DOCSLIB.ORG

The Case Against Vicarious Jurisdiction

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

University of Pennsylvania Law Review FOUNDED 1852 Formerly American Law Register VOL. 152 JANUARY2004 No. 3 ARTICLES THE CASE AGAINST VICARIOUS JURISDICTION LONNY SHEINKOPF HOFFMANt INTRODUCTION The law of adjudicatory jurisdiction, or personal jurisdiction as it is more commonly called, concerns a court's power to renderjudgments enforceable in the forum and by other sovereign states. For U.S. courts, both state and federal, judicial jurisdiction is as essential to t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. For their valuable input, I owe a debt of thanks to Stephen Bainbridge, Joseph Bauer, Philip Blumberg, Lea Brilmayer, Stephen Burbank, Graeme Dinwoodie, Jill Fisch, Doug Michaels, Doug Moll, Edward Purcell, Robert Ragazzo, Charles Rhodes, Michael Solimine, Kent Syverud, and Robert Thompson; and to the faculty participants at the University of Cincinnati College of Law Summer Scholarship Series and the Southeastern Confer- ence AALS Annual Meeting Program, in Kiawah Island, South Carolina. Excellent re- search assistance was provided by Mark Geller and Robert Reckers. Finally, I am grate- ful to David Warrington at the Harvard Law School Library and to Rebecca Bertoloni Meli at the Indiana University School of Law Library for their assistance with the Louis D. Brandeis archival materials. The University of Houston Foundation provided finan- cial support for this project. (1023) 1024 UNIVERSITY OFPENSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 152:1023 institutional existence as oxygen is to human beings. Without it, courts are unable to render binding judgments; without it, they are paper tigers. Measuring the breadth of judicial power under modern jurisdic- tional doctrine is not a formulaic undertaking, to be sure, but most of the time all that is required is to take into account the acts or omis- sions of a single defendant in relation to the forum. That is, we fre- quently need look no further than to see whether the defendant's own conduct makes her amenable to suit. If I travel to collect a debt from one who has taken up residency in a distant state and, in the collec- tion process, inflict physical injury on the debtor, there is little ques- tion that I must be prepared to defend myself in that forum against a civil suit, under penalty of default if I do not appear. Even when a defendant does not personally commit any acts in or directed at the forum, modern statutes and constitutional doctrine render the ab- sent actor amenable to suit. Following the procedural revolution of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,' defendants are no longer able to evade the jurisdictional grasp of a court merely by taking the expedient step of retreating from the forum before being served or, for that matter, not setting foot within the state at all but instead act- ing from a safe distance. Thus, I cannot avoid being subject to suit by hiring someone else and instructing her to use all means necessary to collect the debt in the forum state on my behalf. Upon a close ex- amination of modem jurisdictional doctrine, we may discover two dif- ferent rationales to explain why the exercise ofjurisdiction would be upheld. Jurisdiction may be predicated on the actions I personally took in hiring someone to find and arrest the debtor in the forum state. For jurisdictional purposes, my actions have both statutory and consti- tutional relevance. These were purposeful acts that were directed to cause injury in the forum. 2 I personally retained someone to act on my behalf and either knew or should have known that if kneecaps were broken the injury would be felt (painfully) by the debtor in the forum. The Supreme Court has recognized that in these 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 2 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (McKinney 2001) ("As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdic- tion over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who [acted] in person or through an agent ... "). 2004] AGAINST VICARIOUSJURISDICTION 1025 circumstances the forum state may exercise jurisdiction without violat- ing due process. 