The terrain was free for fresh and authentic nationalist initiatives. The cultural and political situation was ripe for them. There was no reason for surprise that exactly a relatively less known “new face” could fill in the vacuum left by the absence of an influential formation with a strong nationalist profile in Bulgarian political life. The man who properly under- stood the moment and caught it was Volen Siderov.

The strategic “20 points…” clearly testify for the truly populist and unrealistic political strategy of the Ataka party and its leader. If the points would have been widely read and understood – the political success of Ataka and Siderov would be questionable. What is unquestionable is only the electoral outcome.

The phenomenon “Ataka” has become only possible after some major causes of a long lasting national crisis have been eliminated. This applies first of all to the resolution of strategic tasks of the international security of the country. In the current geostrategic context they could be resolved with the country’s membership in NATO and in the European Union. Now it is possible to speak loudly out what has been long kept silent under the regime of political correctness required by the circumstances.

It was not the acute crisis which brought about the allegedly surpris- ing appearance of the radical nationalism in Bulgarian political life. To the contrary, it was the relative stabilization of Bulgarian domestic eco- nomic and political life which made this possible. However, the stabiliza- tion made Ataka possible since the stabilization has been achieved and is being reproduced under precarious conditions.

March 2010 Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria 1

Contents

1. Changing Social and Ideological Backgrounds of Nationalism...... 2 2. Volen Siderov and the Ataka Party...... 11 3. Ataka in the Environment of Bulgarian Politics...... 16 4. New Reasons and Long-term Causes of Nationalist Fashions...... 22 2 Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria

RADICAL NATIONALISM tion only with scandalous news about du- IN CONTEMPORARY BULGARIA1 bious symbols, traffic accidents, personal quarrels and organizational instabilities. 1. Changing Social and Ideological Due to organizational splits, the party’s Backgrounds of Nationalism parliamentary group could not survive till the next general elections. The representa- The parliamentary elections held in 2005 tives of Ataka in the European Parliament marked the appearance of a new phenom- were most efficient in speeches causing enon in the political landscape of demo- interethnic tensions. Nevertheless, in June cratic Bulgaria. For the first time a mani- 2009 the party managed to repeat its suc- festly nationalist coalition called Ataka en- cess in the European elections by send- tered the National Assembly. The surprise ing two representatives to the European was overwhelming since the coalition was Parliament. Even more important was the set up only short before the elections. result achieved in the Parliamentary elec- Soon thereafter it was re-organized in a tions held in July 2009. Ataka received party with Volen Siderov as its leader. The 9.36 per cent of the valid votes (8.14% next surprise was the personal success of in 2005) and took 21 seats in the new Siderov in the Presidential elections held in Parliament. Before and after the elections 2006. Using populist anti-corruption slo- there were talks about possible participa- gans together with anti-Turk and anti-Ro- tion of the party in coalition governments. ma rhetoric he managed to attract the re- The major common ground for the poten- spectable 24% of the votes at the second tial coalition with the GERB party was the round of the elections against the popular similar nationalist assessment of the inter- incumbent Georgi Parvanov. The national ethnic relations in the country by Ataka and international media reported about and GERB. Besides that, both parties used the appearance of a Le-Pen-like political to similarly define their political orienta- figure in Bulgaria. This opinion seemed to tion as belonging to the right side of the be fully corroborated by the performance political spectrum.2 of Siderov and Ataka in the next elections This powerful rise of politically orga- for the European Parliament in 2007. The nized and manifestly right-wing national- party sent 3 MEPs who joined the right- ism represented by Ataka requires close wing parliamentary group Identity, Tradi- scrutiny since no right-wing political group tion and Sovereignty in the Parliament. or movement could be so successful in These remarkable electoral achieve- circulating nationalist slogans in Bulgaria ments notwithstanding, Siderov and his after 1989. Somewhat paradoxically, the party fellows used to attract public atten- influential nationalist groups consisted of members and followers of the supposed- 1 This paper was prepared in the framework of the project „Right-wing extremism and its impact on young democracies in to-be left-wing Bulgarian Communist Par- the CEE-countries”, coordinated by the Budapest Office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. A first draft was presented at the confer- ence „Right-Wing Extremism in CEE-Countries and in Germany: 2 See Hein, Michael (2009) ’Die Europa- und Parlamentswahlen A Danger for Democracy?”, held in Budapest, 27 November 2009 2009 in Bulgarien’. Südosteuropa Mitteilungen, N 5, S. 59. Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria 3 ty which was re-named Bulgarian Socialist motive of its organizers was related to the Party (BSP) in 1990. The major media of need for nationalist legitimacy of the rul- the left-wing nationalist groups was and ing position of the Communist Party and still remains the newspaper “Nova Zora” its leadership. The nationalist legitimacy (“New Dawn”).3 The explanation of this was urgently needed in the seventies and national specific has to do with the influ- eighties since the Communist ideology ential perception of the Bulgarian Com- could no more efficiently function as a munist Party and its successor BSP as a factor of personal identification and polit- representative of national interests. This ical mobilization. The official ideology was was not due to BCP’s international politics less and less able to function as a crucial at all. It had been consequently dominat- factor of the value-normative integration ed by Soviet interests. The major reason of Bulgarian society as well. for this perception was the assimilationist The Bulgarian Communist Party was policy of the Communist Party concern- no exception in Eastern Europe in its ef- ing the ethnic minorities in the country. forts to achieve ethnic homogenization in This policy was particularly intensive dur- order to get political legitimacy. The eth- ing the seventies and the eighties of the nic homogenization in Poland after 1945 twentieth century. The peak of the mea- was due to decisions of foreign powers. sures aiming at assimilation of the ethnic Nevertheless, it was widely used for sub- minorities was the forceful campaign for stantiating the legitimacy of the rule of changing the Turkish-Arabic names of the the Polish United Workers Party. Nicolae Bulgarian Turks to Christian-Slavic names Ceauºescu applied the same policy of in 1984-1985. ethnic homogenization for the same pur- The campaign became popular as “re- poses in Romania. In various ideological vival process”. Its official claim was the re- forms and in a variety of policies nation- vitalization of the presumably lost Bulgar- alism had become a key ideological fac- ian ethnic identity of the Turkish speak- tor of political life in all Eastern European ing people living in the country. Thus, countries. Thus, the revival of Bulgarian the manifest policy aimed at the ethnic nationalism by the Bulgarian Communist homogenization of the Bulgarian nation. Party was a local manifestation of the ef- Due to historical reasons connected with forts of the Eastern European ruling Com- the centuries-long Ottoman rule on the munist parties to fill in with nationalism territory of present-day Bulgaria, the pol- the ideological vacuum. It emerged after icy was so understood and therefore sup- the proletarian and later socialist interna- ported by large segments of ethnic Bulgar- tionalism was obviously losing its mobilis- ians. They did not recognise the complex- ing and socially-integrating power. ity of motives which caused the “revival Together with other historical circum- process”. In reality, the major background stances, it was the image of a factor of ethnic nationalism which helped the BCP 3 See http://www.novazora.net/archive.html. The left-wing intel- lectuals contributing to the newspaper later established their own and later the BSP to adapt to the changes political party under the same name Nova Zora (New Dawn). 4 Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria

