Alternative Perspectives: On Chinese infrastructure projects in Bangladesh
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Alternative perspectives:
On Chinese infrastructure projects in Bangladesh
Author: Lavinia Castellan
Student number: 11124318
Email: [email protected]
Date: September 26, 2016
Place: Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
University of Amsterdam
Department of Anthropology
Contemporary Asian studies masters program
Supervisor: Dr. Shanshan Lan
Reader: Gerben Nooteboom
Reader: Dr L.M. Douw
Word count: 21,327
Page count: 105
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Acknowledgements
Talks of the rise of China as one of the most important phenomenon of our contemporary world arouse my curiosity to better understand the world we live in and motivated me to take on this program. Having lived in Shenzhen China for four years and in Dhaka Bangladesh for two years prior to coming to the Netherlands enabled me to navigate within the two cultures and gave me a particular attachment to both countries. My previous studies in international relations during my bachelors made the right combination of qualities that put together made this year a joyful one to further explore. Often times I wondered about my purpose for having lived in these two places, during the course of this year I felt this masters gave additional meaning to those previous experiences.
The process of writing a thesis is extensive and challenging, I would not have been able to go through with it without the support of a wonderful group of people that made it possible. I would like to pay tribute to the following. To Shanshan Lan for her incredible amount of patience and exceptional guidance’s from the start until the end. She gave this thesis her valuable time, effort, analysis and advice in every stage that I feel is exceptional. She challenged me and motivated me to dig deeper into themes and ideas. I am thankful that she allowed me to be one of her students. I would like to thank Gerben Nooteboom for teaching us the necessary skills to go into the field. Skills in observation, negotiation and interviewing that will be lifelong qualities I hope to take along with me in my future journeys. I would like to thank the University of Amsterdam and the professors of Contemporary Asian studies program for organizing this unique course that opened my eyes and gave the ability to think critically about my surroundings.
During my stay in Bangladesh I had the opportunity to meet some great people who openly discussed with me their ideas and feelings. A special thank you to Mr. Yu for welcoming me to the Chinese community of Dhaka and always being eager to share with me his work life, ideas, and introducing me to more respondents. I would like to recognize those respondents from Bangladesh and other nationalities that I met along the way, who I now consider friends, who were curious and willing to talk to me about their view of China in Bangladesh. I am also grateful to my family, my father and mother, for supporting me to pursue higher education, for having trust and faith in me to never stop investing in education as they say it’s the best legacy they want to leave for their children. I dedicate this to Domenica. Finally, there are errors in this thesis and I apologize in advance for this, I bear responsibility for them.
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Table of content
PART 1: RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
Chapter One: The One Belt One Road in Bangladesh 9
1.1 Motivation 10
1.2 Background information 12
1.3 Research question and sub questions 14
1.4 History of Chinese aid and African and Asia interactions 16
1.5 String of pearls theory 20
1.6 Methodology 22
1.7 Limitations 26
1.5 Thesis outline 28
Chapter Two: Bangladesh between two giants, India and China 31
2.1 A brief history of Bangladesh 32
2.2 Bangladesh need for infrastructure improvement 35
2.3 Bangladesh growing economy 38
2.4 Bangladesh and foreign direct investment 39
2.5 China Bangladesh relations 42
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PART 2: RESEARCH FINDINGS
Chapter Three: Different perceptions of Chinese in Bangladesh 45
3.1 Perception of Chinese in Bangladesh 47
3.2 Chinese perspective on their influence in Bangladesh 53
3.3 Connecting the dots 59
Chapter Four: The Silent Revival of the Bangladesh Railway 61
4.1 The railway then and the railway now 63
4.2 The China railway company in Bangladesh 65
4.3 China and Western debate 67
4.4 Social reality of local discussion of the railway 69
4.5 The Tazara Railway 71
Chapter Five: the “Padma Bridge” the World Bank initiation and China’s tentative completion 77
5.1 The multipurpose Padma Bridge 78
5.2 Changes in the project and corruption 82
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5.3 The Washington and the Beijing consensus 83
5.4 From Challenge to opportunity 85
5.5 Solutions and mixed messages 85
5.6 Chinese perspective about the Padma Bridge 89
5.7 Western perspective about the Chinese role in this project 90
5.8 Current situation of the project 91
PART 3: CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION
Chapter six: Conclusions 93
Reference 97
Appendix 102
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Chapter one
The “One Belt One Road” in Bangladesh
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1.1 Motivation
China’s global presence has sparked a lot of anticipation and much debate.
Difference of opinions ranges from claims over hegemonic dominance, to praises over
an alternative development model departing from the traditional western north south
cooperation. Most existing information comes from the experiences of African countries
and their interaction with China. Whereas most Western academic articles often portray
China in the first category, the Chinese government stance for their motivations is non-
interference, win-win, and friendship for mutual benefit in its ‘going abroad’ policy.
Going abroad or ‘going out’ strategy is a term often used to describe China’s foreign
policy. Foreign development aid since the end of World War II has increased in
significance within international relations as a way of developing strategic interests and
improving the international environment (He, 2008). China stands that its motivation
are mainly humanitarian driven, while most Western media claims that Chinese motifs
may have more to do with regional dominance than with moral obligations, there
remains a clear dual division of views.
The two approaches of Western and Chinese foreign investment and aid goals have been coined with the terms “Washington consensus” and “Beijing consensus”. The
Beijing consensus is viewed as an alternative model of donor and recipient exchange that avoids the paternalism that has come to characterize aid from the West (Brautigam
2009, Chen 2007, and Alden 2006). This model emerged in the 1960s and has matured over time with distinctions as well as similarities with the Washington consensus.
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Scholars such as Brautigam (2009) and Shambaugh (2013) claim that China uses aid not
only as a tool of foreign policy and a means to build political support abroad but as a
practical instrument to promote Chinese exports and help China’s corporations expand
overseas. There are a variety of factors that differentiate the Beijing consensus from
the Washington consensus. The Beijing Consensus model typically involves the
construction of infrastructure projects paid with loans at an advance at zero or near- zero interest rates. Another characteristic is that the Beijing consensus has no strings attached and non-interference with the recipient’s government as long as nations are supportive of China’s sovereignty. These two characteristics play an important role in shaping the exchanges in the past with African nations and in this case in Bangladesh.
Furthermore those that praise this model add that China does not want to expand their military and most of their attention in “going abroad “policies are reflective of soft power projection initiatives that both complement and derive from the past decades of economic growth that China has experienced.
Criticism on the Beijing consensus are also present in the public, media and academia, claiming that the main motives are in line with practice of neocolonialism, corruption, resource extractions and self interest for the Chinese government (Norberg
2006; Lyman 2005). Many have argued that due to China’s non interference with the government of donor countries, exchanges are more hurtful than beneficial. They believe that China is hurting poverty reduction goals and fostering greater corruption by its engagements in other countries. The interplay of these two opinions lays the foundation for this project.
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This project was born out of an interest in Chinese foreign policy as a maturing
donor and Bangladesh in the current shift in world order from a regional analysis.
Bangladesh has an interesting location in Asia especially for trade with the port in
Chittagong. Additionally there is virtually no existing literature about its interaction with
China from people to people’s perspective. Bangladesh is an interesting actor with
respect to China, as its relationships with the West are viewed as being exploitative.
Alternatively, the country is an appealing case for Chinese going abroad to be analyzed
and furthered explored. Diversity of opinions prevails, however what often times is
lacking are the voices of the local people.
1.2 Background information
Recently the going abroad policy of the Chinese government has focused on The
“New Silk Road” and the “One Belt One Road”. On September 7, 2013, President Xi
Jinping announced the “One Road One Belt” plan to revive the Silk Road improving connectivity, economic engagement and trade from China to Europe. This is to include a
Marine Silk road, and Silk Road Economic Belt to invest in transport via air, rail and road
infrastructure projects for mutual cooperation. The National Development and Reform
Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People's
Republic of China stated that “The Belt and Road Initiative is a way for win-win
cooperation that promotes common development and prosperity and a road towards
peace and friendship by enhancing mutual understanding and trust, and strengthening
all-round exchanges” (Judson, 2015). The rise of China over the past few decades has
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made the Chinese policymakers claim historic ownership of the Silk Road and taking the
initiative of the project marks a historical sign of China's growing geopolitical influence
in the world. In the same year that the initiative was announced in a meeting at the
United Nations headquarter Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Bangladesh Prime
Minister Sheikh Hasina said that both Bangladesh and China could work together for the
development of the people of the region. The prime minister of Bangladesh previously
called China the “most dependable and consistent friend” of Bangladesh (Kumara, 2015).
Figure 1 Map of One Belt, One Road
Retrieved from http://iasbaba.com/2016/02/iasbabas-daily-current-affairs-2nd-february-2016/
The Initiative is a vision for the opening-up and cooperation among the countries
along the Belt and Road, the reason I chose Bangladesh is because of its important
position along the Silk Road both in sea and land links with China. The New Silk Road is
constructed partly by using China’s foreign reserves to offer loans to developing
countries for infrastructure and construction. Bangladesh is typically an aid recipient
nation. One year after the country’s independence since 1972 the International
Development Association (IDA) has been supporting Bangladesh. Since then, IDA has
13 provided more than $19 billion support to advance Bangladesh’s development priorities
(World Bank, 2013). The World Bank as well as other western aid actors had supported operations for development outcomes in the nation. Recently aid from western nations has decreased, or stands complications and most notably a few have been cancelled such as the case of the Padma Bridge, which will be discussed in Chapter Five. Therefore
China is a newly added player in the aid development goals, with their own characteristics.
Bilateral exchanges between the two countries range in a variety of projects, this thesis zooms in specifically in regards to The New Silk road. The New Silk Road is a fast and evolving occurrence in the world, but with deep roots in the past. The Silk Road fund will bear the cost of the projects it aims to achieve. China set up $40 Billion dollars for the Silk Road Fund, aimed to support the connectivity of countries along the belt
(Fallon, 2015). With around 80 percent of China’s oil imports passing through the Bay of
Bengal in Bangladesh (Kumara, 2015). It has been argued that one key motivation for
Chinese involvement in the area is to bypass the Malacca Straits, raising the same sentiments as those about the nature of Chinese presence in Africa, this time it has been named “String of Pearls” theory (Marantidou, 2014). In Africa Chinese were blamed for neocolonialism, extracting resources and collaborating with dictators, now these same sentiments of threat are present in the “String of Pearls” theory for Bangladesh. New infrastructure, including pipelines, road, and railway lines, would allow China to use an overland transport for its energy supplies both from the Middle East and Central Asia in order to bypass the Malacca Straits. String of Pearls commentators view this project as
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a global threat, and an initiative for China to expands its military influence and hence as
a result pressuring the global stability. What are often missing in such critiques are the
points of view of the people living in the area where the string of pearls and the new Silk
Road are located.
This project analyzes the New Silk Road and what this means to Bangladesh as
the plan has profound impacts on the country and its citizens. Repeatedly Chinese
government officials emphasize the importance of the effects on local people’s of
increasing cooperation; improved local livelihood, increased job creations, poverty relief,
greater trade relations, cultural exchange, and a variety of other positive effects that the
Belt and Road will bring to the people that are living in the region. In order to
understand these grand plans this research thus asks the following questions.
Research question “What are the perceptions of Chinese involvement with
infrastructure projects in Bangladesh Context?”
Sub-questions: How do the construction projects benefit Chinese-Bangladesh relations?
What are the local reactions towards Chinese people, products and influence in
Bangladesh? How are the local perceptions of China’s influence in Bangladesh different
from western perceptions? What are the similarities and differences between Chinese
infrastructure projects in Africa and in Bangladesh?
In other words I am interested in understanding and documenting the views of locals, due to the fact that most policies and initiatives deriving from both governments emphasize the importance of the projects on local communities and people. Using
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previous perceptions studies of Chinese in Africa I wanted to see if the same attitudes
were replicated in Bangladesh or if there had been a departure of these research findings. Previous studies had concluded that the negative hype present in the media was not translated in the people’s opinions in Africa. Actually most people in many
African nations had positively received Chinese influence in their significant nations. By
engaging in an ethnographic research in order to obtain a balanced view of perceptions
via interviews, surveys, and observations I wanted to comprehend the ties between
China and Bangladesh, in a more bottom up manner I wanted to learn about
Bangladeshi attitudes towards Chinese “One Belt One Road”. Thus make a contribution
to this occurring phenomenon. By adding people to people views this thesis aims to fill
the gap of understanding Chinese involvement as an international player. This research
seeks to contribute to the existing knowledge in the debate of China's recent greater involvement in the global arena, in particular in Bangladesh where little research on
people’s perceptions has been conducted with the focus on infrastructure projects.
1.3 History of Chinese aid in Africa and Asia
The 1955 Bandung conference marked the start of modern Afro-Asian dealings
for peaceful, prosperous coexistence. A year after China began to aid African nations.
Bangladesh was still considered part of Pakistan and, therefore, was not an independent
nation at the time, Bangladesh became independent in 1971 and it took five years for
diplomatic relations with China to be established. In the early 1970s Chinese relations
with Bangladesh were not greatly prominent. Bangladesh was mainly advised by
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Pakistan to engage in relations with China. Pakistan has been the traditional partner of
China in the region, and this greatly influenced Chinese-Bangladesh relations as a
strategy to move away from India’s hegemony (Pant, 2011). It has been argued that this
move towards China in order to move away from India is still present today and it
influences dynamics between the three countries.
