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Boko Haram: Whose Islamic State?

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Boko Haram: Whose Islamic State? JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RICE UNIVERSITY BOKO HARAM: WHOSE ISLAMIC STATE? BY MICHAEL NWANKPA VISITING SCHOLAR JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RICE UNIVERSITY MAY 1, 2015 Boko Haram: Whose Islamic State? THIS PAPER WAS WRITTEN BY A RESEARCHER WHO PARTICIPATED IN A BAKER INSTITUTE RESEARCH PROJECT. WHEREVER FEASIBLE, PAPERS ARE REVIEWED BY OUTSIDE EXPERTS BEFORE THEY ARE RELEASED. HOWEVER, THE RESEARCH AND VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS PAPER ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL RESEARCHER, AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY. © 2015 BY THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY OF RICE UNIVERSITY THIS MATERIAL MAY BE QUOTED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION, PROVIDED APPROPRIATE CREDIT IS GIVEN TO THE AUTHOR AND THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY. 2 Boko Haram: Whose Islamic State? ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author would like to express profound gratitude to Abdulbasit Kassim for his comments on the draft paper, and to Professor Martin Shaw and Professor David Cook for reviewing this paper and helping bring it to its current form. 3 Boko Haram: Whose Islamic State? Executive Summary Boko Haram may be reaching its bitter end as the Nigerian military, with the support of Niger, Cameroon, and Chad, plans a massive ground invasion of the insurgents’ long-controlled safe zone, the Sambisa Forest. The regional Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has the upper hand in this clash, as Boko Haram is running out of steam, having been subjected to constant aerial bombardment since February. Outgoing Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan has refused the offer of the United Nations to send troops, expressing confidence in the MNJTF’s ability to rout Boko Haram before the May 29 handover to the new president. This is the right decision, as any direct involvement of the United States and its European allies, especially France, would only play into the hands of the insurgents and help broaden the international appeal of Boko Haram to other jihadist groups. However, the US can aid the counterterrorism efforts of the MNJTF by contributing to the pool of UN-sourced special funds for the task force and providing enhanced counterterrorism training, as well as intelligence and communication support, to the Nigerian forces and their partners. However, Boko Haram remains deadly as long as sharia is the precondition for political and economic gains to the Muslim north. The Boko Haram insurgency, therefore, is better understood within the dichotomous discourse of exclusion/inclusion and access/non-access to power. In this case, Boko Haram’s self-declared goal of establishing a sharia state offers a partial truth. Introduction In August 2014, one month after the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) declared an Islamic caliphate, the Jama’atul Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (“People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”)—popularly known as Boko Haram— declared its own Islamic state. Between July 2014 and March 2015, Boko Haram controlled 70 percent of the state of Borno in Nigeria (a key state in the group’s northeast stronghold) and conducted two major attacks on its capital city, Maiduguri. However, these attacks were repelled by the Nigerian military, denying Abubakar Shekau (the ruthless leader of Boko Haram who took over from Mohammed Yusuf, the slain founder of the group) and his men full control over Borno. Boko Haram also controlled several towns in the states of Yobe and Adamawa. The 4 Boko Haram: Whose Islamic State? whole area controlled by Boko Haram as of January 2015 consisted of about 20,000 square miles, a land mass equal to the size of Belgium.1 The Nigerian military, bolstered by the African Union–backed regional force of 7,500 troops from Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) countries—Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and the Republic of Benin—has recorded some substantial success in its counterterrorism effort against Boko Haram.2 Their victories include recovering most of the Boko Haram–occupied area and reclaiming Gwoza, the so-called caliphate’s capital, a day before Nigeria’s 2015 presidential election.3 The military killed hundreds of the insurgents, recovered large numbers of weapons, and discovered terrorist bomb-making factories in Yobe on March 13 and in Gwoza on March 30. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is credited for the recent victories against Boko Haram, an assessment that overshadows the Nigerian military’s prior success. Shortly before the MNJTF formally began operation in early March 2015,4 the Nigerian military had reclaimed about 10 towns in the state of Adamawa and several others in the state of Borno. But the conflicting reports on areas retaken or still under the insurgents’ control and the contested Baga casualty figures,5 among many other irregularities, understated the military’s success. The counterterrorism efforts of the Nigerian military were also undercut by the general suspicion that the heightened military action in the weeks leading to an important general election was motivated by the political opportunism of President Jonathan’s administration. Although President Jonathan lost the election, he had hoped the recent gains made against Boko Haram 1 David Blair, “Boko Haram is now a mini-Islamic State, with its own territory,” The Telegraph, January 10, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11337722/Boko-Haram-is-now-a-mini- Islamic-State-with-its-own-territory.html. 2 The regional force was adopted by the heads of state at the 484th meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) on January 29, 2015. 3 The border town between Nigeria and Cameroon was an ideal capital for Boko Haram because of its rocky and hilly nature and because of Mount Mandara, which provides a natural fortress for the insurgents with several channels of caves and tunnels leading to it. 4 The Peace and Security Council of the AU approved the MNJTF operational documents and the announcement of 8,700 troops from the LCBC and Benin on March 6, 2015. 5 The Baga massacre is one of the deadliest Boko Haram attacks with an estimated death toll of 2,000. The massacre lasted four days, January 3–7, 2015, after Boko Haram ransacked the MNJTF military barracks in the town. The Nigerian army disputes Amnesty International’s death toll of 2,000 and instead puts the number at 150. 5 Boko Haram: Whose Islamic State? would guarantee him victory.6 Interestingly, the election campaigns of both President Jonathan and his opponent President-elect Muhammad Buhari, a retired general, were framed largely around the Boko Haram discourse.7 But what does defeating Boko Haram really entail, and how should the recent success of the MNJTF be measured? The MNJTF’s success so far—wresting lands from Boko Haram’s control and killing a number of insurgents—remains only a partial victory as long as many of the 2768 Chibok school girls abducted by Boko Haram in April 2014 are still missing. This is just a fraction of the number of women and girls that Boko Haram has kidnapped since the start of 2014. The total number is estimated at 2,000, excluding boys and men.9 Some of these abductees are likely to be among the casualties of Boko Haram. Many lives have been lost, and many more displaced. There is a symbolic sense of betrayal among members of the community, among Christians who feel that their Muslim neighbors betrayed them to Boko Haram,10 and a sense of state betrayal. It will definitely take more than regaining land control and killing hundreds of insurgents to win the war against Boko Haram. The defeat of Boko Haram is unlikely to be successful until the core leadership of the insurgency is either apprehended or killed, as it is very likely that Shekau and his ideologically driven commanders would rather die than surrender. The Nigeria Joint Task Force (JTF), a special force formed in 2011 comprising the military, navy, police, air force, secret service, and other security agencies, had a short-lived victory against Boko Haram in 2012 with the arrest and murder of several senior Boko Haram commanders.11 In light of the 2004 failed amnesty offered to the Niger Delta militants by then-President Olusegun Obasanjo, in addition to the several botched negotiation attempts with Boko Haram, Shekau and his core commanders must be apprehended 6 “Boko Haram ‘getting weaker’ says Nigeria President Goodluck Jonathan,” by Will Ross, BBC, March 20, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31979292. 7 President-elect Buhari had claimed that, if elected, he would defeat Boko Haram within a couple of weeks. 8 There is no consensus on the number of Chibok girls abducted by Boko Haram, but 276 is commonly cited. 9 Amnesty International, Our Job is to Shoot, Slaughter and Kill: Boko Haram’s Reign of Terror in North-East Nigeria (London: Amnesty International, 2015). 10 Ibid. 11 International Crisis Group, Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency, Africa Report No. 216 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014). 6 Boko Haram: Whose Islamic State? (or killed if they resist arrest) before a full process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration commences. Undeniably, Boko Haram had set upon establishing an Islamic state with potential expansion into northern Cameroon, Niger, and Chad, but in retrospect, its territorial control in northeast Nigeria and attacks in Cameroon and Chad were premature since it does not yet have the administrative capacity nor the military power to control the region. Boko Haram’s declaration of a caliphate in August 2014 shows that it seeks inspiration from ISIS; however, it lacks the propagandistic and technical resourcefulness of ISIS.
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