Beyond Borders: China Opens up to the World
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Western Australia's International Resources
WESTERN AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT MAGAZINE March–May 2004 $3 (inc GST) Print post approved PP 665002/00062 post approved Print China WESTERN AUSTRALIAN OFFICES Department of Industry and Resources Mineral House • 100 Plain Street • EAST PERTH WA 6004 Tel: +61 8 9222 3333 • Fax: +61 8 9222 3430 www.doir.wa.gov.au Investment Services FROM THE MINISTER 168–170 St Georges Terrace • PERTH Western Australia 6000 Postal address: Box 7606 • Cloisters Square PERTH Western Australia 6850 Optimism with LNG Tel: +61 8 9327 5555 • Fax: +61 8 9222 3862 Email: [email protected] NG is vital as an emerging energy source at a time when there INTERNATIONAL OFFICES is concern about the longer-term sustainability of supply of Europe petroleum, issues about security of energy supplies generally, Government of Western Australia L and the need for the world to progress to less greenhouse-intensive European Office • 5th floor, Australia Centre Clive Brown, MLA Corner of Strand and Melbourne Place and polluting forms of energy. Minister for State LONDON WC2B 4LG • UNITED KINGDOM The Western Australian Government is optimistic that several Development Tel: +44 20 7240 2881 • Fax: +44 20 7240 6637 Email: [email protected] new LNG projects can be developed within the next two decades. India — Mumbai To maximise opportunities in LNG and related sectors, the Western Australian Trade Office Western Australian Government is focusing on four strategic areas 93 Jolly Maker Chambers No 2 9th floor, Nariman Point • MUMBAI 400 021 INDIA — developing a strong and competitive economy; providing Tel: +91 22 5630 3979/74/78 • Fax: +91 22 5630 3977 supportive infrastructure to projects; ensuring Government Email: [email protected] facilitation optimises outcomes for business, Government and the India — Chennai Western Australian Trade Office - Advisory Office community; and developing long-term relationships between all players as the basis for 1 Doshi Regency • 876 Poonamallee High Road ensuring mutually beneficial outcomes. -
China's Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade, Investment and Finance Landscape
China's Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade, Investment and Finance Landscape │ 3 China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the global trade, investment and finance landscape China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) development strategy aims to build connectivity and co-operation across six main economic corridors encompassing China and: Mongolia and Russia; Eurasian countries; Central and West Asia; Pakistan; other countries of the Indian sub-continent; and Indochina. Asia needs USD 26 trillion in infrastructure investment to 2030 (Asian Development Bank, 2017), and China can certainly help to provide some of this. Its investments, by building infrastructure, have positive impacts on countries involved. Mutual benefit is a feature of the BRI which will also help to develop markets for China’s products in the long term and to alleviate industrial excess capacity in the short term. The BRI prioritises hardware (infrastructure) and funding first. This report explores and quantifies parts of the BRI strategy, the impact on other BRI-participating economies and some of the implications for OECD countries. It reproduces Chapter 2 from the 2018 edition of the OECD Business and Financial Outlook. 1. Introduction The world has a large infrastructure gap constraining trade, openness and future prosperity. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are working hard to help close this gap. Most recently China has commenced a major global effort to bolster this trend, a plan known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China and economies that have signed co-operation agreements with China on the BRI (henceforth BRI-participating economies1) have been rising as a share of the world economy. -
Dakar Rally in Mourning As Rider Goncalves Dies in Crash Spaniard Carlos Sainz Extends His Lead Over Qatari Defending Champion Nasser Al-Attiyah to Ten Minutes