3 In the situation in which one hires someone else to collect a debt, the first explanation for the exercise of state court power over her is similar to the rationale that justifies jurisdictional amenability when she personally travels to the forum: in both instances, jurisdiction is triggered by her own actions. While we may conceive ofjurisdiction as based on the personal conduct of the named defendant, a second, al- ternative rationale may justify the exercise of judicial jurisdiction by the forum court over a nonresident. Unlike the prior basis, which fo- cuses exclusively on what one personally did in the forum or on what actions she personally took outside of the forum that she knew or should have known would cause injury within the state, it is also possi- ble to base the exercise of state court power on the attribution of her agent's forum contacts to her. Under this second formulation, juris- diction may be understood as triggered not by one's own contacts with the forum, but by the jurisdictionally sufficient contacts or forum nexus of another. Of course, to make this jurisdictional leap, a valid basis is needed for treating another person or entity's jurisdictionally sufficient contacts as though they were the defendant's. That is, there must be some substantive legal rule that permits the court to disregard ajuridical entity's otherwise separate legal existence. In the example above, agency law may be called upon tojustify the imputation of contacts. When one, a principal, hires and instructs another, an agent, to act on her behalf by traveling to the forum to collect a debt, she creates an agency relationship between them.4 When the agent carries out the job, she is acting within the course and scope of her agency; that is, she is acting as the principal intended her to act. If the principal is liable for any injuries the agent causes in the forum as a matter of substantive law, then it may be argued 3 See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ("[lIt is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."). 4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY§ 1 cmt. b (1958) (observing that agency requires a showing of (1) "the manifestation by the principal that the agent shall act for him," (2) "the agent's acceptance of the undertaking," and (3) the parties' under- standing "that the principal is to be in control of the undertaking"); see also RE- STATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001) ("Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a 'principal') manifests assent to another person (an 'agent') that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and sub- ject to the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act."). 1026 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 152: 1023 correspondingly that, as an a priori matter, under modem jurisdic- tional doctrine the principal is amenable to any suit in the forum state arising out of those injuries. There is nothing especially remarkable about this second explana- tion for why the forum court would be able to exercise jurisdiction over the principal for having instructed an agent to collect the debt on her behalf. The attribution of contacts of one person or entity to another for jurisdictional purposes is a frequently seen and often in- voked form of traditional jurisdictional argument. Indeed, this ra- tionale is necessary for engaging in jurisdictional analysis for any case involving nonnatural entities, such as corporations, which cannot act except through others. In International Shoe, which rejected the old "presence" theory of jurisdiction, Justice Harlan Stone noted, in one of the most important passages of the opinion, that to ask whether the corporation is present in the forum so as to satisfy due process "is to beg the question to be decided."' Corporate presence, he observed, "can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it."6 We measure jurisdiction over a cor- poration by the extent and kind of activities "of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process."' Justice Felix Frankfurter made a simi- lar point three years later in his concurring opinion in United States v. Scophony Corp. of America.8 In upholding service of process and the ex- ercise ofjurisdiction over a foreign corporate parent based on in-state service on its domestic affiliate, he wrote: "What was done in the Southern District of New York on behalf of [the parent] ... estab- lishes that the corporation was there transacting business and was found there in the only sense in which a corporation ever 'transacts business' or is 'found."' 9 Even though the use of vicarious jurisdiction for nonnatural entities is a recognized and unremarkable application of jurisdiction, the incorporation of substantive law into the measure of adjudicatory jurisdiction can be problematic. ,While reliance on such law may be useful to identify forum contacts, agency law, and other similar substantive law doctrines-such as respondeat superior, civil and criminal conspiracy, and especially, the corporate law doctrine of veil 5 326 U.S. at 316. 6 Id. 7 Id. at 317. 8 333 U.S. 795 (1948). Id. at 819 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Recommended publications
  • The Standing Doctrine's Dirty Little Secret

