Future Operating Concepts for Maritime Geospatial Forces

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Future Operating Concepts for Maritime Geospatial Forces ISSUE 133 SEPTEMBER 2009 Future Operating Concepts for Maritime Geospatial Forces & Defending Australia in the Australia Pacific Century Same, Same but Different; A Personal Perspective on the Requirements for a Future Submarine One Schoolie’s War: Instructor Lieutenant Commander George Lawrence Hogben DSC, US Bronze Star, RNZN, 1939-1945 HMS Amethyst. Simon the ship’s cat, & John Kerans, the black sheep of the RN Personnel Retention In The Ran Don’t call me ‘Sir’… the Use of Titles & Names in the Royal Australian Navy Honour: Fundamental Value Journal of the Issue 133 3 Contents Reader Response 4 Future Operating Concepts for Maritime Geospatial Forces and Defending Australia in the Australia Pacific Century 5 Same, Same but Different; A Personal Perspective on the Requirements for a Future Submarine 12 HMAS Sydney arrive in New York , steaming up the Hudson river, Sunday July 19, 2009 One Schoolie’s War: accompanied by United States Navy warship USS Mahan Instructor Lieutenant Commander George Lawrence Hogben DSC, US Bronze Star, RNZN, 1939-1945 16 Personnel Retention In The RAN 27 Don’t call me ‘Sir’… the Use of Titles and Names in the Royal Australian Navy 30 HMS Amethyst. Simon the ship’s cat, and John Kerans, the black sheep of the RN 33 Honour: Fundamental Value 39 Front page: Talent Management – An organisational HMAS Ballarat analysis 42 during a scenic sunset at Cumulative Hazard Risk Modelling for anchor off the coast of Egypt Naval Platforms 47 A Look at some of the Implications of Climate Change upon the RAN 51 Visions from the Vault 55 Issue Number 133 ANI Online Guide 56 Printed by Everbest Printing Company HMAS Sydney steams past the Statue of Liberty in New York harbor, Sunday July 19, 2009 Style Notes for Contributors 57 ISSN 1833-6531 Australian Naval Institute Info 58 - RAYTHEON AUSTRALIA - BOOZ & COMPANY - AUSTAL - THALES NAVAL GROUP - DEFENCE MARITIME SERVICES - QUINETIQ Design & DTP: ANI Membership Application Form 59 Diane Bricknell - AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE CREDIT UNION - ATI - EDS - LOPAC - SAAB [email protected] Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 4 Reader Response Sir, and Defence Forces are ultimately ‘face time’ with fleet units is absurd. I commend the Naval Institute for accountable. The stated content of the paper included an “offer of recent their efforts in promoting informed Furthermore, the author fails to examples of operational military surveying in a naval context”. writing and discussion through the achieve the stated intention of the One of these examples is contained in the one sentence of inaugural award of CDRE Roberston paper (detailed in paragraph 6) through paragraph 22 (United States Naval Service), and according to Essay. However, in bestowing the award impenetrable grammar and archaic the footnotes is the sum total of conversations held over three for 2008 on a substandard piece of language, overuse (and incorrect days between the author and the Operations Officer on the work “Remilitarising the Australian use) of acronyms, pretentiousness, USNS Henson. Hydrographic Service (or (Why the overemotional language, incomplete The discussion on hydrography in the Royal Navy also Droggies Need Disbanding)”, (Headmark, research and most alarmingly, disloyalty appears totally informed by a recruiting leaflet, theHMS March 2008) the Institute does itself to fellow officers and the Service. Enterprise website and a discussion with the Executive Officer a disservice and damages the future I have puzzled long and hard over of HMS Enterprise. The author claims that nautical charting reputation of this award. the meaning of several sections without responsibilities have been transferred from the Royal Navy The paper fails on a number of levels. success, including the following: “An to the Foreign Office and references the statement through Most notably the author fails to position evolved AHS with wartime antecedent footnote 14 to the above website and discussion. This website the discussion within the current would suggestively leave the extant, states: strategic context and priorities as stated contemporary AHS wishing to “In addition to surveying in overseas areas, [hydrographic] in the Defence White Paper, but instead evolve in its wake when comparing ships of the flotilla are constantly engaged in updating the charts harks back to the supposedly “glory days” appropriateness of equipment, attitude covering the waters around the United Kingdom” in a very different context of World War of officer, and maturity of doctrine, This is clearly at variance with the statement in the paper II covert operations. The White Paper procedures and product.” and brings in to question the reliability of both of the personal (page 