DOCSLIB.ORG

The National Product of East Germany

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The National Product of East Germany THE NATIONAL PRODUCT OF EAST GERMANY In a recent article1 data and calculations on industrial production and the labor force in Soviet Germany were given. The present article offers similar calculations for the other major sectors of the economy and attempts to make estimates for the major uses of the Gross National Product. Because we are dealing with a Soviet economy it becomes neces- sary to describe the sources on which calculations are based and to explain the methods used in some detail. This has been done in the Appendix (p. I 56 ff.) . OVE R-ALL DEVELOPMENTS Table I gives the result of the calculation of the Gross National Product (GNP) by industrial origin in 1936 and 1950in West German prices. For comparison’s sake the estimates for the GNP of the Federal Republic are also included2. The table includes two alternative estimates for trade. The estimate arrived at by the “employment method” seems preferable to the estimates based on deflation, as explained in the Appendix (pp.I 6016 I ) .Finally, two summations have been made, one which corresponds to the East German concept of the GNP, the other which corresponds to the Western coverage and which includes the services of those people which in Eastern ter- minology are employed in “areas outside of material production”. An attempt has also been made to adjust the GNP of the Federal Republic to correspond to the East German coverage3. I. WOLFGANGF. STOLPER,“Labor Force and Industrial Development in Soviet Germany”, Quarter& Journal of Economics, Vol. 7 I, November I 957, PP. 5 18-545. 2. Only the estimates in 1936 prices, available for the years 1950-1955 are shown. 3. The precise adjustments are described in footnote 4 to Table I, c. The calculations made differ from the normal statistics in that neither actually paid nor imputed rents are included. 132 WOLFGANG F. STOLPER First a brief comment on the relative size of the GNP 1936 in the Federal Republic without West Berlin and in the German Demo- cratic Republic (GDR) including East Berlin. In that year the West German GNP was about 2lI2 times the East German, with the West German population being roughly twice the East German popula- tion. By 1955 the West German population was about three times that in Soviet Germany but the gap in the aggregate GNP had wid- ened. The West German GNP was more than four times the East German GNP. Secondly, if 1955 or 1957 is compared with 1936, the increase in the aggregate GNP was substantially greater in the West than in the East, the Eastern showing being even worse when measured in 1950 than when measured in 1936 prices. There can be no doubt that the per capita product in the GDR was by 1956 barely above 1936 while it was in the Federal Republic substantially above it4. Thirdly, in both the Federal Republic and in the GDR, the in- creases in the GNP between 1955 and 1936 are larger if the East German coverage of the GNP is taken, than when the West German coverage is taken, but the differences are not significant. Fourth, since 1950, the year of the First Five Year Plan, the rates of change are not too different. The GNP of the Federal Republic has increased in 1955 by about 63 lieyoabove 1950. The East German 4. The per capita figures are found on Table 6 (p. 152). During the summer of 1958 I had occasion to discuss my estimates with various gentlemen of the Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung. The over-all results of the estimates made in West Berlin for the post-war years were substantially similar to the estimates presented here. Dr. Abeken and Dr. Kupky pointed out, however, that there was evidence that industrial production in 1936was substantially under- estimated by the census. Thus the growth compared to 1936 of aggregate or per capita GNP would be smaller than the calculations presented indicate. At the time that this is written it is not known to me what the order of magnitude of the required adjustment might be. The reader is, however, advised that West German sources have adjusted the prewar figures for major crops upward by 10% (see Appendix p. 158). This adjustment has already been made in the estimate of agriculture and a similar increase of the estimate for industry would raise the estimated GNP of the GDR (Western coverage) in 1936 from 18.0 billion RM to about 20 billion RM, measured