    The Standing Doctrine's Dirty Little Secret

    Copyright 2012 by Northwestern University School of Law Printed in U.S.A. Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 107, No. 1 THE STANDING DOCTRINE’S DIRTY LITTLE SECRET Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis ABSTRACT—For the last forty years, the Supreme Court has insisted that the standing doctrine’s requirements of imminent injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability are mandated by Article III of the Constitution. During that same time, however, the federal courts have consistently permitted Congress to relax or altogether eliminate those requirements in many “procedural rights” cases—ones in which a federal statute creates a right to have government follow a particular procedure, including to provide judicial review of agency decisions. This Article asks how best to rationalize this contradiction. After examining several possibilities, we conclude that the best course is to recognize openly that the Case or Controversy Clause of Article III means different things in different types of litigation. In one “tier”—cases where Congress has made it clear that it has created procedural rights that may be vindicated in court without meeting the usual injury, causation, and redressability requirements—the plaintiff should merely be required to show that he or she falls within the “zone of interests” the statute aims to protect. In all other cases—the other “tier”—existing Article III standing requirements would apply. AUTHORS—Evan Tsen Lee is Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Josephine Mason Ellis is Law Clerk to the Honorable James L. Dennis, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (2012–2014); J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A., University of California, Berkeley.
  • Rethinking How We Regulate Lawyer-Politicians, 57 Rutgers L

    Rethinking How We Regulate Lawyer-Politicians, 57 Rutgers L

    UIC School of Law UIC Law Open Access Repository UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship 1-1-2005 The Politics of Misconduct: Rethinking How We Regulate Lawyer- Politicians, 57 Rutgers L. Rev. 839 (2005) Kevin Hopkins John Marshall Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/facpubs Part of the Law and Politics Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons Recommended Citation Kevin Hopkins, The Politics of Misconduct: Rethinking How We Regulate Lawyer-Politicians, 57 Rutgers L. Rev. 839 (2005). https://repository.law.uic.edu/facpubs/108 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. RUTGERS LAW REVIEW VOLUME 57 Spring 2005 NUMBER 3 THE POLITICS OF MISCONDUCT: RETHINKING How WE REGULATE LAWYER-POLITICIANS Kevin Hopkins* INTRODU CTION .................................................................................... 840 I. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE LAWYER-STATESMAN .......................... 849 A. The Lawyer in Colonial America ............................................ 850 B. The Decline of the Lawyer-Statesman.................................... 855 II. THE REGULATION OF PRACTICING LAWYERS .................................. 859 A. The Powers of the Court and Bar ........................................... 861 B. The Exercise of Self-Regulation .............................................
  • Civil Offenses and Presidential Clemency

    Civil Offenses and Presidential Clemency

    Buffalo Law Review Volume 64 Number 4 Article 2 8-1-2016 A New Power?: Civil Offenses and Presidential Clemency Noah A. Messing Yale Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview Part of the President/Executive Department Commons Recommended Citation Noah A. Messing, A New Power?: Civil Offenses and Presidential Clemency, 64 Buff. L. Rev. 661 (2016). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol64/iss4/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. BUFFALO LAW REVIEW VOLUME 64 AUGUST 2016 NUMBER 4 A New Power?: Civil Offenses and Presidential Clemency NOAH A. MESSING† INTRODUCTION Article II of the U.S Constitution empowers presidents to pardon “Offences against the United States.” The traditional understanding of that power suggests that presidential clemency extends only to crimes. That view, however, is mistaken. This Article shows that presidents may also pardon civil offenses and opens a discussion about how this power could be used by presidents. Federal civil offenses are laws or regulations that impose penalties on offenders—but that cannot result in the offender being sent to prison.1 Parties who violate these laws may be † Lecturer in the Practice of Law and Legal Writing, Yale Law School. The author received invaluable support from the Lillian Goldman Law Library at Yale Law School, including Julie Graves Krishnaswami, John Nann, Michael VanderHeijden, Drew Adan, and Michael Widener.
  • 2833 the President's Pardon Power Is a Near-Blank Check Hidden Among

