From Dual-Process Theories of the Social Mind. Edited by Jeffrey W. Sherman, Bertram Gawronski, and Yaacov Trope. Copyright 2014 by The Guilford Press. All rights reserved.

Cah pter 23

V isual versus Verbal Thinking and Dual‑Process Moral Cognition

Elinor Amit, Sara Gottlieb, and Joshua D. Greene

Moral judgments are not produced by a respective influences of visual and verbal unified “moral faculty.” Instead, they are thinking on moral judgment. influenced by a combination of automatic First, we briefly review the most relevant emotional responses and controlled cogni- literature on automatic versus controlled tive processes with distinctive cognitive pro- processes in moral judgment and decision files (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; making. Next, we discuss the distinctive Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & features of visual versus verbal processing, Cohen, 2008; Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008; then present a set of related hypotheses con- Paxton, Ungar, & Greene, 2011) and neural cerning the respective influences of visual substrates (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, and verbal thinking on moral judgment, fol- Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Greene, Nystrom, lowed by evidence indicating a special con- Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Mendez, nection between visual imagery and deon- Anderson, & Shapira, 2005; Koenigs et tological moral judgment. We also consider al., 2007; Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Ladavas, a possible relationship between visual and & Di Pellegrino, 2007). This dual-­process verbal cognition on the one hand, and the framework (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Slo- primary and secondary emotion distinction man, 1996; Loewenstein, 1996; Chaiken & on the other. Finally, we conclude with some Trope, 1999; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; speculative thoughts concerning the rela- Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002; tionships among the various cognitive dis- Stanovich & West, 2000; Kahneman, 2003, tinctions discussed in this chapter. 2011) answers some questions while raising many others, including the following: What triggers the automatic emotional responses Moral Dilemmas and Dual-­ that influence our moral judgments? What Process Moral Cognition accounts for the variability in these “gut reactions,” both from person to person and We and others have used moral dilemmas situation to situation? Parallel questions in experiments aimed at breaking moral arise concerning the influence of controlled judgment down into component processes. cognition on moral judgment. In this chap- (Early examples include Greene et al., 2001, ter, we address these questions, focusing on 2004, 2008; Mendez et al., 2005; Koenigs the role of domain-­general cognitive pro- et al., 2007; Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Cush- cesses. More specifically, we consider the man et al., 2006. Earlier work examined

340 Visual versus Verbal Thinking and Dual-Process Moral Cognition 341 moral dilemmas, but without a dual-­process are emotional, as in, for example, early framework: Petrinovich, O’Neill, & Jor- visual processing. gensen, 1993, Mikhail, 2000). This is a use- The distinction between automatic and ful strategy given that moral dilemmas tend controlled processes is familiar enough, but to erupt at the fault lines between competing it is used by different researchers to contrast cognitive processes (Cushman & Greene, different clusters of characteristics. Along 2012). On a philosophical level, these dilem- with the core automatic–­controlled distinc- mas capture the pervasive tension between tion, researchers often distinguish between the rights of the individual and the greater processes that are fast versus slow, uncon- good (Greene, 2007; Paxton, Bruni, & scious versus conscious, implicit versus Greene, 2013). On a cognitive level, they explicit, effortless versus effortful, intuitive reveal the dual-­process structure of moral versus reflective, more emotional versus less cognition. For example, in the classic foot- emotional, and those that require minimal bridge dilemma (Thomson, 1985), one can versus substantial use of central cognitive save five lives by pushing an innocent per- resources (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2003). son into the path of a runaway trolley. Here, In the context of moral judgment, we believe deontological judgments favoring the rights that all of these distinctions apply, but of the individual (“It’s wrong to push the with some caveats. In our view—­indeed, man, even if it saves more lives”) are pref- in any sensible view of moral psychology—­ erentially supported by automatic emotional automatic and controlled processes interact, responses (Greene et al., 2001; Mendez et which makes teasing apart their respective al., 2005; Koenigs et al., 2007; Ciaramelli et contributions challenging. Controlled, con- al., 2007), while utilitarian (or consequen- scious, reflective processes may bring to tialist) judgments favoring the greater good light new information (e.g., through explicit (“Better to push and save more lives”) are reasoning) or highlight old information preferentially supported by controlled cogni- (e.g., through heightened attention or will- tive processes (Greene et al., 2004, 2008). ful acts of imagination). These private men- Before moving on, we wish to clarify our tal acts may then trigger automatic emo- use of the potentially misleading word cog- tional responses. For example, one might nitive. It sometimes refers to a class of psy- respond to an imagined scene much as one chological processes to be contrasted with would respond to the scene itself. But in the more emotional or affective processes, as case of the imagined scene the response is in the journal Social Cognitive and Affec- triggered automatically by an endogenous tive Neuroscience. At other times, cognitive controlled cognitive process rather than by refers more broadly to psychological pro- an external stimulus. (See Cushman, Gray, cess that may be characterized in terms of Gaffey, & Mendes, 