in 1936 prices, which would reduce the aggregate growth between 1956 and 1936 to about 10% as against 15% shown by the calculations in Table I. 1 UU'B 1 The Gross National Product of the German Democratic Republic by Major Sectors, 1936 and 1950-1957 (In Million RM/DM at 1936 and I950 Prices) A. 1936 Prices ~ ~~ Agriculture Transport and Trade Total GNP Industty Year (Including Forestry) Construction Communications (EmploymentMethod) (Eastern Coverage) 2,911.322 I ,020.854 1,372.780 2,208.000 159299.355 '936 7, 786.399 1 I950 2,043.655 5,863.832 445.092 13344.2 I7 1,750.944 11,447.740 I '95' 2,362.229 6,838.070 539.01 1 12479.407 1,702.368 12,921.085 I952 2,647.247 794'7.964 572.699 1,612.232 1,987.200 14,237.342 '953 2,214.997 89577.292 672.742 1,687.135 2,055548 15,207.814 '954 2,231.980 99323.925 745.223 1,836.721 2,115.264 16,253.1 13 7955 22267.747 9,996.399 863.642 1,947.377 2,148.384 179223.549 I956 1,991.162 10,536-985 1,063.730 2,041.938 2,2 10.208 17,844.023 '957 2, I2I .724 I 1,203.013 1,317.973 2,180.642 2,214.624 19,037.966 Index Index Services Index Trade Year 1936 = 100 1950 = IOO (Rough Estimate) (WesternGNP Coverage)' 1936 = loo I~~~~*IOO(Deflation Method) I I 1 I 1 1 1 '936 100.0 '33.7 2,721 18,020 100.0 127.4 I 2,208 I 1 I I 1 I950 74.8 100.0 2,701 78.5 100.0 '95' 84-5 I 13.0 2,660 86.5 110.2 I952 93.1 124.5 2,533 93.1 I 18.6 '953 99.4 132.9 2,574 98.7 125.7 '954 106.2 142.0 2,835 105.9 134.9 '955 112.6 150.5 2,769 110.9 '41.3 I956 I 16.6 '55.9 2,868 1 '4.9 146.4 '957 124.4 166.3 2,894 121.7 155.0 I. Trade included as estimated by employment method. Table I (continued) ~ Agriculture Transport and Trade Total CNP Year Industry Construction (Including Forestry) Communications (EmploymentMethod) (Eastern Coverage) I936 5,575.457 15,668-999 1,995770 1,838.507 39859.584 289938.3 17 '950 49163.995 10,472.226 832.236 13837.472 3,060.650 203368.579 '95' 4,847-190 12,242.140 I ,015.846 2,019.697 2,975-739 23,100.612 I952 5,525.591 13,406.815 1,079.711 2,203.141 3,473.626 25,688.984 '953 4,635.552 151573.300 19247.356 2,306.594 39593.273 279356.075 I '954 4,697.143 16,944.3 16 '7347.145 27512.705 37697.481 297198.790 '955 43872.536 18,025.652 '7536.743 2,674.618 3,755.375 30,864.924 '956 43368.380 '89924.496 2,233.267 2,804. I 5 I 3,863.444 329193.738 '957 4,926.688 20,186.913 29253.214 3,003.684 3,871. '63 343241.672 Index Index Services QNP' Index Index Trade Year = 100 1950 = (Rough Estimate) (Western Coverage) 1936 = IOO = too (Deflation Method) 1 1936 IOO 1950 '936 100.0 142.0 39374 32,312 100.0 I 36.2 3,860 I950 70.4 100.0 39349 23,716 73.4 100.0 3957' '95' 79.8 1 13.4 3,298 26,399 81.7 111.3 4,118 I952 88.8 126.1 3,141 28,830 89.2 121.5 47326 '953 94-5 134.2 32'9' 309547 94.5 I 28.7 4,568 '954 100.9 143.3 39515 32.7'4 101.2 137.9 4,772 I955 I 06.7 151.6 39433 34,298 106.1 '44.6 5,026 I956 I 11.2 I 58.0 3,556 35,750 I 10.6 150.7 5,336 I957 I 18.3 167.6 39589 37983' 117.1 '59.5 5,359 Table I (continued) (In Billion RM/DM at 1936 Prices) C. Federal Rcfiublic' Index Index Index Index Year (Total) GNP' (Adjusted) GNP 1936 = 100 1950 = 100 1936 = 100 1950 - 100 '936 47.928 100.0 87.4 41.188 100.0 90.7 I 100.0 '950 54.845 I '4.4 100.0 45.445 10.3 '95' 62.734 '30.9 I '4.4 53.058 I 28.8 I 16.8 1952 66.664 '39.1 121.6 56.573 '37.4 I 24.6 '953 7 1.556 '49.3 '30.5 60.996 148.1 134.3 '954 77.520 161.7 '41.3 66.536 161.5 '46-4 '955 85.805 179.0 156.4 74.27' 180.3 163.5 3. Stalistischcs Jdrbuch FR., 1956 ed., p.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Dynamics of Soviet–East German Relations in the Early Cold War
    © Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher. INTRODUCTION The Dynamics of Soviet–East German Relations in the Early Cold War The two states that emerged from the defeated Germany were central to the development of the cold war. Rapidly evolving from defeated objects of Four Power policy, the two Germanys became important actors in their own right on the front line of the cold war. Both super- powers initially treated their part of Germany as war booty to be plun- dered and kept weak, but as the cold war developed, they would each come to see their part of Germany as an essential ally whose needs were intertwined with their own. For political, military, economic, and ideo- logical reasons, the superpowers engaged in a competition for allies to show that their side of the cold war was the stronger, more popular, more vibrant one. They also wanted to ensure that their German ally would not unite with the other against them. Beginning in the 1950s, the superpowers invested themselves, and their reputations, increasingly in their German allies, who were adept at taking advantage of this situation. While there have been a variety of in-depth studies of the U.S.–West German alliance,1 there has been much less investigation of the Soviet– East German alliance.2 This book will take advantage of the opening of former communist archives to examine the Soviet–East German side of the cold war from Josef Stalin’s death in 1953 through the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961.
