DOCSLIB.ORG

Iran's Burgeoning Strategic Forces

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Iran's Burgeoning Strategic Forces American Foreign Policy Council Iran Strategy Brief No. 10 February 2018 Iran’s Burgeoning Strategic Forces Ian Williams 1 www.afpc.org | 509 c st ne washington, dc | 202.543.1006 American Foreign Policy Council 1. Ilan Berman, Testimony IAN WILLIAMS is an associate fellow at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), before the House Foreign and associate director of the CSIS Missile Defense Project. A longer version of this Affairs Committee study will appear in AFPC’s forthcoming book on the changing challenge of Iran, to be Subcommittee on published in 2018. Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, May 24, 2017, Among the Islamic Republic of including both ballistic and cruise http://docs.house. Iran’s central strategic goals are the missiles. As a result of Iranian pressure, gov/meetings/FA/ FA18/20170524/106032/ preservation of its political regime and its the issue of ballistic missiles was placed HHRG-115-FA18-Wstate- ascension to what it views as its rightful outside of the “scope of work” of the BermanI-20170524.pdf. place as the regional hegemon of the JCPOA, despite the centrality of these Middle East. These objectives have put capabilities to the delivery of nuclear Iran on an adversarial footing with its weapons. Similarly, as a result of the immediate neighbors, and with much of Iran nuclear deal, strong UN Security the international community. Council resolutions curtailing Iran’s ballistic missile work have been replaced In pursuit of these goals, Iran has invested with weaker language that does not significantly in the development of its clearly prohibit the Islamic Republic’s strategic forces, which today includes development and testing of ballistic the region’s largest and most diverse missiles. arsenal of ballistic missiles, increasingly sophisticated cruise missiles, as well This state of affairs has emboldened as an array of shorter-ranged anti-ship Iran to continue its missile development missiles and air defenses. Iran has also programs, which have seen notable established the technological basis for advancements over the past several a nuclear weapons program. This effort years. In turn, Iran’s missile forces, in has included a blend of overt activities tandem with other strategic tools, under the auspices of a civilian nuclear support a complex national security energy program, and covert activities strategy that both enables the projection aimed at expanding Iran’s nuclear of power across the region, and imposes weapons potential without international costs on adversaries seeking to directly blowback. challenge Iran’s regime. The latter effort became the focus of A MORE PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT intense international attention following As experts have noted, the Iran nuclear its disclosure in 2003, and of extensive deal was always “intended to be tactical U.S.-led diplomacy under the Obama in nature, focusing on just one aspect of administration, culminating in the the Iranian regime’s rogue behavior: its passage of the Joint Comprehensive Plan persistent nuclear ambitions.”1 While this of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. While many focus may have simplified negotiations dispute its long-term efficacy, the JCPOA between Iran and the P5+1 powers (the appears to have at least temporarily U.S., UK, France, Russia, China and slowed Iran’s advance toward a nuclear Germany), even those with the highest weapons capability. No corresponding hopes for the long-term efficacy of the limitations, however, have been placed JCPOA cannot deny that the agreement upon Iran’s strategic delivery systems, entirely neglects significant aspects of 1 American Foreign Policy Council malign Iranian behavior. In fact, mounting law disallow them. Iran has never sought 2. United Nations, “Security evidence suggests that the structure of to acquire a nuclear weapon and never Council, Resolution 2231 (2015) Adopted by the nuclear deal, its limitations, and its will in the future, as it fully honours its the Security Council associated provisions have actually had commitment under the NPT and the at its 7488th meeting, the opposite of their intended effect, JCPOA. Consequently, Iran’s missiles on 20 July 2015,” July abetting and emboldening Iranian are not and could not be designed for 20, 2015, http://www. behavior and capabilities that fall outside delivery of unconventional weapons.”3 In un.org/en/ga/search/ of the parameters of the JCPOA. effect, Iran has maintained that, because view_doc.asp?symbol=S/ it presumably has no intention to acquire RES/2231%282015%29. Perhaps the most significant of these nuclear status, any and all missile-related 3. Press release by the is Iran’s ballistic and cruise missile activities pursued by the regime are Permanent Mission of the development programs. Even without therefore legitimate. Islamic Republic of Iran nuclear weapons, these forces give Iran to the United Nations, as cited in Kathleen H. Hicks the ability to impose significant costs The U.S. government does not share this and Melissa G. Dalton, upon the United States and its regional view, however. Administration officials Deterring