after 1989. The political and ideological strong mobilizing effects which they used mixture of communist egalitarianism with to have in the eighties and the early nine- Bulgarian nationalism made it possible ties in many other societies belonging to that the Bulgarian Socialist Party won the former Eastern Europe. nearly half of the votes in the first demo- Most leaders of the emerging anti- cratic elections held in June 1990. In this communist Bulgarian opposition were specific context the re-vitalization of the sensitive to this historical heritage and pro-fascist war-time radical nationalism of did not lay the stress on anti-Russian na- the “National Legions” and of other small tionalist appeals. The famous proposal by groups was doomed to fail. This was not Stoyan Ganev4 to sue the Soviet Union only due to the nationalist profile of the and later Russia for anti-Bulgarian policies BCP / BSP and its continuing strong in- could not be taken seriously. The leaders stitutional presence in Bulgarian political of the emerging opposition also knew life. Some deeper historical reasons were well that nationalistic slogans and poli- connected with the re-establishment of cies concerning neighbouring countries the Bulgarian statehood in 1878 as the and people as well as towards ethnic mi- outcome of a Russian-Turkish war. This norities in the country itself could not be historical fact had its impacts on the pub- well received by governments and other lic attitudes towards Russia and later to- influential organizations in Western Eu- wards the Soviet Union. The anti-commu- rope and North America. Since they gen- nist and pro-fascist ideologies and poli- erously supported the belated emergence cies in Bulgaria between the two World of the Bulgarian anti-communist opposi- Wars and particularly during the Second tion, it had to understand their fears that World War did not change these basically the political changes may go out of con- positive attitudes substantially. The influ- trol if they would become guided by radi- ence of these attitudes determined the cal nationalist ideas. Therefore, the major position of Bulgaria in the war of Ger- leaders of the anti-communist opposition many against the Soviet Union. The coun- had only one choice. They had to present try was the only German ally which did themselves as liberal cosmopolitans fo- not send troops to the Eastern Front. No cusing their propaganda and policies on widespread feeling of Soviet military oc- the universal human rights which were cupation could develop after the Second suppressed under the rule of the Commu- World War since there was only a short nist Party. The strong manifest stress on presence of Soviet troops in the country. national interests or on patriotic feelings Consequently, it was difficult to develop was not regarded as politically correct in influential anti-communist propaganda the moment. It was politically correct to and policy on anti-Russian nationalist ba- mention the national interests by passing sis in Bulgaria after the political changes and then to underline the future material in 1989. There were certainly slogans of this type, but they did not have the same 4 Stoyan Ganev was minister of foreign affairs in the Philip Dimitrov’s government of the Union of Democratic Forces (1991-1992). Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria 5 prosperity under the conditions of liberal and religious organizations of the Bulgar- free markets, democratic politics and re- ian Turks and the Muslims in the country. spect of human rights. Contrary to some expectations and fears, Thus, in a striking difference to the op- they did not abuse the political instability positional forces and policies in most oth- for revenge or excessive aspirations. This er former socialist countries the leaders of held particularly true for the Turkish based the major right-wing coalition Union of Movement for Rights and Freedoms es- Democratic Forces5 had to be very care- tablished at the very beginning of 1990.6 ful about their reference to nationalist slo- The profound political changes and gans and policies. In this ideological and the cultural uncertainty facilitated the ap- political context the re-established nation- pearance of numerous groups of militant alist organization of the right-wing war- nationalists with a right-wing political ori- time “National Legions” had no chance. entation like the Bulgarian National Revo- It had to join the Union of the Democrat- lutionary Party headed by Dr. Ivan Geor- ic Forces by following the appeal of the giev, the Bulgarian Christian-Democratic common anti-communist ideology and Party with leader Georgi Gelemenov and the advice of the international political ex- others.7 In spite of the efforts of their perts. However, the handful of rather old leaders to achieve publicity by organiz- activists of the Legions like Ivan Dochev ing nationalist manifestations and other was fully marginalized in the Union by the events, these groups and parties remained numerous young, dynamic and ambitious small in numbers and marginal in Bulgar- representatives of the emerging political ian political life. Nationalist emotions and counter-elite. They were pressed by the expectations were connected with the local and international circumstances to re-establishment of the Internal Macedo- avoid nationalism and to choose the pro- nian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO). file of liberals and cosmopolitans. Before the First World War and between This development had some positive the two world wars the organization was consequences. The manifest non-nation- internationally known as an incorporation alist liberalism of the major anti-com- of militant Bulgarian nationalist ideology munist political forces together with the and politics. However, despite its influ- careful policies of the BCP/BSP prevented ence in the South-West of the country potential inter-ethnic tensions. They were and among some groups of the Bulgar- very much possible given the difficult heri- ian youth, the re-vitalized VMRO did not tage of the “revival process” and the in- manage to establish itself as a stable and tensive grass-roots nationalist protests fol- 6 The protests facilitated the establishment of the left-national- lowing its condemnation at the beginning ist Obshtonaroden komitet za zashtita na natsionalnite interesi [All-peoples’s Committee for Defence of National Interests] of the democratization process. The pres- OKZNI in December 1989. On its part, it accelerated the es- tablishment of the Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms ervation of the ethnic peace became also under the leadership of Ahmed Dogan. See about the „Revival Process” and its consequences Human Dvelopment Report. possible due to the policies of the ethnic Bulgaria 1997 (1997) Sofia: UNDP, pp. 49-59. 7 See Yordanov, Ruslan (2002) ’Tyachnata borba’ [Their Strug- 5 The coalition was established in December 1989. gle]. Tema, N 19 (32), 13-22 May. 6 Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria

influential political force in its own under In the same time, the very economic the new democratic conditions. Its leader- and political processes raised profound ship moved in the direction of establishing challenges and required clear positioning or supporting dubious coalitions which of the political forces. They had to make undermined the trust in it in the long run.8 manifest their visions about the aims and The predominance of left-wingers in means of the national development and the nationalist camp continued till the the national interests in dynamic and end of the nineties of the last century. controversial transformations. The priva- The left-wing organizations and their tization of the state owned productive slogans gradually lost influence after the and infrastructural assets was definitely economic and political turbulences in needed in order to facilitate the partici- 1996-1997. Thereafter the new leaders pation of the country in the international of the Socialist Party re-oriented its pro- division of labour, to increase productivity gramme and policies towards social-dem- and the general efficiency of the national ocratic and in many respects even liberal economy. However, was the privatization ideas and political practices. Some traces generally and in important particular cases of the nationalist traditions of the party really carried out in accordance with the could be recognized in its reaction to the national interests? Was it necessary to sell Kosovo-War. These traces disappeared in the national air carrier “Balkan” for a rath- the course of the country’s negotiations er modest price at a bid with practically for membership in the NATO and in the one bidder in 1999? The question was European Union. Both governments of and remains subject of heated debates Ivan Kostov (1997-2001) and of Simeon since it was known that the selected in- Saxe-Coburggotski (2001-2005) propa- ternational bidder used to buy air carriers gated and practiced economic and politi- cheaply only with the intention to sell out cal neo-liberalism and tried to avoid any their property dear. This was what actually manifest expression of nationalist ideol- happened immediately after the deal. Fac- ogy and policies. Thus, under the pressure ing the harsh facts, the new government of international circumstances neither the of Saxe-Coburggotski was pressed by the political left nor the political right or any circumstances to buy the national air car- centrist political formation in the country rier back (to re-nationalize it). The financial wanted to be identified with nationalism loss for the country was substantial. There- or even with any special stress on national after, the company was sold to a Bulgarian interests. Nevertheless, all of them paid holding by the next government. lip-services to the national interests in pre- The scandalous story with the privati- senting their electoral platforms and in zation of the national air carrier “Balkan” the public discussion on their policies. was just one of many similar stories ac- companying the privatization of large enterprises like the chemical plant “Pla- 8 See Karasimeonov, Georgi (2003) Novata partiyna sistema v Balgariya [The New Party System in Bulgaria]. Sofia: Gorex ma” in Pleven, the metallurgical plant Press, pp. 178-179. Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria 7

“Kremikovtsi” near Sofia or the shipyard nomenclatura and their involvement in in Varna. It was most natural that the privatization deals, illegal capital accumu- Bulgarian public wanted and still wants lation and capital transfers to other coun- to know how the national interests have tries.10 Recent investigations lay the stress been taken into account in these and in much less on any specific political colour other major privatization deals. They be- of the shadow and criminal networks. came subject of public debates at national More important is their omnipresence in level. Numerous scandals concerning the the country as well as their long-term de- privatization of smaller enterprises pro- structive impacts on the functioning of voked bitter reactions at regional or local the national economy, state institutions levels in the country. The public outrage and on the culture of trust in Bulgarian was typically directed against people or society.11 This is the way in which the net- groups who managed to unfairly privatize works under scrutiny are predominantly or just rob the public property. Other tar- perceived by the public mind in the coun- gets of public outrage were state admin- try nowadays. The public outrage against istrators who allowed the looting of state them is understandable. property since they were under the sus- The issue of economic and general picion to be generally corrupt. There is a crime was widely conceived by the pub- widespread public opinion in the country lic mind as the major risk facing Bulgar- that the process has been mostly carried ian society during the nineties. In reality, it out by tightly organized legal, semi-legal just became the major indicator of various or directly criminal networks of entrepre- negative effects of the profound re-distri- neurs, politicians and state functionar- bution of property, political influence and ies.9 The suspicion is also widespread that prestige in the country. Other indicators there were and still are well established were the mass and particularly the long- links between national and international term unemployment, the dramatic impov- networks facilitating the fast enrichment erishment of large segments of Bulgarian of mediators and the transfer of property society and the emigration of hundreds of rights and profits from Bulgaria to other thousands mostly young, well educated countries under unfavourable conditions and entrepreneurial Bulgarians. Being in- for Bulgaria. terrelated, all these processes have been The assumptions and suspicions about typically perceived as a national catastro- the looting of national property used to phe during the nineties. Thus, the nega- find support in rumours as well as in do- tive evaluation of the profound changes mestic and international publications. of Bulgarian society quickly replaced the Until recently the journalists were mostly positive expectations which were charac- attracted by the networks of the former teristic for the first months of the transi-

9 See about the phenomenon of legal, semi-legal and criminal 10 Mappes-Niediek, Norbert (2003) Balkan-Mafia. Berlin: Chris- networking in the development of the „second capitalism” in toph Links Verlag, pp. 80-85. Bulgaria Mrezhite na prehoda [The Networks of the Transition] 11 See Roth, Jürgen (2008) Novite balgarski demoni [The New (2008) Sofia: Iztok-zapad. Bulgarian Demons]. Sofia:S lantse. 8 Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria

tion towards market economy and demo- rations of required documents. Moreover, cratic political institutions. the speed of negotiations had to be high The re-establishment of positive atti- in order not to loose the momentum. The tudes towards the reforms started some processes after 2007 made it clear that ten years later with the first signs of eco- there was already a negative attitude to- nomic recovery and political stabilization. wards the EU enlargement accumulating However, the process has been slow and in the Western European societies. The regularly interrupted by scandals con- rising scepticism or even negative attitude cerning economic mismanagement, cor- towards further enlargement of the EU- ruption, inefficiency of state institutions, 25 could prevent the accession of Bulgaria convulsions in the national political life to the EU for a while. Last but not least, and uncertainties concerning the na- due to numerous historical, cultural, geo- tional history and identity.12 More specifi- strategic, economic and even geographic cally, uncertainties accompanied the new reasons Bulgaria did not have the negoti- definition of the aims and means of the ating power of Poland or of the Czech Re- geostrategic re-orientation of the country. public. Given these conditions, intensive Unlike the negotiations with Poland or public debates could probably bring even with the Czech Republic, the negotiations harm to the process. of the European Commission with Bul- Whatever the line of argumentation, garia for its membership in the European the open question remained floating in Union were completed practically without the air: Was the Bulgarian national interest any serious public debate. The informa- well represented and taken into account tion which leaked to the public through during the negotiations for membership of the mass media concerned the opening the country in the European Union and in and the closure of “chapters” for nego- the outcomes of the negotiations? In one tiation as a rule. What the content of the case at least, the national public mind be- “chapters” and of the negotiations was came well informed and was unanimous: – this remained a black box for the public The closure of reactors of the Kozloduy in the country. There were some reason- nuclear power plant as an outcome of the able excuses for this manner of negotia- negotiations for membership in the Euro- tions carried out in closed circles. Most pean Union was definitely a decision taken issues to be negotiated were so complex against the national interests. that only specialists could meaningfully The negotiations of Bulgaria for mem- discuss them. The speed of the negotia- bership in NATO and the accession of the tions was often rather hasty because of country to the Alliance was still another the inefficiency of the Bulgarian bureau- crucial turn in Bulgaria’s geo-political re- cracy which used to protract the prepa- orientation. In the beginning of the nine- ties this very idea seemed to be ridiculous.