2012, described below.) information processing (i.e., all psychologi- Having had such a response, one might cal processes), as in the journal Trends in become consciously aware of the response, Cognitive Sciences, which covers research if not the complete chain of cognitive events in all areas of psychology including emo- that triggered it. One might reflect on that tion/affect. Emotions are “cognitive” in the response, deliberate about it, and ultimately second sense but not the first. Here we avoid override its action tendency. Thus, when it the more narrow use of cognitive, which we comes to complex judgments and decisions, regard as a relic from a time when psycholo- it may be rare for a behavioral response to be gists failed to appreciate the information-­ purely automatic, and it may be impossible processing nature of emotions. When we for a behavioral response to be purely con- wish to distinguish automatic emotional trolled: Controlled cognitive processes must responses from the more controlled pro- have something more automatic on which to cesses on the opposite side of our dual-­ operate (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Neverthe- process framework, we refer to the latter as less, it may be possible to identify distinc- controlled processes or controlled cognitive tive influences of automatic and controlled processes, with no implication that emo- processes on moral judgment, as we explain tions are not “cognitive” in the broader, below. information-­processing sense. Likewise, we Initial evidence for our dual-­process the- recognize that not all automatic processes ory of moral judgment came from functional 342 THINKING AND REASONING magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) stud- exhibit increased activity when people make ies demonstrating the engagement of brain utilitarian judgments (Greene et al., 2004). regions associated with emotion and social More recent behavioral studies implicate cognition in response to “personal” dilem- controlled cognition by showing that cogni- mas such as the footbridge case (Greene tive load selectively interferes with utilitarian et al., 2001, 2004; Schaich Borg, Hynes, judgment (Greene et al., 2008, Trémolière, Van Horn, Grafton, & Sinnott-­Armstrong, Neys, & Bonnefon, 2012), that utilitarian 2006). These regions include the ventro- judgment increases with deliberation time medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the (Suter & Hertwig, 2011), and that utilitar- amygdala. A study of patients with fronto- ian judgment can be increased by inducing temporal dementia (FTD), which produces a more reflective mindset (Paxton et al., “emotional blunting,” provided more direct 2011). Other correlational studies associate causal evidence for the connection between utilitarian judgment with increased “need emotional responses and deontological judg- for cognition” (Bartels, 2008) and (for some ment (Mendez et al., 2005). Here, patients instances of utilitarian judgment) work- with FTD, relative to control subjects/ ing memory capacity (Moore et al., 2008). patients, were three times more likely to Some have argued that utilitarian judgments favor pushing the man off the footbridge in in response to moral dilemmas reflect an the name of the greater good. Subsequent absence of concern about doing harm rather studies examining patients with vmPFC than a moral concern for the greater good. damage underscored this point, showing Most notably, Bartels and Pizzaro (2011) that patients with such emotion-­related found that utilitarian judgments are posi- damage make more utilitarian judgments tively related to various antisocial person- (Koenigs et al., 2007; Ciaramelli et al., 2007; ality characteristics, including psychopa- Moretto, Ladavas, Mattioli, & di Pellegrino, thy and Machiavellianism. However, more 2010; Thomas, Croft, & Tranel, 2011). recent evidence (Conway & Gawronski, Likewise, a positive emotion induction can 2013) generated using the “process dissocia- increase utilitarian judgment, counteracting tion” procedure (Jacoby, 1991) casts doubt the negative emotional response to pushing on this view by distinguishing lack of con- the man (Valedesolo & DeSteno, 2006), cern about harming people (what one might though this does not work for all positive call “un-­deontology”) from positive utilitar- emotions (Strohminger, Lewis, & Meyer, ian moral concerns. Conway and Gawronski 2011). Other studies have linked deonto- (2013) show that deontological and utilitar- logical judgment to heightened physiological ian motivations are distinct moral motiva- responses (Moretto et al., 2010; Navarrete, tions with distinct cognitive profiles, consis- McDonald, Mott, & Asher, 2012, Cushman tent with the dual-­process theory described et al., 2012) and normal conscious access to earlier: Subjects with stronger deontological one’s emotional states, as compared to indi- inclinations tend to be higher in empathic viduals with degrees of alexithymia (Koven, concern, and deontological inclinations are 2011). On a molecular level, deontological selectively increased by an empathy manip- judgment is increased by citalopram, a selec- ulation. In contrast, subjects with stronger tive serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) that, utilitarian inclinations tend to be higher in in the short-term, heightens certain kinds “need for cognition” (Cacioppo & Petty, of emotional responses by increasing the 1982), and utilitarian inclinations are selec- availability of serotonin (Crockett, Clark, tively decreased by cognitive load. Hauser, & Robbins, 2010). Conversely, deontological judgment can be reduced by the anti-­anxiety drug lorazepam (Perkins et The Not Specifically al., 2012). Moral Domain On the other side of the dual-­process equation, many studies associate utilitarian For centuries philosophers and folk psychol- judgments favoring the greater good with ogists have referred to a “moral sense” or the engagement of controlled cognition. “moral faculty,” an idea that retains propo- Brain regions associated with cognitive con- nents today (Mikhail 2000, 2011; Hauser, trol, most notably parts of dorsolateral PFC, 2006). As noted earlier, a strong form of