+25, CMP removal on A/S 89, Sta. 932+10 ... "(Bridge­ •May 16, 1977 Environmental Check Report - #27-824 G.S. 76-487) EEL AS 96, Sta. 295+17. •March 16, 1977 Environmental Spot Check Report #19- "Berms set on 295+417 creeks AS 96. Berms had been pushec 822 - Robert R. Gleason, EEI. AS 96, Sta. 295+17. up at both creeks to stop traffic from crossing the stream~ "Work pad snow clearing. The work pad was being cleared at during the winter. Two-Ninety-Five Creek had a 3x10x20 ft the above-ground sections of pipe so that workers could get in eroded area on the north side where water had byl_)assedthE to make adjustments on the pipe support, insulate valves and ice in the creek. Flow had subsequently restored to its norma insulate VSMs. Clearing was typically done by bulldozer channel by eroding the ice. because of the 3 ft. of snow, the track was one lane wide with "In 417 creek there was a l'x3' erosion channel across the wod occasional turn-arounds cleared. Snow was left on the work pad where the stream had bypassed the stream ice. Cunently _pad 2 to 6 inches deep so that the dormant seeding will not be the water was flowing under the ice." affected. The clearing stopped well short of 295 creek. This Summary recommendation: "Berms were up on 295 + 41~ effort should do minimal damage to the dormant seeded work creeks. There was some erosion caused by initial flow: pad and no damage to water diversion ditches." bypassing the stream ice. Erosion had stopped by 5/14/77." Summary recommendation: "Work pad snow clearing was one lane wide, leaving a 2 to 6 inch pad to protect dormant AOFR - Permittee's Action to Date: "Acceptable" Jacl seeding and the clearing stopped short of 295 Cr AS 96." McCoy. AOFR comment: ''If we leave well enough alone, th, AOFR-Permittee's action to date: "Acceptable." Jack fish will be happy. All traffic is blocked." McCoy. AOFR comment: "This report does not substantiate •May 17, 1977 AT Advisory Memo #3315 - Le~ wanton destruction of cross-drain levees." Pamplin and Lou Swenson, JFWAT. "NCR" AS 96, Sta •March 22-23, 1977 Narrative Surveillance Report - 295+17 (HR 205+23) Chapman Creek. Charles Kay. "Ref stips 1.18.1, 2.4.1.2, 2.5.1.1, 2.8.1. Inadequate drainag, "Chapman Creek Sta. 295+17 A/S 96 North Fork of Windy control at above haul road location (structure too small, ic, Arm Creek Sta. 417+25 A/S 96. blocks) is causing velocity barrier which blocks upstream fisl "At Chapman Creek and the North Fork of Windy Arm migration and will result in unnecessary long-term erosion o Creek, JFW AT observed that vehicles had driven around or haul road. In addition, WP material from previous yeari over the berms at these two block points and across the washouts at above ref. pipeline sta. is present and area aufeised creeks; stipulations similar to that observed at unrestored. JFW AT recommends immediate action to stean French Creek Zero. open HR CMP and subsequent work this summer to includ "JFW AT NCR Adv. Memos #3269 and 3270 were directed to additional drainage installation and restoration." AOFR Kittler and AOFR Kittler stated, 'No environmental Action taken by AOFR: "Need bigger culvert at HR." damage is noted. Permittee will be directed to place barricades prior to spring runoff.' " • March 30, 1977 JFW AT Advisory Memo #3269- Charles Sheep Creek, Alignment Sheet 102 Kay, JFWAT. "Non-Conformance" AS 96, Sta. 295+17. Station 933 + 01 ' "Ref. stips 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2.2, 2.4.1.1, 2.4.1.2, 3.9.1, and attached poloroid photo. APSC has been driving across Chapman A description of this creek and summary of governmen Creek. This area was ----, graded, seeded, and monitoring actions at the crossing there appears in Chapte fertilized last fall and is listed as a block point. Now that a track has been established, others will utilize this unauthor­ VII. The following is a detailed chronology of those actiom ized crossing, thereby increasing the probability of environ- drawn from field and office records of APO and JFW AT, am

108 is included as an illustration of the kinds of field records used Action proposed/taken by Permittee: "2 60" CMP's installed­ in preparing the Sheep Creek and other crossing histories situation confused by change in personnel thus unsatisfactory job resulted. This was AOFR/JFWAT fault more than APSC. summarized in Chapter VIL In 1976 CMP's tore out and LWC installed. This LWC washed out due to steep grading of creek. (See AOFR memo on file •December 10, 1974 daily log Schroeder, AOFR. regarding our attempt to force low gradient.) Recommenda­ "South with Pamplin and Metsker to look at stream X-ings in tions now are to let the stream seek its own gradient with some attempt to resolve issue of 100 foot buffer required on NTP. rock work for pooling." Schroeder, August 25, 1976. Received permission to clear and construct pad to (garbled) •June 15, 1975 - daily log - AOFR. and nearest each bank of stream. At Sheep Creek ... contractor unaware of buffers and JFWAT 1s requirement for "Twin culvert installation at Sheep Creek crossing started X land before clearing can proceed. Foreman outlined plan to many problems connected with installation." shoofly wherever possible at small streams, rather than cross. •June 21-25, 1975 - Narrative Surveillance Report Julius . . . Metsker and Pamplin indicated September through Rockwell. November was probably the best time to cross, unofficially." "There was a list of required actions when I arrived and, • May 23, 1975 - JFW AT Advisory Memo #1563 Lou 11 1 unfortunately, a larger list when I left, as follows: ... perched Pamplin, JFWAT. Permit Action.' culvert on Sheep Creek (3 HR 2018+85 (AS 102)) needs "Reference Alaska Statute 16, Federal Stipulations 2.4.1.3, attention. Check to see if corrected." 2.5.1.1, and 2.7.2.5; there is no objection to the installation of •June 24-July 2, 1975 - Narrative Surveillance Report - the below listed drainage structures and/or work pad Burger, JFWAT. construction at the following fish streams (see attached sheet). Final ADF&G approval (Anchorage) will follow/' Includes "Another problem area requiring followup is a block to fish Sheep Creek, AS 933+01. Drainage structures: "48" CMP passage created by perched work pad culvert and last year's with letdown structure and still in basin." Remarks:" 'Neck haul road construction at Sheep Creek (AS 102)." down' pad at stream crossing and provide downstream •June 29, 1975 JFWAT Advisory Memo #1045 - Carl siltation control measures." Burger, JFWAT. "Non-Conformance." Note: "The above structures and/or construction methods "Installation of work pad culverts at Sheep Creek has not were resolved by field inspection on 5/22/75 with ... "(four provided for fish passage (stip. 2;5.1.1) in that the outlet flows names, not legible). are perched some four feet above stream's water level. Action taken by F .R. Schroeder: "FM issued." ASPC in Attempt has not been made to establish grade to HR culverts, agreement. as requested on 6/9 {JFW AT Memo #1583). The JFW AT requests that permittee submit plan for fish _passageASAP. • May 24, 1975 APO Field Memo #2906 Schroeder, Suggest that clean, mixed gravels and sen es of .pools be AOFR. "Other." considered to establish grade not exceeding 3 percent. "Crossings as proposed in your memo 23 May 75 and JFWAT Additionally, outlet of HR culverts is directing flows over memo 23 May 75 are acceptable and construction may vegetation and weir exists at original stream banks. This proceed. Among the streams listed, Sheep Creek, Station second block to fish passage must be corrected." 933+01 - two 48" CMP with basin." Action taken by AOFR Sahr: "A plan for resting pools up and •June 9, 1975 - daily log - AOFR. downstream has been submitted by L. Pamplin." "AS 102 -fish streams - Sheep Creek. Request for rehabilita­ Advisory Memo Record for AM 1045. tion of stream in attempt to re-establish fish habitat." Action requested by AOFR: "By installing LWC or lowering CMP." •June 9, 1975 - APO Field Memo #1432 - F. Schroeder. Action proposed/taken by Permittee: "LWC Installed March "Other." 76, reference also Memo 2508 wherein JFWAT has removed "Sheep Creek station 933+01. In reviewing this site 8June 75 I Sheep Creek from non-conformance status and requests am convinced that minimal effort would re-establish several study. I concur." Schroeder, August 11, 1976. miles of excellent fish stream habitat. For this reason I am On back of the Advisory Memo is written, "Plan submitted superseding reference memo above (FM 2906 dated 24 May and implemented. Fish passage appears to be provided. 75) and requesting that the basin as previously agreed to be Closed as of 10/76.'' Burger. negated. The culverts may be placed and pad construction proceed provided a uniform gradient be established between Advisory Memo Record for AM 1045. (second one) the haul road culvert {outlet) and the pad culverts (outlet). The Action Requested: "Reevaluate crossing to replace culvert pad culvert should then be placed to accommodate properly, co-install L WC so as to provide proper stream construction of short segments of channel between the road velocity." and the pad and fish passage criteria be utilized re: gradient. Action proposed/taken by Permittee: "Proposed to remove Additional work on this action may include a rock filled culvert and rework up and downstream of crossing to allow channel upstream from the pad and a small amount of work for desired velocities this did not occur. Unfortunately until upstream from the haul road. This work will mitigate damage the Spring of 76. This is not particularly a fish stream - that is previously caused by the winter trail." a couple fish have been observed between the Haul Road and work pad." Sahr, August 21, 1976. •June 9, 1975 - JFWAT Advisory Memo#1583. L. Pamplin, JFWAT. "Other." •July 4, 1975 daily log AOFR. "As a result of our field review and discussions on potential "Sheep Creek claimed by miner Vern Miller. Outcome will impact and possible mitigative measures I concur with your affect requirements for work pad culverts." recommendations that the proposed culverts be installed •August 17, 1975 JFWAT Advisory Memo #1758. Lou without letdown structures and an attempt be made to Pamplin, JFWAT. "Non-Conformance." establish grade to haul road culverts which will facilitate fish movements. This can possibly be accomplished b.ya system of "At present there are several constructed areas, scattered pools and riffles in the excavated channel." Action taken by throughout the above referenced alignment sheets, which AOFR Schroeder: "FM issued requesting study by APSC and have not received adequate attention by APSC as relates to culvert placed accordingly." minimizing impact to fish and wildlife resources. The attached sheets designate." Advisory memo record to AM 1583. Problem: "Creek damage by old winter train and haul road Action taken by AOFR: "To communicate to APSC for culvert midstream channel at downstream side." action." Action requested by AOFR: (Field Memo) "Based upon re­ Attached sheets include in part: analysis with Pamplin, JFWAT, I recommended we try to salvage the stream for fish passage." "(6) AS 102. Station 933+01 {Sheep Creek). Stipulation

