DOCSLIB.ORG

VII.—CRITICAL Noticea the Ethics of Aristotle. Edited with An

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
VII.—CRITICAL Noticea the Ethics of Aristotle. Edited with An VII.—CRITICAL NOTICEa The Ethics of Aristotle. Edited with an Introduction and Notes by JOHN BUBNBT, M.A., Professor of Greek in the United College of St. Salvator and St. Leonard, St. Andrews. Intro- duotion, pp. lii., text, etc., pp. 502. FOB several years students of Greek philosophy have looked for- ward with much interest to the publication of a commentary by Prof. Bnmet on the Nicomaohean Ethics. The author's brilliant work on Early Cheek Philosophy naturally led to the highest expectations, and it is just possible that many people may receive this commentary with a slight feeling of disappointment. The brevity of the introductions (general and special) may tend to arouse the suspicion that an undue amount of attention has been given to the text, and that the present work is in the main merely another text of the Ethics. When, however, feelings of this kind are put aside, and the work is considered strictly as a contribution to the interpretation of the Ethics, there can be but one verdict as to its quality and value. Mr. Burnet informs us that the present edition of the Ethics was originally planned, and most of it written, on a more extensive scale. The work was laid aside when it was known that Mr. Bywater was about to publish a revised text, and Mr. Stewart Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics: and is now produced at the request of the publishers in a less elaborate form. No doubt it might be held that a commentary should lean as far as possible to the side of brevity. But it will be noticed that Mr. Burnet abbre- viated his commentary, not for this reason, but because a more elaborate commentary was on the point of being produced. The inconvenience of the present arrangement for the ordinary English student is obvious. He must acquire all three works, Mr. By- water's, Mr. Stewart's and Mr. Burnet'fr: Mr. Burnet's alone, in its original form, would' have served. Besides, the scale of Mr. Burnet's commentary is very different from that of the Notes. The latter must be at least five times greater in amount, so that Mr. Burnet's commentary might have been muoh more elaborate without even approaching the magnitude of the Notes. On the whole, therefore, one cannot help regretting that Mr. Burnet did not carry out his original plan. Everything that he writes about Greek Philosophy is so interesting that one does not like to miss any of it. JOHN BUBNET, The Ethics of Aristotle. 529 The main justification for the present edition is to be found, as Mr. Burnet indicates in the preface, in the fact that the " method of interpretation is a somewhat novel one ". Mr. Bumet'a thesis is that " most of the difficulties that have been raised about the Ethics are doe to the fact that, though the dialectical character of many passages has long been admitted, commentators have never thoroughly recognised that the treatise is dialectical throughout". It is therefore primarily with reference to this theory that the work as a whole must be judged. Mr. Burnet's account of Aristotle's conception of Method is given in §§ 20-26 of the introduction. He begins by reminding us that " the question of method is always vital to Aristotle ". Every science can be regarded as a conscious application of the rules of the special method appropriate to its special subject-matter, and implies a previous general training in method and also a special training that shall enable the student to recognise the appropriate- ness of the special mode of treatment. The general training in method is of course logic. As Mr. Burnet points out, Giphanius. said long ago: " Vocat llle naitxiav habitum quendam recte judicandi de rebus omnibus quod docet doctrina Analytics; contra <JjrtuS«wia oontrarius ab illo habitus dicitur, hoc est ignoratio doctrines Ana- lytics ". It was indeed a commonplace of the time of Giphanius that a study of the Oryanum is a necessary propaedeutic to the other Aristotelian treatises. But recent students of Aristotle have rather lost sight of this point, and Mr. Burnet does well to recall attention to it. The nature of the special training presupposed by a special science is less clear, and it can hardly be said that Mr. Burnet has succeeded in elucidating completely the brief bints given by Aristotle. The question of method in the Ethics is considered under two heads. In Ethics, as in all practical sciences, two problems are presented, (1) to find the apx1? °f tne science, (2) to pass from the ipxn t° *ne conditions of its being realised. The former is dis- cussed in g§ 22-25 of the introduction, the