Around a decade after the Bandung conference in 1964, Chinese premier Zhou
Enlai laid out eight principles that still govern China’s foreign aid as follows: (i) equality and mutual benefit; (ii) respect for sovereignty with no conditions attached; (iii) provided through interest‐free or low-interest loans; (iv) promotes self‐reliance, not
dependency; (v) quick results; (vi) uses best‐quality equipment of Chinese manufacture;
(vii) emphasizes technology transfer through technical assistance; (viii) Chinese experts
will live at the standard of local experts (Brautigam, 2009). The eight principles are
practiced today in Chinese relations to Africa and also to South Asian nations.
China learned a great deal from its early experiences of development projects
with Japan in the early 1970's, what is significant about this progress is that Chinese paid
all loans in oil, which was the first time introducing this form of substitute payment.
Other lessons learned from Japan are in regional emphasis, internal economic interest,
and flexible approaches to aid. Japan was more concerned with investment and trade
relationships (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). Japanese leaders acknowledged, not only did
domestic economic growth stimulate that of neighboring countries, but the process of
sustained regional growth served Japan’s own long-term economic interests as well
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(Hook, 1995). Mutual benefits approach which is one of the key principles mentioned previously for Chinese foreign aid. Japan began to import oil from China. Japan offered to use low-interest yen loans to finance the export of $10 billion of its modern plant, industrial technology, and materials, and China agreed to pay by exporting the equivalent in crude oil and coal to Japan. These features of Japan’s early foray into resource-backed concessional loans were repeated when Japan began engaging in China.
China, as a Japanese analyst described it, found it “extremely convenient” to be able to import technology and expertise from Japan, while its “vast natural resources” made
China an “ideal trading partner” for Japan (Brautigam, 2009). The initiative was not widely welcome in China due to resentments over Japans past occupation in China.
However, sentiments put aside the partnership proved to be a “win-win”. Chinese officials signed various contracts, which were used to finance infrastructure for transport and energy, and export capacity to Japan; projects for the modernization of
China. Three aspects that characterized the early pattern of this relationship would later be repeated in China’s courtship of resource-rich countries in Africa: investment-for- resource swaps, “compensatory” trade, and media hype (Brautigam, 2009). China's lessons learned were used not only as a tool of foreign policy and a means to build political support abroad, but as a practical instrument to help China’s infant corporations expand overseas. Today in Africa, China is repeating many of the practices and the kind of deals it experienced with Japan as an aid agent for friendly states, and this thesis finds that gradually expansion of Chinese cooperation’s is occurring in the
Bangladesh context.
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Early Chinese foreign relations were mostly conducted in Africa in terms of construction of infrastructure. The Tanzania- Zambia Railway marked an important milestone for Sino-African relations in 1967. The project was finalized in 1975 and it is still highly regarded as the landmark of China’s infrastructure projects, more details about this project are provided in chapter four. The key characteristic of this railway
projects was the fact that it was the first example of focusing on infrastructure by China
before it had become a predominant strategy for Chinese interactions with foreign
nations in order to build better relations. Bangladesh had diplomatic ties with China
going back to the 1970s, but construction of infrastructure did not begin until the 2000s.
China as a developing nation, with great economic success over the past 30 years gave it a great amount of legitimacy to African and Asian nations, both deriving from similar colonizing past and hoping to become economically successful. In analyzing
Chinese aid in Africa, it is interesting to evaluate its differences and similarities to
Chinese aid in Bangladesh and ask if China will produce the same model in Bangladesh.
Perhaps China's involvement in Bangladesh is equally controversial to that of China in
Africa; speculations and anxieties over motifs of regional hegemony; resource grabbing is a continual criticism throughout the rise of China as this research will investigate in the Bangladesh context.
It has been argued that Chinese dynamics of host and recipient relations, avoiding paternalism patterns alike the West, present China as an alternative development agent in the world. Chinese aid alike Western aid has been criticized,
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evolved, relearned and reshaped to fit current realities. Chinese aid style has operated highlighting economic prosperity and non-state interference.
It is worth mentioning that China has been heavily criticized for not providing
sufficient data about foreign aid spending and fuelling the rumors that much of Chinese
aid is focused on natural resources extraction, recent studies of Chinese in Africa
provide light to believe that such motifs are only partially accurate. In 2011, a report by
the Guardian; China published its first report of foreign aid claiming that the majority of
concessional loans, for example, have gone towards the construction of transportation,
communications and electricity infrastructure, while less than 9% has gone towards the
development of energy and resources such as oil and minerals. Due to the exposure of
Chinese records, transparency is no longer extremely confidential.
1.4 String of Pearls theory
China’s recent project in Bangladesh bears a lot of similarities with African
projects. First focusing on infrastructure, consensual loans, and the perceptions of
government officials claiming the projects to be ‘win-win’ and in the benefit of the
people. The debate of whether Chinese involvement’s intentions are altruistic or
exploitative for Bangladesh, have already entered the sphere of academia and
international relations narrative, with the string of pearls theory. Even though China’s
presence in Bangladesh is relatively recent the string of pearls theory is already criticism
on it. In 2004, the U.S. defense industry consultant Booz Allen Hamilton published
“Energy Futures in Asia,” According to the report China’s investments in seaports across
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the areas of the Indian Ocean could be used to create a network of naval bases
stretching from southern China to Pakistan. This became known as the ‘string of pearls’
theory. In the following years, the concept assumed its own shape in a plethora of
publications and news reports (Marantidou, 2014). Mostly the Western and Indian
media has put negative connotation portraying China as an imperialist in its conduct and planning for establishing military/naval bases in the ports. Almost a decade later, however, there is no substantial evidence of the construction of such military bases.
Currently evidence suggest that China’s interest in the pearls has more to do with processing and logistical access to raw materials from the Middle East and Africa and to the European market, than plans to base warships in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka or the
Maldives (Kostecka, 2010, Brunjes, 2013). Yet the string of pearls theory is still debated in western academia and the media. Bangladesh’s foreign minister stated publicly that
China’s investments in port facilities in their nations are strictly commercial (Kostecka,
2010). Additionally, 80 percent of Chinese oil imports traverse the Indian Ocean through the Malacca Strait into the South China Sea and to the mainland, which also adds a new layer of interpretation about the intentions of Chinese involvement in the sea.
In Bangladesh, China has focused on the modernization of the deep-sea port in
Chittagong. Plans included connecting the port with China’s western regions via rail and
road links, providing an outlet to its landlocked western province of Yunnan. The overall
assistance package has been estimated to be $8.7 billion. Bangladesh, once heavily
reliant on foreign aid the country faces an 18 percent drop in foreign aid pledges in the
first eleven months of the 2014–15 financial year (Muni, 2012) thus China represents an
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attractive alternative for foreign partner. In a similar nature in which Africa once saw
China, we witness Sino-Bangladeshi economic ties are deepening. China has agreed to
make the second-biggest investment by any nation in Bangladesh by contributing two- thirds of the $659 million construction cost of a fertilizer factory in Sylhet. Other projects include the Kunming-Chittagong road and loan agreement to upgrade the country’s telecommunication network. China is already Bangladesh’s largest trading partner. Defense procurement is a core element of their partnership and China remains a major supplier of military hardware for Bangladesh’s ground forces, air force, and navy.
Sheikh Hasina has described China as the “most dependable and consistent friend to
Bangladesh “(Pant, 2011, 41).
China’s opening to the world economically and diplomatically in recent years has proved to be an alternative to development for other developing nations inspiring hope, negotiations, and debate. Based on experiences and pragmatic techniques of development, China has been able to gain trust relations with many African and Asian countries. Many projects, as well as forms of implementation, have come to much criticism. China has pledged to non-interference, and it will be interesting to see what the Beijing consensus means to Bangladesh, especially as a way to refute western discourses such as the String of Pearls Theory.
1.5 Methodology
In this section I describe the different strategies taken to collect data for the thesis. The fieldwork for this project was conducted in the capital city of Bangladesh;
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Dhaka. All data collection and interviews took place there. I resided there from January
11, 2016 to March 28, 2016. Dhaka is where the main offices for much of the important
activities are located in regards to the Chinese Bangladeshi relations, such as the
ministry of transportation, central office for the Chinese railway company, the Chinese
embassy and the Padma bridge authority office. Additionally, I had planned to visit
Chittagong but decided it was not necessary due to the fact that people in Dhaka had
expressed opinions about Chittagong port as well.
Prior to arriving in Bangladesh I had categorized groups of people that I intended to interview, the groups changed slightly during the course of the fieldwork. The groups of people that I managed to interview include three categories: Chinese nationals,
Bengali locals and westerners. Within these groups there are subcategories, such as locals working for the government, local business owners, and students each expressing dispersed sentiments about Chinese Bangladeshi relations. Chinese working for the
China Railway Company, Padma bridge engineer, and Chinese business owners/ entrepreneurs, also I interviewed westerners living and working in Bangladesh. All these different views were done in order to obtain a more transparent picture of the perceptions of the Chinese involvement in the country, with different voices expressed.
I had previously lived in Bangladesh before coming to Amsterdam and this was an advantage as I had already established a network of people who proved to be useful.
My main gatekeeper and first point of contact was a Chinese national named Mr. Yu who works for the Chinese railway company. I was able to interview him on four
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different occasions, but decided not to record our interviews due to the fact that some
of such interviews took place for many hours. He provided me with important
information about the railway in general and his ideas about his motivations for working
in the project. Due to his connections, and eagerness to share with me his experiences I was able to meet other Chinese workers who are participating in implementing the
“One Belt One Road” as well as Bangladeshi locals who work with Chinese companies in the construction and maintenance of the railway. Also, I had the opportunity to travel to the railway site on two occasions and conducted informal conversations and firsthand observed the railway and bridges constructed by the Chinese.
Additionally, I went on to adopt different strategies as time progressed to gain more informants often times with contacts I had made previously. The local perspective, the view of Bangladeshis towards Chinese people and Chinese projects, was very important to me as it is an area that was mostly unexplored by academic articles and the media in general, also this group of people I felt would have the most unexpected contribution to the thesis. I wanted to compare the view of locals from Bangladesh to locals from African nations with previous studies. Subsequently, I visited an immigration office where I was able to formally interview ten young professionals working there, five male and five female between the ages of 24 and 35 about their ideas of China in general and China in Bangladesh. During this time responses began to shift from satisfaction with infrastructure projects towards Chinese people in general and Chinese products, this is reflective in chapter three.
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Once I had used up all my previous contacts I moved on to hiring a translator and
conducted semi structured interviews with twenty business owners at different markets
in Dhaka about their interaction with Chinese, their ideas about Chinese goods and their
views of Chinas involvement in the country. The decision to move towards this group of
people was due to the fact that informants often times talked about Chinese products, so I decided to follow this idea, but also keep the infrastructure in mind. With the help
of the translator I also visited the railway station again. There we interviewed the
railway local controller and passengers. It was necessary to bring a translator and it
proved to be fruitful as most of the respondents did not speak English in this specific
location. It was also helpful to create a tie between myself and drawing curious people who wanted to be interviewed. In order to draw more views I also conducted a survey online attaining 133 responses, who answered a set of questions about their ideas of
Chinese in Bangladesh. The questions were delivered to their mobile phones. The questions were in the Bengali local language in order to produce more organic answers as some people might not be able to read and write English. The results then were translated to English and analyzed in chapter three.
Another approach that I took to gain more informants was with the use of my phone I put an advertisement on Wechat, a popular chatting application that allows you to find people nearby. This was very successful, drawing nationals that had knowledge of Chinese Bangladeshi relations and Chinese working and living in Bangladesh as well.
Often time’s people who have this application have a connection to China regardless of their nation of origin. Via Wechat I was able to meet interesting people, such as one of
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the Chinese engineer who works for the Padma Bridge and interviewed him on one
occasion for two hours. We had just met and we talked about sensitive topics, therefore
I decided not to record our meeting. Online I also chatted with various people about
their ideas of the railway, bridges, Padma Bridge and Chinese involvement in this. I also
met a foreigner engineer who had strong sentiments about Chinas role for the Padma
Bridge contributing to a more diversified data.
In internet chat rooms I was also able to observe and interpret events that had previously taken place, but were important background information especially in regards to the Padma Bridge. Here I found experts in this topic, that I was unfortunately not able to find in real life. In blogs and chartrooms I also analyzed reactions especially from the West on Chinese interactions with Bangladesh. Prior to departing I interviewed
Chinese embassy workers and I visited the Padma bridge authority office. During both visits I was able to gather interesting data that confirmed my findings about Chinese interpretation of their motifs for being in Bangladesh.
1.6 Limitations
There was a variety of challenges, disadvantages, and eventually solutions that I faced in the field, but in general I had much positive factors in my advantage. English was the common language that most of the interviews and conversations took place in.
However, due to the different levels of English and my complete lack of Bangla language skills, communication proved to be difficult at times. Mr. Yu, my main Chinese informant, does not speak English and my Chinese is limited, with the use of technology and simple
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language we managed to understand each other. Another informant who was mostly
present with us during the interviews also would translate between the two of us.
Bangladeshi locals depending on their educational level are able to speak English from
zero to native level. It depends on the person. I was mostly speaking to people who had
office jobs, access to the internet and therefore could navigate English fluently. I view
that being a female foreigner student was an advantage for many aspects, contrary to common belief about females having a difficult time in a predominant Muslim society. I
had easy access to offices, to people of Chinese, western and Bengali background, they
were open and eager to talk to me.