109 violatfon: 2.5.1.1. Past correspondence: JFWAT AM #1583 concerns. Work must be done before freezeup, as froze dated 6/9/75; 1045 dated 6/29/75. Action required: 'Fish ground will hinder efforts otherwise. Also, please advis passage be provided; present structure is totally unaccepta­ permittee that they are not in conformance with Alaska Tit) ble.' Completion time; prior to freezeup 1975." 16.05.870." Action taken by AOFR Sahr: "Request action by APSC." Advisory Memo Record for AM 1758. Action reiuested: "Forwarded list and comments to APSC Advisory Memo Record for AM 1853, dated 9/24/75. Locatim for action. 1- Sheep Creek; 2- Union Creek; 3- Nutirwik Creek; 4- Action taken by Permittee: "Action or lack of action to have N/A. been field check to assure compliance.HSahr, August 21, 1976. Arrow to Sheep Creek says, "See FM 2508-Burger JFWA classes this as no longer NC condition. Requests reevaluatioi •September 3-11, 1975 - Narrative Surveillance Report - also 1045." Burger, JFWAT. Problem: "Fish blockage at 1 and 2, stream regrading at: "A list of fish and wildlife concerns on Section V were culvert installation at 4." generated this week outlining 13 pipeline and haul road Action Requested by AOFR: "Because of delays and mm problems (see Advisory Memo #1745, attached). A particular pressing concerns, as well as disagreement on item 3, APS concern on this list are Sheep Creek, AS 102, PL 933+01; Hr requested and was granted by AOFR relief on doing items. 2018+85 ... Following three months of verbal and written 2, and 3 until Spring 1976. No environmental damage coul requests to provide for fish passage at the work pad and haul be cited, thus schedule was not critical. Item 4 was requested road crossings at Sheep Creek, there has been no response Action Proposed/Taken by Permittee: "1. Rehab. w::: from APSC except for promises planned to correct the attempted March 76, but failed. JFW AT has demanded mm situation." than APSC can supply at this location, that being a gradier •September 9, 1977 JFWAT Advisory Memo#1745-Carl less than the original stream, thus guaranteeing fish passag1 Burger, JFWAT. "Non-conformance" "Other." AV analysis is necessary." "Reference JFWAT Memo #1758 (8/17/75). Enclosed list of •September 26, 1975 - daily log - Sahr, AOFR. concerns and requests for action supplement those in memo "Note plan from APSC as to Sheep Creek rehab. Metzk1: referenced above. Pipeline and haul road concerns are listed develop plan - gave to Jacobson for work." herein, to which APSC has not given adequate attention in regard to stip. compliance in minimizing fish and wildlife •September 24-30, 1975 - Narrative Surveillance Report - impacts. Work must be completed as per enclosures." Howard Metzker. Action taken by AOFR Schroeder: "Will transfer modified "Advisory memo #527 was submitted to the AOFR pointin list to APSC for punchlist action on pad refurbishment." out considerations and providing fish passage through th Alignment Sheet 102. Station PL 933+01 HR 2018+85 (Sheep CMP on Sheep Creek, AS 102, Station 933+01. Se Creek). Stipulations: 2.5.1.1 (Non-conformance). Concern: attachment." "Reference JFWAT Memos 1583 (6/9/75) and 1045 (6/29/75). •September 26, 1975-JFWAT Advisory Memo #52' A summer of fish passage has been blocked due to destruction "Other." at winter trail crossing, work pad culverts and haul road culverts. Three months have elapsed without correction by "Points to be considered for fish passage of Sheep Creek ar Permittee." attached .... Action required: "Provide fish passage at work pad crossing 1. Work for fish passage is required before October 1, 1971 and haul road crossing. Road culvert was not skewed 2. Stream channel between haul road and work pad need according to plan. Channel work is necessary downstream to be reconstructed. An approximate 2' vertical dro and u.pstreani of haul road culvert. Work must be completed exists in present channel which is considered to be a fis before freezeup." block. Should be corrected before stream bed is froze1 3. Upper end of right bank culvert needs to be cleared c •September 9, 1975 daily log-AO FR. Refers to: JFWAT (garbled) bank gravel material. Culvert is complete] Advisory Memo #1745, Undated notes on list of concerns in blocked. AOFR log. Includes AS102 Station 933+01. "OK." 4. Downstream culvert outfall needs to be grade Advisory Memo Record for AM 1745. downstream with a series of pools, none of which shoul Subject: "All road culvert erosion AS 102/' be over 4-6 drop height, to the present stream grade, 3( Problem: '1See 1038, 1744, 1898, 2508." 40 feet downstream. A (garbled) stream bank will b Action Requested: "Plan submittal." required the entire length, plus an extended distanc Action taken: "August 76 fix up. Reference Memo AOFR to downstream 10-20 feet. Pools to be constructed should b AOR 27 July 76." Schroeder, August 11, 1976. stream width and 3-4 feet in length. 5. The work upon completion must satisfy both the AOF: •September 10-17, 1975 Narrative Surveillance Report - and JFW AT before acceptance is given." Morehouse, JFWAT. 6. Spring maintenance is required." "No action appears to be forthcoming before freezeup on the Sheep Creek (AS 102, Station 933+01) problems which were Action taken by AOFR Sahr: HPlan to be given to APSC fc identified early last summer. But the appropriate pressures work - may be a legal implication due to mining claims." quickly brought to bear. The pad culvert is still perched and •October 5, 1975 - daily log Schroeder, AOFR. no channel provisions have been made between the HR and work pad. Spring will again find a no fish passage situation at "Plan for Sheep Creek rehabilitation received. Holding fc this location if steps are not taken at this time to provide JFW AT review." suitable accommodation which will allow fish passage to •October 6, 1975 daily log Schroeder, AOFR. above the HR. The work pad culvert may require being reset "Looked at Sheep Creek and submitted my version of whl: or pulled out altogether." · · should be accomplished (FM 1645). No JFWAT here, bt •September 24, 1975 JFWAT Advisory Memo #1853 their input in hand from previous tour. Will be essentially Carl Burger, JFWAT. "Non-conformance." "High priority compromise between two extremes, and better than either. concerns." •October 7, 1975 daily log Schroeder, AOFR. "Reference stips. 2.5.1.1, 2.8.1, 2.5.2.4, 2.4.3.1 and JFWAT memos 1583, 1045, 1745, 1722, 963, 1743 and 1748. Despite "FM 1648 issued authorizing work at Sheep Creek then take continuous requests for plans and rehab from APSC, existing back when APSC engineers couldn't agree on design. Wi fish passage blocks and erosion potentials have not been await decision." addressed in the following areas: •October 7, 1975 APO Field Memo #1648 - Schroedel Sheep Creek, AS 102: PL 933+01. Unnamed. AOFR. "Please consult the above references, JFW AT punchlist and "Your proposal to construct a five foot LWC (insulated) l Ken Durley's (APSC) [Alyeska field biologist] assessment of acceptable. Attached are sketches of the original strear 110 :!onfiguration followed by a generalized alignment which •Novembe1· 1, 1975 daily log Schroeder, AOFR. :1pproximates the original. The gradient is steep in the "Discussed Sheep Creek with Simmons, Arctic, and gave copy stream, thus any coverture and rootwrapping which slow the of FM 1648 ,:vith attachments." water and reduce its gradiant is desirable. . . . If your ·•February 24-March 3, 1976 - Narrntive Surveillance Re­ engineers agree with this plan, you are authorized to initiate port - Carl Burger, JFWAT. work when equipment is available .... " "Jack Cushing (APSC Arctic Engineer) submitted a lengthy Reference drawings apparently misattached to FM 1646, prebreakup restoration list. JFWAT's rehabilitation con­ dated October 6 and located in the file. FM 1645 which log cerns were included (Sheep Creek, AS 100 Fish Stream, etc.). indicates Schroeder's version of Sheep Creek not in file. R. Simmons, Arctic, promised completion of JFWAT priority •October 7, 1975 Narrative Surveillance Report Carl concerns by breakup. AOFR's support JFW AT's request." Burger, JFWAT. •March 6, 1976 daily log - Schroeder, AOFR. "After four months of frustrating requests and several non­ "Discussion Cushing, APSC, on Sheep Ct'eek. Need for work conformances, Sheep Creek (AS 102:933+01) was staked for before A/G instruction." active action by J. Cushing APSC. Cushing believes that the •March 7, 1976 daily log - AOFR. stream bed below two perched CMP's and the work pad can be "FM 2239 Sheep Creek Advisory AS 102." built up with pools and select fill. Ditching upstream of the •March 7, 1976 APO Field Memo #2239 Schroeder, work pad will also tend to rectify fish passage problems below AOFR. "Other." the haul road culvert. Despite the effort to attempt to build up the streambed below the work pad, however, memo #1864 "Sheep Creek has been an issue since June 75 when the exist­ (attached) points out that culvert removal and low water ing drainage structure was installed. In agreements between crossing installation may be more suitable and less costly in AOFR/JFWAT and APSC, this crossing is to be modified the long run." before break-up. Modification will require complete access in the area between the A/G pipe and the Haul.Road. This memo •October 14, 1975 JFWAT Advisory Memo #1864. "Permit is to alert you well in advance that pipe replacement across Action" Other." this section will not be allowed before the modifications have "Reference stips. 2.5.1.1, 2.4.3.1 and Alaska Title 16.05.870. been completed and accepted. The commitment to complete This memo authorizes construction as Sheep Creek for the this work prior to freeze-l!p previously made by APSC was purpose of providing fish passage. APSC has promised to delayed by AOFR at APSC request and to the dismay of complete work by freezeup, this year. On 10/12/75 I observed JFW AT representatives. The commitment then made by the staking of this creek by J. Cushing (APSC). Under his plan APSC to AOFR is considered binding. Please initiate appro­ CMP's would remain and bed will be elevated with select fill priate instructions accordingly. Attachments: All previous and pools below inlet. Excavation upstream will tie channel to FM on the subject." HR CMP's. Recalled that APSC has been advised by AOFR •March 21, 1976 daily log AOFR. Schroeder and myself that a LWC may be more suitable for Discussion/instructions with Squires. Re: work at . . . Also fish passage and less costly in the long run. If present plan again requested/suggested they get on Sheep Creek ... '\:vill fails, a LWC will be requested. In my mind, the best solution is seek Cushing, APSC, and will begin J?UShfor response. As to pull CMP's to natural grade and close access across Sheep March ends, the time for more direct action is approaching." Creek, after pipe -installation, a_n~let mainten~nce equipmeryt •March 22, 1976 daily log Sf'•woPnPl\ AOFR. access by north and south exlstmg roads. Fmal hydrolog1c authorization (Anchorage) will follow." No indicated action ·"Discussion with Elston on Sheep Creek - he is studying pos­ by AOFR. sibilities and will start work shortly." ... Meeting with Arctic, APSC, APO, etc. •October 15, 1975 Field Memo #1655. "Other." "l. Sheep Creek Fly out with Tinkler and set up work ... "This FM supersedes FM 1648 7 October 75: Authorization Choppered to Sheep Creek with Tinkler/Simmons, then granted to construct the crossing as proposed in Cushing talked to Cushing and Loftus, APSC. Cushing \\fants to wait drawing, dated 12 October 75. The riprap in column one as for restoration crew to do work. I requested a written guaran­ shown in AOFR drawing issued under FM 1648 is still tee before I'd let B/G off the hook." suggested, especially in the area between Haul Road and Pad. •March 23, 1976 daily log Schroeder, AOFR. Copy of JFW AT Memo 1864 is attached for your information. "Discussion with Loftus, APSC, re: Sheep Creek. Request that Because of the general difference of opinion as to the design of he consider doing blasting with very light charges, just to this crossing, the final acceptance will be based upon loosen ground for civil crew. Elston to consider the alterna­ performance. Construction is left to your option regarding tives." culvert or LWC." •March 28, 1976 daily log AOFR. •October 19, 1975 daily log - AOFR. "The pre break-up rebuilding of area of Sheep Creek has been "Per Cushing APSC Sheep Creek to be LWC per FM 1648. ... shot, but no other activities started. J. Cushing ... is on R & R, LWC to be installed at Sheep Creek." so that no one is coordinating pre break-up work-this fact was pointed out to H. Fackler and a request made to get APSC •October 15-22, 1975 - Narrative Surveillance Report - rep. to direct pre break-up restoratmn or the AOFR will Morehouse, JFWAT. necessarily take steps to insure action. H. Fackler indicated "Spoke to the AOFR about the problem of getting action on that restoration work to begin with W.P. Crews from north long-standing concerns of Sheep Creek (933+01) and the finish, approximately 1 April no one has been designated to AS 100 fish stream loss. The Sheep Creek situation is that follow up on restoration work until J. Cushing returns ... " there has not been fish passage over the last season due to •March 23-31, 1976 - Narrative Surveillance Report- Carl perched culvert, etc. We have been promised action, but none Burger, JFWAT. has been forthcoming. The latest plan is removal of the culvert Memo indicates that production appears to be getting higher (best plan yet) and installation of an LWC. It remains to be priority than rehabilitation or erosion control again. "To date seen if spring brings fish passage on Sheep Creek." only RX 1 & 3 are under restoration and Sheep Creek (AS 102) •October 21-28, 1975 Narrative Surveillance Report has been blasted for stream restoration. . .. (In regard to Carl Burger, JFWAT. Sheep Creek, A G pipeline is now welded through the area. "Despite an apparent satisfactory plan for fish passage at Hopefully, the big game crossing which straddles the creek Sheep Creek (AS 102) in early October, it is now evident that will allow equipment access with channel restoration for fish work will not commence until just prior to breakup. This is not passage.)" in conformance with APSC promises that work would be com­ •March 31, 1976 - daily log - Schroeder, AOFR. pleted by freezeup. However, contractors are presently at­ tempting to restore fish passage at another high priority area: "Sheep Creek channel is wrong place. Loftus says, 'Operator AS 100 (523+33) ... Areas in Section V reqmring further blew it.' Told him we would have to correct and incorporate action include ... several high priority items (to be complete with old location." by breakup) such as fish passage at Sheep Creek (AS 102) ... " •April 6, 1976 daily log AOFR.

