Shared Borders, Shared Waters

IIHESHAE0_Book.indbHESHAE0_Book.indb i 111/20/20121/20/2012 1:14:361:14:36 PMPM Shared Borders, Shared Waters

Israeli-Palestinian and Colorado River Basin Water Challenges

Editors Sharon B. Megdal, Robert G. Varady & Susanna Eden The University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016

IIHESHAE0_Book.indbHESHAE0_Book.indb iiiiii 111/20/20121/20/2012 1:14:371:14:37 PMPM CRC Press/Balkema is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2013 Taylor & Francis Group, London, UK Typeset by V Publishing Solutions Pvt Ltd., Chennai, India Printed and bound in The Netherlands by PrintSupport4U, Meppel All rights reserved. No part of this publication or the information contained herein may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, by photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Innovations Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016 reported here may not be used without the approval of the authors. Although all care is taken to ensure integrity and the quality of this publication and the information herein, no responsibility is assumed by the publishers nor the author for any damage to the property or persons as a result of operation or use of this publication and/or the information contained herein. Published by: CRC Press/Balkema P.O. Box 447, 2300 AK Leiden, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] www.crcpress.com – www.taylorandfrancis.com Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Applied for

ISBN: 978-0-415-66263-5 (Hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-59768-2 (eBook)

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Foreword ix Preface xi Acknowledgments xv Acronyms xvii Key terms and definitions xxi

Introduction 1 SUSANNA EDEN, ROBERT G. VARADY, SHARON B. MEGDAL AND JENNA CLEVELAND

SECTION 1 Water development: Infrastructure and institutions 5

1 The development of water infrastructures in Israel: Past, present and future 7 NAAMA TESCHNER AND MAYA NEGEV

2 Arizona’s water infrastructure: A history of management and use 21 DOUGLAS E. KUPEL

3 Key issues, institutions, and strategies for managing transboundary

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016 water resources in the Arizona-Mexico border region 35 ROBERT G. VARADY, ROBERTO SALMÓN CASTELO AND SUSANNA EDEN

SECTION 2 Political and economic perspectives on water 51

4 The role of creative language in addressing political realities: Middle-Eastern water agreements 53 ITAY FISCHHENDLER, AARON T. WOLF AND GABRIEL ECKSTEIN

5 Revisiting water politics and policy in Israel: Policymaking under conditions of uncertainty 75 SAMER ALATOUT

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6 Water pricing in Israel in theory and practice 91 YOAV KISLEV

7 Achieving water policy objectives through water pricing: A case study of Arizona’s decentralized approach to water provision 105 SHARON B. MEGDAL AND JORGE LARA ALVAREZ

SECTION 3 Learning from comparison 117

8 Property systems and conservation of instream flows: Israel and the Western United States compared 119 DAVID SCHORR

9 Water, land, and development: Comparative Arizona – Israeli- Palestinian perspective 133 CHRISTOPHER SCOTT, JEAN-PHILIPPE VENOT AND FRANÇOIS MOLLE

10 Perspectives on water conservation in Israel and Palestine: Foundations and future 151 KRISTINA DONNELLY, NEDA ZAWAHRI AND CLIVE LIPCHIN

SECTION 4 Challenges, new and old: Climate change and wastewater 165

11 Implications of climate change in Palestine 167 AMJAD ALIEWI, P.E. O’CONNELL AND MOHAMMED N. ALMASRI

12 Climate change challenges and solutions for water managers 187 GREGG M. GARFIN Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016 13 Challenges of transboundary wastewater management for Palestinian communities along the Green Line – The Israeli-Palestinian border 203 RASHED AL-SA`ED AND AHMAD M. AL-HINDI

14 Management of transboundary wastewater discharges 221 ALON TAL

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SECTION 5 Expanding water supplies: Promising strategies and technologies 233

15 Expanding water resources in Arizona: Role of reuse in reaching sustainability 235 KAREN L. SMITH

16 Desalination in Arizona: Challenges, applications and prospects 247

WENDELL P. ELA AND JAMIE MCEVOY

17 Sea water desalination in Israel: Planning, coping with difficulties, and economic aspects of long-term risks 263 ABRAHAM TENNE

Concluding insights 275 ROBERT G. VARADY, SUSANNA EDEN AND SHARON B. MEGDAL

Bio sketches 277 Index 283 Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016

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Fresh water is finite and universally sustains life as well as all aspects of human society. Its distribution, however, varies a great deal both in space and time, ignoring political boundaries and giving, therefore, rise to possible competition between uses and users. Increasingly felt global change phenomena, ranging from the impacts of population change to those of climate variability, exacerbate the stress on world’s water resources. Increased industrialization, urbanization and agricultural needs, a growing world population and the need to adapt to climatic changes place high demands on the planet’s water resources – and therefore on our vital capacity to manage, govern and share water wisely. In a world with nearly 300 river basins shared by two or more countries, the management of water across political territories requires particular knowledge and skills to decrease the potential for conflicts and find mutually acceptable solutions through cooperation among the stakeholders of a limited but vital resource, water. In 2009, the University of Arizona in Tucson hosted the Arizona, Israeli, and Palestinian Water Management and Policy Workshop (AzIP), with the support of UNESCO. The workshop was held in one of the driest regions of the planet. Inter- national experts coming from various disciplines, ranging from the fields of science, water management and governance, examined transboundary water management and cross-border cooperation in comparable environmental settings: naturally scarce water resources under high pressure from various sectors. The AzIP workshop gave the impulse for this book, Shared Borders, Shared Waters. It reflects the expertise of the participants of the workshop and of international water experts in developing and evaluating feasible water management solutions and demonstrates the value of a Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016 science-based policy dialogues in a highly sensitive context. Through its M.Sc. course on Water Conflict Management, UNESCO-IHE trains water experts to manage shared water resources and resolve water conflicts, focusing on negotiation, mediation and decision-making processes. By co-publishing Shared Borders, Shared Waters, UNESCO-IHE is proud to further contribute to the expansion of the knowledge base for water cooperation and good governance and to help provide an innovative source for researchers and decision makers. As global environmental and demographic changes heighten competition for limited water resources, we are thankful for efforts that attempt to harness science to achieve effective water-management policies. Shared Borders, Shared Waters is that rare book that seeks to promote this aim by drawing on the expertise of scientists and practitioners from sometimes-contentious border regions. In spite of its conflict

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potential, water connects rather than divides, giving us hope for increased cooperation and conflict avoidance. For the arid areas that are the focus of this collection, the book offers the promise of the best of science diplomacy. The Editors of this valuable volume, Sharon Megdal, Robert Varady and Susanna Eden, deserve a great deal of appreciation for their brave and bold act to bring together experts from various disciplines and areas of potential water conflicts to turn those, through open and intelligent dialogs, into areas of potential cooperation.

András Szöllösi-Nagy Rector UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education Delft, The Netherlands Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016

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This book traces its origins to 2006. That summer, lead editor Sharon Megdal, the director of the University of Arizona (UA) Water Resources Research Center, traveled to Israel to explore what she saw as potential commonalities between that country’s water-resources-management challenges and those faced by Arizona, in the arid southwestern United States. Megdal toured the region, meeting with officials, academics, and practitioners. She found that in spite of the dramatically different histories of the two regions, a number of palpable similarities emerged: the prevalence of drought, problems of salinity, the promise of seawater desalination and effluent reuse; and the significance of institutions, water pricing, and allocation policies across water- using sectors. The experience whetted Megdal’s appetite for a deeper, more sustained examination of these issues. At about the same time, co-editor Robert Varady, deputy director of the UA’s Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, was invited by UNESCO’s International Hydrological Programme (IHP) to participate in an unusual event organized by the Israeli-Palestinian Science Organization (IPSO). IPSO was embarking on a multiyear effort to produce the first modern history of water management in Israel-Palestine. That December, Varady – at the time the secretary of the International Water His- tory Association – attended a special meeting in Perugia, Italy, convened by IHP and hosted by the Government of Umbria. The other participants were the Israeli and Pal- estinian co-directors of IPSO, three distinguished Israelis and thee prominent Palestin- ians (including the present head of the Palestinian Water Authority), two UNESCO officials, and a few host-country dignitaries. The chief outcome of this two-day ses- sion was a commitment to pursue the history project and any related activities that Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016 might promote its achievement. Soon after, in early 2007, Megdal and Varady met, compared experiences, and agreed to collaborate by holding a workshop designed to merge the two sets of interests, both concerning the topic of water. Megdal’s aim was to effect a comparison of water-management and policy in the two regions, while Varady sought to introduce temporal context into the discussion. Discussions with Ed Wright, Director of the Arizona Center for Judaic Studies at the UA, and Anne Betteridge, Director of the UA Center for Middle Eastern Studies, confirmed their interest in joining this effort to share lessons learned and identify solutions to the myriad water challenges faced by the regions. The result of these discussions was the September 2009 Arizona-Israeli-Palestinian Water Management and Policy Workshop hosted by the University of Arizona in

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Tucson, Arizona. The program explored salient issues relating to water scarcity in the two regions, but its thrust was an attempt to understand the economic, environmental, and community implications of expanding reuse and desalination for sustaining future water supplies. The workshop represented an intensive planning effort involving four University of Arizona centers whose missions reflect the span of topics included in the workshop. The Water Resources Research Center, the Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, and the Arizona Center for Judaic Studies worked together for 18 months to attract experienced and knowledgeable experts from the two regions. At the workshop, invited presentations by expert scientists and practitioners formed the basis of the discussion. In addition to invited speakers, the workshop included young scholars as full participants. These emerging researchers contributed actively and participated throughout the workshop. The workshop was motivated by the identified similarities of two transboundary, water-scarce areas whose populations and economies are growing. Arizona, a state in the southwestern United States, bordering Mexico, relies significantly on the over- allocated Colorado River as well as on non-renewable groundwater supplies. Across the globe, the Israeli-Palestinian region is supplementing its traditional water sources with desalinated seawater. Both regions are suffering from chronic water scarcity that is likely to be exacerbated by unfavorable climate conditions should climate change projections prove accurate. In addition, in each case, legal frameworks for surface water and groundwater rights and use remain subjects of debate. Sustainable and cost-effective solutions to the water challenges of the two regions clearly require innovative, multifaceted approaches. A central goal of the program was to identify potential future collaborative activity. While the workshop acknowledged the various divides that exist in these regions, the participants – and in this volume, the authors – were guided by the principle of “science diplomacy.” Across the world, the history of contentious water issues confirms that the resolution of such issues can engender collaboration rather than divisiveness. Experience has shown that researchers who are sensitive to sociopoliti- cal conditions often can help avoid or resolve conflict by serving as neutral experts, offering assistance through reasoned, independent analysis. The workshop, grounded on this premise, and the volume that it has spawned benefited from consultation with many colleagues on both sides of the Atlantic. The Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016 book, while based upon the event and relying on its key presentations, is substantially enhanced by newly-commissioned chapters with additional insights and analyses by authors who did not participate in the 2009 workshop. It includes perspectives on past and present water management challenges. It looks to current and future solutions for the two regions, where shared borders and shared waters are fundamental to water management dialogues. The chapters confirm that much work remains to be done. Policy makers, water managers, experts such as university researchers and consultants, and citizens – the ultimate beneficiaries or losers of public policies – will all be involved in development and implementation of sustainable solutions to the many challenges. Preparation of this volume drew from the insights and expertise of many across the globe, including many who are budding scholars. In a field that has been traditionally

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dominated by males and by engineers, this collection benefits from significant gender diversity as well as disciplinary diversity among our authors. We are especially pleased to note that several of our female authors, in particular, are in the early stages of their careers. Whatever our individual role in developing water solutions, it is important that we encourage and support the development of future water leaders. Of course we hope this book informs the reader; but perhaps more importantly, we hope it will stimulate consideration of how we can bridge the divides to cross borders and share the waters.

Sharon B. Megdal, Robert G. Varady and Susanna Eden Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016

IIHESHAE0_Book.indbHESHAE0_Book.indb xiiixiii 111/20/20121/20/2012 1:14:371:14:37 PMPM Acknowledgments

We begin by thanking the many authors who have contributed their research and observations to this collection. We have already noted their diversity, but we should also acknowledge their expertise, their commitment to improving water-management policy, and their patience through an extended publication period. The workshop, and therefore the present volume, could not have been possible without grants from the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF), the U.S.-Israel Bina- tional Science Foundation (BSF), and the University of Arizona Foundation. We are grateful to program official, Geoffrey A. Prentice, and official contacts Martha Ione and Osman Shinaishin of NSF, and Yair Rotstein, the executive director of BSF. Other financial support was provided by UNESCO-IHP, then directed by András Szöllösi- Nagy; the UA Faculty Research Development Grant program; UA Water Sustain- ability Program and Technology Research Initiative Fund (TRIF); International Arid Lands Consortium; International Water History Association; Israeli-Palestinian Sci- ence Organization; Sol Resnick Water Resources Research Endowment; UNESCO International Hydrological Programme; United Nations Association of Southern Arizona; Tucson Water; Elaine Minow Resnick; Arizona Center for Judaic Studies; Center for Middle Eastern Studies; Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy; and Water Resources Research Center. A number of individuals bear special recognition for their support and assistance throughout the process leading to the appearance of this volume. At the University of Arizona in Tucson, the president, Robert Shelton, addressed the public event held as part of the workshop and provided institutional support. J. Edward Wright, the director of the UA’s Arizona Center for Judaic Studies; and Anne H. Betteridge, the director Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016 of the UA’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies were stalwart supporters and cospon- sors of the workshop. Also at the UA, staff members of the Water Resources Research Center offered invaluable assistance in organizing the workshop and in preparing the manuscript; we thank LaVonne Walton, Jane Cripps, Joe Gelt, Marissa Tamar Isaak, Kelly Mott-Lacroix, Chet Phillips, and Hunter Richards. Meanwhile, in Europe, Alexander Otte at IHP in Paris, was instrumental in arranging for UNESCO support for and cosponsorship of the workshop, and for the publication of the volume. Léna Salamé, also at IHP, helped facilitate the publication process. In 2012 this process was taken on by UNESCO-IHE in Delft, The Neth- erlands, through the good offices of the rector, András Szöllösi-Nagy, Bart Schultz, chair of IHE’s publications board. Thanks also are due to Janjaap Blom, Senior Pub- lisher, and Lukas Goosen, Production Manager, Taylor & Francis Group/CRC Press

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Balkema, and to Peter Stroo, graphic designer for IHE, for shepherding this book through publication. The Tucson workshop was fortunate to have presentations by Uri Shani, at the time the head of the Israeli Water Authority, and (via video) by Shaddad Attili, the head of the Palestinian Water Authority. Their involvement facilitated participation by their Israeli and Palestinian colleagues. The program and this book have similarly benefited from collaboration with the Israeli-Palestinian Science Organization and their respective co-directors, Dan Bitan and Hassan Dweik. Jill Shaunfield of the U.S. Department of State attended the workshop and provided continuing encouragement. The richness of this volume was informed by the presentations and discussions that took place during the Tucson workshop. We are grateful to all the workshop participants for their contributions. After the workshop, in early 2010 two of the editors (Megdal and Varady) were able to discuss the subject of this book with a number of scientists, administrators, and NGO representatives in Israel and in the Palestinian territories, including Uri Shamir, Shaul Arlosoroff, David Katz, Paul Rohrlich, Fuad Bateh, Nader Al-Khateeb, Dan Bitan, and Hassan Dweik. Finally, we would like to give special thanks to the anonymous reviewers who contributed their expertise to ensuring and enhancing the high quality of the individual chapters. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016

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ACC: Arizona Corporation Commission ADWR: Arizona Department of Water Resources AE: Actual Evapotranspiration AFY: Acre Feet per Year AMA: Active Management Area AOGCM: Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Model AWS: Assured Water Supply AWTF: Advanced Water Treatment Facility BADCT: Best Available Demonstrated Control Technology BCM: Billion Cubic Meters BECC: Border Environment Cooperation Commission BEIF: Border Environment Infrastructure Fund BOD: Biochemical Oxygen Demand BOO: Built, Owned & Operated BOR: Bureau of Reclamation BOT: Build, Operate & Transfer CA: Chemical Addition CAP: Central Arizona Project CAPEX: Capital Expenditures CCI: Control-Check-Isolate CEA: Controlled Environment Agriculture CEC: Commission for Environmental Cooperation CEC (2): Contaminants of Emerging Concern Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016 CF: Cartridge Membrane Filtration CILA: Comisión Internacional de Límites y Aguas CM: Cubic Meters CONAGUA: Comisión Nacional del Agua CRU: Climatic Research Unit DFID: Department for International Development DOP: Declaration of Principles DWR: Deptartment of Water Resources EDR: Electrodialysis Reversal EMS: Environmental Management System ENSO: El Niño-Southern Oscillation EPA: Environmental Protection Agency

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ET: Evapotranspiration GAO: General Agricultural Ordinance GCM: Global Climate Model GDP: Gross Domestic Product GFD: Gallons per square Foot per Day GHG: Greenhouse Gas GMA: Groundwater Management Act GMF: Granular Media Filtration GPCD: Gallons Per Capita per Day GTZ: German Agency for Cooperation IBC: International Boundary Commission IBWC: International Boundary and Water Commission ILA: International Law Association ILC: International Law Commission INA: Irrigation Nonexpansion Area IOI: International Outfall Interceptor IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ISARM: Internationally Shared Aquifer Resources Management IWRM: Integrated Water Resource Management JRV: Jordan Rift Valley JSET: Joint Supervision and Enforcement Team JWC: Joint Water Committee L/C/D: Liters per Capita per Day LCRB: Lower Colorado River Basin LCRMSCP: Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program LPWTF: Lewis Prison Water Treatment Facility MAF: Million Acre Feet MC: Marginal Cost MCL: Maximum Containment Level MCM: Million Cubic Meters MCMY: Million Cubic Meters per Year MDPF: Marana Desalination Pilot Facility MF: Membrane Microfiltration MGD: Million Gallons per Day MoU: Memorandum of Understanding Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016 NADB/NADBank: North American Development Bank NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement NGO: Nongovernmental Organization NIWTP: Nogales International Wastewater Treatment Plant NWC: National Water Carrier OPEX: Operation Expenditures OPT: Occupied Palestinian Territory PA: Palestinian Authority PE: Population Equivalent PE (2): Potential Evapotranspiration PLS: Partial Lime Softening PPP: Polluter Pays Principle

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PS: Permeate Stabilization PWA: Palestinian Water Authority R&D: Research And Development RCM: Regional Climate Model RO: Reverse Osmosis SAIC: Science Applications International Corporation SAR: Sodium Adsorption Ratio SAT: Soil Aquifer Treatment SMX: Sulfamethoxazole SRES: Special Report on Emissions Scenarios SRP: Salt River Project SUSMAQ: Sustainable Management of the West Bank and Gaza Aquifers SWRO: Sea Water Reverse Osmosis TAAP: Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Program TDS: Total Dissolved Solids TOR: Terms of Reference TSS: Total Suspended Solids UCRB: Upper Colorado River Basin UN: United Nations UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization USGS: U.S. Geological Survey VMP: Value of The Marginal Product VSEP: Vibratory Shear Enhanced Processing WB: West Bank WDA: Water Desalination Administration WHO: World Health Organization WIFA: Water Infrastructure Finance Authority WMIDD: Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District WRP: Water Reclamation Plant WWTF: Wastewater Treatment Facility WWTP: Wastewater Treatment Plant YDP: Yuma Desalting Plant YHWWTP: Yad Hanna Wastewater Treatment Plant Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016

IIHESHAE0_Book.indbHESHAE0_Book.indb xixxix 111/20/20121/20/2012 1:14:381:14:38 PMPM Key terms and definitions

Acre-foot: One acre of surface area to a depth of one foot (unit of volume) Alluvial: Deposited by flowing water Anti-scalant: Additive for water to delay impurity accumulation, to be used in preparation for reverse osmosis Aqueduct: A device or channel constructed to convey water Brackish: A type of water that is more saline than freshwater, but less than seawater Brine: Saline water containing more than 100,000 mg/L TDS Chloramine: A disinfectant for treating drinking water Contaminants of emerging concern: Chemicals found in drinking water that may be more concentrated than previously known, which may be of danger to humans or the environment Co-riparian states: States which share a boundary along a riparian zone due to a river or stream Cryosphere: Earth’s collective ice-covered regions Desalination: Process used to remove salt or minerals from saline water to make it more suitable for certain purposes Drip irrigation: A water- and fertilizer-saving irrigation method which gradually delivers small amounts of water and nutrients directly to a plant’s roots Effluent: Treated or untreated wastewater that flows out of a waste water treatment plant or other facility Electrodialysis reversal: An electrochemical separation method that is used to remove charged particles from water Enjoin: To legally prohibit or require a specific action Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016 Epikarst: The surface of karst, along with its fissures and cavities that collect surface- water and transport it underground Estuarine ecosystems: Ecosystems found in partly enclosed bodies of water, connected to the open sea, with nearby rivers or streams Eutrophication: A water ecosystem’s response to the addition of various substances found in waste, such as sewage or fertilizer Evapotranspiration: A portion of the water cycle that involves both evaporation and the loss of a plant’s water in the form of vapor through transpiration Flocculation: In chemistry, the process by which colloids come out of suspension following the addition of a clarifying agent Fodder: Feed for domesticated agricultural livestock

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Fouling/Biofouling: The accumulation of undesirable material, organic or inorganic, onto the solid surface of a device that hinders its ability to function Granular media filtration: An intermediate step in a water treatment or filtration process that generally takes place after gravity separation Halophyte: A plant that grows in highly saline waters Hectare: One thousand square meters of area, commonly used in measurement of land Hydraulic slope: The slope of the bottom of a water channel Influent: Anything that flows into a body of water Karstic: Shaped by the dissolution of soluble layers of bedrock Khamasin event: A hot, dry cyclone Kibbutz: Communal village in Israel, traditionally based on agriculture Moshav: Cooperative agriculture-based village in Israel Multi-partite basins: River basins with more than two nearby riparian countries Nanofiltration: Membrane filtration process, used mostly with low TDS water, for removing unwanted materials Nitrification-denitrification: A microbial wastewater treatment process that involves converting ammonium ions to nitrogen gas Oxidation ponds: Ponds used for secondary treatment of sewage effluents, in which bacteria break down organic matter Paramaterization: Approximation by analysis of average effect and sensitivity to change Parts per million: Measurement used to describe dilute concentrations in water or soil Pervaporation: Process used to separate mixtures through partial vaporization through a membrane Photovoltaic: Related to the conversion of solar radiation into electricity Potentiometric surface: Hypothetical surface representing the height to which water trapped in an aquifer would rise if it were not confined Reverse osmosis: Method of membrane filtration in which a saline liquid is pressu- rized on one side of a membrane, forcing out the solvent but leaving unwanted materials on the other side of the membrane Riparian zone: An area characterized by the meeting of land with a river or stream Safe-yield: Water management goal for achieving a long-term balance between annual amount of groundwater withdrawn in an active management area and annual recharge Saline: Characteristic of water that contains a significant amount of dissolved salts Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016 Silviculture: The practice of managing health, growth, and other characteristics of forests to meet specified needs Sodium absorption ratio: Measurement of suitability of water for agricultural irrigation, as determined by the amount of dissolved solids in the water Specific flux: Permeate flux divided by net transmembrane pressure difference Vadose zone: Portion of Earth extending from the top of the ground surface to the water table Wadi: Intermittent stream that remains dry except during the rainy season

IIHESHAE0_Book.indbHESHAE0_Book.indb xxiixxii 111/20/20121/20/2012 1:14:381:14:38 PMPM Introduction

Susanna Eden, Robert G. Varady, Sharon B. Megdal and Jenna Cleveland

A person first encountering this book is likely to wonder why it brings together two distinct regions into one publication on water management. What bearing can the strategies and policies pursued in the Colorado River Basin in the United States and Mexico have on water management for Israelis and Palestinians, and vice versa? The authors of the articles collected in this volume demonstrate that this is a rich field of inquiry and an opportunity for mutual learning. The regions share many physical and societal characteristics that motivate exchanges of information and approaches. The first and most obvious point of similarity is aridity and competition for scarce water resources. As the Colorado River flows south toward its delta in the Sea of Cortes, the U.S. states of Arizona and California and the country of Mexico are furthest downstream and the last to receive its waters. Similarly, the Jordan River, which waters the Israeli-Palestinian region, is shared with multiple neighbors. Ari- zona experiences an unevenly distributed average annual precipitation of between 90–760 mm (3.5 and 30 inches), with most concentrated in the higher elevations. In the large metropolitan areas of Phoenix and Tucson, average annual rainfall is 200 mm (8 in) and 270 mm (11 in) respectively. This range and distribution is very similar to rainfall in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. There, average annual precipitation generally ranges from 10–89 cm (1 to 35 in). Although in the extreme north and higher elevations Israel can receive considerable precipitation – as much at 120 centimeters (47 in), most of the region receives significantly less – in the range of 10 to 30 cm (4–12 in), with very little rain falling in the arid south. Rapid population growth constitutes a second point of similarity. Israeli population is growing at a rate of roughly 2 percent per year, while Palestinian population is Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016 increasing at a rate closer to 3.5 percent annually. Until 2008, Arizona was the second fastest growing state in the U.S., with a population growth of 2.9 percent. Growth has slowed because of the financial downturn, but is expected to return as the economic situation improves. Population density, of course, is much greater in the Israeli-Pales- tinian region than in Arizona. Arizona is eleven times as large as the Israeli-Palestinian region, with much of its terrain sparsely inhabited. Population density in Israel, with 120 people per square km, and the West Bank and Gaza, with 1,500 people per square km, contrasts distinctly with that of Arizona, at 17 people per square km. However, Arizona is one of the most urbanized states in the United States, with 88 percent of its population concentrated in five metropolitan areas. As a result, some parts of Arizona face analogous density-related issues.