47) states that: I find it appalling that the author has communication sources. More specifically the author fails “The key to defending Australia is been rewarded for launching a scathing to inform that the national charting responsibility is a joint to control the air and sea approaches and unfounded attack on his fellow venture between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and to our continent, so as to deny them officers (paragraph 13). The author Ministry of Defence, the latter being a key supplier of vessels to hostile ships and aircraft, and feels no compunction to provide any and man power (as indicated above), and the immediate provide maximum freedom of action hard data to support his statements hierarchy to the UK Hydrographic Office. for our forces. That means we need concerning the four “types” of While the author finds no problem with hydrographic ships a fundamentally maritime strategy. Hydrographers or his offensive inference in the Royal Navy requiring “close escort in a potentially hostile Our strategic geography, our relatively that the Hydrographic service is a environment” he dismisses the force protection requirements small population and our comparative dumping ground for disinterested and/ of Australian ships as “baby-sitter operations”. advantage in a range of technologies all or incompetent and/or “soft” officers that The author places great emphasis on warfare skills but dictate that our defence should focus on can’t make the grade at the “sharp” end. seems to have forgotten some of the basic requirements of an our air and sea approaches.” Neither is the comparison between officer in the Royal Australian Navy and should take some time Given this strategic context, the the two specialisations for Maritime to re-acquaint himself with the Navy values of Integrity – “the current role of the Hydrographic Service Geospatial Officers – Hydrography display of truth, honesty and fairness that gains respect and is very clear, and flies directly in the face or Meteorology and Oceanography trust from others” and Loyalty – “being committed to each of the discussion paper subtitle “Why the (METOC) valid. METOC specialists other and to our duty of service to Australia”. I congratulate the Droggies Need Disbanding”. The author’s are dealing with the highly dynamic author on his recent selection for promotion, and trust that suggestion that only main fairways and atmosphere, with a specific task of in his new rank he will do more to uphold and mentor these ports need to be surveyed to adequately managing constantly changing data values. defend the Nation is an astonishingly within the battle space of a Task Group. This essay contains few facts, very little discussion and naive assumption. For Hydrographers, the same real-time appears to be the platform on which a disgruntled member can In a thinly veiled slur to his superiors data manipulation capability is not air his grievances. The basic structure of an essay is absent, with and the government of the day (“The required, as their aim is the collection the sweeping (and unsupported) statements of the concluding AHO... will continue to commit military and correlation of data for use at a paragraphs having no substantive place in the body or indeed operational support to a lower priority strategic or operational level, well before the introduction. in order to achieve accountable-to- the tactical situation develops. The In closing, as the first recipient of this award, this winning Canberra measurable goals”) the author suggestion that hydrography is not a essay sets the bar very low for future entrants. seems confused as to who the Fleet maritime warfare enabler due to a lack of Matthew Templeton Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 133 5 Future Operating Concepts for Maritime Geospatial Forces and Defending Australia in the Australia Pacific Century byC OMMANDER STEWART DUNNE “To be, or not to be: that is the question” future plans for the development efficiencies and long term cost savings. – Hamlet (Act III, Scene I) of Force 2030, including the major Importantly, this will also address capability investments that will need to seagoing capacity that has been a ike all high level Defence be made in the coming years. feature of current survey platform documents post the delivery This will directly impact on the limitations, allowing a degree of ofL the Defence White Paper 2009 Hydrographic Survey Force (HSF). flexibility and deployability in how (DWP) there will be a need to revisit, The 100 or so words pertaining to and when the platforms can be used in if not substantially rewrite the way the HSF future are embedded in the future. that business will be conducted in the Offshore Combatant Vessels section future. of chapter nine, which detail the New Role, New Function? This is no less relevant
Recommended publications
