The Digital Version of the Doctoral Thesis Death and the Self. a Metaphysical Investigation of the Rationality of Afterlife Beli
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
The digital version of the doctoral thesis Death and the Self. A Metaphysical Investigation of the Rationality of Afterlife Beliefs in the Contemporary Intellectual Climate by Johan Eddebo, is published without poems on pp. 13, 194 and 195. For the full version, see ISBN 978-91-513-0137-2 (printed version). Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis Uppsala Studies in Philosophy of Religion 3 Cover picture: Maria Näsström. “if i believe”. Copyright 1923, 1951, (c) 1991 by the Trustees for the E. E. Cummings Trust. Copyright (c) 1976 by George James Firmage, “why did you go”. Copyright 1923, 1951, (c) 1991 by the Trustees for the E. E. Cummings Trust. Copyright (c) 1976 by George James Firmage, from COMPLETE POEMS: 1904–1962 by E. E. Cummings, edited by George J. Firmage. Used by kind permission of Liveright Publishing Corporation. Johan Eddebo Death and the Self A Metaphysical Investigation of the Rationality of Afterlife Beliefs in the Contemporary Intellectual Climate Dissertation presented at Uppsala University to be publicly examined in Geijersalen, Engelska parken, Thunbergsvägen 3, Uppsala, Friday, 15 December 2017 at 13:15 for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The examination will be conducted in English. Faculty examiner: Professor Charles Taliaferro (Department of Philosophy, St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minnesota). Abstract Eddebo, J. 2017. Death and the Self. A Metaphysical Investigation of the Rationality of Afterlife Beliefs in the Contemporary Intellectual Climate. Uppsala Studies in Philosophy of Religion 3. 206 pp. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. ISBN 978-91-513-0137-2. This dissertation's purpose is to test the hypothesis that beliefs in the possibility of post- mortem survival can be rationally held within the context of the contemporary scientific and philosophical environment. In terms of criteria of rationality, a basic evidentialism is assumed, such that propositions which are sufficiently supported by the available evidence can be rationally held. With regard to the compatibility with contemporary science and philosophy, it follows as a further criterion that the relevant evidence must be satisfactorily anchored within the framework of these traditions. The relevant evidence concerns two levels. First, the basic level of the conceptual coherence of afterlife beliefs is addressed, so that the logical possibility of post-mortem survival can be established. Secondly, the viability of the metaphysics which are implied in the support of the logical possibility (i.e. the metaphysics needed to actualize post-mortem survival) is defended, establishing the metaphysical possibility of post-mortem survival. At this stage, reductive physicalism, which is the only position that effectively undermines post-mortem survival, is criticized, and the problem of interaction which burdens several of the survival- enabling ontologies is addressed. As for the criterion of scientific compatibility, it is further shown that contemporary physics are compatible with the survival-enabling metaphysics, and that contemporary physics can be argued to provide a moderate positive relevance with regard to these positions. The conclusion drawn is that belief in the possibility of post-mortem survival is not only rationally permissible within the framework of contemporary science and philosophy, but also rationally obligatory, i.e. that this possibility cannot rationally be denied with regard to the reviewed evidence. Keywords: death, subjectivity, selfhood, afterlife, irreducibility, critique of naturalism, immaterialist ontologies, dualism, idealism, philosophy of religion, quantum theory, interpretations of quantum mechanics, modernity Johan Eddebo, Studies in Faith and Ideologies, Philosophy of Religion, Box 511, Uppsala University, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden. © Johan Eddebo 2017 ISBN 978-91-513-0137-2 urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-332097 (http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-332097) To St. Edith Stein Contents Acknowledgments......................................................................................... 11 1. Introduction ......................................................................................... 15 1.1. Introduction and overview................................................................. 15 1.1.1. General remarks on the purpose and subject ......................... 17 1.2. Purpose .............................................................................................. 20 1.3. Empirical framework ......................................................................... 22 1.4. The current state of research on the viability of afterlife beliefs ....... 22 2. Method, goals and prospects ..................................................................... 26 2.1. The cumulative case .......................................................................... 29 2.1.1. The cumulative case for the rationality of afterlife beliefs ........ 31 2.2. Foundations of the case ..................................................................... 31 2.2.1. Intelligibility .............................................................................. 32 2.2.2. Validity and soundness .............................................................. 3 2 2.3. Detailed structure of the cumulative case .......................................... 33 2.4 Summary ............................................................................................ 34 3. The intuition of post-mortem survival ...................................................... 35 3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................ 35 3.2. Intentional burial and primordial forms of belief in an afterlife ........ 37 3.3. An argument for the historical presence of a continuity intuition ..... 38 3.3.1. The intuition of post-mortem continuity .................................... 41 3.3.2. The intuition of post-mortem continuity and the first-person perspective ........................................................................................... 47 4. Death and post-mortem survival ............................................................... 49 4.1. Introduction ....................................................................................... 49 4.1.1. Definition of death and post-mortem survival ........................... 49 4.2. Legacy problems of death and the afterlife ....................................... 51 4.2.1. The problems of personal identity ............................................. 52 4.2.2. The synchronic and diachronic problem in view of the phenomenological criterion ................................................................. 52 4.2.3. The problem of individuation .................................................... 57 4.2.3.1. The phenomenological criterion and spatio-temporal individuation ................................................................................... 59 4.3. Basic possible responses to the legacy problems from the major metaphysical positions ............................................................................. 61 4.3.1. Reductionist physicalism: mnemonic and bodily continuity ..... 62 4.3.2. Dualism, idealism and non-reductive materialism: immaterial continuity, composite continuity and phenomenal presence ............... 65 4.3.2.1. Immaterial continuity ......................................................... 65 4.3.2.2. Composite continuity ......................................................... 67 4.3.3. Brief assessment of the remaining metaphysical positions ........ 70 4.4. Prominent arguments for post-mortem survival: physicalist- friendly arguments .................................................................................... 72 4.4.1. Zimmerman’s case ..................................................................... 72 4.4.2. Van Inwagen’s argument ........................................................... 76 4.4.3. Trenton Merricks’ account ........................................................ 77 4.5. Immaterialist arguments .................................................................... 78 4.5.1. Swinburne’s argument ............................................................... 79 4.5.2. Hasker’s argument ..................................................................... 80 4.6. Conclusions ....................................................................................... 80 5. A basic metaphysics of mind: the ownness model of the minimal self .... 84 5.1. Introduction ....................................................................................... 84 5.2. The basics of the model ..................................................................... 85 5.2.1. On the presence and character of subjective consciousness ...... 86 5.2.2. On the indivisibility and unity of subjective consciousness ...... 87 5.3. The ownness model: the first-person perspective as the minimal self .. 92 5.4. The ownness model in relation to alternative conceptualizations ..... 93 6. A critique of reductive physicalism .......................................................... 95 6.1. Introductory remarks ......................................................................... 95 6.2. What is reductive physicalism? ......................................................... 96 6.3. Why does reductive physicalism emerge? ........................................ 98 6.4. Which arguments effectively undermine reductive physicalism? ... 102 6.4.1. On eliminative materialism .....................................................