Visual versus Verbal Thinking and Dual-Process Moral Cognition 343 psychological faculty for morality has been to require a “common currency” for moral ruled out, as moral judgment involves the and nonmoral values (Chib, Rangel, Shi- operations of distinct and often competing mojo, & O’Doherty, 2009). The most direct cognitive systems. The mere “involvement” evidence for this idea comes from Shenhav of diverse cognitive systems does not, by and Greene (2010), who conducted an fMRI itself, challenge the idea of a core “moral study in which they varied the magnitude faculty.” People who respond to moral ques- and probability of morally salient outcomes. tions must, at the very least, rely on auditory For example, abandoning one drowning or visual cognition to receive information person might enable one to save five oth- about the question at hand. Likewise, moral ers with a probability of 50%, or 20 others judges must use their capacities for lan- with a probability of 40%, and so on. They guage, memory, motor responding, and so provided evidence that moral judgments forth, in familiar and routine ways. But the such as these rely on domain-­general valu- dual-­process theory outlined earlier poses a ation mechanisms, ones that also represent deeper challenge to theories positing a uni- and integrate information about probability fied moral faculty. If we are correct, it is not and magnitude in nonmoral contexts, such just that multiple systems are “involved.” as self-­interested economic decision mak- Instead, different cognitive systems under- ing (Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, write different kinds of moral values. In & Glover, 2005). Thus, core representations other words, moral cognition is fractured in of value in moral judgment are probably not a deep way. representations of moral value per se, but Much of the idea of a “moral faculty” simply value in a more generic sense. Fur- might be retained if these distinct cognitive thermore, it seems that emotional responses, systems were dedicated specifically to moral such as the negative response to pushing the judgment, but we have already seen evidence man off the footbridge, depend in surprising that they are not. For example, we know ways on how our brains represent actions: that various forms of cognitive load interfere People are more likely to approve of using specifically with utilitarian moral judgment a person as a trolley-­stopper if, instead of (Greene et al., 2008; Trémolière et al., 2012; pushing the man directly off the footbridge, Conway & Gawronski, 2013). The concur- one hits a switch that drops him through a rent tasks used in these load paradigms have trap door (Cushman et al., 2006; Greene et nothing to do with morality (e.g., hitting al., 2009). a button when a certain number appears) The foregoing discussion indicates that a Thus, these cognitive load experiments show lot of moral thinking is not specifically moral that moral judgment depends, at least to thinking: Moral judgment depends in sub- some extent, on domain-­general processing. stantive ways on cognitive systems that per- More to the point, these studies show that form rather general (not specifically moral) specific kinds of moral judgment depend functions. This naturally prompts the ques- preferentially on domain-­general process- tion: What other kinds of not specifically ing. In other words, the role that controlled moral thinking have distinctive influences cognition plays in moral judgment is not on moral judgment? Here we consider the merely like the role that auditory processing respective contributions of visual and verbal plays in hearing about moral dilemmas. thinking to moral judgment. We begin with We have seen similar evidence on the a discussion of distinctive features of visual emotional side. Once again, positive emo- and verbal thinking. tions (more specifically, “mirth”) can have a distinctive influence on moral judgment (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006), indicating that The Adaptive Design moral emotions exist in an affective space of Information Processing: that is shared with emotional responses that Visual versus Verbal are not naturally regarded as “moral.” This should come as no surprise given that moral Pictures are concrete representations that considerations must be weighed against in nearly all cases1 physically resemble their other considerations that are not necessar- referent objects. They are analog representa- ily moral, a capability that would appear tions (Goodman, 1976). In contrast, words 344 THINKING AND REASONING

in nearly all cases2 represent more abstractly theory. In our view, words are always more and bear more arbitrary relations to their abstract than pictures; therefore, we expect referents. Words are digital representations to see some reliable differences between that comprise a finite set of discrete units. them. Concrete words, such as the word Words typically correspond to categories table, and pictures, such as an outline draw- and refer to a broad range of concrete objects ing of a table, are close relatives in dual cod- (Glaser, 1992; Paivio, 1986). Consider, for ing theory. Both stimuli are dual-coded by example, visual and verbal representations both systems. Consequently, comparable of a chair or the concept “chair.” A picture performance is expected with such stimuli. of a chair will typically represent some spe- In our view, there is an inevitable difference cific chair, with a specific number of legs, in concreteness–­abstractness between the adjoined at specific angles, etc. But the word word table and the picture of a table, even chair is far more general.There is effectively though both items are highly imaginable. an infinite number of ways in which one can The reason is that the word table encom- draw a chair, or even a kitchen chair, or a passes a larger category (innumerable indi- red kitchen chair with four legs. Words are, vidual tables), while a picture of a table rep- once again, more abstract. resents a specific table. As a result, pictures One of the most influential theories con- are categorized better than words (including cerning differences in the processing of pic- concrete, readily