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U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe End of an Era?

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U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe End of an Era? 1. U.S.S.R. AND EASTERN EUROPE END OF AN ERA? T WAS AN UNBELIEVABLE scene: thousands of East and West Gennans Icelebrating together in the early hours of November 10, 1989, many atop the Berlin Wall chipping away pieces of it as souvenirs of the night the East Gennan government lifted all re­ strictions on travel to the West. Nearly 200 East Gennans had been shot trying to cross that wall since it was built in 1961. It was not the first amazing picture to emerge from Eastern Europe. Ever since 1985, when Mikhail S. Gor­ bachev came to power in the Soviet Union, the headlines coming out of Moscow have made jaded Soviet­ watchers sit up and take notice. Instead of Communist propaganda, they were reading uncensored complaints about the Soviet system by Soviet citizens. By 1987, Gorbachev's ambitious plans for restructuring the Soviet economy and democratizing the political system had optimistic Western analysts predicting radical change in the U.S.S.R. By the end of 1989, even many diehard skeptics were confessing to as­ tonishment. The first contested elec­ tions in Soviet history had been held in March , complete with noisy campaign­ ing and upset losses by some of the party 's handpicked candidates. At the new Congress of People's Deputies, delegates criticized one major govern­ ment or Communist party institution after another- including Gorbachev ReutersIBcttmann Newspholos himself-while an estimated 200 mil­ Dismantling the Iron Curtain: Hungarian soldiers on the Austrian border, May /989. lion Soviets sat glu ed to their sets watching the televised proceedings. By Hungary's Communist party dis­ viet leader Gorbachev's personal im ­ the end of the first session of the Con­ solved itself two months later, declared portance to all of these changes. Skepti­ gress, the U.S .S.R. had its first embry­ the country a republic and rewrote its cism about his motives has given way onic opposition group, the Inter­ constitution. Hungary had already to a widespread sense that why he is Regional Group of People's Deputies. started tearing down the barbed-wire encouraging reform matters less than In Eastern Europe (see map, p. I I) Iron Curtain along its border with neu­ how those reforms are transforming the the Communist bloc's first non-Com­ tral Austria in May; East Germany U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe- and re la­ munist government took office in Po­ completed the job six months later. tions with the U.S. "Today," says For­ land in August 1989. It is impossible to overestimate So- eign Policy editor Charles William 6 GREAT DECISIONS 1990 Maynes, "the debate is not about because of inadequate roads, tran sporta­ to energize the Soviet people and enlist whether he is for real, but about tion and storage facilities. Only heavy their help. This required changing the whether he will succeed, whether we government subsidies keep food prices "party line" which for years claimed can, or should, help him, and most of low, and chronic shortages of even the that all was well, suppressing facts that all, whether even if he di sappears to­ most basic daily necessities are a fact of proved otherwise. Gorbachev believes morrow the refanns that he has initiated Soviet life. the "discrepancy between the reality can ever be rolled back." Outside of military and space pro­ and the proclaimed policy" had "bred The New York Times has pro­ grams, most goods and services pro­ public passivity and di sbelief in the nounced the cold-war era ended; others duced in the U.S.S.R. are of poor qual­ slogans being proclaimed." This situ­ think such a watershed is at least within ity and outmoded. (In a single month, ation had to be changed before he could reach and are calling on the U.S. to ad­ exploding Soviet-made televisions restart the stalled economy. With just its Soviet policy accordingly. Still caused 90 apartment fires.) Industrial glasnost, meaning roughly openness or others warn that Gorbachev's political equipment and machinery are old; raw public airing, Gorbachev widened the future is by no means certain. In the materials such as coal and oil are be­ limits of permissible debate in the So­ past year, he has had to deal with wors­ coming more costly to extract and are viet Union to levels unimaginable a few ening economic conditions, paralyzing used wastefully. There is little techno­ years ago. Newspapers and television strikes and violent unrest on the Soviet logical innovation: the world revolution report the news rather than party propa­ periphery. If hi s reforms fail, a conser­ in computers and telecommunications ganda. Reporters attend weekly press vative backlash could lead to renewed of the 1970s and 1980s has bypassed briefings on levels of crime (which had repression within the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet Union, where personal com­ not been reported since 1933), alcohol­ Eastern Europe and a more dangerous puters and even hand calculators are ism and poverty-social ills that Com­ period in U.S.