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Another point of similarity is the percentage of total water used for agriculture. Agriculture accounts for approximately 70 percent of water used annually in Ari- zona, essentially the same percentage as used by Israeli-Palestinian agriculture. An important difference between the regions is that recycled water supplies most of the agricultural irrigation in Israel, while Arizona irrigators use mostly Colorado River water, other surface supplies, and groundwater. Heavy use of groundwater is another concomitant feature of aridity, agricultural development and population growth. Conditions of groundwater aquifer depletion are thus common to Arizona, Israel, and the areas administered by the Palestinian Authority (PA), and the control of groundwater exploitation has emerged as a major management goal. In addition, in both regions, long-distance water transportation structures were built to relieve groundwater stress by conveying renewable water supplies to areas of intensive use. Examination of physical similarities sheds light on similar and divergent paths of institution building. The combination of aridity and growing concentrations of population dictates the development of extensive water supply infrastructure to bring water from where it is available to where people use it. The stress on water resources exerted by large, concentrated populations and intensive agriculture motivate innovation and adoption of advanced technologies for agricultural water efficiency, wastewater reuse and desalination. The greater population densities and water resource limitations in the state of Israel may have inspired earlier and more comprehensive use of these technologies than in Arizona. While in its formative years Israel drew on U.S. expertise in water resource development, newer technologies have been adopted more aggressively in Israel. Arizona has adopted comparable strategies in its water planning, but implementation lags behind its Mediterranean counterpart. While the regions experienced similar patterns of water resource development, they did so in very different legal, institutional and cultural contexts. The following chapters provide a map to explore the potential for making useful discoveries in water resource management by looking across the globe to comparable regions. This volume comprises five sections with individual articles arranged within the sections by theme. In concept, the sections flow from past to future and from general to specific. As background and setting, Chapters 1 and 2 examine the development of infrastructure in the two regions in a historical context. They describe the development of infrastructure projects, the forces that shaped them and future challenges. Teschner and Negev trace Israeli water development from pre-state decisions through inde- Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016 pendence, to current issues including wastewater reuse, desalination, the Dead Sea and the proposed Red-Dead Canal. They also touch on Palestinian resource development and dependence on Israeli infrastructure. Kupel takes a historical view as well, exploring the expansion of Arizona’s water infrastructure from the canals and irrigation ditches used by Native Americans and early Hispanic settlers to the massive Central Arizona Project. Both regions are faced with managing water resources that cross boundaries. Such borders separate water management regimes and delineate other areas of difference, including levels of governmental authority, economic resources, and infrastructure development. These cross-border issues can stimulate cooperation or conflict, as a comparison between the two border regions discussed in this volume shows. Multiple

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chapters make reference to water management arrangements between Israel and the areas under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority and to conflicting positions that have been taken by the parties. Chapter 3 describes the institutions on the U.S.- Mexico border that have ushered in an era of cooperative problem solving. Varady, et al., provide an overview of U.S.-Mexico border issues and institutions, the history of their development, and current challenges and initiatives. The authors look specifically at processes that foster cross-border cooperation. In the tradition of social science, political scientists, economists and geographers subject real-world water-management conditions to context-based qualitative analytical analysis. Fischhendler, et al. (chapter 4) explore the language used in case study negotiations among Israel, Jordan, and the PA-administered areas. In an analysis that has broad applicability, they examine how the explicit language of international law is transformed creatively to add nuances or blur distinctions that thus help to satisfy both sides of an issue. Alatout (chapter 5) also looks at the power of language in his discussion of the interaction of science and politics in policymaking. The two papers create theoretical frameworks for analysis that could fruitfully be applied to policymaking in the U.S. Southwest. The promise of these approaches for other similarly situated areas points to a key purpose in bringing together scientists from the different regions: advancing learning about water management through a process from which robust generalizations and principles will emerge. Economists Kislev (chapter 6) and Megdal and Alvarez (chapter 7) contrast the ways in which Israel’s centralized water governance and Arizona’s decentralized approach affect water pricing. Kislev elucidates freshwater and recycled water prices and extraction levies in the agricultural sector, as well as prices in the municipal and industrial sectors. Megdal and Alvarez provide historical background and comment on the current status of water management and use in multiple sectors in Arizona before examining the range of water pricing approaches employed in the state. Section 3 offers comparative analyses. Each paper looks at a specific aspect of water resources for side-by-side comparison. Although analogous conditions of aridity, growth, and development led to similarities in infrastructure, very different institutions evolved to plan, regulate, and manage water resources. Schorr’s discussion of property regimes in water (chapter 8) and Scott, et al.’s, comparison of development trajectories (chapter 9) draw conclusions about the impact of multiple factors on outcomes. Schorr’s examination of the potential for legal protections for instream flows uncovers a paradox. Although instream flow protections appear more likely under Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016 Israel’s public ownership regime than Arizona’s Prior Appropriation property rights system; on the ground, Israel’s record of flow protection is similar to that of Arizona. Scott, et al., compare the physical geographies; populations, constructed landscapes, agricultural systems and resource development processes in Arizona, Israel and the Palestinian Territories. They see in power disparities a major reason for differences where geographic factors are very similar. Donnelly, et al. (chapter 10), take the long view of water conservation by Israelis and Palestinians, beginning with how water resources and conservation are treated in Islam and Judaism. They contrast the political and social frameworks to uncover distinct efforts, obstacles and opportunities for conservation and the development of a joint conservation strategy between Israel and the Palestinian Territories.

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Section 4 tackles the challenges of climate change and wastewater management in the two regions. The analysis of Aliewi, et al. (chapter 11), projects decreased rainfall, decreased aquifer recharge, increased flood frequency and severity, increased evaporation rates, and increased saltwater intrusion in Gaza’s Coastal Aquifers as the main negative impacts likely to result from global change. Garfin (chapter 12) describes very similar impacts for the arid southwest. Both chapters consider adaptive changes in water management as a necessary response to these challenges. As the two regions face similar changes, exchange of information and strategies gains in importance. The value of sharing experience is perhaps particularly useful for Arizona with regard to wastewater reuse. Compared with Arizona, and indeed with most other countries in the world, Israel recycles very high amounts of its effluent. This wastewater reuse has allowed for agricultural expansion, even as the country experienced decreased levels of precipitation and increased levels of municipal demand. Israel’s aggressive pursuit of wastewater reuse, however, may have had unintended consequences that concern Tal (chapter 14). Concerns include questions about the adequacy of wastewater treatment and the presence of endocrine disruptors and antibiotics. Tal claims that safety regulation has lagged development and use, leaving many questions about potentially harmful consequences unanswered. Unlike their neighbors, Palestinians struggle to develop wastewater infrastructure. Al-Sa`ed and Al-Hindi (chapter 13) look at the wastewater challenges Palestinians face in providing basic sanitation services, as well as the difficulties in managing transboundary wastewater discharges. The paper concludes with options for cooperation regarding transboundary wastewater, including establishment of an analogue to the International Boundary and Water Commission that operates between Mexico and the U.S. The final section discusses methods for expanding supplies to meet future demands. Two options are examined in depth: water reuse and desalination. In Ari- zona, as Smith (chapter 15) and Ela and McEvoy (chapter 16) explain, development of these resources lags for several reasons. Smith lists the key challenges to greater reuse of water in Arizona as: building and financing water reuse infrastructure, pricing and metering recycled water, addressing public health concerns for safety, and educating the public about the role of recycled water in sustainable water resource management. For Ela and McEvoy, desalination holds promise as a future regional water supply, but they believe that until other, less expensive, supplies are fully utilized, development will remain slow. By contrast, the situation in Israel dictated extensive use of recycled water and an aggressive program of desalination. Issues relating to Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:25 12 October 2016 Palestinian and Israeli wastewater reuse were raised previously (chapters 13 and 14). Although agreeing that challenges remain with regard to desalination, Tenne (chapter 17) has no reservations about its promise and describes in detail the efforts Israel has made to enhance water supplies through investment in desalination technology. Collectively these chapters make a strong case for sharing and comparing across these two distant yet similar regions. Emerging from the juxtaposition are new insights into common challenges, and further questions of comparison and contrast are likely to yield more such enlightenment from future collaborations.

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IIHESHAE0_Book.indbHESHAE0_Book.indb 5 111/20/20121/20/2012 1:14:381:14:38 PMPM Chapter 1 The development of water infrastructures in Israel: Past, present and future Naama Teschner and Maya Negev

INTRODUCTION: PRE-STATE PERIOD

Israel is a land of water scarcity, with 60% desert and 8 dry months a year. Annual precipitation averages from more than 700 mm in the north to less than 35 mm in its Southern strip (Kislev, 2001, see also this volume). In ancient times, water has been collected in cisterns and wells, and transported from springs, streams and groundwater to settlements by aqueducts, e.g. to Jerusalem and to Caesarea. Later, the Arab inhabitants of the land watered their fields and orchards by open canals, taking advantage of gravita- tion (Sitton, 2002). Water infrastructure started to change dramatically in the first half of the 20th century, developed in parallel by the British Mandate and the new Zionist settlers, who came predominantly from Europe and included engineers who had a vision of cultivating the land. In his futurist book Altneuland, Theodor Herzl, “the visionary of the State of the Jews”, described fields of wheat and barley, corn, poppy seeds and tobacco, which are high water consuming crops. The first person to envision a national water plan in 1920 was Pinchas Rotenberg, one of the leaders of the Yishuv, the Jewish Zionist settlement in the land that preceded the State of Israel. Neverthe- less, the expert delegation of the US Federal Bureau of Reclamation that visited Israel in the mid 1920’s, invited by Zionist leader Haim Weitzman, still concentrated only on the Coastal Aquifer (ignoring the Sea of Galilee and the mountain aquifer). It was not before the late 1930’s that Dr. Walter Lowdermilk outlined the plan that is considered today the initial vision for developing the national water system (Schwarz, 1990). By then the senior water managers at the time agreed that the strategy should be to transfer water from where it is plentiful to where it is not, to supply water during the dry season, to convey water under pressure in pipes in order to overcome topographi- cal barriers and reduce leakage, and finally to take an integrative approach and supply water throughout the country, particularly to the arid Negev desert (Sitton, 2002). In 1937, in rare cooperation, all the central development agencies of the Yishuv established one company, in order to found, operate and manage hydrological projects for irrigation and domestic consumption – Mekorot (“Resources”) (Tal, 2002), which was registered in the British Mandate government. Its first head was Levi Eshkol, later the third Prime Minister of Israel, and his professional partner was Eng. Simha Blass. Eshkol and Blass conducted the first water infrastructure initiative two years earlier, water drilling for agriculture in the Yizrael Valley in the North of country. During its first decade, Mekorot executed drilling and pumping facilities, placed water pipes and supplied water to settlements in the North and Center of Israel as well as the

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North-Western Negev. However, one of its main aims was to provide water to the Negev desert at large (Mekorot, 2011). Blass was in charge of planning this infrastructure. He submitted the first plan in 1939, and it included three stages: 1. transport water from nearby drills, 2. transport water from the Yarkon river in Central Israel, and 3. transport water from the North (Blass, 1973). After a pilot transport effort in 1947, the first major stage, the Yarkon–Negev pipeline, became operational during the 1950s. Blass’s plans were the basis for a national water carrier that was executed after the establishment of Israel in 1948, as further described below. All plans were inspired by the Zionist mission to create a large Jewish settlement based on agricultural activity and the soon to be first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s vision of “making the desert bloom”. Ben-Gurion, like other European Zionists, thought that the desert will be a blessing only if it will no longer be a desert. He wrote that the state of Israel cannot stand a desert within it (Ben-Gurion, 1955). However, the new infrastructure created a non-realistic thirst for water, and blinded decision-makers regarding the long-term implications of the pressure on such a delicate resource (Tal, 2002).

EARLY YEARS AFTER NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE: INSTITUTIONS, REGULATIONS AND MAJOR PROJECTS

Most of the water-related infrastructures and institutions in Israel are a result of the Water Law. Enacted in 1959, this comprehensive law reflects to a great extent its crea- tors’ ideology and perception of water. Its first concern was with the nationalization of all sources of water. Its opening section therefore expropriated all private water resources and all types of water (including rainfall and wastewater), and fixed the control over collection, storage and distribution of water under the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture (and later under the Ministry of Water and Energy) and three operational bodies: the Water Commission, the national water utility Mekorot and Tahal, the national water planning company (which was later privatized in 1996). The Water Law is the most significant mechanism that supported a completion of the shift from communal (especially of Arab communities, which used to collect and divert rain water for drinking and irrigation purposes) or regional scales of management, toward an integrative, centralised and statist water management (Feitelson and Fischhendler, 2009). The Water Commission determines the abstractions from all water resources, allocates the water to the different users (now all metered) and Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:28 12 October 2016 following a recent structural reform in the sector, the renewed Water Authority is also responsible for setting water tariffs (fiscal decisions were until recently made by parliamentary committees). A Public Committee of Water Management that is mainly composed of members of the agrarian sector, and a “water court” that deals with any claims of a person or organization that sees itself as damaged by the commissioner’s decisions, were also established as part of the centralized water institutions. The hydrological map of the country consists of a few main natural sources of fresh water. The Sea of Galilee, which receives most of its water from the Jordan River, used to provide more than a quarter of the country’s total demand. However, the average of 400 million cubic meters (MCM) pumped by Mekorot from the lake dropped to merely 133 in 2009, an indication of the severe water deficit and the water levels decreasing below the “red line”, which was set as an indicator of the minimum

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water level that the lake can reach without severe consequences to the quality of the water. Already in 1990 deficiency of the water resources reached 1.6 billion MCM (Tal, 2002). The second major water resource is the Mountain aquifer in the east and the Coastal Aquifer in the west, providing approximately 350 MCM annually. The sources of water that flows to the Sea of Galilee are partly situated in Syria and Lebanon, which for decades meant that any activity related to water diversion in either side of the border was a source of contention and agitated conflict. These geographical and geopolitical conditions were an additional reason for an integrative system of water management and use that could foster large scale hydrological projects (Fischhendler and Heikkila, 2010). Prices as well, were set at a single, uni- form level across the country (Tal, 2008). Physical integration was achieved by the National Water Carrier (Figure 1) that connects the three major sources. When the National Carrier was built between 1953 and 1964, it consumed 80% of the total national investments in water infrastructure, and consumed 4% of national energy consumption, with a huge cost for the young state that reached 175 million dollars. Pushed by enormous pumps, massive pipes bring water from the Sea of Galilee, at 213 meters below sea level, to 44 meters above sea levels. The water is then carried along 130 Kilometers. Its northern section is an open canal while its southern sections conveys in large pipes underground, transporting about 400 MCM of water a year. Today, with the introduction of desalinated water to the integrative water system, the National Carrier is reconstructed in a way that will allow water to also be moved from desalination plants in the west coast to other parts of the country in the east, south and north. Additionally this requires a new pipe line from the east to Jerusalem, a massive infrastructure project that is currently carried out by Mekorot. Regulations of drinking water quality had to be set in the early days by the Min- istry of Health, since the Sea of Galilee naturally contains high salt and mineral concentrations, but they were not, by any means, sufficient, nor significantly capable of protecting the quality of the sources themselves. During the 1950s and 1960s urban sewage systems as well as industrial waste were directed into near-by streams with little or no treatment. The drafters of the Water Law, however, did not mention the Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:28 12 October 2016

Figure 1 The National Carrier (photo: Naama Teschner).

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word “pollution” in any of its 150 sections (Tal, 2002). Parallel to the development of environmental legislation in the US during the 1970s, a new section was later added to the Israeli Water Law with the objective of regulating and preventing water resources pollution, especially of groundwater, wells and streams. Yet, although the amend- ments to the law determined that the Water Commission can also initiate enforcement actions and force polluters of water to repair damage, enforcement capacity, and consequently the ability to deter heavy polluters, remain relatively weak (Tal, 2007).

ALLOCATIONS

During the first decades of the State of Israel, water was allocated generously. The rapid population growth and rising standards of living, the Zionist visions of agriculture, the desire to attain food-independence, and the aggressive development of industry, were seen as much more urgent than addressing the long-term effects of over-pumping. Moreover, the real figures of water availability were not agreed upon in the early stages. In 1948 hydrologists estimated that the 248 MCM utilized that year was only a fraction of the potential refill of the water resources, but in reality it is about a quarter of it (Schwarz, 1990; Tal, 2002). Nevertheless, by 2009 water consumption increased to 1910 MCM, for all usages (including allocations to Jordan and the Palestinians), and from all sources, including desalinated and reclaimed water (Water Authority 2010). Figure 1 shows that while overall water supply in Israel has been fairly steady over the last two decades, fresh water supply to agriculture decreases, reclaimed water usage in agriculture increases, and domestic and industrial supply remains relatively constant. The overall water for agriculture per capita was reduced by about half from the 1960’s to today (but productivity per capita increased, with water productivity three times better today (Kislev, 2001). Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:28 12 October 2016

Figure 2 Water supply in Israel by sector.

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In the past, the association of the Water Commissioner with the agricultural lobby often resulted in decisions which mirrored the Commissioners’ personal values, favoring the farming sector in national water allocation (Feitelson et al., 2007). The gener- ous distribution to agriculture that characterized Israel’s water management strategy, enabled farmers to grow high water consuming crops such as cotton. The policy came at the expense of over-pumping of ground and surface water, with severe hydrological implications. This general approach was stopped by a new water commissioner, appointed from Israel’s academic sector in 1991, soon after he took over (Tal, 2002). As an emergent measure allocation to agriculture was cut by 70% inter alia through use of economic tools, such as raising water prices and reducing subsidies. After paying less than a third of the cost of water for many years, by the mid 2000’s farmers paid 88% of the actual cost with little effect on their profits. Adaptive measures, such as changing crops to more water-efficient ones, like pees and sunflowers helped make this transition possible (Tal, 2007). In recent years, severe water shortages led to water saving campaigns and the introduction of the “drought tax”, a political contested measure designed to reduce water demand. Nevertheless, these actions reduced water usage by 11% in the domestic sector and 9% in the agriculture sector during 2009 relative to the previous year (Water Authority, 2010), and 13% reduction in total consumption of local authorities, including domestic, public gardening, education facilities, hotels and retail (CBS, 2009). Figure 2 shows the current water consumption in Israel by sectors, indicating that out of the total 1910 MCM (1267 MCM freshwater and 643 MCM reclaimed), the agriculture sector is still the largest consumer with 53.2%, the domestic sector consumes 35.8%, and the rest is divided between industry (5.8%) and allocations to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Jordan (5.1%) (Water Authority, 2010). When one considers freshwater consumption alone, however, (Figure 3), the equation changes: of a total 1267 MCM, the domestic sector is the largest consumer with 54%, the agriculture sector receives only 32%, Jordan and PA 8% and the industry 6%. In other words, the domestic sector has overtaken the agriculture sector in consumption Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:28 12 October 2016

Figure 3 All water consumption in Israel 2009.

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Figure 4 Freshwater consumption in Israel.

of freshwater, a recent and increasing trend. The domestic consumption of freshwater range is between 100 and 230 litter per person per day (Mekorot, 2011). The average water consumption per capita, however, has been reduced by 12% following a water saving campaign in 2009 (Bar-Eli, 2009).