  • This for Rememberance 4 Th Anks to a Number of Readers Some More Information Has Come to Light Regarding the Australians at Jutland
    ISSUE 137 SEPTEMBER 2010 Th is for Rememberance Fuel for Th ought: Nuclear Propulsion and the RAN Re-Introducing Spirituality to Character Training in the Royal Australian Navy Navy Aircrew Remediation Training People, Performance & Professionalism: How Navy’s Signature Behaviours will manage a ‘New Generation’ of Sailors Management of Executive Offi cers on Armidale Class Patrol Boats Th e very name of the Canadian Navy is under question... A brief look at Submarines before Oberon Amphibious Warfare – Th e Rising Tide (And Beyond…) Studies in Trait Leadership in the Royal Australian Navy – Vice Admiral Sir William Creswell JOURNAL OF THE 137 SEPT 2010.indd 1 21/07/10 11:33 AM Trusted Partner Depth of expertise Proudly the leading mission systems integrator for the Royal Australia Navy, Raytheon Australia draws on a 1300 strong Australian workforce and the proven record of delivering systems integration for the Collins Class submarine, Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyer and special mission aircraft. Raytheon Australia is focused on the needs of the Australian Defence Force and has the backing of Raytheon Company — one of the most innovative, high technology companies in the world — to provide NoDoubt® confi dence to achieve our customer’s mission success. www.raytheon.com.au © 2009 Raytheon Australia. All rights reserved. “Customer Success Is Our Mission” is a registered trademark of Raytheon Company. Image: Eye in the Sky 137Collins SEPT Oct09 2010.indd A4.indd 12 21/10/200921/07/10 10:14:55 11:33 AM AM Issue 137 3 Letter to the Editor Contents Trusted Partner “The Australians At Jutland” This for Rememberance 4 Th anks to a number of readers some more information has come to light regarding the Australians at Jutland.
    [Show full text]
  • The British Commonwealth and Allied Naval Forces' Operation with the Anti
    THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND ALLIED NAVAL FORCES’ OPERATION WITH THE ANTI-COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS IN THE KOREAN WAR: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE OPERATION ON THE WEST COAST By INSEUNG KIM A dissertation submitted to The University of Birmingham For the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of History and Cultures College of Arts and Law The University of Birmingham May 2018 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT This thesis examines the British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces operation on the west coast during the final two and a half years of the Korean War, particularly focused on their co- operation with the anti-Communist guerrillas. The purpose of this study is to present a more realistic picture of the United Nations (UN) naval forces operation in the west, which has been largely neglected, by analysing their activities in relation to the large number of irregular forces. This thesis shows that, even though it was often difficult and frustrating, working with the irregular groups was both strategically and operationally essential to the conduct of the war, and this naval-guerrilla relationship was of major importance during the latter part of the naval campaign.
    [Show full text]
  • Newsletter SOUTH NSW 1235
    RUSI NSW Anzac Memorial, Hyde Park South, Sydney NSW 20001 PO Box A778 SYDNEY Newsletter SOUTH NSW 1235 www.rusinsw.org.au Issue No. 55 – Nov 2019 / Jan 2020 [email protected] Register to receive this free eNewsletter, click link below Telephone: (02) 8262 2922 http://www.rusinsw.org.au/Newsletter In this bumper issue: Defence support to firefighting effort: p.3 & 5, Australia / Fiji defence co-operations: p.4, Navy Amphibious Force: p.5, Appointment of the new Warrant Officer of the Air Force: p.10, Defence signs multi-million dollar contract for air defence radars: p.14, International News including Australia U.S. Partnership articles: p.14-15. Upcoming 2020 RUSI NSW Lunchtime Lectures Tuesday 28 January 2019 Anzac Memorial Auditorium Speaker: Colonel David Wilkins OAM (Ret’d) Subject: The Three Vietnam Wars - 1954 to 1975 David was the Adjutant of 5 RAR and also Company 2IC and OC. He edited the 2009 edition of “The Year of the Tigers” – the history of the second tour of 5 RAR to Vietnam. David was also one of a small team who researched and wrote the four volumes of “The Trumpet Calls” - the history of the men and women from the Municipality of Ku-ring-gai who served in the Great War. David will provide an insightful presentation on the Three Vietnam Wars that will cover: · causes of the 2nd Vietnam War from the Cold War to the domino theory and SEATO · was the domino theory a legitimate basis for fighting in Vietnam? · the 2nd Vietnam War- was the US strategy appropriate or misguided? · was it an American defeat? · some controversies of the war · public relations as a principle of war.