    2833 the President's Pardon Power Is a Near-Blank Check Hidden Among

    THE PRESIDENT’S CONDITIONAL PARDON POWER The President’s pardon power is a near-blank check hidden among the Constitution’s checks and balances.1 Despite substantial hand- wringing about possible abuses of the power, scholars have almost en- tirely overlooked the most potent tool in the President’s pardon power arsenal: the ability to attach conditions to clemency grants (the “condi- tional pardon power”).2 As a subset of the general pardon power, the conditional pardon power is assumed to be similarly “unfettered,”3 “ple- nary,”4 or “unlimited.”5 This cannot be correct. If the conditional pardon power were truly “unfettered,” then the President could wield it for political advantage. He or she could pardon, and thereby re-enfranchise, thousands of convicted felons in key swing states upon the condition that they vote for his or her party in the up- coming election. Pardon recipients who failed to fulfill the condition would be thrown back in jail.6 If the conditional pardon power were truly “plenary,” then the President could use it to replace a duly enacted penal scheme with one of his or her own choosing. Imagine Congress unanimously passed, over the President’s veto, a bill requiring jailtime for police officers who killed unarmed civilians with chokeholds. A President who preferred only limited civil liability could unilaterally impose a different penal scheme by pardoning all such officers upon the condition they pay the ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 1 The power is granted with only two textual limits: the President may only pardon crimes “against the United States” and may not issue pardons “in Cases of Impeachment.” See U.S.
  • PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER: Are There Limits And, If Not, Should There Be?

    PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER: Are There Limits And, If Not, Should There Be?

    PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER: Are There Limits and, if Not, Should There Be? Paul F. Eckstein* Mikaela Colby** ABSTRACT Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution gives the President power to pardon those who have committed “offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.” Although it seems straightforward and all-sweeping, questions about when the clause may and should be employed abound: May the President grant a pardon before a crime has been charged or even committed? May the President grant a pardon for a corrupt purpose and, if so, is the pardon valid? May Congress limit the pardon power in any way? Is a pardon of a person convicted of criminal contempt valid? And, perhaps most often discussed today, may the President pardon himself? This article examines the text of the clause granting the pardon power, offers a brief history of pardons, and discusses the adoption of the clause at the Constitutional Convention, and its treatment in the Federalist Papers and at the various ratification conventions. After suggesting answers to the questions asked above, the article discusses possible ways to cabin the President’s pardon power. Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed. The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel. As the sense of responsibility is always strongest in proportion as it is undivided, it may be inferred that a single man would be most ready to attend to the force of those motives, which might plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to considerations, which were calculated to * Partner at Perkins Coie, LLP and member of the State Bar of Arizona since 1965.
  • The President's Power to Pardon: a Constitutional History

    The President's Power to Pardon: a Constitutional History

    William & Mary Law Review Volume 18 (1976-1977) Issue 3 Article 3 March 1977 The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History William F. Duker Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons Repository Citation William F. Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 475 (1977), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol18/iss3/3 Copyright c 1977 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr William and Mary Law Review VOLUME 18 SPRING 1977 NUMBER 3 THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO PARDON: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY WILLIAM F. DUKER* INTRODUCTION The Constitution of the United States specifically invests the President with the power "to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeach- ment."' This power is not among the most awesome powers of the American Chief Executive; it is, at best, his most benevolent power. This capacity for benevolence, however, has not inspired this study. The Article was prompted, rather, by the complacent acceptance of an apparently benign executive gift that cannot be checked by the other branches of government. This lack of restriction on the exer- cise of the power suggests that it is time to consider alteration of the President's pardoning power. This Article, primarily a constitutional and legal history, explores one facet of the United States' Executive's power to pardon. The political history surrounding the power is not discussed except inso- far as it affected the form of the power and insofar as it aids in an understanding of the prerogative.
  • An Unappreciated Constraint on the President's Pardon Power