latter in §§ 22 and 26. The apprehension of the Aprf of Ethics (t.e., the definition of €i&ufiovla) presupposes a certain habituation (j&a/uk) in the hearer. When this has been secured, the science is able to commence its search for its &pxo> an^ *^e metn°d it uses is Dialectic. " The word tkaXtKTuc!) properly means nothing more than the art of dia- logue or conversation—it signifies the theoretical formulation of the practice of Socrates. Plato developed this method. ... In his hands it became the only instrument of philosophical thinking, the ideal of a completed science. To this Aristotle could not agree. A dialectio proof was to him no proof at all: for it had no middle term. It could not be the right instrument for arriving at mediate propositions: for we can only be said to know these in the true sense ofthe word when we know them as the conclusions of a syllogism. This was Aristotle's own contribution to Logic, and he is never weary of showing us that the syllogism is the only 34 530 CBITICAL NOTICES : adequate form for the mediate truths of science. But it remains as tane for him as it was for Plato that the dialectic method is the only way of arriving at immediate propositions, propositions which can have no middle term between their subject and their predicate, and we have seen that it is from such propositions that all science must start" (§ 24). This passage is perhaps liable to be misunder- stood. " Dialectic " seems to be used in a limited sense as equi- valent to Plato's technical sense of the word and to a part only of dialectic in the Aristotelian sense. Though the discovery of im- mediate propositions is the speeial function of Dialectic (or more strictly is /uAurra oiKtlov rip SuiAtirnio/?, Topics, 101 b, 2) it is not its only function. A dialeotic proof may be a (nAAoyioyto* SuiAfim- xoc, and a syllogism must have a middle term. The next section (25) is perhaps the most valuable in the general introduction. It contains a most interesting account of the method of dialectic, as used in Ethics for the determination of the apyq of the science. Of special importance is the point that /j^rafitpditty {cf. utTafiaiytw) is the technical term for the process of developing an h>So(ov by means of criticism. The account of the technical term -n-po^K-rj/Mi is hardly satisfactory. " We begin by ' taking' (Xafifiaviw) premisses from the beliefs of the many and the wise to serve as premisses (tv&ofa. ny>oTdcrc«V But our attitude towards these beliefs is by no means uncritical. ... As a general rule, we find that they are contradictory, and when we find such a contra- diction between received beliefs, we have what is called an impia (literally, ' no thoroughfare').... The teohnioal name for a pair of contradictory o&>£a is Trpd/JXij/ia and the solution of it is called the Averts." Also note page xliii. " A irp6f$krnui. (*yx>/?uAA<i>) only differs from a 7rpdra<7w (wportiy<i>) in form (T<JI rpcmp), cf. Top., 101 b, 29." This tends to suggest that a n-po/SAi^a is a pair of contradic- tory premisses, and seems to lose sight of the fact that a irpo/8A.7^ui is essentially a conclusion (not as such of course but before it has been proved). A irpoftkrifia is of the rpoTos, TUTtpov TO C<$OV nt^or Surow bfturfivs c<rri ivOptairov r) OV ; (Which of the alternatives 8 is P, S is not P, is true ?) and there may be no Sd£a with respect to it (Top., 104 6, 1-5. irp6pX.r]/ia 8" ia-rl StaAtfmitov Otiopij/xa . irtpl ov t) ox&tTtpws 8o£a£oufnv 77 barriox; ol iroAAol TCHS <ro<£o« r) ol (rotfxA TW: iroAAotS r) luiripoi avTOt iavrott). On the other hand a wpcrrao-it is of the form &pd yc TO £<j>ov irefov Stirouv opurfiot tarty ivOponrov; and is on the whole «M>O&K and not "problematical". Of course, in general, there is difference of opinion with respect to SP, and in this case, as Mr. Burnet shows, the object of dialectic is, by means of criticism, to qualify the opposed views in such a way as to bring them into harmony, the ultimate assumption of the method being that neither the mass of mankind nor the great thinkers are likely to be altogether wrong. We-may now turn to the second question with respect to method, the question as to the procedure of the science after its ipxj has been determined ($§ 22, 26). Being a x/xun-uo) brurr^iiij, Ethics is JOHN BtJRNET, Tht Ethics of Aristotle. 531 necessarily analytic in method : that is, it starts from its ip^n or (in the order of yivtcns) i-cAot, and has to determine by analysis the steps or means necessary towards the realisation of its end.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Matter and Minds: Examining Embodied Souls in Plato's Timaeus