    [Show full text]
  • Civilians: the Fulcrum for a Modern Fleet
    Chief of Navy Essay Competition The Youth Division (MacDougall Prize) Civilians: The Fulcrum for a Modern Fleet “We need to think differently […] by reviewing our basic operating concepts, reimagining the way that Navy should view itself in the twenty-first century, re-examining our assumptions and, most importantly, re-engineering our modus operandi…”1 – Vice Admiral Tim Barrett AO CSC RAN On 3rd September 1939 Australia declared war on Germany and by 1941 was seeking innovative ways to sustain the war effort at sea. This need served as the genesis of two important augmentations to the Royal Australian Navy (RAN): the Women’s Royal Australian Naval Service (WRANS) in April2 and the Naval Auxiliary Patrol (NAP) that June3. This essay will briefly identify the role played by the aforementioned services in supplementing an RAN stretched for resources before identifying similar challenges in the Navy of today. It will then explore the possibility of rectifying this by increasing the use of civilian support across the RAN, such as through the introduction of a modern Australian Fleet Auxiliary. Spread across the globe, the RAN realised it would need to do everything it could to maximise the availability of her sailors and warships while continuing to maintain a suitable presence on the home front. For this reason, both the WRANS and NAP would target those not eligible to serve in conflict at sea. Officer Commanding Sydney Naval Establishments Commodore Muirhead-Gould was quoted by the Sydney Morning Herald on the 4th November 1941 as saying the NAP “would not release any member from any other kind of service under the laws of the Commonwealth” and that, while “applications for enrolment were being received from unmarried men under 35 […] these men could be enrolled in the patrol only if they were in reserve occupations or medically unfit”4.
    [Show full text]
  • The Oakhill Drive Volume 32 | July 2015
    The Oakhill Drive volume 32 | july 2015 The Centenary of the Gallipoli Campaign 1915 – 2015 his year, 2015, marks one hundred years since the Gallipoli Campaign in World War I. The spirit of ANZAC has come to mean T many things for so many people over these past 100 Years. Next year, 2016, Oakhill College will celebrate 80 Years of Lasallian education in the Hills Region. During the course of our 80 Year history only one of our Alumni has died in the service of our country – Trooper Jason Brown (Class of 1999). In 2013 Jason was made an Alumni of Distinction (posthumously) in memorial of his life. Many hundreds of our Alumni have served or are still serving in our defence forces. As we pay tribute to all those many Australian men and women who have died in conflicts around the world over the past 100 years we would also like to recognise the achievements and on-going commitment to the service of this country by our Alumni. One such person is Colonel Kahlil Fegan. Kahlil Fegan graduated from Oakhill College in 1988 after commencing at the school eight years earlier in Grade 5. He studied for a Bachelor of Arts Degree at Newcastle University prior to graduating from the Royal Military College - Duntroon in 1993, to the Royal Australian Infantry Corps. He has served in a wide variety of roles in Australia, Canada, East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan. Kahlil is currently serving as the Chief of Staff of the 1st Division/Deployable Joint Forces Headquarters. He is married to Ilona, an Organisational Development Manager and has two daughters, Caitlin and Lauren and a young son Elijah.
    [Show full text]
  • South-West Pacific: Amphibious Operations, 1942–45
    Issue 30, 2021 South-West Pacific: amphibious operations, 1942–45 By Dr. Karl James Dr. James is the Head of Military History, Australian War Memorial. Issue 30, 2021 © Commonwealth of Australia 2021 This work is copyright. You may download, display, print, and reproduce this material in unaltered form only (retaining this notice and imagery metadata) for your personal, non- commercial use, or use within your organisation. This material cannot be used to imply an endorsement from, or an association with, the Department of Defence. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, all other rights are reserved. Issue 30, 2021 On morning of 1 July 1945 hundreds of warships and vessels from the United States Navy, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), and the Royal Netherlands Navy lay off the coast of Balikpapan, an oil refining centre on Borneo’s south-east coast. An Australian soldier described the scene: Landing craft are in formation and swing towards the shore. The naval gunfire is gaining momentum, the noise from the guns and bombs exploding is terrific … waves of Liberators [heavy bombers] are pounding the area.1 This offensive to land the veteran 7th Australian Infantry Division at Balikpapan was the last of a series amphibious operations conducted by the Allies to liberate areas of Dutch and British territory on Borneo. It was the largest amphibious operation conducted by Australian forces during the Second World War. Within an hour some 16,500 troops were ashore and pushing inland, along with nearly 1,000 vehicles.2 Ultimately more than 33,000 personnel from the 7th Division and Allied forces were landed in the amphibious assault.3 Balikpapan is often cited as an example of the expertise achieved by Australian forces in amphibious operations during the war.4 It was a remarkable development.