12 See Kalinova, Evgeniya and Iskra Baeva (2002) Balgarskite Some ten years later even the Socialist prehodi 1939-2002 [The Bulgarian Transitions 1939-2002]. So- Party did not have objections against the fia: Paradigma, p. 242 f. Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria 9 conditions for membership of Bulgaria in ing in accordance with the Constitution. the NATO. The issue became the topic of Whatever the circumstances of the tak- only sporadic public debates. They were ing of this decision might be, it should be mostly focused on domestic matters like respected. Nevertheless, many questions the re-orientation of BSP in the interna- concerning the ethnic connection of the tional politics. The most profound issues Movement still deserve discussion. The concerning the national security and the most serious open question concerns the long-term national interests were hardly very compliance of the so established po- discussed in a manner one may assume litical model of ethnic representation with the issues would deserve. the long-term national interests. This and Last but not least, there has been a many other questions concerning the ac- highly sensitive topic of partly domestic tivities of the MRF have accompanied the and partly international relevance which whole period of the democratic develop- has accompanied all discussions concern- ment of the country. They were usually ing the national interests. This was and based on the assumption that this model remains the topic of the representation of political representation would be in- of the ethnic minorities in the political acceptable in constitutional and institu- decision-making, in the implementation tional terms in traditional democratic so- and in the control of political decisions cieties. Various debates have taken place at national and local level. So far, the rel- about the alleged involvement of MRF evance of the topic refers mostly to the functionaries and particularly of its leader political representation and participation Ahmed Dogan in questionable economic of the Turkish ethnic minority. Since the and political deals. beginning of the political changes this Thus, given the obvious presence, in- representation has been practically mo- tensity, complexity and relevance of issues nopolized by the Movement for Rights concerning the national security, national and Freedoms. It is a public secret that the interests and everyday problems facing Movement is an ethnically based political millions of people in Bulgaria one could party with religiously motivated voters. only wonder how it was so long possible This situation obviously contradicts Art. not to have influential nationalist politi- 11 (4) of the democratic Constitution of cal forces in the country. All neighbour- Bulgaria passed on 12.07.1991: “There ing post-socialist countries had or have shall be no political parties on ethnic, ra- such forces in their Parliaments – Romania cial or religious lines...”.13 There was a de- Mare, the Serbian Radical Party and VM- cision of the Constitutional Court which RO-DPMNE in Macedonia. In contrast, in defined the Movement for Rights and Bulgaria openly nationalist slogans were Freedoms as established and function- only sporadically made public by indi- viduals like the populist politician Zhorzh Ganchev or the poet Rumen Leonidov. 13 See Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, http://www. parliament.bg/?page=const&lng=en. The situation became particularly strik- 10 Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria

ing at the beginning of the new century gration became the typical reaction to the since all the socialist, the conservative and unemployment and poverty. Crime and the liberal political platforms and politi- general insecurity used to dominate every- cal actions had already disappointed the day life during the nineties and partly later Bulgarian voters several times. The same on. All changing governments seemed to turned out to apply to the political plat- be ready to comply with all requirements form and the policies of the highly per- of the new international patrons what- sonalized government of the former king ever the implications for Bulgarian people Simeon Saxe-Coburggotski. He came to and the Bulgarian state might be. Large power on the wake of a typical convulsion parts of Bulgarian economy and particu- of Bulgarian political life. The convulsion larly the banking system got under full for- was due to the public disappointment of eign control. One could only ask himself the outcomes of the government of the or herself about the very possibility of a Union of Democratic Forces (1997-2001). national economic policy given the nearly The expectations were high that the for- full ownership of the banks in Bulgaria by mer king and his government would re- the foreign capital. Against this experience ally carry out strong and efficient policies the feeling that a pro-nationalist ideology focused on the international representa- and politics might change the situation for tion and domestic implementation of na- better became widespread. But there was tional interests in the broadest sense of no influential political figure and attractive the word. Most probably, Simeon Saxe- nationalist political formation in sight. In Coburggotski really had such intentions objective scientific terms this was a para- together with some others. However, at doxical situation. The lack of explicitly na- the end of his mandate in 2005 the pub- tionalist and influential political actor(s) lic disappointment with the performance became obvious. of his government was tremendous. This The former Prime Minister Ivan Kostov was somewhat surprising given some ob- rightly understood the specifics of the cul- vious achievements of the government in tural and political moment. After his elec- the economic, political and cultural sta- toral defeat in 2001 he left the liberal Union bilization of Bulgarian society and in the of Democratic Forces and founded his own improvement of its international position. party “Democrats for strong Bulgaria”. The major reason for the disappoint- Then he immediately started a vociferous ments and for the accompanying electoral campaign against the Movement for Rights convulsions in Bulgarian politics was sim- and Freedoms dominated by ethnic Turks. ple. Neither the socialist and conservative The campaign was particularly focused on governments nor the government of the the economic and political activities of the former king managed to substantially im- leader of the Movement Ahmed Dogan. prove the standard of living and the qual- Taking these activities too seriously, some ity of life of large groups of the impover- analysts were quick to predict that Kostov ished population of the country. Mass emi- would fast and massively capitalize on the Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria 11 strong but disoriented nationalist political There he used to publish articles support- preferences floating in the air.T he immedi- ing its neo-liberal ideology and policies. ate effect was discouraging, however. Kos- In 2003 Siderov took part in the elections tov and his party did not manage to effec- for a mayor of Sofia on the list of a small tively occupy the available broad political peasants’ party and received just a hand- niche for nationalist ideology and practice. ful of votes. Mutations of this type are not The explanation for the failure was very unusual in Bulgarian political life. Even the simple. Correctly or not, Kostov was still hasty way in which Volen Siderov estab- too much remembered as a pro-Western lished his electoral coalition before the politician who used to implement policies elections was not exceptional as well. The dictated from abroad. New faces and new former king Simeon Saxe-Coburggotski slogans were needed in order to orient, also registered his movement (party) im- mobilize and channel the nationalist feel- mediately before the parliamentary elec- ings and transform them into nationalist tions in June 2001 and nevertheless won political activities. with a landslide of the votes. The electoral Thus, the terrain was free for fresh coalition Ataka could be in no way so suc- and authentic nationalist initiatives. The cessful and received only 8.14% of the cultural and political situation was ripe for votes in 2005. Nevertheless, the surprise them. There was no reason for surprise was overwhelming. How could this be- that exactly a relatively less known “new come possible indeed? face” could fill in the vacuum left by the There is no simple explanation for this absence of an influential formation with first electoral success of Volen Siderov and a strong nationalist profile in Bulgarian his electoral coalition Ataka which was political life. The man who properly un- transformed into political party under the derstood the moment and caught it was same name after the elections. One may Volen Siderov. explain the phenomenon with the inclina- tion of Bulgarian voters to search and opt 2. Volen Siderov and the Ataka Party for new faces, new names and new slo- gans after the long series of disappoint- The man who registered the electoral co- ments with well known politicians. In this alition Ataka in the spring of 2005 was sense Siderov and Ataka could not be known as a newspaper journalist. Howev- identified with persons, organizations and er, he was more popular as the moderator electoral platforms which were already of a popular TV talk show called also Ata- voted for and have disappointed the vot- ka. Before 2005 Volen Siderov had some ers. Contrary to the case of Kostov, the sporadic political involvements. In 1992 he connection of Siderov to the early stage of happened to be the editor-in-chief of the the neo-liberal Union of Democratic Forces Demokratsiya newspaper which was the was already forgotten. Moreover, he could major periodical publication of the then be legitimized by the public mind as an governing Union of Democratic Forces. authentic nationalist since he was known 12 Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria

for his strong statements on his TV show of the Presidential elections in 2006. At against the former Bulgarian governments this point of time one could already iden- and political establishment for their cor- tify a clear-cut nationalist political forma- ruption and allegedly anti-national poli- tion in Bulgaria. Ataka and Siderov were cies. His strong statements against Roma, already established as factors in Bulgar- against the Turkish Movement for Rights ian political life. and Freedoms and against its ethnic lead- It would be somewhat over-hasty, ership were also well known. Thus, he however, to immediately define the politi- attracted old nationalists, young people cal formation Ataka and its leader Volen disappointed by the corrupt liberal democ- Siderov as belonging to the right-wing racy of Bulgarian style and a strong volatile political spectrum as well. In fact, Volen protest vote against policies disrespecting Siderov and the leader’s party Ataka rep- the national identity and the national in- resent a political platform which is not terests. Protest vote of this type could be easy to specify in terms of the traditional attracted from all age groups and from all conceptual opposition between politi- educational and occupational categories. cal “left“ and political “right”.14 This is The first electoral success of Volen Sid- not surprising at all. On the one side, it erov was due to the fact that he spoke out is difficult indeed to draw a clear distinc- what people representing diverse groups tion between the left and right political wanted to listen to: corrupt deals in the platforms and political actions in all post- privatization had to be suspended; corrupt socialist societies. On the other side, in a politicians had to be put before the court typical populist manner Siderov attacked together with the people from the shadow in his first speech in the BulgarianN ation- businesses; no Bulgarian agricultural land al Assembly the deal with the national air had to be sold to foreigners, etc. Due to carrier “Balkan” in 1999 as a deal carried this populist rhetoric Ataka abruptly and out against the national interests.15 One substantially changed the political and ide- has to note that the deal was implement- ological landscape in the country. Manifest ed by the explicitly right-wing govern- nationalism could not be kept outside the ment of Ivan Kostov. Thus, Siderov takes Parliament any more. One could still keep the typical pose of a populist politician to the understanding that manifestly na- who is entitled to criticise everything and tionalist speech was just political nonsense, everybody provided the audience would totally out-fashioned or not politically cor- be interested exactly in this. Not only left- rect. But due to the decision of the voters wing politicians, political forces and gov- this provocative speech had to be listened