imaginable words), are less tures and words is the dual-­coding theory potent primes, are rendered less accurate by (DCT, Paivio, 1986). According to DCT, incidental changes, and impart a sense of there are two separate representation sys- proximity. All of these features go beyond tems. One is specialized for representing those posited by the dual coding theory. information conveyed by spatial, nonver- Amit, Algom, and Trope (2009) have bal stimuli, and the other is specialized for related this difference in abstractness representing information conveyed verbally. between visual and verbal representations Words are initially represented by the ver- to another important cognitive dimension, bal system, and scenes and pictures are ini- that of psychological distance (Trope & tially represented by the nonverbal or imag- Liberman, 2010). They hypothesize that ery system. In subsequent processing, each people preferentially represent items that are stimulus can be coded by the other system as psychologically proximal (either spatially, well—hence the possibility of dual coding. temporally, or socially) in visual format and The theory does not posit mutually exclusive preferentially represent psychologically dis- processing of words and pictures: Each stim- tal items in verbal format. This preference ulus can be encoded and processed by each exists in two ways: as a tendency to represent of the two systems. The major explanatory some items visually and other items verbally, variable in the theory is the imaginability of and as a processing advantage when items the input. Pictures are readily imaginable. are represented in the preferred manner. Concrete words are also easily imagin- This medium–­distance hypothesis builds on able; therefore, such words are likely to be construal-­level theory (CLT; Trope & Liber- encoded by the image system as well as the man, 2010), according to which people pre- verbal system. In contrast, abstract words fer to represent information more abstractly are likely to be encoded by the verbal system when they are more distant from the target only. This difference explains the superiority of thought. in memory of concrete over abstract words, There are two accounts for this medium–­ and, often, of pictures over words. distance association. The first account is The concrete–­abstract distinction in dual functional: Because words are relatively coding theory is relevant, but, in our view, it abstract, they capture the essential proper- does not map perfectly onto the distinction ties of an item, those that are likely to remain between pictures and words. According to constant across changes in location, or con- DCT, in principle, words can be as concrete text more generally. For example, a chair’s as pictures (although pictures cannot be as visual appearance varies depending on light- abstract as some words). When concreteness ing, the angle from which it is viewed, and (or abstractness) is comparable, process- whether or not it has been repainted. Yet it ing is comparable according to dual coding remains the same chair, and, conveniently, Visual versus Verbal Thinking and Dual-Process Moral Cognition 345 may be referred to by the same word, chair, or selective attention (Amit, Algom, & Trope, by the same phrase, “Dana’s favorite chair.” 2009), and memory (Amit, Rim, Halbeisen, After the chair is repainted, the picture may Algom, & Trope, in preparation; Amit, be out of date, but the word applies as well Algom, Trope, & Liberman, 2008). Here, as ever. The second account of the medium–­ we hypothesize that the association between distance association is perceptual: Pictures medium (visual vs. verbal) and distance has are subject to perceptual analyses akin to implications for emotional responses and those performed on the objects themselves evaluations. Our theory begins with the (Glaser, 1992; Stenberg, 2006; see also, idea that proximal objects–­events tend to DeLoache, Pierroutsakos, Uttal, Rosengren, be more emotionally salient. This principle & Gottlieb, 1998; DeLoache, Pierroutsakos, makes functional sense. Emotions are ulti- & Uttal, 2003). For the most part (e.g., out- mately for doing, not just feeling, and events side of astronomy), perception occurs only that are “here and now” are more likely to in the presence of the perceived object. With- require an immediate response. For exam- out the object present, there is nothing for ple, Mobbs et al. (2007) found that as a photons to bounce off of, nothing to emit threat becomes spatially closer, brain activ- pressure waves or airborne molecules, and ity shifts from the vmPFC to the periaque- therefore nothing to impinge on our sensory ductal gray, indicating a shift from general surfaces and engage our perceptual facul- evaluative representation (“common cur- ties. Perception, then, presupposes prox- rency”) to preparation for defensive behav- imity. And because pictures are perceived ior. A further step connects visual represen- more or less as objects are perceived, they, tation to emotion by way of proximity: If too, convey a feeling of proximity. Words, in you hear the word lion, you may need to act, contrast, need not convey proximity. On the but you may also simply be overhearing an contrary, one of the most useful aspects of idle conversation about lions. In contrast, if language is that it allows us to communicate you see a lion, the odds that you need to act, and think about things that are not present. or at least be on guard, are much higher. (Of Thus, visual perceptions present objects as course, you could be at the zoo. But zoos are “here and now,” whether or not they are, recent inventions, unlike conversations.) while words specialize in conveying infor- This argument is consistent with ­Kensinger mation across space and time. and Schacter’s (2006) account of the differ- Thus, two related rationales—­one func- ence between pictures and words in eliciting tional and the other perceptual—­invite the emotional reactions, with corresponding lat- hypothesis that visual representations are eralization in the amygdala. associated with proximity, while verbal rep- resentations are associated with distance. The specificity of the right-­amygdala response Recent