111 "Weekly meeting held at Dietrich. 1. Pre break-up stress. some problems which have been previously documented st APSC promised their 20-30 beds for civil crew in Telcon with not resolved such as: Sheep Creek ... " Ferguson, PM, he claimed ignorance of lack of action and says •May 6, 1976 - daily log AOFR. work will be done. Crunches on equipment to haul padding, "Per J. Cushing (APSC) Sheep Creek, sandbag dike to be r riprap, etc. Fuel line work ... tying this up. AIC trucks (6) to placed with permanent dike." be headed this direction tomorrow. Jacobson, APSC, in meet­ ing and will be on top of action. Weather has forced us into an •May 14, 1976 daily log - Schroeder, AOFR. early break-up posture and may cause some trouble. Every "Observed Sheep Creek flow. I see no chance of establishil effort will be made by the team to get critical items." any sort of important fishery up this stream and am inclin1 •April 14, 1976 daily log - Schroeder, AOFR. to question going on with rehabilitation." "Discussion with Cushing on Sheep Creek. Apparently the •May 17, 1976 - daily log - AOFR. pooling and filling of the stream channel is pref erred by Jack. "Tour south with Anderson, MRI, Gustafson, JFW AT, Cus I'm tired of this one and intend to let the crossing go in as ing, and Craig, APSC, to view training dike at 103-0. Resolv1 APSC wishes. If it doesn't hold, I suppose we start again (for all fish issues to all satisfaction. Based on location of bank the 4th time)!" suggested maintaining stream inside of bank to outlet •April 20, 1976 - daily log Schroeder, AOFR. lowe1:end. 48" CMP will provide adequate discharge capaci~ I believe. Culvert through 103-0 access road requires m01 "Tour south with Burger and Hoskins. Sheep Creek not yet than 10 foot cut, and the area dO\vnstream is not good habita correct. Burger to handle request for berm with Cushing. Oil This was removed from consideration." spills at Sheep Creek ... " •May 25, 1976 daily log - Sahr, AOFR. •April 6-14, 1976 Narrative Surveillance Report - Carl Burger, JFWAT. "Sheep Creek water has undermined insulation ar washed part of insulation downstream. Needs rework." "Strong AOFR support initiated the start of APSC's ECl pro­ gram in our pre-breakup concerns, starting south to north. • May 25, 1976 - Spot-Check Report #089-27 4 - Anders< According to Brent Stonebreaker (APSC management) some MRI. five crews will complete as much as possible on the green Description: "Observed washed out LWC Sheep CreE sheet. At least one crew will concentrate on AOFR Schroeder's Work pad. Routine non-conformance." list of priorities (fish passage concerns, erosion control, etc.). Explanation: "High ,vater ,vashed out work pad and insul Work on Sheep Creek restorations [AS 102 is nearing comple­ tion obviously this LWC was not installed to correct dept tion]." Suggested remedial action: reinstall when flood waters i •April 13-21, 1976 Narrative Surveillance Report Mark dO\vn." Buckley, JFW AT. [Pre-breakup, Sheep Creek] AOFR comment: "Discussed with Craig and Cushing, APSC "It now appears very likely that all our high priority pre­ Remedial Action Report for SCR 0-89-274. July 16, 197 breakup concerns will be adequately addressed. However, Anderson, MRI. Sheep Creek, AS 102, has been worked on, but is incomplete Remedial Action Observed: "Wot·k pad washed out debr and, therefore, unacceptable. Exigencies of the fuel gasline cleaned up. If LWC needed for future, Section IV will do.' work in Section VI have drained away some valuable men and •May 30, 1976 daily log Schroeder, AOFR. equipment from the EC-1 crews, but, hopefully, the schedule will still be met." "Olein, AOFR 6, down to look over crossings-LWC-atfo streams. Problems noted with large rock moving to dow1 •April 20-28, 1976 Narrative Surveillance Report - Carl stream end and blocking passage ... Noted the fall line Burger, JFWAT. Sheep Creek fill-in operation without riprap and with mi "LWC and channel reconstruction were implemented at located channel completely destroyed by high flows as pre Sheep Creek (AS 102) recently, but not fully in accordance dieted. Back to the drawing board." with last year's plans. Advisory Memo 1889 (attached) sug­ •June 4, 1976 - JFWAT Advisory Memo #2508 Ca gested that additional measures, including full construction Burger, JFWAT. "Punchlist." "Non-conformance." "Other to assure fish passage. When passage is provided, JFW AT "See attached list of items requiring work. Items 5 and 8 on: NCR-1045 should be cleared." are non-conformances at present." •April 24, 1976 JFWAT Advisory Memo #1889 Carl Action taken by AOFR Sahr: "See FM 3756." Burger, JFW AT. "Other." 11 Attached punchlist: The following are general and specif "Reference stips. 2.8.1 and 2.5.1.1. As per our field review and items requiring attention in Section V: ... informal discussions with APSC, JFWAT recommends addi­ tional bed excavation and/or construction of the small dike (7) AS 102, Sheep Creek. LWC has failed. JFW AT no at northern extremity of newly built channel adjacent to haul recommends that insulation pieces be cleaned frrn road so that flow integrity is assured. (Rehab crews should be stream and channel left for study. Large rocks must t passing this area shortly.) Also, JFW AT still feels that series replaced in stream as philosophy barriers, howeve of pools are necessary below LWC and below HR CMP's to en­ Also, widening of the rechanneled portion parallelin sure fish passage. Placement of large rocks in channel should haul road may help. J FW AT feels that wol'I<:pa also be of benefit to migrating fish." access should be restricted through Sheep Creek." Action taken by AOFR Knight: "Will advise APSC (Cushing) •June 4, 1976 APO Field Memo #3756 - Sahr, AOF: of above and continue to monitor and take all actions neces­ "Other." sary to assure fish passage." "RE: JFWAT FM 2508 and attach Burger/Sahr 5 June 7 •April 25, 1976 daily log Knight, AOFR. Your attention is directed to the following list of discrepanci "On Sheep Creek Burger (JFW AT) to check for fish pas- which require attention or reply as to intentions: sage potential." 1. Immediate attention LWC maintenance, are pum ing silt excessively - provide fish passage. •May 3, 1976 - daily log - AOF'R. 2. Immediate a.ttentiou - culvert plug AS 103 north of M "FM 3800-2 issue for work on Sheep Creek and silt control at 103.0. AF 103, station 1258. [Sukakpak] Action needed soon." 3. AS 100 SC #1, No prior field approval given for co •May 3, 1976 - APO Field Memo #3800-2 Schroeder, struction. Provide drainage around dike tip to river f, AOFR. "Green sheet work Sheep Creek; and AS 103.""Other." high river drainage. "Please take immediate action on the following problem areas 4. Immediately south of (3) above take steps to stop erosic involving fish streams: AS 102, Station 933 Sheep Creek: A of exit of slough. sand bag or gravel berm is needed to keep creek in the con­ 5. See item #4 of JFWAT FM above (Union Creek). Ir structed flow channel. Presently more flow goes over the silt mediate attention. area than through the channel. Minimal labor can accomplish 6. See item #5 of JFWAT FM above -Immediate atte this job/' tion. [Same for J FW AT items #6 and #7 (Sheep Creek 9. Areas of thermal degradation AS 102, 103 and 105 - •May 5, 1976 - daily log - Knight, AOFR. this time take steps to insure integrity of Haul Roadd1 "Made ground and aerial check of area south of Dietrich to erosion, prevent silting into streams at lower enc

112 Work problem of permanent solution. face at low flow. 10. Immediate action - AS 106, station 72+43 fish stream 4. Needs to be reasonably maintenance free. trench construction nearby. 5. Should meet above requirements as economically as 11. AS 109 take steps to minimize siltation from road, possible." · X-ing to north." No indicated action by AOFR Williams (Department of High­ Action taken by Pennittee: "Items 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, ways). care of as required within seven days items 3, 5, 7, 9 re­ •September 26, 1976 daily log Schroeder, AOFR. quired further study and was turned over to Section IV \Vhen change over occurred." Noted August 18, 1976 by Sahr. "Discussed ... (and] Sheep Creek hope problems have been cleaned up - appears to be an agreement between Burger •June 15, 1976 Narrative Surveillance Report Carl JFWAT, Cushing, and Craig, APSC." ' Burger, ,JF'WAT. •October 5, 1976 daily log - AOFR. "The punch list generated last tour (memo 2508) at AO FR's suggestion has induced some APSC action. Revegetation is "To Gailbraith to omission agreed to or discussed to be done at progressing well, but there have been no attempts to water or 22 September meeting with Keyes and staff and Moolin/ otherwise maintain ceilings or last year's returning vegeta­ Stoneb1·eaker APSC per AOFR Olien request. Items included tion. Low water crossings still need maintenance and more work at two fish streams, the Sandbag and fishladder AS 101 work is necessary at Sheep Creek." and Sheep Creek 102. Stonebreaker claims items not dis­ ~ussed and agreed upon, however, they just neglected to be •July 1, 1976 daily log Sahr. AOFR. mcluded in notes. I am tired of being in middle and arguing!" "NC FM 3962 Sheep Creek Reconstruction of LWC and clean­ •October 20, 1976 Spot-Check Report C045-448. up." Spot check performed: "Checked progress of rehabilitation APO Field Memo #3962, July 1, 1976, Sahr, AOFR. "Non­ work on Sheep Creek and sandbag fishladder on AS 101. conforrnance." Greensheets have been issued and approved for these two pre­ "Reference stips. 2.5.1.1 and 2.7.2.5. You are being cited in freezeup items. Routine nonconformance." violation of the stipulations for obstructing fish passage and Explanation: "Work on these two areas has not started to debris in Sheep Creek. Verbal request have been made to re­ date." design and reconstruct the Sheep Creek LWC and remove in­ AOFR Comment: "Track and RAR." sulation in the creek for the past month, and to date no effort has been made to do so. It is understood that construction ac­ Remedial Action Reort for SCR 45-448. tivities at this location are the responsibilities of APSC, sec­ Action Observed: "Rehab. of Sheep Creek and AS 101 fishlad­ tion IV and Green Associates. However, it is still the responsi­ der area has been completed according to approved green­ bility of APSC to comply with the stipulations regardless of sheets." November 4, 1976. the section. Please take the appropriate action to insure the •September 14-22, 1976 - Narrative Surveillance Report - above is accomplished ASAP you are requested to reply as Gustafson, JFW AT. to action taken regarding the above by 3 July 76." 1. Out of spec CMP's Section V haul road includes Sheep Action taken by Permittee: "Debris clean up and condition of Creek. Reason velocity. the LWC acceptable to JFWAT" (No date.). 2. JFWAT linewide inventory. Date 9/22/76. Subject •June 30-July 7, 1976 Narrative Surveillance Report area Work Pad, federal land. Section V. Carl Burger, JFWAT. Subject area: haul road. "The following Advisory Memos were issued: Includes in part: Sheep Creek Station HR 2018+85. Problem: "fish passage blocked; road CMP's never #2517'. The failure of LWC at Sheep Creek (AS 102) was docu­ mented one month ago when JFW AT advised that insulation skewed as per original plans." pieces be removed from stream and that velocity controls Document reference: AM 1045-6/29/75. 1745-9/9/75. (large rock) be considered for fish passage. This memo was 1853-9/24/75. 1864-10/14/75. 1889-4/24/75. 2508-6/5/ issued due to absence of action from Permittees. The memo 76. 2517-7/1/76. also advised that general LWC maintenance is necessary Recommendation: "Re-install HR CM P's as per origi­ through Section V. AOFR Sahr took appropriate action .... ,. nal plans to provide fish passage; or, construct tie-in. •July 1, 1976 JFWAT Advisory Memo #2517 Carl channels along west side of road." Burger, JFWAT. "Other." Timing: before break-up '77. "Reference stips. 2.2.1.1 and 2.5.1.1. This item is not critical or Subject area: Work pad, federal land. urgent but needs attention, as per our punch list issued nearly AS 102. Station 933+01. Problem: "Fish passage a month ago (JFWAT Memo 2508). Cleanup of LWC failure block; inadequate erosion control." (insulation pieces, etc.) and placement of a few large rocks for Document reference: AM 1045-6/29/75. 1745-9/9/75. velocity control is again recommended. (Also, LWC mainte­ 1853-9/24/75. AM 1864-10/14/75. AM 1889-4/24/75. nance throughout Section V is necessary.)" AM 2508-6/5/76. AM 2517-7/1/76. Action taken by AOFR Sahr: "Issued NC FM 3962." Recommendation: "Provide fish passage and imple­ •July 8, 1976 daily log Schroeer, AOFR. ment adequate erosion control measures." "Discussed Sheep Creek Tom, EEI, erroneously estimated Timing: before break-up '77. flow at ten times Q 50 during a washout. After I pointed out •September 28-October 6, 1976 - Narrative Surveillance road culvert capacity upstream made that impossible, he Report Jack Gustafson, JF',WAT. agreed his figure must be an error. He did agree the best solu­ "Priority pre-freeze of items which should be worked on as tion would be to establish natural grade and suggested traffic soon as possible include: be routed around after construction." (b) AS 102 HR 2018+85: need a plan and execution of the •September 18, 1976 JFWAT Advisory Memo #2954 plan for rehab of Sheep Creek." Gustafson, JFWAT. Location Mostly Haul Road Locations. •October 12-19, 1976 - Narrative Surveillance Report "Non-Conformance." Jack Gustafson, JFW AT. "Blocks to fish passage referenced at 2.5.1.1. This is a re­ "Green sheets have been issued for work at Sheep Creek and minder that HR culverts at Coon Gulch Creek, Sheep C,·eek the sandbag 'fish ladder.' According to APSC Engineer, the AS 104 Station 2699, Nutirwik Creek AS 109 HR817+50, re­ contractor will be doing the work in this corning week." main in the non-conformance status. It is already covered by previous JFW AT memos. Request that a remedial action •October 26-November 3, 1976 Narrative Surveillance Re- plan be submitted including design, schedule, temporary port Jack Gustafson, JFWAT. (during construction) erosion control measures, and perma­ "At long last Sheep Creek (AS 102 HR 2018+85) ... has re­ nent erosion control measures. Structure or facility must meet ceived some attention ... a slightly meandered, riprap-lined the following requirements: · channel with energy dissipators has been constructed at 1. Must not exceed 4 feet per second at Q-5. Sheep Creek. The HR culverts remain unchanged. The effec­ 2. Needs to be able to withstand Q-50 floods. tiveness of this solution will be evaluated after break-up." 3. Bottom of CMP should be 6 inches below water sur- • March 3, 1977 Environmental Check Report #009-849. 113 "Inspected pre-breakup scheduled cross-dramage structures •May 11, 1977 Environmental Check Report #016-833. at the following locations: AS 102. station 933+00. Sheep Check performed: "Review of status of uncompleted pre Creek. Install insulated LWC, 10 feet N of Bent 59, status in­ breakup '77 items. AS 102 Sheep Creek no work aufei: complete. Remarks: Excessive aufeis, must wait melting. between WP and haul road." •March 8, 1977 JFWAT Advisory Memo #8469. "Other." •May 13, 1977 - Environmental Check Report #023-833 "The attached comments pertain to a list I found by accident Location ... AS 102, station 933+00. Sheep Creek. in which Del Chapman, APSC, requested JFW AT input. "Passing lots of water aufeis upstream. LWC too wide to pasi 'rhey relate to drainage/erosion/restoration problems on fish needs 'V' bottom for low water and some work on clown AS 104-114. Please relay the attached three-page comment to stream side to rneet original streambed." APSC." AOFR comment: "FM 4760." Action taken by AOFR Berus: "Will be clone!" The attached list included, in part: "Haul Road CMPs: AS 102 •May 13, 1977 - Environmental Check Report #403-835. HR 2018+85 - fish passage problems, AS 103 HR 2373+80- Check Performed: "Checked progress of following pre fish passage, AS 113 HR 1053-28 (3 CMPs) - fish passage breakup items. (RE: APO pre-breakup list of 5/1/77.) Thes problems. Additional items on JFW AT pre-break up punch items have not been completed satisfactorily: 1. AS 102, sta list 9/22/76 not included on APSC list. A. AS 102 933+01. Pro­ tion 933+00 Sheep Creek LWC not satisfatory to assure fis} ~,iding fish passage in ernsion control measures on work pad. passage." have been on But-list .... " AOFR comment: "FM 4760.'' •April 19, 1977 Environmental Check Report #024-830 - •May 14 JFWAT Advisory Memo 3549 Gustafson Anderson, MRI. JFWAT. Location: Line wide. Check performed: "Observed work on LWC on work pad 41The attachment (two pages) identifies Fish Sensitive Itemi Sheep Creek several feet of aufeis had been removed and not on the original list which require pre-breakup work am dozer was digging below thalweg in preparation for placing items on original list which may require additional post insulated X-ing. Work was also-proceeding below haul road breakup work. (O&M repsonsibility.)" culvert at PL station 1144 in an attempt to halt thermal ero­ Action taken by AOFR: "FM 4760." sion ... " List includes: "AS 102, Station 933+01. Sheep Creek (on origi Summary recommendation: "LWC at Sheep Creek more ex­ nal list). Riprap will probably 'French drain' low flows tensive than greensheetcalls for. Road for mine owner not yet Agreed with Jim Sahr that they could remedy after monitor built. Work on Highway CMP drainage appear satisfactory ing at post-breakup ... " ... All Pre-breakup items." • May 18, 1977 - Environmental Check Repo1't #039-833 - •April 27, 1977 JFWAT Advisory memo #3519 Jack Anderson, MFI. · Gustafson - JFWAT. Various locations including, in part"AS 102-SheepCreek­ "Reference AS 16.05.870 and stip. 2.5.1.1. The contractor has plenty of water - will pass fish today more work later." installed the insulated LWC at Sheep Creek and its sure looks nice. However, it appears that the top layer of riprap fill will •May 29, 1977 JFWAT Advisory Memo #3575 Gustaf 'French drain' all that high flows and serve to block fish pas­ son, JFW AT. "Non-conformance." !:iage.Correct 'French drain' effect pre-breakup.': "Reference stip. 2.6.1.1. It appears that the LWC at Sheer Action taken by AOFR Sahr: "Per agreement with Jack G., Creek will not be a 'French Drain,' as suggested in AM 3519 will wait for breakup to further evaluate effects of riprap in However, the steep gradient and lack of a thalweg will inhibi· stream." fish passage. Provide for fish passage. •May 2, 1977 JFWAT Advisory Memo 3531. "Other.,, Action taken by AOFR Berus: "FM 4771." "Attached is a seven page list of the status of 30 priority pre­ •June 2, 1977 Environmental Check Report #010-834 breakup fish sensitive items between Many Creek (AS 100) Various locations .... and Atigan River No. 2 (AS 114). This was monitored yester­ "AS 102, station 933+00 Sheep Creek was breached, bu, day. Of these 30 items, 11 (37%) had been worked and are ac­ equipment filled in again today and definite fish blockage to ceptable; five (17%)have been worked and are not acceptable; day - new plan is in the mail." nine (30%) have not been worked or are in process; and five •June 4, 1977 - JFWAT Advisory Memo #3683 - Rober1 (17%) are new items. Of the previously identified items, 44% Hallock, JFW AT. "Non-conformance.'' are worked and acceptable, 20% are worked and not accepta­ "It is recommended that the LWC at Sheep Creek be graded tc ble, and 36% are not ,vm·kecl." match the thalweg per typical drawing, D-00-C1310. ThE Action taken by AOFR Berus: "FM 4729." channel should be confined to about 10 feet in width witr Attached list includes: "AS 102 (1) Sheep Creek, Station hand-placed riprap like the section between the pad and thE 933+00; (JFWAT AM 3519). Have worked. Not acceptable, haul road designed by Jack Cushing, Alyeska." but can remedy after breakup. Water will 'French drain.' Action taken by AOFR Berus: "OK will request." Fish passage appears to be blocked by riprap .... " In the AOFR Log attached to JFW AT Advisory Memo #368~ •May 3, 1977 - Environmental Check Report #047-830 (AS dated June 4, 1977 is part of a memorandum to Moolin frorr 100-107). Berns dated June 7, 1977. "Reviewed all items on Section V pre-breakup list requiring Subject: "Fish related problems in northern district, federa continuing surveillance until complete .... AS 102 Sheep lands, and wildlife. Creek, Sta. 933- will need work - bottom now French drain - no fish passage due to massive aufeis upstream. "This 9-page memorandum with attachment 'A' is the resul1 of a recent JFW AT linewide inventory requested by thh •May, 1977 APO Field Memo #4745. AOFR. All of the items shall be addressed in writing by APSC Illegible, but referred to an attached sheet. "13 items of major item by item by close of business 13 June '77. They will be ex ... concerns that needs attention ... " List includes: AS 102 pected to be shown in schedule form for cornpletion prior tc Station 933+00. Sheep Creek. May still have problems ensur­ non-Fish and Wildlife restoration work. ing fish passage to east side of culvert." "Those items that your office may find disagreemf'nt witr Work completed: "JFW AT to monitor during breakup." shall be-dealt with APO in Anchorage as AOFR is not in posi· •May 10-18, 1977 - Narrative Surveillance Report- Gustaf­ t!on to give any rel,jef of that as JFWAT has cited a stip viola· son, JFWAT. tlon for every one. "JFW AT AM 3548 and 3549 clarify the remaining fish sensi­ List includes: " ... AS 102, station 933+01. JFW AT recom· tive pre-breakup work as of May 14, 1977. On 5/18 the four re­ mends that the LWC be graded to match thethalwegpertypi· maining fish sensitive items which were on the original list cal drawing D-00-C131 with maximum 10 foot wide channe that required completion work ... Two fish sensitive items and riprap be hand placed across pad as per the way it is be· identified on the original list require additional work after tween pad and HR.' breakup (Sheep Creek ... )."