    Matter and Minds: Examining Embodied Souls in Plato’s Timaeus and Ancient Philosophy By Emily Claire Kotow A thesis submitted to the Graduate Program in Philosophy in conformity with the requirements for the Master of Arts Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada September, 2018 Copyright © Emily Claire Kotow, 2018 Abstract With the rise of Platonism influenced by Plotinus and Descartes, philosophers have largely overlooked the fact that Plato directly acknowledges that there is a practical and valuable role for the body. The Timaeus clearly demonstrates that Plato took the idea of embodied minds seriously, not just as an afterthought of the immortal soul. Ultimately this research demonstrates that Plato did not fundamentally have a problem with the mind-body relationship. In offering an argument for Plato’s positive ideas of embodied minds and the necessity thereof, I will also demonstrate, through a historical comparative, why I think the emphasis on mind rather than on embodied mind might have occurred. ii Acknowledgments I would like to thank Dr. Jon Miller and the Philosophy Department of Queen’s University for allowing me to pursue my interests freely -a great privilege that few are fortunate enough to experience. iii Table of Contents Abstract………………………………….………………………………….…………………………………. ii Acknowledgments………………………………….………………………………….………………….. iii Table of Contents………………………………….………………………………….…………………….iv Introduction………………………………….………………………………….……………………………5 Chapter One: Plato’s Embodied Soul.……………………………….……………………………12 i. Plato and
    [Show full text]
  • Anaximander and the Problem of the Earth's Immobility
    Binghamton University The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB) The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter 12-28-1953 Anaximander and the Problem of the Earth's Immobility John Robinson Windham College Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp Recommended Citation Robinson, John, "Anaximander and the Problem of the Earth's Immobility" (1953). The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter. 263. https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/263 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more information, please contact [email protected]. JOHN ROBINSON Windham College Anaximander and the Problem of the Earth’s Immobility* N the course of his review of the reasons given by his predecessors for the earth’s immobility, Aristotle states that “some” attribute it I neither to the action of the whirl nor to the air beneath’s hindering its falling : These are the causes with which most thinkers busy themselves. But there are some who say, like Anaximander among the ancients, that it stays where it is because of its “indifference” (όμοιότητα). For what is stationed at the center, and is equably related to the extremes, has no reason to go one way rather than another—either up or down or sideways. And since it is impossible for it to move simultaneously in opposite directions, it necessarily stays where it is.1 The ascription of this curious view to Anaximander appears to have occasioned little uneasiness among modern commentators.
    [Show full text]
  • Parmenides B6.1–2 Without a Modal Fallacy
    Aporia vol. 21 no. 1—2011 Parmenides B6.1–2 without a Modal Fallacy MICHAEL J. HANSEN n all accounts, Parmenides makes a marvelous argument in the Way of Truth. However, there is no clear consensus among inter- Opreters about how to read it. The only noncontroversial point in interpreting the work seems to be that in it, Parmenides did something pro- found to philosophy. Despite this collective obligation to acknowledge Par- menides’ unique innovation (whatever it may be), it has become popular to read Parmenides as relying on a modal fallacy to make his argument. This would be an embarrassing mistake for such an influential work, especially given the argument’s deductive appearance. In this paper, I will outline the modal fallacy that Parmenides is accused of and argue for an interpretation that is free of the fallacy. I. The Alleged Modal Fallacy The critical fragment we must examine to decide the question is B6.1–2, in which the fallacy is supposed to occur: crhV toV levgein te noei`n t' ejoVn e!mmenai e!sti gaVr ei^nai, mhdeVn d' oujk e!otin . (Graham 214) Michael J. Hansen is a senior majoring in philosophy at Brigham Young University. He is interested in ancient philosophy, the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and metaphysics. In the fall, he will be pursuing a PhD in philosophy at the University of California–Los Angeles. This essay placed first in the 2011 David H. Yarn Philosophical Essay Contest. 2 MICHAEL J. HANSEN As usual, Parmenides’ language admits of many permissible translations for interpreters to quibble over, but this fragment is exceptionally difficult to render.