Time constraint was an issue at the beginning of the fieldwork as I was not too
familiar with conducting interviews and I found that many times conversations ran for a
long period of time, but little useful information in regards to my project was revealed.
This was both frustrating and time-consuming. However with time, I learned how to
better manage time to produce more productive interviews. Sometimes discussing different topics would lead to an interesting insight that would in a way come back to my original idea.
Another limitation is that I was not able to get the views from the elite class in
Bangladesh or government workers as I did not manage to attain an interview with any of them, which previously I mentioned that I had intended to interview. Furthermore, I would like to state that for some categories, such as westerners, or Chinese workers the number of correspondence was very limited and therefore this places a limitation on
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this paper. I am aware of this fact, and as a solution I attempted to conduct more in
depth interviews with these particular individuals. It may be erroneous to draw
premature conclusion about perceptions of Chinese in Bangladesh based on this thesis,
however it does provide some insight information that both confirm and deviate from previous conclusions based on research conducted in African countries about perceptions of Chinese involvement.
1.7 Thesis outline
Chapter two is a short background to Bangladesh as a country and its relations
with China. This chapter explains the importance of construction of bridges due to the
geography in the country. This chapter briefly describes the countries colonial past and
break away from India and Pakistan, currently the country’s move away from aid into
investment. Bangladesh has an attractive position for foreign investment from China.
Bangladesh then has strategically position in the world. In chapter three I analyze the
local perception of Chinese people, goods, and infrastructure in Bangladesh, and
compare it with existing literature on perceptions of Chinese presence in Africa. I
examine how these different perceptions contradict, complement and corroborate with
each other. Chapter four and five are about two case studies of Chinese infrastructure
projects in Bangladesh. Chapter four discusses the Chinese Railway project in
Bangladesh and the local perception of it. I also compare and contrast it with previous a railway project, namely the Tazara railway in Tanzania. Chapter five is the case study of
The Padma Bridge, which is an interesting case due to the role of corruption, the World
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Bank, and China’s arrival in the construction of the bridge. I analyze China’s role in the project by comparing and contrasting perspectives from Chinese, Western, and local actors respectively. Chapter six concludes attempting to answer the research question that the perceptions of Chinese infrastructure projects are not as negative as the media makes it out to be but also that there are many distinctions to the previous findings in
African nations, thus Bangladesh case is an appealing one.
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Chapter two Bangladesh between two giants, India and China
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Bangladesh position from a geographical, regional and strategic point of view has
been advantageous in many aspects in recent times. This chapter argues that
Bangladesh stands between two giants, on the one hand India and the West who has
been the traditional partners economically, culturally, and acting as aid providers. On the other hand, China, the new friend that has focused not only in assisting the country with infrastructure projects but increasingly with trade and alleviated the country when the first partner could not. Thus, Bangladesh has been able to arrange itself as an opportune player, in terms of gaining deals and keeping good relations with India and the West and at the same time moving closer to China. The absence of historical baggage and the resultant absence of a hostile domestic constituency enable
Bangladesh to pursue a clear and balanced policy towards China. Its leaders or political parties are not unduly worried about getting close to Beijing. China’s refusal to interfere in Bangladesh’s domestic debates and its non-preference of any particular party or ideology adds positively to the relations, so much so that there is a growing domestic competition in Bangladesh to promote closer ties with China (Datta, 2008). Ties with
Western nations have slowly deteriorated as this thesis further explores. Indeed,
Bangladesh has been careful dealing with meeting internal goals alongside sustaining good ties with different countries.
2.1 A brief History of Bangladesh
Bangladesh is located at the Bay of Bengal and the country is bordered by India and Myanmar. After the departure of the British colonial regime, Bangladesh
32
had a 24 year union with Pakistan; Bangladesh then was named East Bengal. The two
countries separated with growing disputes that lead to a war, Bangladesh gained its
independence in 1971. Since independence there was been interesting dynamics with
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, leading to tensions, and regional disputes, however recently the three nations have had steady prosperous relations in recent times.
Interestingly better relations have developed with China in terms of economic prosperity than with India, or Pakistan, experts have appointed that this is mainly due to the lack of conflicts between Bangladesh and China. However this chapter elucidates that that is only partly true and more details give a more profound explanation. Namely
better economic ties between China and Bangladesh that has allowed better relations
between the two governments. China has stepped in as a partner to Bangladesh
increasingly prospering relations.
Today Bangladesh has a population of 166.2 million, it is the world's eighth-most
populous country, the fifth-most populous in Asia and the third-most populous Muslim-
majority country. Bangladesh is a developing country, with a market-based mixed
economy and it has been projected that the country will be an important emerging
market. The per capita income of Bangladesh was US$1,190 in 2014, with a GDP of
US$209 billion. In South Asia, Bangladesh has the third-largest economy after those of
India and Pakistan, and has the second highest foreign exchange reserves after India
(Thrope, 2012).
33
In the early five years of independence, Bangladesh adopted socialist policies which
proved to be a critical blunder by the Awami League. The subsequent military regime and BNP and Jatiya Party governments restored free markets and promoted the
Bangladeshi private sector (Lesser, 1998). In 1991, finance minister Saifur Rahman launched a range of liberal reforms. The Bangladeshi private sector has since rapidly expanded, with numerous conglomerates now driving the economy. Major industries include textiles, pharmaceuticals, shipbuilding, steel, electronics, energy, construction materials, chemicals, ceramics, food processing, and leather goods. Export-oriented industrialization has increased in recent years, with the country's exports amounting to
US$30 billion in FY2014-15. The predominant export earnings of Bangladesh come from its garments sector. The country also has a vibrant social enterprise sector, including the Nobel Peace Prize-winning microfinance institution Grameen Bank and the world's largest non-governmental development agency BRAC (Worldbank.org, 2015).
Bangladesh has been showing strong growth performance with a GDP growth rate of
6-7%. The economy however has to deal with a number of economic bottlenecks to reach the required GDP growth rate of 8-10% to fulfill Vision 2021 (Bangladesh Planning commission, 2016). The inadequacy in infrastructure is one of these major challenges
and the main point of focus for this thesis. The infrastructure of the country is currently
insufficient to keep pace with the growing economy.
Among all infrastructure systems, a well-knit transport and communication system
connecting all regions of the country is crucial for the advancement of a developing
34 country such as Bangladesh. To enhance and facilitate the growing trade needs of the country, to accommodate the transportation needs of commuters, to attract foreign investments and to ease the transportation of goods throughout the country, a strong communication system is essential.
2.2 Bangladesh need for infrastructure improvement
The current reality of Bangladesh is one in need of infrastructure development and renewal. International players have attempted to foray into the country providing aid. The development and economic card has been played strategically by Bangladesh,
China and international players, in order to attain balance of power and better positioning. This chapter thus asks the question what is the importance of Bangladesh as an international player, both in terms of its location and its economy? And how does
Bangladesh attempt to meets its goals while battling its challenges?
Bangladesh has an interesting position both by water and land making it important for the “One belt and One Road”. Most of the country is situated on deltas of large rivers flowing from the Himalayas. Geographically Bangladesh has three significant rivers; the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna. There is a pressing need for infrastructure projects to be developed in the country due to the limited connectivity that the rivers cause and sustained population growth in recent years has generated higher demand for electricity, transport, and telecommunication services, and contributed to widening infrastructure deficits. Better integration between rural and urban parts is vital and is lacking in the nation.
35
A functioning infrastructure system enables greater connectivity, trade, access on a national as well as on an international level. According to the World Economic
Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 2009-10 Bangladesh's infrastructure industry is one of the most underdeveloped in the world. The country's infrastructure competitiveness was ranked 126th out of 133 countries, the lowest ranking among its
South Asian neighbors. The Bangladesh government outlined its rural development strategy, vision for 2021 focusing on development of infrastructure including much emphasis on roads and overall improvement of infrastructure. However, such goals cannot be reached by the government of Bangladesh alone. Roads remain unsafe &
Injury and death rates from road accidents in Bangladesh are among the highest in the world. The World Health Organization believes that more than 20,000 people are killed on Bangladesh's roads every year (Kelly, 2012). Railway and bridge construction have been funded with the help of international donors. Since 2011, roads have reduced transport costs and in turn the cost of goods and services. Chapter four further compares and contrast road and railway investment plans. China offering development in infrastructure has been an attractive alternative partner to the country.
Chittagong, located in The Bay of Bengal, is the second largest city and main port in the country. Willem Van Schendel makes the point that Chittagong was an attractive place throughout time, where people are drawn to it for commercial, cultural exchanges and networks. Unlike some foreigners that migrated permanently to the area, the
Chinese traders visited the port of Chittagong to buy cotton textile and horses from
Bengal and sell ceramics but there are no indications that they settled there (Van
36
Schendel, 2015, 102). Today the Bay of Bengal is still a vital strategic location for
economic reasons. It adjoins seas like the Andaman Sea and the Malacca straits are the
link between south east and South Asia. Thus the significance of this port and desire for
world powers to obtain a say in it extended throughout time. Chapter four touches on
points about the port connecting railway structures in more detail. Currently The
Chittagong port is forcing container ships to wait for the incoming and outgoing tides before they enter or leave the harbor. According to reports, these delays can cost an extra $15,000 per day, making handling much more expensive than in neighboring
countries. With 15 percent of country’s GDP dependent on apparel exports, the
Bangladesh government is facing pressing need to modernize its port facilities (Kumara,
2015).
The following example illustrates how Bangladesh deals with the two giants by
keeping them at ease while at the same time meeting its needs. Despite the fact that
China already is the main manager of the Chittagong port, in early in 2015 China had
negotiations with the country in order to build a new port the Sonadia port. China was
much interested in the construction of this port as part of the “One Belt One Road”
strategy. However, criticism from the West claiming that such plan was part of the
“String of Pearls” theory resulted in pressure on the government of Bangladesh and consequently Japan won the contract. Bangladesh Planning Minister A.H.M. Mustafa
Kamal said that “some countries, including India and the United States, are against the
Chinese involvement in the project“ (Kumara, 2015). In the past China was accused of
mainly engaging with African nations in order to extract natural resources. Even though
37
China presently administers the Chittagong port, the same sentiments of those in Africa of neo imperialist and military expansion have already deterred Chinas growing influence in the region. Bangladesh then has to be very tactical, in keeping international players, the West including Japan in one hand, and China in the other to meet its pressing needs.
These examples of various failing or nearing failing government facilities, of the roads, the Chittagong port, in connection to the railway and various bridges are all interconnected. Future projects for better infrastructure laid an opportune foundation for international players to assist Bangladesh in the construction, reconstruction and better management of such. It is important to also analyze the current economic trends and international agendas to further understand Bangladesh’s current position.
2.3 Bangladesh growing Economy
Bangladesh's economy has grown despite political instability, poor infrastructure, corruption, insufficient power supplies, slow implementation of economic reforms among other challenges that the country faces. Population below poverty line is 31.5%
(2010 est.) the unemployment rate is 5%. About 40% of the population is underemployed. Yet the economy has grown at an annual average of about 6% over the last two decades and the country reached World Bank lower-middle income status in
2015 (CIA World Fact Book, 2015). Despite the optimistic records, around 47 million people are still living below the poverty line and due to the country’s geographic setting much of these people are isolated. It is with the construction of better roads, railways
38
and bridges that there might be hope to better integrate the society of Bangladesh as a
whole.
Through a mixture of traditional aid and investment Bangladesh hopes to attain its
goals, whilst experiencing global shifts in the economy. Bangladesh, faces an 18 percent
drop in foreign aid pledges in the first eleven months of the 2014–15 financial year and
hence is desperate for Chinese investment (Kumara, 2015). In addition to the
investments of infrastructure, China is also Bangladesh’s largest trading partner. In
2012–2014, trade between the two countries was around $8.29 billion and Chinese
businessmen invested $43 million. For China overseas investment became an important
economic development strategy since the 1970, steadily growing. Between 1977 and
2010, China invested only US$250 million; however in 2011 alone, it invested some
US$200 million in Bangladesh (Islam, 2013), China’s accumulated aid to Bangladesh
reached US $1 Billion at the end of 2013 (Riaz, 2016). Bangladesh is an attractive place for investment due to its location, cheap labor/ profitability and relaxed trading laws. It is also a challenging place to conduct business due to the political instability, and current lack of proper infrastructure. Nevertheless, Bangladesh is very optimistic about its ties with China as the economic relations continue to expand.
2.4 Bangladesh and foreign direct investment
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is considered one of the vital ingredients for overall development process of a developing country like Bangladesh. Industrial development is an important pre-requisite for economic growth of a developing country. Bangladesh is
39
basically a country of agrarian economy. For her economic development, industrial
economy is imperative (Afsana, 2012). Since independence, Bangladesh is trying to be a suitable country for FDI. In order to accelerate economic growth, Bangladesh opened its
economy in the late 1980s to reap the benefits of FDI. In 1989 the government set up
Board of Investment (BOI). The primary objective of which is aimed at attracting and
facilitating investment from abroad. The government also lifted restrictions on capital
and profit repatriation gradually and opened up almost all industrial sectors for
foreigners to invest either independently or jointly with the local partners. Further, the government also introduced various financial and non-financial incentives like tax
exemptions for power generations, import duty exemptions for export processing
industries, tax holiday schemes for undertaking investment in priority sectors and low
development areas, zero duty rate for the import of capital machinery and spare parts
for 100 percent export oriented industries, almost no restrictions on the entry and exit
mode, and reduction of bureaucratic hassles in getting faster approvals of foreign
projects. Together with all these incentives followed by a low labor cost structure,
Bangladesh has been an attractive destination for FDI in the South Asian region since
the late 1980s.