to already in the Parliament. 14 The first electoral success ofAtaka immediately provoked a vivid discussion about the proper classification of the new political phe- No agency specialized in public opin- nomenon. There were voices that Ataka should be classified as an extremist left-wing party since Volen Siderov insisted on a strong ion polls could foresee that this type of state control on the economy. See Zhecheva, Kristina (2007) hate-speech would secure the participa- ‚“Ataka“ mezhdu nationalizma i populizma’[Ataka between Na- tionalism and Populism]. Politicheski izsledvaniya, N 3, p. 49. tion of Volen Siderov in the second round 15 Siderov, Volen (2007) Moyata bitka za Balgariya [My Fight for Bulgaria]. Sofia: Bumerang, p. 4 Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria 13 ernments have been generally inefficient, country. However, banks in Bulgaria are corrupt and anti-national. Only with the largely owned by foreign banks. The re- exception of Siderov and his Ataka party quirement would imply a full-scale nation- all other left and right politicians, parties alization of financial assets owned mostly and governments in Bulgaria have been by banks from the EU countries. If taken inefficient, corrupt and anti-national. seriously, this could be done indeed by The famous programmatic “20 Points means of a full-scale political revolution. of ATAKA Party”16 provide abundant evi- Is this what Ataka really suggests? dence for the difficulties in clearly iden- Point 7 stipulates a correspondence tifying the place of the Ataka party in between incomes, taxes and the needs the traditional polar distinction between of the Bulgarian population. This sounds left and right in the European politics. quite attractive, but the absence of any The four points at the beginning just re- reference to the productivity of work is peat the content of articles of the current striking. Point 8 suggests that privatiza- democratic Constitution of the country by tion deals could be generally revised. stressing their relevance for the unitarian One could only try to imagine the way character of the Bulgarian state. Point 5 in which this general requirement should reads that “The Bulgarian state is obliged be made compatible with the Bulgarian to provide for the health, social security legislation and with the internationally and conditions for cultural and material accepted legal norms. The strong formu- prosperity of all Bulgarians with all means lation “Bulgarian agricultural land should of the state power”. The text is strikingly not be sold to foreigners under whatever similar to numerous formulations in pro- conditions” once more implies that Bul- grammatic documents of the Bulgarian garia should leave the European Union. Communist Party before 1989. Unfortu- Together with the direct requirement for nately, no modern state could be able to leaving the NATO (point 13) the indirect materialize the promise for all-embracing requirements for leaving the EU raise the welfare without the active individual par- profound question about the very possibil- ticipation of responsible citizens. Point 6 ity of a small country to be fully sovereign manifestly proposes state protectionism and neutral on the Balkans. Since 1878 for Bulgarian entrepreneurs. Protectionist all governments of modern Bulgaria were policies of this type are strictly forbidden confronted with this question and no one by the legal regulations of the European could give a satisfactory answer. To the Union. Should Bulgaria already leave the contrary, their decisions brought about a Union? Another requirement of the same long series of national catastrophes. One kind suggests Bulgarian ownership of pro- can only wonder if Volen Siderov and his duction facilities, trade and banks in the Ataka party really have the magic solution to this puzzle. The suggested solution “To return Bulgaria to the Bulgarians!” makes 16 20 tochki na partiya ATAKA [20 Points of ATAKA Party]. See http://www.ataka.bg/index.php?option=com_content&task=vi the puzzle more complicated, not less. ew&id=13&Itemid=51. 14 Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria

The strategic “20 points…” deserve liamentary elections held in 2005. This the above sketchy analysis since they success should be seen in the context of clearly testify for the truly populist and the very substantial differences in the re- unrealistic political strategy of the Ataka sults achieved by other parties in both party and its leader. If the points would parliamentary elections. The repeated have been widely read and understood – electoral success of the Ataka party the political success of Ataka and Siderov should be also placed in the context of would be questionable. What is unques- the general instability of the electoral tionable is only the electoral outcome. preferences in the country due to nu- Ataka managed to attract the support of merous and volatile protest votes. They 395, 733 voters at the general elections were the major factor for the electoral held in July 2009 and thus to improve its convulsions accompanying the political electoral result as compared to the par- development of democratic Bulgaria:17

Table 1: Electoral results of the major political parties in Bulgaria (Parliamentary elections 1990-2009, % of the valid votes)

June Oct. Dec. April June June July Party 1990 1991 1994 1997 2001 2005 2009 Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and electoral alliances 47.15 33.14 43.58 22.07 17.15 30.95 17.70 Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) and electoral alliance 36.20 34.36 24.17 52.26 18.18 7.68 6.76 Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union (BZNS) 8.0 3.9 - - - - - Movement for Rights and Liberties (DPS) 6.03 7.55 5.43 7.60 7.45 12.81 14.50 National Movement Simeon II (NDSV, NMSP) - - - - 42.74 9.88 3.02 Ataka - - - - - 8.14 9.36 Democrats for Strong Bulgaria (DSB) - - - - - 6.44 - Bulgarian National Alliance (BNS) - - - - - 5.19 - Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) ------39.70 Order, Legality and Justice ------4.13

Given the average of 9.36% votes for tracted by the party and its leader at the Ataka, what groups were particularly at- parliamentary elections in 2009?18

17 The data stem from the official Bulletins of the Central Elec- toral Commission in Sofia. 18 The following data has been collected and processed by the Alfa Research agency for market and social research in Sofia. Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria 15

Table 2: Votes for Ataka (in %) a) By the type of settlement Sofia Regional Town Small Town Village 4.7 10.0 10.0 10.0 b) By age 18-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61+ 8.7 7.7 8.6 9.3 11.5 c) By education Higher/ Primary and High School University Lower 6.2 10.9 10.0 d) By gender Male Female 11.8 7.0 e) By ethnic group Bulgarian Turk Roma Other 10.7 0.8 1.7 7.8

Briefly summarized, the voters of Ata- is the Bulgarian National Alliance es- ka were substantially overrepresented tablished by Boyan Rasate in 2006. The among the male Bulgarians older than organization is rather small in numbers 61 years of age. They were underrepre- but received large publicity because of sented in Sofia, among the voters having its “national guards” wearing uniforms higher education, among the women and which very much resemble SA uniforms. among the voters of Turkish and Roma The “national guards” were established ethnic origin. to defend Bulgarians from Roma attacks. Thus, a nationalist but conditionally Without underestimating the relevance right-wing party has stabilized its posi- of the issues connected with the specifics tion in the Bulgarian parliamentary life. of the Roma population and the domes- This is an important development which tic and international echo of the activi- deserves a close analysis focused on this ties of Rasate’s “national guards”, these party, its real political platform and fu- activities are marginal and most probably ture prospects. The major reason for this do not have any future in the form they focus on the ideology and politics of have been conducted. To the contrary, Ataka is the fact that there are no other the somewhat “softer” nationalist and nationally relevant right-wing nationalist xenophobic propaganda and politics of formations in Bulgaria although all right- Ataka is already a relevant factor in Bul- wing formations currently use nation- garian political life and correspondingly alist argumentation. There are several deserves analysis in the context of the small and politically negligible neo-nazi instable Bulgarian political environments. groups. The best known among them 16 Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria

3. Ataka in the Environment the reasons why no large and politically of Bulgarian Politics relevant radical-nationalist and pro-fascist movement or party similar to the Iron The belated appearance of Ataka as a tru- Guard in Romania could be established in ly nationalist political force in Bulgaria af- Bulgaria. Prof. Alexander Tsankov’s efforts ter 1989 requires a detailed explanation. to develop the parties “Naroden sgovor” It should refer to the controversies of the [People’s Alliance] and “Democraticheski national political and cultural history and sgovor” [Democratic Alliance] as power- traditions as well as to the social-structur- ful pro-fascist parties failed. The major al processes in the country in the course reason was the ability of the monarchy to of the democratic political changes. keep the political left in the country under Like in most European societies, nation- control without using radical right-wing alist movements and organizations were organizations.19 On their part, both mon- well represented on the Bulgarian politi- archs Ferdinand I and Boris III tried to im- cal scene between the two world wars. plement active nationalist policies against There were good reasons for their variety the neighbouring countries although in and changing influence. The country lost rather different ways. Boris III hoped to large territories in the wake of the Berlin achieve major national aims mostly by Congress (1878), the Second Balkan War diplomatic activities and not by mobiliza- (Treaty of Bucharest, 1913) and the First tion of radical domestic forces. However, World War (Treaty of Neuilly, 1919). The policies of ethnic suppression and ethnic reparations after the First World War were assimilation were regularly carried out by heavy. Nevertheless, petit-bourgeois dem- Bulgarian governments and were sup- ocratic parties and internationalist leftists ported by the monarchy. became more influential after the World Since the participation of Bulgaria in War than the nationalist and revanchist the Second World War under the banner parties and movements. Fascist-like orga- of monarchy-led rightist nationalism end- nizations could only take over the power ed once more with national catastrophe, after coup d’états in 1923 and 1934. The the revanchist and aggressive national- king (tsar) Boris III who ruled the country ism was largely discredited in the public in an authoritarian way till 1943 was an mind. Therefore no influential right-wing ally of Nazi Germany during the Second nationalist cultural and political tradition World War. He officially tolerated the fas- could be continued after 1944. Even the cist organizations of “National Legions“, personal continuation of right-wing ideas “Ratnik” and “Brannik”. But it was a and policies became impossible since most public secret that he had personal pref- functionaries of pro-fascist organizations erences to the British model of political were severely persecuted and physically institutions and government. Besides the