114 Appendix D

Analysis of the Costs of Delay in the Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline Project

by Michael J. Scott Institute of Social and Economic Research

Analysis of the Costs of Delay in the costs of the project by forcing the allocation of labor, ma­ Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline Project chinery, and materials to activities which are not physi­ cally necessary to accomplish the primary goal of the Because of the apparent importance of keeping the Alyeska project, or by reducing the efficiency of activities which ipeline on schedule and the high actual costs involved, this are necessary to complete the project, or both. aper discusses the anticipated costs of not meeting the con­ 4. Standards for contract completion which stipulate a truction schedule of the trans-Alaska pipeline project for product superior to that desired by the user of the prnd­ hree of the principal decision-making bodies involved in the uct tend to increase project cost because of better mate­ roject: Alyeska's owner companies (as a group), the State of rials used. daska, and the U.S. government, especially the Department f the Interior. 5. Contract conditions such as no-strike clauses and reim­ The paper begins by looking at conditions which tend to in­ bursable-cost subcontracts tend to increase costs because rease pipeline construction costs, and which Alyeska appar­ unions do not typically give up the right to strike without ntly accepted in order to meet a tight construction schedule. compensation, and because there is little financial incen­ 'his is followed by a discussion of Alyeska's (actually, the tive for subcontractors to minimize cost when they are wner companies') financial incentives for accepting high fully reimbursed. onstruction costs, to stay on schedule, and the incentives for 6. Learning occurs over the life of a project or a series of he state and federal governments to expedite completion of projects and tends to reduce the costs of performing a :1e pipeline as much as possible. fixed unit of work. Learning improves management per­ formance, production schedules, allocation of personnel, :onditions Tending to Increase Construction Costs materials allocation and accounting, and specific skill There are several aspects to the costs of an operation the size performances. The less opportunity there is to learn from f the trans-Alaska oil pipeline project, including the sheer mistakes and to alter prncedures, the more unfamiliar ize of such costs. The following conditions increase the unit the job, techniques used, and operating environment, osts of production programs: and the more frequently and radically the operating en­ 1. Short planning horizons tend to increase costs per unit of vironment changes, the higher will be the operating work by reducing the testing time for ne\v methods and costs. equipment, causing shortcuts and compromises in orga­ nization, and forcing the firm to pay premiums for mate­ Alyeska's Acceptance of High-Cost Conditions In view of these factors, the operating environment in which rials, equipment, and labor in order to assemble them on the Alyeska consortium found themselves during the plan­ time to begin operations. Changes in management struc­ ning and construction of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline project ture that bring new planners into the project can reduce almost guaranteed that high construction costs would be in­ the advantage of a long lead time. curred. The project had a rather long lead time by most stand­ ards: from July 1968 to April 1974. However, the Alyeska 2. Allowing shorter construction periods to produce a given Pipeline Service Company was not formed until August of volume of work tends to increase costs per unit of work by 1970, and the management team was changed frequently restricting the range of options in construction tech­ during the period 1970-1975.1 Construction management planning by Bechtel. the actual planner and original con­ niques, forcing the utilization of less-than-efficient pro­ struction management contractor for pipeline and road con­ portions of labor, machines, and materials, and compel­ struction activities, did not begin until October 1978. six ling the labor force and machinery to operate at inef­ months before construction began. (Fluor Engineers were ficient rates. hired in December 1972 to plan and construct the terminal and pump stations.)2 Alyeska took over Bechtel's functions in 3. Restrictive conditions imposed on the project to achieve May 1975, bringing a different management group into the social goals other than the building of the project (e.g., middle of an ongoing project. While this is not evidence that environmental protection) tend to increase the private the project was not accorded enough lead time, it seems likely 115 that the planning function \Vas disrupted by the necessity to system developed and implemented (but later dropped) by switch management responsibilities, which would have ex­ Alyeska in late 1975!1provided bonuses for work finished if the tended tbe learning period of the management level, dis­ work was done at or under Alyeska's estimated cost, combined rupted planning, and raised cost.3 with an extra incentive for on-time completion. 10Thefact that The project was designed to be executed in the space of bonuses to subcontractors were proposed by Alyeska for on· about three years. In order to stay on that construction sched­ time completion during a period in late 1975 when proje~tcost ule, Alyeska employed almost twice the number of people as overruns were a primary concern also indicated the impor­ they anticipated as late as 1971.~In spite of the fact that hous­ tance of on-time completion to Alyeska. ing and meals were provided, the Project Labor Agreement provided for Alaska standard craft wages, time-and-a-half for overtime (beyond 8 hours per day, 40 hours per week), and Costs of Delay in the Project double time for some Sunday and holiday work. Since the Alyeska appeared to accept higher construction cost when standard shift·was 10 hours per day, and 70-hour weeks were the choice would have involved project delay. One may demon­ common,5 the labor costs of staying on schedule were enor­ strate what the value of early project completion was to mous, and labor manhours ran far over the budgeted amount Alyeska and the parent oil companies by asking how costly both in 1975 and 1976. According to the U.S. General Ac­ delay might have been to the consortium. counting Office, direct labor manhours overran estimated In this calculation, as in those that follow, we attempt to amounts required to complete the project by about 53 per­ measure the cost per unit of time of delay, settling on one year cent.6 as an example. The relevant cost is the foregone benefit of Certainly part of the increase in labor costs may have re­ earlier completion, as seen at the time decisions were made, sulted from work related to government requirements to redo which enabled the project to stay on schedule. This "time of work to comply with either environmental or safety stipula­ decision" is somewhat arbitrarily chosen in the examples that tions. The digging up and rechecking and rewelding of many follow, yet the calculations sti11provide a useful illustration of sections of pipe in 1976 is an ex·amp]e of such regulations re­ the incentives involved. quiring work not considered necessary by the contractor or. Sample calculations appear in Table 1, which gives a rough pipeline user, but was necessary if the project was to be al­ estimate of the perceived magnitude of the costs to the lowed to proceed. Alyeska consortium of a one-year delay in construction due to Reimbursable-cost contracts and no-strike clauses were postponed startup as perceived in 1974 prior to beginning negotiated with Alyeska's execution subcontractors and the work. The table also lists costs to the consortium of an extra various labor unions in August 19727 and April 1974,8 respec­ year of construction time, as perceived in 1974, after construc­ tively. The incentive structure in the subcontractor incentive tion had begun. Both estimates are in 1977 constant dollars.

