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Normalised Template for Word97 INDIA SRI LANKA BILATERAL RELATIONS Simran Chandok1 INTRODUCTION Sri Lanka is an important neighbor for India. Maintaining healthy relations with Sri Lanka has been a matter of great priority to India. From sharing the narrow Palk Strait to supporting the government in its military interventions in the North and East of Sri Lanka during the latter stages of the Sri Lankan Civil War; India and Sri Lanka have shared a long standing relationship. Geographically, India is Sri Lanka’s closest neighbor. Separated only by the Palk Strait, the distance between the 2 landmasses is as little as 12 nautical miles in some places. If it were not for the narrow stretch of water separating India and Sri Lanka, they would have been one nation. However this tiny stretch of water has resulted in the creation of 2 distinct, developing nations whose importance is increasing in the current global scenario. Historically, the link between India and Sri Lanka is as old as the Ramayana. In the epic written by Sage Valmiki in the 11th Century BC, Ram and his Vanara Army constructed the Ramasetu- a bridge made of limestone shoals- extending from the Pambam Island (near Rameshwaram) in India till the Mannar Island off the coast of Sri Lanka in order to save his wife, Sita, from the Rakshasee King, Ravana. Even though this was regarded as just a story, the Ramasetu is actually in existence. It is popularly known as the Adam’s Bridge. Just as in the story, the bridge extends between the Pambam Island and Mannar Island and divides the Palk Strait from the Gulf of Mannar. Though, now partially submerged, it has been evidenced that the Adam’s Bridge was afloat until 1480 when a cyclone hit, causing it to get submerged. Thus, there is a real possibility that the Ramayana was actually based on a true incident. This would mean that India and Sri Lanka have been connected to one another- geographically and historically- for more than 1100 years now. 1 2nd Year BBA LLB Student, Symbiosis Law School, Pune 1 | P a g e Journal On Contemporary Issues of Law (JCIL) Vol. 2 Issue 3 INDIA-SRI LANKA BILATERAL RELATIONS (1947-1983) India gained independence from the British Rule in 1947 while Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948. After gaining its independence, the primarily Sinhalese population of Sri Lanka was very unhappy with the favoritism attitude adopted by the British towards the Tamils. This policy of favoritism towards one ethnic background was in keeping with the famous “divide and rule policy” used by the British in India to divide the Muslims and Hindus. There was immense pent up aggression against the Tamils, and thus, when the Sinhalese Government was formed, there was blatant discrimination against them. There were various restrictive practices enforced against the Tamils, seriously hampering their rights as the citizens of the country. The Sinhalese Government adopted various policies like the Sinhalese Only Act, 19562 that openly disregarded the Tamils living in Sri Lanka. After much protest, the Government introduced the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act, 19583. However this was an inadequate legislation- meant only to appease the population and not to bring about any real legislative effect. Tired of this discrimination, the Tamils living in the Eastern and Northern Provinces of Sri Lanka- especially in the Jaffna Peninsula- started creating militant outfits to spread fear among the Sinhalese population. These outfits demanded for an independent Tamil State, free from the rule of the Central Government, where Tamil would be the official language and the Government would be elected from amongst the people of that State. The Tamil Nadu state Government and population of the time were exceptionally sympathetic towards the plight of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and publicly supported them. Owing to sour relations between the then Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi and the then Sri Lankan President, J.R. Jayawardhane, the Indian Central Government also supported these militant groups. In fact, in mid 1983, Indira Gandhi ordered RAW4 to fund, arm and train several militant groups of which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealem (LTTE), spearheaded by Prabhakaran, emerged to be the strongest. The bilateral relations between India and Sri Lanka were constantly strained until there was a complete breakdown in 1983. 2 The Sinhalese Only Act, 1956 declared Sinhalese as the only national language of Sri Lanka completely disregarding Tamil and Tamilians living in Sri Lanka. 3 The Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act, 1958, declared Tamil the official language for administrative purposes. In addition to this, it also declared Tamil as the medium of instruction in Secondary and Higher Secondary education. 