research supports this medium–­ (to pictures and not to words) and the general- distance hypothesis (Amit, Algom, & Trope, ity of the left-­amygdala response (to both stim- 2009). In one experiment, participants ulus types) may reflect their respective roles in viewed two items (e.g., an apple, a chair) automatic processing (perhaps more likely to either verbally or pictorially, and in appar- occur for pictures than for words) versus elab- orative, associative, or conceptual processing ently “distal” and “proximal” locations (which may occur for both pictures and words within a depth illusion. As predicted, par- . . . ). The latter interpretation would be con- ticipants were faster to identify pictures of sistent with recent evidence indicating that objects when they were near rather than dis- left-­lateralized amygdala activity tends to be tant, but they were faster to identify words elicited across a wider range of tasks than is denoting those objects when they were dis- right-­lateralized amygdala activity. (p. 121). tant rather than near. Other experiments that manipulated temporal distance (using Consistent with this dissociation, other ancient vs. modern objects; e.g., a cart vs. a research indicates that visual representa- car) and social distance (using domestic vs. tions, as compared to verbal representa- foreign objects; e.g., a dollar vs. a euro) found tions, are more emotionally salient (Holmes similar results. Furthermore, the same pat- & Mathews, 2005; Holmes, Mathews, tern of results was obtained with other cog- Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2006; Holmes, nitive tasks, such as speeded categorization, Mathews, Mackintosh, & Dalgleish, 2008; 346 THINKING AND REASONING

Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; De Houwer Visual Thinking, Verbal & Hermans, 1994). For example, Holmes Thinking, and Moral Judgment: and Mathews (2005) asked participants Some Convergent Hypotheses to read ambiguous event descriptions that were eventually resolved in a negative direc- We may now integrate the foregoing discus- tion. They were asked either to imagine the sion of dual-­process moral cognition with situation or to focus on the meaning of the the foregoing discussion of visual and verbal words. Holmes and Matthews found that cognition. Putting these together suggests state anxiety increased significantly over the following line of reasoning: If deontolog- time for those in the group given imagery ical moral judgments are preferentially sup- instructions, but not for those asked to ported by emotional responses, and visual focus on the verbal meaning. Similarly, in imagery facilitates emotional responses, then another study, Holmes et al. (2008), pre- perhaps visual imagery preferentially sup- sented picture–­caption pairs to participants ports deontological judgments. Likewise, if and instructed them to produce either an utilitarian judgments are preferentially sup- image or a verbal sentence, and to integrate ported by less emotional forms of thinking, each picture with its caption (experimen- and if verbal processing facilitates responses tal blocks alternated between negative or that are less emotional (more abstract, dis- benign meaning combinations). Compared tanced), then perhaps verbal processing may with the verbal condition, state anxiety preferentially support utilitarian judgments. scores in the imagery group increased more These hypotheses are, in fact, also sug- across negative combination blocks, but gested by a related line of reasoning, ema- decreased across benign blocks. Reported nating from cognitive neuroscience: Many of liking for pictures, when displayed alone at the brain regions most consistently engaged the beginning and end of the experiment, by moral judgment (Greene et al., 2001; decreased for pictures that had been in Greene, 2009) are part of the “default net- negative (rather than benign) combinations, work” (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001). Accord- and this difference was significantly greater ing to one theory of default network func- in the imagery group. Finally, De Houwer tion (Buckner, Andrews-­Hanna, & Schacter, and Hermans (1994) used a word–­picture 2008), it is responsible for generating mental affective Stroop task and found that emo- simulations of events that are not “here and tional pictures, but not words, produced now,” such as events that are in the past, interference effects. Furthermore, naming in the future, or in the minds of others. In times were shorter for negative pictures, but light of this, one might suppose that moral not for negative words. The authors con- dilemmas (and especially those that are most cluded that pictures have privileged access emotionally engaging) elicit increased activ- to emotional information. This makes sense ity in the default network as people imagine from an evolutionary perspective given that the events described in the dilemma, events visual information has been triggering emo- such as a runaway trolley headed toward tional responses for millions of years, while five innocent people and oneself reluctantly language is a relatively recent evolutionary pushing an innocent person in front of that development. trolley in the hope of stopping it. Moreover, In summary, there is evidence that visual one might suppose that such mental simula- representations, relative to verbal represen- tions trigger emotional responses that guide tations, are more emotionally salient. This moral judgments, such as the judgment that may be because things that are perceived it is wrong to push the man off the foot- visually—­especially historically, but also bridge. Finally, one might suppose that such today—are more likely to be “here and now” simulations are in part sensory simulations, and to demand an immediate response. In complete with visual imagery, and that this contrast, verbal representations appear to imagery plays a key role in triggering the have a “comparative advantage” when it aforementioned emotional responses. comes to representing things that are distal If we are correct, such responses are not and more abstract, and are therefore less necessarily triggered by mental stimulations. likely to demand