WASTE-WATER RECLAMATION

Many efforts were made in Israel to advance the transformation of sewage from a hazard and a primary source of pollution, to an additional reliable source of usable water, thus reducing pressure on natural water resources. In 2011, 95% of the population is connected to a sewage system and 75% of domestic effluent is reused for irrigation, industrial or recreational purposes. The Dan Region Reclamation Project (Shafdan) which operates since 1987 is the largest wastewater reclamation facility in the country. It treats 130 MCM of wastewater annually from the heavily populated Tel-Aviv Metropolitan area. Most of the effluent is treated to a secondary level, Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:28 12 October 2016 through a biological process, and delivered 100 km south to agricultural purposes in the Negev desert. In the Shafdan there is also use of a Soil Aquifer Treatment technique (originally implemented in Arizona). Here, a sandy aquifer serves as both an additional treatment and a seasonal/multi-annual storage. As part of the integrative water infrastructures system, reclaimed wastewater is also discharged upstream in several rivers in order to help restore dried and polluted streams. The water is later recaptured downstream for irrigation of parks or agriculture crops (Friedler, 2001). However, extensive use of recycled wastewater poses health, economic and environmental risks, resulting from residual chemical or biological contaminants such as high concentrations of nutrients, salts that are toxic to plants including sodium, chloride and boron. While some nutrients were found to be beneficial to crops, others cause soil degradation and groundwater pollution (Ben-Gal et al., 2006). In 2010,

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after a decade of negotiations, the Interior and Environmental Protection Commit- tee of the Israeli parliament finally approved new standards set by the “Inbar Com- mittee”. These recommended values for reused wastewater quality – for thirty-seven parameters – are designed to minimize potential damage to water sources and to cultivated soil, while protecting public health. A major part of an institutional reform in the water sector is the effort to manage the resource in a closed fiscal system in order to improve efficiency and to promise that any economic surplus from the water sector is invested back in the system. Until recently, water management was based on a divided jurisdiction between government and local municipalities: the latter responsible for delivering water within its jurisdiction, collecting water bills and providing sewage services. The result was often severe neglect of urban sewage infrastructures and untreated leakages in water pipes. Local councils were tempted not to pay Mekorot for the water and instead to use the money for other purposes. Therefore, the Ministry of Finance is leading a transition toward the establishment of sewage corporations within local and regional councils, an intermediate step toward the privatization of sewage services (Tal, 2007).

DESALINATION

Experiments with desalination technology started in Israel already in the 1960s, based on a feasible breakthrough made by Eng. Alexsander Zarchin, who immigrated to Israel in 1947. Zarchin founded a governmental owned desalination company, which was later privatized and became the multinational group of IDE Technologies. The first seawater desalination plants (using a Multi-Stage Flush technology) were constructed by Mekorot in dry and relatively remote areas, such as the city of Eilat (at the country’s southern tip), desalinating water from the Gulf of Aqaba. Eilat and other small settlements in this region were too far to be connected to the national water system. Several years later, a cheaper production technique was developed treating both brackish and seawater by Reverse Osmosis (RO), (Gvirtzman, 2002). Other small and experimental RO plants, mainly for brackish water, were constructed in different locations in Israel’s southlands. Yet, large scale water production was still far ahead. The technology was still in its incipient stages and costs were still prohibitively high (Tal, 2006a). By 2003, however, the price of desalination had fallen dramatically, from roughly Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:28 12 October 2016 $2.50 per cubic meter in the 1970s to $0.53 (Greenlee et al., 2009; Becker et al., 2010). With a growing overdraft in the country’s main fresh water reservoirs and up- to-date projections of future droughts and foreseen impacts of climate change, seawater desalination ostensibly emerged as the ultimate solution to scarcity and uncertainty in the availability of water. In 2005 the first large scale plant, and at that time the biggest of its kind in the world, was constructed as a Build, Operate & Transfer (BOT) project (public-private partnership) desalinating 120 MCM/yr. Two more plants have followed, expending desalination capacity to 320 MCM/yr, equivalent to approximately 42% of the current domestic water requirements (Tenne, 2010, see also this volume). Figure 4 below presents numbers of past and projected annual desalination capacity. Moreover, most recent long-term national plan is to increase desalination to up to 1.5 billion cubic meters/yr by 2040 (Water Authority, 2011).

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Production of desalinated water MCM/yr (source: Tenne, 2010) 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122014 2013 2020

Figure 5 Past and projected annual desalination capacity in Israel.

Desalination presents new challenges to water professionals and planners, especially in a geographically small country such as Israel. It requires major adjustments in current water infrastructures since the major production is shifted from the northern source of the Sea of Galilee to the central and southern coast of the county. Additionally, while desalination technology carries the benefits of introducing a new and theoretically unlim- ited source of water and therefore securing water supply for all usages, (as is the case with other industries), it entails long-term environmental disadvantages (Schiffler, 2004). Among the major concerns are the high energy needs and associated greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, waste (brine) discharges and the occupation of valuable coastal areas. The government and the Water Authority’s intentions to base water management strategy primarily on desalination have drawn some criticism, primarily from environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which demand that greater attention be given to water saving campaigns and reclamation of polluted wells (for example see Friends of Earth Middle-East and the Society for the Protection of Israel websites). Yet, there is a general consensus that desalination is a necessity, both for the sake of the natural envi- Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:28 12 October 2016 ronment and for meeting the growing water requirements. Accordingly, there is only a need to find “the right balance” – between increasing supply and reducing demand.

THE DEAD SEA AND THE RED-DEAD CANAL

The name “Dead Sea” originates from the absence of flora and fauna life in this lake, the result of its extreme salinity 33% – eleven times more than the 3% found in the Mediterranean. The Dead Sea is a terminal lake situated in the lowest place on earth, currently 424 meters below sea level. This constitutes a 34 meter decrease since the beginning of the 20th century, and a decrease from a surface area of 940 km2 to 637 km2 due to a reduction from 1,500 MCM refill annually to a current 400 MCM

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(Abu Qdais, 2008). The reasons for the decline are the diversion of water from the Sea of Galilee to the Israeli National Carrier and also to Jordan and Syria, preventing the natural flow through the Yarmouk and the Southern Jordan River to the Dead Sea. In addition, the pumping to the chemical industries in Israel and Jordan, natural evaporation and the general drop in precipitation (often attributed to climate change) lead to the steady drop in water level of one meter a year, with attendant costs of 90 million dollar annually in Israel alone (Gavrieli et al., 2005; Tikva, 2006). The shrinkage of the Dead Sea has severe consequences: with the dramatic drop in underground water levels, sinkholes are created unexpectedly in the vicinity, including under roads, settlements and agricultural land. The drop in the sea level and at the same time the artificial increase of the level of the industrial pools, have severe economic (mainly tourism), environmental and safety impacts on all riparians. The Dead Sea constitutes the border between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. Israel and Jordan developed significant tourist industries along the Dead Sea which are threatened by the disappearing sea. This situation led to international and regional efforts to find a solution that will stop the decrease in the sea level and return the sea level existing at the beginning of the 20th century, before the massive anthropogenic interruptions. Perhaps the most popular and most examined solution to the shrinkage of the Dead Sea is the Red-Dead Canal, or the Peace Conduit. According to this proposal, 2,000 MCM/year water will be transported from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Dead Sea, 1,200 will be dropped to the Dead Sea in order to create electricity that will enable desalinating the remaining 800 MCM (Tikva, 2006). This will enable supplying the severely water stressed Jordan and increasing the Dead Sea water levels, benefitting all parties and the environment. The cost of the project is estimated at 2 billion dollars and the current World Bank feasibility study alone costs 15 million dollar (Tal, 2006b). Experts warn about significant downsides, including leakage of sea water to the underground water along the way, vulnerability to earthquakes, change of landscape, mixing Red Sea water with the brine of desalinated water, (including the chemical used in the process) with Dead Sea Water. It is postulated that this might lead to creation of gypsum, making mineral mining more difficult and changing the color of the water to white, possibly leading to development of algae. Finally there is concern about the consequences to the Red Sea from pumping such quantities, including harm to the coral reef (Asmar, 2003; Gavrieli et al., 2005). Several experts suggest that while the deteriorating state of the Dead Sea should be addressed, the urgency Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:28 12 October 2016 still does not call for magic bullet mega-solutions such as the conduit, which may have irreversible effects.

THE PALESTINIAN WATER SITUATION

We present here a brief account of the Palestinian water situation, as it relates to water infrastructure in Israel, while thorough accounts of the Palestinian water situation can be found in the literature. Water is a major issue at stake in the conflict between the Palestin- ians and Israelis, in this water scarce region. Notwithstanding improvements in the water infrastructure and allocations, Palestinians suffer severe scarcity of water, especially in Gaza, and frequently lack the authority to manage their water sources. The largest water

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source in The Palestinian Authority is the Mountain Aquifer, which is also a main water source for Israel – both for the settlements in the West Bank and in Israel within the green line, where downstream flow from the aquifer is utilized (Aliewi, 2010). Israel and the Palestinians share additional water resources and hazards. These including the Mediterranean Sea, a source for desalination, mainly in Israel but with a potential to rescue Gaza from its severe water scarcity; the Dead Sea, which is a source for tourism, and may be the location of desalinized water from the Red Sea should the Red-Dead canal materialize; and finally, sewage, which needs to change from a hazard to a water resource, but still flows from the West Bank to Israel, polluting its streams and causing a major environmental health hazard. At present, only 6–7% of Palestinian sewage is fully treated (Tal and Abed Rabbo, 2010). This severe lack of sewage systems and constant leakage in water pipes, characterize both Palestinian towns and Israeli settlements, and are major hazard to public health, to groundwater and to ecosystems. Another major hazard to the groundwater is illegal drilling of wells by Palestinians that lower the water table and can pollute the aquifer. Major water projects such as desalination in Gaza or water reclamation in the West Bank have made little progress due to a variety of factors, including Palestinian internal considerations, Israeli bureaucracy or the suspending of funding from international funders, due to the rise of Hamas in Gaza. The Oslo Agreements between Israel and the PA included the establishment of several joint commissions. The one commission that continued to function and meet for over a decade, including during the violent days of the second Intifada, is the Joint Water Commission. While the two sides have different views regarding the functioning of the committee and the frequency of meetings, it is agreed that the commission has contributed to some significant improvements in the Palestinian water infrastructure, but at the same time may be responsible for lack of progress in other essential water projects. Yet, the Committee proved that the both sides can cooperate and solve problems jointly, which is a promising outcome (Jayousi, 2010; Kerret, 2010). Regarding Palestinian allocations, the estimated water use is as follows: municipal and industrial: 112 MCM/yr (59 in the West Bank, 53 in Gaza) and irrigation: Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:28 12 October 2016

Figure 6 Estimated water use in the West Bank and Gaza.

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174 MCM/yr (89 in the West Bank, 85 in Gaza), therefore the total water usage in The Palestinian Authority annually is 286 MCM. The estimated needs of the Palestinian population are much greater, estimated in 2010 at 723 MCM, which is 437 MCM beyond the current supplies. While according to both Israel’s Water Authority and the Palestinian Water Authority the potential freshwater for domestic use in the West Bank is approximately 110 l/c/d (litter per capita per day), due to severe leakages and unauthorized water abstractions, the actual allocation is estimated in no more than 73.7 l/c/d. Since this figure does not include those who are not connected to the water infrastructure at all, it is argued that a realistic figure is 50 l/c/d (Water Authority, 2008; Aliewi, 2010, see also this volume). The water situation in Gaza in much more severe, and allocations are estimated at 13 l/c/d (Aliewi, 2010).

CHALLENGES AHEAD AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

The hydrological mission of Israel’s establishment has largely achieved its goal. Today, reasonable quality water is provided to consumers with a relative high level of reliabil- ity regardless of pervasive drought conditions. This was made possible in a relatively short time period, through the projects outlined in this chapter, as well as technological innovations, such as drip irrigation, and the local water industry’s large investments in R&D of high-tech water technologies. Another important achievement is the unprecedented percentage of recycled wastewater (75%) in Israel, which compares favorably with similar semi-arid countries such as Spain (12%) or Australia (9%). From an environmental point of view, current water infrastructures, regulations and practices require grater attention from politicians, policymakers and water managers if these are to become more sustainable. For example, 110 MCM of non-reused domestic and industrial effluent are still discharged without treatment. Many streams and wells are polluted and the aquifers suffer from rapid salinization and seawater intrusion. Streams are drying up and aquatic ecosystems are under threat as a result of over-pumping and “drought-induced water pumping”. Finally, the externalities of desalination are not fully known and in order to keep the price of water low, there is a possibility that the full environmental costs of desalinated water (that includes the energy externalities and long-term effects on the environment) will not be internalized in future water prices. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:28 12 October 2016 Traditional and current institutional structures pose additional challenges. It has been argued for instance that there are inadequate mechanisms in place to allow for the participation of different stakeholders, particularly the general public (National Investigation Committee, 2010). In addition, the integrated physical infrastructure does not necessarily indicate an integrated institutional capacity. In fact, it might be that authorities and responsibilities for water resources and management are distributed among too many ministries and bodies, who have interests that sometimes over- lap, and at other times compete. This has posed difficulties in the past, for example in the enforcement of the Water Law against polluters (Fischhendler and Heikkila, 2010). In the near future, additional emphasis should be given to demand-side management, to water conservation techniques and to innovative best-practices to manage

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water use at different scales beyond the national (such as community management schemes and cross border ones). Rain harvesting and grey water installations, to name a few, should receive a greater attention from water managers and legislators. Mega intervention projects such as the Red-Dead Canal require an in-depth, careful assessment that considers previous experiences both in Israel and worldwide. Finally, but crucially, a solution to the Palestinians’ acute water shortages needs to be advanced by future desalination infrastructure. This depends on political will on both sides as well as on the international community. It therefore cannot be a substitute for interim, pragmatic strategies for alleviating water scarcity in the region.

REFERENCES

Abu Qdais, H. (2008) Environmental impacts of the mega desalination project: the Red-Dead Sea conveyor. Desalination, 220, 16–23. Aliewi, A. (2010) Water Resources: The Palestinian Perspective. In Tal, A. & Abed Rabbo, A. (Eds.) Water Wisdom: Preparing the Groundwork for Cooperative and Sustainable Water Management in the Middle East. Rutgers University Press. Asmar, B.N. (2003) The Science and Politics of the Dead Sea: Red Sea Canal or Pipeline. The Journal of Environment & Development, 12, 325–339. Bar-Eli, A. (2009) Water Authority seeking to cut Israeli home water usage by 10% in 2009. Haaretz 7 April 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/news/water-authority-seeking-to-cut-israeli- home-water-usage-by-10-in-2009-1.273708 Becker, N., Lavee, D. & Katz, D. (2010) Desalination and Alternative Water-Shortage Mitiga- tion Options in Israel: A Comparative Cost Analysis. Journal of Water Resource and Protec- tion 2, 1042–1056. Ben-Gal, A., Tal, A. & Tel-Zur, N. (2006) The sustainability of arid agriculture: Trends and challenges. Annals of Arid Zone, 45, 227. Ben Gal, A. (2010) Sustainable water supply for agriculture in israel. In Tal, A. & Abed Rabbo, A. (Eds.) Water Wisdom: Preparing the Groundwork for Cooperative and Sustainable Water Management Between Israelis and Palestinians. Rutgers University Press. Ben Gurion, D. Mashmaut HaNegev (The Meaning of the Negev). Speech at Sde Boker, Janu- ary 17th, 1955 (Hebrew). Blass, S. (1973) Water in strife and action, Ramat Gan, Massada (Hebrew). Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) (2009) Local Authorities in Israel. http://www.cbs.gov.il/ reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=201124075 (Hebrew). Feitelson, E. & Fischhendler, I. (2009) Spaces of water governance: the case of Israel and its Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:28 12 October 2016 neighbors. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 99, 728–745. Feitelson, E., Fischhendler, I. & Kay, P. (2007) Role of a central administrator in managing water resources: The case of the Israeli water commissioner. Water Resources Research, 43. Fischhendler, I. & Heikkila, T. (2010) Does Integrated Water Resources Management support institutional change? The case of water policy reform in Israel. Ecology and Society, 15, 4. Friedler, E. (2001) Water reuse – an integral part of water resources management: – Israel as a case study. Water Policy, 3, 29–39. Gavrieli, I., Bein, A. & Oren, A. (2005) The expected impact of the peace conduit project (The Red Sea-Dead Sea pipeline) on the Dead Sea. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Glo- bal Change, 10, 3–22. Greenlee, L.F., Lawler, D.F., Freeman, B.D., Marrot, B. & Moulin, P. (2009) Reverse osmosis desalination: Water sources, technology, and today’s challenges. Water research, 43, 2317–2348.

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Gvirtzman, H. (2002) Israel Water Resources – Chapters in Hydrology and Environmental Science, Jerusalem, Yad Ben Zvi Press (Hebrew). Jayousi, A. (2010) The Oslo II Accords in Retrospect: Implementation of the Water Provisions in the Israeli and Palestinian Interim Peace Agreements. In Tal, A. & Abed Rabbo, A. (Eds.) Water Wisdom: Preparing the Groundwork for Cooperative and Sustainable Water Man- agement Between Israelis and Palestinians. Rutgers University Press. Pp. 43–48. Kerret, D. (2010) Article 40: An Israeli Retrospective. In Tal, A. & Abed Rabbo, A. (Eds.) Water Wisdom: Preparing the Groundwork for Cooperative and Sustainable Water Man- agement Between Israelis and Palestinians. Rutgers University Press, Pp. 49–61. Kislev, Y. (2001) The water economy of Israel. Research Paper, The Center for Agricultural Economic Research, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Rehovot, http://ageconsearch. umn.edu/bitstream/14995/1/dp0111.pdf Mekorot (2011) The National Water Company website. National Investigation Committee (2010) Final Report, The National Investigation Commit- tee on the state of Israel’s water economy. In Bein, D., Kislev, Y. & Avimelech, Y. (Eds.). Haifa. http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/mayim/doc/sofi.pdf (Hebrew). Last accessed: 22 March 2011. Schiffler, M. (2004) Perspectives and Challenges for Desalination in the 21st Century. Desali- nation, 165, 1–9. Schwarz, J. (1990) Management of the water resources of Israel. Israel Journal of Earth Sci- ences 39, 57–65. Sitton, D. (2002) Development of Water Resources. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. Tal, A. (2002) Pollution in a Promised Land, Berkeley: University of California Press. Tal, A. (2006a) Seeking Sustainability: Israel’s Evolving Water Management Strategy. Science, 313, 1081–1084. Tal, A. (2007) Natural Flow: Questions and Answers in respect to the adjustment of the Water Law to New Environmental Circumstances Mechkarei Mishpat, 23. (Hebrew). Tal, A. (2008) Water Management in Israel: The Conspicuous Absence of Water Markets. Expo Zaragoza. Zaragoza, Spain. Tal, A. (2010) Thirsting for Pragmatism: A Constructive Alternative to Amnesty International’s Report on Palestinian Access to Water. The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 4, 59–73. Tal, A. & Abed Rabbo, A. (Eds.) (2010) Introduction. Water Wisdom: Preparing the Ground- work for Cooperative and Sustainable Water Management Between Israelis and Palestin- ians. Rutgers University Press, Pp.1–12. Tal, D. (2006b) $15 m Red-Dead canal feasibility study mooted. Globes. http://www.globes. co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=1000102704 Tenne, A. (2010) Sea Water Desalination in Israel: Planning, coping with difficulties, and economic aspects of long-term risks. State of Israel, Desalination Division, Israel Water Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:28 12 October 2016 Authority. Tikva, H. (2006) Research and monitoring in the Dead-Sea in light of dropping sea levels. Data and Resarch Division, The Israeli Parliment (Hebrew). Water Authority (2008) water consumption in Judea and Samaria http://www.water.gov.il/ Hebrew/about-reshut-hamaim/The-Authority/FilesWatermanagement/00141110.pdf. Water Authority (2010) Water consumption in 2009 – final report. (Hebrew). Water Authority (2011) Israel Water Authority Website. www.water.gov.il (Hebrew).

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IIHESHAE0_Book.indbHESHAE0_Book.indb 5151 111/20/20121/20/2012 1:14:451:14:45 PMPM Chapter 4 The role of creative language in addressing political realities: Middle-Eastern water agreements

Itay Fischhendler, Aaron T. Wolf and Gabriel Eckstein

INTRODUCTION

International water agreements are often the mechanisms used to foster and insti- tutionalize political cooperation. Water agreements facilitate data and information exchange, lessen the potential for future river basin conflicts, and even serve as a platform to induce cooperation over other more contentious issues. Indeed, historically, over 3,600 treaties have been signed that relate to all aspects of international water, including over 500 addressing water as a commodity since 1950 alone (United Nations Environment Programme 2002). These include cases of treaties signed between hostile countries, such as the 1960 Indus Treaty between India and Pakistan. In contrast, since 1950 there have been only 37 cases of acute dispute (those involving violence) over transboundary waters – of those, 30 are between Israel and one or another of its neighbors. In fact, the only true “water war” between nations on record occurred over 4,500 years ago between the city-states of Lagash and Umma in the Tigris-Euphrates basin. Since water resources are being driven to the edge of their natural limits, today even the most cooperative of neighboring states finds it difficult to achieve mutually acceptable arrangements over shared water resources (McCaffrey 2001). As a means for helping states negotiate resolutions to water disputes, a number of international bodies have formulated general legal principles and norms focusing on basin- wide development and management, the appropriation of water according to clearly defined water rights, and joint management of shared water resources (Shmueli 1999; Benvenisti and Gvirtzman 1993; Conca et al. 2006). These principles and norms are intended to change the behavior of states by introducing new principles and norms of conduct. Among these international bodies are the International Law Association, which developed the 1966 Helsinki Rules and the 2004 Berlin Rules, and the Inter- national Law Commission. Today, nearly all states agree that the numerous water treaties and other international legal instruments testify to the existence of customary international law for transboundary water resources (Dellapenna 2006). While states are being urged to adopt these principles and norms21, emerging trends in transboundary water regulation suggest that, in fact, states tend to embrace

21 Another example for the call to adopt many of these top-down normative norms is the Hayton and Utton’s Bellagio draft Treaty on groundwater. It was the first to comprehensively deal with groundwater. For more, see Hayton and Utton 1989.

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other less traditional principles that may better address their own political needs. For example, Conca et al. in their study on whether governments are converging on common principles for governing shared river basins found that there is only weak evidence for the actual adoption of common principles for regime formation (Conca, et al. 2006). Also, Kliot et al. determined that very few of the institutions they examined corresponded to the ideal model of institutions for the management of trans- border water resources, namely, a basin-wide multipurpose institution that treats the whole basin as a single unit and equitably integrates all riparians (Kliot and Shumueli 2001). Yet, many of these institutions were nevertheless found to be effective in managing the shared resource. Treaties in basins with multiple riparians are still often bilateral and many of these treaties are based on needs rather than rights, as stipulated by customary law, and the coordination achieved is limited. In some cases it seems that even if the language of international law does appear in treaties, it actually has a different meaning there. Such was the case in the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin (1995 Mekong River Treaty) that, although employing the term “basin” treaty, often meant a watercourse, which is a smaller spatial unit of jurisdiction than a basin (Sneddon and Fox 2006). The aim of this study is to examine why states fail or decline to adopt several of the general principles of customary law formulated by these international organizations and to identify the creative language that is adopted instead The principles to be examined are 1) basin-wide development and management; 2) the appropriation of water according to clearly defined water rights; and 3) joint management of water resources by all basin riparians. To this end, a comparative research design is offered. Three case studies will be examined in detail, including the water components of the 1994 Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan, the 1995 Interim Water Agreement (“Oslo II”) between Israel and the Palestinian Authority; and the 2005 agreement between Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan to conduct feasibility studies for a canal project between the Red and Dead Seas. The last is not a treaty and hence does not have the same weight in international law as do treaties. In addition, the Israeli-Jordanian one is a permanent one with allocation of surface water as a focus while the Israeli- Pales- tinian one is an interim agreement also with allocation of groundwater. The study first examines the emergence of international water law and its three core principles. Next, through the three case studies, it seeks to understand why these so-called “ideal” principles are often not adopted and what alternative principles Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016 might replace them. Finally, it discusses the limits and limitations of the three principles vis-à-vis their ability to reconcile a negotiation process steeped in conflict.

THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW

According to Cano, international water law for the non-navigational uses of transboundary surface water resources did not emerge substantially until after World War I (Cano 1989). Since that time, a number of international organizations have sought to provide general legal principles and norms that can apply to the world’s freshwater resources. These principles and norms were typically codified in non-binding declarations, guidelines, and recommendations. In a number of cases,

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though, these principles and norms were adopted into regional agreements, such as the 1995 Mekong River Treaty and the 1995 Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern Africa Development Community, that were binding on the parties to those agreements. The appearance of these principles and norms in multiple international instruments, even non-binding ones, suggests that they may have achieved the status of customary international law. These general legal principles and norms were intended to be legally binding where countries adopted an instrument containing those principles and norms. While it is tempting to look to these principles for clear and binding rules, it is more accurate to think in terms of guidelines for the process of conflict resolution: “The principles (of customary law) themselves derive from the process and the outcomes of the process rather than prescribe either the process or its outcome” (Dellapenna 1997). The evolution of international water law can be divided into three stages, dominated by different principles: In the early era the world’s transboundary watersheds were parceled by states guarding their sovereignty so tightly that legal cooperation over the resource aspects of water was nearly impossible, rendering only zero-sum solutions. The rights-based approaches and extreme principles of water law, like the absolute territorial sovereignty or the absolute riverine integrity doctrines, dominated the traditional era. In the modern era states abandoned these rigid principles for the sake of international cooperation. Indeed, during this period, numerous treaties were signed between countries sharing a common water resource. This process was coupled by the increasing involvement of several international legal bodes such as the Inter- national Law Association. While treaties over navigational issues have been adopted since 805 AD, the postmodern era focused on non-navigational issues (Elver 2006). It has also introduced both the notion of sustainable water management and economic efficacy to reconcile economic interests and environmental concerns. In 1997, the UN General Assembly voted in favor of a Convention on the Non- Navigational Uses of International Water Courses (UN Watercourse Convention). The UN Watercourse Convention codifies many of the principles deemed essential by the international community for the management of shared water resources, such as equitable and reasonable utilization of waters with specific attention to vital human needs; protection of the aquatic environment; and the promotion of cooperative management mechanisms. Even though it is not yet in force, and may not, the principles and norms it embodies have increasingly been invoked at international fora. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016 To date, only 15 countries are party to the UN Convention, well below the requi- site 35 instruments of ratification, acceptance, accession, or approval needed to bring the Convention into force22 (United Nations Treaty Collection 2002). Second, while the Convention offers general guidance to co-riparian states, its vague, and occasion- ally contradictory, language can result in varied, and indeed conflicting, interpreta- tions of the principles contained therein (Biswas 1999). Finally, there is no practical enforcement mechanism to back up the Convention’s guidance.

22 The following countries were listed as Party to the Convention as of July 2007: Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Namibia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, South Africa, Sweden, and Syrian Arab Republic.

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For purposes of this paper, we examine the emergence of three principles in international water law: consideration of the whole basin (rather than merely the waterways); water allocations based on rights; and joint management.

EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW

Basin wide management considered At the beginning of the 20th century, the basin became the recognized unit for developing and managing water resources in individual multipurpose projects. But it was during the 1960s that that the concept became widespread in water development (Teclaff 1996). Basin-wide institutions are now pitched as the most appropriate unit for internalizing all externalities associated with water/land/human interaction. Such water institutions include river basin councils, commissions, and authorities. The basin-wide paradigm receives the support of many international bodies, such as the World Bank and the European Union (Alaerts and Moigne eds. 2003; Global Water Partnership 2000; Green Cross International and World Water Vision 2000; European Union Framework Directive for Community Action in the Field of Water 2000). Consequently, the base- line for negotiation and management was often the basin scale (Frey 1993; Waterbury 1997; Fischhendler and Feitelson 2003; Fischhendler, et al. 2004). In the last few decades, legal scholars have also agreed that the critical unit of analysis for international water resources is that of the international drainage basin.23 For example, the International Law Association, already in 1951, began endorsing the integrated basin principle (Teclaff 1996). This was followed by the 1966 Helsinki Rules mentioned above that promoted a holistic approach to water management at a basin level. In 1986, the scope and definition was widened by the ILA to encompass interre- lated transboundary surface and ground waters as well as transboundary aquifers that are completely dissociated from any surface water resources (The Seoul Rules on Inter- national Groundwaters 1986). Finally, the Berlin Rules even more explicitly endorsed the basin concept with a call for the establishment of basin-wide mechanisms to govern shared water resources (The Berlin Rules on Water Resources 2004, see Article 64). However, when the United Nations considered the Helsinki Rules in 1970 according to Biswas (1999), some states (Brazil, and France, for instance) objected

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016 to the prominence of the drainage basin approach, which might be interpreted as an infringement on a nation’s sovereignty. Others argued that, given the complexities and uniqueness of each watershed, general codification should not even be attempted. It should also be noted that in 1991, during the ILC’s effort to draft principles of international water law, it adopted the term “international watercourse” as the unit for water management. This was a compromise between the “surface channel” notion, which ignored hydrological realities, and the “drainage basin” concept, which ignored the realities of sovereignty24 (Wescoat 1992). Even the Berlin Rules, while endorsing

23 For some examples of cooperation in the management and use of international resources, see Housen- Couriel 1994. 24 For more details on the scope of the 1997 Watercourse Convention and the debate over the geographic unit that would be subject to the Convention’s legal principles, see Eckstein 2005.

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the basin-wide management mechanisms as the best mean for achieving equitable and sustainable management of waters, neither specifically require such institutions to be established, nor provide specific details for such mechanisms (The Berlin Rules on Water Resources 2004).

Water rights considered In Western, Roman-based legislation, the economic aspects of water are defined in terms of either public or private rights. Most legal systems today recognize and protect the property aspects of water rights (Solanes 2001). International law strives to delineate those riparian state rights to international water resources (Benvenisti and Gvirtzman 1993). The underlying rationale for establishing water rights is that a clear definition of who is entitled to use the water will reduce uncertainty and conflict (Pradhan and Meinzen-Dick 2001). This is in line with neoclassical economics, which see property rights as a fundamental concept of development (Molle 2004). Thus, the “right” terminology has penetrated many of the legal instruments that seek to articulate or establish international water law. For example, the Helsinki Rules put forth the notion of legal rights to water in many of its clauses (The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers 1966, see Articles XXX, XXXI). Simi- larly, the Watercourse Convention stresses the right of watercourse states to utilize the watercourse (Article, 5). The Berlin Rules, though not setting rights as a guideline for appropriating water, stress the right to have access to water. (The Berlin Rules on Water Resources 2004, see Article 17). Given the predominance of the rights-based language, it is not surprising that during most international negotiations, parties base their initial positions in terms of rights. However, in almost all of the disputes that have been resolved, particularly on arid or exotic streams, the paradigms used for negotiations have not been “rights- based” at all – neither on relative hydrography nor specifically on chronology of use, but rather “needs-based” (see Table 1). “Needs” are defined by irrigable land, population, or the requirements of a specific project.

Joint management considered Navigation laid the groundwork for a legal or administrative unity of the river basin in politically divided basins. This sense of management unity was built upon as the Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016

Table 1 Examples of needs-based criteria.

Treaty Criteria for allocations

Egypt/Sudan (1929, 1959, Nile) “Acquired” rights from existing uses, plus even division of any additional water resulting from development projects Johnston Accord (1956, Jordan) Amount of irrigable land within the watershed in each state India/Pakistan (1960, Indus) Historic and planned use (for Pakistan) plus geographic allocations (western vs. eastern rivers) South Africa (Southwest Africa)/ Allocations for human and animal needs, Portugal (Angola) (1969, Kunene) and initial irrigation

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non-navigation demands and the technological means to meet those demands grew. Indeed, in the US from 1940s to 1970, a series of river basin commissions were established. During the 1940s and 1950s, basin authorities emerged throughout the world: in India, Sri Lanka, Brazil, Colombia, Ghana, Australia and other countries. These took a variety of forms. Some only coordinated planning while others established a joint mechanism to govern the basin. In a coordinated structure each party has its own institutions which coordinate some of their activities. In a joint structure the activities were carried out by a joint institution to which the parties delegated authority (Haddad, et al. 1999). Acknowledging the benefits of cooperative water management, it seems that the international community has often advocated a high intensity of cooperation in the form of joint management structure. In 1911, the Institute of International Law published the Madrid Declaration on the International Regulation regarding the Use of Inter- national Watercourses for Purposes other than Navigation. The Madrid Declaration outlined certain basic principles of shared water management, recommending that co-riparian states establish permanent joint international commissions. Expanding on these guidelines, in developing the Helsinki Rules, the ILA promoted the establishment of a joint agency that would settle disputes and formulate plans or recommendations for the most efficient use of the transboundary water resource (The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers 1966, Article XXXI). Also, the 1997 Watercourse Convention establishes the general obligation to cooperate (Article 8) and the management required for cooperation (Article 24) called for the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions. Similarly, the Berlin Rules call for the establishment of a joint management arrangement to ensure equitable and sustainable use of water (Article 64). Yet, again it seems that real-life experience often deviates from the ideal joint structure. Kliot and Shmueli (2001), while analyzing nine major river basins found that in only a minority of them, a high level of cooperation is gained. Approx- imately 106 of the 263 international basins in the world have agreements, only 20% of which include more than two riparians. Dombrowsky likewise finds that only 20% of all multi-partite basins have multilateral organizations in place (Dombrosky 2005). The next section examines in detail three case studies in order to understand why these so-called “ideal” principles are not adopted and what alternative principles might replace them. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016

MIDDLE-EASTERN WATER AGREEMENTS

Background to the Israeli-Arab water agreements Most of Israel’s water resources are transboundary. Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians share the lower basin of the Jordan River, whose main flow comes from tributaries located in Lebanon and Syria and which discharges some 1250 million cubic meters (mcm) annually (Soffer and Kilot 1988). These waters are used both as a potable water supply of the metropolis of Amman, through the King Abdullah Canal, and for the water supply in Israel, through the Israeli National Water Carrier, built in 1964. Israel

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and the Palestinians also share the Mountain Aquifer, which supplies 600 million cubic meters per year. Israel utilizes nearly 80 percent of the water in this aquifer, and the Palestinians use the remainder (Trottier 1999). The Mountain Aquifer provides pris- tine water to both sides, although it is highly susceptible to pollution due to its karstic structure; thus, its management requires a high degree of cooperation (Haddad et al. 1999). Finally there is the Coastal Aquifer, the southern tip of which underlies the Gaza Strip. Until the 2005 disengagement process, it provided water to both the Pales- tinian population and the Jewish settlements of the Strip. Despite the shared nature of the resources, both Israel and Jordan, already in the 1950s, announced unilateral plans to develop the Jordan Basin. Israel planned the diversion of the northern Jordan River, through the construction of a carrier, to the Coastal Plain and Negev Desert (Naff and Matson 1984). Jordan opposed this out-of-basin water transfer and instead announced its intention to irrigate the Jordan Valley by channeling the Yarmouk River into the King Abdullah Channel. As Israel started implementing its plan, a series of border clashes erupted between it and Syria; these clashes escalated to an armed conflict in 1953 (Wolf and Ross 1992). But even earlier the US sent Eric Johnston as a special envoy to the region with the mission of reaching regional agreement between the riparian states on the division of the waters of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers. Johnston’s 1951 proposal was rejected by all countries as was his 1955 version. Within a decade, the tension over water, coupled with the regional border dispute, led to numerous political clashes over water between Israel and Jordan, some of which developed into significant military confrontations.25 After the Six Day War of 1967 the geopolitical map of the Middle East changed dramatically. Apart from Israel’s victory in terms of land and borders, it also gained water resources by acquiring two of three Jordan River headwaters, as well as winning control over the Mountain Aquifer previously held by Jordan. Israeli military rule extended to all civilian affairs in the territory of the West Bank, including water (Tal 2002). This meant that the drilling of any well in the West Bank required an Israeli permit. Israel granted only 23 of these to Palestinians between 1967–90 (Awartani 1992). In contrast, during the same period Israel exploited this water unsustainably to address the growing political pressure of its agricultural sector (Fischhendler in Feitelson and Shamir eds., forthcoming). Israel has also gradually increased its use of the Yarmouk (Priscoli and Wolf, forthcoming) and during the 1970s and ‘80s had plans to revive the Mediterranean Sea-Dead Sea Canal first visual- Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016 ized a century earlier by the Zionist movement (Varadi 1990). The canal’s aim was to produce hydroelectricity by using the differential sea level between the two seas. While Israel was developing the resource, Jordan and Syria did not sit idly by. In the mid-1970s, as Jordan faced water shortages in its main cities of Amman and Irbid, it revived its plan to jointly build a large storage facility on the Yarmouk with Syria. The plan for a “Unity Dam” was again discussed by the two at the end of the 1980s and in the ‘90s, causing considerable tension in Israel, which initially opposed its construction (See Hof 1995; Keinan 2005).

25 Yet, it is important to keep In mind that the Israeli-Arab water conflicts of the Fifties and Sixties were not entirely over water. For more see Feitelson 2000.

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As all freshwater utilization has reached the limits of its availability in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Jordan, tensions over scarce water have increased. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that during early ‘90s, water wars were expected to erupt in the Middle East (See Starr 1991; Bullock and Darwish 1993). Despite such friction, the Israelis and Jordanians often met to discuss and regulate water sharing on the Yarmouk, which had to be frequently adjusted because of Syrian abstraction of the flow upstream (Haddadin 2001). Yet, as long as the regional conflict over territory and refugees was not resolved at the political level, talks over water were never institutionalized into a treaty. The Madrid peace conference in 1991 and the many negotiations that followed marked a turning point in water relations. In Madrid, two parallel negotiating tracks – the bilateral and multilateral tracks – were established. The former referred to direct negotiations between Israel and each of its immediate Arab neighbors, with the exception of the Palestinians, who, at the time, were included in the Jordanian delegation at the insistence of Israel (Rubinstein 2004). The latter focused on key issues that concern the entire Middle East and that might generate confidence-building measures (Peters 1996). Each track was divided into groups that included the water issue. While the work on both tracks was progressing, Israel and the Palestinians initiated a secret negotiating track outside the framework of the Madrid conference that resulted in the Oslo I Accord, signed in September 1993. That Accord, which announced the establishment of a Palestinian interim authority, also noted the need for cooperation in the field of water. Subsequent to Oslo I, Israel and the Palestinians in September 1995 signed the Oslo II Interim Agreement, in which article 40 of Annex III addressed issues of water and sewage. The moment it became clear that Israel and the Palestinians were about to sign Oslo I, the bilateral talks between Israel and Jordan intensified. Water was the last and most contentious issue resolved in those negotiations, which came to an end with the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty in October 1994; Annex II of the treaty pertains to the two countries’ shared water. The Israel-Jordanian agreement set in motion the plan to develop the Dead Sea area; both sides declared the Jordan Rift Valley a development zone and established the Trilat- eral Economic Committee and Jordan Rift Valley (JRV) Steering Committee. Finally, in April 2005, after three years of negotiations, a feasibility study was signed for the environmental and social assessment of the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance study. The next section examines briefly the negotiations over the language negotiated Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016 and adopted in each of the three agreements.

Negotiating international language

The Israeli-Jordanian agreement A Jordanian demand that Israel reorganize their respective water rights was raised already in 1992 while both countries discussed the common agenda for the coming water negotiations. Water rights were important for Jordan, whose use of the Jordan River had been diminished by Israel’s extensive use of that water (Haddadin 2001) and in light of the Palestinians obtaining reorganization of their own water rights in talks with Israel (Izraeli 2005). Since water rights are based on several factors, such as

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Figure 1 The geopolitical units in the Jordan basin.

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hydrology, geography, historical use and needs and so on, though the weight of each factor is not determined universally, but rather based on the circumstances of each case it was thus clear to Israel that setting the allocation on the basis of disputable algorithms would result in long-term disagreements (Shamir 2003). Even if the weight of each factor was agreed upon, Israel feared that Jordan’s water needs in the future would change, which may result in a demand for adjustment (Sabel 2005). Finally, Israel was concerned that recognizing its water rights on the Yarmouk may allow its neighbor to raise counter-claims on the Jordan River, which Israel wished to leave as an exclusively Israeli water body (Izraeli 2005). Instead, Israel preferred a clear division of water based on a definition of the water source and location, quantities and qualities and pricing (Shamir 1998). The disagreement was resolved by both sides putting forward the notion of securing their respective “rightful water share”, the meaning of which was left to be defined in the next phase of negotiation (International Legal Materials 1993). As the controversy over water rights continued, it was the technique of incorporating both sides’ needs in the treaty language that defused the deadlock. This occurred only when the formula of “rightful allocation” was introduced at the late stages of negotiations. “Rightful allocation” implies that the Jordanian rights are the allocation both sides agree upon (Rizner 2005). This term served to provide a psycho- logical reference to “rights” that was important to Jordan while basing the allocations on what is specified in the agreement, as that was important to Israel (Shamir 1998). Next, there was a need to clarify the meaning of “rightful allocation” and to divide the water between the two states accordingly. Jordan’s interpretation of its respected water rights was to receive from Israel 200 mcmy of potable water from the Jordan River, half of it from the Sea of Galilee, also known as Lake Kinneret (Haddadin 2001), on the basis that the lake is an international watercourse where Jordan is a riparian (Rizner 2005). Israel, in contrast, argued that Jordan is not a riparian to the lake itself (Katz-Oz 2005). Thus, Israel opposed including any reference in the treaty to the Jordan River as a “shared basin” (Sabel 2005) and insisted that the term “Lake Kinneret” not appear in the treaty language (Shamir 2005). As a result, although it was clear that the source of some of the water provided to Jordan is the lake itself, the lake’s name was not mentioned in the treaty, nor was there any reference to the Jordan River as a shared basin. Instead, it stated that the source would be “from the Jordan River directly upstream from the Deganya gates on the river” while the meaning of Jordan River was deliberately left ambiguous Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016 (Sabel 2005). Finally, there was a need to set the degree of cooperation and dependency required to execute the treaty provision. Israel was concerned that setting up a joint management structure, in which both countries share and develop the basin resources, might put the burden of droughts and of funding new water resources on it, as it has more water alternatives (Rizner 2006; Shamir 2005). It was also concerned about any interpretation that might describe the treaty and its institutions as a symbol of Israel’s control in the basin (Shatner 2005). Consequently, the Joint Water Committee (JWC) was set up to oversee the treaty implementation established coordination mechanisms rather than a joint or a cooperative framework. These were restricted to cooperation in developing plans for purposes of increasing water supplies and improving water use efficiency within the context of bilateral, regional or international cooperation.

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Time Jordan Israel

1991 lower joint water water Madrid basin Jordan coordinated structure rights allocation conference allocation allocation structure

1992 Common not bilateral rightful agenda defined cooperation water share Legend Scale of agreement Nature of cooperation 1994 Jordan bilateral rightful Water river Basis for cooperation allocation agreement allocation allocation

Figure 2 Language evolution in the Israeli-Jordanian negotiations.

Figure 2 presents the language employed by both sides and how the differences in jargon were reconciled in the negotiation process.

The Israeli-Palestinian agreement While Jordan consented to discussing “allocations”, the Palestinians insisted on the division of water based on water rights (Shamir 1998). As a result, just after the Madrid conference when the multilateral water group met in Geneva to discuss the regional water issues, the Palestinians insisted that their water rights be negotiated; in response, Israel argued that this was a political topic that was outside the multilateral and technical scope (Izraeli 2005). Instead, Israel suggested that until Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016 this issue was discussed during the permanent negotiations phase, both sides should adopt a “pragmatic approach” of dividing the water according to the future needs of the Palestinians (Kantor 2005). The Palestinians refused to discuss water needs independently of water rights and left the multilateral water group until this issue returned to the agenda (Haddad 2004). The Israeli objection to discussing Palestinian water rights based on the “reasonable and equitable” criteria originates with the fear that this term was not quan- tifiable (Kinarti 2006), and thus may build great expectations on the Palestinian side (Rizner 2005). Israel was further concerned about water rights providing the Palestinians fixed entitlement to water even during a regional drought (Kantor 2005). The Palestinians, on the other hand, opted for water rights as leverage for land rights (Haddad 2004).

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Another point of disagreement was the Palestinians’ wish that the agreement include “joint” management over the entire basin and a reference to them as riparian to the Dead Sea (Sabel 2005). For the Palestinians, terminology commonly used in international law was assumed to assure them the support of the international community (Attili 2006). Furthermore, attaining a joint basin-wide agreement and even a joint water utility might have provided the Palestinians with the power to reallocate existing water uses, which were dominated by Israel outside the West Bank (Attili 2004). Thus, not surprisingly, Israel opposed such terminology and opted for a coordinated management structure over the West Bank that would better reflect the existing status quo. Yet, it also suggested augmenting the Palestinians’ water supply through a desalinization plant on the Israeli coast at Hadera (Katz-Oz 2005). A breakthrough for the Palestinians occurred when Abraham Katz-Oz, the head of the Israeli negotiation team to the multilateral talks, agreed to acknowledge the Palestinians’ water rights on an equitable basis as well as their affinity to the Dead Sea. Once this was accepted there was no return and these issues were included in the Declaration of Principles (DOP) on the interim self-governance arrangements signed in Washington on September 13, 1993 (Annex, III, article 1). Yet, many of the Israeli negotiators that were against acknowledging the Palestinians’ water rights decided on a strategy of postponing the clarification of the meaning of equitable water rights to the permanent status negotiations. In the meantime, the Israeli strategy was to continue to advance water allocation based on the pragmatic approach (Kinarti 2006). Next, in 1994 the Cairo Agreement was signed, Annex II (Article II) of which touched on shared water in the Gaza Strip. The agreement announced that a sub-committee would deal with water issues of mutual interest while its scope and scale were restricted, allowing water sovereignty of each side to be maintained. The Cairo Agree- ment was followed by intensified negotiations that led, a year later, to the Taba Agree- ment, often called Oslo II, article 40 of which addressed water and sewage. The clash between allocation based on rights versus allocation based on pragmatism was resolved in the negotiations only when a third approach was adopted: the approach negotiated the Palestinians’ interim water needs on the basis of population patterns and irrigation needs. Once the allocation was agreed, the Palestinian allotment was to be presented in the negotiated agreement as water rights based on reasonable and equitable criteria, again without clarifying what reasonable and equitable actually meant (Rizner 2005). At Israel’s insistence the scale of the agreement was restricted to the West Bank rather than the entire basin (see Figure 1). Narrowing the scale prevented the Palestinians from Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016 gaining control of the major water source of Israel, located on the western fringe of the Mountain Aquifer outside the West Bank zone. To ensure that the agreement would not affect the Kinneret or the Jordan River, Israel made sure that it did not recognize the Palestinians as riparian to the Jordan basin; the agreement did not even mention this water resource (Rizner 2005). Instead, it said that “various” water resources would be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, without clarifying the meaning of “various”. Finally, to address the Israeli demand, a coordinating mechanism was set up to administer the agreement, with decisions made on a veto basis. Coordination should be understood in this context as an alternative to joint management (1). “Joint” would suggest ownership and “management” of a resource versus coordination, which indicates that each side is sovereign in its domain but agrees that certain matters can be managed together (Shamir 2005). The only shared structure was the establishment

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Time Palestinian Israel

1991 Mountain Geneva joint water West coordinated water Aquifer and structure Bank Meeting Dead Sea rights structure needs

1993 not not water rights Legend Oslo I defined defined Scale of agreement

Nature of cooperation coordination West Bank Basis for 1995 and various water and joint rights based allocation Oslo II resources enforcement on needs

Figure 3 Language evolution in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

of an enforcement arm of the JWC, termed Joint Supervision and Enforcement Team (JSETs). The assumption was that a joint structure for enforcement is inevitable since this is the only way to prevent disagreements (Shamir 1998). Figure 3 presents the language advanced by both sides and how the differences in terms were reconciled in the negotiation process.

The Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian agreement Following a request by Jordan at the beginning of 2002, a World Bank Technical Assist- ance Mission visited the Hashemite Kingdom. The purpose of the visit was to assess the support of both Israel and Jordan for the Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal with the aim of saving the Dead Sea and providing desalinated freshwater to the region, and especially Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016 to Amman (Read Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project 2002a). The two countries agreed to establish a small joint Steering Committee that included the World Bank and that would prepare the Terms of Reference (TOR) required for the project (Read Sea- Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project 2002b). Several months later, the principles for the TOR were submitted for acceptance by the Israeli Ministry of Regional Cooperation. The draft called for joint examination of the project by the two governments with the involvement of the World Bank, USAID and/or the U.S. State Department. Both Jordan and Israel preferred a route entirely in Jordan. This would exclude some of the Israeli pressure groups that might oppose the project and would make it eligible for World Bank funding that only developing countries can receive (Benvenisti and Gvirtzman 1993). Yet, the early draft addressed neither the scale of the examination nor the number of alternative routes to be examined (Israeli Government, Ministry of Regional Cooperation

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2002). Following the early draft, the need to further advance the project was boosted by the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development and the Third Water Forum in Kyoto, both of which stressed the vision of saving the Dead Sea through the “peace conduit” (Johannesburg Summit 2002). A year later, a more mature draft was issued by the World Bank. Following the Bank’s insistence, the draft now included the Palestinians as riparians in the agreement along with Israel and Jordan (Blitz 2006). It also paved the way for an examination of the water resources of the entire Jordan basin and for establishing regional joint institutions to govern the TOR (The Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project 2003a). Finally, it acknowledged the need for consultation with the public and implicitly the entitlement of all basin parties (including the Palestinians) to water and land rights in the basin. Broadening both the scale and scope of investigation raised strong objection on behalf of Israel, while it was the Palestinians who insisted on these changes (The Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project 2003b). For the Palestinians, an agreement that touched on water and land issues in the entire basin, with reference to international law, was assumed to provide them with leverage for obtaining their “reasonable and equitable” water and land share in the permanent status negotiations with Israel (Attili 2006). In contrast, for Israel such an agreement might prejudge the results of the permanent status talks with the Palestinians and might infringe on its sovereignty and water/land resources, including Lake Kinneret and the Dead Sea (Blitz 2006; The Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project 2003b; Keidar 2005). Instead, Israel suggested that the Palestinians’ participation be examined at a later stage, in accordance with the progress on the final negotiations and to decouple the TOR from the regional water use, the peace process, and the upper basin riparians (Alaster 2006; The Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project 2003b). Despite pressure from both Jordan and the World Bank to accept the early draft (Bein 2006), Israel’s strong objection to the 2003 draft resulted in a revised draft published by the World Bank (The Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project 2004). The new version of the TOR excluded much of the customary law language found in the previous draft, including any reference to Lebanon and Syria as upper riparians, the option for a joint management structure governed by a regional institution and the status of the Palestinians as riparians (see Table 1). Instead, the TOR included a statement that the agreement will not prejudice the riparian rights of any of the parties, that the nature of cooperation remains to be studied, and that the parties status would change from riparians to “beneficiary party” (The Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project 2003). The “beneficiary” language adopted satisfied the Israeli demand for the passive status Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016 of the Palestinians (See Alaster 2006; Yinon 2006) while the term “party” addressed the Palestinians’ needs for recognition as equal parties to the agreement (Attili 2006). The statement also addressed the Palestinians’ wish that the agreement not infringe on the rights of Syria and Lebanon, which were not involved in the negotiations, while for Israel it enabled decoupling of the agreement from the final negotiations. However, despite the many compromises reached in the 2004 TOR version, Israel still objected to it. Israel wished to modify the objective of the study from saving the Dead Sea to a technical study that focuses on examining only the convenience route preferable to Jordan and Israel (Blitz 2006). Reframing the objectives of the agreement would have lowered the importance of an investigation into the management of the water uses in the entire basin, an issue that was problematic for both Jordan and Israel (Alaster 2006). However, the World Bank continued to insist on the need to see the

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Time Palestinian Israel

Early entire joint and Palestinians conveyance Palestinians negotiations regional coordination basin institutions as riparians route not included

joint and entire First draft regional riparians basin institutions

lower beneficiary Second draft to be studies Legend basin party Scale of agreement

Nature of cooperation

Final conveyance Basis for to be studies beneficiary agreement route party allocation

Figure 4 Language evolution in the Red-Dead negotiations.

TOR in a wider regional context that includes the peace and water management of the entire basin (Yinon 2006). The breakthrough in the negotiations came just after the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005 and with the help of some more creative drafting (Yinon 2006). In the fourth draft of the agreement the basin water study was replaced by policy statements each country issued on water resources management indicating that the nature of cooperation was to be studied rather than pointing towards joint manage- Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016 ment (The Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project 2005). Finally, the objectives of the study were framed to take on the semblance of a technical agreement, as requested by Jordan and Israel. This affected the parties involved in the negotiations on the Israeli side: the professional environmental community that headed the negotiations was replaced by the Israeli Water Commission team that now also addressed the political realities of negotiations in a conflict area. Politicizing the negotiation process further excluded from the negotiation process the examination of other alternatives for the conveyance (Bein 2006). Finally, in April 2005, the three beneficiaries signed an agreement to launch a feasibility study for the environmental and social assessment for the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance study. Figure 4 presents the language advanced by both the Palestinians and the Israelis and shows how the differences in language were reconciled in the negotiation process.

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Table 2 Evolution of language/content adopted in Red Sea-Dead Sea draft agreements.

Content 2002 draft 2003 draft 2004 draft 2005 agreement

Aim – Save the Dead – Save the – Save the – Feasibility study Sea Dead Sea Dead Sea – peace – peace – peace – desalinization – desalinization – desalinization – energy – energy Scale Not defined Implicitly the Lower basin Water conveyance whole basin route Parties Governments Riparian; parties Beneficiary parties Beneficiary parties definition Parties Israel and Jordan All basin riparians Israel, Jordan, Israel; Jordan, involved Palestinians Palestinians Nature of Joint examination Regional institutions To be studied To be studied cooperation and possibly joint management Scope Not defined – Red Dead – Red-Dead – Red-Dead conveyance and conveyance and conveyance alternatives routes alternative routes – water policy – water resources – water resources statements management Effect on Implications on Implications on Not to “prejudice Not to “prejudice water and land and water land and water the riparian rights” the riparian rights” land rights rights rights Public Isareal, Jordan, Consolation with Consolation with Consolation with participation World Bank, a wider public a wider public a wider public USAID, US State Department

Table 2 presents the evolution of negotiations over the Red Sea-Dead Sea agreements. Essentially it shows how the aim, scale, scope and public participation of the early drafts have changed during an intense two years of negotiations.

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Water problems are often characterized as “wicked” problems that face multiple and conflicting interests over the utilization of integrated natural systems such as an aquifer or a watershed (Scholz and Stiftel 2005). To solve these problems in an equitable and optimal manner, certain principles of international water law call for a higher degree of physical and institutional integration, often at a basin-wide scale, and a clearer definition of water rights. Otherwise, it is assumed that fragmented water systems will result in unilateral development activities that ignore the rights of other basin riparians (Alaerts 2003; Molle, et al. 2006). Against these assumptions stands the low commonality of the use of joint basin-wide management based upon water rights in water treaties. The present study argues the importance of power asymmetries between states and the nature of the

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water dispute that often extends beyond water as explanatory variables to explain this discrepancy between theory and practice. Under those conditions this study argues that the adoption of these principles is not feasible. Thus, a more traditional “bottom-up” approach is employed to adopt “creative terminology” as a means for circumventing the volatility inherent in these principles. Both the negotiation over the legal terminology and the language adopted were found in themselves to be a manifestation of the power struggle and asymmetries between Israel and its neighbors. It was the weak riparians – both Jordan and the Palestinians – that, in order to change the power balance and enhance their access to land and water resources, endorsed the language of the international law, that is, calling for joint basin-wide management based upon water rights, while Israel sought alternative terminology that would uphold the status quo. This explains why drafting the water treaties was found to be a complex, lengthy and often contradictory process, and one associated with high transaction costs. It also explains why the legal language that was finally adopted is rather ambiguous as ambiguity enabled virtual consent, which in turn allowed each side to assume that its own language dominates the treaty. Much of the deadlock was resolved only when the parties moved from their adver- sarial positions to address the interests behind the positions, where a compromise was forged that captures elements of international law while still addressing the needs of the stronger riparian – for example, adopting rightful allocation terminology in the case of Israel and Jordan, and rights based on needs in the case of Israel and the Pal- estinians. The “rights” terminology came to satisfy the Jordanians or the Palestinians while the “allocation” or the “needs” terminology came to address the Israeli needs. The Red-Dead talks also exposed an integrative stage of negotiation during which the parties started to add benefits to the agreements. This is the “beneficiary party” definition, which helped bypass any allocation and recognition based upon water “rights.” This evolution of water conflict negotiation under asymmetrical conditions explains why the language adopted deviated from the recommended international legal norms while still managing to address the needs of the weak riparian. The result was often in adopting only minimal and vague definitions that capture the spirit of international law principles but also allowing the freedom to tailor the agreements to the specific asymmetries of these case studies. Yet, it seems that while Israel was willing to compromise on the rights issue and the nature of cooperation, on the spatial scale the treaty’s language still reflects its power inequities. In fact, in all three Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016 agreements the mandate of the regime does not go beyond parts of the basin that may endanger Israeli sovereignty and water and land control. Although the study’s aim is not to identify the ramifications of following these non-traditional language alternatives, attention should be paid to the long-term implications of the language adopted—especially given its abundant ambiguity and repeated failure to change the water status quo. In the case of the Israeli-Jordanian water agreement, this so-called creative ambiguity was already found to be destructive (Fischhendler 2004). In the case of Israel-Palestinian agreement, due to the language adopted, some even do not consider their allocations under the interim agreement to reflect their water rights as based on reasonable and equitable criteria (Attili 2006). Some international scholars have also criticized many of the institutional components of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement as dressing up domination as “co-operation”

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(Selby 2003) or as an imposed-order regime that benefits the Israeli side at the expense of Palestinian water (Zeitoun 2007). Consequently, the Palestinians have stated that in the final negotiations they must not repeat the language mistakes made in the Oslo agreement (Husseni 2006). As a result, the 2000 water agreement draft agreed at Camp David (that was to replace the Oslo agreement) included a more explicit language of international law as it contains both references to “equitable and reasonable” and water rights language (Sher 2006). Negotiations in conflict areas over water resources are often conducted between unequal partners, with each bringing to the negotiation table considerations that go beyond water (LOWI). These conditions can often create conflicting patterns of interests such that under conflict conditions a basic non-political issue, such as water allocation, can become politicized. These conditions that were often found to impede cooperation characterize many environmental and especially water problems (United Nations Environment Programme 2006). This suggests that the Israeli-Palestinian- Jordanian case is not exceptional. A more realistic language that better reflects the political and power asymmetries but still acknowledges the importance of the existing rules of customary law turns the Middle Eastern example to a possible option for other regions facing water disputes. While the solutions crafted by the parties have not been adopted by other states/regions, they constitute examples of local decision-making that might someday be adopted elsewhere under similar asymmetrical conditions. Ultimately, the Middle Eastern water experience teaches us that despite attempts to establish a “top-down” approach for the development of international water law for facilitating the drafting of water treaties, a broader approach that acknowledges the volatility, unique characteristics, and asymmetries inherent in these situations must be adopted. Otherwise the result may be no agreement at all.

REFERENCES

Alaerts, G.J. (2003) Institutions for River Basin Management: A Synthesis of Lessons in Developing Cooperative Arrangements. In Alaerts, G.J. and Moigne, G.L. (Eds.) Integrated Water Management at River Basin Level. The World Bank. Alaster, Y. Personal Communication. Legal Advisor for the Water Commissioner, February 13, 2006. American Society of International Law. (1993) Israel-Jordan: Common agenda for the bilateral Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016 peace negotiations. International Legal Materials, 32, 1522–1524. Attili, S. (2004) Israel and Palestine: Legal and Policy Aspects of the Current and Future Joint Management of the Shared Water Resources. Negotiation Affairs Department-Palestine Liberation Organization. Attili, S. Personal Communication. Palestinian Liberation Organization, Negotiation Support Unit, February 20, 2006. Awartani, H. (1992) Artesian Wells in Palestine: Present Status and Future Aspirations. Palestinian Hydrological Group. Bein, A. Personal Communication. Head of the Israeli Geological Survey for the years 1990–1995 and 2000–2005, February 13, 2006. Benvenisti, E. and Gvirtzman, H. (1993) Harnessing international law to determine Israeli-Palestinian water rights: The mountain aquifer. Natural Resources Journal, 33, 543. Biswas, A.K. (1999) Management of international waters. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 15, 429.

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Blitz, N. Personal Communication. Head of Water Supply Department, The Water Commis- sion, January 1, 2006. Bullock, J. and Darwish, A. (1993) Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East. Gollancz. Cano, G. (1989) The development of the law in international water resources and the work of the International Law Commission. Water International, 14, 167. Conca, K., Wu, F. and Mei, C. (2006) Global regime formation or complex institution building? The principled content of international river agreements. International Studies Quar- terly, 50, 263. Dellapenna, J.W. (1997) Personal communication. Dellapenna, J.W. Equitable Participation and the New Paradigm for International Water Law: The Key to Governance of the Global Water System. Paper Presented at The International Workshop on Governance and the Global Water System, Bonn, Germany, June 20–23, 2006. Delli Priscoli, J. and Wolf, A. (Forthcoming) Managing Water Conflicts: Dispute Resolution, Public Participation and Institutional Capacity-Building. Cambridge University Press. Dombrowsky, I. (2005) Conflict, Cooperation and Institutions in International Water Manage- ment. Dissertation, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University. Eckstein, G. (2005) A hydrogeological perspective of the status of ground water resources under the UN Watercourse Convention. Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, 30, 525. Elver, H. (2006) International environmental law: Water and the future. Third World Quar- terly, 27, 885. European Union Water Framework Directive. (2000) European Union Framework Directive for Community action in the field of Water. Feitelson, E. (2000) The ebb and flow of Arab-Israeli water conflicts: Are past confrontations likely to resurface? Water Policy, 2, 343–363. Fischhendler, I. (Forthcoming) The Politics of Water Allocation in Israel. In Feitelson, E. and Shamir, U. (Eds.) Water for Dry Land. Resources for the Future Press. Fischhendler, I., Eaton, D. and Feitelson, E. (2004) The short and long term ramifications of linkages involving natural resources: The U.S.-Mexico transboundary water case. Environ- ment and Planning C, 22, 633. Fischhendler, I. and Feitelson, E. (2003) Spatial adjustment as a mechanism for resolving river basin conflicts: The U.S.-Mexico case. Political Geography, 25, 547. Frey, F.W. (1993) The political context of conflict and cooperation over international river basins. Water International, 18, 54. Global Water Partnership. Towards water security: A framework for action. Document prepared for the Second World Water Forum and Ministerial Conference at The Hague, March 17–22, 2000. Green Cross International and World Water Vision. National sovereignty and international Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016 watercourses. Document prepared for the Second World Water Forum and Ministerial Con- ference at The Hague, March 17–22, 2000. Haddad, M., Feitelson, E., Arlosoroff, S. and Nasseredin, T. (1999) Joint management of shared aquifers: An implementation-oriented agenda: Final report of phase II. Harry S. Tru- man Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace. Haddad, M. Politics and water management: A Palestinian perspective. Paper Presented at the 2nd Israeli Palestinian International Conference, Turkey, October 10–14, 2004. www.ipcri. org/watconf/papers/marwan.pdf Haddadin, M. (2002) Diplomacy on the Jordan: International Conflict and Negotiated Resolu- tion. Springer. Hayton, R.D. and Utton, A.E. (1989) Transboundary groundwaters: The Bellagio draft treaty. Natural Resources Journal, 29, 663–722. Hof, F.C. (1995) The Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers in the Israel-Jordan peace treaty. Middle East Policy, 3, 47.

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Husseni, H. (2006) Personal Communication. Legal advisor to the Palestinian negotiation team. Jerusalem, March 12, 2006. International Law Association. (1966) The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers. August 1966, http://webworld.unesco.org/water/wwap/pccp/cd/pdf/ educational_tools/course_modules/reference_documents/internationalregionconventions/ helsinkirules.pdf International Law Association. (2004) The Berlin Rules on Water Resources. August 21, 2004. http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/ILA_Berlin_Rules-2004.pdf International Water Law Project. (1986) The Seoul Rules on International Groundwaters. http://internationalwaterlaw.org/intldocs/seoul_rules.html Izraeli, M. (2005) Personal Communication. Consultant to the Israeli Water Commissioner, January 3, 2005. Johannesburg Summit. (2002) Jordan and Israel Announce Project to Save Dead Sea. August 24, 2006. http://www.un.org/jsummit/html/whats_new/feature_story33.htm Kantor, S. (2005) Personal Communication. Member of the Israeli Negotiation Team in the Israel-Jordan Peace Talks, July 31, 2005. Katz-Oz, A. (2005) Personal Communication. Member of the Israeli Negotiation Team in the Israel-Jordan Peace Talks, July 11, 2005. Keidar, Y. (2005) Personal Communication. Israel Multilateral Peace Talks Coordinator, June 25, 2005. Keinan, E. (2005) Personal Communication. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Direc- tor General and Legal Advisor, June 26, 2005. Kinarti, N. (2006) Personal Communication. Advisor for the Minister of Regional Cooperation and the Galilee, February 7, 2006. Kliot, N. and Shmueli, D. (2001) Development of institutional frameworks for the management of transboundary water resources. International Journal of Global Environmental Issues, 306, 3–4. McCaffrey, S.C. (2001) The Law of International Watercourses: Non-Navigational Uses. Oxford University Press. Molle, F. (2004) Defining water rights: By prescription or negotiation? Water Policy, 6, 207. Molle, F., Wester, P. and Hirsch, P. (2006) River Basin Development and Management. In Molden, D. (Ed.) Water for Food, Water for Life: A Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture. International Water Management Institute. Naff, T. and Matson, R. (1984) Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation? Westview Press. Peters, J. (1996) Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks. Royal Institute of International Affairs. Pradhan, R. and Meinzen-Dick, R. Which rights are right? Water rights, culture and underlying Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016 values. Paper presented at the meeting on Water Resources, Human Rights and Governance, Kathmandu, Nepal, February 29–March 2, 2001. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project. Ministry of Water and Irrigation/Jordan Valley Authority, Jordan and Ministry of Regional Cooperation, Israel: Summary of Discussion. April 18, 2002. Red Sea-Dead Sea Conveyance Project. (2002a) Israeli Government, The Ministry of Regional Cooperation, Proposal-Principles for Terms of Reference (TOR): The Red Sea-Dead Sea “Peace Conduit”, Project: Israel- Jordan. The World Bank, June 2, 2002. Red Sea-Dead Sea Conveyance Project. (2002b) Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, World Bank Tech- nical Assistance Mission: Aide Memoire. April 8–23, 2002. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project. (2003a) Feasibility Study and Environmental and Social Assessment. Draft Terms of Reference and Annotated Comments, Second draft. October 7, 2003.

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Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project. (2003b) Israel and Palestinian Comments, First draft. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project. (2004) Feasibility Study and Environmental and Social Assessment. Terms of Reference, Third draft, May 2004. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project. (2005) Feasibility Study: Environmental, Tech- nical and Economic and Environmental and Social Assessment, Terms of Reference. April 19, 2005. Rizner, D. Personal Communication. Legal Advisor of the Israeli Negotiation Team in the Isra- el-Jordan Peace Talks, September 1st, 2005. Rizner, D. Personal Communication. Legal Advisor of the Israeli Negotiation Team in the Isra- el-Jordan Peace Talks, February 20, 2006. Rubinstein, E. (2004) The Peace Between Israel and Jordan. In Nevo, J. (Ed.) Neighbors Caught in a Maze: Israel-Jordan Relations Before and After the Peace Treaty. Yitzhak Rabin Center for Israel Studies. Sabel, R. Personal Communication. Legal Advisor of the Foreign Ministry for Water Talks, May 14, 2005. Scholz, J.T. and Stiftel, B. (Eds.) (2005) Adaptive Governance and Water Conflict: New Institu- tions for Collaborative Planning. Resources for the Future Press. Selby, J. (2003) Dressing up domination as “co-operation”: The case of Israeli-Palestinian water relations. Review of International Studies, 29, 121. Shamir, U. (2003) The Negotiations and the Water Agreements Between the Hashemite King- dom of Jordan and the State of Israel. In Haddadin, M.J. and Shamir, U. (Eds.) Jordan Case Study. UNESCO-IHP. Shamir, U. (1998) Water Agreement between Israel and its Neighbors. In Albert, J., Bernhards- son, M. and Kenna, R. (Eds.) Transformations of Middle Eastern Natural Environments: Legacies and Lessons. Yale University. Shamir, U. (2005) Personal Communication. Member of the Israeli Negotiation Team in the Israel-Jordan Peace Talks, May 31, 2005. Shatner, D. (2005) Personal Communication. Member of the Israeli Negotiation Team in the Israel-Jordan Peace Talks, August 15, 2005. Sher, G. (2006) The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 1999–2001 Within Reach. Routledge. Shmueli, D.F. (1999) Water quality in international river basins. Political Geography, 18, 437. Sneddon, C. and Fox, C. (2006) Rethinking transboundary waters: A critical hydro politics of the Mekong Basin. Political Geography, 181, 25. Soffer, A. and Kliot, N. (1988) Regional Water Projects in the Middle East. University of Haifa. Solanes, M. (2001) Water Rights: Functions, Conditionalities, Administration. In Feitel- son, E. and Haddad, M. (Eds.) Management of Shared Groundwater Resources: The Israeli- Palestinian Case with an International Perspective. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016 Starr, J.R. (1991) Water wars. Foreign Policy, 82, 17. Tal, A. (2002) Pollution in a Promised Land: An Environmental History of Israel. University of California Press. Teclaff, L.A. (1996) Evolution of the river basin concept in national and international water law. Natural Resources Journal, 36, 359. Trottier, J. (1999) Hydropolitics in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA). United Nation Environmental Program (UNEP). (2006) Human Development Report 2006, Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty, and the Global Water Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan. United Nations Environment Programme. (2002) Atlas of International Freshwater Agree- ments. http://na.unep.net/siouxfalls/publications/treaties/1_Front_atlas.pdf United Nations Office of Legal Affairs Treaty Section. (2002) United Nations Treaty Collection. http://untreaty.un.org/.