influence of non-fascist ideologies and 19 See about the specifics of fascism in Bulgaria and its com- political organizations, this was one of plicated relationships with the monarchy Poppetrov, Nikolai (2008) Fashizmat v Balgariya [Fascism in Bulgaria]. Sofia: Kama. Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria 17 eliminated after 1944. Others lost the for this development is the experience of connection to the processes in Bulgaria losers in the reforms which is commonly due to the decades spent in emigration. shared by Bulgarians and Turks. However, Paradoxically enough, after some inter- this common experience of losers in the nationalist efforts to support the cultural transition to market economy could be development of all ethnic groups in the used and abused in the search for ethnic country after 1944, it was Todor Zhivkov’s scapegoats and for re-vitalizing Bulgarian regime which step by step returned back nationalism on this basis. to the pre-war tradition of the nationalist The re-vitalization of ethnic hate- policies of ethnic suppression and assimi- speech and xenophobic political actions lation. The non-Slavic or non-Christian took two rather different directions. The names of the Roma were “streamlined”, first one openly referred to the ethnic then the names of the Bulgarian-speaking based Movement for Rights and Free- Muslims. In 1984-1985 the massive opera- doms, its activities and particularly against tion for changing the Turkic-Arabic names the activities of its founder and leader of the Bulgarian Turks was carried out. Ahmed Dogan. There is no doubt that the No teaching in Turkish was allowed any well thought through political activity of more, traditional dresses were forbidden. Ahmed Dogan had the consequence that It was not advisable to speak Turkish on the MRF is currently the most stable politi- public places. Having in mind the intensity cal organization in Bulgaria and the only of the ethnic pressure on people having one which has had permanently increas- Turkish ethnic identity in Bulgaria during ing electoral outcomes during the whole the eighties, it was an achievement in the transition period (with the negligible ex- domestic politics that the feared clashes ception in 1994). The party is very well between Bulgarians and Turks did not rooted in the administration of ethnically come true after 1989. Bloody interethnic mixed regions and dominates the local confrontations like on the territory of for- governments in some of them. As seen mer Yugoslavia were avoided in Bulgaria. from another angle, it was at least partly In the course of time it became political- due to the politics of Dogan and the MRF ly correct to speak about the successful that the interethnic peace has been main- Bulgarian ethnic model. The expression tained. This made the MRF legitimate and mostly refers to the relationships between respected partner in two coalition govern- the two major ethnic groups of Bulgar- ments after 2001. ians and Turks in the country. Given the However, despite all efforts of the lead- perspective of EU membership of Bulgaria ership of MRF to change its ethnic com- and the accomplishment of this task, the position and ethnic support, the party still Bulgarian Turks themselves officially and remains ethnically based. At the general unofficially accepted the ethnic status- elections held in July 2009 the party was quo. The anti-Turkish propaganda lost voted for by 87.4% of the ethnic Turks momentum. One of the major reasons and only by 1.6% of the ethnic Bulgar- 18 Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria

ians in the country.20 Given this obvious in ghetto-like areas. Typically, Bulgarians result, one still may ask about the practical tend to lay the blame for this situation relevance of constitutional arrangements on Roma themselves. In the critical times and about the long-term effects of vot- of the nineties, however, the widespread ing along ethnic preferences in a unitarian negative attitude to Roma took situation- state. Some serious political problems pose al overtones: Why should they not pay for the authoritarian organization of the party electricity when Bulgarians are definitely itself. Many questions have been publicly expected to pay? Why should Roma re- debated about the ways of the financing ceive child benefits and social benefits if of the party activities, the involvement of they don’t pay to the budget? The echo of party functionaries in corrupt networks these discussions was and remains strong. and about the aspirations of the party con- The issues of Roma way of life became cerning key positions in the state admin- increasingly a hot topic and nourishment istration. Last but not least, mass media for nationalist propaganda and actions. have regularly shown special attention to Thus, there were and there are enough speeches and behaviour pattern of Ahmed historical and social-structural reasons for Dogan. A video recording of his pre-elec- the development of influential national- tion speech of 18 June 2009 was broad- ist and xenophobic right-wing political casted by the “Nova Televiziya” channel organization(s) in Bulgaria. However, it several days later and stirred a controversial turned out that the inefficiency of the pro- discussion since he particularly stressed his tracted economic and political reforms did personal role in distributing the state fund- not immediately bring about influential na- ing in Bulgaria.21 tionalist and extreme right-wing organiza- The discussions on issues related to the tions on the Bulgarian political scene. Un- Roma as the second largest ethnic group der the conditions of a general insecurity have rather different content and style. about the content and direction of domes- They are mostly focused on scapegoating. tic and international developments moder- Under the conditions of extremely high ate parties took the lead. Once the relative unemployment and mass misery among stabilization of the domestic economy and Roma and the weakening of the Bulgar- politics was achieved and the membership ian state some Roma habits and traditions of the country in the NATO and in the Eu- became increasingly perceived as an im- ropean Union clarified the international mediate threat to the property, dignity political orientation of the country, the dor- and life of both Bulgarians and Turks par- mant right-wing nationalism could better ticularly in the rural areas. In the towns define its ideological and political niche. the tragedy of Roma is even more vis- The self-positioning of Volen Siderov ible due to their territorial concentration and Ataka on the Bulgarian and inter- national political scene was made in his 20 According to data of Alfa Research Agency for Market and detailed interview which was published Social research. 21 See http://sofiaecho.com/print.php?storyd=743487 days before the parliamentary elections (30.11.2009). Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria 19 held on 05. July 2009.22 Already the title pensions should come from the reduction of the interview conveyed the message of the state administration. Generally, less that Siderov has learned what kind of openness to the world economy and more speech is politically correct nowadays. He state regulation of the national economy very much insisted on the point that the was needed according to Siderov. attack-symbolic of his party should have As to the most urgent tasks after the nothing to do with similar symbols in Ger- elections, they had to include the reform many during the thirties. The real refer- of the justice system, support to the real ence of the symbols was supposed to be sector in the national economy and reform only the successful Bulgarian attack and of the old-age pension system. National capture of the Turkish fortress of Edirne in agreement should be reached on these is- 1912. Since he defined himself as a Chris- sues and Ataka would actively participate tian, nothing could connect his political in the preparation and implementation of thinking and behaviour with the pagan these reforms - in coalition with the GERB style of thinking and behaviour of Hitler. Party or not. Special attention should be Thus, the terrain was prepared for his paid to the fact that the active involve- original visions and practical approaches. ment of Ataka in the reform process might As to the development of Bulgarian econ- temporarily strengthen the support to the omy, they included a preference towards Movement for Rights and Freedoms since the real production and not towards vir- its leaders speculate with the threats to tual monetary economy. Interventions the ethnic peace. However, so Siderov, of the Bulgarian state into the national the ethnic peace in Bulgaria used to be economy should be seen as unavoidable disturbed only by Turkey between 1985 as this has had already happen in Japan and 1989. There were actually no Bulgar- or in South Korea. The state interven- ian Turks in the country but Bulgarians tions should be particularly targeted on converted to the Muslim religion. MRF it- the dishonest foreign companies which self were unconstitutional and should not just pump out profits from Bulgaria with- take part in the executive power. As to out investing into the national economy. the Roma they should no more have the The Czech state owned electric company privileged position not to pay to the state CEZ was mentioned as an example since budget and only to receive support from it supports the Czech pensioners at the it. State intervention would be needed in expense of the poor Bulgarian pension- order to change their economic situation ers. The whole system of old age pensions and educational level. This understanding should be radically reformed since the of the ethnic situation in the country by private pension funds already collapsed Ataka were based on its sound patriotism all over the world. Additional money for and permanent reference to the national interests. Other nationalist organizations

22 See Ivan Dikov (2009) Bulgaria nationalist „Ataka” Party should join Ataka in its efforts to represent Leader Siderov: I Can’t be Follower of Hitler (Interview) http:// and defence the national interests. www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=105072 (30.11.2009). 20 Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria

As to the international politics, the taken in consideration in the discussions relations with Macedonia were com- before the parliamentary elections as well. plicated since long brain-washing had Comparing the content of the above changed the ethnic identity there and important interview with statements by created an artificial nation. The support leaders of other parties and coalitions of the USA to Macedonia is similar to the and analyzing the electoral results, one support provided to the country by the may reach a conclusion which seems to Comintern. NATO was an instrument of be most relevant concerning Bulgarian American domination. Ataka was against political scene and the major actors on the setting up of NATO military bases in it. The massive, repeated and loud refer- the country. International policy of na- ence to national interests, the promises tional dignity was needed for Bulgaria. to revise privatization deals with dishon- The European Union should develop as est international investors, the general re- Europe of nations. jection of the participation of the MRF in Reading the interview carefully one the executive power, the personal attacks may say “déjà-vu”. It was Todor Zhivkov’s against Ahmed Dogan’s policies, etc. were propaganda which interpreted the inter- part and parcel not of the Ataka electoral ethnic tensions in the country only as a campaign alone. In one way or another, result of foreign interventions. It was this they were part and parcel of the electoral propaganda which generally interpreted campaign of the GERB party as well. Simi- the presence of Turkish speaking Muslims lar slogans were repeated by Ivan Kostov in Bulgaria only with the conversion of who was the most vociferous partner in ethnic Bulgarians to the Muslim religion. the Blue Coalition uniting the rests of the One may have difficulties in the search Union of Democratic Forces. Yani Yanev for originality in the ideological slogans, made the entrance of his party “Order, in the suggested organizational measures Law and Justice” into the National As- and patterns and in the public standing of sembly possible by focussing the public Bulgarian nationalists so far. Some nuanc- attention just before the elections on the es are important, however. One may no teaching of fundamentalist Islam in some more come across slogans like “NATO out villages with Muslim population. Even the of Bulgaria”, “banks in Bulgaria – in Bul- Socialist Party returned back to the nation- garian hands”, “prohibition of ethnic par- alist electoral propaganda and decided to ties”, etc., which dominated the famous include the strongly patriotic party “Nova “20 points of the Ataka party”. Obviously, Zora” in its Coalition for Bulgaria for the its leader was calculating possibilities for parliamentary elections. participation in the government and tried How to interpret this fever of all major to become nationally and internationally political formations in Bulgaria to compete acceptable. As to the coalition partners, with each other by stressing the national- GERB was seen as the best one but the ist rhetoric? Obviously, the surprising elec- Bulgarian Socialist Party was seriously toral success of the Ataka coalition at all Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria 21 elections since 2005 has influenced the ship in the coalition. This was understood strategists of all parties and electoral coali- as a general support to the GERB party tions. They had to make their own nation- and made the decision easier to build its alist turn in the electoral campaigns. This minority government. Ataka expressed is a new pattern in the political strategies its full support to it. On its turn, Ataka and most probably of political action. Dur- certainly expects support by the GERB ing the period of settling the international government to its patriotic initiatives. In situation of the country by means of its fact, at the Opening Session of the 41th membership in the NATO and in the Eu- National Assembly Volen Siderov sug- ropean Union the nationalist rhetoric was gested a Resolution for condemnation not the best electoral asset. A major po- of the genocide on the Bulgarian people litical party moving openly in this direction during the Ottoman rule between 1396 could thus commit political suicide. Now and 1913. A memorial and a memorial the situation has changed profoundly. It day should remember about undeniable is hardly imaginable that a member-state tragic facts in Bulgarian history. This initia- of NATO and of the European Union or a tive could receive no open support by any political force in such a country could be of the prime ministers of Bulgaria after internationally or domestically punished 1989 since all of them were well aware for applying to nationalist rhetoric and of the sensitivity of the political circles in even to nationalist policies. A punishment neighbouring Turkey about the issue of for this reason could be hardly substanti- genocide. Considering also the implica- ated and implemented even concerning tions for the Bulgarian domestic policy, Bulgaria or Bulgarian political forces since no one would dear to express opinion on there are political parties or movements the issue. Obviously, the international and propagating nationalism in all Western the domestic situation of the country has European countries. In some cases these changed. The new Prime Minister Boyko parties or movements propagate national- Borisov positively evaluated the initiative ism in more extremist versions than Ataka in the mass media. The readiness for mu- does it in Bulgaria. Therefore, one may tual support of Ataka and GERB on na- expect that the nationalist turn in the Bul- tionalist basis is obvious. garian politics will become a phenomenon How to explain these somewhat strik- with long-term presence in the Bulgarian ing developments on the surface of Bul- domestic and international politics. garian political life? What are their short- This seems to be confirmed by the po- term and long-term determinants? What litical decisions and actions after the par- are the prospects of nationalism as a fac- liamentary elections. Three political par- tor of political orientation, decision and ties expected to be invited by the GERB action in Bulgarian politics? How to place party as partners in a ruling coalition, but the phenomenon of Bulgarian national- only Ataka among them did not mention ism in the Eastern European processes? any conditions for the potential partner- 22 Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria

4. New Reasons and Long-term gime of political correctness required by the Causes of Nationalist Fashions circumstances. The justification of the pres- ence of a radical nationalist party in Bulgaria One may take the rise of radical national- is not difficult now. In fact, radical national- ism in recent Bulgarian political life as just ist groups, movements and parties are part one of the many short-lived cultural and of the political spectrum in most NATO and political fashions. In fact, the organized EU member countries. Why should Bulgaria nationalism appeared on the Bulgarian po- be an exception from this rule? litical scene suddenly like a fashion which The argumentation might go deeper, would not last for long. The last assump- however. The country moved through an tion is most probably false. There are so- existential crisis of rapid economic decline cially relevant reasons and causes for the and slow recovery, acute political instability recent appearance of radical nationalism. and cultural disorientations. Nevertheless, They were hinted at above and should be no radical movement or political organiza- put under close scrutiny in the remainder. tion had managed to establish itself as an The task of the proper interpretation of influential political factor during this critical the phenomenon is not easy. It is usually period. The simple explanation is that there taken for granted that political radicalism was no attractive political platform promis- thrives as a reaction to acute critical situa- ing an easy way out of the grievances. The tions in society. Was this the case in Bulgaria concentration on survival dominated the in 2005 or in 2009? No, Bulgarian society everyday life. People, who could not find was not in whatever way in an acute eco- resources for survival in the country they nomic, political or cultural crisis at that time. could try their chances abroad. Now the Given this fact, one could try to explain the situation has changed. Even in the condi- rise of nationalist radicalism from the op- tions of a global financial and economic cri- posite side. One may assume that the phe- sis the real issue for individuals and house- nomenon “Ataka” has become only pos- holds in Bulgaria is rarely the biological sur- sible after some major causes of a long last- vival. Political life can return to normality. It ing national crisis have been eliminated. This includes radical nationalist movements and applies first of all to the resolution of strate- parties practically all over the world. gic tasks of the international security of the Therefore, it was and it is not the acute country. In the current geostrategic context crisis which brought about the allegedly they could be resolved with the country’s surprising appearance of the radical na- membership in NATO and in the European tionalism in Bulgarian political life. To the Union. It was well known by politicians that contrary, it was the relative stabilization of manifestly nationalist slogans could put ob- Bulgarian domestic economic and political stacles on the way of the integration of the life which made this possible. However, the country in both organizations. This danger stabilization made Ataka possible since the is over. Now it is possible to speak loudly out stabilization has been achieved and is being what has been long kept silent under the re- reproduced under precarious conditions. Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria 23

Recent international comparative studies resentative national survey in Bulgaria insist provide the evidence that the current eco- on the point that the current economic situ- nomic, political and cultural situation in the ation of the Bulgarian people is worse than country is full of tensions which intensity is in the times before 1989. This is a clear indi- higher than in most other post-socialist so- cation for the availability of a strong protest cieties. This applies to the perception of the potential in Bulgarian society which might economic situation in the country first of all. be mobilized by radical forces on the left or The majority of the interviewees in a rep- right side of the political spectrum:23

Table 3: “Would you say that the economic situation of most people in your country is better, worse, or about the same as it was under communism?” (in %)

Country Better Worse About the same DK Poland 47 35 12 6 Czech Republic 45 39 12 3 Russia 33 45 15 7 Slovakia 29 48 18 5 Lithuania 23 48 15 14 Bulgaria 13 62 18 7 Ukraine 12 62 13 12 Hungary 8 72 16 5

The situation is even more precarious state administration. The dissatisfaction in the field of the quality and the effi- with the corrupt politicians and with the ciency of the state administration. In this inefficient handling of crime and illegal respect the Bulgarian interviewees lead in drugs has been repeatedly and success- the negative side of the scale of satisfac- fully used in the propaganda campaigns tion concerning the functioning of the of the Ataka party:24 Table 4: National problems today beyond the economy in the former Eastern bloc (in %)

Corrupt political Country Crime Illegal drugs leaders Bulgaria 76 76 74 Czech Republic 71 55 51 Hungary 76 69 54 Lithuania 78 76 66 Poland 58 49 49 Russia 52 51 54 Slovakia 52 55 46 Ukraine 70 56 46

23 Two Decades After the Wall’s Fall (2009) Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, p. 40. The representative national sur- veys were conducted in August-September 2009. 24 Ibid., p. 76. 24 Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria

Last but not least, in a clear contradic- ion polls carried out in Eastern Europe by tion to the official diplomatic declarations the Pew Research Centre in 1991 and in about the fully settled issues concerning 2009 provide the evidence that the feel- state boundaries, the public opinion in ings of dissatisfaction with the existing the country has substantial reservations state borders have become in the mean- in this respect. Moreover, the public opin- time more intensive in Bulgaria:25 Table 5: Do parts of neighbouring countries belong to us? (Answer “Agree”, in %)

Country 1991 2009 Change Bulgaria 52 66 +14 Hungary 70 61 -9 Russia 22 58 +36 Poland 60 51 -9 Lithuania 46 40 -6 Czech Republic 42 40 -2 Slovakia 34 29 -5 Ukraine 24 24 0

