15 AHIØSA AND COMPASSION IN JAINISM Kristi L. Wiley Ahiysa is one of the core ethical values in Jainism, as expressed in the oft-quoted phrase “ahiysa paramo dharmah (nonviolence is the supreme form of religious conduct).” Padmanabh S. Jaini has observed that within Jainism there is a “preoccupation with ahiysa,” for no other religious tradition “has carried it [ahiysa] to the extreme of the Jainas. For them it is not simply the first among virtues but the virtue.”1 Although in most religious traditions non-harming relates to other living beings, Jaini has noted that “for Jainas, however, it [hiysa] refers primarily to injuring oneself – to behavior which inhibits the soul’s ability to attain moksa.”2 The reasoning here is that a tendency to intentionally harm other living beings that is motivated by strong passions (kasaya) causes the binding of harmful varieties (papa prakrti) of karmic matter to one’s own soul. These karmas cause rebirth in undesirable states of existence as hell-beings (naraki) and animals (tiryañca) that are characterized by a preponderance of suffering and that are not conducive to spiritual progress, thereby prolonging the soul’s journey in saÅsara.3 Ahiysa and nonpossession (aparigraha), along with the doctrine of manifold aspects (anekantavada), are frequently viewed as cornerstones of a Jain world- view.4 The concept of compassion is mentioned less frequently in most survey texts on Jainism. For example, in The Jains by Paul Dundas there is no entry for the word compassion in the index, and in The Jaina Path of Purification by P. S. Jaini, it is discussed briefly.5 However, Jains sometimes associate ahiysa with compassion in their writings. For instance, in an essay entitled “Environmental wisdom in Ancient India,” L. M. Singhvi states: Compassion and reverence for life are the sheet-anchor of the Jain quest for Peace, Harmony, and Rectitude, based on spiritual and physical symbiosis and a sense of responsibility and restraint arising out of the principle of cause and effect. Although the term ahiysa is stated in the negative (a ϭ non, hiysa ϭ violence), it is rooted in a host of positive aims and actions which have great relevance to contemporary environmental concerns. Ahiysa is an aspect of daya (compassion, 438 AHIØSA AND COMPASSION IN JAINISM empathy and charity). Jiva-daya means caring for and sharing with all living beings, tending, protecting and serving them. It entails univer- sal friendliness (maitri), universal forgiveness (ksama) and universal fear- lessness (abhaya). It is the same sense of compassion and non-violence which is the basis of the ancient Jain scriptural aphorism Parasparopagraho Jivanam (all life is bound together by the mutual support of interdependence).6 On a website for Jain pilgrimage sites, Jainism is described as being “synony- mous with ahiysa. Ahiysa (non-violence) occupies the supreme place in Jainism. Compassion (daya) is the guiding force of non-violence. It is the pos- itive way of life. It has been assigned an equally high place in Jainism – ‘Daya dharma ka mool’ (Compassion is the basis of religion).”7 Given the fact that compassion is mentioned along with ahiysa in contempo- rary writings such as these, it would be useful to investigate the textual basis for these statements in earlier Jain sources. In what contexts is compassion discussed in the Tattvartha-sutra, which is accepted by both Fvetambaras and Digambaras? Are views about compassion in the Tattvartha-sutra and its commentaries reflected in writings on lay and mendicant conduct and in texts on karma theory? Is there evidence of sectarian differences in views on compassion? How do the commentators define the various Sanskrit words such as anukampa, daya, and karujya that are translated into English as “compassion”? Views on compassion in the Tattvartha-sutra and commentaries Compassion is mentioned twice in the Tattvartha-sutra (ϭ TS) itself, at TS 6.12 where anukampa is listed as one of the causes of binding sata-vedaniya karma and at TS 7.6 (ϭ SS 7.11) where karujya is listed as one of the contemplations (bhavana) that strengthen the five lay vows (ajuvrata) and the five mendicant vows (mahavrata).8 Compassion is mentioned in the commentaries on TS 1.2 where a proper view of reality (samyak-darfana) is defined as belief in existents (tattva) ascertained as they really are.9 Two Fvetambara and three Digambara commentaries on the Tattvartha-sutra are examined here. The Fvetambara com- mentaries include the bhasya by Umasvati, which Fvetambaras believe is an autocommentary, and the vrtti by Siddhasenagaji (c. seventh century), which is the most extensive Fvetambara commentary on both the sutra and the bhasya. The three Digambara commentaries include the Sarvarthasiddhi of Pujyapada (sixth century), the Tattvarthavartika (Rajavartika) of Akalakka (eighth century), and the Tattvarthaflokavartika of Vidyananda (ninth century).10 At the first occurrence of each Sanskrit word used by the commentators that may be trans- lated into English as “compassion,” the definitions from the Sanskrit–English dictionaries of Monier-Williams and Apte are included in the notes. 