Iran After the partners should conflict occur. They also have declared Iran’s recent ballistic Nuclear Deal (Washington, provide Iran with a kind of deterrent missile testing and proliferation to be DC: CSIS, March 2017). cover to pursue its malign activities in “in defiance” of UNSCR 2231.4 The U.S. 4. Secretary of State Rex the region with less perceived risk of intelligence community has furthermore Tillerson, Remarks at the direct military confrontation with the assessed that—irrespective of Tehran’s U.S. Department of State, United States, the Gulf Cooperation public denials—Iran’s ballistic missiles Washington, DC, April Council states, and/or Israel. Such a are “inherently capable of delivering 19, 2017, https://www. dynamic could easily to lead to strategic WMD.”5 state.gov/secretary/ miscalculation and conflict. remarks/2017/04/270341. htm. Moreover, while Iran did significantly 5. Director of National United Nations Security Council reduce its missile testing during the Intelligence Dan Coats, Resolution (UNSCR) 2231 notably only period of multilateral negotiations over as cited in Adam Kredo, restricts development of those missiles the JCPOA, it resumed them shortly after “Intel Report: Iran Refining “designed to be capable” of delivering the deal was concluded in July 2015. Nuke Pathway System nuclear weapons. The resolution it Since then, Iran may have conducted as in Flagrant Violation of replaced, UNSCR 1929, was stricter, many as 25 launches of ballistic missiles, Ban,” Washington Free stating that “Iran shall not undertake cruise missiles, and satellite launch Beacon, May 12, 2017, any activity related to ballistic missiles vehicles.6 http://freebeacon.com/ capable of delivering nuclear weapons, national-security/intel- including launches using ballistic missile Notably, Iranian officials are eager to avert report-iran-refining-nuke- delivery-system-flagrant- technology.”2 possible consequences for their ballistic violation-ban/. missile work. Thus, in October of 2017, 6. “Iranian Missile Launches: While the linguistic change may seem on the heels of the Trump administration’s 1988-Present,” Missile slight, a revealing March 2015 press unveiling of a new “comprehensive” Threat, n.d., https:// release clearly shows that the shift was Iran strategy designed to, among other missilethreat.csis.org/ not lost on Iran, with the Iranian UN things, curtail the ballistic missile threat iranian-missile-launches- delegation observing that, “Security from Iran, the country’s Supreme Leader, 1988-present/. Council Resolution 2231 does not Ali Khamenei, unilaterally announced 7. Kelsey Davenport, “Iran’s prohibit legitimate and conventional that he would henceforth restrict the Leader Sets Missile Range military activities, nor does international range of the country’s indigenously- Limit,” Arms Control Today, 2 American Foreign Policy Council December 2017, https:// produced missiles to 2,000 kilometers.7 urban areas, civilian infrastructure and www.armscontrol.org/ potentially larger military installations, act/2017-12/news/ This range, however, still permits Iran and; shorter-range tactical missile iran%E2%80%99s- leader-sets-missile- to strike targets throughout the entire systems, such as anti-ship and air range-limit. Middle East, as well as in parts of defense systems, meant to contest 8. “Iran to widen missile southeastern Europe. Furthermore, access and control of strategically range ‘if threatened because the restriction is self-imposed, sensitive areas such the Arabian by Europe,’” Al Jazeera there is no way to independently verify Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. These (Doha), November Iran’s compliance with its own caps. forces and doctrines work in concert 26, 2017, http:// Likewise, the restriction makes no to support a cost-imposing strategy www.aljazeera. mention of payload weights, significant against adversaries that confront Iran com/news/2017/11/ because the full extent of a missile’s militarily. iran-widen-missile- maximum range can be masked by range-threatened- testing it with a heavier payload. Finally, Ballistic Missiles europe-171126123011158. html. Khamenei’s declaration is confined to The backbone of Iran’s MRBM fleet 9. “Shahab-3 Variants,” ballistic missiles, with no corresponding is the Shahab-3 series of ballistic Missile Threat, n.d., commitments from Iran’s leadership to missiles, which is based on the North http://missilethreat.csis. limit any other kinds of missiles, such as Korean No-Dong. The Shahab was org/missile/shahab-3- cruise missiles, air defenses, or anti-ship first tested in 1998. More recently, variants-emad-ghadr. capabilities. Iran has unveiled and tested other 10. Idrees Ali, “Iran tested Shahab-3 variants such as the Ghadr medium-range ballistic Indeed, there is nothing to stop the Iranian and Emad, which Iran claims have missile: U.S. official,” regime from increasing the range of its greater accuracy.9 The Shahab-3 and Reuters, January 30, missiles is short order should it choose to its variants have estimated ranges 2017, https://www. do so.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Winning the Salvo Competition Rebalancing America’S Air and Missile Defenses
