The Cryptologic Provider of Intelligence from Global High

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN The Cryptologic Provider of Intelligence from Global High-Capacity Telecommunications Systems TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN Today’s Cable Program Three Access Portfolios Foreign RAMPART–A (3rd Party) WINDSTOP (2nd Party) Unilateral Corporate – BLARNEY - FISA RAMPART-I/X FAIRVIEW RAMPART–T (ClanSIG) STORMBREW OAKSTAR - PRISM MYSTIC FAA TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Got Fiber?? UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN Incredible Challenges… How To Find Target Communication on a Typical Fiber Optic Cable? 1 Cable X 12 Fibers X 64 wavelengths X 10 B bits/Sec = 100 Million Simultaneous Telephone or Internet Sessions (TS//SI//REL) International Internet Growth (Billions of bits/second) 6000 5000 4000 (TS//SI//REL) 3000 2000 1000 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN Partnering with Foreign SIGINT partners to enable access to foreign intelligence Partnerships developed jointly with Foreign Affairs Directorate TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN RAMPART A (TS//SI//NF) Unconventional special access program leveraging Third Party partnerships: • High-capacity international fiber transiting major congestion points around the world • Foreign Partners provide access to cables and host U.S. equipment • U.S. provides equipment for transport, processing and analysis • No U.S. collection by Partner and No Host Country collection by U.S. – there ARE exceptions! • Shared tasking and collection TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL Typical RAM-A Configuration SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL Cable to Database LOPERS FASCIA WC-2 & DEEP DIVE PINWALE Front End Switch Cable Controller Tipping TURMOIL MARINA TRAFFICTHIEF ACS TWISTEDPATH BLACKPEARL SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL .

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Mutual Watching and Resistance to Mass Surveillance After Snowden
Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183-2439) 2015, Volume 3, Issue 3, Pages 12-25 Doi: 10.17645/mac.v3i3.277 Article “Veillant Panoptic Assemblage”: Mutual Watching and Resistance to Mass Surveillance after Snowden Vian Bakir School of Creative Studies and Media, Bangor University, Bangor, LL57 2DG, UK; E-Mail: [email protected] Submitted: 9 April 2015 | In Revised Form: 16 July 2015 | Accepted: 4 August 2015 | Published: 20 October 2015 Abstract The Snowden leaks indicate the extent, nature, and means of contemporary mass digital surveillance of citizens by their intelligence agencies and the role of public oversight mechanisms in holding intelligence agencies to account. As such, they form a rich case study on the interactions of “veillance” (mutual watching) involving citizens, journalists, intelli- gence agencies and corporations. While Surveillance Studies, Intelligence Studies and Journalism Studies have little to say on surveillance of citizens’ data by intelligence agencies (and complicit surveillant corporations), they offer insights into the role of citizens and the press in holding power, and specifically the political-intelligence elite, to account. Atten- tion to such public oversight mechanisms facilitates critical interrogation of issues of surveillant power, resistance and intelligence accountability. It directs attention to the veillant panoptic assemblage (an arrangement of profoundly une- qual mutual watching, where citizens’ watching of self and others is, through corporate channels of data flow, fed back into state surveillance of citizens). Finally, it enables evaluation of post-Snowden steps taken towards achieving an equiveillant panoptic assemblage (where, alongside state and corporate surveillance of citizens, the intelligence-power elite, to ensure its accountability, faces robust scrutiny and action from wider civil society).
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