Therefore, the data of Table 4 and dis- in the course of five centuries ofO ttoman cussions on Bulgarian history and Bulgar- rule in the Bulgarian lands. In addition, ian national identity indicate that the is- this long historical experience receives sues related to the causes and reasons of real meaning in the context of the much radical nationalism are much more com- shorter but rather important co-existence plex and complicated than the tensions in of sovereign Bulgaria with the economi- the current economic and political situa- cally and militarily strong Turkey on the tion or the pragmatic efforts of persons border of the country. Given these facts to attract public attention in order to be and their historical contexts, one should elected in the Bulgarian National Assem- have understanding about some attitudes bly might suggest. of ethnic Bulgarians. They are often un- The first long-term cause for the rele- certain about the degree of state loyalty vance of the debates on Bulgarian nation- of their compatriots who firmly keep to alism concerns the ethnic and religious their Turkish-Muslim identity. The uncer- structure of Bulgarian society. Bulgaria is tainty does not play any special role at the the country in the European Union with level of the everyday communication. At the largest share of Muslims in its popula- this level the mutual understanding be- tion. By far the largest part of them keeps tween ethnic Bulgarians and ethnic Turks to the Turkish ethnic identity. It is close- has been usually marked by the predomi- ly related to their Muslim identity. This nance of ethnic and religious tolerance. statistical fact reveals its real relevance This tradition is strong and it explains why against the background of the historical the recent political attacks of Bulgarian experience which had been accumulated 25 Ibid., p. 57. Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria 25 nationalists are only in very exceptional tion during state socialism did change the cases directed towards the Turkish ethnic situation. It got much worse in the times group in general. Instead, the attacks are of transition to market economy since the focused on the Turkish political elite or- Roma were the first to pay the bill of un- ganized in the Movement for Rights and employment and impoverishment. More- Freedoms. Its leadership has been repeat- over, they became an easy pray for gener- edly described as posing risks to Bulgarian al accusations since they are in reality un- political life and Bulgarian sovereignty. In derrepresented among the tax payers and particular, the leader of the MRF Ahmed overrepresented among the receivers of Dogan had become a personalized target social support of various kinds.26 As a re- of accusations for illegal enrichment, po- sult, slogans and activities having Roma as litical intrigues and conspiracies in favour target of insults and attacks easily attract of Bulgarian Turks and Turkey. Given the public support. Roma are increasingly con- intensity of the accusations, one cannot ceived as the threatening others. These be really sure about the clear distinction negative stereotypes can be always used made between the ethnic group of Turks for the purposes of the right-wing nation- in Bulgaria and the political elite of the alism. Taking the national interests seri- ethnic group. The distinction might be- ously, the anti-Roma propaganda alone is come easily blurred in times of domes- not less destructive than the political pas- tic or international tensions. No political sivity concerning the problems of Roma. force in Bulgaria is currently interested in This policy has been practiced for twenty such development or working in this di- years. An interview of Volen Siderov with rection. But the ethnic composition of the a journalist from the Austrian radio was electoral support for Ataka is indicative internationally widely commented. After that this option for development in the being asked by the journalist about the interethnic relations in Bulgaria cannot be integration of Roma in Bulgaria he sug- excluded under specific domestic and in- gested to the journalist to take one hun- ternational circumstances. dred thousand Bulgarian Roma to Austria The above distinction between the at- and to integrate them there. The Austrian titudes towards the ethnic group and its journalist could not find the proper words political representation does not apply in to react to the suggestion. Certainly, no- the case of the numerous and increasing body could take the option seriously. Ac- Roma population in the country. These tive and constructive policies are very attitudes are negatively generalised in much needed for resolving the long accu- rather stable stereotypes. They reproduce mulated problems connected with the ed- a substantial social distance between the ucation and vocational training of Roma Bulgarian ethnic majority and Roma. They and their realization in the labour market. are widely perceived and treated as the ex- 26 See Genov, Nikolai (2007) ’Globalisierung und Lebenslagen cluded others. Neither the internationalist ethnischer Gruppen: Veränderungen in Bulgarien’.In: Heller, policies nor the policies of ethnic assimila- Wilfried et all. Eds. Ethnizität in der Globalisierung. München: Otto Sagner, pp. 87-108, part. p. 97. 26 Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria

The problems are burning since Roma will grate are very short-sighted and objectively soon become the second largest ethnic contradict the national interests. group in the country. The nationalist anti- Some clarifications are needed con- Roma slogans lead to a political blind alley cerning the sporadic anti-Semitic slogans if they come without long-term projects spread by some right-wing nationalists in and efforts for economic, political and the country. The slogans do not have any cultural inclusion of this ethnic group into specific domestic meaning at present. The mainstream Bulgarian society. Neverthe- Jewish community was numerous in the less, the nationalist slogans might be also country before the Second World War but useful. Paradoxically enough, they might practically disappeared due to the emigra- foster the upgrading of the efficiency of tion thereafter. Without any specific local state institutions which have to deal with reference the slogans about global Jewish the Roma issues. Without this upgrading conspiracies etc. do not make too much even well designed and financed efforts sense and could hardly mobilize any rele- concerning the inclusion of the Roma eth- vant political activity. The slogans and poli- nic group are doomed to failure. Ethnic cies against allochthonous ethnic groups Bulgarians cannot be interested in such (new migrants) are also rather general since negative development in the long run. the new migrants are still relatively few in As seen in this broader context of in- Bulgaria. Nevertheless, the migrants from terethnic relations in Bulgarian society, Africa and Asia are visible. They are currently the anti-Turkish slogans and actions of the target of xenophobic propaganda and right-wing Bulgarian nationalists are very victims of racist attacks. One may assume questionable in two respects. First, they that together with the rise of the attractive- spoil the cultural and political situation in ness of Bulgaria as a stable EU member this the country currently and in the future. type of xenophobic and nationalistic activi- Second, they motivate Bulgarian Turks to ties might become more intensive. leave the country. There is nothing new in The second point of relevance concerns this policy. Manifestly or not, it has been the international references of the slogans on the agenda during the whole history and potential actions of Bulgarian nation- of the third Bulgarian statehood. But the alists. They are realistic in one respect at intended solution is dubious. Due to the least. In spite of the widespread critical at- mass emigration of ethnic Bulgarians the titudes to state borders (see Table 5), the country already lost a substantial share of questioning of the international borders is the ethnic majority group. This is one im- not manifestly on the agenda of Bulgar- portant reason why the ethnic composition ian radical nationalists yet. In fact, direct of the country is changing in the direction questioning of borders is a rarity in the of the larger and larger presence of Roma slogans of nationalists all over Europe. As in the population of the country. As seen in a rule, their slogans and activities have this historical perspective, the slogans and mostly domestic targets or international policies for pushing Bulgarian Turks to emi- organizations as targets. However, given Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria 27 the increasing Bulgarian Diaspora one may after decades of uncertainties concerning expect that the preservation of the ethnic the national identity, national history and identity of Bulgarians outside of the Bul- national interests there is a widespread garian borders would be of increasing im- need to return back to some uniting na- portance for the propaganda and policies tional myths and legends. In fact, there of the Ataka Party. So far, this has not been is no nation or state in the world living the case. In the famous 20 programmatic and surviving without this type of myths points the issue is just absent. Most prob- and legends concerning the common ori- ably, this will change in the context of the gin, common heroes, common sufferings collaboration between the government of and common historical paths. The need the GERB Party and Ataka. The appoint- for a return to the common ethnic roots ment of a special minister for the Bulgarian comes usually to the fore of the public Diaspora in the GERB government gives agenda after periods of profound chang- the signal that this might be expected. es in property and income structures, of The third point of relevance concerns standard of living and way of life. This the participation and activities of Bul- is what happened in Bulgaria together garian nationalists in the very wide and with the profound economic and politi- rather controversial area of the discus- cal reforms after 1989. Now the nation sions concerning the Bulgarian history has approached the historical point of and the Bulgarian ethnic and national redefinition of values.O ne may wish and identity. The heated debates on the oc- expect that this re-definition would move casion of a project which was mislead- in the direction of strengthening the ingly renamed “The Myth on Batak” values of democratic tolerance. Under have clearly shown that the various re- similar circumstances, however, many lated issues touch upon rather sensitive nations have experienced a landslide perceptions of a wide audience. Profes- of value-orientations in the direction of sionals in social sciences and humani- ethnic fundamentalism and ethnic intol- ties and representatives of the broader erance.28 The present-day international intellectual audience, left wing and right situation is definitely not favourable for wing nationalists as well liberals of vari- the establishment of powerful national- ous nuances reacted emotionally. The ist right-wing movements. The Bulgarian discussion signalled that a relatively small tradition is also not much favourable in group of liberal intellectuals opting for this respect. But some nationalist feelings the universal rights of free speech and of people who have been or are socially free scientific research met the joined op- out-rooted might be supportive to politi- position of state institutions and the eth- cal platforms and organizational actions nic Bulgarian public at large.27 Obviously, resembling the platforms and actions of the radical nationalist right-wing move- 27 The debate had its peak in 2007. However, it will certainly continue. See Liberalen pregled [Liberal Overview], http:// 28 See Parsons, Talcoott (1954 [1942])’Some Sociological As- www.librev.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl pects of the Fascist Movements’. In: Parsons, Talcott. Essays in e&id=687&Itemid=97 Sociological Theory. New York: Free Press, pp. 124-141. 28 Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria

ments during the thirties. The somewhat or the nation-state, but it was the fail- charismatic leader Volen Siderov and his ure of the small, intellectually unable and leader’s party Ataka definitely profited with weak will, corrupt, egoistic, cosmo- from such feelings influencing segments politan, etc. ruling group which brought of the voters in Bulgaria. about the catastrophe and the common The most profound issue behind the suffering during the transformation. This search for belonging to a respectable and type of scapegoating anti-elitism is omni- respected ethnic community concerns the present in the propaganda of the Bulgar- new identity of the Bulgarian nation and ian right-wing nationalists. It meets some the Bulgarian state. The new definition of difficulties in the argumentation, how- identity is needed in the aftermath of the ever. Due to the long Ottoman rule Bul- profound changes in the domestic social garian society has no aristocracy or aristo- structures and in the geostrategic situation cratic traditions. Since the belated re-es- of the country. This new identity is still in tablishment of the national statehood in making.29 The vacuum might be filled in at 1878 the economic, political and cultural least partly by radical or moderate nation- elites have mostly consisted of self-made alistic self-definitions.S ome of them might people. The sharp turns in the elite build- be just due to efforts to compensate feel- ing after 1944 and then 1989 made the ings and assessments of low national sta- establishment of elite dynasties practically tus in international comparisons. National- impossible. The elite of the state-socialist ist slogans, political platforms and actions administration had mostly its origin from might well thrive on this emotional and the peasantry. The present day political intellectual soil. They might be the expres- and economic elite mostly consists of self- sion of a compensatory mechanism for na- made people from the academia and the tional or ethnic humiliations. The only way businesses. Thus, the slogans against “the out of the imaginary world of compensa- ruling mafia” have hardly any identifiable tory illusions is the mobilization for achiev- focus. They will immediately turn counter- ing real results in the ethnic and national productive in the moment in which the development and in the international com- Ataka party would in one way or another petition. Exactly the missing of this realistic take some governmental responsibility. effort seems to be the major weakness of Having given signals that they are willing the Bulgarian nationalists so far. to take governmental responsibilities as The above discussed compensatory political elite, the leaders of the Ataka are mechanism has the political elite as its facing the danger to be immediately dis- usual target since it is regarded in Bulgaria credited by there own slogans against all as a failed elite. The typical argumenta- ruling groups as “the ruling mafia”. tion is rather simple: It was or it is not the The fourth crucial issue concerns the failure of the ethnic group or the nation impact of the ongoing globalization on the Bulgarian nation state and particularly on its 29 See Genov, Nikolai (2006) ‚Bulgaria’s New Identity’. South capacity to manage the burning problems East Europe Review, Vol. 9, N 3, pp. 43-56. Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria 29 of the welfare state. The current financial the Western European countries where and economic crisis has provided abundant their headquarters are located. The credits evidence about the potential for construc- in the branches in Bulgaria dried out. The tive solutions and for potential conflicts.O n Bulgarian government did not have legal the one side, the restrictive monetary poli- mechanisms to influence this policy which cies imposed on Bulgarian economy by the was obviously detrimental for the national global institution of the International Mon- economy in the context of the global finan- etary Fund in the form of currency board cial crisis. The general nationalistic slogans turned out to be efficient in passively pre- about “banks in Bulgarian hands” could be venting the national financial system from thus supported by the facts. the deep crisis which affected the finances The membership in the European of other Eastern European states. On the Union has been long regarded by the other side, the far reaching predominance Bulgarian public opinion as a major fac- of foreign property in the banking sector tor for the economic prosperity of the of Bulgaria manifested its controversial country and the households in the con- character. During the previous years the text of globalization and its uncertainties. domination of big foreign banks on the Two years after the country has become a Bulgarian banking sector was a guarantee member of the Union the public mind has for its stability. However, in the times of the changed and this is still another source for global financial crisis the big foreign banks strengthening nationalist emotions and got mostly concerned with the stability of nationalistic policies:30