    [Show full text]
  • August 21, 1968 Letter from the Central Committees of The
    Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified August 21, 1968 Letter from the Central Committees of the Bulgarian, East German, Hungarian, Polish, and Soviet Communist Parties regarding the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia Citation: “Letter from the Central Committees of the Bulgarian, East German, Hungarian, Polish, and Soviet Communist Parties regarding the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia,” August 21, 1968, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, ANIC, Fond CC RCP - Chancellery, File No. 133/1968, pp. 27-36. Translated by Delia Razdolescu. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110458 Summary: Letter from the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union explaining the need for intervention in Czechoslovakia. The letter lays out the rationale behind the Brezhnev Doctrine. Original Language: Romanian Contents: English Translation TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY The Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, of the Socialist United Party of Germany, of the Polish United Workers' Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union make it their duty to inform you that most of the members of the Presidium of the C.C. of the C.P. of Czechoslovakia and of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic addressed us the request to grant the Czechoslovak people without delay support in the struggle against the rightist, anti-socialist and counterrevolutionary forces, as in the wake of the developments of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, there appeared a real danger of a counterrevolution and of losing the conquests of socialism.
    [Show full text]
  • Konrad Adenauer and the Cuban Missile Crisis: West German Documents
    SECTION 5: Non-Communist Europe and Israel Konrad Adenauer and the Cuban Missile Crisis: West German Documents access agency, the exchange of mutual non-aggression declara- d. Note: Much like the other NATO allies of the United tions and the establishment of FRG-GDR technical commissions. States, West Germany was not involved in either the ori- Somehow the proposals leaked to the German press, leading gins or the resolution of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.1 Secretary of State Dean Rusk to protest the serious breach of confi- EBut, of course, nowhere in Europe was the immediate impact of dence. Hurt by the accusation, Adenauer withdrew his longstand- Khrushchev’s nuclear missile gamble felt more acutely than in ing confidante and ambassador to Washington, Wilhelm Grewe. Berlin. Ever since the Soviet premier’s November 1958 ultima- Relations went from cool to icy when the chancellor publicly dis- tum, designed to dislodge Western allied forces from the western tanced himself from Washington’s negotiation package at a press sectors of the former German Reich’s capital, Berlin had been the conference in May. By time the missile crisis erupted in October, focus of heightened East-West tensions. Following the building Adenauer’s trust in the United States had been severely shaken.4 of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and the October stand-off The missile crisis spurred a momentary warming in the between Soviet and American tanks at the Checkpoint Charlie uneasy Adenauer-Kennedy relationship. Unlike other European crossing, a deceptive lull had settled over the city.2 allies, Adenauer backed Kennedy’s staunch attitude during the cri- Yet the Berlin question (centering around Western rights sis wholeheartedly, a fact that did not go unnoticed in Washington.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 the Wall of Words: Radio and the Construction of the Berlin Wall Kate