The trend of Inflow of FDI in Bangladesh has increased over the 1980s as
compared to earlier periods and this same momentum continues in 1990s as well. The
total inflow of FDI has been increasing over the years. During the period of 1977-2010,
total inflows of FDI were USD 8927.9 million, among which the total inflows of FDI
during 2006-2010 was USD 4158.63 million. In 1977, this inflow was USD 7 million and in
40
2008, annual FDI reached to USD 1086.31 million. Unfortunately, there was a declination in inflows of FDI in 2010 which was USD 913.32 million (DeSilva, 2011).
Bulk of the FDI into Bangladesh came from western countries up until 2010, but of late China is also becoming a big source of FDI and concessional loans for Bangladesh in multiple sectors. In fact, from the time that the “Bangladesh-China Friendship Year” was declared in 2005 through to 2008, salient examples of Chinese investment included: the commencement of direct air links between Dhaka and Beijing; an agreement on nuclear co-operation; the construction of a di-aluminium phosphate fertiliser factory; the signing of a joint venture agreement for mining coal, between Bangladesh’s state owned Petrochemical company, Petrobangla, and two Chinese companies, China
National Machinery Export Import Corporation and Xushou Coal Mining Group; the creation of the US$25 million ($23.6 million), Chinese-funded, Dhaka-based Bangladesh-
China Friendship Exhibition Centre; and capacity-building and training assistance programs for Bangladeshi public servants and security forces personnel.
In March 2010, both countries celebrated 35 years of diplomatic ties, which culminated in the signing of four bilateral agreements. Following the June 2010 visit of the Chinese Vice-President to Bangladesh, more agreements were signed worth 1.8 B$.
However, the centre piece of China’s growing influence in Bangladesh is symbolized by its interest in modernizing the Chittagong port, which handles around 92 per cent of the country’s import-export trade (Future Directions International, 2011). The following section describes in more detail the building up to such collaborations.
2.5 China Bangladesh relations
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China and Bangladesh established diplomatic relations in 1975 since then, the affairs between the two countries has grown to cover a wide spectrum of bilateral relations (Sakhuja, 2009). Over the years, the two sides have signed a plethora of bilateral agreements. The Chinese approach, it has been argued is maintaining and promoting its diplomatic linkage in South Asia based on long term consideration.
Furthermore China seems to be dealing with South Asian nations as units of whole rather than individual partners in a constantly re-definable relationship. The importance of this interactions is linked to China' role perceptions in current world politics
(Chakrabarti, 1994). On the one hand we see China further engaging in world politics, with its own agenda and on the other we see Bangladesh dealing with Chinese propositions in an advantageous matter.
Sreeradha Datta (2008) has done extensive research in Bangladesh-China Relations as an attempt to understand why there is a push from Bangladesh towards China. He made some appealing conclusions. One, that through a host of political moves, economic largesse and military linkages, China has succeeded in cultivating friendly relations with countries that are less friendly towards India, including Bangladesh and
Pakistan as an attempt to avoid Indian hegemonic power in the region. Second, there is a growing domestic competition in Bangladesh to promote closer ties with China.
Additionally, the author points out that Bangladesh favors China over India, despite similarities in the two cultures. This statement was expressed to me on a few occasions in interviews, when people told me, “you know a little secret, here in Bangladesh we don’t like India”, and most people interviewed had positive attitudes towards China in
42
contrast. These simple ideas shared on the ground by locals are translated by larger
government operations, and are reflective of deep cultural and historical roots. This is
interesting due to the similarities between Bangladesh and India, yet the pull away and
push towards China. Also, compelling as in the early stages of Bangladesh, China was
indifferent about political confrontations, migration issues, and other affairs of young
Bangladesh, meanwhile India was more supportive of the country. China has acquired
widespread political support inside the country. Various parties and groups can deal
with China without having to worry about their adversaries using that to gain political
capital. Both the mainstream political parties the Awami and BNP, are not afraid of
being seen as pro-China (Datta, 2008. 757), therefore the Chinese card used in many
instances in African nations to gain or weaken supporters is used here for positive
imagine building. I find that many negative views about China are nonexistent, or very
limited for the case in Bangladesh, the following chapter further explains this
phenomenon. China is courted by all Bangladeshi political parties. Indeed, there is a subtle rivalry among mainstream parties to promote closer political and economic ties
with Beijing. Whereas India and Pakistan carry attachments of disputes, wars and issues,
China to Bangladesh means greater economic prosperity. It is these social and historical
points that mold existing perceptions from Bangladeshi locals towards Chinese foreign
policy in the country. As India-Bangladesh relations have weakened, Chinese
Bangladeshi relations have strengthened, as this chapter hopes to have conveyed this is
not due to cultural differences, confrontations or theories, but rather this is due to
43 growing projects and economic ties. In the following chapter I discuss how these national plans and projects have translated to people’s voices and ideas.
44
Chapter three Different perceptions of Chinese in
Bangladesh
45
The “Chinese model” has been said to be compelling to many nations that have
engaged with it, for example in Africa due to the fact that both derive from a colonial background. China’s economic growth over the past decades has made this model even more appealing to those engaging in it. This is true for Bangladesh as well. Such interactions inspire vast dialogues among actors both academically as well as on the ground. In this chapter I will present two contributors to the discussion the local and
Chinese view. Chinese are involved in Bangladesh for various reasons explained in chapter two. As a consequence, this chapter explores the different perceptions of
China’s presence in the country. For the local perceptions I interviewed business owners, young workers and conducted a survey. A commonality among this group is the need to emphasis Bangladesh’s own stand in the China-Bangladeshi relations debate and lack of awareness of Chinese influence in projects. For the Chinese view I examined the views of officials from the Chinese embassy, as well as workers in the railway and Chinese businessmen. With the exception of entrepreneurs, generally, they view China as a great contributor to Bangladesh and their presence as enhancing that connection. These groups represent different views that greatly support and often times replicate the voices of their corresponding government, hence showing a nationalistic tendency among dialogues. Additionally I argue that such dialogues are used in order to combat accusations. These voices are used as tools to respond to accusations not only by government leaders but also by nationals. Below is an overview of each dialogue in an effort to bring light to interesting themes.
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3.1 Local perceptions on Chinese products
One of the key components of this investigation is the views of the local
Bangladeshi population, due to the fact that both Chinese and Bangladeshi leaders have proclaimed that the implementation of the “One Belt One Road” project is for the
benefit of the local population. Therefore the reactions of locals are crucial. As stated
previously local’s responses about their views about China in Bangladesh vary in each
category, however a general presentation is stated below. First the business owners,
second, young professionals and lastly the views of survey respondents are represented
here bringing light into their personal experiences and observations and what this
contributes to Chinese Bangladeshi relations.
Local business owners
Made in China products are found all over the world, Bangladesh is no exception
to this. Toys, shoes, everyday household products, appliances and many of these goods
have entered the market in
Bangladesh due to economic
engagement discussed in chapter
two. Bangladeshi–Chinese trade
Figure 2 Chinese products found in local markets continues to be dominated by state level transactions. China has emerged as
Bangladesh’s largest trading partner. Sreeradha Datta (2008) claims that Bangladesh is
47
highly dependent on India for food sources and other essential commodities, yet trade
with China is more relaxed and not based on everyday livelihood samples. Therefore he
concluded that China offers some greater inbuilt advantages to Bangladesh. While its
trade with China is flourishing, Bangladesh is not dependent upon Beijing. This I argue has contributed to popularity and acceptance of China in the country. To further investigate Chinese made products in Bangladesh I visited three different markets in
Dhaka and talked to the business owners about which percentage of their stores contained Chinese products, what they think about such products and Chinese influence in their businesses and in the country as a whole. I found that these markets have a
large percentage of goods coming from China. Of the twenty stores visited some had
only Chinese products, whereas others have less. The markets cater mainly to middle
income consumers and are popular places for locals to buy their household items.
In an interview one shop owner, similarly to those interviewed for this study,
claimed that "We bring here high quality products from China. They (products) offer
good services and we sell the products with official guarantees. We often find our
customers very happy with the Chinese products. China is also very good in many other
ways as a country, beyond electronics.”(BRICS studies, 2016) Similarly those people I interviewed are aware of China’s importance to the Bangladeshi economy. In regards to the products, business owners were satisfied for the most part. Some had complaints about the products being of low quality and the fact that this has caused a decrease in demand and overtime loss of customer confidence. Many attribute their decision to buy products from China to the fact that they are able to make high profits. Those
48
businesses that do not have Chinese products criticized their rivals for driving their businesses near to closure due to low prices. In sum, Chinese products are available and influential in Bangladesh. While different in quality, price of the products are low and this in turn creates more competition which leads to lower prices for the consumers, which is a positive effect for the Bangladesh economy.
One specific product can lead to positive social consequences in the country as a whole, as the following example illustrate for Africa and Bangladesh. “African consumers benefit from cheap products offered by Chinese firms. For instance, Chinese plastic sandals conquered the whole African continent in the last years. That changed the daily life of African women and children enormously in that way that going shoeless is [in] the past in poor African countries” (Hess and Aido, 2013. 113). Similarly, during the course of the fieldwork, there was a boom in the consumption of electronic mosquito rackets in Dhaka, which were found almost everywhere in the city. This product is made in China and is an extremely popular household item and beneficial for the prevention of mosquito prone diseases, such as dengue that frequently affects the country. Many people are aware that this kind of cheap and available product comes from China and they are happy with its consumption.
In regards to China as a country all of the twenty shop keepers told me that
China is a friend to Bangladesh, only one person said that Bangladesh is now growing dependent on China and he is personally worried about what the future will be as ties grow closer. He feels that his business is not able to prosper due to the fact that the
49
products have a high profit at first, but over time his store has lost customers. In general,
however people are happy about the availability of Chinese products and this point was
further explained to me by young professionals.
Young professionals
I also interviewed a group of young professionals working in an immigration
office about their perceptions of Chinese products and China in Bangladesh. They made
appealing correlations to the accessibility of products to consequences of everyday life
experiences, attributing China positively to social enhancement in Bangladesh. Those
people interviewed thought that the import of products was good for the country. One
informant told me China has allowed Bangladesh to have a “not luxurious, but
comfortable lifestyle”. Another informant told me that the Chinese have opened the
minds of the people in Bangladesh. As he later elaborated this was because anyone rich,
poor, educated or not, had reasonable access to a phone and therefore access to the
internet and having access to the internet means having access to the world. He said,
“You know the rickshaw driver down there, he asked me to please give him the code for
the WIFI of the office, and they do all their transactions and reservations on their
mobiles. If they didn’t have these Chinese phones, how else can they do so?”(Rakib)
People in Africa also had a similar view about Chinese products benefiting the community. In the survey of Sautman and Yan (2007) found that in Cameroon 81 percent of the population welcomed Chinese products, mainly as affordable to the poor and aiding locals to set up businesses; 35 percent cited affordable Chinese motorbikes
50 creating taxi jobs for young men, thus reducing the crime rate. Here we see a commodity changing the way of life, by enhancing communication via telephones and creating job opportunities for taxi drivers. Interestingly, those interviewed attribute
China and Chinese products to this improvement of life standards.
Survey
I conducted an anonymous survey online asking seven questions in regards to general perceptions of Chinese in Bangladesh. The questions were derived from previous studies about African perceptions on Chinese influence, I wanted to explore if similar results could be found for the Bangladesh case. 173 people responded to the survey from which 133 completed full answers, correspondents were between ages 18 to 48, 33 of the respondents were female and 140 male. The majority of the responses were positive which is consistent with African results, yet at times responses and themes shifted away from previous findings.
The first question “what is your view of the Chinese?” 100 out of 139 responses said that China helped with economic development. Second most dominant answer was that they felt “Help but are also source of problems for local people”. What is striking about this question is that not a single person responded negatively. People do not feel that China is harmful to the country. When asked about China’s policies in Bangladesh compared with Western policies, about half of the respondents thought that Chinese policies are slightly more favorable than westerners, and the other half thought that
China’s policies are much more beneficial to Bangladesh than they are to China. These
51
findings are similar to that of the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey asked Africans in ten
countries to compare the influences of China and the US in their own countries. In nine
of the ten countries, by margins of 61 to 91 percent, African respondents said the
Chinese influence was good (Sautman and Yan, 2007). The results of that survey further
explained that Africans felt neglected by the United States and the West. The results of
the Bangladesh survey show a different stance, one in which China, the West and
Bangladesh collaborate to meet developmental goals as it is reflective in this survey
results.
Another part of the questionnaire worth analysis is about Chinese people and
Chinese projects acceptance. Most people responded saying that they are very satisfied or satisfied with the construction projects by the Chinese. Additionally in the survey I included questions about adaption of Chinese to local society. Respondents view
Chinese as adapted, hardworking, disciplined and friendly. There were no comments on unfriendly, racist, opportunity seeker, selfish, not social or not disciplined, showing that those who answered the questionnaire have a positive impression of Chinese people.