-Soviet relations. still rarities. munist society was supposed to have How should the U.S. respond to the What Soviet citizens do have is a eliminated. Government critics voice changes in the Soviet Union and East­ system that guarantees the majority a their opinions on subjects that would ern Europe? How can it take advantage job, a place to live and subsidized food. have meant a jail sentence not long ago. of the historic opportunities Gorbachev But the poor quality and meager choice Soviet citizens-and the rest of the has presented without running unac­ of consumer goods has created what world-have also been given their first ceptable risks? Gorbachev has called "a gradual ero­ look at official statistics on the size of sion of the ideological and moral values the army and the defense budget, until A society on the ropes of our people." Soviet consumers are now closely guarded state secrets. "Economic restructuring," Gor­ sitting on piles of rubles, worth $30 bil­ The official version of Soviet hi story bachev has written, is "an urgent neces­ lion by some estimates, because there is is being reexamined. Blame for the sity." The Soviet economy had ground nothing to spend them on. Social and country's problems has been publicly almost to a halt by 1985, leaving a physical ills have multiplied. Alcohol­ heaped on Communist party officials, country with the military credentials of ism afflicts an estimated 17 million, both living and dead. Brezhnev is in a superpower and the internal workings most of whom are men. Related to this posthumous disgrace for sending the of a Third World nation: "Upper Volta is a high divorce rate. Life expectancy U.S.S.R. into its "years of stagnation." with rockets," as one saying goes. is declining and the infant mortality rate Nikita S. Khrushchev, Brezhnev's re­ This was not always the case. Joseph is among the highest in the world-four form-minded predecessor who had been Stalin achieved rapid growth for a to five times that in the West---<1ue a "nonperson" since his 1964 mister, while by centralizing all economic ac­ largely to the poor state of health care. has been restored to a place of honor. tivity in the 1930s, enabling him to di­ Some 30% of Soviet hospitals do not Stalin, whose economic success was rect all available resources into heavy have sewage systems; many lack run­ achieved through terror and the murder industry as the first step in a crash ning water. Health problems are aggra­ of millions during the forced collectivi­ modernization program. While much of vated in many places by polluted air zation of agriculture and the purges of the world was mired in the Great De­ and contaminated water. the 1930s, is accused of "enormous and pression, the Soviet gross national prod­ unforgivable" acts of lawlessness. Even uct (GNP) grew 8-9% a year, and eco­ Glasnost Vladimir I. Lenin, the founder of the nomic growth continued at impressive Gorbachev has staked his career on revolution, has come in for some criti­ rates well into the I 950s. Thereafter the reversing these trends without destroy­ cism (though not yet by the top Soviet growth rate slowed, and by the end of ing the economic security that the So­ leadership). The rewriting of history is Leonid I. Brezhnev's 18-year rule in viet system provides for its citizens. At moving so fast in the U.S.S.R. that 1983, it was down to less than 2% a the 27th party congress in late February spring history exams had to be canceled year. Soviet farmers (20% of the Soviet 1986 he laid out a plan to achieve "a in 1988 because Soviet textbooks had Union's 289 million citizens, more new quality of growth: an all-out inten­ not caught up. fanners than in all the Western industri­ sification of production on the basis of Books, films and plays critical of the alized countries and Japan combined) scientific-technical progress." He prom­ Soviet government, banned for years, produce less than one quarter of what ised to double Soviet industrial output are being published, and a number of Western farmers do. A third of Soviet and GNP by the end of the century. imprisoned dissidents have been re­ produce rots in the fields every year To accomplish this, his first task was leased and encouraged to participate in U.S.S.R. AND EASTERN EUROPE 7 the growing debate. Physicist Andrei D. ages of consumer goods are worse than Sakharov, back from exile in Gorki, they have been in 30 years.
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