    The Wall of Words: Radio and the construction of the Berlin Wall Kate Lacey, University of Sussex This paper draws on the BBC monitoring reports of radio stations in the West and East to examine how the building of the Berlin Wall was discursively constructed in the weeks leading up to the overnight closure of the inner city frontier on 13 August 1961. It draws specifically on files relating to broadcasts from both East and West Germany over the summer months to see how the closure of the frontier hung in the airwaves. Background Of course the story of the postwar division of Germany and its capital Berlin into 4 zones is very well known, as is the fact that there had been growing tension and repeated flashpoints as the Cold War set in, from the Soviet blockade of the Western sectors of Berlin and the Berlin Airlift in 1948 that saw the end of the joint administration and led to the foundation in 1949 of the two German states. East Berlin remained as capital of the German Democratic Republic, while the capital of the Federal Republic moved to Bonn, leaving West Berlin formally to remain a territory under Allied supervision, but with open borders to the East. In May 1953 the border was closed between East and West Germany, but not between the two halves of Berlin. Five years later, Kruschchev claimed that Bonn had ‘erected a wall between the two parts of Germany’ (Wilke, p.149) and delivered his Berlin Ultimatum, demanding the withdrawal of Western troops from West Berlin so that Berlin could become a ‘free city’ in a move towards a confederation of the two Germanies.
    [Show full text]
  • Download the Publication
    COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT WORKING PAPER #54 Sino-Hungarian Relations and the 1956 Revolution By Péter Vámos November 2006 THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT WORKING PAPER SERIES Christian F. Ostermann, Series Editor This paper is one of a series of Working Papers published by the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. Established in 1991 by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War as it emerges from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side” of the post-World War II superpower rivalry. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to accelerate the process of integrating new sources, materials and perspectives from the former “Communist bloc” with the historiography of the Cold War which has been written over the past few decades largely by Western scholars reliant on Western archival sources. It also seeks to transcend barriers of language, geography, and regional specialization to create new links among scholars interested in Cold War history. Among the activities undertaken by the project to promote this aim are a periodic BULLETIN to disseminate new findings, views, and activities pertaining to Cold War history; a fellowship program for young historians from the former Communist bloc to conduct archival research and study Cold War history in the United States; international scholarly meetings, conferences, and seminars; and publications.
    [Show full text]
  • The Berlin Wall: Life, Death and the Spatial Heritage of Berlin Gérard-François Dumont
    The Berlin Wall: Life, Death and the Spatial Heritage of Berlin Gérard-François Dumont To cite this version: Gérard-François Dumont. The Berlin Wall: Life, Death and the Spatial Heritage of Berlin. History Matters, 2009, pp.1-10. halshs-01446296 HAL Id: halshs-01446296 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01446296 Submitted on 25 Jan 2017 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. HOME ABOUT FEATURES BOOK REVIEWS PODCASTS EXHIBITS CONTACT The Berlin Wall: Life, Death and the Spatial Heritage of Berlin By Rector Gérard-François Dumont Professor at the University of Paris-Sorbonne Chairman of the Journal Population & Avenir Translated by Thomas Peace, York University Abstract Introduction Before the wall: Demographic haemorrhage Much more than a wall Crossing the Great Wall Death of the wall Is the wall still present? Berlin’s spatial paradox Further Reading Abstract Walls that divide are meant to be broken down. Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the legacy of the East-West division can still be seen in the city’s architecture, economy and overall culture. This paper examines Berlin’s spatial and political history from the wall’s beginnings to the long-term repercussions still being felt today.
