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III Seminário Idn Jovem 30 º n III SEMINÁRIO IDN JOVEM ANDRÉ COUTINHO MENDES, CAROLINA BRÁS NOVO, JOANA ARAÚJO LOPES, JOÃO LYLE MARTINS LUCE, MÁRCIO FERREIRA GUIMARÃES, PEDRO MIGUEL CONSTANTINO, MARIA SOFIA MacEDO, CAROLINA BARATA, FREDERICO RIBEIRO BENVINDA, SORAIA MARQUES CARVALHO, ANA CLÁUDIA CAMPOS, ANNA MOMOTOVA, NATÁLIA RODRIGUES, CLAUDIA SOARES DE ALMEIDA, RUI FLORÊNCIO ISSN 1647-9068 00030 Instituto Instituto da Defesa Nacional 9 7 7 1 6 4 7 9 0 6 0 0 0 da Defesa Nacional nº30 III Seminário IDN Jovem Comentadores Prof. Doutor Bruno Ferreira Costa Prof. Doutora Liliana Reis Ferreira Prof. Doutor Samuel de Paiva Pires Prof. Doutor António Marques Prof. Doutor Donizete Rodrigues Prof. Doutora Maria João Simões Papers Ameaças Transnacionais Política Externa Segurança Energética e Economia Migrações e Direitos Humanos Informação e Segurança do Ciberespaço Covilhã 5 e 6 de Abril de 2018 Instituto da Defesa Nacional Os Cadernos do IDN resultam do trabalho de investigação residente e não residente promovido pelo Instituto da Defesa Nacional. Os temas abordados contribuem para o enriquecimento do debate sobre questões nacionais e internacionais. As perspetivas são da responsabilidade dos autores não refletindo uma posição institucional do Instituto da Defesa Nacional sobre as mesmas. Diretor Vitor Rodrigues Viana Coordenador Editorial Alexandre Carriço Núcleo de Edições Capa António Baranita Nuno Fonseca/nfdesign Propriedade, Edição e Design Gráfico Instituto da Defesa Nacional Calçada das Necessidades, 5, 1399-017 Lisboa Tel.: 21 392 46 00 Fax.: 21 392 46 58 E-mail: [email protected] www.idn.gov.pt Composição, Impressão e Distribuição EUROPRESS – Indústria Gráfica Rua João Saraiva, 10-A – 1700-249 Lisboa – Portugal Tel.: 218 494 141/43 Fax.: 218 492 061 E-mail: [email protected] www.europress.pt ISSN 1647-9068 ISBN: 978-972-27-1994-0 Depósito Legal 344513/12 © Instituto da Defesa Nacional, 2018 2 III SEMINÁRIO IDN JOVEM Preâmbulo A segurança e a defesa estão intrinsecamente ligadas aos valores da liberdade e do bem-estar. A preservação destes valores, indissociáveis do modo de vida das sociedades democráticas, deve encontrar nos jovens o seu garante futuro e o seu principal ativo. As Universidades, como plataforma geradora de conhecimento, reflexão crítica e responsáveis pela transmissão de conceitos e práticas de cidadania às gerações futuras, nas mais diversas áreas de atividade, contam com o Instituto da Defesa Nacional (IDN) como um parceiro ativo para a consecução desse objetivo. Depois do sucesso das primeira e segunda edições do Seminário “IDN Jovem” (novembro de 2016 e abril de 2017), o Instituto da Defesa Nacional, numa organização conjunta com diversos Núcleos de Estudantes de Ciência Política e de Relações Interna- cionais de Universidades Portuguesas, promoveu na Universidade da Beira Interior, na Covilhã, entre 5 e 6 de abril de 2018, o terceiro “Seminário IDN Jovem”. Neste evento científico, para além das palestras de três Keynote Speakers, o evento contou com apresen- tações de 19 papers elaborados pelos estudantes de faculdades das regiões de Braga, Coim- bra, Covilhã, Lisboa e Porto, que se enquadraram nos seguintes grupos temáticos: Amea- ças Transnacionais; Política Externa; Segurança Energética e Economia; Migrações e Direitos Humanos, e Informação e Segurança no Ciberespaço. A sessão de abertura do III “Seminário IDN Jovem” contou com a presença de Sua Excelência O Ministro da Defesa Nacional, Professor Doutor José Alberto de Azeredo Lopes, que proferiu uma intervenção subordinada ao tema “Diplomacia e Defesa”. O principal objetivo deste “Seminário IDN Jovem” foi, uma vez mais, o de propor- cionar aos estudantes de licenciatura, pós-graduação, mestrado e doutoramento, um espaço de apresentação pública das suas reflexões e debates científicos sobre temáticas relacionadas com a segurança e defesa, cujo aprofundamento resulta nos artigos agora publicados no presente número dos Cadernos do IDN. Este é um compromisso que o Instituto da Defesa Nacional se orgulha de manter com os estudantes do ensino superior, aproximando-os das temáticas de segurança e defesa e potenciando os seus contributos e reflexões na promoção de um debate alargado e participado pelas novas gerações. Vítor Rodrigues Viana IDN CADERNOS 3 4 III SEMINÁRIO IDN JOVEM Índice Preâmbulo 3 Vítor Rodrigues Viana PAINEL 1 – AMEAÇAS Transnacionais Human Terrain System: a Ascensão e Queda da Informação Sociocultural no Esforço de Contrainsurgência – o Caso do Afeganistão 29 André Coutinho Mendes O Salafismo-Jihadismo e uma Nova Forma de Terrorismo: o Estado Islâmico 47 Carolina Brás Novo O Terrorismo, os Mass Media e a Securitização 59 Joana Araújo Lopes PAINEL 2 – POLÍTICA EXTERNA Russia and the Middle East: Revisiting the History and Propaganda