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Varadi, J. (1990) Historical Review. In Arad, V., Varadi, J. and Beyth, M. (Eds.) Mediterra- nean – Dead Sea Project Bibliography. Geological Survey of Israel. Waterbury, J. (1997) Between unilateralism and comprehensive accords: Modest steps towards cooperation in international rivers basins. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 13, 279. Wescoat, J.L. (1992) Beyond the river basin: The changing geography of international water problems and international watercourse law. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, 3, 301. Wolf, A. and Ross, J. (1992) The impact of scarce water resources on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Natural Resources Journal, 32, 919. Yinon, D. (2006) Personal Communication. Legal Advisor for the Minster of Infrastructure, February 13, 2006. Zeitoun, M. (2007) The conflict vs. cooperation paradox: Fighting over or sharing of Palestinian- Israeli groundwater? Water International, 32, 105–120. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:31 12 October 2016

IIHESHAE0_Book.indbHESHAE0_Book.indb 7474 111/20/20121/20/2012 1:14:491:14:49 PMPM Chapter 5 Revisiting water politics and policy in Israel: Policymaking under conditions of uncertainty

Samer Alatout

INTRODUCTION

Most if not all contemporary experts on Israeli water policy and politics assume that water has been a scarce resource long before the establishment of the state in 1948. This presumed scarcity is not framed in relative terms, where per capita availability is the main concern; rather water scarcity is often described in absolute terms, where the resource is perceived as limited because of the natural conditions that are usually described as arid and semi-arid.26 This is precisely why Israeli water management became synonymous with the challenges of dealing with “water scarcity” – hence focusing attention on the supply side to increase available resources, on efficiency measured in terms of the productivity per unit of water, and the centralization of the administrative and technical apparatuses of water management. The basic question facing the water policy apparatus had been: how can the state ensure that there is enough water for a population that had been increasing exponentially since the establishment of the state? That is also probably the reason why water quantity rather than water quality was the main issue defining water policymaking at least until the late- 1970s and early-1980s.27 Given this predominant assumption, most water policies during the 1950s and 1960s are often seen as a logical consequence of water scarcity: the heightened importance of public and state interests in water resources, the efficient use of those resources, their national security relevance, and hence the importance of their technical and institutional centralization (Menachem, 2000; Feitelson, 2006). All of these elements, especially during the 1950s, legitimized arguments in favor of building a strong centralized state at the intrastate level (to presumably protect every

26 In 1950’s Israel, water scarcity was articulated with the presumed annual potential of 1,500 to 1,800 million cubic meters per year (down from a presumed water potential of over 3,000 million cubic meters per year, dominant before the establishment of the state). 27 One reviewer asked a great question that should be given attention: Would it be possible to assume that this lack of focus on water quality was due, not to the assumption of water scarcity, but to the fact that pollution was still less prominent and that technologies for understanding it were yet not available? This of course could be part of the answer, but not sufficient. The framework of this paper builds on the understanding that, for a problem to become recognizable as one, a network of actors and events has to actively construct it as such in a process of problematization. This involves multiple techno-political negotiations about what “nature” is telling the scientific community and what mandate is society giving its political representatives. Given this understanding, the fact that water quality was not discussed during the 1950s has more to do with the type of techno-political coalitions of governance that emerged then than with epistemological understandings of the pollution.

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drop of water) and hawkish politics on the regional and interstate level – to gain as high a share of shared water resources like the Jordan River as possible (Lowi, 1993; Wolf, 1995; Brecher, 1975). What becomes immediately apparent is the fact that to most scholars who study Israeli water policy of the 1950s one paradigm of policymaking, naïve-realist, seems to be taken for granted: “science speaks truth to power.”28 There seems to be a trust in the notion that scientists are technical-rational actors, devoid of politics when it comes to their science and engineering. There is also the assumption that these very actors were able through the use of objective scientific methodologies to uncover the facts of water availability in the state and entrust those facts to policymaker. Branding water scarcity as “fact” gave water policy – especially centralization and state control – the power of commonsense. However, in the past few years I have demonstrated that water scarcity was not the unquestionable fact it is often thought to be, at least not between 1948 and 1959. In this sense, the perception and fact of scarcity have a history of emergence; behind scarcity’s emergence and solidification there were a host of struggles over scientific (what constitutes a scientific fact, what evidence is allowed or not allowed, and how those should be arrived at) and political questions (over the meaning of Jewish subjectivity in the new state, the role of the state in civil society, and the form of governance that was desired) (Alatout 2008 and 2009). In other words, the process by which uncertainty was turned into certainty and by which scientific consensus around water scarcity was achieved, did not lack controversy, scientific or political. The focus of this paper is to shed light on the technical and political controversies of the day, just before a ‘consensus’ was arrived at, between those who believed water was a scarce resource and those who believed water was abundant. In this sense, the paper takes the position that scientific consensus is a technopolitical arrangement that hides from view the inherent uncertainties in scientific practice, on the one hand, and the very relations of power that produce it, on the other. If this is truly the case, that there is a fundamental uncertainty in scientific knowledge, then the question of its role in policymaking sneaks up its head again: is the role of science to speak truth to power? What if science and what we take as scientific facts are already the results of relations of power and political maneuvering, how can we then trust science itself in the process? How can we, in other words, take water scarcity as fact and use it to justify a host of political, juridical, and institutional changes that are not less than reorganizing life itself? Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 Three decades worth of work in the sociology, anthropology, and politics of science and science policy engaged this very question. The problem is that under conditions of scientific uncertainty, which is the norm from the point of view of science studies scholars, deferring to scientific expertise undermines the political democratic potential in science policymaking (Jasanoff, 1990, 1995, 2004; Latour, 1979, 1993, 2004; Bijker et al., 1986). In this sense, the paper is interested in answering the

28 Not all scholars follow this approach. In a diametrically opposed view, some see environmental knowledge as an instrument of politics. One such approach can be found in De-Shalit 1995. Although I am sympathetic to such a reading of policymaking that avoids objectivist or naïve-realist pitfalls, here I emphasize, following Jasanoff 2004, a co-productionist approach. The concern is more with the nuances of the relationship between science and politics: how do they shape one another and constitute each other’s condition of possibility rather.

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following question: How is science policymaking possible given the understanding that scientific facts are politically and culturally mediated? In other words, how can we avoid wrestling science policy from the democratic process and throwing it in the hands of bureaucratic institutions of technoscience?29 In the following I provide a sense about how water was dealt with during the British Mandate of Palestine (1918–1948) and the first decade of the Israeli State (1948–1959). In this section I cover a missing gap in the literature by tackling water politics under the Mandate, which has not been studied before, but constitutes the necessary background for understanding water politics and policy during the first decade of the state. I also elaborate on how water that was initially constructed as an abundant resource during the mandate era underwent a shift of perception during the first decade of the state to emerge as a scarce resource. In a number of subsections, I describe the technoscientific and political drivers for such a change. In the conclusion, drawing again on recent science policy studies, I suggest a different framework for understanding policymaking that is at once faithful to the uncertainty of scientific knowledge, but also capable of taking into account relations of power functioning in the very making of scientific facts and policy.

WATER AND JEWISH IDENTITY IN PALESTINE-ISRAEL, 1918–1959

In this section I provide a brief account of the relationship between water and Jewish identity in two historical periods, during Mandate Palestine between the mid-1930s and 1948 and in Israel during its first decade of existence, 1948–1959. Together, they help us appreciate the changing nature of the relationship between humans and their environments or, more specifically in this context, between water and identity politics. As will become apparent, the changing nature of knowledge about water is tightly coupled with its management and governance, but, also, with the changing nature of Jewish subjectivity in Palestine and Israel. More specifically, I describe how and why between the mid-1930s and 1948, the notion of water abundance became dominant among Zionist water experts, how abundance became the basis for justifying a number of technical and political options and, in the process, helped define Jewish identity in terms of immigration and settlement (the Jew is settler). Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 Following that, I describe how and why between 1948 and the late-1950s, the notion of water abundance was slowly, but surely replaced with that of scarcity. Water scarcity during this period became an important element around which technical and political actors coalesced and formed a network; it was used to justify the centralization of water technical apparatus, the centralization of water management and governance, and, in the process, was used to justify a strong, interventionist state. This

29 This should not be seen as endorsing the notion that Israel has ever been a democratic state in any substantive sense. Certainly, the democratic character of Israel is questionable and partial. The focus of this paper, rather, is to emphasize the fact that politics is not the exclusive domain of narrowly defined political actors (parties, state institutions, etc.), but that politics is also the effect of scientific and technological practices.

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network was essential for articulating Jewish subjectivity with that of citizenship of the modern nation-state.30

Water abundance, immigration, settlement, and Jewish subjectivity, mid-1930s to 1948 Despite the fact that most actors, experts and lay people alike, are convinced that water had been scarce in Palestine-Israel since time immemorial, the fact of the matter is that these perceptions changed a number of times in different directions throughout history. Most important for our concerns here is that at the eve of the establishment of the state, most Zionist scientific and political experts believed that water was an abundant resource in Mandate Palestine. Many would deservedly wonder why. Given the dominant view of water scarcity at present times, how and why did the majority of Zionist experts believe water to have been abundant in Mandate Palestine? Water became a political resource, deployed in the management of daily political relations between Zionist institutions and British Mandate authorities, increasingly since the early- to mid-1930s.31 The reason for that is more or less obvious. Even before the British occupation of Palestine started, the British Government offered the Zionist Organization its commitment to establishing a Jewish National Home in Palestine.32 After the British forces entered Palestine toward the end of 1918, they immediately recognized the Jewish community of Palestine as a political community, but limited their recognition of the Palestinians to their civil and religious rights. Increasing Jewish immigration into Palestine was the main agenda item on the Zionist Organization’s political program towards creating a Jewish National Home. This became especially the case since the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine were a small minority – by 1918 Palestinian Jewish community was below 10% of the total population.33 The British Mandate’s main objective in Palestine was also increasing Jewish immigration, but, under Palestinian pressures, linked the annual increase to what

30 Some might argue that this demonstrates that water was used as an instrument to achieve political ends. This might be true in part and in certain cases – some technical discourses, especially when produced within state bureaucracies or in strong affiliation with political organizations, tends to be used in instrumental fashion. One finds evidence for such a reading even in the Zionist and Israeli case on hand. However, I avoid this quasi conspiratorial explanation precisely because in a number of other occasions this does not hold true. As will become clearer below, the more pertinent explanation, the

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 one I choose, is that the link between science and politics is the result of a number of cultural forces and multidirectional: politics shapes science, but so does science shape politics; historical narratives, archaeological research, and biblical discourses, also shape one another, as well as science and politics. The relationship between politics and science, therefore, is under a number of pressures that identifying one in particular (for example politics) as the main determinant leads us to losing sight of other possible explanations for why things unfold the way they do. 31 This does not mean that water was never political before then in Palestine. As a matter of fact, it was an important element in determining the boundaries of Palestine in the negotiations between 1918 and 1922. However, my claim here is that water was not deployed as a strategic political resource in the management of daily relations between Zionist and British Mandate forces in Palestine until the mid-1930s. 32 For the complete text of what came to be known as the Balfour Declaration, see Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (eds.), The Israeli-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict, 5th ed. (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1995), p. 16. 33 There is a great deal of controversy over population numbers. However, none estimate the Jewish population of Palestine in 1918 to be more than 10% mark.

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came to be known as the “absorptive capacity of Palestine,” a term meant to soften, at least rhetorically, the effects of increasing Jewish immigration on the original inhabitants of Palestine.34 Palestinian rejection of Jewish immigration became increasingly vocal, especially during the mid 1930s, which forced the British to reconsider their assumptions about Jewish immigration, the absorptive capacity of Palestine, and the political aspirations of the Palestinians. The result was an increasing tension between the Zionist Organi- zation and British Mandate authorities over the ‘appropriate’ annual level of Jew- ish immigration into Palestine or, in other words, over the exact level of Palestine’s absorptive capacity. It is here that water was mobilized as an important part of what I called previously “a Zionist water network of immigration, settlement, and colonization” (Alatout 2009). For the Zionists, water was an abundant resource in Palestine that would, if used properly and utilized in agriculture, expand the absorptive capacity of Palestine. The British authorities on the other hand concluded that the water resources of Pal- estine were meager, scarce, and insufficient to support the Zionist program of open immigration into the country. Even though the particulars of these debates are not of our concern here, it would be beneficial to make at least one point. Struggles over the water balances of Palestine increasingly became shorthand for a political struggle over immigration, settlement, and colonization; over what is or is not allowable; and over which political program was legitimate. Moreover, those struggles often took the form of struggles over a number of technoscientific elements that were directly or indirectly linked to water estimates: struggles over the annual water potential in Palestine (abundance or scarcity), over the methodologies used to arrive at such estimates (theoretical-deductivist or empirical), and even over the productivity of a unit of water. By 1948 a number of hearings were conducted by Mandate authorities in order to decide British policies in Palestine. Throughout, a large number of Zionist water and political experts were interviewed and, in the process, many of the exchanges focused on water resource availability, research methods, appropriate uses, etc. The overwhelming majority of Zionist experts (see Table 1) strongly argued that the water resources of Palestine were abundant, diametrically opposed to British estimates of water resources. In addition, during the same time, a number of studies were written and published by Zionists or Zionist sympathizers on the water resources of Pal- estine describing the role water could play in expanding the absorptive capacity of Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 Palestine.35 In addition to this shift in scientific thought, water resource management and the institutions built to govern those resources became increasingly national, i.e., concentrating and organizing water management in Jewish national institutions like that of Mekorot water company established in 1937.36 This was the beginning of a shift that

34 The term “absorptive capacity” and its use in Palestine to depoliticize and technicize Jewish immigration has been treated more fully in Alatout 2009. 35 Picard 1936 and 1939; Lowdermilk 1944; Hays 1948. 36 For example, at the time Mekorot was established, two water companies were in existence, owned by different communal settlements: the Jordan River Valley Society, jointly owned by five settlements in the Jordan Valley, and the Harod Valley Water Society, owned by seven settlements in the Harod Valley. In addition, there were 16 water cooperative societies in smallholder villages.

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Table 1 Actors’ perception of water resource availability and their politics of immigration.

Estimate of Stand on Stand on the yearly water politics of absorptive capacity Actor Methodologies potential immigration of Palestine

Mandate Water Empirical 1,200 mcmy Limited Static Department immigration Zionist geophysicists Theoretical More than Open immigration Dynamic (e.g., Loendburg and deductivist 3,000 mcmy (water is already proved Stern)39 abundant) Zionist geologists Empirical More than Open immigration Dynamic (e.g., Leo Picard) 3,000 mcmy (don’t know water resources, need more funding for research)

was to solidify during the first decade of the state. Before 1937, water companies were organized on a local and regional scale only.37 The same trend of arguing in favor of abundance continued during the 1940s. The height of water research came with the publication of Walter Lowdermilk’s book, Palestine: Land of Promise. Building on a mix of biblical conceptions of Palestine, archaeological study of ruins, and soil studies, Lowdermilk argued that Palestine was capable of supporting millions of people and that recent declines in population has to do with its inhabitants – in short, Arab cultures did not allow for an agricultural way of life to thrive and led to the destruction of water ways, soil, etc. Lowdermilk’s conclusion was that Palestine should be open to Jewish immigration, not only because it can support that many immigrants, but also because those immigrants were Pales- tine’s only salvation and protection from the desert. Lowdermilk, moreover, argued for the diversion of the Jordan River in the north to the Negev desert in the south. In the late-1940s and continuing the argument of abundance, James Hays of the Tennes- see Valley Authority, built on Lowdermilk’s work and wrote a detailed engineering plan for the diversion project. In the end, water abundance became the center of a network of forces, water experts, institutions of water management, Zionist political institutions, and Zionist settlement organizations, which made its main form of knowledge the framework of

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 abundance and built in the process an understanding of Jewish subjectivity as one of immigration and settlement.38

37 This was not limited to water resources. Since 1936, when the Peel Commission’s hearings were under- way and it became clear that the Peel Commission’s report would suggest the partitioning of Palestine into two states, Jewish companies were increasingly organized on a national scale. Witness, for example, the establishment of, in addition to Mekorot, the air transportation company, Aviron Ltd., and the national employment fund, Bizur, both established in 1936. At the time, these were the only three companies organized by the Zionist national institutions: the Histadrut, the Jewish National Fund, and the Jewish Agency. 38 For a more detailed discussion of the emergence of water abundance and its relationship with Zionist politics, see Alatout 2009.

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Water scarcity, centralized state, and the citizen of the modern nation-state, 1948–1959 During the initial years of the state (1948–1952), water policymaking was entrusted to a couple of institutions. One, the more important from a political viewpoint, was the Water Department within the Ministry of Agriculture and inherited from the British Mandate. The first Israeli director of the water department was Simcha Blass, a Zion- ist water expert who was largely involved in determining a number of water policies of the Zionist organization in the pre-state era. The second institution was Mekorot Water Company.39 The Chief Engineer of Mekorot was Aaron Wiener. In a way, one cannot ask for a better expression of the tensions within Israeli water policymaking than the relationship between these two experts. It is not an exaggeration to say that Blass and Wiener were diametrically opposed on a number of issues that underscore what is important in water policymaking in Israel at the time. These can be summarized in three elements, which engendered strong debates: legitimate scientific estimates of the water potential of the state; appropriate technical structures for the management of water resources; and approaches to water resources governance. The move from an estimate of abundance to one of scarcity was, probably under- standably, contentious, at least because of the entrenched belief in water abundance in pre-state period. Faced with a commitment to opening up Israeli borders for Jewish immigration, more than doubling the state’s population by 1952, and a commitment to the dispersal of those immigrants throughout the country, but especially in the Negev desert, settlement of these immigrants became one of the most important issues facing the new Israeli state. Moreover, immigration and settlement were articulated with concerns over the state’s very sovereignty, the state’s very reason for being, expressed as the protection of its territorial integrity and security – since the early- 1930s, the assumption had been that sovereignty is ensured only when the project of Judization of empty spaces, as well as spaces inhabited by Palestinians, is fully accom- plished (Kimmerling, 1983; Tessler, 1994). Water was deemed essential for the project of immigration and settlement – basi- cally to make available water for agricultural, industrial, and domestic uses in the Negev desert and new border towns. As a matter of fact, water projects claimed up to 25% of the state’s budget until the mid-1960s. Then, it should not be a surprise that questions about water’s annual potential, technologies for managing it, and institu-

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 tions for governing its use dominated discussions until 1959. Neither should it be surprising that answers to those questions were meaningful to other questions like the sort of society that was being built in Israel, the type of state/civil society relations that were appropriate, the type of institutions of government to manage daily life, but also the type of Jewish subjectivity that is appropriate for the new emerging polity.

Water scarcity versus abundance In 1950, the Israeli cabinet convened an inter-ministerial committee to look into building a diversion scheme of the Jordan River from the north of the country to

39 Mekorot is the Hebrew word for resources.

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the northern parts of the Negev.40 The committee was unable to reach an agreement on the water potential of the state, which was deemed the most crucial question for a water policy that imagined building huge structures in the process. The conflict over the water potential of the state lasted three years with Simcha Blass leading the charge that the water potential of Israel was more than 3,000 million cubic meters per year (mcmy) and Aaron Wiener arguing that the water potential was significantly less than that. The conflict extended to accusations over how scientific or how politically motivated was each of these estimates – it boiled down to a conflict over what constitutes legitimate evidence. Blass argued that a hybrid historical, theoretical, and deductivist approach was the only legitimate scientific approach to the water potential of the state. If there is more than 10 billion cubic meters per year (bcmy) of rainfall and assuming the rate of percolation to groundwater aquifers was at least 30%, then it makes sense to assume that the water potential is at least 3,000 mcmy (Blass, 1952 and 1956). Others, led by Aaron Wiener, chose the empirical route, “the water potential is exactly the water we have access to,” argued Wiener in an interview.41 That was extremely scarce, according to Wiener, not more than 1,500 mcmy initially. What is ironic about the empiricist position Wiener took is the fact that it was that of the British Mandate Government earlier in the 1940s and was attacked by Zionist experts as unimaginative, uncreative, and empty (British Government, 1946). The presumed resolution of this impasse came through the establishment of a new water institution, Tahal Water Company for Israel (Tahal from here on) that was to take care of the planning aspects of the national project. The makeup of Tahal embodies the conflicts over the water potential: Blass was appointed Tahal’s director general and Wiener his deputy. This was short lived, however, and Blass was forced out by the end of 1953. Despite the politics of the day and the many issues that might have surrounded his resignation, I have to say that Blass’ resignation was based, at least in part, on the fact that he could not deliver: after sinking more than 200 exploratory wells throughout the state, water was empirically scarce and even he, as the head of the water apparatus in Israel, was not able to prove it otherwise. He invested his credibility as a water expert in his abundance thesis and found it difficult to survive the network of scarcity that emerged. This is despite the fact that Blass kept insisting that water resources of Israel are indeed abundant in a number of his writings and discussions until his death in July 1982.42 Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016

40 Even though the idea of diverting the Jordan River to the Negev have circulated in Zionist circles for some time, the most serious treatment of such a plan started with Walter Lowdermilk (1944), who described a general plan for a diversion scheme along the lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority, James Hays (1948) who paid more attention to technical details, and Hays and Lowdermilk (1948) that updated the Hays study. The Israeli plan for the diversion scheme was initially based on what came to be known as the Lowdermilk/Hays plan. 41 Interview with author, 1997. 42 Blass’ insistence on the abundance of the water resources of the state was repeatedly mentioned in interviews with Israeli water experts. Interviews were conducted by author with Menachem Kantor, the water commissioner of Israel between 1959 and 1977, Meir Ben Meir, the water commissioner between 1977 and 1981 and again between 1996 and 2000, and with Aaron Wiener.