Table 1 COSTS TO ALYESKA CONSORTIUM OF DELAYED PIPELINE COMPLETION

1. Increase in out-of-pocket construction costs due to delay: Assumptions • Pre-construction cost increase 1969-1974: $3.2 billion ($7.7 billion total cost, estimated May, 1977).1 • Implied total cost, without pre-construction increases: $4.5 billion • Ratio of May, 1977, estimate to estimate without pre-construction cost increases= 1.71111. • Implied average annual rate of pre-construction cost increase= 14.37%2 • Implied average annual rate of project cost increase during construction 15.43%3 • Implied average annual rate of construction cost inflation 12.04%4 • I mp lied discount rate for project cost evaluation = 10%·~ Calculations a. Implied cost of one-year additional delay in start date, assuming prevailing rate of pre-construction cost increase 1969- 1974: 3-Year Construction Schedule 1974 1975 1976 1977 ~ Total Outlays (Billion$) 2.00 1.142 1.318 1.522 -0- 5.9826 Outlays in 1974 Dollars (12.04% Inflation Rate) 2.000 1.019 1.050 1.082 -0- = 5.151 Present Value of Outlays (10% Discount Rate) 2.000 0.926 0.868 0.813 -0- 4.607 Present Value of Outlays in 1977 Dollars (12.04% Inflation Rate) = 6.479 Delayed Construction Schedule 1fil.Q lli1§ ll!1Z 1978 Total Outlays (Billion$) -0- 2.287 1.306 1.507 1.721 = 6.82F Outlays in 1974 Dollars (12.04% Inflation Rate) -0- 2.079 1.040 1.072 1.092 = 5.283 Present Value of Outlays (10% Discount Rate) -0- 1.890 0.860 0.805 0.746 = 4.301 Present Value of Outlays in 1977 Dollars (12.04% Inflation Rate) 6.049 Reduction in out-of-pocket costs from project delay (1977 $) = ($.430) billion b. Implied cost of one-year additional construction time at prevailing rates of construction cost increase, 1974-77: 3-Year Construction Schedule llill. llill. 1m ill1§ Construction Outlays 1975-1977 (Billion$) 1.142 1.318 1.522 -0- 3.982 8 Outlays in 1974 Dollars (12.04% Inflation Rate) 1.019 1.050 1.082 -0- 3.151 Present Value of Outlays (10% Discount Rate) 0.926 0.868 0.813 -0- = 2.607 Present Value of 1975-1977 Outlays in 1977 Dollars (12.04% Inflation Rate) = 3.667

116 4-Y ear Construction Schedule 1filQ. 1976 1211 l[7_§_ 1974 Construction Outlays 1975-1978 .788 .796 .797 .797 3.1789 Present Value of Outlays (10% Discount Rate) .716 .723 .659 .599 2.697 Present Value of 1975-1978 Outlays in 1977 Dollars (12.04% Inflation Rate) 3.793 Increase in out-of-pocket costs from additional year of construction (1977 Dollars) $ .126 billion Adjustment for Real Cost Increases in 4-Y ear Construction Schedule Wf2 JJmi .1fil1 1978 1974$ Outlays for 3-Year Schedule 1.019 1.050 1.082 =o== 3.151 Equal Outlays for 4-Years (1974 Dollars) .788 .788 .788 .787 = 3.151 Expenditures Postponed for 4-Year Schedule (2fil) (.262) (294) -o= (.787) -0- .239 .271 .304 8.14 1974$ Cost Increases from Postponing Some (.231) (.262) (.294)= (.787) Expenditures to the Following Year -0- Ea :mm :nTO= .027 Sum of Equal Outlays and Cost Increases, 1974 Dollars .788 .796 .797 .797 3.178 Delayed production of oil: Assumptions • Planned throughput: 600 thousand barrels per day initially, 1.2 million per day after two months, for 20 years 10 • Price of oil at wellhead: $5 per barrel in 1974, increasing at an average of 10%per year through 1979, 5% per year thereafter 11 • Assumed lifting cost: 50 cents per barrel. Increase at same rate as oil prices 12 Cost Calculations 1fil.7 1978 1979 1f!§Q 1fil!1 lfil!§_l3 a. Gross Revenue (billion $): Without Delay $1.213 $3.204 $3.524 $3.701 $8.480 $-0- With Delay =9.:::- 1.335 3.524 3.701 8.480 8.907 b. Difference in Gross Revenue 1.213 1.869 -0- -0- =o=­ (8.907) Less: Lifting Costs (50¢/bbl) .110 .140 -0- -0- -0- (.608) Less: State Royalties (12.5% of b) .152 .234 -0- (1.113) c. Oil Company Share of Revenue .951 1.495 -0- (7.186) d. Less: State Severance Tax (7 .5% of c) .071 .112 -0- (.539) Difference in Net Wellhead Revenue $ .880 $1]8s $-0- $(6.647) Difference in Present Worth (at l0 1!'odiscount rate) .880 1.257 -0- -0- -0- (.898) Difference in Constant Dollar Present Worth .880 1.140 -0- -0- -0- (.294) Total Present Worth of Foregone Value of Production $1.239 billion ($1.726 billion, 1977 dollars)

into the future by one year, and multiplying each planning cost by 14.::!7 otnotes. Table 1 percent. the rate of pre-construction cost increase. , Speech by E. L. Patton, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Alyeska 8. Same as footnote 6, excejil that the $2.0 billion spent by October 1!)74 is Pipeline Service Company, to the Town Hall of California, May 17, ignored, since it would iave been uninfluenced by attempts to stay on 1977, Los Angeles. schedule after that date. . Found by solving x4 = 1.71111 for x. !l. Computed from the ;{.year schedule, using the Adjustment for Heal Cost . Computed by the following methodology: $5.982 billion was the nominal Increases schedule. It is reasonable to suppose that there would be some dolla1· estimate of outlays to the end of constl'Uction in rnid-1977, as of increase in "real" dollar cost as the schedule of the Alyeska project is, October. l!.174. By May, l!.175, one year after project startup. expenditures stretched out to 4 years. We have assumed here that management foresaw had exceeded $2 billion and committed funds, in exress of $4 billion. We (accurately) the actual 15.4:~ percent rate of im:reaRe in nominal cost bet ween assume one-hair of these funds had been committed by October. 1974. l!lU and 1!177. which is a.:mpercent above the 191i!.I-Hl7-1rate of "inflation" Therefore. remaining expected expenditures were ::m.!.182billion as of that increase in the [~ngineering News Record index, but that they wrongly date. Since total project outlay,: increased to $7.7 billion by the May, W77, assumed additional real cost increases which oceurred after October 1!174 to e,;timate, or $1.718 billion over a two and one-half year period. and this be zero. increase came on the uncommitted portion of funds. the im1>lied rnte of W. Oil 11111/ <:11.~,/mmwl, ,June 27, 1977, pµ. liti-fi7. The effect or the loss of Pump project cost ine1-ease is obtained by solving for the following relationship Station 8 is to make maximum possible throughputabout800.UOO barrels per for x: day until Spring 1!)78. 1-'urther expan;;ions to lJi million or 2.0 million x'···= 5.7/:UJ82 barrel,; predicted in the spring of 1!)74 were lo be considered carefully. Oil aud G11;;./0111·1wl,;\forch 18.1H74. p. !J7. It now appears likely that expansion The October. 1!)74, estimate was described by Patton in his Los Angeles to lJi million barrels will be undertakenonlyslowly,duetotlw West Coast oil speech (n.l) as the "rit·,;t meaningful estimate" or projcct cost. ,mrplus. Average annual rate of increase in the period l!.IHH-Hl74.of the Engineering 11. Estimate in 1974 tel'lrn,. based on $:{.Ullper barrel pipeline tariff estimated News Record Index of construction costs. as reported in U.S. Department of by an Alyeska official in l!.174, linked to a pipeline constt·uction cost ofabout Commerce ,'-,'nn'r'!f q{ C111T1·11flfuxim•ss, various issues. $6 billion. about $1 barrel tankerage, and a$!) per barrel refinery gate price Ten percent assumes 2/a of prnject rinance comes from bonds with an effec· in California, based on "ARCO Hikes Prices for California Oil." Oil ,11ulUus live yield or 7.5 percent: 1/a from equity capital at a before-tax yield of 15 ,l,mn111/, March 18. 1H7,l. On this basis, rn77 wellhead pl'ice is approximately percent. $(i.ti5, close to Alaska Department of Revenue best currenlestimatesof $1i.5a­ $7.00. The inc1·ease is expected to take account of world inflation through the . Distribution computed Crom October. l!J74. estimate. using assumed nominal year 2000 and does not include real increase,; in oil value. dollar rate of increase in project outlays of 15.48 percent per annum, by solving for x: 12. Lifting costs are unknown. They were estimated by M.A. Adelman in Hl7 lat bet ween 18 and 21icents pet· barrel. The)' are doubled here to reflect increases x + x( 1.154:H + x( 1.15,Ur $:3.982 billion. in costs since H>71 and to provide a margin fol' uncertainty. See M.A. which yields x = $1.142 billion. This calculation varies from footnote 8 in that Adelman et al. .4.hrnka Oil: Co.sf f!JIII S!IJ>Jl/11(New York: Praegel'. 1!)7l). it assumes the first $2.0 billion has not yet been spent. pp. 21-2:t . The distribution was developed by moving the distribution of expenditures I:i, Intended to include all impacts after 1H97.

117 Costs of delayed startup in this case equal the algebraic sum "paid" by the owner companies {and by the State of Alas of construction cost savings in calculation (la), and lost through reduced royalties and taxes) in the form of reduc revenues in calculation (2), or about 1.296 billion 1977 dollars. wellhead prices. Therefore, the extra costs of pipeli If the project had been stretched out for one more year, based construction represent a true cost to the owner cornpan on the 1974-1977 experience, calculations (lb) and (2) show a over time. Even the apparent benefit to the owner corn pan cost of delay of about 1.852 billion 1977 dollars. The amount of from sharing the reduction in wellhead price is offset to soi money involved is clearly substantial even after corporate extent by payments of revenue-related taxes by Alyeska income taxes are subtracted. Even if the combination of Alaska. corporate income tax savings and our over-estimation of the true rate of cost increase reduces the impact of delays by 50 Costs of Delay to the State of Alaska percent in each case, the total cost impact to the consortium of As principal royalty owner in the Prudhoe Bay oil field (1 a one-year delay in startup still would have been $648 million Alaskan Native Fund receives 2 percent of the gross wellhe 1977 dollars, while it would have been $926 million in the case value of production, up to the limit of $500 million under 1 where the construction period is stretched out an additional Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act), the State of Alas year. Consequently, it wasevidentlywell worth it to the owner had a clear financial interest in expeditingtheconstructior companies to spend very large sums to start construction as the trans-Alaska pipeline. In addition, the state had intere soon as possible and to stay on schedule, once the decision was in the early completion of the line because of its status a made to proceed with construction of the pipeline. taxing jurisdiction and because of its interest in reduci unemployment and increasing the incomes of Alaskans. Ta1 Cost Recovery 2 contains computations from the vantage point of 19 Since the additional cost could presumably be recovered by estimating the financial cost to the state of delays in pipe} the pipeline consortium in tariffs which eventually become startup and completion. As can be seen by working throu earnings of the owner companies (indeed, the above calcula­ the computations, given initial pipeline throughput of { tions crudely imply thearnountofthetariff increase), one may thousand barrels per day (rising to 1.2 million barrels af reasonably ask in what sense Alyeska'scosts are"real" costs to two months), wellhead price of oil rising from $5 per barre: the owner companies and in what sense they are mere ac­ 1974 at 10 percent per year until 1979 and 5 percent the counting charges but not real costs. The most useful and after, lifting costs of 50 cents per barrel, royalties at 1: simple way to think about the problem is to note first of all that percent of wellhead value, severance taxes at an average of the companies have little or no control over the maximum percent of wellhead value, and property taxes at 20 mills price for which they can sell their oil to refineries, since this is taxable pipeline property, the 1974 present worth of the to determined by competition with foreign oil. Secondly, the cost to the state expressed in nominal dollar terms would hi recovery of cost over time by pipeline tariffs can be viewed as been in excess of $181 million {$340 million in constant H a charge of part of the owner company (Alyeska) to another dollai- terrns). 11 The state clearly could have understood· part ( the production division of the owner corn pany ). Since the magnitude of this direct financial cost of delay in 1974, a delivered price of oil is (and tanker charges are) basically subsequent additions to the severance tax rate to an apprc outside of company control, the only way for pipeline costs to mate average of 11.5 percent on North Slope product go up is if the netback wellhead price goes down. Thus.even if further increased the state's financial stake in ea the increased costs are "recovered" by Alyeska, they are completion.

Table 2 COST TO THE SrA TE OF A.LASKA OF DELAYED PIPELINE CoMPLETION {Billions of Dollars) Assumptions (Sarne as in Table 1) Cost Calculations 1977 1978 1979 ll!fil1 1984 1998 a. Gross Revenue {billion $): I Without Delay $1.213 $3.204 $3.524 $3.701 $4.724 $8.480 $-0- With Delay -0- .LB.3i ~ .aJQl 4.724 8.480 ~ b. Difference in Gross Revenue 1.213 1.869 -0- -0- -0- -0- (8.90' c. Net State Royaltiest (10.5% of b} .127 .196 -0- -0- (.061) -0- (.93, d. State Severance Tax (7.5% of b) .091 .140 -0- -0- -0- -0- (.66:

e. Pipeline Property Tax 2 .058 .027 -0- -0- -0- -0- Difference in Direct Revenue $ .276 $ .363 $-0- ${ .061) $-0- $(1.fn Difference in Present Worth (at 8% discount rate) $ .276 $ .306 $-0- $-0- $( .036) $-0- $( .31 Difference in Constant Dollar Present Worth, 1977 $ .276 $ .278 $-0- $-0- $( .022) $-0- $( .10 Total Present Worth of Foregone Revenues= $228 million ($428 million, 1977 dollars). Total Present Worth of Foregone Revenues in 1974 (8% discount)= $181 million ($340 million, 1977 dollars).