    WINNING THE SALVO COMPETITION REBALANCING AMERICA’S AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES MARK GUNZINGER BRYAN CLARK WINNING THE SALVO COMPETITION REBALANCING AMERICA’S AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES MARK GUNZINGER BRYAN CLARK 2016 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA) The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. ©2016 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Mark Gunzinger is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Mr. Gunzinger has served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Transformation and Resources. A retired Air Force Colonel and Command Pilot, he joined the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2004. Mark was appointed to the Senior Executive Service and served as Principal Director of the Department’s central staff for the 2005–2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. Following the QDR, he served as Director for Defense Transformation, Force Planning and Resources on the National Security Council staff. Mr. Gunzinger holds an M.S. in National Security Strategy from the National War College, a Master of Airpower Art and Science degree from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, a Master of Public Administration from Central Michigan University, and a B.S. in chemistry from the United States Air Force Academy.
    [Show full text]
  • Design Characteristics of Iran's Ballistic and Cruise Missiles
    Design Characteristics of Iran’s Ballistic and Cruise Missiles Last update: January 2013 Missile Nato or Type/ Length Diameter Payload Range (km) Accuracy ‐ Propellant Guidance Other Name System (m) (m) (kg)/warhead CEP (m) /Stages Artillery* Hasib/Fajr‐11* Rocket artillery (O) 0.83 0.107 6; HE 8.5 ‐ Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐12* Rocket artillery (O) 1.29 0.244 50; HE 10 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐23* Rocket artillery (O) 1.82 0.333 120; HE 11 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐14* Rocket artillery (O) 2.8 0.122 18.3; HE 21.5 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐25* Rocket artillery (O) 3.2 0.122 18.3; HE 30 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐36* Rocket artillery (O) 2 0.122 18.3; HE 18 Solid Spin stabilized Shahin‐17* Rocket artillery (O) 2.9 0.33 190; HE 13 Solid Spin stabilized Shahin‐28* Rocket artillery (O) 3.9 0.33 190; HE 20 Solid Spin stabilized Oghab9* Rocket artillery (O) 4.82 0.233 70; HE 40 Solid Spin stabilized Fajr‐310* Rocket artillery (O) 5.2 0.24 45; HE 45 Solid Spin stabilized Fajr‐511* Rocket artillery (O) 6.6 0.33 90; HE 75 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐112* Rocket artillery (O) 1.38 0.24 50; HE 10 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐213* Rocket artillery (O) 1.8 0.333 60; HE 11 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat‐614* Rocket artillery (O) 6.3 0.355 150; HE 100 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat15* Rocket artillery (O) 5.9 0.355 150; HE 120 Solid Spin stabilized Zelzal‐116* Iran‐130 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.61 500‐600; HE 100‐125 Solid Spin stabilized Zelzal‐1A17* Mushak‐120 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.61 500‐600; HE 160 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat‐1018* Mushak‐160 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.45 250; HE 150 Solid Spin stabilized Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
    [Show full text]
  • Blood-Soaked Secrets Why Iran’S 1988 Prison Massacres Are Ongoing Crimes Against Humanity
    BLOOD-SOAKED SECRETS WHY IRAN’S 1988 PRISON MASSACRES ARE ONGOING CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 7 million people who campaign for a world where human rights are enjoyed by all. Our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards. We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations. © Amnesty International 2017 Cover photo: Collage of some of the victims of the mass prisoner killings of 1988 in Iran. Except where otherwise noted, content in this document is licensed under a Creative Commons © Amnesty International (attribution, non-commercial, no derivatives, international 4.0) licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode For more information please visit the permissions page on our website: www.amnesty.org Where material is attributed to a copyright owner other than Amnesty International this material is not subject to the Creative Commons licence. First published in 2017 by Amnesty International Ltd Peter Benenson House, 1 Easton Street London WC1X 0DW, UK Index: MDE 13/9421/2018 Original language: English amnesty.org CONTENTS GLOSSARY 7 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8 METHODOLOGY 18 2.1 FRAMEWORK AND SCOPE 18 2.2 RESEARCH METHODS 18 2.2.1 TESTIMONIES 20 2.2.2 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 22 2.2.3 AUDIOVISUAL EVIDENCE 23 2.2.4 COMMUNICATION WITH IRANIAN AUTHORITIES 24 2.3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 25 BACKGROUND 26 3.1 PRE-REVOLUTION REPRESSION 26 3.2 POST-REVOLUTION REPRESSION 27 3.3 IRAN-IRAQ WAR 33 3.4 POLITICAL OPPOSITION GROUPS 33 3.4.1 PEOPLE’S MOJAHEDIN ORGANIZATION OF IRAN 33 3.4.2 FADAIYAN 34 3.4.3 TUDEH PARTY 35 3.4.4 KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF IRAN 35 3.4.5 KOMALA 35 3.4.6 OTHER GROUPS 36 4.