an immediate response. On the contrary, insofar as mental simula- Visual versus Verbal Thinking and Dual-Process Moral Cognition 347 tions of events are emotionally salient, it is In the other condition, they were presented because the events themselves are, or would as pictures. When the items were presented be, even more emotionally salient. This as words, participants grouped them into a hypothesis is supported by recent work by smaller number of more abstract categories. Cushman et al. (2012), who took physiologi- When the items were presented as pictures, cal recordings from subjects while they phys- participants grouped them into a larger num- ically simulated violent actions in the lab ber of more concrete categories. (e.g., smashing someone’s realistic-­looking Notably, utilitarian judgments give pre- false leg with a hammer). Subjects experi- cedence to ends (“Better to save more lives enced heightened physiological responses . . . ”). Deontological judgments, in contrast, (peripheral vasoconstriction) when perform- famously give precedence to concerns about ing these pseudoviolent actions, as compared means (“But it’s simply wrong to kill an to performing physically similar actions that innocent person, even for a good cause”). are not pseudoviolent (e.g., hammering a This suggests that utilitarian judgments may nail), and to observing others perform the be facilitated by high-level construals, while same pseudoviolent actions. Critically, for deontological judgments may be facilitated our present purposes, the strength of these by low-level construals. physiological responses was positively corre- Putting the foregoing ideas together sug- lated with deontological responses to hypo- gests yet another line of reasoning that leads thetical moral dilemmas, suggesting that to our central prediction: Visual imagery emotional responses to mentally simulated is inherently concrete, depicting specific violence are related to emotional responses objects, actions, and other events. When one to actual violence. (This assumes, of course, visualizes a purposeful action, the means that Cushman et al.’s physical simulations of employed to achieve the desired end will violence produce reactions similar to those most likely be visualized in a concrete way. produced by actual violence. See also experi- For example, if one visualizes someone bak- ments combining virtual reality and physi- ing bread, one is very likely to visualize the ological recordings; Navarrete et al., 2012). tools used to bake the bread (rolling pin, Yet another rationale for this hypothesis oven, etc.). Thus, we hypothesize that visual follows from CLT (Liberman & Trope, 2008; imagery naturally facilitates low-level con- Trope & Liberman, 2010). Once again, struals of actions, whereby the means to the according to CLT, objects and events may end of the action is represented as a concrete be represented (construed) at multiple levels chain of physical events. And, thus, by high- of abstraction. (See also action identification lighting the concrete means by which ends theory; Vallacher & Wegner, 1985). High- are achieved, visual imagery facilitates deon- level construals are relatively abstract, reflect- tological moral judgments (at least in con- ing overarching goals (“I’m moving to a new texts in which the harmful action is a means house”). Low-level construals, in contrast, to a greater good, as in the case of pushing are relatively concrete, reflecting the means the man off the footbridge). Along parallel employed to achieve overarching goals (“I’m lines, we hypothesize that verbal process- loading boxes into a truck”). If, as suggested ing facilitates more abstract representations, earlier, words are more abstract representa- and that these more abstract representations tions than pictures, then words and pictures promote higher-­level construals that empha- may respectively map onto high and low levels size the ends to be achieved over the means of construal (Amit, Algom, & Trope, 2009; used to achieve them. Thus, according to Amit, Algom, Trope, & Liberman, 2009). this hypothesis, verbal thinking will facili- Indeed, the former researchers have shown tate utilitarian judgment. that verbal representations facilitate more Thus, we have three related rationales—­ abstract, high-level construals, while visual from dual-­process moral cognition, from the representations facilitate more concrete, low- cognitive neuroscience of the default net- level construals. For example, participants work, and from CLT—all pointing toward in one experiment organized items associ- the same hypotheses: Visual thinking facili- ated with a camping trip into groups. In one tates deontological moral judgment, and ver- condition, the items were presented as words. bal thinking facilitates utilitarian judgment. 348 THINKING AND REASONING

Visual Imagery and Moral interference. Given what we know about the Judgment: Evidence role of emotion in deontological judgment (discussed earlier), this suggests that visual We have conducted three experiments that imagery plays a role in triggering the emo- test these ideas (Amit & Greene, 2012). In tional responses that drive deontological the first of these, we employed a measure of judgments. We note that we did not observe visual versus verbal cognitive style adapted a parallel effect with verbal interference. from Kraemer, Rosenberg, and Thompson-­ That is, verbal interference did not decrease Schill (2009). Subjects completed two utilitarian judgment, despite our prediction, matched working memory tasks, one visual and despite the fact that other forms of cog- and the other verbal. In the visual version, nitive load have this effect (Greene et al., subjects saw a target shape, then had to 2008, Trémolière et al., 2012). identify one of two subsequently presented A third experiment examined more closely shapes as having more attributes in com- the contents of these morally salient visual- mon with the target. In the verbal version, izations. A natural hypothesis is that visual the visual attributes were replaced by words imagery preferentially supports deontologi- (e.g., striped, red). The visual and verbal cal judgment, because people tend to visual- tasks