1£-'Y 1977 computed as the difference between Nr•1•1•11m·S1111n·,··" revised esti1 1State royalty rate of 12.5 percent, less 2 percent AN CSA payments to Natives. for 1977 and the actual value for l.976. All other years: Based on the differ 1984 figure rep1•esents faster payout of overriding 2 percent royalty, in no delay between J,~y 1978 estimate and FY Hl77 revised estimate fo1· Hl78; zero fo ease. Both cases reach $500 million in 1984. other years after pipeline completion. 118 Nor is this all. Table 2 leaves out the impact on the state's and gas would supply 33 percent of demand in Petroleum income tax collections of slowed-down or postponed construc­ Administration for Defense District V (PAD V) by 1975 and tion. Clearly this is afar moredifficultcomputation, since it is 46 percent by 1980, which he considered an "unacceptable" not clear what total Alaskan employment or wages and level. In an accompanying analysis, Lincoln stated that a salaries would have been if the project had either been usignificant delay" in utilizing North Slope oil could have delayed at startup or completion. It seems possible, however, serious national security implications, since it would happen that if the same number of labor hours had been expended at a time when the U.S. was more dependent on insecure later (due to startup delays), or less intensively (due to letting foreign sources, and since lack of transportation facilities the construction schedule stop by refusal to pay overtime, for would retard further exploration and development necessary example), there could have been a substantial lowering of to lessen the dependence. 14 wage and salary income in the period 1974-77, without suffi­ Federal security concerns about foreign supply, as identi­ cient compensating increases in 1978.12 In addition, th.estate fied in a U.S. Cabinet Task Force report, The Oil lmpoJ't had a clear stake in reducing unemployment and in providing Question, in 1970 remained throughout the application and jobs for its citizens, and delays in startup or the extending of construction period as incentives for the federal government the construction schedule would have extended the years of to expedite production: relatively high unemployment of the early 1970s in the first 1. War might increase domestic petroleum demand, or case, and could have reduced employment opportunities and cause the loss of tanker? supplying the U.S. incomes of some Alaskans in the second case.13 2. Local or regional revolution, hostilities, radical govern­ ments in exporting countries, communistdiplomatic or Costs of Delay to the Nation as military pressure, or guerrilla activities might physi­ Perceived by the Federal Government cally disrupt foreign sources or transportation. Among the aspects of delay with which the federal 3. A group of exporting countries might act to deny their oil to us, either in parallel or in concert. government might have been concerned, besides the impact 4. Exporting countries · might take over the assets of on the producing companies and Alaska, were: the effect on American or European companies. the national defense capability of ir1creasing dependence on 5. Exporting countries might form an effective cartel, 1 foreign (especially Eastern Hemisphere) oil; the adverse raising oil prices substantially. " impact of large foreign purchases of oil on the U.S. balance of To put these concerns of the federal government in perspec­ payments; possible reduced federal tax revenues; the reduced tive, it is obvious that since 1971. the last three difficulties possibility of holding down the rate of increase of consumer have actually occurred to a greater or lesser extent. Moreover, and producer energy costs; and for the Interior Department, in 1976, the average estimated U.S. requirements for crude which has a fiduciary .responsibility for Native claims, the oil runs to refineries were 13.4 million barrels per day, of disruption of payments of the 2 percent of production value which 5.3 million, or 39.6 percent, were fm·eign in origin.ii; into the Alaska Native Fund established by the Alaska Native The Federal Energy Administration figures for January Claims Settlement Act. In assuring compliance with the through July 1977 show dependency of nearly 46 percent, 01· various environmental and technical stipulations on the 6.7 million barrels per day. 17 Six hundred thousand daily projects, the government was in a position to cause delay in barrels would have reduced 1977 dependency in the first startup of the pipeline project, and in a position to slow down seven months by 4 to 5 percent, while 1.2 million barrels per completion, once the construction had begun. The costs of such day would have reduced dependency from 46.0 percent down delay were apparently perceived as significant, if not sub­ to 37.7 percent. In all, the potential problems caused by pipe­ stantial, and could have contributed to a mood in favor of line delay would have been to exacerbate a dependency which expediting construction, wherever possible. was growing at 4 to 9 percentage points per year and which The Department of the Interior Analysis of the Economic had uncertain, but adverse, national security consequences. 18 and Security Aspects of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, a three­ At the time that the Interior Department analyzed the na­ volume study published in 1971-72, outlines in several places tional impacts of delays in the trans-Alaska pipeline construc­ the federal government's and other parties' specific concerns tion in 1971, it was thought (and hoped) that North Slope oil with heavy dependence on foreign oil, especially that pro­ delivered by pipeline to Valdez would reduce resource (capi­ duced in the Eastern Hemisphere. Dr. William A. Vogley, tal and labor) costs for oil consumed in the United States. If Director of the Office of Economic Analysis at the U.S. crude oil could have been produced and delivered to the U.S. Department of the Interior, stated five major findings of the consumer for lower resource cost than the purchase price of study. The third of these was: foreign crude, the difference represents a net saving to the The development of North Slope oil is an important nation. An estimate of resource cost savings appears in national security objective: the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Table 3. System can deliver oil sooner than the other efficient mode. The crucial question to the consumer is: would this reduced With respect to the transportation alternatives, the major cost be reflected in lower prices for products using oil? The national security conclusions by General George A. Lincoln, answer seems to be that Alaska state taxes, federal taxes, and Office of Emergency Preparedness, were: company profits will take up most of the difference between 1. It was important to get North Slope oil to the Lower 48 resource costs of producing plus delivering North Slope oil states as soon as possible so as to lessen U.S. dependence and the purchase cost of foreign crude oil. while the consumer on potentially insecure foreign sources of petroleum. is charged a price based on the marginal supply cost­ 2. The trans-Alaska oil pipeline could bring North Slope oil to the market an estimated three years sooner than a roughly, the refinery gate price of the foreign producer. It MacKenzie Valley route. may be that federal government hoped to share with the con­ 3. Early completion of the Alaska pipeline must be con­ sumer the lower resources cost of oil-based fuels and products sidered an important national security objective. made from North Slope oil through its system of controlled Lincoln partially relied on Interior's Office of Oil and Gas crude oil prices administered by the FEA, or increased com­ analysis which indicate9 Eastern Hemisphere sources of oil petition in PAD V (West Coast U.S.). Regardless, the savings

119 Table 3 CALCULATION OF RESOURCE COST SAVIN(;S I•'lWM NORTH SLOPE CRUDE OIL (1977 Constant Dollars) As.<;1l111ptions Delivered Price of Foreign Crude Oil in Los Angeles, per barrel $13.50 Resource Costs of North Slope Crude Oil: Production costs $ .50 per barrel Pipeline tariff to Valdez 6.00 per barrel Tanker to California 1.00 per barrel Total 7.50 Resource Cost Savings to Economy, per barrel $ 6.00 Caleulations Cost of Delayed Production to the Economy (Output assumptions same as Table 1): Billions of 1977 Dollars 1977 1978 1,lJ79 1980 1.997 1998 Without Delay $1.098 $2.628 $2.628 $2.628 $2.628 $ 0 With 1-Year Delay _Q_ .Llfil§.. 2.628 2.628 2.628 2.628 Difference $1.09 $1.530 $ 0 $ 0 n- $(2.628) Present Value (10%) 1.09 1.391 0 0 0 ( .355) PresentValue(8%) 1.09 1.417 0 0 0 ( .522) Present Value of One-Year Delay in Pipeline Completion: $2.126 billion (10%discount rate) $1.985 billion (8%discount rate) in 1977. 1974 Present Value of One-Year Delay in Pipeline Completion: $1.597 billion (lQl,/6discount rate)-$1.576 billion (8%discountrate). to the economy as a whole and the losses resulting from pipe­ $1.855 billion. A single year's delay, of course, would havi line completion delays were still substantial. been much less costly. The opportunity cost of private resources in the economy The world changed considerably after 1971, with mud can generally be taken as 10 percent. In such a case, the pres­ higher foreign retained values, and with considerable foreigr ent value of cost savings foregone from a one-year delay as investments in the United States to finance the outflow o1 seen in 1974 would have been $1.597 billion, expressed in 1977 dollars. To get a rough idea of the probable impact of a one· constant dollars. Even if the government used a discount rate year delay in pipeline completion on the cunent balance oj of only 8 percent, reflecting the marginal cost of borrowed payments, one need only note that the March 1977 Sm·PeJJqi funds in bond markets, the total resource cost of a one-year Current Business reports a 1976 net trade deficit of about $H delay in the pipeline would have been $1.576 billion. billion with OPEC19 on imports of 1.616 billion barrels,2° 01 Another aspect of "costs" to the nation was the negative irn­ about $9.90 of deficit per imported barrel from OPEC sources. pact of purchases of foreign oil on the U.S. balance of pay­ If the balance of payments could have been improved by $9.90 ments, or the net amount by which U.S. dollar outflows could per barrel of North Slope crude run to U.S. refineries, the be expected to exceed inflows. The federal government had balance of payments "cost" of a year delay in completion can reason to consider the effect on balance of payments over the be computed as in Table 4. Probably the total effect over time long run, and expedite construction of a domestic oil source on the balance of payments would not be as large as $9.90. (the pipeline) to reduce that deficit. However, it should be Also, this is not a true cost to the country in the usual sense, noted that a single year's delay in pipeline construction, while since the $9 .90/bbl. of "saving'' on balance of payments does contributing to the deficit marginally, would not be as impor­ not include the U.S. expenditures necessary to obtain the sav­ tant from a policy standpoint as a failure to build the pipeline, ing. However, to a federal administration concerned about or a failure to build on a route which would maximize the short-run fluctuations in the balance of payments, the figures balance of payments advantage. in Table 4 indicate that delay in the pipeline could have been The 1971 Interior Department study identified several costly. reports which attempted to measure the balance of payments Finally, the Interior Department, in its capacity asan agent impact of Alaskan oil. Except for one analysis by Alyeska Pipe­ for American Native people, could have been concerned about line Service Company, all these reports were based on the bal­ the consequences of delay of payments to Alaska Natives ance of payments appendix of the 1970 Cabinet Task Force under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Under the Study, The Oil Import Question, with differences in findings terms of the Act, a 2 percent royalty is paid into the Alaska arising out of varying assumptions and interpretations of data Native Fund on gross wellhead value of oil and gas sold. The contained in the original report. The balance of payments ef­ Interior Department could have anticipated the effect that fects of importing additional oil was assumed to consist pri­ delay of oil sales might have had on the fund. (See Table 5.) marily of the first round retained value of oil in the foregin In absolute dollar value, the total impact on the Alask2 country (that is, payments of taxes and royalties to foreign Native Fund is considerably smaller than in other probabl1: governments and payments to foreign local factor of produc­ areas of federal concern. However, AN SCA provided only for tion, primarily wages and salaries and utilities), less return a fixed schedule of dollar payments from royalties whose total flows, plus tanker charges, plus net U.S. investment in foreign value, $500 million, which could only shrink with continued capacity necessary to produce the oil. Investments required inflation. Furthermore, if the $500 million was recognized for tankerage were not included, since few U.S. dollars were partly as startup capital for the Native corporations il1 going into the construction of tankers at the time. Both "first­ Alaska, then the later this money appeared in the Alaska round" and "higher roundj) return flows were considered. Native Fund, the less useful it would be in starting up th1: Based on this, the 1971 Department of Interior study esti­ Native corporations, a key feature of the settlement ,vith thE mated that net annual dollar outflows resulting from a perma­ Alaska Natives. Thus, the impact on Native Fund could well nent increase of one million imported barrels per day from have been a significant incentive for Interior to help expeditE the Middle East, phased in over three years, would be about the pipeline. 120 Table 4 IMPROVEMENT OF U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS WITH NORTH SLOPE PROOUCTION 1 (Billions of 1976 Dollars) 1977 1978 1979 1980 1.977 19[)8 ,Without Delay $1.812 $4.336 $4.336 $4.336 $4.336 $ 0 With 1-Year Delay 4.336 4.336 4.336 4.336 Increased Value of Balance 1.812 2.524 0 0 0 (4.336) Present Value of Increase (8% Dis- count Rate) 1.812 2.337 0 O 0 ( .861) Total Present Value of Cost of Delay $3.288 billion 1974 Total Present Value of Cost of Delay (8% Discount Rate) $2.610 billion

1Value for balance of payments purposes of one barrel of North Slope crude oil is assumed to be $9.90. See text.

Table 5 IMPACT OF DELAY ON THE ALASKA NATIVE F'uND (Millions of 1977 Dollars) Assu,nptions (Same a Table 1) Payments to Alaska Native Fund 1.977 1978 1979 1980 1.981 1982 1,983 1984 Without Delay $24 $64 $70 $74 $78 $82 $86 $ 22 With 1-Year Delay 0 _gz_ 70 ..1L _.1§_ _§g_ _§_§_ _.];L Difference $24 $37 $0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $(61) Difference: Constant 1977 Dollars $24 $35.2 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $(37.6) Present Value at 10% $24 $32.0 $ 0 $ O $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $(19.3) Present Value at 8% $24 , $32.6 $ 0 $ O $ O $ 0 $ 0 $(21.9) Total Present Value of Cost of Delay (Native Fund Earns 10% Return) $36.7 million Total Present Value of Cost of Delay (Native Fund Earns 8% Return) $34.7 million Total 1974 Present Value of Cost of Delay $27.6 million (10% Discount Rate) - $27.5 million (8% Discount Rate)