    An Unappreciated Constraint on the President's Pardon Power

    University of Connecticut OpenCommons@UConn Connecticut Law Review School of Law 2020 An Unappreciated Constraint on the President’s Pardon Power Aaron Rappaport Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review Recommended Citation Rappaport, Aaron, "An Unappreciated Constraint on the President’s Pardon Power" (2020). Connecticut Law Review. 444. https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/444 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW VOLUME 52 APRIL 2020 NUMBER 1 Article An Unappreciated Constraint on the President’s Pardon Power AARON RAPPAPORT Most commentators assume that, except for the few restrictions expressly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, the President’s pardon power is unlimited. This Paper suggests that this common view is mistaken in at least one unexpected way. Presidential pardons must satisfy a modest procedural rule: they must list the specific crimes covered by the pardon. The “specificity requirement” means that vague and broadly worded pardons are invalid. This claim bears a significant burden of persuasion, since it runs so counter to accepted opinion. Nonetheless, that burden can be met. This Paper’s argument rests on an originalist understanding of the constitutional text, an approach that the Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed as the appropriate method for interpreting the Pardon Clause. That approach leaves little doubt that a specificity requirement is a binding limitation on the President’s pardon power. The final part of this Paper examines the ramifications of the specificity requirement for federal criminal investigations, particularly investigations into Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election. The specificity requirement may prove surprisingly significant in this latter context, since it both raises the political costs, and narrows the legal scope, of any pardon the President might grant to former campaign advisors.
  • EX PARTE GARLAND OVERRULED; the PRESIDENTIAL PARDON IS NO LONGER UNLIMITED Zachary J

    EX PARTE GARLAND OVERRULED; the PRESIDENTIAL PARDON IS NO LONGER UNLIMITED Zachary J

    Western New England Law Review Volume 41 41 (2019) Article 7 Issue 1 2019 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—I BEG YOUR PARDON: EX PARTE GARLAND OVERRULED; THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON IS NO LONGER UNLIMITED Zachary J. Broughton Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview Recommended Citation Zachary J. Broughton, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—I BEG YOUR PARDON: EX PARTE GARLAND OVERRULED; THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON IS NO LONGER UNLIMITED, 41 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 183 (2019), https://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol41/iss1/7 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 7 - BROUGHTON. PUBLISHER READY. 2.19.2019 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019 9:46 PM WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW Volume 41 2019 Issue 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—I BEG YOUR PARDON: EX PARTE GARLAND OVERRULED; THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON IS NO LONGER UNLIMITED Zachary J. Broughton President Trump’s August 2017 pardon of Joseph Arpaio for his contempt of court conviction raised the constitutional question of whether there are any limitations to the president’s pardoning power. In the 1867 seminal case, Ex parte Garland, the Supreme Court opined that the president is the only person who can limit the pardon power, and that a pardon can be issued before, during, or after conviction.
  • A Blank Check: Constitutional Consequences of President Trump’S Arpaio Pardon

    A Blank Check: Constitutional Consequences of President Trump’S Arpaio Pardon

    A BLANK CHECK: CONSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF PRESIDENT TRUMP’S ARPAIO PARDON Genevieve A. Bentz* ABSTRACT On August 25, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued the first pardon of his administration to Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio. The pardon was in response to Arpaio’s conviction of criminal contempt by U.S. District Judge Susan Bolton. Judge Bolton found Arpaio to have flagrantly disregarded the previous ruling of United States District Judge G. Murray Snow. In 2011, Judge Snow charged Arpaio with civil contempt after Arpaio violated a preliminary injunction ordering him to stop racially profiling Latino drivers. The Department of Justice also found that the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office had engaged in discriminatory policing including racial profiling and illegal searches—violating both federal law and the Constitution. President Trump’s pardon was issued before Arpaio was formally sentenced or granted appeal. An amicus brief filed by Erwin Chemerinsky on September 11, 2017, argues Trump’s pardon is constitutionally invalid. An executive pardon for a contempt of court charge was last explicitly addressed in the century-old case of Ex Parte Grossman. Trump’s pardon deserves scrutiny because it undermines the separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches while also emboldening future disrespect for the rule of law. The Arpaio pardon is an attack on the judiciary as a whole, beyond a particular judge and his orders. * Genevieve A. Bentz is a current student at Georgetown University Law Center with an expected graduation date of May 2019. She previously attended Princeton University, graduating with a Bachelor of Arts in English Literature in 2012.
  • The Solicitor General and Intragovernmental Conflict