4 RAW- Research & Analysis Wing of India: RAW is the Indian Intelligence Agency established in 1968 after the Sino-India War, 1962 under the guidance of Rameshwar Nath Kao. 2 | P a g e Journal On Contemporary Issues of Law (JCIL) Vol. 2 Issue 3 In 1983, the Sri Lankan forces killed 3000 Tamils in the Jaffna Peninsula as a reaction to some of the Tamil separatist groups killing 13 Sinhalese soldiers. This incident sent the separatists over the edge and drove them to declare war against the Central Government. INDIA-SRI LANKA BILATERAL RELATIONS 1983-1991 (THE CIVIL WAR YEARS) Shocked at the cruelty of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces in killing 3000 Tamils, the Indian Government chose to let the Civil War pan out and not intervene. There was immense support from Tamil Nadu to help the Tamil militants, however, India did not want to interfere or influence the Sri Lankan Civil War publicly as it would be a gross violation of various provisions of the UN Charter- an organisation India and Sri Lanka are members of. All the support provided by the Indian Government to the militants was done secretly- away from the public eye. On the face of it, India remained uninvolved. Finally in 1987, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces launched a complete offensive in the Jaffna Peninsula. They blocked the entire peninsula cutting off basic supplies of food, portable water and medical facilities to the Tamil militants and the civil population in the beginning of January, 1987. Following this, a military attack was launched against North and East Sri Lanka killing approximately 200 Tamil Civilians. For weeks the blockade persisted with no access to basic amenities. Speared on by the Tamilians of Tamil Nadu and all across the country- the Indian Government decided to take its first public step to support the Tamil militants by sending 1000 tons of food supplies in boats to the Jaffna Peninsula. It was communicated to the Sinhalese Government that this move was based on “humanitarian grounds” and not a show of support by the Indian Government. However the Sri Lankan Navy did not allow the Indian Navy boats to enter Sri Lankan territory. The sending back of the boats was considered a victory by the Sinhalese and they welcomed the Navy as heroes after this incident. The Indian Government could not take this insult silently and launched Operation Poomalai- the Jaffna Food Air Drop- the first offensive by the Indian Government against the Sri Lankan Government. The mission was that a 32 Transport Aircraft escorted by 5 Air Force planes would fly over the Jaffna Peninsula and other blocked territories and air drop 1000 tons of food and necessary supplies. Operation Poomalai was important in 2 aspects- firstly, it provided relief to the civilians and militants alike and secondly, it marked the active involvement of India in the Sri Lankan Civil War. 3 | P a g e Journal On Contemporary Issues of Law (JCIL) Vol. 2 Issue 3 INDO SRI LANKAN ACCORD After Operation Poomalai, Sri Lanka was apprehended by the fact that the Indian Government had actively entered the War. Worried of its incapability to face the full force of the Indian Military, Sri Lanka sought India’s assistance to end the war. The Sinhalese Government agreed to compromise thus resulting in the creation of the Indo Sri Lankan Accord, 1987. The Indo Sri Lankan Accord is popularly known as the Rajiv-Jayawardhane Accord- after its 2 architects- the then Indian Prime Minister- Rajiv Gandhi and the then Sri Lankan President- J.R. Jayawardhane. It was signed on 29th July, 1987 and is one of the most important agreements signed by the 2 countries. The Accord stated that the Colombo Government would undertake devolution of power in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan troupe would withdraw from these areas and Tamil would be introduced in the Sri Lankan Constitution as one of the official languages of the country. The Accord further stated that India would send its military troupes- the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to whom the Tamil separatists would surrender their weapons. This Accord was looked upon as an opportunity to end the Civil War with Indian assistance. However, since the LTTE leader- Prabhakaran was not involved in these discussions, he refused to support the Accord. Operation Pawan, the codename for the IPKF mission in Sri Lanka was to be a peaceful one. The IPKF was supposed to act in an intermediary capacity. The military contingent was not under orders to fight or attack. They were only supposed to confiscate arms and ammunitions from the Tamil Separatists such as the LTTE and enable peace talks between the Separatists and the Sri Lankan Government. However, Prabhakaran and the other Separatists leaders pledged non co-operation and launched attacks on the IPKF. The IPKF were sent into the forests of Jaffna with old and incorrect maps, while the Tamil Separatists could navigate the forests even in the dark.
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