Below is a tentative reasoning why this is.
In the Bangladesh context a lot of tensions and conflicts are nonexistent compared to African nations. There are no migration issues of Chinese coming into
Bangladesh, there are no labor disputes among locals and Chinese, for example in
Zambia shooting in a Chinese mining company. Chinese living in Bangladesh for the most part are only there for temporary missions, and more recently engage in higher skilled
52
labors thus not confronting with the local population in the labor market. Such issues
are left for India and Pakistan. It has been argued that politicians in African nations use
China’s opposition to gain votes, this has been coined with the term China card.
Politicians do not use the China card in the negative connotation that has been used in
Africa, on the contrary politicians in Dhaka want to be seen as friends of China. On a
surface this might be reasons to explain the result in the survey, and general responses
from the local audience.
To a certain extent, the survey result is similar to Sautman and Yan’s findings in
Africa. China is perceived as different from the West in that it provides some
investments of direct benefit beyond elite circles, does not insist that local political
economy steer a required course, and contributes to local talent pool rather than
draining it (Sautman & Yan, 2007). Yet the perceptions of Chinese in Bangladesh seem to
be more positive and less contested. This might be due to two important factors. One,
the government’s close connection with China and lack of negative media portray of it.
Second, due to the fact that Chinese presence in Bangladesh is still in its formative stage
and tensions present in African nations have yet to be found in this case.
3.2 Chinese perspective on their influence in Bangladesh
The next section to be explored is the Chinese stance on their personal
justification and motivation for being in Bangladesh. Scholars such as Chen (2007) and
Alden (2006) have pointed out that the activities that China engages in have changed in
recent years, from developing and aid such as infrastructure development to now more
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profit-centered activities. This phenomenon is visible in Bangladesh, I met Chinese people working for the railway, Padma bridge, typical infrastructure projects, but also
entrepreneurs, businessmen and for example in the airport I observed an abundant
amount of business travelers coming from China. Roles that Chinese people perform
abroad have also changed from low skilled to higher skilled labors. What is interesting
about this shift in engagement of China with foreign nations is that we continue to
notice the dialogue of win-win, friendship among political leaders in Africa and those
Chinese nationals living in Bangladesh. I had the opportunity to talk to different Chinese people about their interpretation of their roles in the country as well as their ideas about locals. Firstly, I talked to embassy workers, who almost paraphrased the words of the “One Belt One Road”. Second I talked to Mr. Yu a railway engineer and lastly entrepreneurs and individuals working for Chinese firms who also had sentiments about
their positive contribution to the local environment.
Embassy workers’ voice
I met Mrs. Liu and Mr. Yan, the secretary to the ambassador and the assistant of the people’s republic of China embassy in Bangladesh. We talked about the “One Belt,
One Road” policy and what this meant for Bangladesh. Mr. Yan told me that it is not one road precisely that will be constructed across Bangladesh, but rather it is a projection that the Chinese government has to construct many roads, bridges, and ports, projects and even investments that are part of the “One Belt, One Road” to enhance connectivity between Bangladesh China and the world. Mr. Yan told me that previously the Chinese
54
government had the same or very similar project called “Going Abroad” policy and that
the “One Belt, One Road” is a continuation of such plan. The embassy workers told me
“in the past forty years Bangladesh has developed greatly especially in the past ten
years, but still is in the need for China’s help, aid and investment, Bangladesh is still not
self sufficient. Bangladesh is weak in planning and lacks capital for infrastructure
projects, hence the need for China.”
They felt a social responsibility that China should be the one that provides help
to countries such as Bangladesh in its infrastructure development as well as other
projects. They further explained that private Chinese companies such as China Southern
airlines also are part of the “One Belt One Road” initiative, increasing flights and
providing greater connectivity. The company has increased flights between Dhaka and
major Chinese cities such as Guangzhou as every year more than 10,000 Bangladeshis
participate in Canton Fair. It will be easy for the Bangladeshi participants to go to Canton
Fair if the Dhaka-Guangzhou route opens (Xinhua, 2009).The embassy workers did not mention the fact that this increase of flights is due to greater demand and greater turnaround of profit for the company, rather they simply stated that this was a direct cause of better integration and benefit of the two countries. Furthermore, the two people in the embassy told me that they are enthusiastic about China’s role to bring hope and change for the rest of the world. They said, “In the past years China has grown and feels the need and has the privilege to help those countries in Asia to also develop.
Bangladesh and Chinese relations are complementary, as both countries have positive aspects that can be used for the advantage of each other.”
55
They told me that even though China builds many projects sovereignty of each
country is always respected. The voice of the embassy workers echoed the official
statements of the “One Belt, One Road” and Chinese leaders views due to the fact that
they are government employees after all.
Mr. Yu and Railway workers
Chinese government employee’s views about their presence in the country are
mainly humanitarian driven. I met with Mr. Yu before arriving to Bangladesh for the
fieldwork and he was my main correspondent, and gatekeeper throughout my time
there. He works for the Chinese railway company and is the director of operations. He
has lived in Bangladesh for six years and previous to that lived in different African
nations. We talked about a variety of subjects such as his views about what the projects
mean to Bangladesh and Bangladesh people in general. He, as well as other Chinese
workers for the railway told me that they felt a great amount of pride in the work that
they accomplish is bringing better infrastructure into the country. They told me that in
addition to the railway lines they had also constructed roads. This was very good for the
safety of the people and it made going from one village to another much easier. Before,
crossing by foot was risky because it required walking on the railway lines, or going
down the river, which was time-consuming. Koko, another employee of the China
Railway Company, told me “Bangladesh should be very thankful because China sends
the best of their engineers here to construct the bridges and railways”. They are proud of this big project, the One Belt One Road, coming from China and helping those
56
countries in less fortunate situations. She told me 30 years ago China was the same as
Bangladesh now, and China wants to help economically less developed neighbor nations
to build good relations and see them prosper the same way in which China has done.
She said it makes China happy to help other nations, but that some western nations are
very jealous of Chinese economic growth, and that they are not happy with what China
is doing abroad.
We also discussed the experience of living in Bangladesh, in which they all
pointed out that it was a difficult one due to the lack of a good lifestyle, good food
choices, lack of freedom and ironically lack of proper infrastructure causing much traffic.
In general they all said that they missed China. Furthermore, they attribute delay on the
local workers saying that Bangladeshi workers are slow, the railway construction kept
getting delayed and it took four years to make whereas in China it would have taken one
year.
The approximately ten Chinese railway workers, have created their niche of work,
where they combine Chinese traditions such as food while at the same time make an
effort adapting to local Bengali society in their everyday lives. It is their sense of pride
and humanitarian assistance towards Bangladesh that motivates their pursuit in the country.
Entrepreneurs
Another story of Chinese living in Bangladesh is unfolding with Chinese nationals working without government direct assistance in the country, thus versifying the
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Chinese perception. I had the chance to meet with a few entrepreneurs from China
coming to Bangladesh, some of them living there with contracts of up to a few years but for the most part coming for short business trips. None of them had intentions of permanently settling in Bangladesh. I never met or knew anyone who had met a second generation Chinese, or someone that had lived there for a long period of time. It could be argued that their views range from nationalistic to a more capitalistic orientation.
One of them Mr. Wang, told me that China is a harmonious country and has never sought to expand or invade other territories, and claims from the West over China wanting to colonize other countries are simply false. He works for Huawei and told me that Bangladesh is a difficult, high risk, and simply unpleasant place to live, but that
Chinese people are hard workers and they can sustain pain and hardship. This he claims has enabled him to be able to stay there. Also he feels the need to help others as he explained to me that his company was there for the purpose of helping Bangladesh have better telecommunications networks.
Other Chinese businessmen and women had less nationalistic views about their presence in Bangladesh. They told me that Bangladesh was a great place for opportunities and for their business to grow. In Bangladesh they mainly are involved in the garment industry due to even cheaper labor in Bangladesh than in China. In a report by the New York Times found that a Hong Kong company that handles sourcing and apparel manufacturing for companies reported that its production in Bangladesh jumped 20 percent last year, while China, its biggest supplier, slid 5 percent (Bajaj, 2010).
Furthermore, minimum wage in Bangladesh is much lower than it is on China. Rather
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they take a more practical view of their presence in Bangladesh, one which involves
business as the main motif. With the exception of Mr. Wang entrepreneurs put less stress on words such as friendship and win-win as they are interested in their personal
agendas and economic gains and are not sponsored by the Chinese government to be in
Bangladesh. Those individuals working directly for the Chinese government like Mr. Yu view Bangladesh as a place in need of their help, entrepreneurs view Bangladesh as a place to help themselves have better lives.
In the documentary by the BBC “The Chinese are coming out”, Chinese entrepreneurs and business owners were asked about their reasons to moving to Africa, in this case, the Chinese correspondents feel that western companies are scared and do not see the opportunities in the country. The interviewee said that there is a mutual benefit in this process because locals get products that they need, and Chinese are able to open their businesses in the country. The Chinese view is that in the past they want to help African countries such as Tanzania, as socialist solidarity under communist Mao, overtime it is capitalism that drive exchanges. Chinese do not see poor countries in need of charity, but as a place for business opportunities and vast potential market as was the case for the group of entrepreneurs found in Dhaka. Entrepreneurs come to Africa and
Bangladesh to create better business opportunities often times for themselves. Such shift is consistent with the low to high skilled migration move of laborers deriving from
China to other parts of the world. Due to the fact that often times this is a personal decision, they do not carry humanitarian motivations in their dialogues for moving abroad.
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3.3 Connecting the dots
The case of Bangladesh bears similar results to previous studies conducted on perceptions about Chinese influence, in which China is welcomed to participate in the construction of better infrastructure for the country. However, for Bangladesh locals often view this process as one initiated by their government and for the benefit of their country. China is then not viewed as a threat and possible invader but also it is not viewed as a humanitarian aider as the Chinese make themselves to be. The string of pearls which causes much anxieties among Indian, American and western commentators are ironically not existent among the people of the streets of Dhaka.
The narratives examined in this chapter speak to one another. The use of key terms and phrases such a “friendly” “win win” “harmonious” that is much often used by
Chinese leaders are then replicated by nationals on the ground level. I argue that it is a strategy to respond to the western accusations of China being a new imperialist state.
Often times Chinese would say that the West is scared, intimidated and jealous of their activities abroad. Bangladeshi locals also follow their leader’s use of language and strive to make it clear that Bangladesh is independent and their efforts, regardless of who is helping them, are a result of national agenda. In the meantime, western media watches from a distance and makes warning signs to Bangladesh about China. In order to understand the complexity of the Chinese presence in Bangladesh, we need to take into account the triangular relations between China, Bangladesh and the West. In the next two chapters we dig deeper into two cases of China-Bangladesh interactions.
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Chapter four The Silent Revival Of the Bangladesh Railway
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A functioning railway has considerable benefits in the transport of goods and
people, connecting places in countries such as Bangladesh. The Bangladesh railway was
constructed under the colonial regime of Britain. After Bangladesh gained its
independence the railway system deteriorated significantly. Recently much debate
surrounds a possible extinction of such mode of transport. However what this chapter
tries to convey is that with the collaboration of international players, significantly China
in the “One Belt One Road” initiative, the railway is experiencing a revival. New lines
have been constructed by the China Railway Company and contradictory to studies
focused on the declining influence of the railway, the current investments propel its
continuation. This chapter starts with a brief introduction of the history of the railway,
followed by the challenges of the railway and subsequent entry of the Chinese. I then
discuss the local reaction to the railway. Lastly as a conclusion I compare and contrast
the Tazara railway and Bangladesh railway in an attempt to analyze similarities and
differences between Chinese infrastructure project in Africa and in Bangladesh.
Discussions about the Bangladesh railway are divided among three main players,
Westerners, locals and Chinese, each representing their individual views on the topic.
We see the reduced influence of the West in the project, the local’s lack of awareness of
Chinese influence on the project and instead claiming credit for its success, especially among those working with the local government operations. The criticism by passengers on the management serves as a response to the local government claims, and more precisely show the social reality of the Bangladesh railway. The Chinese demonstration of pride in their work for better development and relationship building in Bangladesh
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are common themes found in this study. The railway unlike the Padma Bridge in chapter
five does not have as many controversies, and it could be suggested that the Chinese
influence in the railway is less divisive in global debate, thus enabling soft power
objectives to be carried out in accordance to both Chinese and Bangladesh leader’s
strategic plans.
4.1 Railway then and Railway now
During colonial rule the British established themselves in Chittagong in 1884 and
managed both the Chittagong port and the railway connecting Calcutta (India) and
Sylhet (Bangladesh). Mainly due to tea plantations located in the latter city, the
production of this commodity made an important contribution to the construction of
the railway and the port. In 1971 Bangladesh was a newly independent country with
these two important legacies, the railway and the tea plantations. The Bangladesh
railway system is about 2,745 kilometers (1,706 miles) (CIA The world fact book, 2016).
According to Asian Development Bank’s Railway reform progress Report in 2014 it carried 65.00 million passengers and 2.52 million tons of freight. The amount of people employed for the railway is also an important economic driver for the nation, reports on the number of employees vary from 25,083 to 40,000 employees .Today Sylhet is still the tea capital of Bangladesh and Chittagong is the main port of the country, the railway
is still an important link, however increasingly less so.