    [Show full text]
  • Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
    PML9_Aristotle_2006 Page i Friday, February 17, 2006 10:53 AM The Peter Martyr Library Volume Nine Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics PML9_Aristotle_2006 Page ii Friday, February 17, 2006 10:53 AM Habent sua fata libelli EDITORS OF THE PETER MARTYR LIBRARY, SERIES ONE GENERAL EDITORS John Patrick Donnelly, S.J., Frank A James III, Joseph C. McLelland EDITORIAL COMMITTEE W. J. Torrance Kirby, William J. Klempa EDITORIAL BOARD IRENA BACKUS JOHN MCINTYRE Institut d’histoire de la Réformation University of Edinburgh Université de Genève MICHAEL PERCIVAL-MAXWELL PETER S. BIETENHOLZ McGill University, Montreal University of Saskatchewan H. WAYNE PIPKIN FRITZ BÜSSER Associated Mennonite Institut für Schweizer Biblical Seminaries Reformationsgeschichte, Zurich JILL RAITT EMIDIO CAMPI University of Missouri, Columbia Institut für Schweizer Reformationsgeschichte, Zurich ROBERT V. SCHNUCKER University of Northern Iowa RICHARD C. GAMBLE Reformed Theological Seminary DAN SHUTE The Presbyterian College, Montreal TIMOTHY GEORGE Beeson Divinity School JOHN TEDESCHI University of Wisconsin–Madison ROBERT M. KINGDON Institute for Research in the Humanities THOMAS F. TORRANCE University of Wisconsin–Madison University of Edinburgh DIARMAID MACCULLOUGH JOHN VISSERS St. Cross College, Oxford University The Presbyterian College, Montreal ALISTER E. MCGRATH CESARE VASOLI Wycliffe Hall, Oxford University Università de Firenze The Peter Martyr Library Volume Nine COMMENTARY ON Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Peter Martyr Vermigli Edited by Emidio Campi and Joseph C. McLelland with introduction and annotations by Joseph C. McLelland VOLUME LXXIII SIXTEENTH CENTURY ESSAYS & STUDIES KIRKSVILLE, MISSOURI USA ◆ 2006 Title Page PML9_NicoEth_Prelim Page iv Wednesday, February 22, 2006 12:54 PM Copyright 2006 by Truman State University Press, Kirksville, Missouri All rights reserved.
    [Show full text]
  • Arethas of Caesarea and the Scholia On
    Ryan Bailey ARETHAS OF CAESAREA AND THE SCHOLIA ON PHILOSTRATUS’ VITA APOLLONII IN LAUR. 69.33 MA Thesis in Medieval Studies Central European University CEU eTD Collection Budapest May 2012 ARETHAS OF CAESAREA AND THE SCHOLIA ON PHILOSTRATUS’ VITA APOLLONII IN LAUR. 69.33 by Ryan Bailey (USA) Thesis submitted to the Department of Medieval Studies, Central European University, Budapest, in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Arts degree in Medieval Studies. Accepted in conformance with the standards of the CEU. ____________________________________________ Chair, Examination Committee ____________________________________________ Thesis Supervisor ____________________________________________ Examiner ____________________________________________ CEU eTD Collection Examiner Budapest May 2012 ii ARETHAS OF CAESAREA AND THE SCHOLIA ON PHILOSTRATUS’ VITA APOLLONII IN LAUR. 69.33 by Ryan Bailey (USA) Thesis submitted to the Department of Medieval Studies, Central European University, Budapest, in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Arts degree in Medieval Studies. Accepted in conformance with the standards of the CEU. ____________________________________________ External Reader CEU eTD Collection Budapest May 2012 iii ARETHAS OF CAESAREA AND THE SCHOLIA ON PHILOSTRATUS’ VITA APOLLONII IN LAUR. 69.33 by Ryan Bailey (USA) Thesis submitted to the Department of Medieval Studies, Central European University, Budapest, in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Arts degree in Medieval Studies. Accepted in conformance with the standards of the CEU. ________________________ Supervisor ____________________________________________ External Supervisor CEU eTD Collection Budapest May 2012 iv I, the undersigned, Ryan Bailey , candidate for the MA degree in Medieval Studies, declare herewith that the present thesis is exclusively my own work, based on my research and only such external information as properly credited in notes and bibliography.