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The technical apparatus of water management Debates over the water potential of the state spilled over to debates over the type of technical solutions to water policymaking. Despite the large number of technical disagreements between the two groups, one, in particular, is important for our context here: was the National Water Carrier to be a limited project of diversion that was to bring water from the Jordan River in the north to the Negev desert in the south for the purposes of settlement or was it to become a central technical apparatus through which all the water of Israel was to be managed? Blass argued for the former: the National Water Carrier should be a diversion project exclusively (for the management of the Jordan River waters) and other technical solutions should be devised on local and regional scales for managing water resources throughout the country. Wiener and others, though, thought of the National Water Carrier as a centralization project that would help solidify control over the scarce resources and guaranty their efficient use, the biggest challenge facing water policymaking from their viewpoint. As this demonstrates, uncertainty was resolved in favor of scarcity, which was then deployed to legitimize a centralized technical option. This was in contradistinction of abundance that was deployed in order to legitimize local and regional control of technical options. This was only one of the moves toward centralization in water management (extraction and distribution). Water governance, as we will see in the next section, was also subject to the same argument.

Centralizing water governance The centralization of water governance was a messy, difficult, and multifaceted process. It gained legitimacy only by the emergence of a network of scientific and political institutions, scientific experts and political actors that successfully articulated together Ben-Gurion’s political philosophy of Mamlakhtiyut and scientific conceptions of water scarcity. Mamlakhtiyut, often translated as statism, conceived of the state, not only as the institutional representation of its citizens, but also the very source of their identities. For Ben-Gurion, the state is the ultimate expression of both Jewish history and culture; it is the ultimate expression of Jewish ‘regeneration’ after years of the ‘degeneracy’ of diasporic life. Because of that, the very meaning of Jewish identity emanates from and finds expression in the state and its institutions. Jewish identity is fulfilled in a strong notion of citizenship of the modern nation-state. Most importantly, centralization of Jewish politics, in Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 contradistinction with the decentralized life of the diaspora as well as pre-state Palestine, is precisely what would enable the state to take on the historic responsibility of regeneration. Ben-Gurion and his party colleagues in Mapai often grounded the centralization project (of education, the military, population dispersal, etc.) in a general, but vague notion of scarcity (of people, of land, of natural and financial resources). Water scarcity and the centralization of water institutions were part of this project of state making.43

43 In Israel during the time, probably in other places as well, political actors like Ben-Gurion were firmly in favor of certainty: if certainty was not already present, then the state would work in order to create it. This is not surprising. After all, the state is often invested with a clear vision of identity politics that posits clear distinctions between “us” and “them”. Clarity of positions enhances the state’s ability to mobilize and control. Hints of doubt are often detrimental to state projects. Thanks for Itay Fischhen- dler for suggesting this reading to me.

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As a number of scholars (Jessop, 1990; Mitchell, 1991) have argued, the state’s character as a unified and a homogeneous project should not be taken for granted or thought to be pre-determined. Rather, it is the conclusion of diverse practices in a number of locations and policy spheres. Nor is there a guarantee that the state as a homogeneous actor will ever emerge or, in case it actually does emerge, that the state as a unified actor across all policy domains will continue to be thus. In other words, the emergence and fixity of the state is an empirical question. It depends on the struggles waged in local situations to answer certain problems – what Gramsci (1971) calls ‘war of position.’ In water policymaking, the Israeli state-as-actor can be said to have emerged and, more or less, stabilized through debates and struggles over water availability, the appropriate technical apparatus for its management, and the appropriate institutional apparatus for its government. This process came to a conclusion with the passing of the Water Law in 1959.44 Of the three institutions entrusted with water policymaking in Israel during the 1950s (the Water Department in the Ministry of Agriculture, Mekorot Water Co., and Tahal), the Office of the Water Commissioner in the Ministry of Agri- culture emerged as the most powerful, both in the formal (legal and institutional) and symbolic (its tie to agricultural settlement cooperatives and Zionist institutions that predate the state) senses of the word. In addition to consolidating and centralizing the institutional apparatus of water management, the centralization of water governance was made possible in a number of legal codes passed throughout the 1950s starting with the General Agricultural Ordinance (GAO) of 1950 and culminating in a comprehensive Water Law in 1959 (Table 2). As water scarcity took hold in technoscientific debates over water availability, legal discourse over water governance did two things: first, it progressively encoded scarcity in law and thus grounded it as the basis of policymaking (Alatout 2008), and, second, it progressively provided legitimacy for the centralization of the institutional apparatus for water management. By so doing, the Water Law did not only help solidify the notion of water as a scarce resource, but also helped define state interests and the institutions authorized to represent those interests. Of particular importance here is the comprehensive governance apparatus that defined Jewish subjectivity in terms of citizenship of the modern nation-state, subject to its surveillance, intervention, and discipline. Since the mid- to late-1950s, water scarcity became a powerful scientific construct, hegemonic given its ideological and political effects on Israeli society and the Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 region at large. The network of scarcity and centralization also became a fixture in Israeli policy and made possible the centralization of the water policy apparatus, its institutions, its technologies, and its policymaking frameworks. At the conclusion of the 1950s, Jewish identity came to be defined, at least in some circles, for the purposes of water management, and not without struggle, as that

44 See note 3 above. The same understanding I provided about abundance could be said about scarcity. While water scarcity as a concept was often put into strategic political uses, my intention here is to argue that there are multiple politico-cultural-scientific pressures that shape how politics and science are produced and what work they do. The state did not produce scarcity: it shaped the scientific and technical apparatuses that ended up producing scarcity. But, the same could be said about the technoscientific apparatus: it did not produce mamlakhtiyut; it shaped the political apparatuses of policymaking in such a way that helped mamlakhtiyut to become a dominant political concept.

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Table 2 Water regulation 1950–1959.

Water code Main objectives

General – Declared all water surface resources publically owned and entrusted with Agricultural the state Ordinance (1950) Water Drilling – Declared groundwater resources publically owned and entrusted its Control Law monitoring and control to the state (1955) Disconnected water rights from land ownership Drilling permits to be obtained from the Water Commissioner The Water Commissioner to monitor water abstracts and use Water Metering Law – Authorized the water commissioner to monitor water uses at every (1955) water source – Authorized the water commissioner to establish water tariffs Defined state interests and linked those to the water commissioner Drainage and – Extended control of the water commissioner to winter floods and waste Flood Control Law water (1957) – Authorized the Minister of Agriculture to declare drainage areas and establish drainage authorities Water Law (1959) – Extended definition of water that is public to everything including “springs, streams, rivers, lakes and other currents and accumulations of water, whether above ground or underground, whether natural, regulated or manmade, and whether water rises, flows or stands therein at all times or intermittently, and includes drainage water and sewage” – Extended the authority of the water commissioner who could intervene at any time and any place to permit, monitor, withdraw permits, define legitimate uses, change those, etc.

of citizenship of the modern nation-state – subject to its surveillance, discipline, and control.45

CONCLUSIONS

Despite the dominance of the concept of water scarcity since the late-1950s, abun-

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 dance still finds its advocates (see note 45). Uncertainty in that context remains, despite the marginalization of those who emphasize it. However, struggles over water management did not stop at the water potential; rather, since the late-1950s, they took new forms, introduced different actors, and were framed in new debates about appropriate knowledge of water resources, meaningful technical responses to water

45 This should not be taken to mean that all uncertainty disappeared or that those arguing for the notion of abundance stopped doing so. It only means that those actors and their scientific research were increasingly marginalized. A number of water experts, including, for example, Arie Issar, who was a student of Leo Picard, insisted and still do on the abundance of water resources arguing that what is needed is more funding for research. Issar himself insists that the water potential of the state ignores both renewable and non-renewable groundwater aquifers under the Negev desert. Interview by author with Arie Issar on 17 August 1997.

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challenges, and the relationship between state and citizen. This goes beyond the focus of this paper, however.46 Most importantly, those uncertainties often underwrote different technical, social, and political strategies for dealing with water management. We saw in this paper that the notions of water abundance and scarcity did not only mediate different technoscientific conceptions of the world, but also different political strategies for organizing society. Policymaking that assumes to be deploying unproblematic knowledge about the water resources is misguided at best and malevolent at worst. In this context, and for our declared purposes at the beginning of the paper, we need to answer the following question: given the political and cultural embeddedness of any “facts” about Israeli water resources – or any technoscientific facts more broadly – how can we make sure that policymaking does not become a bureaucratic process that ushers in political interests under the cloak of scientific objectivity and truth? In other words, how can we make sure that, under conditions of uncertainty and the political and cultural embeddedness of scientific knowledge, apparatuses of water management remain faithful to the democratic mandate of governance,47 to their representational responsibility of the public, no matter how that public is defined?48 I would like to suggest the work of Donna Haraway (1988) as a possible departure point. Haraway differentiates between positivist (what she calls God’s view) and relativist frameworks for understanding scientific knowledge. The first assumes scientific facts to be true, impartial, and representative of nature; the second, relativist framework, assumes all knowledge claims are politically mediated and thus equally valid. For Haraway, the second, relativist view of technoscience is a radical response to the first, but just as misguided. While the first insists on objective knowledge as truth, the second insists on the impossibility of objective knowledge altogether. For her part, however, Haraway suggests that there is a value in keeping the criteria of “objective knowledge”, but she insists that objective knowledge as such is always partial, locatable, and embodied. This in part means that objective knowledge, understood by Haraway to be “situated knowledge”, is always produced in a historically specific moment, under historically specific contingencies, and through specific actors who think, feel, and emote. Therefore, objective knowledge could be thought of as a moving target that depends on history, place, and actors.

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 46 I am in the process of completing a manuscript that addresses recent developments in Israeli water policy. 47 In a recent paper, Fischhendler and Heikkila (2010) argue, in a similar vein, that uncertainty often leads to “a path dependency that empowers players who receive benefits from maintaining the existing system.” 48 I have to repeat here, I do believe that Palestinian Israelis are often not within the purview of the Israeli state institutional apparatuses and that for the most part the ‘democratic’ process excludes their participation. It is often limited to the Jewish citizens of the state. Even though I believe paying close attention to these exclusions would shed new lights on some aspects of water knowledge and governance, they would not change the main arguments of the paper: the political embeddedness of knowledge and governance. If at all, paying attention to the Palestinian dimension in Israeli water policymaking would strengthen the conclusion. However, I chose to focus on Jewish-Jewish relations in this context precisely to demonstrate that the embeddedness of knowledge in politics does not depend on national struggles only or even primarily; rather, the political-cultural embeddedness of scientific facts is the result of the very organization of institutions of knowledge and governance.

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This could be seen as defeatist to some in policymaking circles: how can we account for all the different, often conflicting, situated knowledge(s) about water resources and still be able to know, govern, extract, and distribute water to users? Certainly, given the commitment to the notion of “situated knowledge”, there can be no one easy answer to this question. I would like, however, to offer a few suggestions, certainly not as a definitive programmatic framework, but only in the spirit of starting a conversation on a difficult subject. First, along with Haraway, I suggest that we assume that all knowledge about the water resources is partial; it is limited by a number of factors including those related to the actors producing that knowledge, their historical context, their cultural-political frameworks, their methods of arriving at facts, their affiliations and networks, etc. If knowledge is assumed to be situated in this sense, then we will be forced to search for what is overrepre- sented in, as well as what is excluded from, any scientific account. Second, I also suggest we assume that all knowledge about water resources mediates relations of power.49 This is not meant to advocate for a sinister view of knowledge production as a tool of power. Rather, it is meant to underscore the fact that knowledge is always produced in a web of relations of power resulting in “facts” that are also deployed to solidify those same relations of power. In other words, knowledge is both an effect of power and simultaneously what makes power possible. In order to build a science policy that is just and democratic, we need to pay attention to the role knowledge plays in the distribution of power. Third, and building on the first and second points, we need to make a genuine and concerted effort at engaging all of those affected by water policymaking in the process from beginning to end. But, in order to achieve this objective, we also need to have a dynamic framework that sees all elements of water policymaking as moving targets (water resources themselves, the actors involved, and the political and economic contingencies). This in the end would require continuous uncovering and enrollment of newer actors, knowledge(s), and visions. These practices might, on the one hand, inform policymaking itself, but might also point to strategic choices for academic research on water policymaking. In this latter sense, committed to a democratic mandate of policymaking, academics need these practices in order to keep a critical engagement with policymaking, one that is not only committed to investigating its [policymaking’s] technical or organizational efficiencies, but also for its effects on the just distribution of resources. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank both Robert Varady and Sharon Megdal for inviting me to participate in the Arizona-Israeli-Palestinian Water Management and Policy Workshop, held at the University of Arizona in August of 2009. I would also like to thank all participants in that workshop for their valuable comments and suggestions. Special thanks to Itay Fischhendler for reading and commenting on a previous draft, as well

49 Michel Foucault (1980) emphasizes the multiple linkages between knowledge and political power and speaks rather of knowledge/power nexus.

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as for Susanna Eden for her patience and persistence. In addition, thanks are due to those who reviewed the paper. All remaining errors are my own.

REFERENCES

Alatout, S. (2000). Water Balances in Palestine, Regional Cooperation, and the Politics of Numbers. In David Brooks and Ozay Mehmet (eds.), Water Balances in the Eastern Medi- terranean. Ottawa, Canada: IDRC Books. Alatout, S. (2006). Towards a bio-territorial conception of power: territory, population, and environmental narratives in Palestine and Israel. Political Geography 25, 6: 601–621. Alatout, S. (2008). ‘States’ of Scarcity: Water, Space, and Identity Politics in Israel, 1948–1959. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 26, 6: 959–982. Alatout, S. (2009). Bringing abundance back into environmental politics: Constructing a Zion- ist Network of Abundance, Immigration, and Colonization, 1918–1948. Social Studies of Science 39, 3: 363–394. Bijker, W., Pinch, T., & Hughes. T. (1986) The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Blass, S. (1952). Ha-Mayim BiMdinet Yisrael: Skira [Water in the state of Israel: a survey], [in Hebrew] Central Zionist Archives 5594/4707/Gimel. Blass, S. (1956). Water. The Israel Yearbook, 1956–57 (Jerusalem; Israeli Publications Ltd., 1957), pp. 103–109. Brecher, M. (1975). Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy. London: Oxford University Press. De-Shalit, A. (1995). From the Political to the Objective: The Dialectics of Zionism and Envi- ronment. Environmental Politics, 4, no. 1: 70–87. Feitelson, E. (2006). Impediments to the management of shared aquifers: A political economy perspective. Hydrogeography 14: 319–29. Fischhendler, I. & Heikkila, T. (2010). Does Integrated Water Resources Management Support Institutional Change? The Case of Water Policy Reform in Israel. Ecology and Society 15, 1: 4. http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss1/art4/ Foucault, M. (1980). Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings [edited by Colin Gordon]. New York: Pantheon Books. Gramsci, A. (1971). Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers. Haraway, D. (1988). Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism as a Site of Dis- course on the Privilege of Partial Perspective. Feminist Studies 14, 3: 575–599. Hays, J. (1948). T.V.A. on the Jordan: Proposals for Irrigation and Hydroelectric Development in Palestine. D.C. Commission on Palestine Surveys.

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 Jasanoff, S. (1990). The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Jasanoff, S. (1995). Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Jasanoff, S. (2004). States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order. New York: Routledge. Jessop, B. (1990). State Theory: Putting the Capitalist States in their Place. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania University Press. Kimmerling, B. (1983). Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley. Laster, R. (1976). The Legal Framework for the Prevention and Control of Water pollution in Israel. Jerusalem: Ministry of the Interior. Latour, B. (1993). We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Latour, B. (2004). Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Latour, B. & Woolgar, S. (1979). Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts. Princ- eton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lowi, M. (1993). Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lowdermilk, W. (1944). Palestine: Land of Promise. New York. Harpers & Brothers Publishers. Menachem, G. (2000). Water policy in Israel: policy paradigm, policy networks, and public policy. In eds. D. Nachmias & G. Menahem, Public Policy in Israel. Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute. Mitchell, T. (1991). The limits of the state: beyond statist approaches and their critics. The American Political Science Review 85, 1: 77–96. Tessler, M. (1994). A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Indianapolis: Indiana Univer- sity Press. Wolf, A. (1995). Hydropolitics Along the Jordan River: The Impact of Scarce Water Resources on the Arab Israeli Conflict. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016

IIHESHAE0_Book.indbHESHAE0_Book.indb 8989 111/20/20121/20/2012 1:14:511:14:51 PMPM Chapter 6 Water pricing in Israel in theory and practice

Yoav Kislev

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the world, water prices reflect local laws and institutions for water delivery. Some places, such as Israel, manage and price water in a largely centralized way, others, such as Arizona, approach management and pricing in a more decentralized manner. This chapter reviews water management and regulation in Israel, presents basic theoretical elements, and surveys the practice of water pricing in Israel. The discussion points out the challenges associated with pricing water to reflect its scarcity in these growing, water-short regions.

THE WATER SECTOR

The particular characteristics of the water sector in Israel affect its pricing policy: water in natural sources is scarce and a single water system supplies most of the users in urban centers and agriculture. This chapter presents the basic economic approach to water pricing and surveys the application of the principles in the real world. It starts with a short description of the water sector and its institutions. Israel is a small and narrow country (Figure 1); half of its area is a desert. Precipi- tation, which falls only in the winter months, averages more than 700 mm per year in the north and less than 35 mm in the southern tip of the country. The core functions of the water sector have been to store water from winter for use in the summer and from rainy years to dry ones, and to carry water from the north to the center and the south. Two sources have been added recently to the country’s water supply: When population expanded and urbanization grew, treated and recycled sewage was added to supply, mostly for use in agriculture, but with smaller amounts also allocated to natural habitats. More recently, desalinated seawater has become a significant source of water. Table 1 presents information, for 2008, on sources and users of water. Fresh water is stored in the Sea of Galilee (Lake Kinneret in Hebrew, labeled “Lake Tiberias” in Figure 1) in the north and in several groundwater reservoirs; the largest two are the Mountain Aquifer and the Coastal Aquifer. The Mountain Aquifer is located mostly under the West Bank from a point south of Nazareth to Beer Sheva (political borders are marked in Figure 1 by broken dotted lines). The Coastal Aquifer stretches along the Mediterranean from a point south of Haifa to Gaza. The National Water Project (Carrier) is a system of conduits running west and south from the Sea

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LEBANON LEGEND SYRIA Litani R. Dan R. National Water-Carrier Banias R. Local Water Projects

Pumping Stations Hasbani R.

Chloride Water Jordan Eshed Kinrot Carrier Pumping station HAIFA Lake Oishon R. Tiberias TIBERIAS

Yarmuk R. NAZARETH Kinneret-Beit Shan conduit W. Ya bs i BEIT SHEAN Kunneret-Negev Conduit

W. Rajib NABLUS Wadi al-Zarqa Ya r q o n TEL AVIV YAFO East Yarqon-Negev Pipeline AMMAN Jordan R. W. Shuaib REHOVOT W. K a f r e i n JERICHO JERUSALEM West Yarqon-Negev JORDAN Pipeline

Dead Sea GAZA HEBRON Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016

BEER-SHEVA

SEDOM

Figure 1 A Map of Israel and the National Project. (Source: Kliot, nurit, water resources and conflicts in the middle east, routledge, 1994.)

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Table 1 Water Provision, 2010, Million Cubic Meters.

Agriculture Industry Urban Others Total

Freshwater 476 95 687 95 1353 Recycled 414 414 Brackish 165 35 2 – 202 Floodwater 45 45 Total 1100 130 689 95 2014

Source: Water Authority. Notes: Of the freshwater, 300 MCM (million cubic meters) were supplied from desalinated seawater and 24 MCM were desalinated brackish water, mostly in the southern tip of the country. The category “Others” includes transfers to the Kingdom of Jordan (49 MCM) and areas of the Palestinian Authority.

of Galilee and connecting most of the sources and users of water in the country in a single grid. Two thirds of the water in Israel is supplied by the largest, government owned utility, Mekorot Co. The company also operates the National Project. The other suppliers are private well owners, municipalities, and regional cooperatives. Municipalities are required to collect and treat their sewage and several cities have cooperative projects with agricultural interests in their vicinity. The metropolitan area of Tel Aviv, where the majority of the population is concentrated, supplies recycled water to the western Negev. The last several years were particularly dry, since 2005 reservoirs’ recharge has been lower than average, water was in short supply and farmers and households were called to reduce consumption. These developments – and the worry that they may have heralded a lasting climate change – hastened the construction of seawater desalination plants along the Mediterranean coast. Three relatively large plants are already operating and provide close to 300 MCM of water to the national grid. A fourth plant is under construction and a fifth is in advanced planning stages. Trying to avoid the concentration of economic power in Mekorot, the first four plants were constructed and will be operated by private interests. Only the fifth desalination plant is scheduled to be built by a subsidiary of the national water company. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016

INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATION

As natural resources, the water reservoirs are common pool resources. Under open access individuals tend to behave as free riders: that is, they withdraw water so long as it is beneficial for their own use disregarding the detrimental effect that their extraction has on other users of the reservoirs (for example, by lowering water levels or drawing in saline ocean water). Under such circumstances, the resource will be depleted. In addition, in Israel suppliers are monopolies, particularly Mekorot. (Actually they are local monopolies, each in its area of supply.) These features call for government intervention. Accordingly, the Water Law (1959) stipulates that all water sources in the country are publicly owned; there is no private ownership of water. A government

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agency is responsible for the utilization and the sustainability of the resources. The law requires measurement of all uses of water. This means that wells and pumps are monitored and consumers – households, manufacturers, farmers, and others – pay by the volume of water they use. Two far-reaching reforms took place in the water economy in the last ten years. One was the removal of urban water provision from the control of municipal governments and the other was a restructuring of the sector’s regulatory body.

Water and wastewater corporations In the past, municipalities were responsible for water and wastewater services in their areas of jurisdiction. A great share of the water supplied in urban areas was purchased from Mekorot and smaller shares came from wells owned and operated by the cities themselves. The municipalities collected one-time connection fees to cover capital outlays in water and sewage systems and bimonthly charges for their operating costs. Activities in water and wastewater were integrated with all other local services and it was often convenient to neglect the expensive maintenance of the water systems and to divert money collected for water to seemingly more urgent needs. The results were infrastructure breakage, interruption of supply, and leakage – particularly of sewage. To amend this situation, the responsibility for the provision of water and wastewater services in urban areas was shifted from the local governments to new independent corporations. The new entities were and, in many cases, still are owned by the municipalities, but they may eventually be transferred to private hands. The law establishing the new entities was passed in 2001, but, despite the encouragement of the national government, the reform has been gradual, and is still not complete as of August 2010. Significant improvements in the services were recorded in several of the cities in which the new corporations took over. However, difficulties should also be expected, particularly in socially and economically weak localities where management will not be efficient and customers’ payments will seldom cover cost. These problems will have to be solved in the coming years.