Since the British departure from the country there has been deterioration to the maintenance and management of the railway. The main factors are lack of government
funding for the project, competition from other forms of transport, and over the years
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deficiency of maintenance has contributed to the railway’s decline. Government
ownership and management accompanied by political interference in the sector adds to
the complexity, making it more difficult to operate in a commercially and economically efficient manner (Rahmatullah, 2007). A report by JICA found that the government of
Bangladesh has scarcely made any new investments in railway development since
independence. They have become so old and decrepit that they are unable to fully
capitalize on the railway’s inherent strengths resulting in reduced transportation volume, poorer service and a smaller role for the railway in the overall transport sector (JICA,
2007). The railway remains notorious for a long-established tradition of ticketless travel
among passengers, which I later discuss in more detail in interviews in the local reaction
section.
Research on the Bangladesh railway further shows that the main factor for declining railway effectiveness has been road competition, which is privately owned, meanwhile the railway is government controlled and regulated. This was accompanied by lack of investment. These factors have lessened the competitive advantage resulting in poor service quality and safety.
In the long run a dysfunctional railway may damage economic goals of the country thus there is a pressing need for its revival. In a speech by the World Bank country director Christine Wallich in 2006 she pointed out that railways could provide an efficient passenger transport system on the Dhaka-Chittagong corridor, rail transports freight containers much more efficiently than trucks and is much more environmentally friendly. Currently, Bangladesh Railways carries only 10% of the
64 containers coming to Chittagong. Better management practices could easily increase this. Despite all shortcomings, the railway plays a crucial role for the country and the need of usage to its full potential has been expressed by Westerners, Bangladeshis and
Chinese. These challenges have given room for China Railway Company to enter the field.
4.2 The China Railway Company in Bangladesh
The China railway company is one of the collaborators with Bangladesh along with other international donors. The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank (WB) provide assistance in policies and financing for the railway in Bangladesh. The Asian Development Bank is providing $505 million in loans to Bangladesh to improve railway infrastructure. The total estimated cost of the project is more than $800 million. In addition to the ADB loans, the European Investment Bank is lending $175 million and the Bangladesh government will supply the balance (Sharma, 2015). The China railway group is collaborating in the construction of the project and recently in the funding as well, which is further discussed in the following section. Deeper cooperation of China into
Bangladesh with the railway has taken place since 2011. The project is called the “Tongji
-Bhairab Bazar Double Line Project”. This is a double line project for the existing line.
According to my Chinese informants who work in the railway, the British government had advised the Bangladeshi government not to use the railway due to the high probability of accidents. Despite these warnings the local government continued its usage. Currently with the construction of the new line, the train system will be more
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safe and stable, my Chinese correspondents told me. These plans fall into the “One Belt
One Road” goals in respects to Bangladesh to help the nation have better infrastructure.
From the Chinese perspective the motivation for the construction of such lines are to
enhance economic engagement between China and Bangladesh. They claim that the
Chinese railway bared no or little economic gain and incentives and that it is mostly a humanitarian and diplomatic assistance to Bangladesh to improve infrastructure at the cost of Chinese expertise and low interest loans. The financial officer for the China railway company said to me, “We are not expecting to have a big turn over for this project, I mean we will not gain a lot of money from here, rather it is to help Bangladesh with its railway”. My informant never mentioned other international donors who are also financing the project, they were very much interested in making it clear that the main motif is due to cooperation and enhancement of Bangladesh via China.
My main contact for this project happens to be the railway project coordinator,
Mr. Yu shared with me his opinions about the railway and his experiences working in
Bangladesh for the past six years. We decided to go on a fieldtrip in order to get a firsthand experience and get an idea of the railway. We went on a five hour drive from
Dhaka to the interior of Bangladesh, passing by villages and rice plantations. Each train station was a center for much activity to take place, from markets of everyday commodities, students going to school. A large number of people were concentrated in each of the stations as it is normal in a railway station. According to my Chinese correspondents, they built a new railway line parallel to the old British one thus significantly reducing the traveling time. They take great pride in the work they have
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done for Bangladesh. They explained to me the upgrades and improvements that had
been made under their surveillance. This includes new railway lines, import of trains, training of pilots, construction of bridges, and import of technology from China to
Bangladesh. They feel the “One Belt One Road” initiative is not just a plan but it is the motivation that drives their work. The railway is for good relations between Bangladesh and China as all my Chinese correspondences told me. Workers for this project explained to me that they are happy to be part of it because it is coming from China and helping those countries in less fortunate situations. Koko told me during an interview,
“Thirty years ago China was the same as Bangladesh now. We were poor and had no international help. Now China is in a favorable economic situation and thus wants to help other neighbor nations to build good relations and see them prosper the same way in which China has done”. Their voices echoed those of their government leaders in that they are enhancing ties, building good relations, and for mutual benefit of both countries.
4.3 China and Western debate
The financing for the railway from the Chinese side is under the Asian infrastructure investment bank, whose main aim is for the development of infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region. Bangladesh has been one of the first countries to sign up to participate in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2014. The initiative “was born out the Chinese government frustration with what it regards as the slow pace of reforms and governance, and wants greater input in global established institutions like the IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank which it claims are
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dominated by American, European and Japanese interests” (Philippa, 2014). We notice
that the creation of the AIIB is to allow China a greater say in the world, with the motive
of infrastructure development. The Asian infrastructure investment bank has received
criticism from the West. The white house national Security Council stated concerns over
Chinese inability to meet high standards in such projects, in regards to governance, and
environmental and social safeguards.” (The Standard, 2015). President Xi jinping responded to these criticisms in 2015 saying that “The construction of the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is to boost economic and financial cooperation in an all-round manner, and work as an active promoter of economic globalization and regional integration “(Wang, 2015). Xi insisted that the Silk Road Fund and the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank would promote the common development of all countries as well as their people.
Criticism from the West about the Marine Silk Road with regards to Bangladesh is that the activities that China engages in are not purely economical, but also that China wants to have a stronger influence in military presence. Western commentators claim that China’s ambitions are sketchy, and have said that the Bay of Bengal is the next
South China Sea. Specific criticisms for the railway are not yet fully there, however criticism of China about the port of Chittagong have entered the sphere of academia and general public concern in the West. The railway is an important link to the port. We notice whereas the China narrative is one of peaceful cooperation for developmental causes, the western take on China’s initiative is one of raising speculations and giving warning signs to Bangladesh.
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4.4 Social reality of local discussion of the railway
The Tongi–Bhairab Bazar Railway section has purchased 150 new passenger carriages, implemented reforms, rehabilitated yards, extended loops, and upgraded signaling, which is where my Chinese correspondents work. Despite these efforts currently as Faridul Islam (2009) in an “Empirical Analysis of Bangladesh Railway
Earnings” finds that the public perception of the railway service is very poor, as is the general media reporting of the railway.
Many Bangladeshi people told me that at least once a year they go to their hometowns to visit their families in the interior of Bangladesh, usually for Bengali New
Year. This could not have been done without the railways, since most of them do not own a vehicle. It is a tradition to take the trains to the village, my respondents told me.
Some people have their whole families living in Dhaka and therefore do not ever use the railway and if needed they take a plane to visit other major cities. When I asked people about what they felt about China collaborating with the government in the construction of the railway, most people were not aware that this was happening. One respondent provided me with a possible reason for this, “The government does not inform the people about what China is doing in Bangladesh” (Nabila Chowdury, 24).
The local audience has little or no positive sentiments towards China in regards
to the implementation of “The One Belt one Road” project despite their use of the
railway. This could be due to the fact of lack of advertisement about the projects, or
perhaps a misconception that many people believe that the projects are entirely
executed by the government of Bangladesh. “The railway is good for me when I visit my
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family in Sylhet, but has China directly helped me? Not at all. Personally I do not feel this
way”. Mr. Islam told me.
I wanted to interview those that use the railway on a regular basis therefore with
the help of a translator I visited the main terminal of the railway located near the airport
where I had previously had a fieldtrip with Mr. Yu. The view of the passengers
themselves was varied and somewhat playful. We talked to young students, older men
and women, families and single passengers. There are three factors that are worth
mentioning about which this group of people all coincided in their views about the
railway. One is that they were mostly positive about the availability of the railway.
Second, that most of them were not aware of the influence of China in the railway, they
mostly believe that the railway has been constructed and maintained by the local
government. And third, that they all mostly felt that the railway was in need for
improvement. They pointed out that constant delay and poor conditions on the train are
all problems that have the potential of being solved with the collaboration of the
government and train workers. Most informants told me that they prefer taking the
train over the bus and car because it was cheap, at times even free because of the lack
of ticket control. They said it was reliable, comfortable and fun. I noticed that there
were no visible ticket counters, furthermore when I talked with the people waiting for
the train at the station many of them confessed that they do not usually pay for the
tickets. Five school children told me, “we ride in the train for free, we need it every day to go from home to school which is in Dhaka and it doesn’t make sense for us to pay for it every day”, they laughed and continue saying, “anyway, nobody ever checks”. This
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observation confirms to studies about the railway previously done that spoke of issues with program planning for the railway, as well as ticketless tradition. Additionally, I asked them about the influence of China on the railway, most of them had a confused face and said that they were unaware that China has had any form of influence in the railway.
Similarly, those working for the railway from the government of Bangladesh lack a strong opinion about the influence of China in the railway. I spoke to the Railway master, who is in charge of the timetables and procedures of the train. He told me that he has received a train arriving from China a few days earlier and it was as in poor conditions he claimed. Due to the poor construction, old materials, he was not happy about the Chinese collaboration with the railway. He mostly emphasized on the quality of the railways and thus blamed China. He said that it was due to the Bangladeshi government that people in the country were able to enjoy this form of transportation.
He highly praised Hasina and her people for being able to do such a good job in the country. Thus once again showing nationalistic narrative for those involved in the project.
4.5 The Tazara railway
Although the engagement of China in Bangladesh Railway is almost a silent one,
Chinese engagement in the railway in African nations is still discussed today. Prior to engaging in the railway in Bangladesh, China had constructed the Tanzania–Zambia railway. It was the first major infrastructure project by China in the 1960s during the
Cultural Revolution, serving as an important focal point for Chinese Foreign policy into
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today’s New Silk road. The social reports about it serve as a comparison for analysis
about the railway in Bangladesh.
The Tanzania-Zambia Railway is often claimed as the main example of Chinese
African relations and Chinese aid in independence and development in the region.
Beginning in February 1965 when the then President Nyerere of Tanzania requested
China to assist the construction of the railway. This was due to the fact that western donors including; the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, the World Bank, and the United Nations declined interest in the project (Monson, 2009). The World Bank report in 1964 projected that only 87,000 tons of cargo would be carried between
Zambia and Tanzania by the year 2000, not enough to support a railway, and recommended that a road be built instead (Bailey, 1976). It was therefore China who seized the opportunity to engage with Tanzania in this project, in a similar way that the
Bangladeshi railway is currently being constructed with deeper and stronger ties with
China.
The 1860-kilometer long rail-road starts from the capital of Tanzania and ends in
Zambia. To build the Tazara railway, the Chinese Government provided an interest-free loan of 988 million RMB yuan and shipped about 1 million tons of equipments and materials. The number of technicians and workers dispatched for the construction was about 50,000, which is significantly more than the workers for the railway project in
Bangladesh, at the peak period, the number of Chinese workers and staff working at
construction site were as many as 16,000. Materials and even food was brought from
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China, workers had very challenging working conditions due to climate challenges, difficulties in the landscape and wildlife hazards. Reports claim that over 64 Chinese people died during the construction. Chinese experts and engineering technicians did all the work of exploration, survey and designing and they also assisted the Tanzania and
Zambia governments to organize the execution of the construction. Similarly China collaborated with the Bangladeshi government almost thirty years later in the construction of the railway, but in a lesser degree due to the fact that a railway already existed there.
There are similar social consequences from the Tazara railway to the Bangladesh railway. Jamie Monson who has done extensive research from 1998 to 2003 on the
Tazara railway social consequences after the construction by collecting passenger-parcel receipts, interviewed passengers, and observed daily life in the railway corridor. The study found that the railway Tazara has been an important factor for the development of a thriving entrepreneurial economy along the route in southern Tanzania. Today
Tazara connects local communities and provides farmers with the physical, social, and economic mobility they need to contend with rural Africa’s unpredictable economic conditions. Similarly the Bangladesh railway bares social, economical opportunities to take place between the different villages. Pilots, passengers of the railway and Chinese workers told me that the railway is a great way to enhance connectivity with the interior of the country with the capital for people and commodities.
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There has also been a lot of positive claims and revalidation that came about due
to the railway. Critiques of the Tarzana railway post construction often are not critiques
on China itself, but on corruption and poor post handling of the project on African
nation’s behalf. The Chinese did not achieve their goal of training and supervising
enough African technicians to take over the management of Tazara after their departure.
As a matter of fact, the railway authority continues to rely on a team of Chinese experts.
There has been ongoing speculation about the future privatization of the railway and a
climate of uncertainty and allegations of corruption have clouded the railway’s future.
Similarly the Bangladesh railway has hoped to improve service quality in order to be
competitive with other modes of transportation with the cooperation of the local
government.
Today the voices are very much divided in that the locals view the project as self-made and consider its success as due to their own efforts. The Chinese carry sentiments from the Tazara railway into Bangladesh viewing their work as humanitarian and good, and that the westerners warn Bangladesh by criticizing about its growing bilateral ties yet also collaborate together with local and Chinese in the construction of this project.