    [Show full text]
  • Economic Development of Comecon Countries
    Munich Personal RePEc Archive Economic development of Comecon countries Dumitriu, Ramona and Stefanescu, Răzvan Dunarea de Jos University of Galati, Dunarea de Jos University of Galati 28 September 2015 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/89012/ MPRA Paper No. 89012, posted 15 Sep 2018 06:57 UTC VANGUARD SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS IN MANAGEMENT, vol. 12, no. 1, 2016, ISSN 1314-0582 Economic Development of Comecon Countries Ramona Dumitriu, Razvan Stefanescu Abstract: In 1949, Soviet Union and some of its satellites created Comecon with the announced goal to facilitate economic cooperation between the socialist countries. The inefficiency of socialist systems affected the performances of Comecon members. However, the analysis of economic development from some of these countries should take into consideration the substantial subsidies received from other Comecon members. Keywords: Economic Development; Comecon; Socialist Systems JEL: N10, O10, O20, P20, P36 1. INTRODUCTION The concept of economic development is aproached from various perspectives in the specialized literature. The Human Development Report 1990, elaborated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), defines the basic objective of economic development as “to create an environment for people to enjoy long, wealthy and creative lives” (UNDP, 1990). This objective is linked to the quality of life which is evaluated by various indicators: life expectancy, level of nutrition, literacy rates etc. (Birdsall, 1993; Easterlin, 1995; Easterlin, 2000; Alkire, 2002; Veenhoven & Hagerty, 2006; Easterlin & Angelescu, 2012). Sen (2001) included freedom among the main dimensions of the economic development. Todaro & Smith (2012) proposed three aspects to characterize the economic development: - increase of living conditions; - improvement of the citizens self-esteem needs; - free and just society.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction CSCE, the German Question, and the Eastern Bloc
    Introduction CSCE, the German Question, and the Eastern Bloc ✣ Gottfried Niedhart During a visit to Israel in June 1973, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt spoke at the Weizmann Institute in Jerusalem about the development of East-West relations. As always, he emphasized the gradual nature of his own approach. A “sustainable peace policy” was to him no “project of large leaps.” Instead, he described his own policy as one of “small, progressing steps.” Even the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was about to start in Helsinki in the summer of 1973 and comprised all European states (with the exception of Albania) plus Canada and the United States, should not lead to “wishful thinking,” Brandt declared. “And yet, who would have dared to predict a decade ago that a conference of such constructive substance was taking shape!”1 The preceding years—the early 1970s—had witnessed a new form of rapprochement between East and West in general and between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the member-states of the Warsaw Pact in particular. Although this new form of interaction did not eliminate the fundamental conflict between East and West, it did change the mode and framework in which the conflict was to be conducted from then on. The Final Act of the CSCE, signed in Helsinki on 1 August 1975 by 35 national leaders, was an expression of this change: “It was there that Europe’s postwar era finally came to an end.”2 This document defined the principles that ought to guide all relations and interactions among the signatory states.
    [Show full text]
  • Stories Behind the Berlin Wall: Lesson Modules
    Utah State University DigitalCommons@USU All Graduate Plan B and other Reports Graduate Studies 5-2018 Stories Behind the Berlin Wall: Lesson Modules Nicholas Redmon Utah State University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports Part of the Cultural History Commons, Eastern European Studies Commons, European History Commons, Geographic Information Sciences Commons, German Literature Commons, Human Geography Commons, Secondary Education Commons, and the Social History Commons Recommended Citation Redmon, Nicholas, "Stories Behind the Berlin Wall: Lesson Modules" (2018). All Graduate Plan B and other Reports. 1200. https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports/1200 This Creative Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at DigitalCommons@USU. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Graduate Plan B and other Reports by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ! 1! !! ! ! ! ! Stories!Behind!the!Berlin!Wall:!Lesson!Modules! Nicholas!Redmon! Utah!State!University! November!18,!2017! ! ! ! 2! Introduction!to!Lesson!Module! This!website!is!a!collection!of!primary!documents!focused!in!three!pivotal!years,! 1961,!or!at!the!construction!of!the!Wall,!1980,!almost!two!decades!into!the!midst!of! German!Democratic!Republic!(GDR!or!East!Germany)!since!the!Wall’s!erection,!and!1989,! as!the!Wall!is!brought!down.!This!component!on!the!website!is!a!lesson!module,!which!is!a! road!map!for!teachers!and!students!studying!what!life!was!like!in!the!GDR,!behind!the!