439 KRISTI L. WILEY Compassion and samyak-darfana In his commentary on TS 1.2, Umasvati lists four indicative signs of samyak- darfana: prafama (calmness), saÅvega (fear of worldly existence), anukampa (compassion), and astikya (belief in the existents such as the soul, non-soul, and so forth), but he does not define any of these indicative signs. Siddhasenagaji defines anukampa as “ghrja or karujya towards living beings. For example, those who are desirous of happiness for all living beings and who are desirous of the cessation of suffering, having decided, ‘I will not cause them any affliction, not even a little,’ they strive for this with a tender heart.”11 In Digambara commentaries on this sutra, compassion (anukampa) is not defined by Pujyapada. However, Akalakka defines this term as “maitri (friendli- ness, kindness) towards all beings”12 and Vidyananda defines it as “daya towards all mobile (trasa) and immobile (sthavara) beings.”13 The Digambara commenta- tors state that there are two types of samyak-darfana: saraga samyak-darfana (right belief with attachments) and vitaraga samyak-darfana (right belief without attachments). The indicative signs of samyak-darfana, namely prafama, saÅvega, anukampa, and astikya, are associated with saraga samyaktva. Vitaraga samyak- tva is characterized only by the purity of the soul itself (atma-vifuddhi-matra). There are slight variations in the wording of various Digambara commentaries. Pujyapada states that samyaktva is of two types “on account of a difference in the object (saraga-vitaraga-visaya-bhedat).”14 It is not entirely clear to me what Pujyapada is saying here. One way to interpretet his statement is that when the object of perception is saraga, in other words, when the object is a living being who has not overcome attachments and aversions, there would be compassion towards that person by someone who has attained samyaktva. There would be no compassion when the object is vitaraga. This would include a person who has overcome all attachments and aversions, and contemplation of the inner soul itself, which is characterized by innate purity and thus not affected by karma that causes attachment or aversion. Akalakka does not use word “object” (visaya). Instead, he mentions that samyaktva is of two types “on account of the distinction between saraga and vitaraga (saraga-vitaraga-vikalpat).” Commenting on the phrase “atma-vifuddhi-matra,” Akalakka states: “When the seven varieties of karma have entirely disappeared, there is only the purity of the soul. This is vitaraga samyaktva.”15 This phrase is somewhat ambiguous because there are no souls that are devoid of seven of the eight main varieties (mula-prakrti) of karmic matter. Apparently Akalakka is associating vitaraga samyaktva with a kevalin, who has destroyed all varieties of destructive (ghatiya) karmas previously bound with the soul and for whom the binding of seven of the eight main varieties of karmic matter has disappeared (all karmas except for sata-vedaniya karma).16 The kevalin has thereby attained direct omniscient knowledge of all existents, including the soul itself, and has eliminated forever all attachment (raga) and aversion (dvesa). In his commentary on TS 1.2, Vidyananda also associates anukampa with saraga samyaktva. In the Hindi commentary on this verse, Pajdit 440 AHIØSA AND COMPASSION IN JAINISM Majikcand explains that prafama, saÅvega, anukampa, and astikya are good or auspicious attachments (fubha-raga).17 Vidyananda clarifies another point by explicitly stating that the qualities of saÅvega and anukampa are not possible for those who have a false view of reality (mithyadrsti) and are thereby in the first gujasthana.18 Thus, according to Digambara commentators, compassion is associated with the samyaktva of those who are still subject to the binding of the eight main vari- eties of karmic matter, in other words, by those who are affected by conduct- deluding (caritra-mohaniya) karma, which causes attraction (raga) and aversion (dvesa) in the form of the four passions (kasaya), namely anger (krodha), pride (mana), deceitfulness (maya), and greed (lobha) in the three lesser degrees of intensity.19 This would include those who have not taken any vows and are thereby in the fourth gujasthana, laypeople who have taken the lay vows thereby attain- ing the fifth gujasthana, and mendicants who have taken the mendicant vows