China has collaborated in the construction of railways in African nations from start until the end. For Bangladesh it has collaborated in making new lines. As mentioned previously the Tazara railway received a lot of attention in China, in Africa and internationally whereas the railway in Bangladesh has received little attention or no
attention. This lack of awareness is found even with passengers, to those working at the
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railway. Had it not been for my Chinese informants, it would have been difficult to attain
a lot of information in this regard. This is one important difference between the two
railways. This could be due to the fact that both railways have been constructed at
different times in history. One was constructed during the Mao period, and serves as a
reflective example of good government relations when China was not economically stable. The railway in Bangladesh today might have more to do with procedural arrangements of Chinese government, yet we still hear the voices of humanitarian goodwill involved in the project from the Chinese railway workers. Perhaps today China is not too concerned in raising awareness on this development for a number of reasons, one of them being that it will not gain a lot of profit from this project. In the case of
Bangladesh it seems to be that the government has taken full or large accountability of many projects and the revival of the railway could be one of them. The Padma Bridge discuss in the following chapter is another example of the local government taking accountability for the project. The Bangladesh railway is very important for trade of goods and transportation of people, however there is a lack of awareness about Chinese implementation in the project, which is a notable contrast to the Tazara railway. The railway is reviving silently largely in part by China.
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Chapter five
The “Padma Bridge”: the World Bank initiation and China’s tentative completion
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This chapter is a case study of the Padma Bridge which is a project to better integrate and develop Bangladesh. The bridge was originally financed by the World Bank and other international donors, however, after corruption scandals were found on behalf of the Bangladeshi government and the appointed Canadian firm the donors withdrew from the project. Interestingly, Chinese companies decided to collaborate with the local government in the continuation of the project. This chapter analyses the specific reactions about the bridge from a local Bangladeshi, Western and Chinese perceptive. Within each group, the views vary greatly. Therefore, it would be erroneous to conclude that one group follows one idea, however, there are common lines and similarities that certain groups displayed and this is what this chapter attempts to investigate and put together. The conclusion section reveals current debates that are surrounding the Padma Bridge and the Chinese influence in it. Even though this project is currently unfolding we already notice instances in which Chinese are being accused of corruption, delays and other negative views confirming prejudices of western view towards Chinese in previous infrastructure projects.
5.1 The multipurpose Padma Bridge
The Bangladeshi bridge authority stated that The Padma Bridge will form an integral part of the realization of the Transnational Asian Highway network. The bridge construction was initiated in 2010 and is an ongoing project in order to provide improved connectivity between the central capital Dhaka and southwestern part of the country. The two districts are separated by the Padma River where in the southwestern
78 part over 30 million or 25% of the Bangladeshi population reside. Furthermore, the bridge authority stated that this project will accelerate socio-economic development of the Southwest region, which is currently relatively isolated and underdeveloped. The incidence of poverty in the Southwest region is higher than in the rest of the country.
The Gross Regional Product (GRP) of the South Western region (Khulna and Barisal divisions) is only 17.4 % of the GDP compared to 38% in Dhaka division. There is a sharp division between the two districts and hence the call for better integration.
Initially, the Padma Bridge was to be constructed with the help of loans from four donors – World Bank would provide $1.2 billion, Asian Development Bank (ADB)
$615 million, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) $400 million, and Islamic
Development Bank (IDB) $140 million. It was anticipated that about 73,300 persons would be affected by the project. There were a number of studies conducted by the named donors to meet the standards for the bridge. Evaluations on the area of the project, social impact, and environmental hazards. Once all preliminary studies were finished in 2011 the project began. The contract between the World Bank, the other donors and the government of Bangladesh stated that transparency and accountability were important factors in order to conduct the project, and these principles should be kept up throughout the completion of the bridge.
The Bangladesh Bridge Authority appointed AECOM as Design Consultant for the project. The bridge is partly situated in the active floodplain of the Padma River, which combines the outflow of two of the longest rivers in the world: the Ganges and the
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Brahmaputra. The bridge will be one of the longest river crossings in the world. A two- level steel truss bridge was selected, with the concrete top of a four-lane highway running on the upper concrete deck and the railway, including a gas pipeline and telecommunications cables on the lower level (Tapley, Sham & Holmberg, 2010). The area of the two ports was also carefully selected. With the collaboration of various actors international and national, the project had optimistic foundations.
Figure 3 Location of the bridge project. Retrieved from the Daily Star1
Currently, transportation takes place via ferries, which are time-consuming and hazardous. A respondent named Moriom Mawla, 28, who works in Dhaka told me that she travels to Barisal frequently, at least once a month because part of her family still lives there. She came to Dhaka to improve her life, find a better job and advance her future as her hometown is very “undeveloped”, she describes in contrast to the capital.
When I asked her about her monthly visits she described a story that was repeated to me on many occasions.
1 http://www.thedailystar.net/country/pm-inaugurates-padma-bridge-river-training-work-186211
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“The journey is long and very unstable; the ferry shakes and leaves people
feeling seasick. It takes many hours and the ferries are unpredictable as far as time
departures. Leaving, (boarding on the ferry) is chaotic, smelly and noisy. I dread it. With the construction of the Padma Bridge I feel it will be a great improvement in the wellbeing of the country as a whole and I will personally benefit when I travel back to visit my family”. (Moriom)
In the time of the fieldwork there were many news reports about accidents,
even deaths occurring due to ferry malfunctions. Thus, the hope for a more convenient
and fast form of transportation was often expressed in interviews, regardless of current
circumstances. Most people who are not involved in the creation of the bridge are
enthusiastic about the end result and technological advances in the nation. “We have
been waiting a long time for this bridge”, many people told me. The bridge will stretch
for 6.15 kilometer and cost US $2.9 billion facilitating economic, social and industrial
connectivity between the two regions. The Padma Bridge Project will drastically shorten
the travel time between Dhaka and Khulna from over 12 hours to approximately 3 hours.
Furthermore, the project is expected to improve the national GDP by 0.56% a year. The
project is viewed as very important infrastructure development of the country as it
uplifts people from poverty by more engagement between the two districts, and
enhanced transportation and improved logistics not only for Bangladesh but in the
continent.
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5.2 Changes in the project and corruption
The Padma Bridge was viewed as a challenging yet rewarding project by all parties involved. The ambassador of Japan expressed a great deal of enthusiasm about the project which had the highest concessional loan in the history of 40 years of bilateral relations, with a 40-year return, in an official statement that the embassy issued. The ambassador stated the great benefits the project would bring with much emphasis on the poverty relief for the people of Bangladesh. This would have also been the largest sum of money that the World Bank would have given in a loan since its founding history.
However, the original four donors decided to reevaluate their agreement with the government of Bangladesh after bribery and corruption were suspected to be taking place among local government officials during the bidding process.
The World Bank alleged that bridge project’s main organizers as well as other politicians accepted bribes first in September 2011 and again in April 2012 from the
Canadian firm SNC-Lavalin. The bank first negotiated with the Anti-Corruption
Commission (ACC), and asked the government of Bangladesh to collaborate providing evidence abiding by the local laws. The people who were accused of taking bribes were the former Communication Minister Syed Abul Hossain, Bridges Division Secretary
Mosharraf Hossain Bhuiyan along with the Prime Minister's Economic Affairs Advisor Dr.
Moshiur Rahman, who was the Integrity Advisor of the project. It was difficult to trace back evidence of corruption from the local government, and subsequently, prevent it from taking place. Local government officials denied the accusations. In an interview
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with BBC and various other Medias, Prime Minister Hasina denied any allegations of
corruption from the government of Bangladesh and has up until today stood by that
stance. Transparency international has ranked Bangladesh as a most corrupt nation in
the world three times in a row since 2010 and in 2015 it stood at 139 out of 168
countries in the corruption perception index.
After the World Bank raised the issue of corruption, attempts were made to negotiate different approaches with the Bangladeshi government in order to continue with the project; the final decision was regarded as “unsatisfactory” in order to proceed.
Finally, the bank decided to withdraw from the project on June 29, 2012, and canceled the US$1.2 billion credit for the bridge project. The bank stated that “the World Bank cannot, should not, and will not turn a blind eye to evidence of corruption,” After the
World Bank made this decision, the other three donors immediately followed by retrieving as well.
5.3 The Washington and the Beijing consensus
This was the first time in the World Banks history that it had withdrawn from a project after it had already begun operations. The World Bank follows the principles set by the Washington consensus in which one of the policies is that it will not tolerate corruption. It was commented that the motive for the bank to cancel the loan was largely to set a good example for other countries to follow in accordance with the banks decree. Retreating from the project did not mean that the bank would withdraw from all projects in Bangladesh; however the Padma bridge project was put on hold for the
83 next two years. In contrast the Beijing consensus offers an alternative to the
Washington consensus, in the sense that its policies are more flexible. Turin comments that one of the primary hallmarks of the Beijing Consensus is that it does not dictate finite policy points to those who may seek to use it as a model (Turin, 2010), meaning it does not interfere with internal affairs. The Beijing consensus recognizes the need for flexibility in solving multifarious problems. It is inherently focused on innovation, while simultaneously emphasizing ideals such as equitable development and a “Peaceful Rise”
(Ramo, 2004: 5). The main difference between the two consensus lies in that whereas the Washington consensus interferes with internal affairs of the Bangladeshi government, the Chinese consensus does not. It was under these Beijing Consensus views on when is it appropriate to aid a nation that China was able to make an entry into the construction of the Padma Bridge.
China entering into the Padma Bridge is an interesting case due to the fact that from the start we see a deviation from previous academic literature in two aspects; one, about the dominance in the infrastructure market, and two in that China was not accused of corruption but rather entered into Bangladesh as a consequence of an outside corruption scandal. These two points are usually negative connotations that surround practices that Chinese have engaged in the past. Chen (2009) argues that
Chinese dominate the market for large-scale public projects in African nations, and in the case of Bangladesh we see that they only joined later. The second accusation that
Chinese firms usually fall into is that they often disregard local laws and exploit local communities (Broadman, 2008; Carmody, 2009; Zheng, 2010; Cheru & Obi, 2011). Again
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in this case we notice that the entry of Chinese company into Bangladesh was legal, and
furthermore, it did not promote corruption. However this case is still a recent one and
further investigation with time would be needed in order to draw more conclusive views.
Interestingly currently, there is an absence of discourses on dependency, neo- imperialism, and other negative connotations among Bangladeshi locals towards
Chinese influence in the country.
5.4 From challenge to opportunity
After the World Bank withdrew from the project, The World Bank received much criticism from Bangladesh as well as from the West. Local Bengali Reporter Anand
Kumar said that “It is true that the World Bank has to be concerned about the proper and corruption-free implementation of projects. But on occasion, the decisions also
have to be strategic. It should not suddenly expect miracles in countries like Bangladesh.”
Many bloggers and commentators felt anxious about the effect of the decision, that it
would place a great deal of stress in the country. As a consequence from “Challenge to
opportunity” was the government slogan for the aftermath of the events. The
government took this as an opportunity to prove to the world its self-reliance.
5.5 Solutions and mixed messages
As a solution to the departure of the World Bank from the project in 2014 two changes were made. The first change was about the financing of the project. The second change was about the consultancy team for the construction of the bridge, river training and appointment of supervisory consultancy.
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The government of Bangladesh decided to construct the bridge on its own funds from foreign reserves but with the construction by a Chinese company. China Major
Bridge Engineering Company Ltd was selected to construct the bridge. China proposed building the bridge on the build-own-transfer (BOT) basis by investing $2 billion or 70 percent of the project cost. However, from the Bangladeshi media perception all financing is emphasized as being national. More explanation is given below. Four companies - China Major Bridge Engineering Company, Daelim-L&T JV and Samsung C&T
Corporation - purchased the tender papers. But only the Chinese company submitted their financial proposal on time, before the due date of April 24, 2014 (Bangladesh news
24, 2014). The state-owned company has constructed, roads, railways, and structures like the famous 36 km Hangzhou Bay Bridge, the longest sea-crossing bridge in the world. It has been argued that the Chinese construction companies present in African nations are state-owned or state-assisted enterprises (Chen, 2009, Baah & Jauch, 2009 and BIDPA, 2012), which is also true for this case. Furthermore, the company goals states that it has enhanced the strategy of “Going Global”, actively participated in countries such a Bangladesh. It seems that these objectives are in line with the “One
Belt, One Road” policies, about providing aid to countries in their plans to upgrade their infrastructure.
Much information is hard to come by and it is simply unavailable, in order to have a more clear idea of the financing and procurement process, I visited the Padma bridge office. When I asked the engineers of the Padma Bridge why China won the bid, everyone seemed to agree that this was due to the low cost that the company agreed to
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work under, which is only partly true. The tender evaluation committee went through
this proposal and found that China Major has given the lowest bid and recommended to
take this proposal. After approval by the Cabinet Committee on Government Purchase
(CCGP), the Government signed the agreement with construction firm China Major
Bridge in June 2014. Little did they mention about local government corruption.