    [Show full text]
  • 162 Aristotle on Practical Inference, the Explanation of Action, And
    Aristotle on Practical the Inference, Explanation of Action, and Akrasia GERASIMOS SANTAS n his edition of the Nicomachean Ethics John Burnet added two as relevant to Aristotle's discussion of appendices particularly akrasia (weakness). The first appendix, De Anima, I I I , 10, contains Aristotle's discussion of how practical reason and want combine to cause movement for the sake of something and how explanations of action can be constructed in terms of these two elements; in the other appendix, De Motu 7, Aristotle casts explanations of actions in the form of practical inferences. The relevance of these passages to Aris- totle's discussion of akrasia is beyond dispute: Aristotle explicitly employs practical inferences to represent the motivations of the akrates (weak man), and he clearly regards the behavior of the akrates as a case of movement for the sake of something, a case of action. Bumet's appendices suggest what seems to me the only sound strategy for unraveling and understanding Aristotle's explanation of akrasia. We must place this explanation within Aristotle's general theory of the explanation of action and the role of practical inference in such explanation. Akrasia is a difficult case with problems peculiar to it, but all the same it is a case of movement for the sake of something, and in explaining it Aristotle follows his paradigm of the explanation of action. In this paper I wish to take full advantage of this strategy in an attempt to reconstruct in detail and take a fresh look at Aristotle's account of akrasia. The dividends of this strategy will show them- selves, I hope, as I try along the way to resolve some of the textual and philosophical difficulties in Aristotle's account, difficulties traditionally 1 and recently raised by commentators.
    [Show full text]
  • The Fragments of the Poem of Parmenides
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by D-Scholarship@Pitt RESTORING PARMENIDES’ POEM: ESSAYS TOWARD A NEW ARRANGEMENT OF THE FRAGMENTS BASED ON A REASSESSMENT OF THE ORIGINAL SOURCES by Christopher John Kurfess B.A., St. John’s College, 1995 M.A., St. John’s College, 1996 M.A., University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, 2000 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2012 UNVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH The Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences This dissertation was presented by Christopher J. Kurfess It was defended on November 8, 2012 and approved by Dr. Andrew M. Miller, Professor, Department of Classics Dr. John Poulakos, Associate Professor, Department of Communication Dr. Mae J. Smethurst, Professor, Department of Classics Dissertation Supervisor: Dr. Edwin D. Floyd, Professor, Department of Classics ii Copyright © by Christopher J. Kurfess 2012 iii RESTORING PARMENIDES’ POEM Christopher J. Kurfess, Ph.D. University of Pittsburgh, 2012 The history of philosophy proper, claimed Hegel, began with the poem of the Presocratic Greek philosopher Parmenides. Today, that poem is extant only in fragmentary form, the various fragments surviving as quotations, translations or paraphrases in the works of better-preserved authors of antiquity. These range from Plato, writing within a century after Parmenides’ death, to the sixth-century C.E. commentator Simplicius of Cilicia, the latest figure known to have had access to the complete poem. Since the Renaissance, students of Parmenides have relied on collections of fragments compiled by classical scholars, and since the turn of the twentieth century, Hermann Diels’ Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, through a number of editions, has remained the standard collection for Presocratic material generally and for the arrangement of Parmenides’ fragments in particular.
