American Foreign Policy Council Iran Strategy Brief No. 10 February 2018 Iran’s Burgeoning Strategic Forces Ian Williams 1 www.afpc.org | 509 c st ne washington, dc | 202.543.1006 American Foreign Policy Council 1. Ilan Berman, Testimony IAN WILLIAMS is an associate fellow at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), before the House Foreign and associate director of the CSIS Missile Defense Project. A longer version of this Affairs Committee study will appear in AFPC’s forthcoming book on the changing challenge of Iran, to be Subcommittee on published in 2018. Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, May 24, 2017, Among the Islamic Republic of including both ballistic and cruise http://docs.house. Iran’s central strategic goals are the missiles. As a result of Iranian pressure, gov/meetings/FA/ FA18/20170524/106032/ preservation of its political regime and its the issue of ballistic missiles was placed HHRG-115-FA18-Wstate- ascension to what it views as its rightful outside of the “scope of work” of the BermanI-20170524.pdf. place as the regional hegemon of the JCPOA, despite the centrality of these Middle East. These objectives have put capabilities to the delivery of nuclear Iran on an adversarial footing with its weapons. Similarly, as a result of the immediate neighbors, and with much of Iran nuclear deal, strong UN Security the international community. Council resolutions curtailing Iran’s ballistic missile work have been replaced In pursuit of these goals, Iran has invested with weaker language that does not significantly in the development of its clearly prohibit the Islamic Republic’s strategic forces, which today includes development and testing of ballistic the region’s largest and most diverse missiles. arsenal of ballistic missiles, increasingly sophisticated cruise missiles, as well This state of affairs has emboldened as an array of shorter-ranged anti-ship Iran to continue its missile development missiles and air defenses. Iran has also programs, which have seen notable established the technological basis for advancements over the past several a nuclear weapons program. This effort years. In turn, Iran’s missile forces, in has included a blend of overt activities tandem with other strategic tools, under the auspices of a civilian nuclear support a complex national security energy program, and covert activities strategy that both enables the projection aimed at expanding Iran’s nuclear of power across the region, and imposes weapons potential without international costs on adversaries seeking to directly blowback. challenge Iran’s regime. The latter effort became the focus of A MORE PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT intense international attention following As experts have noted, the Iran nuclear its disclosure in 2003, and of extensive deal was always “intended to be tactical U.S.-led diplomacy under the Obama in nature, focusing on just one aspect of administration, culminating in the the Iranian regime’s rogue behavior: its passage of the Joint Comprehensive Plan persistent nuclear ambitions.”1 While this of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. While many focus may have simplified negotiations dispute its long-term efficacy, the JCPOA between Iran and the P5+1 powers (the appears to have at least temporarily U.S., UK, France, Russia, China and slowed Iran’s advance toward a nuclear Germany), even those with the highest weapons capability. No corresponding hopes for the long-term efficacy of the limitations, however, have been placed JCPOA cannot deny that the agreement upon Iran’s strategic delivery systems, entirely neglects significant aspects of 1 American Foreign Policy Council malign Iranian behavior. In fact, mounting law disallow them. Iran has never sought 2. United Nations, “Security evidence suggests that the structure of to acquire a nuclear weapon and never Council, Resolution 2231 (2015) Adopted by the nuclear deal, its limitations, and its will in the future, as it fully honours its the Security Council associated provisions have actually had commitment under the NPT and the at its 7488th meeting, the opposite of their intended effect, JCPOA. Consequently, Iran’s missiles on 20 July 2015,” July abetting and emboldening Iranian are not and could not be designed for 20, 2015, http://www. behavior and capabilities that fall outside delivery of unconventional weapons.”3 In un.org/en/ga/search/ of the parameters of the JCPOA. effect, Iran has maintained that, because view_doc.asp?symbol=S/ it presumably has no intention to acquire RES/2231%282015%29. Perhaps the most significant of these nuclear status, any and all missile-related 3. Press release by the is Iran’s ballistic and cruise missile activities pursued by the regime are Permanent Mission of the development programs. Even without therefore legitimate. Islamic Republic of Iran nuclear weapons, these forces give Iran to the United Nations, as cited in Kathleen H. Hicks the ability to impose significant costs The U.S. government does not share this and Melissa G. Dalton, upon the United States and its regional