    The Solicitor General and Intragovernmental Conflict

    Michigan Law Review Volume 76 Issue 2 1977 The Solicitor General and Intragovernmental Conflict Michigan Law Review Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, Other Law Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons Recommended Citation Michigan Law Review, The Solicitor General and Intragovernmental Conflict, 76 MICH. L. REV. 324 (1977). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol76/iss2/5 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Solicitor General and Intragovernmental Conflict According to one former occupant of the office, "[t]he Solicitor General has no master to serve except his country."1 In serving that master, the Solicitor General has broad authority to formulate the legal position of the United States in particular matters, 2 and that power has far-reaching effects. Through his authority to deny fed­ eral agencies and departments access to the Supreme Court, 3 the Solicitor General may significantly influence agency and depart­ ment policy. In acting as the government's advocate before the Supreme Court, 4 in deciding whether to appeal cases unsuccessfully litigated by the Justice Department/' and in authoring briefs for the United States as amicus curiae in appellate cases, 0 the importance of the Solicitor General's role is obvious.
  • Proposals to Reform the Presidential Pardon Power

    Proposals to Reform the Presidential Pardon Power

    An Absolute Power, or A Power Absolutely in Need of Reform? Proposals to Reform the Presidential Pardon Power Democracy and the Constitution Clinic Fordham University School of Law Milana Bretgoltz, Albert Ford, & Alicia Serrani January 2021 An Absolute Power, or A Power Absolutely in Need of Reform? Proposals to Reform the Presidential Pardon Power Democracy and the Constitution Clinic Fordham University School of Law Milana Bretgoltz, Albert Ford, & Alicia Serrani January 2021 This report was researched and written during the 2019-2020 academic year by students in Fordham Law School’s Democracy and the Constitution Clinic, where students developed non-partisan recommendations to strengthen the nation’s institutions and its democracy. The clinic was supervised by Professor and Dean Emeritus John D. Feerick and Visiting Clinical Professor John Rogan. Acknowledgments: We are grateful to the individuals who generously took time to share their general views and knowledge with us: Christopher Cuomo, Esq., Professor Richard Epstein, Professor Andrew Kent, Deborah Leff, Esq., and Professor Mark Osler. This report greatly benefited from Gail McDonald’s research guidance and Stephanie Salomon’s editing assistance. Judith Rew and Robert Yasharian designed the report. Table of Contents Executive Summary .....................................................................................................................................1 Introduction .....................................................................................................................................................3
  • The Essential Supreme Court Decisions, 15Th Edition

    The Essential Supreme Court Decisions, 15Th Edition

    Essential Supreme Court Decisions Essential Supreme Court Decisions Summaries of Leading Cases in U.S. Constitutional Law Fifteenth Edition JOHN R. VILE ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK Published by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowmanlittlefield.com Estover Road, Plymouth PL6 7PY, United Kingdom Copyright © 2010 by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Vile, John R. Essential Supreme Court decisions : summaries of leading cases in U.S. constitutional law / John R. Vile. — 15th ed. p. cm. Rev. ed. of: Summaries of leading cases on the Constitution / Joseph F. Menez and John R. Vile. 14th ed. 2004. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4422-0384-6 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-4422-0385-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-4422-0386-0 (electronic) 1. Constitutional law—United States—Digests. I. Menez, Joseph Francis, 1917– Summaries of leading cases on the Constitution. II. Title. KF4547.4.V55 2010 342.7300264—dc22 2010008375 ϱ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.