    [Show full text]
  • The London School of Economics and Political Science Defying Moscow
    The London School of Economics and Political Science Defying Moscow, engaging Beijing: The German Democratic Republic’s relations with the People’s Republic of China, 1980-1989 Zhong Zhong Chen A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, June 2014 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 87,593 words. Abbreviations BA Bundesarchiv, Berlin BStU Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik CAAC Civil Aviation Administration of China CC Central Committee CCP Chinese Communist Party CDU Christlich Demokratische Union CIA Central Intelligence Agency CoCom Coordinating Committee on multilateral exports control COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance CPGB Communist Party of Great Britain CPSU Communist Party of the
    [Show full text]
  • AQA GCSE History End of Year Exam Revision Unit 1
    AQA GCSE History End of Year Exam Revision Unit 1 International Relations: Conflict and Peace in the 20th Century International Relations Topics International Relations Topics 1. The origins of the Cold War 1945-55 How close was the world to war in the 1960s? Why did the USA & USSR become rivals in the years 1945-49? The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 Ideological differences between the USA & USSR. Czechoslovakia, 1968 Yalta & Potsdam The Brezhnev Doctrine The Iron Curtain (Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe) 3. Failure of détente and the collapse of Communism 1970-91 The Truman Doctrine Why did détente collapse in the 1970s and 1980s? The Marshall Plan Cominform & Comecon Détente The Berlin Blockade & Airlift The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan Ronald Reagan How did the Cold War develop 1949-55? Solidarity NATO Why did Communism collapse in Central & Eastern Europe? The Arms Race The Korean War Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan The Warsaw Pact Reagan Solidarity Death of Stalin, Khrushchev & the „thaw‟ in the Cold War Policies of Gorbachev The revolutions in Eastern Europe & the fall of the 2. Crises of the Cold War 1955-70 Berlin Wall The fall of Gorbachev & the break-up of the USSR How peaceful was peaceful was peaceful coexistence? Khrushchev‟s policies (destalinisation & peaceful coexistence). Hungary 1956 The arms race The space race The U2 Crisis The Berlin Wall The Exam Paper The Exam Questions There will be 6 questions on the exam paper: Each question has 3 parts and will be laid out in the format below: 1. The Origins of the First World War.
    [Show full text]
  • [Laos, East Germany, Berlin, Cuba, Vietnam], August 23, 1962
    · THE PRESIDENT'S IN:tELLIGENCE CHECKLIST / I i DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL 23 AUGUST 1962 E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3) I Tep 6EERET ISCAP No. 20 (\ -O~ ,document I¥::>· ., ~ Guf{ of Tonkin • PhoL'mi Forces Bose p,reas D iV-eo Base )\reas ., Kong Le/Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese Base Areas Road Trail ® Route number Miles , ! ,I __ , 1. Laos a. Souvanna told Ambassador Unger Wednesday evening (Vientiane time)6f an apparent agreement with Souphannou~ vong for one ICC check.point at Nhommarath in the area under Pathet Lao control. A firm decision was "expected" Thursday. According to a late press report this morning, there is also to be a checkpoint on the Plaine des Jarres for "North Vietnamese laborers and technicians." b. With respect to Nhommarath, Souphannouvong may have been delaying in order to permit North Vietnamese troops in. this particular area to clear out. Six days ago, Kong Le's unit at Nhommarath reported that the North Vietnamese there would b.e gOing home on the 19th, 20th and 21st, and . terday th'e unit reported that the V se h'ad "left the region.", I E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(I) c. Chinese Communist activities and intentions in Phong Sa1y province in northern Laos are increasingly puzzling. Several days ago we had a Lao neutralist report from Phong Sa1y that Chinese Communist troops--from the road building group-.. armed wi th mortars and artillery were deployed at Muong Yo and Boun Neua and had built several fortified positions.
    [Show full text]