in Kremlin-Assad Relations 91 João Lyle Martins Luce Terrorismo: Reflexões Acerca dos Instrumentos Jurídico-Políticos da UE 105 Márcio Ferreira Guimarães European Union vs Russia: the Pictures in our Heads 123 Pedro Miguel Constantino As Pretensões Geoestratégicas da Federação Russa: um Jogo de Soma Zero 139 Maria Sofia Macedo Estratégia Internacional das Grandes Potências: o Conceito Estratégico Nacional da China 163 Carolina Barata O Mar em Zófimo Consiglieri Pedroso: a Sucessão de Hegemonias e a Permanência do Impacto Português 183 Frederico Ribeiro Benvinda IDN CADERNOS 5 António Maria de Bettencourt Rodrigues: os Pan-movements, a Grande Guerra e a Europa 197 Soraia Marques Carvalho PAINEL 3 – SEGURANÇA ENERGÉTICA E ECONOMIA Segurança Energética Europeia: o Corredor de Gás Meridional e o Projeto EastMed 215 Ana Cláudia Campos Impacto do Energiewende Alemão na Europa: o Papel do Nord Stream 2 na Segurança Energética Europeia 237 Anna Momotova PAINEL 4 – MIGRAÇÕES E DIREITOS HUMANOS Migrações Influenciadas pelas Alterações Climáticas: a Problemática da Lacuna Jurídica no Direito Internacional 257 Natália Rodrigues PAINEL 5 – INFORMAÇÃO E SEGURANÇA NO CiberespaÇO A Problemática da Cibersegurança: o Caso da Estratégia Nacional de Segurança no Ciberespaço 271 Cláudia Soares de Almeida Apanhados na Rede: Programa de Vigilância da NSA após o 11 de Setembro 289 Rui Florêncio 6 III SEMINÁRIO IDN JOVEM Instituto da Defesa Nacional III Seminário IDN Jovem Instituto da Defesa Nacional e Universidade da Beira Interior Covilhã, 5 e 6 de Abril de 2018 Papers Ameaças Transnacionais Política Externa Segurança Energética e Economia Migrações e Direitos Humanos Informação e Segurança do Ciberespaço IDN CADERNOS 7 Papers do “III Seminário IDN Jovem” Quinta-feira, 05 de abril de 2018 1 – Ameaças Transnacionais Comentador: Professor Doutor (14H15 – 15H45) Bruno Ferreira Costa “Human Terrain System: a ascensão e a queda da André Manuel Cordeiro Coutinho informação sócio-cultural no esforço de Mendes contra-insurgência – o caso do Afeganistão” “O Salafismo-Jihadismo e uma Nova Forma de Carolina Martins Brás Novo Terrorismo: o Estado Islâmico” “O (in)Sucesso do Terrorismo Depende de ti” Joana Araújo Lopes Comentadores: Professora Doutora 2 – Política Externa Liliana Reis Ferreira (16H00 – 17H30) Professor Doutor Samuel de Paiva Pires “Russia and the Middle East: revisiting the history and João Lyle Martins Luce propaganda in Kremlin-Assad relations” “A Ação Externa da União Face ao Terrorismo” Márcio Jorge Ferreira Guimarães “European Union vs Russia: the pictures in our heads” Pedro Miguel Moreira Constantino “As Pretensões Geoestratégicas da Federação Russa: Maria Sofia Cardoso Borges de um jogo de soma zero” Macedo “Estratégia Internacional das Grandes Potências: o Carolina Antunes Barata Pires Vilela conceito estratégico nacional da China” “O Mar em Zófimo Consiglieri Pedroso: a sucessão de Frederico de Sousa Ribeiro Benvinda hegemonias e a permanência do impacto português” “António Maria de Bettencourt Rodrigues: Soraia Milene Marques Carvalho os pan-movements, a Grande Guerra e a Europa” 8 III SEMINÁRIO IDN JOVEM Quarta-feira, 06 de abril de 2018 3 – Segurança Energética e Economia Comentador: Professor Doutor (11H00 – 12H30) António Marques “Segurança Energética Europeia: o corredor de gás Ana Cláudia Figueiredo Sousa meridional e o projeto EastMed” Campos “Impacto do Energiewende Alemão na Europa: papel do Anna Momotova Nord Stream 2 na segurança energética europeia” 4 – Migrações e Direitos Humanos Comentador: Professor Doutor (11H00 – 11H30) Donizete Rodrigues “Migrações Induzidas pelas Alterações Climáticas: uma ameaça à segurança ou uma oportunidade de Natália Rodrigues Alves desenvolvimento?” 5 – Informação e Segurança no Ciberespaço Comentador: Professora Doutora (11H30 - 12H30) Maria João Simões “A Problemática da Cibersegurança: o caso português” Cláudia Marisa Soares de Almeida “Apanhados na Rede: programa de vigilância da NSA Rui Filipe de Oliveira Florêncio em democracia” III Seminário IDN Jovem IDN CAInstitutoDERNOS 9 da Defesa Nacional Papers do “III Seminário IDN Jovem” 10 III SEMINÁRIO IDN JOVEM Sessão 1: Ameaças Transnacionais André Manuel Cordeiro Coutinho Mendes, Mestrando em Estratégia, Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas da Universidade de Lisboa (ISCSP-UL). Human Terrain System: a ascensão e a queda da informação sócio- -cultural no esforço de contra-insurgência – o caso do Afeganistão RESUMO O Human Terrain System foi criado em 2005 para colmatar as dificuldades sócio-culturais existentes no seio de um problema de contra-insurgência, nos teatros de operações do Ira- que e do Afeganistão. Neste estudo, procura-se analisar este programa nos seus variados parâmetros, as suas vicissitudes e o impacto
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