    [Show full text]
  • An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy: the Chief Fragments and Ancient Testimony, with Connecting Commentary
    Book Reviews An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy: The Chief Fragments and Ancient Testimony, with Connecting Commentary. By John Mansley Robinson. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968. Pp. x+342. $4.25. Paper.) This is a book that fills a long-standing need and does it well. In the past, the teacher of a survey course in the history of ancient philosophy who wished to cover the pre-Socratics more fully than is done in one of the several anthologies of Greek philosophy had awkward options. The most up-to-date and authoritative of the text- books, G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven's The Presocratic Philosophers, is too forbidding for a course at the sophomore-junior level. John Burnet's classic, Early Greek Philo- sophy, still unsurpassed in the quality of translation, puts one-sided emphasis on the scientific character of early Greek philosophy. Besides, neither Kirk-Raven nor Burner cover the Sophists (Burnet not even Democritus). Kathleen Freeman's Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (a translation of the B sections in Diels-Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker) has the virtue that it gives the student a forceful and graphic impression of the scantiness of actual fragments; but the student is likely to feel more bewildered than challenged. As for the anthologies devoted specifically to the pre- Socratic.s, Milton C. Nahm's Selections from Early Greek Philosophy is badly dated, and PhiLip Wheelwright's The Presocratics takes excessive liberties with translation. Robinson's book now affords an excellent choice. The selection of primary source materials for the whole sequence from Ionians to Sophists is adequate to generous.
    [Show full text]
  • Aristotle's Theory of Incontinence Roy A
    ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF INCONTINENCE BY ROY A. CLOUSER One of the better known theses in the history of practical ethics is Socrates' theory that no one ever commits an act knowing it to be bad. Both Plato (Protagoras 352 B C, 358 ff.) and Xenophon (Memorabilia III, 9, 5) represent Socrates as holding that if a man knows what is best he will do it; only when he ignorantly mistakes something bad for what is good does he do the bad thing. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle also attri- butes this view to Socrates and takes strong exception to it. Now despite Aristotle's declared opposition to this view, a number of commentators have interpreted his treatment of the issue to be actually the same as or at least compatible with that of Socrates. My purpose here will be to suggest that such interpretations are without sufficient textual basis. Accordingly I will not be concerned with questions of dating, compilation, and authorship connected with the Nicomachean ethics, but will restrict my remarks strictly to an exegesis of the text as it stands. Referring to the commission of an act while knowing that it is wrong as "incontenence", Aristotle remarks: "Now we may ask how a man who judges rightly can behave incontin- ently. That he should behave so when he has knowledge, some say is impossible; for it would be strange - so Socrates thought - if when knowledge was in a man something else could master it and drag it about like a slave." (1145 b 22-25). Aristotle goes on to say that this position of Socrates' contradicts observed facts.
    [Show full text]
  • Greek Philosophy Macmillan and Co., Limited London Bombay Calcutta - Madras Melbourne the Macmillan Company New York Boston * Chicago Dallas San Francisco
    of flijiiosopijp GREEK PHILOSOPHY MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED LONDON BOMBAY CALCUTTA - MADRAS MELBOURNE THE MACMILLAN COMPANY NEW YORK BOSTON * CHICAGO DALLAS SAN FRANCISCO THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD. TORONTO GREEK PHILOSOPHY PART I THALES TO PLATO BY JOHN BURNET MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON 1924 COPYRIGHT First Edition 1914. Reprinted 1920, 1924. PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN PREFACE THE preparation of this volume was undertaken some the Lexicon years ago, but was interrupted by my work on Platonicum, which has proved a more formidable task than was at first anticipated. I have to thank the editor of this series and the publishers for their generous indulgence in the circumstances. It is unfortunate in some respects that I have been in a form obliged to deal with certain parts of the subject which does not admit of detailed argument and still less Greek of controversy. The second edition of my Early Philosophy (referred to as E. Gr. Phf} makes this in large measure unnecessary in Book L, but there are certain parts of Book III. where I have had to state my conclusions baldly in the hope that I may have a later opportunity for the of discussing their grounds. My chief aim present has been to assist students who wish to acquire a firsthand of knowledge of what Plato actually says in the dialogues some- Jiis maturity. So long as they are content to know Platonism thing of the Republic and the earlier dialogues, must be a sealed book to them. I have not thought it well to present Greek names in a Latin dress.