CRICKET | Page 4 GOLF | Page 6 Buttler sorry Ormsby for outburst; weathers Lowry questions use of surge to win in stump mic Hong Kong Monday, January 13, 2020 TENNIS Jumada I 18, 1441 AH Williams ends title GULF TIMES drought to win in Auckland SPORT Page 7 MOTORSPORT Dakar Rally in mourning as rider Goncalves dies in crash Spaniard Carlos Sainz extends his lead over Qatari defending champion Nasser al-Attiyah to ten minutes AFP Wadi ad-Dawasir, Saudi Arabia ortuguese motorbike rider Paulo Goncalves has died after a crash in the Dakar Rally yester- Pday, the 40-year-old becoming the gruelling motorsport mara- thon’s 25th fatality. Goncalves suff ered the fatal accident after 276 kilometres of the seventh stage from Riyadh to Wadi ad-Dawasir. “The organisers received an alert at 10:08 (0708 GMT) and dispatched a medical helicopter that reached the biker at 10:16 and found him unconscious af- ter going into cardiac arrest,” a statement on the rally’s offi cial website reported. “Following resuscitation ef- forts in situ, the competitor was taken by helicopter to Layla Hos- pital, where he was sadly pro- nounced dead,” it added. Dakar director David Cast- era revealed it was Australian defending bike champion Toby Price who was the fi rst to discov- er the stricken Goncalves lying Toyota Gazoo Racing’s Nasser al-Attiyah and his co-driver in action on the sand. during stage 7 of the 2020 Dakar Rally yesterday. (Reuters) Goncalves was competing in his 13th edition of the Dakar. He commented: “This sport is ex- driver Peterhansel in third. -
China's Special Economic Zones And
China’s Special Economic Zones and Industrial Clusters: Success and Challenges Douglas Zhihua Zeng © 2012 Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Working Paper The findings and conclusions of this Working Paper reflect the views of the author(s) and have not been subject to a detailed review by the staff of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Contact the Lincoln Institute with questions or requests for permission to reprint this paper. [email protected] Lincoln Institute Product Code: WP13DZ1 Abstract In the past 30 years, China has achieved phenomenal economic growth, an unprecedented development “miracle” in human history. How did China achieve this rapid growth? What have been its key drivers? And, most important, can China sustain the incredible success? While policy makers, business people, and scholars continue to debate these topics, one thing is clear: the numerous special economic zones and industrial clusters that emerged after the country’s reforms are without doubt two important engines of China’s remarkable development. The special economic zones and industrial clusters have made crucial contributions to China’s economic success. Foremost, the special economic zones (especially the first several) successfully tested the market economy and new institutions and became role models for the rest of the country to follow. Together with the numerous industrial clusters, the special economic zones have contributed significantly to gross domestic product, employment, exports, and attraction of foreign investment. The special economic zones have also played important roles in bringing new technologies to China and in adopting modern management practices. However, after 30 years’ development, they also face many significant challenges in moving forward. -
120Th U.S. OPEN CHAMPIONSHIP – FACT SHEET
120th U.S. OPEN CHAMPIONSHIP – FACT SHEET Sept. 17-20, 2020, Winged Foot Golf Club (West Course), Mamaroneck, N.Y. mediacenter.usga.org | usopen.com | @usga_pr (media Twitter) | @usopengolf (Twitter and Instagram) | USOPEN (Facebook) | #USOpen iOS and Android mobile app: U.S. Open Golf Championship PAR AND YARDAGE Winged Foot Golf Club’s West Course will be set up at 7,477 yards and will play to a par of 35-35—70. The yardage for each round of the championship will vary due to course setup and conditions. HOLE BY HOLE Hole 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total Par 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 5 35 Yards 451 484 243 467 502 321 162 490 565 3,685 Hole 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Total Par 3 4 5 3 4 4 4 4 4 35 Yards 214 384 633 212 452 426 498 504 469 3,792 ARCHITECTS Winged Foot Golf Club’s West Course was designed by A.W. Tillinghast and opened for play on Sept. 8, 1923. Tillinghast, who also designed Winged Foot’s East Course, competed in two U.S. Opens and eight U.S. Amateurs between 1902 and 1912. Gill Hanse supervised a renovation of the West Course and that work was completed in 2017. He had previously renovated the East Course. COURSE RATING AND SLOPE Based on the course setup for the championship, the Course Rating™ for Winged Foot Golf Club (West Course) is 76.9 and its Slope Rating® is 146. -