were matched for difficulty. Our index ize the harm caused as a means more than of cognitive style (visual vs. verbal) was the harm to be avoided as an end. For example, difference in accuracy between the visual in the footbridge dilemma, people tend and verbal versions of the working memory to visualize the harm to the person who is task. After completing the memory tasks, pushed more than they visualize the harm subjects responded to a set of moral dilem- that will befall the five other people if noth- mas, including the footbridge dilemma, ing is done. We tested this hypothesis using along with other, similar “high-­conflict per- self-­reports concerning the contents of peo- sonal” dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2007) in ple’s visual imagery. In a between-­subjects which one can kill one person in order to design, people responded to either the foot- save the lives of several others. As predicted, bridge dilemma or the trolley dilemma, in we found that participants with relatively which one can save the five other people by higher visual scores, indicating a more visual turning the trolley onto a side track, killing cognitive style, made more deontological one person instead. In these two dilemmas, judgments. That is, they were less approving the consequences are identical but the nature of violating the rights of one person in order of the action is different. In the footbridge to produce a greater good for others. case, the harm is causally necessary to In our second experiment we used an achieve the goal (a means to an end), while experimental manipulation to test for a the harm is incidental (a side effect) in the causal relationship between cognitive style trolley dilemma. These dilemmas also differ and moral judgment. In each experimental in whether the agent applies “personal force” trial, the participant read a moral dilemma to the victim (Greene et al., 2009), essentially and deliberated while engaging in a 2-back the difference between directly pushing the working memory task (Kirchner, 1958). victim or harming the victim in a more indi- In the visual version, subjects saw a series rect, mechanically mediated way, such as of shapes (e.g., triangle, circle) and were hitting a switch (see also Royzman & Baron, asked to indicate by button press whether 2002; Cushman et al., 2006; and Moore et the present shape was identical to the shape al., 2008). As predicted, people responding presented two items previously. In the ver- to the footbridge dilemma reported more bal version, visual shapes were replaced by vividly imaging the person to be sacrificed, words naming shapes. Thus, subjects were as compared to the five to be saved. We saw exposed to either visual interference or verbal no such effect for the trolley case, and this interference while making moral judgments. difference in who gets visualized partially We also included a no-­interference control mediated the relationship between dilemma condition. As predicted, visual interference and judgment. In summary, it seems that we made judgments more utilitarian, both in say “no” to pushing the man off the foot- comparison to verbal interference and no bridge (at least partly), because we tend to Visual versus Verbal Thinking and Dual-Process Moral Cognition 349 visualize this violent event more than other thinking cannot cause primary emotion. morally consequential events, and because Our more modest hypothesis is that there we tend to respond emotionally to that visu- may yet be a tighter relationship between alization. Convergent evidence comes from visual thinking and primary emotion on the Conway and Gawronski (2013), who show one hand, and between verbal thinking and that presenting visual displays of the poten- secondary emotion on the other. tial victims in such dilemmas selectively Preliminary data support this hypoth- enhances deontological inclinations. esis. In one experiment (Amit, Chakroff, & Greene, in preparation), we had participants think about times when they experienced Visual versus Verbal either primary or secondary emotions. At the Thinking and Primary same time, participants performed a 2-back versus Secondary Emotions visual or verbal working memory task, simi- lar to the one used in the interference experi- Many researchers distinguish between pri- ment described earlier. We found that per- mary emotions (e.g., anger and happiness) formance on the visual task was worse when and secondary emotions (e.g., shame and people recalled experiencing a primary emo- pride). Primary emotions are thought of as tion and that performance on the verbal task being discrete and evolutionarily conserved, was worse when people recalled experienc- as relatively independent of cultural influ- ing a secondary emotion. This pattern of ence, as requiring less conceptual cognition, interference is consistent with the idea that as having relatively short typical duration, visual thinking preferentially supports the and as evoking universally recognized facial experience of primary emotion, while verbal expressions (Demoulin & Teixeira, 2010, thinking preferentially supports the experi- Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972). Sec- ence of secondary emotions.3 ondary emotions, in contrast, are thought If these preliminary data hold, they may of as being uniquely human (Gaunt, Leyens, have interesting implications for our under- & Demoulin, 2002; Leyens et al., 2001), as standing of emotion particularly and of com- involving complex conceptual cognition, as plex, multimodal cognition more generally. having relatively long typical durations, and First, they would provide further evidence as being less readily observable (Demoulin for the controversial distinction between et al., 2004). Some theorists have character- primary and secondary emotions. Second, ized secondary emotions as “self-­conscious” the tendency to think more visually than ver- (Tracy, Robins, & Tangney, 2007) or bally, and vice versa, may explain variation “moral” emotions (Haidt, 2003). among emotional responses across individu- To summarize the previous points in a als and situations. For example, some clinical rough (and somewhat contentious) way, the disorders, such