Summary structure documented by Lenzner may have led to In summary, our computations show, given some reasona­ higher project costs, compared to a situation in which the ble assumptions concerning the building of the pipeline, rates final management structure was known in the beginning. of price increases of oil, building materials, and labor, that 2. Al.yes/ca Status Report, December 1972, p. 1 quoted in Lenzner, Final Report, p. XI3. However, Fluor's plan­ there were significant financial and other incentives to the ning effort required reworking of many of the designs Alyeska parent companies, state government, and federal already prepared by Alyeska and was held up, according government to complete the trans-Alaska pipeline as quickly to Alyeska, by a failure to select major equipment items, as possible. Given the constraints of the technical stipulations, late turnover of Alyeska's work, delays in critical vendor engineering data, and Fluor's general slow pace in environmental protection objectives, and legal requirements, "grasping and scoping the project." (Alyeska Status Re­ much faster completion was unlikely. However, the incentives port, p. 15, July 1973 and p. 14, August 1973 as quoted in were such that all three parties had a strong interest in circum­ Lenzner, Final Report, pp. XI6 and XI7.) Thus, Fluor venting anything they might regard as a cause of u1111ecessary was granted a shorter effective planning horizon than might be indicated by the hiring date. delay. To the extent that any stipulation, regulation, or proc­ 3. It is possible that, given what apparently were mistakes ess was regarded by any or all of these parties as a source of in early planning, failure of Alyeska to rectify these by "unnecessary" delay (and the definition of "necessary" or "un­ changing management structure might have increased necessary" is subject to broad interpretation). each of the par­ cost even more. ties had ample reason to rearrange construction schedules, 4. Compare Arlon R. Tussing, et al., Alaska Pipeline Re­ pm'f, Fairbanks, Alaska, Institute of Social, Economic, ask for (or grnnt) variances from stipulations, and in general and Government Research, 1971, p. 84. which quotes expedite the project by any legal means possible. testimony of E. L. Patton before the Legislative Pipe­ line Impact Committee, April 3, 1971, which has peak.­ 1. A history of the changes in the management team is year monthly average employment in Alaska at 6,846, given in Chapters I and II of The Management, Planning, plus or minus 15-20 percent, with latest estimates of the and Construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Syste,ii. actual 1976 average of about 16,350, computed by ISER Report to the Alaska Pipeline Commission by the Com­ economists from Alyeska weekly press releases, 1976. mission's Special Counsel, Terry F. Lenzner of the firm Wald, Harkrader, and Ross, Washington, D.C., August 1, 5. Lenzner devotes considerable time and effort in his 1977 (hereafter, Lenzner, Final Report). While the Lenz­ Chapter V, Final Report to documenting that many of ner report makes much of the motives for frequent the causes of long hours lay in management disorganiza­ changes in the management structure of the project and tion or outright abuse of payroll procedures, e.g., pp. V23 alleged problems with the efficiency of various arrange­ to V 46. Lenzner's preliminary statement regarding cost ments, particularly the number of levels involved, that is overruns to the Alaska Pipeline Commission (June 15, not the point to be made here. The very shifting of the 1977) quotes a Telex message from F. P. Moolin of 121 Alyeska to all Execution Contractors, Pipeline Depart­ than 1.5 include the state's lost interest earnings on in­ ment Managers, et al., as saying it was 'uncommon to come taxes received and the fact of a progressive income find any worker who received less than 70 hours of pay tax rate structure, which takes a larger"bite" out of over­ per week." "Productivity/Project Labor Agreement" p. 2 time hours. (October 29, 1975). Lenzner's statement to the Commis­ 13. The State Pipeline Coordinator's Office actually did pro­ sion carries the full title Preliniinary Sta.tement of TetTJJ duce an estimate of the cost of incremental delay to the F. Lenzner, Special Counsel, Alflska Pipeline Commis­ state's treasury in February 1975. Given somewhat dif­ sion in Response to Request of the State of Alaska, and is ferent assumptions than those used in Table 2, the pipe­ dated June 15, 1977 (hereafter, cited as Lenzner, Pre­ line coordinator estimated that a year's delay in project liminary Statement). startup would cost the state $504.5 million. 6. Statement of Monte Canfield, Jr., Director, Energy and 14. An Analysis of the Economic and Security Aspects of the Minerals Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, Trans-Alaska PipeHne, Volume IL· Supporting AnaltJses before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Re­ (Washington, D.C.: Office of Economic Analysis, U.S. sources, September 26, 1977, p. 7. Dept. of Interior), December 1971, pp. M-2-1, M-5-2 7. See Lenzner, Preliminary Statement, p. IV-1. through M-5-7. 8. Lenzner, Final Report, pp. II-33, II-34. 15. The Oil Import Question: A Report on the Relationship of 9. Lenzner, Preliminary Statement, p. II-18, paraphrasing Oil Imports to the Ncltional Security. Report of the Cabi'­ an interview with Peter DeMay, Vice President of Proj­ net Task Force on Oil ImportControl{Washington, D.C.: ect Management, Anchorage, Alaska, June 10, 1977. U.S. Government Printing Office), February 1970, p. 31. 10. Performance Bonus Plan, Trans-Alaska Pipeline Project 16. Monthl11 Petroleum Statistics Report FEA/B-77/379, (to Perini Arctic Associated), Article T-5, Calculation of Federal Energy Administration, National Energy In­ Bonus. formation Center, July 1977. 11. The apparent anomoly in both Tables 1 and 2 of constant 17. Ibid. dollar impacts being larger than current dollar impacts 18. Using the FEAdata above, growth in the ratio was about in a period of inflation is due to the fact that the compu­ 4.4 percentage points 1974-75, 6.6 points between 1975 tations assume a mere postponement of income, rather and 1976, and 8.3 points between January-June 1976 and than a total loss. Since oil prices rise rapidly over the January-June 1977. period, the offset to current losses by an extra year of the 19. Louis J. Moczar, "U.S. International Transactions: mcome at the end of twenty years is quite significant in Fourth Quarter and Year 1976," Survey of Current Busi­ current (inflated) dollar terms, but much less significant ness 57(3):41, March 1977. when inflation is taken into account. 20. Sur11e11of Current Business, July 1977, p. S-35, reports 12. Since overtime is paid at 1.5 times regular salary, more total tJ.S. 1976 imports of crude and unfinished oils of than 1.5 times as many regular hours would have to be 1.947 billion barrels, of which, according to the source in added in 1978 to make up for revenue losses on overtime note 21, above, 83 percent was from OPEC nations, or pay in 1976 and 1977. Factors making the total more 1.616 billion barrels.

122 List of Interviews

Interviews

Anchorage Other John Havelock, former Alaska attorney general, July 1, 1977. Alaska Pipeline Office Charles Herbert, former commissioner, Alaska Department Al Alson, realty assistant, April 5, 1977. of Natural Resources, July 13, 1977. Larry Brickman, EEI, August 30, 1977. Ray Morris, Environmental Protection Agency, May 17, 1977. Duane Carson, former AOFR, August 29, 1977. Tom Sexton, pipeline liaison, Alaska Department of Environ­ Roger Gray, EEI project manager, April 11; July 12; mental Conservation, May 19, 1977. August 30, 1977. Burt Silcock, former national director, Bureau of Land Man­ Jack Gough, former AOFR, August 29, 1977. agement, May 11, 1977. Dwight Hovland, soils scientist, August 20, 1977. Mike Smith, former chief of habitat, Alaska Department of Don Keyes, construction coordinator, April 8; September 2, Fish and Game, May 17; May 19, 1977. 1977. David Spencer, former wildlife refuge supervisor, FWS, Bob King, EEI, August 23, 1977. June 8, 1977. Herbert Kittler, AOFR, May 4; August 24, 1977. Blair Wondzell, former FSO, State Pipeline Coordinator's Office, August 23, 1977. Arlan Kohl, technical staff coordinator, April 8; June 9, 1977. Gerald W. Zamber, former assistant chief, BLM pipeline divi­ Jack McCoy, AOFR, May 10; August 25, 1977. sion, May 16, 1977. Giles McDonald, hydrologist, August 22, 1977. Leonard McKinney, executive assistant, March 21, 1977. William Moses, solicitor, March 21, 1977. Quentin Norgaard, AOFR, August 23, 1977. Other Alaska Roger Post, EEI, August 23, 1977. Juneau Morris Turner, acting authorized officer, March 21; August 3; Dave Cline, Division of Policy Development and Planning, August 5; August 16; August 29, 1977. Office of the Governor, July 27, 1977. Richard Wolf, MRI deputy project manager, August 23; Norman Gorsuch, former Alaska attorney general, July 26; August 30, 1977. July 27, 1977. Joint Fish and Wildlife Advisory Team Rod Pegues, assistant Alaska attorney general, July 26, 1977. Jackie Campbell, former field monitor, August 15, 1977. Jerry Reinwand, deputy commissioner, Alaska Department Allan Carson, state supervisor, March 29; August 30; Septem- of Environmental Conservation, July 26, 1977. ber 26; October 17, 1977. Fairbanks Jack Fisher, fisheries engineer, August 9, 1977. David Klein, University of Alaska, Cooperative Wildlife Re­ James Glaspell, technical staff, April 6, 1977. search Unit, May 4, 1977. Robert Hallock, former field monitor, August 31, 1977. Dave Norton, former state supervisor, JFWAT, September 1, James Hemming, federal coordinator, March 17; May 12; 1977. June 7; August 31, 1977. Steve Sisk, Alaska Department of Highways, September 1, Hank Hosking, assistant federal coordinator, March 17; 1977. August 12, 1977. Nancy Kavanagh, technical staff, August 30; September 27, 1977. Washington, D.C. Keith Morehouse, staff wildlife biologist, September 2, 1977. Lewis Pamplin, former field monitor, August 5, 1977. Department of the Interior Ken Roberson, field monitor/technical evaluations, August 4, Stewart Brandborg, Office of Assistant Secretary for Fish, . 1977. Wildlife and Parks, August 23, 1977. Julius Rockwell, APO/ JFW AT fisheries biologist, July 7; David Grayson, Office of the Solicitor, August 25, 1977. July 12; August 12, 1977. Joel Greenstein, Office of Administration and Management Lou Swenson, former field monitor, August 17, 1977. Policy, August 23, 1977. Carl Yanagawa, assistant state supervisor, March 17; Lynn Greenwalt, director, Fish and Wildlife Service, August 11, 1977. August 23; August 25, 1977. State Pipeline Coordinator's Office Paul Kirton, Office of the Solicitor, August 25, 1977. Guy Martin, Assistant Secretary, Lands and Waters, Charles Champion, pipeline coordinator, March 18, 1977. August 22, 1977. Al Greer, ecologist, March 24, 1977. Henry K. Noldan, chief, Division of Minerals Environmental Robert Huck, senior engineer, March 24, 1977. Assessment, August 21, 1977. Jim Whaley, ecologist, March 24, 1977. Robert Stewart, Office of Biological Services, FWS, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service August 22; August 23, 1977. Norval Netsch, activity leader, stream alterations. March 22; Other June 8; October 12, 1977. Jack Horton, former official, Office of the Secretary, DOI, Melvin Monson, area administrator, ecological services, August 25, 1977. May 27, 1977. Kenneth R. Roberts, National Marine Fisheries Service, LeRoy Sowl, deputy area director, July 7; September 13, August 24, 1977. 1977. Russell Train, former Under Secretary, DOI, August 25, Gordon Watson, area director, March 22; May 19, 1977. 1977. 125