120Th U.S. OPEN CHAMPIONSHIP – FACT SHEET
120th U.S. OPEN CHAMPIONSHIP – FACT SHEET Sept. 17-20, 2020, Winged Foot Golf Club (West Course), Mamaroneck, N.Y. mediacenter.usga.org | usopen.com | @usga_pr (media Twitter) | @usopengolf (Twitter and Instagram) | USOPEN (Facebook) | #USOpen iOS and Android mobile app: U.S. Open Golf Championship PAR AND YARDAGE Winged Foot Golf Club’s West Course will be set up at 7,477 yards and will play to a par of 35-35—70. The yardage for each round of the championship will vary due to course setup and conditions. HOLE BY HOLE Hole 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total Par 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 5 35 Yards 451 484 243 467 502 321 162 490 565 3,685 Hole 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Total Par 3 4 5 3 4 4 4 4 4 35 Yards 214 384 633 212 452 426 498 504 469 3,792 ARCHITECTS Winged Foot Golf Club’s West Course was designed by A.W. Tillinghast and opened for play on Sept. 8, 1923. Tillinghast, who also designed Winged Foot’s East Course, competed in two U.S. Opens and eight U.S. Amateurs between 1902 and 1912. Gill Hanse supervised a renovation of the West Course and that work was completed in 2017. He had previously renovated the East Course. ENTRIES The championship is open to any professional golfer and any amateur golfer with a Handicap Index® not exceeding 1.4. Since 2012, the USGA has annually surpassed the 9,000 mark in entries, with a record 10,127 entries accepted for the 2014 U.S. -
Chinese Cities of Opportunity 2020 Seizing the New Opportunities of China’S Urbanisation
Beijing Hangzhou Xi’an Kunming Wuxi Nanchang Harbin Shanghai Wuhan Xiamen Jinan Taiyuan Zhongshan Haikou Guangzhou Hong Kong Chongqing Hefei Guiyang Urumqi Lanzhou Shenzhen Zhengzhou Tianjin Macao Shenyang Shijiazhuang Baoding Chengdu Changsha Qingdao Foshan Fuzhou Changchun Tangshan Nanjing Suzhou Ningbo Zhuhai Dalian Nanning Hohhot Chinese Cities of Opportunity 2020 Seizing the new opportunities of China’s urbanisation While China has entered the mid to late stages of stressed, China must gradually form a “dual circulation” its urbanisation process, urbanisation maintains a development pattern, in which the domestic economic strong driving force for China’s economic and social cycle plays a leading role while the domestic and development, yielding tremendous opportunities and international dual circulations complement each other. potential for growth. In 2019, for the first time, the This “dual circulation” not only demonstrates a logic of urbanisation rate of China’s permanent population ensuring bottom-line security by improving economic exceeded 60 percent, which is expected to approach resilience, but also a logic of expanding opening-up and the average level of developed countries in the next 20 integrated development with an enterprising spirit. In years. However, the urbanisation rate of the registered the process of developing a “dual circulation” pattern, population is currently below 45 percent. Continuous cities—especially central cities—will play a leading role as promotion of a new type of “people-centric urbanisation” platforms for growth and opening-up as well as pillars of will help narrow the gap between the economic and social resilience—veritable places of opportunity. development of urban and rural areas, extensively improve The China Development Research Foundation and PwC public services and social welfare, and provide internal have paid close attention to China’s urbanisation, with impetus for robust economic growth. -
Port Governance in China Since 2004: Institutional Layering and the Growing Impact of Broader Policies