    [Show full text]
  • Hezbollah's Missiles and Rockets
    JULY 2017 CSIS BRIEFS CSIS Hezbollah’s Missiles and Rockets An Overview By Shaan Shaikh and Ian Williams JULY 2018 THE ISSUE Hezbollah is the world’s most heavily armed non-state actor, with a large and diverse stockpile of unguided artillery rockets, as well as ballistic, antiair, antitank, and antiship missiles. Hezbollah views its rocket and missile arsenal as its primary deterrent against Israeli military action, while also useful for quick retaliatory strikes and longer military engagements. Hezbollah’s unguided rocket arsenal has increased significantly since the 2006 Lebanon War, and the party’s increased role in the Syrian conflict raises concerns about its acquisition of more sophisticated standoff and precision-guided missiles, whether from Syria, Iran, or Russia. This brief provides a summary of the acquisition history, capabilities, and use of these forces. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & middle east INTERNATIONAL STUDIES program CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 1 ezbollah is a Lebanese political party public source information and does not cover certain topics and militant group with close ties to such as rocket strategies, evolution, or storage locations. Iran and Syria’s Assad regime. It is the This brief instead focuses on the acquisition history, world’s most heavily armed non-state capabilities, and use of these forces. actor—aptly described as “a militia trained like an army and equipped LAND ATTACK MISSILES AND ROCKETS like a state.”1 This is especially true Hwith regard to its missile and rocket forces, which Hezbollah 107 AND 122 MM KATYUSHA ROCKETS has arrayed against Israel in vast quantities. The party’s arsenal is comprised primarily of small, man- portable, unguided artillery rockets.
    [Show full text]
  • Security Council Distr.: General 27 January 2020
    United Nations S/2020/70 Security Council Distr.: General 27 January 2020 Original: English Letter dated 27 January 2020 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council The members of the Panel of Experts on Yemen have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel, prepared in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 2456 (2019). The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) on 27 December 2019 and was considered by the Committee on 10 January 2020. We would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council. (Signed) Dakshinie Ruwanthika Gunaratne Coordinator Panel of Experts on Yemen (Signed) Ahmed Himmiche Expert (Signed) Henry Thompson Expert (Signed) Marie-Louise Tougas Expert (Signed) Wolf-Christian Paes Expert 19-22391 (E) 070220 *1922391* S/2020/70 Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen Summary After more than five years of conflict, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen continues. The country’s many conflicts are interconnected and can no longer be separated by clear divisions between external and internal actors and events. Throughout 2019, the Houthis and the Government of Yemen made little headway towards either a political settlement or a conclusive military victory. In a continuation from 2018, the belligerents continued to practice economic warfare: using economic obstruction and financial tools as weapons to starve opponents of funds or materials. Profiteering from the conflict is endemic.
