Visual Versus Verbal Thinking and Dual‑Process Moral Cognition
From Dual-Process Theories of the Social Mind. Edited by Jeffrey W. Sherman, Bertram Gawronski, and Yaacov Trope. Copyright 2014 by The Guilford Press. All rights reserved. CAH PTER 23 V isual versus Verbal Thinking and Dual-Process Moral Cognition Elinor Amit, Sara Gottlieb, and Joshua D. Greene Moral judgments are not produced by a respective influences of visual and verbal unified “moral faculty.” Instead, they are thinking on moral judgment. influenced by a combination of automatic First, we briefly review the most relevant emotional responses and controlled cogni- literature on automatic versus controlled tive processes with distinctive cognitive pro- processes in moral judgment and decision files (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; making. Next, we discuss the distinctive Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & features of visual versus verbal processing, Cohen, 2008; Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008; then present a set of related hypotheses con- Paxton, Ungar, & Greene, 2011) and neural cerning the respective influences of visual substrates (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, and verbal thinking on moral judgment, fol- Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Greene, Nystrom, lowed by evidence indicating a special con- Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Mendez, nection between visual imagery and deon- Anderson, & Shapira, 2005; Koenigs et tological moral judgment. We also consider al., 2007; Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Ladavas, a possible relationship between visual and & Di Pellegrino, 2007). This dual- process verbal cognition on the one hand, and the framework (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Slo- primary and secondary emotion distinction man, 1996; Loewenstein, 1996; Chaiken & on the other. Finally, we conclude with some Trope, 1999; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; speculative thoughts concerning the rela- Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002; tionships among the various cognitive dis- Stanovich & West, 2000; Kahneman, 2003, tinctions discussed in this chapter.
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