Research in Transportation Business & Management 22 (2017) 184–200 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Research in Transportation Business & Management Port governance in China since 2004: Institutional layering and the growing impact of broader policies Theo Notteboom a,b,c,d,e,⁎, Zhongzhen Yang b a China Institute of FTZ Supply Chain, Shanghai Maritime University, People's Republic of China b Transportation Management College, Dalian Maritime University, People's Republic of China c Antwerp Maritime Academy, Belgium d Faculty of Applied Economics, University of Antwerp, Belgium e Maritime Institute, Faculty of Law, Ghent University, Belgium article info abstract Article history: This paper builds further on the work of Cullinane and Wang (2007) and more recent work on (port) governance Received 30 May 2016 in China. We argue that the market environment in which Chinese ports operate is quite different compared to Received in revised form 6 September 2016 ten years ago. The global and domestic economic slowdown and structural changes in the economic base have Accepted 12 September 2016 affected seaport volumes and freight traffic growth. Fears for port capacity shortages have made room for over- Available online 17 September 2016 capacity. New geo-economic policies such as the ‘Go West’ strategy and the ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) initiative, the implementation of modern corporate governance principles and the establishment of Free Trade Zones (FTZs) are affecting the Chinese container seaport system. The above factors have triggered a number of strategic and managerial implications on Chinese ports: (a) an increased focus on seaport integration and co-operation, (b) a strong orientation on hinterland development through corridors and dry ports, (c) a two-way opening up of the seaport sector by combining initiatives to attract foreign investments and trade to Chinese ports with an internationalisation of Chinese port-related companies. -
Chinese Communists and Rural Society, 1927-1934
Center for Chinese Studies • CHINA RESEARCH MONOGRAPHS UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY NUMBER THIRTEEN CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND RURAL SOCIETY, 1927-1934 PHILIP C. C. HUANG LYNDA SCHAEFER BELL KATHY LEMONS WALKER Chinese Communists and Rural Society, 1927-1934 A publication of the Center for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, California 94720 Cover Colophon by Shih-hsiang Chen Center for Chinese Studies • CHINA RESEARCH MONOGRAPHS UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY NUMBER THIRTEEN CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND RURAL SOCIETY, 1927-1934 PHILIP C. C. HUANG LYNDA SCHAEFER BELL KATHY LEMONS WALKER Although the Center for Chinese Studies is responsible for the selection and acceptance of monographs in this series, respon sibility for the opinions expressed in them and for the accuracy of statements contained in them rests with their authors. © 1978 by the Regents of the Universit y of California ISBN 0-912966-18-1 Library of Congress Catalog Number 78-620018 Printed in the United States of America $5.00 Contents INTRODUCTION ......... ........... .. .. ..... Philip C. C. Huang INTELLECTUALS, LUMPENPROLETARIANS, WORKERS AND PEASANTS IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT.................. 5 Philip C. C. Huang AGRICULTURAL LABORERS AND RURAL REVOLUTION . 29 Lynda Schaefer Bell THE PARTY AND PEASANT WOMEN 57 Kathy LeMons Walker A COMMENT ON THE WESTE RN LITERATURE. 83 Philip C. C. Huang REFERENCES . 99 GLOSSARY . .. .......... ................. .. .. 117 LIST OF MAPS I. Revolutionary Base Areas and Guerilla Zones in 1934 2 II. The Central Soviet Area in 1934 . 6 III. Xingguo and Surrounding Counties......... .. 10 1 The Jiangxi Period : an Introduction Philip C. C. Huang The Chinese Communist movement in its early years was primarily urban-based. -
First Qualifying Stage
2019 年亚巡资格赛 本档构成亚巡赛有限公司(新加坡)与各参赛者的协议 资格赛第一关 A : 2018 年 11 月 28 日 – 2018 年 12 月 1 日 (72 洞比杆赛) Windsor Park & Golf Club (Course A & B), Bangkok, Thailand 资格赛第一关 B : 2018 年 12 月 19 – 22 日 (72 洞比杆赛) Lakeview Resort & Golf Club, Hua Hin, Thailand (Course A & B) Lakeview Resort & Golf Club, Hua Hin, Thailand (Course C & D) Windsor Park & Golf Club (Course A & B), Bangkok, Thailand 最终关 : 2018 年 12 月 26– 30 日 (90 洞比杆赛) Lakeview Resort & Golf Club, Hua Hin, Thailand (Course A & B) Lakeview Resort & Golf Club, Hua Hin, Thailand (Course C & D) 第二轮截止后,另外两轮将在同一高尔夫球场进行 (Lakeview Resort & Golf Club (Course A & B) & Lakeview Resort & Golf Club (Course C & D)). 第四轮截止后,最后一轮将在 Lakeview Resort & Golf Club, Hua Hin (Course C & D)高尔夫球场进行 报名截止日期: 资格赛第一关 A:2018 年 11 月 14 日 资格赛第一关 B 和最终关:2018 年 12 月 12 日 1. 