    [Show full text]
  • The Iranian Missile Challenge
    The Iranian Missile Challenge By Anthony H. Cordesman Working Draft: June 4, 2019 Please provide comments to [email protected] SHAIGAN/AFP/Getty Images The Iranian Missile Challenge Anthony H. Cordesman There is no doubt that Iran and North Korea present serious security challenges to the U.S. and its strategic partners, and that their missile forces already present a major threat within their respective regions. It is, however, important to put this challenge in context. Both nations have reason to see the U.S. and America's strategic partners as threats, and reasons that go far beyond any strategic ambitions. Iran is only half this story, but its missile developments show all too clearly why both countries lack the ability to modernize their air forces, which has made them extremely dependent on missiles for both deterrence and war fighting. They also show that the missile threat goes far beyond the delivery of nuclear weapons, and is already becoming far more lethal and effective at a regional level. This analysis examines Iran's view of the threat, the problems in military modernization that have led to its focus on missile forces, the limits to its air capabilities, the developments in its missile forces, and the war fighting capabilities provided by its current missile forces, its ability to develop conventionally armed precision-strike forces, and its options for deploying nuclear-armed missiles. IRAN'S PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT ...................................................................................................... 2 IRAN'S INFERIORITY IN ARMS IMPORTS ................................................................................................... 3 THE AIR BALANCE OVERWHELMINGLY FAVORS THE OTHER SIDES ........................................................... 4 IRAN (AND NORTH KOREA'S) DEPENDENCE ON MISSILES ........................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Iran and the Gulf Military Balance - I
    IRAN AND THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE - I The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions FIFTH WORKING DRAFT By Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner Revised July 11, 2012 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 2 Acknowledgements This analysis was made possible by a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation. It draws on the work of Dr. Abdullah Toukan and a series of reports on Iran by Adam Seitz, a Senior Research Associate and Instructor, Middle East Studies, Marine Corps University. 2 Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 5 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 6 Figure III.1: Summary Chronology of US-Iranian Military Competition: 2000-2011 ............................... 8 CURRENT PATTERNS IN THE STRUCTURE OF US AND IRANIAN MILITARY COMPETITION ........................................... 13 DIFFERING NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES .............................................................................................................. 17 US Perceptions .................................................................................................................................... 17 Iranian Perceptions............................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies
    Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies Updated May 8, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44017 SUMMARY R44017 Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies May 8, 2019 Iran’s national security policy is the product of many overlapping and sometimes competing factors such as the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution, perception of threats Kenneth Katzman to the regime and to the country, long-standing national interests, and the interaction of Specialist in Middle the Iranian regime’s factions and constituencies. Iran’s leadership: Eastern Affairs x Seeks to deter or thwart U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate Iran or to bring about a change of regime. x Has sought to take advantage of opportunities of regional conflicts to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that it asserts favors the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. x Seeks to enhance its international prestige and restore a sense of “greatness” reminiscent of ancient Persian empires. x Advances its foreign policy goals, in part by providing material support to regional allied governments and armed factions. Iranian officials characterize the support as helping the region’s “oppressed” and assert that Saudi Arabia, in particular, is instigating sectarian tensions and trying to exclude Iran from regional affairs. x Sometimes disagrees on tactics and strategies. Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i and key hardline institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), oppose any compromises of Iran’s national security core goals. Iran’s elected president, Hassan Rouhani, and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif support Iran’s integration into regional and international diplomacy.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Ballistic Missile Program
    Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program Updated: April 2021 1 Contents Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program ................................................................................................................. 3 Nature of Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program ................................................................................................. 3 Iran’s Ballistic Missiles and Iran’s Nuclear Program .................................................................................. 3 North Korean Assistance .......................................................................................................................... 4 Iran’s Ballistic Missiles and the JCPOA ...................................................................................................... 5 Multiple Tests Since the JCPOA ................................................................................................................ 5 The West's Views of Missile Tests as a UN Violation ................................................................................. 7 Iran’s Position on Ballistic Missile Development and Test Launches ......................................................... 8 Regional Threat ....................................................................................................................................... 9 Threat to the American Homeland and Europe ...................................................................................... 12 Iran’s Space Launch Capability and ICBMs .............................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Paper 2 1 Russian Missiles
    Turkey’s Turbulent Journey with the EPAA and Quest for a National System By Nilsu Gören Executive Summary This paper provides an overview of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile defense debate from a Turkish perspective. While Turkey participates in the EPAA by hosting a U.S. early-warning radar in Kurecik, Malatya, its political and military concerns with NATO guarantees have led to the AKP government's quest for a national long-range air and missile defense system. However, Turkish decision makers' insistence on technology transfer shows that the Turkish debate is not adequately informed by the lessons learned from the EPAA, particularly the technical and financial challenges of missile defense. Introduction With Turkey being the closest NATO nation to the Middle East and lacking a robust integrated air and missile defense architecture, Turkish policymakers face decisions on continuing to rely on NATO resources, investing in indigenous capabilities, or procuring foreign systems. While the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands have historically provided Patriot systems to southeast Turkey, Turkey has political and technical concerns about NATO guarantees under the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), leading to the proposition that Turkey needs to develop indigenous air and missile defense capabilities to reduce vulnerability. However, Turkey’s controversial tender for the foreign acquisition of a long-range air and missile defense system, dubbed the T-LORAMIDS process, has led to concerns within NATO about Turkey’s strategic orientation and intentions. This paper first identifies the missile threats to Turkey, mainly from Syria and Iran. It then defines Turkey’s role in the EPAA and the Turkish activities towards procurement of a national long-range air and missile defense system that would allow for technology transfer to eventually achieve indigenous design.