Around 3,500 people are currently working on the bridge. Of them, 500 are from
China and the rest from Bangladesh. Over 200 Chinese engineers, officials and laborers
and another 6,000 local workers will join (Shohel, 2015). This statistic shows that the
majority of workers for the project are locals, which deviates from previous ideas about
Chinese projects abroad. In “China Bashing” by Sautman, B., & Yan (2013) found that
Chinese companies are usually viewed as employing only Chinese workers. However one
characteristic that is often found in African countries and it is repeated here is that most
of the Chinese employers hold a higher position such as engineers while locals usually
hold lower skilled jobs. I asked Bangladeshi nationals that I encountered during the
fieldwork about how they feel about a Chinese company constructing the Padma Bridge.
Responses varied, some would say that as far as they knew the Chinese were the best
engineers for bridge construction and therefore felt confident about their handling the
project on Bangladesh’s behalf. Less commonly, others felt that the project should have
been a completely national one without the financing or any influence from
international agencies. Other people told me that they felt the bridge was risky and
were not confident about the structure due to low quality in Chinese products. Although
locals’ points of view about whether or not they approve to have a Chinese company
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constructing the bridge varies, they all maintained that they do not feel threat or danger
about having Chinese coming into Bangladesh, this nuances the String of pearls theory.
Bangladeshis do not feel a threat by China in the Padma Bridge. The idea that China is constructing the Padma Bridge in order to have marine domination over the Bay of
Bengal is not part of conversations among locals and it is far from their imaginations.
The second change after the World Bank departure was about the nature of financing for the project. According to local news the cost of the project has increased and it will be implemented solely with government funding. The country's foreign currency reserve now stood at $18 billion. According to the Bangladeshi financial department current estimates, the total cost of the bridge project is $2.9billion, of which $2.03 billion would be needed in foreign currency. The government has “pre-paid”
15% of the total costs to the CMBEC and Sinohydro. Around 70% of the cost will be paid
for in Dollars, which will be supplied by the state-owned Janata Bank. Moreover, the
government considers setting aside a part of the country's foreign currency reserve for
the project. From the local government view, due to the financing being internal, the
Padma Bridge has changed names from Padma Bridge often being referred to as the
Dream project.
National pride often expressed in government leaders’ speeches taking the term
of Dream project in regard to the Padma Bridge. The same sentiments of opportunity
and self-reliance have been adopted by those involved directly with the construction of
the bridge. It appears that the issue of corruption has been removed from the daily talks
88 of people and emphasis on the future has been adopted. Often in interviews I would hear this statement,” this is an opportunity for Bangladesh to do it right. We don’t need the help from anyone, we can do this”. I visited the office of the bridge authority where one floor is entirely devoted to workers of the Padma Bridge. There I had the chance to talk to the workers of the project, who would tell me that this is a project that
Bangladesh is proud of to show the world, to project the country’s self-sufficiency at a global stage. The project director Shafiqul Islam told me, “Everyone is entitled to their opinions; some people think it is bad, some people think it is good, but this is a socially and economically wholesome project by Bangladesh and for Bangladesh.”
5.6 Chinese perspective about the Padma Bridge
“If China did not help, there would be no help” (Pang Dong)
I managed to meet with one of the engineers, Pang Dong, working for the Padma
Bridge. He told me that often times the media blames his company for corruption.
Chinese told me this a few times, they approve and admire their government. They told me that they are doing their job for the good of the Bangladeshi people. “If China did not help, there would be no help. China came to Bangladesh to help the country”. This is what most of my Chinese respondents told me. Alden & Alves’ (2009) concluded that the Chinese often use their similar impoverished background with the Africans to strengthen Sino-African relations and promote similarities between both. This is replicated in Bangladesh as well in many instances. Chinese people feel a sense of pride in being able to help those that were “like we were a few decades ago”. Another
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respondent told me that China has a harmonious presence in the world, traditionally
and even more so recently. “We are not concerned with occupying other nations by
violence; rather, China wants to help those in less fortunate countries in a peaceful, win-
win way”. This was the common view among Chinese towards their presence in
Bangladesh - to help Bangladesh, and to create win-win collaborations.
5.7 Western perspective about the Chinese role in this project
Despite the fact that the West now plays very little direct influence in the Padma
Bridge, the western narrative is still important to analyze due to its ongoing effects globally. Surprisingly there is little criticism from the West about Chinese inclusion into this particular project in academic journals, newspapers and even blogs. Similar to the local perceptive, the western take on this project varies from support to the World Bank and also criticism of it; however the criticism on China is minimal.
In the Western media, there is a strong movement to fight corruption.
“Corruption is a significant obstacle to international development...” (Zimmerman,
2016). Westerners living in Bangladesh that I spoke carry the same idea, that corruption
should never be tolerated. I interviewed a Swedish national working previously with the
Padma Bridge who told me “This project had reached the highest level of corruption
starting from the prime minister. Corruption is a question of morals and ethics and
where our western morals and ethics nowadays forbid corruption, the Chinese look at
this differently.” He felt that if corruption was a part of the procedure then it is
intolerable. He mentioned that the Chinese have a willingness to collaborate with
90 corrupt governments, which no Bangladeshi would mention to me. Interestingly, this particular informant failed to mention that much of the scandal of corruption actually happened before the Chinese company arrived in Bangladesh, nevertheless the fact that they were willing to continue working despite the scandal is what seemed to be much of disturbance to him.
I also analyzed blogs from westerners view about the Padma Bridge, in a platform called “global anti-corruption” blog. The blog stated that the added cost and further delay of the project hurt the long term goals of the bank due to having zero tolerance. “In the particular circumstances of this case, the withdrawal was the best of the Bank’s bad options.” This blog critiques the World Bank, not the government of
Bangladesh and not the Chinese involvement at all. Commentators agreed that fighting poverty is the ultimate goal of the World Bank and fighting corruption is another priority, but perhaps of less significance for the Padma Bridge. Again, similarly to local commentators westerners argued that the bank should have stayed in the project and were not quick to bash on China.
5.8 Current situation of the project
Currently, the cost of the bridge has climbed by over US$1 billion, almost three times the original estimate. The expected completion date was first being pushed back to 2018, but recently it has been pushed even further to 2020. These climbing costs and greater delays may suggest that the money is not properly handled, corruption might be the cause, or perhaps poor managements is continuing, and gradually Chinese are being
91 accused of this negativity. Previous studies on Chinese companies abroad noted that the
Chinese were often accused of causing delays. As early as 2015, the Dhaka tribute reported that the Chinese firms “have been held responsible for delaying project works in Bangladesh; Sinohydro delayed the upgradation of the Dhaka-Chittagong Highway and CMBEC delayed the upgradation work of the Joydebpur-Mymensingh Highway.”
Accusations of corruption have yet to come to the fore.
The Padma Bridge has undergone many changes from donors to collaborators, to names. Nevertheless, two factors remain constant and that is the pressing need for its fulfillment and the inability to do so due to constant delays. Interestingly, local government officials maintain pride in their work as do Chinese workers for this project each claiming that their respective government is the one that has enhanced development in the region. The local reaction varies from the hope that the bridge will bring technology and change in the country. One respondent, while discussing the
Padma Bridge and his particular lack of enthusiasm about it, I asked many times why he was not hopeful for the bridge and all the benefits it would bring. He simply told me that
“We live in a corrupt society”.
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Chapter six Conclusion
93
This thesis provided an insight to Bangladeshi Chinese relations from an
international level, to a people to people perception, followed with two case studies. I
would like to go back to the research question of this thesis and ask “What are the perceptions of Chinese involvement with infrastructure projects in Bangladesh Context?”
It has become apparent that Bangladesh has an interesting arrangement with
connections with both the West and China that are reflective in the voices of those
people living in the area. Bangladesh positions itself in a favorable way attracting
Chinese foreign aid while and at the same time maintaining Western relations. It has
been argued that current shifts towards China are strategic motifs in order to avoid
Indian hegemony in the region. China has an important stance in the Chittagong port,
but did not attain rights on the Sonata port demonstrating the balancing act that
Bangladesh plays satisfying Western request and keeping friendship ties with China. This balancing act has not always been a smooth one and has resulted in different dialogues to be exchanged, most noticeably, the West, The local and the Chinese voices in chapter three and further presented in chapters four and five. The local perception of Chinese is varied and diverse. It appears that the vast majority of people view Chinese products in a positive light and Chinese investment in the country is welcomed. Those people working in Bangladeshi government sectors do not accredit the Chinese for the development of the country but rather view it as an intrinsic national move.
Furthermore many people are unaware of Chinese influence in the country in regards to infrastructure projects, and this is an important rebuke to the string of pearls theory.
The string of pearls theory claims that China is increasing its influence in countries such
94
as Bangladesh perhaps with military motivations, yet the people of Bangladesh do not
feel threatened and many times are unaware of this accusations. The western take on
Chinese in Bangladesh is one that China is threatening global stability, and warns
Bangladesh to further engagement with China as it did with African nations in the past.
This leads to another important topic of the thesis, the similarities and differences
between Chinese infrastructure projects in Africa and in Bangladesh. For the case in
Bangladesh there are many distinctions to the African-Chinese relations. In the
Bangladesh context a lot of tensions and conflicts among locals and Chinese are
nonexistent. Issues of migration, labor disputes, land disputes, political tactics, are not
present in Bangladesh. This is a reflection of shifts in Chinese going abroad strategy and
current reality of Bangladesh. The Chinese for the most part maintain that their efforts
in the country are humanitarian. This thesis argues that the reasoning for these
statements is due to previous humanitarian moves that China had with African nations,
the Tazara railway for example. Although the Tanzania railway was constructed in the
1960s Chinese workers still believe that their efforts in constructing the railway in
Bangladesh are in humanitarian nature. Unlike the Tazara railway the Bangladesh
railway has received little international attention. The Padma Bridge unlike the railway
has received much attention, due to corruption scandals in the Bangladeshi government.
Interestingly for this case China has not received negative concentration. Although the
bridge will have economic gains for China, informants both in the Chinese embassy and
Chinese engineers believe that their work is for morally helping the country. Among all
95
the different dialogues Bangladesh, the West, and China the common goals is to attain
better infrastructure and improving the economy of the nation.
One thing is clear and that is that China has given African nations and Bangladesh an alternative take to issues that often times were neglected by Western nations. Both
the Padma Bridge and the Bangladesh railway had been projects left unfinished by
western donors. By constructing needed infrastructure developments China has gained
a good reputation in Bangladesh of friendship for the most part, however not as loud
and clear as perhaps Chinese people working in Bangladesh attempt to be received.
Regardless of the acceptance, or lack of awareness of Chinese projects this strategy has
allowed China to further build relations in the country. Developing countries have the benefit of more choices due to China. The cases shown in this work emphasised the importance of better dialogue among all providers of international cooperation. Finally,
China and Bangladesh are changing rapidly. This means that studies must be designed to capture the dynamics of change in the Chinese going abroad debate.
96
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Appendix of interviews
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Formal interviews= 24
name Gender/ Occupation Language Time of Formal/informal age proficiency interview Chinese Mr. Yu Male/60 Engineer at the Mandarin 5 different Formal nationals Chinese railway Chinese occasions company Koko Female/26 Finance Native 3 different Formal controller of English occasions China railway company engineer Pan Dong Male/26 Engineer for the Good level 1 Formal Padma bridge of English interview, 2 hours
Mr. Wang Male/35 Engineer for Good level 2 formal Huawei of English interviews, 3 hours each
Mrs. Liu Female/ Chinese Good level 1 Combined 30 embassy worker of English interview, formal 1:10 interview minutes
Mr. Yan Male/29 Chinese Good level 1 embassy worker of English interview, 1:10 minutes
Bangladeshi Kamran Sarkar Male/29 Immigration Native 30 Formal nationals worker English minutes Moriom Female/ Immigration Native 25 Formal Malwa 27 worker English minutes
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Brisky Anwar Female/ Immigration Native Formal 34 worker English Nabila Female/ Immigration Native 20 formal Chowdury 24 worker English minutes Segur Islam Male/ 35 Immigration Native 30 Formal worker English minutes Tarkeem Islam Male/ 29 Immigration Native 20 Formal worker English minutes Rabik Male/ 35 Immigration Native 45 Formal Chowdhudy worker English minutes Samia Female/ Immigration Native 35 Formal Musherrof 28 worker English minutes Nusaiba Sifat Female/ Immigration Native 45 Formal 29 worker English minutes Trisha Falguni Female/ Immigration Native 30 Formal 31 worker English minutes
Students Nadid Shahriar, Male/ 27 Student Native 1:10 hour Combined English formal interview Rifat Rahim Male/ 28 Student Native 1:10 hour English Mohamed Male/ 27? Student Native 1:10 hour Anwar English NGO Monowara Female/ Program Good 40 Informal workers Khan 45 controller English minutes conversation Yesmin Ema Female/ Assistant Low 40 Informal 28 English minutes conversation Raisa Female/ Communications Native 40 Informal
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chowdhury 27 officer English minutes conversation
State Mojammal Male/ 47? Railway Bengali Translator Formal officials Hosain controller
Mr. Yahya Male/ ? Assistant Native 1 hour Formal Padma English bridge Mr. Mohamed Male/? Engineer Native 45 Formal worker Golam Mortuje English minutes Mr. Md Male/ ? project director Native 30 Formal Shafiqul Islam English minutes Railway Meethu Male/ 50? Engineer Working Talked on Informal worker proficiency various occasions
Westerners Mr. Straub Male/ 55 engineer Native 1:20 Formal English minutes
Group of Female/ housewife Spanish Talked on Informal foreigner 40? various ladies occasions
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