    [Show full text]
  • March 2018 We Began Our Year with a Very
    Victorian Chapter President's Musings – March 2018 We began our year with a very interesting illustrated address by CMDR Matthew Hoffman RAN, the XO of HMAS CERBERUS. CMDR Hoffman told us of his Naval career to date and left us in no doubt as to the importance and effectiveness of our submarine force in respect of the overall defence of our nation. Our speaker on March 26th is WWII veteran Pamela Nichols who enlisted in the WRANS in 1943. Check out the flyer for further information. You definitely won't want to miss it! Please don't turn up for our April meeting on the 23rd, as it is now being held on April 30th! What we have in store for you on the 30th is well worth waiting another week for! ANZAC VOICES GALLIPOLI – From those who were there! Anzac Voices is the story of Gallipoli, told by the Diggers who lived through it: regular troops, senior commanders, stretcher bearers, signal operators, a nurse and a Turkish general, as well as Australia's official war correspondent, Charles Bean. We will hear disc one of a two disc set on ABC Classic's CD 481-1626. It is available for purchase from ABC shops, and well worth buying for your children or grandchildren! ANZAC Day itself is a very special day to all of us, and this year is even more special for the members of the NHS of A, as leading the Melbourne march at 0900 are a father and son, who are both currently serving in our Royal Australian Navy.
    [Show full text]
  • Journal of the Australian Naval Institute
    Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Autumn 2004 AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE The Australian Naval Institute was formed as a self-supporting and non-profit nrfrin_ organisation: incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory in 1975. The main objectives of the Institute are: • to encourage and promote the advancement of know ledge related to the Navy and the i«nitr profession: and • to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and the mariiinir profession. Membership subscription rates are located on the inside back cover of the Journal. Further information can be obtained from the Business Manager, Australian Naval Institute, PO Box 29, Red Hill ACT 2603. email: [email protected], or via the website at www.navalinstitute.com.au. Patron the Institute's website. Chief of Navy VADM Chris Ritchie, AO RAN Style Guide. Articles and correspondence should be submitted electronically in Microsoft Word, with limited Council Members formatting. Relevant pictures or maps can be submitted President RADM Rowan Moffitt, RAN electronically (if under 1 MB), otherwise they should be Vice President CAPT Gerry Christian, RAN provided on CD. Secretary CMDR Peter Leavy, RAN Articles may range in size from 1-10 pages - anything Treasurer LCDR Craig Opie, RAN larger should be submitted to the Sea Power Centre- Journal Editor Mr Andrew Forbes Australia for possible publication as a Working Paper Councillor CDRE James Goldrick, AM CSC RAN (spca.seapower(£>defence. gov.au). Councillor CDRE Peter Jones, AM DSC RAN Councillor CAPT Ray Griggs, CSC RAN Editorial Board Councillor Dr David Stevens Editor Mr Andrew Forbes Councillor LCDR Lisa Batchler, RAN andrew.forbes 1 (Sjdefence.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Introduction
    Notes 1 Introduction 1. Donald Macintyre, Narvik (London: Evans, 1959), p. 15. 2. See Olav Riste, The Neutral Ally: Norway’s Relations with Belligerent Powers in the First World War (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965). 3. Reflections of the C-in-C Navy on the Outbreak of War, 3 September 1939, The Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939–45 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990), pp. 37–38. 4. Report of the C-in-C Navy to the Fuehrer, 10 October 1939, in ibid. p. 47. 5. Report of the C-in-C Navy to the Fuehrer, 8 December 1939, Minutes of a Conference with Herr Hauglin and Herr Quisling on 11 December 1939 and Report of the C-in-C Navy, 12 December 1939 in ibid. pp. 63–67. 6. MGFA, Nichols Bohemia, n 172/14, H. W. Schmidt to Admiral Bohemia, 31 January 1955 cited by Francois Kersaudy, Norway, 1940 (London: Arrow, 1990), p. 42. 7. See Andrew Lambert, ‘Seapower 1939–40: Churchill and the Strategic Origins of the Battle of the Atlantic, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 17, no. 1 (1994), pp. 86–108. 8. For the importance of Swedish iron ore see Thomas Munch-Petersen, The Strategy of Phoney War (Stockholm: Militärhistoriska Förlaget, 1981). 9. Churchill, The Second World War, I, p. 463. 10. See Richard Wiggan, Hunt the Altmark (London: Hale, 1982). 11. TMI, Tome XV, Déposition de l’amiral Raeder, 17 May 1946 cited by Kersaudy, p. 44. 12. Kersaudy, p. 81. 13. Johannes Andenæs, Olav Riste and Magne Skodvin, Norway and the Second World War (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1966), p.