view, however. Administration officials Deterring Iran After the partners should conflict occur. They also have declared Iran’s recent ballistic Nuclear Deal (Washington, provide Iran with a kind of deterrent missile testing and proliferation to be DC: CSIS, March 2017). cover to pursue its malign activities in “in defiance” of UNSCR 2231.4 The U.S. 4. Secretary of State Rex the region with less perceived risk of intelligence community has furthermore Tillerson, Remarks at the direct military confrontation with the assessed that—irrespective of Tehran’s U.S. Department of State, United States, the Gulf Cooperation public denials—Iran’s ballistic missiles Washington, DC, April Council states, and/or Israel. Such a are “inherently capable of delivering 19, 2017, https://www. dynamic could easily to lead to strategic WMD.”5 state.gov/secretary/ miscalculation and conflict. remarks/2017/04/270341. htm. Moreover, while Iran did significantly 5. Director of National United Nations Security Council reduce its missile testing during the Intelligence Dan Coats, Resolution (UNSCR) 2231 notably only period of multilateral negotiations over as cited in Adam Kredo, restricts development of those missiles the JCPOA, it resumed them shortly after “Intel Report: Iran Refining “designed to be capable” of delivering the deal was concluded in July 2015. Nuke Pathway System nuclear weapons. The resolution it Since then, Iran may have conducted as in Flagrant Violation of replaced, UNSCR 1929, was stricter, many as 25 launches of ballistic missiles, Ban,” Washington Free stating that “Iran shall not undertake cruise missiles, and satellite launch Beacon, May 12, 2017, any activity related to ballistic missiles vehicles.6 http://freebeacon.com/ capable of delivering nuclear weapons, national-security/intel- including launches using ballistic missile Notably, Iranian officials are eager to avert report-iran-refining-nuke- delivery-system-flagrant- technology.”2 possible consequences for their ballistic violation-ban/. missile work. Thus, in October of 2017, 6. “Iranian Missile Launches: While the linguistic change may seem on the heels of the Trump administration’s 1988-Present,” Missile slight, a revealing March 2015 press unveiling of a new “comprehensive” Threat, n.d., https:// release clearly shows that the shift was Iran strategy designed to, among other missilethreat.csis.org/ not lost on Iran, with the Iranian UN things, curtail the ballistic missile threat iranian-missile-launches- delegation observing that, “Security from Iran, the country’s Supreme Leader, 1988-present/. Council Resolution 2231 does not Ali Khamenei, unilaterally announced 7. Kelsey Davenport, “Iran’s prohibit legitimate and conventional that he would henceforth restrict the Leader Sets Missile Range military activities, nor does international range of the country’s indigenously- Limit,” Arms Control Today, 2 American Foreign Policy Council December 2017, https:// produced missiles to 2,000 kilometers.7 urban areas, civilian infrastructure and www.armscontrol.org/ potentially larger military installations, act/2017-12/news/ This range, however, still permits Iran and; shorter-range tactical missile iran%E2%80%99s- leader-sets-missile- to strike targets throughout the entire systems, such as anti-ship and air range-limit. Middle East, as well as in parts of defense systems, meant to contest 8. “Iran to widen missile southeastern Europe. Furthermore, access and control of strategically range ‘if threatened because the restriction is self-imposed, sensitive areas such the Arabian by Europe,’” Al Jazeera there is no way to independently verify Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. These (Doha), November Iran’s compliance with its own caps. forces and doctrines work in concert 26, 2017, http:// Likewise, the restriction makes no to support a cost-imposing strategy www.aljazeera. mention of payload weights, significant against adversaries that confront Iran com/news/2017/11/ because the full extent of a missile’s militarily. iran-widen-missile- maximum range can be masked by range-threatened- testing it with a heavier payload. Finally, Ballistic Missiles europe-171126123011158. html. Khamenei’s declaration is confined to The backbone of Iran’s MRBM fleet 9. “Shahab-3 Variants,” ballistic missiles, with no corresponding is the Shahab-3 series of ballistic Missile Threat, n.d., commitments from Iran’s leadership to missiles, which is based on the North http://missilethreat.csis. limit any other kinds of missiles, such as Korean No-Dong. The Shahab was org/missile/shahab-3- cruise missiles, air defenses, or anti-ship first tested in 1998. More recently, variants-emad-ghadr. capabilities. Iran has unveiled and tested other 10. Idrees Ali, “Iran tested Shahab-3 variants such as the Ghadr medium-range ballistic Indeed, there is nothing to stop the Iranian and Emad, which Iran claims have missile: U.S. official,” regime from increasing the range of its greater accuracy.9 The Shahab-3 and Reuters, January 30, missiles is short order should it choose to its variants have estimated ranges 2017, https://www. do so.