References Cited·

References Cited

Department of the Interior Memorandum from deputy area director, Fish and Wildlife Service, Anchorage, to director, Bureau of Sport Fisheries Memoranda and Wildlife, Washington, D.C. Subject: "Draft Proposed Memorandum from Assistant Secretary for Fish and Pipeline".Road Surveillance Team." November 3, 1972. Wildlife, Parks, and Marine Resources to members of North Memorandum from Morris J. Turner, chief, Division of Pipe­ Slope Task Force. Subject: "Proposed Action Program," line, Bureau of Land Management, to technical advisor, April 30, 1969. Office of the Secretary, Department of the Interior. Subject: Memorandum to Secretary Hickel from President Nixon. "Draft Memorandum of Discussions on Flood Plain and May 9, 1969. Above Ground Design held in Houston, December 12 and 13, Memorandum from Assistant Secretary for Fish and 1973." December 21, 1973. Wildlife, Parks, and Marine Resources to Under Secretary. Memorandum from supervisory fish and wildlife biologist, Subject "Pipeline-Suggested Route Change on Upper Special Studies, Fish and Wildlife Service, Anchorage, to file. Gulkana River." February 2, 1970. Subject: "Meeting on Biological Monitoring Team." February Memorandum of Gerald Zamber, assistant pipeline project 20, 1974. coordinator, pipeline division, Bureau of Land Management, Memorandum from Under Secretary to director, Bureau of to files. Subject: "Meeting with BCF and BSFW on Pipeline Sport Fisheries and Wildlife. Subject: "Personnel and Bud­ Study Coordination. 0 April 24, 1970. geting Procedures for Trans-Alaska Pipeline." March 7, 1974. Memorandum from director, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Memorandum from Under Secretary to Assistant Secretary Wildlife and director, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries to for Fish and Wildlife and Parks. Subject: "Alaska Pipeline." Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks. Subject: April 23, 1974. · "Suggested Route Change of TAPS Pipeline Around Upper Memorandum from activity leader, Energy Delivery Gulkana River." July 6, 1970. Systems, Fish and Wildlife Service, Anchorage, to files. Memorandum from regional director, Bureau of Commercial Subject: "Meeting with Authorized Officer." April 21, 1974. Fisheries, Juneau, to state director, Bureau of Land Manage­ Memorandum to Alaska Pipeline Office's authorized officer's ment, Anchorage. Subject: "TAPS Pipeline Route near representative from Julius Rockwell, APO/JFWAT.July31, Paxson-Summit Lake Area." July 9, 1970. 1974. Memorandum reportofMorrisJ. Turner,projectcoordinator, Memorandum to AOFRs, MRI, JFW AT from Alaska Pipe­ Bureau of Land Management, pipeline division. "Road line Office construction coordinator. Subject: "Field Surveil­ Designs and Construction Procedure Review: Houston, lance Procedures." April 30, 1975. Texas, October 7 through 9, 1970." Memorandum to AOFRs from Alaska Pipeline Office con­ Memorandum from Morris J. Turner, pipeline coordinator, struction coordinator. Subject: "Spot Checks-NCRs.'' May 1, Bureau of Land Management, to Burton Silcock, state direc­ 1975. tor, Bureau of Land Management. Subject: "lnteragency Fish Memorandum to Alaska Pipeline Office authorized officer's and Wildlife Team/' December 4, 1970. representative from technical staff coordinator. Subject: Memorandum from Jack 0. Horton, Assistant to the Secre­ "Non Welding Quality Control Concerns." May 28, 1976. tary, to [agency heads]. Subject: "TAPS 102 Statement." Memorandum from Andrew Rollins, authorized officer, to February 3, 1971. Allen Reynolds, director, Audit and Investigation, Depart­ Memorandum from regional director, Bureau of Commercial ment of the Interior. August 23, 1976. Fisheries, Juneau, to chairman, executive committee, Inter­ Memorandum to Under Secretary from director, Audit and agency Fish and Wildlife Team. Subject: "Review of Pollution Investigation Department of the Interior. September 10, Contingency Plans for Trans-Alaska Pipeline.'' March 12, 1976. 1971. ,/ Memorandum from JFW AT staff wildlife biologist to Memorandum from associate director, Bureau of Land Man JFWAT federal coordinator. Subject: "Remedial Action of agement, Washington, D.C., to Deputy Under Secretary. Big Game Crossings." September 20, 1976. Subject: "EPA Involvement in Trans-Alaska Pipeline Memorandum to files from Alaska Pipeline Office authorized ProJect." May 19, 1972. officer's representative. Subject: "Project Review Meeting." Memorandum from Jared Carter, executive secretary, December 10, 1976. Federal Task Force on Alaska Oil Development, to [inter­ agency group]. Subject: "Trans-Alaska Pipeline­ Memorandum to the files from James Hemming, JFWAT Pre-Construction and Construction Procedures." July 12, federal coordinator. Subject: "Status, Big Game Crossing." 1972. December 21, 1976. Memorandum from state director, Bureau of Land Manage­ ment, Alaska, to director, Bureau of Land Management, Letters Washington, D.C. Subject: "BLM-USGS and BLM-BSF&W Letter from Burton Silcock, state director, Bureau of Land Pipeline Involvement Discussion." November 2, 1972. Management, to David Henderson, Trans-Alaska Pipeline Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, chairman, to Federal System, Anchorage, Alaska. May 11, 1970. Task Force on Alaska Oil Development [and others]. May 23, Letter from Andrew Rollins, authorized officer, to Alyeska 1973. Pipeline Service Company and the Commissioner, Alaska Memorandum from Morris J. Turner, member, Technical Department of Highways. June 10, 1974. Advisory Board, to Deputy Under Secretary, Office of the Letter to Frank Stivers from Morris Turner, authorized Secretary. Subject: "Comments in Response to Request by Ed officer's representative. March 3, 1975. Patton, Alyeska, Reference:-Design Criteria." June 13, 1973. Letter to Alyeska Pipeline Service Com~any's manager, Memorandum from chairman, Technical Advisory Board, to project permissions, from authorized officers representative. chairman, Federal Task Force on Alaska Oil Development. Subject: "Corrective Action on Wildlife Crossings." Decem­ Subject: "Technical Advisory Board Meeting held on July 19, ber 23, 19'.75. 1973." July 20, 1973. Letter from authorized officer to Alyeska Pipeline Service "Memorandum of Record, check point meeting of November Company manager of environmental protection. February 19, 19-20, 1973." Bureau of Land Management draft. 1976. 129 Letter from acting authorized officer to president, Alyeska suiting. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Managernent Handboo Pipeline Service Company. Subject: "Quality Assurance February 1974. Program." January 31, 1977. U.S. Geological Survey. Environniental bnpact A nalys·i.s:TJ Letter to William Darch, president, Alyeska Pipeline Service Exmnple of the Proposed Tmns-Alaska Pipeline. Geologic, Company, from Morris Turner, acting authorized officer. Survey circular 695. David A. Brew. Reston, Virginia. 197 March 16, 1977. Alaska Pipeline Office. "Comments-Preliminary DesiJ;1 Reports Review." July 12, 1974. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Manage­ Alaska Pipeline Office. APO "Stop Orders.''. August 12,197 ment, Surveillmwe of the Proposed Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. 1970 Annual Report. Anchorage, Alaska. 1971. U.S. Department of the Interior, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Proposed Tmns-Alaska Pipeline. 1972. U.S. Congress U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Reports Wildlife. "A Report on Comparisons of the Fisheries Re­ sources Along Proposed and Alternative Pipeline Routes U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affair between Isabel Pass and Willow Lake." Anchorage, Alaska. Panel Report on Institutional Mechanisms, Cornell Wo,rksho September 1972. on Energy and the Environment. Committee Print. May 197: Meeting Report from Bureau of Land Management state U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affair director to Bureau of Land Management national director. Federal Lands Right of Way Act of 1973, Report 93-207 1 Subject: "Alyeska Pipeline Service Company Meeting on Big . accompany S.1081, 93 Cong., 1 Sess. June 12, 1973. Game Movements, Copper River Basin.' December 13, 1972. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Interior an U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Manage­ Insular Affairs. Amending Section 28 of the Mineral Leas in ment. Alaska State Office, Division of Pipeline. Tmns-Alaska Act of 1920, and Autlwrizing a Tra-ns-Alaska Oil and Go Pipeline Project:Administration and Managem,entSummary. Pipeline, andfor Othet Purposes, Report No. 93-414, to accorr October 1973. , pany H.R. 9130, 93 Cong., 1 Sess. July 20, 1973. Meeting Report from Alaska Pipeline Office wildlife biologist U.S. Comptroller General, General Accounting Office. Tram to authorized officer. Subject: "Alyeska Pipeline Service Alaska Oil Pipeline-Progress of Construction Throug Company Action re Big Game Movement." March 22, 1974. November, 1975. February 17, 1976. Review and Critique of Alaska Pipeline Construction Phase U.S. ComP.troller General, General Accounting Office. Traw QuaUty Assurmwe Manuais. Mechanics Research Inc. Report Alaska Oil Pipeline-Inf on nation on Const·ruction, Technica 3210-01/1. April 30, 1974. and Environ·mental Matters through Sp·ring, 19 77. August 2: A Partial List of Key Fish and Wildlife Areas AlotlQ the 1977. Tmns-Alaska Pipeline Route, With Critical and Less Critical Hearings Periods Identified. Joint Fish and Wildlife Advisory Team. U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affair1 November 15, 1975. Trans-Alaska Pipeline, Hea:ri-ngs, on the Status of th An Overview Study With Respect to Effectiveness of the Stipu­ Proposed Trans-Alaska Pipeline, 91 Cong., 1 Sess. October H lations During the Construction Phase. Report prepared for 1969. Mechanics Research Inc. by Terminu~ Limited. Toronto, U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affair! Canada. August 1977. Statement on S.1041, Title IV, and on S.1081, by Joh U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Audit and Investi­ Havelock, attorney general, State of Alaska. March 27, 197i gation. Study of the Alaska Pipeline Office Monito·ring of U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affair1 Quality Assurance and Control by the Alyeska Pipeline R1'.ghtsof Way Across Federal Lands, Hearings on S.1081 an. SerV"iceC01npany. September 10, 1976. other bills, 93 Cong., 1 Sess., Part 1. March 27, 1973. Recommendations for bn'}Yroving the Effectiveness of the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Interior an, Systems Designed w Mom'.torAlyeska's C01nplimwe with the Insular Affairs. Oversi,ghtHearings on Const·ruction of Trmu Right-of-Way Agreement. Report prepared for Alaska Pipe­ Alaska Pipeli',ie, before the Subcommittee on Public Land: line Office by Price Waterhouse and Company. Anchorage, 94 Cong., 1 Sess., Anchorage, Alaska. February 12, 1975. Alaska. October 1976. U.S. Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Th List of Designated Wildlife Crossingsfo-rthe Trans-Alaska Oil Const·ruction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System-Hearin! Pipeline. Joint Fish and Wildlife Advisory Team Special 94 Cong., 2 Sess. July 21, 1976. Report Number 11. August 1977. List of Stremns and Other Water Bodies along the Trans­ Alaska Oil Pipeline Route. Fourth revision. Richard L. Johnson and Julius Rockwell. State of Alaska Other Memoranda and Letters U.S. Department of the Interior. "Interior Releases Final Letter from William A. Egan, Governor of Alaska, to Burto Environmental Impact Statement on Trans-Alaska Pipeline W. Silcock, state director, Bureau of Land Managemeni Proposal; No Decision Due Yet." News Release. March 20, March 20, 1971. 1972. Letter to chief, Bureau of Land Management, pipeline divi Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, Alaska Area. "Brief­ sion, from management coordinator, division of game, Alask ing Statement-Construction Monitoring for the Trans­ Department of Fish and Game. September 12, 1973. Alaska Pipeline." December 19, 1973. · Letter from Commissioner James Brooks, Alaska Depar1 Agreement and Grant of Right-of-Way for Trans-Alaska Pipe­ ment of Fish and Game, to the Oil and Gas Associatior line between the United States of America and Amerada Hess September 17, 1973. Corporation, ARCO Pipe Line Company, Exxon Pipeline Memorandum of the Commissioner of the Alaska Departmen Company, Mobil Alaska Pipeline Company, Phillips Petro­ of Natural Resources. March 11, 1974. leum Company, Sohio Pipe Line Company, and Union Alaska Memorandum from game biologist, Alaska Department o Pipeline Company. January 1974. Fish and Game, Fairbanks, to chief of habitat, Alaska Depar1 Cooperative Agreement between the United States Depart-nient ment of Fish and Game, Juneau. Subject: "Alyeska/Fish am of the Interior and State of Alaska Regarding the Proposed Wildlife Team Big Game Crossing Meeting." March 18, 1974 Tmns-Alm;ka Pipeline. January 1974. Memorandum from James W. Brooks, Commissioner, Alask: U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of the Secretary. Department of Fish and Game, to pipeline surveillance super Order No. 2960, "Trans-Alaska Pipeline-Organizational visor. June 26, 1974. and Functional Responsibilities." January 23, 1974. Memorandum to Alaska Statute 16 file from Allan Carsor. U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Management Con- JFWAT state coordinator. December 13, 1974. 130 Letter from state _pipeline coordinator to president, Alyeska Miscellaneous* Pipeline Service Company. October 28, 1974. Bassett, Beau, Trustees for Alaska. "A Legal Analysis of Letter from state pipeline coordinator to president, Alyeska Major Federal and State Fish and Wildlife, and Environ­ Pipeline Service Company. February 25, 1976. mental Protection Statutes as Applied in Surveillance of the Memorandum from Blair Wondzell, field surveillance officer, Trans-Alaska Pipeline." September 21, 1977. State Pipeline Coordinator's Office, to Vyrl Goff, Alyeska Child, Kenneth N ., and Lent, Peter C., Alaska Cooperative Pipeline Service Company project manager, Section 3. Wildlife Research Unit, University of Alaska. The Reactions October 13, 1976. of Reindeer to a Pipeline Simulation at Penny R·iver, Alaska: Reports and Documents lnterini Report. May 3, 1973. Child, Kenneth N., Alaska Cooperative Wildlife Research CooperaUve Agi·eement between United States Depart-ment of Unit, University of Alaska. The Reactions of Bm-ren-Gou:nd the Interior and State of Alaska regarding the Proposed Trans­ Caribou to Si:mula.ted Pipel?:neand Pipel-ine Crossing Struc­ Alaska fipeline. January 8, 1974. tures at Pnidhoe Bay, Alaska. June 30, 1973. Right-of-way Lease for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline between the State of Alaska and Amerada Hess Corporation, ARCO Pipe Edmondson, Cameron. "Third-Party Supervision for the Line Company, Exxon Pipeline Company, Mobil Alaska Pipe­ Pipeline?" Alaska lnd1tstry, October 1973, pp. 33-35. line Company, Phillips Petroleum Company, Sohio Pipe Line George, Alexander L. "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Company and Union Alaska Pipeline Company. May 1974. Making Foreign Policy." American Political Science Review "An Analysis of Environmental Stipulation Compliance on LXVI, 3 (September 1972): 751-785. the Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline." Allan Carson, JFW AT state Glasgow, Leslie L. "Federal Responsibilities in IheNorth­ coordinator. September 10, 1975. The North Slope Task Force." Science inAlaska, Proceedings State Pipeline Coordinator's Office. Annual Report, 1975. of the 20th Alaska Science Conference. College, Alaska. Statement of Allan Carson, JFW AT, state surveillance super­ August 1967 (Published 1970). visor, before the President's Council on Environmental Interagency Fish and Wildlife Team, fisheries section. Quality, Hearings on Natural Gas Pipeline from Prudhoe "Minutes of Meeting." October 16, 1973. Bay, Alaska. May 16, 1977. Interagency Fish Working Team Meeting. "Minutes." The Managenient, Plmwing and Construct-ion of the Trans­ July 31, 1970. Alaska System. Report to the Alaska Pipeline Commission by "How BLM Wants to Police Pipeline." Anchorage Daily News, the Commission's Special Counsel, Terry F. Lenzner. August 22, 1973. August 1, 1977. LeResche, Robert. "The Future of Caribou in Alaska.1' Anchorage Daily News, December 11, 1973. Lyers, Henry R. "Federal Decisionmaking and the Trans­ Alaska Pipeline." Ecology Law Quarterly, Vol. 4:915 (1975), Other pp. 948 ff. Alyeska Pipeline Service Company Manning, Harvey. Cry Crisi.~.San Francisco: Friends of the Minutes of Meeting between Alyeska Pipeline Service Earth, 1974. Com__panyand State of Alaska. Subject: "Big Game Passage of Norton, David. "Pipeline Surveillance from the Insfde." the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System.'' March 15, 1974. Alaska Conservation Review XVI (2/3), Summer-Fall 1975. Trans-Alaska Pipeline QuaUt-yAssurance During Construc­ Norton, David. "Effects of the Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline tion. Alyeska Pipeline Service Company. February 1975. Construction Phase on Fish and Wildlife Management." "An Audit of Wildlife and Road Crossings, Pipeline Sections 1, Paper prepared for Commission Counsel, MacKenzie Valley 2, 3, 4." Alyeska Pipeline Service Company Quality Assur­ Pipeline Inquii;-y. March 24, 1976. ance. December 1975. Orth, Donald, U.S. Geological Survey. Dict-ionm·y of Alaska Letter from Alyeska Pipeline Service Company manager of Place Names. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, environmental protection to authorized officer and state pipe­ 1967. line coordinator. Subject: "Moose Crossings." February 7, Sage, Bryan L. Alaska aml Its Wildlife. New York: Viking 1976. Press, 1973.

*Items in this section are arranged alphabetically, rather than chronologically.

131 fl' U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979 0-269-947