    [Show full text]
  • Australia's Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise
    AUSTRALIA’S NAVAL SHIPBUILDING ENTERPRISE Preparing for the 21st Century JOHN BIRKLER JOHN F. SCHANK MARK V. ARENA EDWARD G. KEATING JOEL B. PREDD JAMES BLACK IRINA DANESCU DAN JENKINS JAMES G. KALLIMANI GORDON T. LEE ROGER LOUGH ROBERT MURPHY DAVID NICHOLLS GIACOMO PERSI PAOLI DEBORAH PEETZ BRIAN PERKINSON JERRY M. SOLLINGER SHANE TIERNEY OBAID YOUNOSSI C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1093 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9029-4 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2015 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface The Australian government will produce a new Defence White Paper in 2015 that will outline Australia’s strategic defense objectives and how those objectives will be achieved.
    [Show full text]
  • Beyond Plan Pelorus the Royal Australian Navy's Future Strategy Will See It Acquire More Capable Individual Platforms but Also Gain Capability at the Task Force Level
    ihs.com Jane's Defence Weekly [Content preview – Subscribe to IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly for full article] Beyond Plan Pelorus The Royal Australian Navy's future strategy will see it acquire more capable individual platforms but also gain capability at the task force level. Julian Kerr reports Reflecting both the introduction of new capabilities and improvements in platform support, by 2018 the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) anticipates regularly generating and deploying self-contained naval task groups capable of accomplishing the full spectrum of maritime security operations. Under Plan Pelorus, released in April and spelling out the chief of the navy's three-year strategic intent, the RAN will seek the ability to establish sea control in two geographical locations and, after an initial surge, maintain one location of local sea control. Presumably at least partially driven by the escort needs of the RAN's new 27,500-ton Canberra-class landing helicopter docks (LHDs), Plan Pelorus moves the operational emphasis from independent units to grouping together the combat capability of ships in task groups. HMAS Canberra off the north Queensland coast with five MRH90 aircraft on deck and its four landing craft deployed. (Australian DoD) 1642785 © Copyright IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved. All Article 1 Page 1 of 14 trademarks belong to IHS and its affiliated and subsidiary companies, all rights reserved. ihs.com In addition, planning for the decade beyond Pelorus recently received a boost with the announcement in August of a continuous domestic naval shipbuilding programme intended to deliver new frigates and a new class of offshore patrol vessel (OPV) to the RAN years ahead of schedule.
    [Show full text]
  • FROM CRADLE to GRAVE? the Place of the Aircraft
    FROM CRADLE TO GRAVE? The Place of the Aircraft Carrier in Australia's post-war Defence Force Subthesis submitted for the degree of MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES at the University College The University of New South Wales Australian Defence Force Academy 1996 by ALLAN DU TOIT ACADEMY LIBRARy UNSW AT ADFA 437104 HMAS Melbourne, 1973. Trackers are parked to port and Skyhawks to starboard Declaration by Candidate I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other institute of higher learning, except where due acknowledgment is made in the text of the thesis. Allan du Toit Canberra, October 1996 Ill Abstract This subthesis sets out to study the place of the aircraft carrier in Australia's post-war defence force. Few changes in naval warfare have been as all embracing as the role played by the aircraft carrier, which is, without doubt, the most impressive, and at the same time the most controversial, manifestation of sea power. From 1948 until 1983 the aircraft carrier formed a significant component of the Australian Defence Force and the place of an aircraft carrier in defence strategy and the force structure seemed relatively secure. Although cost, especially in comparison to, and in competition with, other major defence projects, was probably the major issue in the demise of the aircraft carrier and an organic fixed-wing naval air capability in the Australian Defence Force, cost alone can obscure the ftindamental reordering of Australia's defence posture and strategic thinking, which significantly contributed to the decision not to replace HMAS Melbourne.
    [Show full text]