as phobia of spiders (which primary emotions are thought to be more are concrete targets), seem to be more closely “primitive.” One can say with more pre- related to primary emotions, whereas others, cision and confidence that vision is more such as generalized anxiety disorder (which primitive than language: Our ancestors has no specific, concrete target), seem to be have been seeing for hundreds of millions of more closely related to secondary emotions. years, whereas language is a relatively recent If there is a preferential connection between evolutionary development. If vision and visual cognition and primary emotions, or a primary emotion are both more primitive, preferential connection between verbal cog- operating in tandem for many millions of nition and secondary emotions, understand- years, one might suppose further that there ing these connections may prove useful in are more direct connections between visual understanding the causes of these disorders processing and primary emotion. Likewise, and possible avenues for treatment. Finally, one might suppose that secondary emotions one might wonder about the connection are more dependent on language. Here we between visual processing and deontological wish to be clear: We are by no means deny- judgment in light of the previous discussion ing that visual thinking can cause secondary of primary versus secondary emotions. This emotion. Nor are we claiming that verbal discussion suggests that deontological judg- 350 THINKING AND REASONING ments may be preferentially supported by ary history (ancient widespread adaptations one or more primary emotions. However, it vs. recent and uniquely human adaptations). is not clear which primary emotion or emo- Thus, we have in this chapter attempted to tions would be involved. Fear? Disgust? Or connect many dots. We acknowledge that the perhaps such judgments are driven by emo- connections we have drawn do not yet form tions that are in some ways like primary a clear picture, but we nevertheless strongly emotions but less well understood. This is an suspect that these connections are not ran- interesting avenue for future research. dom. If forced to identify a central node in this conceptual network, we would put our finger on the abstract–­concrete distinction: Concluding Thoughts Over evolutionary time, our brains evolved the capacity for increasingly abstract repre- Dual-­process theories are both powerful sentation. In the moral domain, this enables and pervasive, making sense of a wide range us to judge actions by their consequences of phenomena in social judgment and deci- (“How many lives were saved?”), which may sion making. In particular, the dual-­process vary dramatically from context to context, framework has deepened our understanding rather than by observable features of the of moral psychology and provided a bridge acts themselves (“Does it involve intentional between moral psychology and cognitive pushing?”). Abstraction allows us to think neuroscience. But this framework leaves about things that are far away in space and open many questions, including the causes in time (next year’s trip to London), gloss- and representational nature of the automatic ing over unknown or irrelevant details (the and controlled processes that (typically) put outbound flight number). Likewise, abstrac- the “dual” in dual process. Here, we have tion allows us to set and pursue high-level attempted to integrate several widely used goals (visiting London), independent of the cognitive distinctions: deontological versus specific concrete means that we may use to utilitarian, concrete versus abstract, proxi- achieve them (taking Flight 228 to Heath- mal versus distal, visual versus verbal, and row). Abstraction allows us to represent primary versus secondary. Construal level things as good or bad, not merely because theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010) connects of their immediate value (“Tasty food makes the abstract–­concrete distinction to the me feel happy”) but because of the value they proximal–­distal distinction. Research by take on in their social contexts (“Providing Amit (Amit, Algom, & Trope, 2009; Amit, food for others makes me feel pride”). And Wakslak, & Trope, 2013) connects these words enable us to represent abstract con- two distinctions to the visual–­verbal distinc- cepts that can be represented imperfectly, or tion. Research we have done together (Amit perhaps not at all, with visual (or otherwise & Greene, 2012) connects the visual–­verbal sensory) representations. In light of the pre- distinction to the deontological–­utilitarian vious discussion, one might think that there distinction, a connection suggested in at is a deep connection between our capacity least two distinct ways: (1) Deontological for abstraction and our capacity for dual-­ judgments and visual representations both process cognition, and perhaps that is true. tend to be more emotional (perhaps specifi- However, we suspect that there is no simple cally primary emotions); (2) deontological mapping here. In particular, some automatic judgments are focused on means rather than processing seems to involve representations ends, suggesting a low level of construal, that are very abstract, such as the math- which is associated with psychological prox- ematical intuitions of mathematicians or, imity, which is associated with visual rep- more prosaically, the use of abstract social resentation. Our research (Amit et al., in categories to make dispositional attributions preparation) also (tentatively) connects the (Nussbaum, Trope, & Liberman, 2003). visual–­verbal distinction to the distinction Thus, many puzzles remain concerning the between primary and secondary emotions. relationships among abstract versus concrete As noted earlier, some or all of the distinc- thinking, visual versus verbal thinking, and tions may have analogs in the domain of the two sides of dual-­process cognition. We neural mechanisms (e.g., default network vs. hope that this discussion has provided some other large-scale networks) and evolution- useful clues. Visual versus Verbal Thinking and Dual-Process Moral Cognition 351

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