形式 资格赛将以 2 个阶段的比杆赛进行 (A) 资格赛第一关 第一阶段分成 2 个部分(A 和 B )将在不同的日期举行。 所有参赛者都可以选择任何部分的和任何球 场的比赛,除了获得豁免权自动进入最终关的参赛者。(豁免权详情请看以下部分(B) ) 资格赛第一关 A 72 洞比杆赛 : 2018 年 11 月 28 – 2018 年 12 月 1 日 练习赛 : 2018 年 11 月 26 – 27 日 资格赛第一关 A 将在以下地点进行: i) Windsor Park and Golf Club (Course A & B). 资格赛第一关 B 72 洞比杆赛 : 2018 年 12 月 19 – 22 日 练习赛 : 2018 年 12 月 17 – 18 日 资格赛第一关 B 将在以下地点进行: i) Lakeview Resort & Golf Club, Hua Hin, Thailand (Course A & B) ii) Lakeview Resort & Golf Club, Hua Hin, Thailand (Course C & D) iii) Windsor Park & Golf Club (Course A & B), Bangkok, Thailand 申请者可在申请书上注明自己想参赛的地点和日期,我们将会以先到先得的原则分配。 第一关计划打 72 洞(4 轮)。参赛选手将先进行两轮比赛。当完成 36 洞比赛之后,前 80 名和并列 80 名的选手(包括业余选手)将继续参加后两轮比赛。如果总参赛人数少于 100 人,则进入后两轮比赛的 名额数将被削减到总参赛人数的三分之二。 主办方将在比赛当周宣布最终关的参赛名额。达到或并列于最终关资格分数线的参赛选手将获得进入 最终关的资格。 (B) 最终关 (90 洞比杆赛) 90 洞比杆赛 : 2018 年 12 月 26 – 30 日 练习赛 : 2018 年 12 月 24 & 25 日 符合以下条件的选手可获得第一关的豁免权并且直接进入最终关。 a. -
Afgc China Market Industry Guide
AFGC CHINA MARKET INDUSTRY GUIDE A GUIDE TO THE CHINESE MARKET INDUSTRY This project is supported by funding from the Department of Agriculture and Water Resources. Published October 2018. Australian Food and Grocery Council. This report was prepared for the Australian Food and Grocery Council by Peloris Consulting, through funding provided by the Department of Agriculture and Water Resources. The report contains general information only. The Australian Food and Grocery Council is not, by means of this publication, rendering business, financial, investment, trade, legal, tax, or other professional advice. Professional advice should sought independently, including advice on regulatory requirements of exporting to and selling food and groceries in China. The Australian Food and Grocery Council will not be held responsible for loss or damages sustained by any person or entity relying on the information in this publication. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any manner or form without written permission from the Australian Food and Grocery Council. Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................................3 Part A: - China Food Safety Regulations .............................................................................................4 China Food Safety Law (2015) of The Peoples’ Republic of China ................................................. 4 E-Commerce Law of The Peoples’ Republic of China (2018) ........................................................... -
Subsidy Programs
SUBSIDIES REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CHINA PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 25.10 OF THE AGREEMENT The following communication, dated 15 April 2016, is being circulated at the request of the Delegation of the United States. _______________ In the report that it prepared for China's most recent Trade Policy Review, held in July 2014, the Secretariat included information that it had uncovered on 30 support programs for China's fisheries sector.1 The Secretariat's Report noted that China had not notified any of these support programs to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Committee) and that China could not verify any of the information provided to it by the Secretariat. During the ensuing Trade Policy Review meetings, China responded to Members' questions about these support programs by stating that it needed more time to identify and verify information regarding these support programs. In April of last year, the United States submitted questions to China with respect to these programs and other fishery support measures the United States had uncovered through its own efforts.2 Once again, despite its obligation under Article 25.9 of the Agreement to provide answers "as quickly as possible and in a comprehensive manner", China to date has not meaningfully responded to the United States' request and has refused repeated requests to meet bilaterally to discuss the issue, and the issue of subsidy notifications more generally. In November of last year, China submitted its latest subsidy notification covering the period 2009 through 2014.3 In this notification, China did not include: (1) any of the fishery subsidy programs identified in China's 2014 TPR report, (2) any of the additional measures identified by the United States in its Article 25.8 submission or (3) any of the fisheries subsidies measures identified in the 2014 Article 25.10 submission of the United States4.