    [Show full text]
  • Classical Studies Departmental Library Booklist
    Page 1 of 81 Department of Classical Studies Library Listing Call Number ISBN # Title Edition Author Author 2 Author 3 Publisher Year Quantity 0 584100051 The origins of alchemy in Graeco-Roman Egypt Jack Lindsay, 1900- London, Frederick Muller Limited 1970 0 500275866 The Mycenaeans Revised edition Lord William Taylour, London, Thames & Hudson 1990 M. Tulli Ciceronis oratio Philippica secunda : with introduction and 6280.A32P2 Stereotyped edition Marcus Tullius Cicero A. G. Peskett, ed. London, Cambridge University Press 1896 notes by A.G. Peskett A258.A75 1923 A practical introduction to Greek prose composition New Impression Thomas Kerchever Evelyn Abbott London : Longmans, Green, and Co. 1923 Gaius Valerius London : Heinemann ; New York : G. P. A6264.A2 Catullus, Tibullus, and Pervigilium Veneris F. W. Cornish 1931 Catullus, Tibullus Putnam's Sons Lucretius on matter and man. Extracts from books I, II, IV & V of the De scientific appendices AC1.E8 A. S. Cox N. A. M. Wallis London, G. Bell & Sons Ltd. 1967 rerum natura. by R.I. Gedye AM1.M76 1981 3 59810118X Museums of the world Third, revised edition Judy Benson, ed. Barbara Fischer, ed. [et al] München ; New York : K.G. Saur 1981 AM101.B87 T73 1971 0 002118343 Treasures of the British Museum: with an introduction Sir John Wolfenden London, Collins 1971 AS121.H47 Vol. 104 & Dublin : Hodges, Figgis & Co. Ltd. ; ISSN: 0018-1750 Hermathena : a Dublin University review No. CIV, Spring 1967 Trinity College Dublin 1967 105 1967 London : The Academic Press Ltd. AS121.H47 Vol. 110 - Dublin : Hodges, Figgis & Co. Ltd. ; ISSN: 0018-1750 Hermathena : a Dublin University review No.
    [Show full text]
  • Background: Parmenides and Plato
    POEM OF PARMENIDES English translation : John Burnet (1892) I The steeds that bear me carried me as far as ever my heart Desired, since they brought me and set me on the renowned Way of the goddess, who with her own hands conducts the man who knows through all things. On what way was I borne along; for on it did the wise steeds carry me, drawing my car, and maidens showed the way. And the axle, glowing in the socket - for it was urged round by the whirling wheels at each end - gave forth a sound as of a pipe, when the daughters of the Sun, hasting to convey me into the light, threw back their veils from off their faces and left the abode of Night. There are the gates of the ways of Night and Day, fitted above with a lintel and below with a threshold of stone. They themselves, high in the air, are closed by mighty doors, and Avenging Justice keeps the keys that open them. Her did the maidens entreat with gentle words and skilfully persuade to unfasten without demur the bolted bars from the gates. Then, when the doors were thrown back, they disclosed a widepening, when their brazen hinges swung backwards in the sockets fastened with rivets and nails. Straight through them, on the broad way, did the maidens guide the horses and the car, and the goddess greeted me kindly, and took my right hand in hers, and spake to me these words: - Welcome, noble youth, that comest to my abode on the car that bears thee tended by immortal charioteers ! It is no ill chance, but justice and right that has sent thee forth to travel on this way.
    [Show full text]