Table 6: “In the long run, do you think that Bulgaria’s overall economy has been strengthened or weakened by the economic integration of Europe?” (in %)

Country Strengthened Weakened Neither/Nor DK Poland 53 28 15 4 Slovakia 41 33 21 6 Czech Republic 31 37 25 7 Lithuania 28 34 27 11 Bulgaria 14 63 16 7 Hungary 9 71 15 4

The generally non-democratic or anti- Ataka party shows that they are ready to democratic programmatic statements and adapt to the existing democratic political action patterns of the Bulgarian radical order in order to avoid marginalization. Vo- nationalists are publicly known. Are their len Siderov increasingly takes a moderate statements and actions really dangerous public approach to the issues under discus- for the young democratic institutions in sion. Recently he has not participated in Bulgaria? Few would positively answer scandalous public actions which accompa- the question. To the contrary, the political 30 Two Decades After the Wall’s Fall (2009) Washington, D.C.: behaviour of the leaders of the nationalist Pew Research Center, p.68. 30 Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria

nied the short history of the party. It is still to be even less realistic. There are no signs difficult to say if this policy is just a cam- so far that dramatic changes of the in- ouflage or an attempt to make nationalist ternational constellation are on the near slogans and policies acceptable in broader horizon. Thus, it is hard to expect that in- circles. One may assume that the leader- ternational issues would strengthen the ship of the party understands well that the domestic position of Ataka and would time for radical nationalist propaganda make the party able to discredit or under- and action is not fully ripe yet. The coun- mine the democratic political institutions try has not been so dramatically hit by the in the country. Bulgaria lost the Second financial and economic crisis like Hungary Balkan War in 1913. Two national efforts or Latvia. The major explanation is the ef- to resolve territorial issues by participat- ficiency of the institution of the currency ing in World Wars were unsuccessful. board. Thus, the accumulated public dis- Against this historical experience it would appointments from the repeated promises be difficult to raise broad public support for a fast and substantial improvement of to ideas and actions in favour of aggres- the living standard have accumulated but sive foreign policies. This might only occur not so far to become socially explosive. under a strong foreign pressure. It is not The attempts at developing scenarios for in sight. Without foreign incentives and the economic and political development massive foreign support Bulgarian nation- of the country in the context of a deep alists cannot be a serious force preparing economic crisis did not lead to conclusions or implementing undemocratic domestic about foreseeable economic catastrophes, or foreign policies. acute political crises and mass public un- Therefore, what Bulgarian national- rests.31 Thus, under conditions which are ists of the type of Ataka can still rely on not expected to change profoundly, one is mostly the spreading of nebulous na- could hardly expect a landslide move of tionalist slogans without constructive the public political preferences in favour of content. For instance, nationalists are and radical political actions headed by Ataka. will continue to be against the giving-up To the contrary, one may expect continu- of national sovereignty to the bureaucracy ing efforts on the part of its leadership to in Brussels. But they readily participate in adapt to the mainstream democratic poli- the work of the institutions of the Euro- tics of Bulgarian style in order to become pean Union. Nobody of them questions more and more acceptable as partner in the reasons for the membership of Bul- ruling coalitions. garia in the European Union. Nationalists The assumption that the leadership of are against victimizing of Bulgarian sol- Ataka could use and abuse international diers in NATO operations. However, it re- tensions and conflicts for implementing mains unclear in which different way the its radical anti-democratic politics seems international security of the country could

31 See Meinardus, Marc (2009) ‚Bulgarien und die globale Krise or should be achieved and maintained. – Wirtschaftliche, soziale und politische Implikationen’. Südos- Bulgarian nationalists are anti-globalists teuropa Mitteilungen, N 2, pp. 6-21. here pp. 20-21. Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria 31 in the sense that Bulgaria is understood cope with it by establishing stronger col- to be on the loosing side in the globaliza- lective bodies of party leadership.32 The tion. What should be really done in order debates continued after the elections. The to change the unfavourable situation of experience from the scandals and splits of the country in the global competition – the Ataka parliamentary group in the 40th this is the topic which remains so far be- National Assembly is rather instructive. Or- yond the content of the public statements ganizational instabilities might continue to of Siderov as well. Thus, he and his party trouble the party, its parliamentary repre- mostly profit from the protest votes so sentation and various bodies in the legis- far. This will be increasingly difficult un- lative and executive in which activists of der the GERB government which came to Ataka are represented. power with the manifest intention to act Another source of political tensions in favour of the national interests. Ataka and conflicts caused by the activists of the might have the option to openly and con- Ataka party might continue to be the rude sequently support these efforts and thus language which dominates their speeches to lose identity in its efforts to mobilize which often contain direct offenses to protest. Or, the party might continue to the opponents. However, rude and of- opt for protest without constructive pro- fensive speech is not the monopoly of posals and thus to move in the direction Ataka in the Bulgarian political debates. of political irrelevance. Hate speech and uncultivated expressions Thus, it seems at the first glance that have been largely present in the Parlia- Volen Siderov and Ataka have only two ments after 1989. However, it seems that options which are not too much promis- the nationalist speakers go through the ing. They do not open prospects for any same learning process like most other ac- important role of Ataka in the national po- tivists of political parties in the country. So litical life. This might be a strong conclu- far, the direction is towards more civilized sion, however. Bulgarian political life is so forms of political presentation and action. unstable that a variety of options are basi- The public opinion in the country is cally possible and their probability is diffi- very much divided concerning this relative- cult to assess. One of these options is the ly new phenomenon. The primitivisms of development of Ataka in the direction of a right-wing nationalists are mostly subject long-term factor of instability in Bulgarian for jokes in intellectual circles. However, politics due to the instability of its own or- large segments of society have accumu- ganizational form which is too much cen- lated strong feelings of national depriva- tred on the decisions of the party leader. tion during the last two decades. So, they Even in the very eve of the parliamentary have some understanding for the specifics elections in July 2009 there were serious of discussion and action of Volen Siderov debates in the leading circles of the party and his followers. For some segments of concerning the authoritarian personal style of Volen Siderov. The suggestion was to 32 See EUROREX Watchblog (2009) 30. June, http://www.euro- rex.info/2009/06/30/bulgarien-fuhrungskrise-bei-ataka 32 Radical nationalism in contemporary Bulgaria

society both the left-wing and right-wing nationalists seem to be even the very much needed speakers and defenders of the na- tional identity and national interests. Thus, the Bulgarian politicians, the Bulgarian public and the international observers are still looking carefully at the development of the political constellation in the country and at the positioning of Volen Siderov and the Ataka party in these constellations. It is still early to make any strong conclusions about the political fate of the radical na- tionalist party and its leader.

About the author: Nikolai GENOV: Professor of Sociology at the Free University in Berlin. Research fields: sociological theory, globalization, interethnic relations, social risks, interna- tional migration. Recent book publica- tions: Advances in Sociological Knowledge (2004); Ethnicity and Educational Policies (2005); Ethnicity and Mass Media (2006), Comparative Research in the Social Sci- ences (2007), Interethnic Integration (2008), Global Trends in Eastern Europe (2010). Coordinator of research projects of EU, UNESCO, UNDP, ILO, Volkswagen Foundation. Director of the UNESCO-ISSC International Summer School Compara- tive Research in the Social Sciences. The terrain was free for fresh and authentic nationalist initiatives. The cultural and political situation was ripe for them. There was no reason for surprise that exactly a relatively less known “new face” could fill in the vacuum left by the absence of an influential formation with a strong nationalist profile in Bulgarian political life. The man who properly under- stood the moment and caught it was Volen Siderov.

The strategic “20 points…” clearly testify for the truly populist and unrealistic political strategy of the Ataka party and its leader. If the points would have been widely read and understood – the political success of Ataka and Siderov would be questionable. What is unquestionable is only the electoral outcome.

The phenomenon “Ataka” has become only possible after some major causes of a long lasting national crisis have been eliminated. This applies first of all to the resolution of strategic tasks of the international security of the country. In the current geostrategic context they could be resolved with the country’s membership in NATO and in the European Union. Now it is possible to speak loudly out what has been long kept silent under the regime of political correctness required by the circumstances.

It was not the acute crisis which brought about the allegedly surpris- ing appearance of the radical nationalism in Bulgarian political life. To the contrary, it was the relative stabilization of Bulgarian domestic eco- nomic and political life which made this possible. However, the stabiliza- tion made Ataka possible since the stabilization has been achieved and is being reproduced under precarious conditions.

March 2010