    [Show full text]
  • USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal #714
    USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL Maxwell AFB, Alabama Issue No. 714, 22 May 2009 Articles & Other Documents: U.S. Diplomat Flies in for Key Nuclear Talks Iran Successfully Test-Fires Sejjil 2 Missile China Reiterates Support for Ban on Nuclear Weapons, Ahmadinejad Claims Iran's New Missile is Capable of Complete Nuclear Disarmament Hitting Israel Russia, U.S. Open START Talks Iran Touts Missile Launch U.S. and Russia Begin Arms Talks with a December Nuclear Missile Test-Fire a Success, Iran Says Deadline Iranian Missile Launch Alarms US U.S.-Russia Nuclear Talks make Positive Start Russian-U.S. Panel says Missile Shield in Europe Lavrov says Arms Control Pact with U.S. Must Give Ineffective Equal Security U.S.-Russian Team Deems Missile Shield in Europe Russia Foreign Minister: Arms Control Talks need to Ineffective take US Missile Defense Plans into Account Gates Defends U.S. Missile Defense Cuts Moscow says First Round of Russia-U.S. Arms Talks Successful: Report India Tests Nuclear-Capable Missile: Sources Russia Links Nuclear Talks to US Anti-Missile Plan The Arms-Control Dinosaurs Are Back Photos in Pakistan Signal Growing Nuclear-Arms Get Ready for another North Korean Nuke Test Program Barack Obama is giving Iran the Time it needs to build a U.S. Military: Nuke-Armed Iran would be 'Calamitous' Nuclear Bomb Iran to Mass Produce Long-Range Missiles Iran's Missile Test: A Message to Obama and Netanyahu Iran Nuclear Danger Downplayed in Reports Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Latest Missile Test: Scenarios and Implications for the New Administration by Farzin Nadimi
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 2757 Iran's Latest Missile Test: Scenarios and Implications for the New Administration by Farzin Nadimi Feb 3, 2017 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Farzin Nadimi Farzin Nadimi, an associate fellow with The Washington Institute, is a Washington-based analyst specializing in the security and defense affairs of Iran and the Persian Gulf region. Brief Analysis Regardless of how the details surrounding Sunday's launch shake out, it was an unhelpful move at a time when the Trump administration is determining its policy toward Iran's missile program and broader regional behavior. ccording to recent media reports, Iran conducted a weapons test on January 29 that involved either a A nuclear-capable ballistic missile, a land-attack cruise missile, or perhaps even both. Alternatively, in light of prior Iranian statements and preparations, it might have been an attempted satellite launch gone awry. Whatever the case, the Trump administration has described the incident as a destabilizing move, put Tehran "on notice" for the launch, and announced new sanctions targeting "multiple entities and individuals involved in procuring technology and/or materials to support Iran's ballistic missile program." Analyzing the systems that may have been tested is important because it could give valuable insights into Iran's capabilities and intentions, both present and future. In particular, it could help the international community assess Tehran's claim that its ballistic missile program is purely defensive in nature. BALLISTIC AND CRUISE SCENARIOS Q uoting unnamed U.S. officials, Reuters noted on January 30 that Iran had quietly tested a ballistic missile out of its Semnan test range the previous day.
    [Show full text]