The water authority Although Mekorot is regarded as the national water company, it is not the only water provider. There is thus no single utility enterprise that can be seen as responsible for Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 water and wastewater services in the country. As a result, the government cannot limit its role to conventional economic regulation, such as done, for example, by The Water Services Regulation Authority in England and Wales (Ofwat, 2010). In Israel, apart from being the economic regulator, the government is also involved in management and long run planning of the water economy. These duties affect the structure and the activities of the agency in charge of the sector. The original 1959 Water Law entrusted the management and regulation of the water economy to a single individual, the Water Commissioner. He was assisted by the staff of the Water Commission, a government agency comprising two professional departments – Hydrology and Planning – and an administrative body responsible for the allocation and overseeing of withdrawal permits, allotments in agriculture and industry, and the promotion of development of the sector including, recently, the desalination plants.

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Table 2 Areas of responsibility in the water economy.

National economy Urban sector

Resources + Economic ++

The law gave the Commissioner a wide range of powers; however, it also left many dimensions of the water sector to the responsibility of others. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture allocated quotas to farmers; municipalities, including their water services, were controlled by the Ministry of the Interior; and the Treasury set prices, but parliamentary committees were also often active in the determination of water tariffs. The multiplicity of participants in decisions on water issues was seen as detrimental to efficient management of the sector and, when difficulties in reforming urban water economies were encountered, the government proposed to modify the Water Law and restructure the underlying institutional setting. A new law, which went into effect in 2007, abolished the position of the Commis- sioner and established a Governmental Authority for Water and Sewage headed by a Director. It also established a Council of the Water Authority, whose members are the Director of the Authority, officials from several government ministries, and two members to act as representatives of the public (appointed by ministers). The Author- ity, with its Director, can be seen as the executive branch of the water regulation body, while the Council acts as its legislative branch. The Council decides on water allocation and tariffs and is expected to assist the director in executing government’s policy in the water sector. The new, reformed law expanded significantly the area of responsibility of the new regulatory body. Table 2 clarifies this division of responsibility. In the table, the resources are the water reservoirs, and they – including those exploited by urban pro- viders – belong to the national water economy. The desalination plants can be seen as part of the resources or, and perhaps better, as outside suppliers from which the water sector purchases inputs. The economic row in the table stands for economic and business regulation: Mekorot in the national economy and the city corporations in the urban sector. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 In his time, the Water Commissioner was responsible only for the regulation of the resources and their utilization. He permitted water withdrawal and controlled its allocation. He also promoted new projects and development. His involvement in price setting was minimal. This has changed; the Water Authority is now responsible for all three marked cells in Table 2. The formerly independent regulator of the urban corporations was absorbed in the new Authority and it (its Council) was also given the duty and power to decide on tariffs. As the economic regulator, it also oversees investments in Mekorot and the urban corporations. In addition to its responsibility for the water sector in Israel, the Authority is also in charge of supplying water, according to treaties, to areas of the Palestinian Authority and the Kingdom of Jordan. Israel has been criticized for blocking the access of Palestinians to water sources. The Water Authority rightfully claims that it

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is not only honoring the signed agreement (Oslo Treaty) but providing more than the stipulated supply (Water Authority, 2009). Others think that, in this case, adhering to the written letter is not enough (Kislev, 2008): it is the duty of the government of Israel, responsible for the Palestinian areas, to provide the local population with water services similar to the services that households in Israel enjoy.

Two allocation problems There are two major allocation problems in water: a. allocation of extraction: where, when and how much to withdraw; b. allocation of water for utilization and consumption. The two problems are distinct, although the Israeli law obscures the distinction. The criterion for extraction of water is sustainability of the resource. The role of the Water Authority is to guard the long run stability of the quantity and quality of the nation’s water resources. Fulfilling this role may require decisions on each source and well separately, depending on local hydro-geological circumstances. Accordingly, the law specifies that water may be withdrawn only under an extraction permit issued by the Authority. The criterion for the allocation of water for consumption and utilization is efficiency; that is, the maximization of economic welfare from the use of water. The discussion turns now to basic economic principles of water allocation.

WATER PRICING: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The next four subsections present, by example, the basic theoretical framework for water pricing and allocation. They will be followed by surveys of cost and water tariffs in Israel.

Allocation of water from a single spring Consider a region with a single spring irrigating the fields of two farms. The water flows to the fields on its own with no need for energy or labor. The water yield of the spring, the annual quantity, is limited. A regional planner attempts to maximize the “national income” of the region, the sum of income in the farms. Water allocation that achieves this goal is depicted in Figure 2: the total yield of the spring, the quantity c, is divided such that the value of the marginal product (VMP) of water in the fields Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 of farm A is identical to the corresponding value in farm B. (The curve D is the horizontal sum of the VMP curves in the individual farms.) The following discussion will deal with methods of allocation. The discussion relates to methods applicable for a large number of water users and the reference to two farms is used only to exemplify the principles. In places where the number of users is actually small – for example, in water cooperatives – the arguments may be modified. One may think of three distinct methods of allocation.

1 Allocation by quotas: farm A will receive a CM (cubic meters) of water per year, farm B will receive b CM; 2 Allocation by prices: with the price p farmer A will take a CM per year and farmer B will take b CM;

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NIS

Per

VMP VMP

a b c Water Farm A Farm B Spring

Figure 2 Water from a spring.

3 A market: the initial allocation will be arbitrary (but not more than the total available in the spring, c) and the farmers will trade the water. The one who received more water, relative to the VMP on the farm, will sell; the other farmer will buy.

With quota allocation the planner has to know exactly the VMP schedule on each and every farm. Where allocation is by prices, the planner has to know only the market-clearing price. This price can be discovered by trial and error. If the price is set too high, there will be under-utilization of the spring’s water and income will not be maximized. The price will then be lowered. Prices have an additional advantage over quotas: they are not personal; they do not allow discrimination; and they constrain the rule of bureaucracy. In principle, market allocation (item 3) may be as efficient as allocation by prices. But the initial allocation of the water is an allocation of wealth. This raises policy questions regarding how it should be determined. Where property rights in water were determined in the past and are by now a given fact, the creation of a water market is a solution for efficient allocation (Trading water may, however, raise legal and social issues that are not discussed in this chapter). Where water is a common Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 resource, the property of the public at large, price allocation is more appropriate.

Scarcity value, price, and extraction levy Given that the total yearly quantity of water is c CM, if water use in farm A is expanded by one CM, allocation in farm B will be reduced by one CM. The reduction in production on farm B will then be the cost of water use on farm A. Symmetrically, the cost of water added on farm B is reduced production on A. This cost is an opportunity cost – the loss of output in an alternative allocation of water. Cost in economics is always opportunity cost: the cost of energy in water transportation is an opportunity cost and so also the cost of labor on the farm, since energy and labor utilized on one farm are not used on another and do not contribute there to production. For conven-

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ience, despite all costs being opportunity costs, we shall term cost incurred by conventional inputs “cost of purchased factors.” Among the purchased factors are all the inputs, including labor and capital – only water in its sources is treated separately. In the example of the spring presented above, in which the water flows on its own to the fields of farms A and B, the opportunity cost is also the scarcity value of the water (the marginal scarcity cost). A scarcity value emerges because of water being constrained by nature to the quantity c. As this is less than the combined demand for the resource, the water is scarce. With a larger yield of water in the spring, scarcity cost is smaller; where water yield is very large, relative to its value in production, scarcity cost is zero. In Figure 2, if allocation is by prices, the price p in money units per CM is the scarcity price. Deduction of one CM from the spring’s water will reduce output by an amount the value of which is p. Sometimes this price is also termed the social cost because the reduction of output is a reduction in the product of the society (farms A and B are both parts of the society). The price p is set in some places as the extraction levy or the pumping tax. It transmits to water users the scarcity cost of water and they, the users, may decide on their own how much water to take. A social planner does not know in detail the contribution of water on the farms and there is no need for him to be involved in on-farm decisions. With the right price, the farmers will take the right quantities, they take the social cost into their own private consideration; they internalize it. The question now arises, with price allocation the farmers will pay p dollars per CM, whom will they pay in a region that enjoys the benefit of the spring water? If the water belongs to the public, the payment for the water also belongs to the public. In such a case the payment will be to the government’s budget, to the state treasury. The objection often heard of money going to the government instead of to the public (the “people”) is meaningless in a democracy, as the budget of the government is the budget of the public at large. It is worth observing that the opportunity cost, and any other concept of cost, is meaningful only when water allocation is optimal – when income is maximized – as in the diagram. If, as an example, allocation in the region is arbitrary and farm A received more water than in Figure 2 and farm B received less, the concept of opportunity cost is empty since it is possible, with an alternative allocation, to increase output at no cost and without adding water to the region. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 Purchased inputs The analysis is now modified. Assume that cost of water supply is not zero but MC1 as in Figure 3. The symbol MC was chosen to emphasize marginal cost (when marginal cost is constant, as in Figure 3, it is equal to the average cost). MC1 is the cost of the purchased inputs. The introduction of purchased inputs has, however, not modified the appropriate price of water, it is still p. But now the scarcity cost (the efficient extraction levy, if applied) is p-MC1. The general definition is: the marginal scarcity cost is the opportunity cost (value of marginal productivity) minus the cost of purchased inputs, provided the difference is positive. If the difference is negative, the scarcity cost is zero. Thus in Figure 3, if the cost of purchased inputs is MC2, the farmers will not take all the spring’s water and the scarcity cost will be zero.

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NIS

Per

MC2

MC1 D

C water

Figure 3 Supply of water from a spring with purchased inputs.

Withdrawal from a reservoir The total quantity of water in the Coastal aquifer in Israel is estimated to be 20 billion CM, annual withdrawal (safe yield, sustainable withdrawal) is roughly 300 million CM per year; that is, less than 2% of the stock. Annual safe yield is determined by annual recharge. Once the safe yield is set, it should be taken as the annual yield of the spring – a constant magnitude. (Replenishment fluctuates widely. Safe yield for a stable supply will therefore be less than average yearly replenishment.) If demand is relatively high, water is scarce, the allocation problem is identical to the problem depicted in Figure 3. If priced efficiently, the water from the reservoir will be priced according to the opportunity cost, Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 which is the sum of the cost of purchased inputs and scarcity cost. It is often stated that the scarcity cost of water is determined by the tradeoff between generations. This is true where water is “mined”, where withdrawal exceeds replenishment and the quantity in the reservoir is depleted. Water used in this generation reduces the amount that will be available to the next. This, however, is not the case where withdrawal is limited to the safe yield, in which case scarcity value is not affected by intergenerational considerations. (An exception related to the quality of water is here disregarded.) It should be noted that, for simplicity, the discussion is conducted in ideal terms, assuming that the same quantity of water will be supplied year in and year out and the corresponding price will also be kept constant over-time. This price will be set such that all (safe yield) water will be taken and used efficiently. It is often stated that the

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function of the price is to conserve or save water. This is not accurate. The primarily role of setting an economically appropriate price is to direct producers (and consumers) to utilize water efficiently. If the price is set comparatively high, to reduce water use, income (welfare) will be reduced. As an example, examine Figure 3; if a price equal to MC2 is set, when the cost of purchased inputs is MC1, the total quantity used will be smaller than c and some of the spring’s water will not be taken. Its value will be wasted. So also in a reservoir such as the Coastal Aquifer in which water flows to the sea, a price set too high will cause too much water to be drained to the sea. This is a waste. A price that saves water, over and above its efficient use, causes waste. The purpose of prices is not to save water but to inform the users about the marginal social cost of the resource.

THE EVOLUTION OF WATER COSTS IN ISRAEL

Figure 4 depicts the major features of the evolution of cost in the water economy of Israel. The horizontal axis traces the development of the water economy; both its technical expansion – from local withdrawals to distance supply, and then to seawater desalination – and historically, from the establishing of the State to the present and to future expected developments. As seen in Figure 4, the cost of local production is 0.12 US dollars per CM, while the cost of water supplied by the national project is $0.35. Desalinated seawater costs $0.60 per CM. (The numbers are not exact or average costs; they are approximate values used for illustration.) These are the costs of purchased inputs. Where is scarcity cost? This cost varies along the X axis; that is, through time. Examine, as an example, the situation in 1970 (the demand curve marked 1970 represents approximately the situation in that year). There is local withdrawal in the Coastal region and, in addition, water is moved from Lake Kinneret southward. A simple way to calculate the scarcity value of the water in the Coastal Aquifer is to compute the difference between the cost of water brought by the National Project and that of local production; that is, $0.23 per CM (0.35–0.12). This calculation is based on the assumption of an equilibrium prevailing in the coastal region: the users of water in the region pay $0.35 per CM and this is also the VMP on their farms. Therefore, the opportunity cost (total cost) is $0.35 per CM and the scarcity cost, as seen above, is the total cost minus the cost of purchased inputs. This magnitude, $0.23 per CM will therefore be the efficient extraction levy in the Coastal Aquifer. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 What is the scarcity cost in Lake Kinneret? Let’s start with 1970; by the assumption underlying Figure 4, we have not made use in this year of all the available water. The situation in the lake was then like the situation depicted in Figure 3 with purchased cost MC2, the scarcity cost of the lake’s water was then zero. It will be $0.25 per CM in 2015 (60–35).

PRICES AND LEVIES

There are three major sets of water prices in Israel: prices for fresh and recycled water supplied by Mekorot, prices charged in the urban sector, prices charged by “private” suppliers – mostly regional cooperatives. In addition, payments are collected

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$/CM Local National Desalination supply Project

Supply 0.60

2015

0.45

0.35 2001 1960

1970 0.12

600 1,550 MCM/Year

Figure 4 Three epochs in the water economy.

for sewage services and extraction levies are imposed on water withdrawn from the reservoirs – Lake Kinneret and the aquifers. The private entities charge to cover their cost. Tariffs for Mekorot and urban water are set administratively. In the past, these prices did not necessarily cover costs. Their determination was somewhat arbitrary, influenced by political considerations. Gaps between cost and revenue were covered for Mekorot by the state budget and in the urban sector from municipal sources (or surpluses in the water account were added to the general revenue of the municipalities). Today total cost of water and sewage services, in Mekorot and the urban corporations, is covered by prices collected from users. Details are presented below. It should be noticed, that although the principle of cost recovery is maintained in water provision, there still exists substantial government support in the sector. The state budget finances investment in recycling projects, in new urban corporations, in sewage systems in poor localities, and more. These aspects of the water economy are

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Prices in agriculture

Freshwater The prices farmers pay to Mekorot for freshwater are of increasing block rate. Each agricultural consumer is allotted a quota and, as of 2010, the prices are (calculated at the exchange rate of NIS 3.80 per $1.00): First block, 50% of the quota $0.36 per CM Second block, next 30% 0.42 Third Block 0.55

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The quotas were set many years ago and they have not changed much since. In dry years, farmers may be limited to take only part of the quota, but the price structure does not change. A “water consumer” in agriculture is a private farmer, a kibbutz (communal village), or a moshav (cooperative village). In the last case, individual operators in the cooperative are not constrained privately by quotas, the coop may distribute the Moshav’s allotment and charge the members as it sees fit. By an agreement between the government and representatives of the farmers, water prices will gradually rise until they reach average cost of supply including the cost of purchased desalinated water. It is expected that by 2015 prices will be 50% higher than today.

Recycled effluent Treated urban sewage is mostly used in agriculture. Mekorot operates two large recycling plants, near Tel Aviv and near Haifa, and several smaller facilities. All others are owned and run by local operators, mostly regional agricultural cooperatives. Meko- rot’s price for recycled effluent is $0.21 per CM. The construction of private facilities is subsidized, aiming to set cost equal to Mekorot’s charges. (The idea is that individual farmers will pay the same price whether their effluent is provided by Mekorot or by a regional cooperative.)

Extraction levies The prices farmer pay Mekorot are the same throughout the country. Consequently, the cost of water to well owners and those pumping directly from rivers or Lake Kinneret may be significantly lower than to their neighbors who receive water from the national system. To ameliorate this situation, in the past the government operated an Equaliza- tion Fund: low cost water users paid into the fund and high cost users were on the receiving end. In fact, most of the payment went to Mekorot; since the company supplied to remote and hilly areas. This policy was modified ten years ago. Extraction levies replaced payments to the Equalization Fund. In principle, extraction levies are to be set equal to scarcity rents and they may vary according to locality and source of water. In reality, the levies are not always set as pure economic theory would dictate. However, they do differ geographically and by sector, they also vary by quantity, season, and precipitation. Farmers in the coastal area who withdraw aquifer water pay block rate levies: Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 First block, 25% of the withdrawal license $0.02 per CM Second block, additional 55% 0.27 Third block 0.41 Farmers in other areas, particularly farmers who draw their water from rivers and Lake Kinneret, pay much lower rates. Some of these are higher in dry years and lower in rainy times.

The urban sector Much of the work of the Water Authority in the last couple of years has been on tariffs for the urban water and wastewater corporations. By law these tariffs have to

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cover cost and the original intention of the Authority was to set locality-specific prices to reflect local cost. These intentions, published in preparation for public hearing before the Council of the Water Authority, encountered harsh criticism in the media and strong opposition in political circles. Accepting the criticism, the new price schedules set for the urban corporations in 2010 are identical, the same prices for each and every corporation. Customers in municipalities that have as yet not transferred their water services to independent corporations, pay similar rates. Like farmers, households pay corporations block-rate tariffs. The first block is for a “basic quantity” of 3.5 MC per person per month (7 CM in a single person household). The second block is for additional amounts. Basic quantity $2.27 per CM Additional amount $3.65 per CM Most offices and institutions pay only the higher rate. These rates cover both water and sewage services and they include a 16% value added tax. As indicated, internal costs of water and wastewater services in the corporations vary markedly, but customers pay identical prices. To have the corporations cover just costs, not making profits or suffering losses, Mekorot prices for bulk quantities, at the city gate, are set differentially. Low cost corporations pay Mekorot per unit of water more than others. The range of tariffs is between $0.80 and $1.50 per CM of water provided to residential users (price for water the corporations transfer to other users may differ slightly). Two items on the tariff schedules have not been finalized when the tariffs were originally set: Charges for capital outlays and extraction levies. As indicated, municipalities collected from homes and buildings one-time connection levies to cover investment in water and sewage infrastructure. The Water Author- ity Council attempted to replace these levies with a capital outlay component in the price per CM. The municipal water corporations protested, arguing that they will lack funds for new developments, and, following heated debates, the Council postponed the implementation of idea for one year. The inclusion of capital outlays in the price of water, if accepted, will add $0.21 per CM to the rates quoted above. Households currently served by the corporations, those who had paid the levy when they were connected, will be exempt from the payment for 14 years. Fifteen percent of the water provided in the urban sector is withdrawn from wells owned by municipalities or by the water corporations. When deciding on new prices, Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016 the Water Authority Council set extraction levies for locally withdrawn water so that its cost is similar to the cost of water purchased by the corporations from Mekorot. By law the levies, considered as taxes, have to be approved by a parliamentary committee. They have been approved with a delay of ten months. These two delays are indications of the difficulties the Water Authority and its Council face and can be expected to face as they attempt to implement the restructuring of the urban water sector.

Cross-subsidization Prices households paid in the past for water supplied by municipalities were also of the block rate schedule. Large families received larger allotments at the lower rate. Since

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many of the large families were also poor, richer and smaller households supported poorer and larger ones. This was internal municipal cross subsidization. A problem with this kind of support is that some cities are inhabited mostly by poor and large families while the population in others constitutes mostly well to do and small families. Consequently, the few relatively “rich” of the poor towns supported their poor neighbors while the real rich of the better situated cities supported the few poor families residing among them. The shift to independent corporations brought this problem to light and its recognition was behind the suggestion of the Water Authority to set locality specific prices for Mekorot water. In other words, locality specific prices will prevail even when (and if) all corporations reach the same level of efficiency and have identical internal costs. (The complicated price structure could be avoided if tariffs were not set at block rates and only one price was charged. But this simple solution was politically unacceptable.) In the past, the prices Mekorot charged did not cover the cost of provision and the government supported the company regularly from state budgets. Now, the tariffs are set so that the total payment the company collects covers all its costs (Mekorot is not charged extraction levies). In fact, urban consumers cover part of the cost of supplying water to agriculture. The Water Authority estimates that this cross subsidization element adds $0.24 per CM to urban water price. When farm prices rise in the coming years, as agreed, urban prices may be lowered. Once this is done, water prices to the agricultural sector will not be supported any more. However, as in the urban sector, farm prices are and will be cross-subsidized internally: Mekorot charges identical prices from all users in agriculture and farmers in low cost areas support water provision to their high cost colleagues.

REFERENCES

Kislev, Yoav. (2008). Water in the Palestinian Localities, http://departments.agri.huji.ac.il/economics/yoav-home.html Ofwat. (2010). The Water Services Regulation Authority, http://ofwat.gov.uk/ State of Israel, Water Authority. (2009). Water Issues Between Israel and the Palestinians, http://www.water.gov.il/ Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:32 12 October 2016

IIHESHAE0_Book.indbHESHAE0_Book.indb 104104 111/20/20121/20/2012 1:14:541:14:54 PMPM Chapter 9 Water, land, and development: Comparative Arizona – Israeli- Palestinian perspective

Christopher Scott, Jean-Philippe Venot and François Molle

INTRODUCTION

Water and land for expanding human settlements frame differential processes of “development” across the regions considered in this volume. Aridity, relative scarcity of both water and land, urban growth pressures on existing water uses, and expanding water reuse are shared challenges in Arizona, Israel, and Palestine. The Southwest United States, centered on the state of Arizona, relies heavily on Colorado River basin surface water and continues to makes intensive use of groundwater for agriculture and expanding urban water demands. Transboundary asymmetries in water endowments, management capacities, and legal frameworks place Arizona in a complex institutional and policy environment, particularly over water resources shared with neighboring basin states and with Mexico. Here, land is scarce not in an absolute sense but the high proportion of public lands held by federal and state governments creates unique geographical patterns of real estate development. Analogously, though with important differences explored in this chapter, Israel and Palestine depend both physically and institutionally on Jordan River basin surface- and groundwater resources as well as the Mediterranean Coastal Aquifer. Power asymmetries that are rooted in political and economic histories result in differential water access and endowments. Land, which has a unique security logic and is constrained physically and by political- cultural geographies, and access to water together shape the past and future development of the region in fundamental ways.

COMPARATIVE PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHIES

Arid regions around the world are faced with scarce water resources. This basic challenge tests societal innovation to sustain economic development and demographic growth, and as result, it may lead to social and political tensions and even conflict. However, because of the fundamental nature of human and environmental needs for water, scarcity also drives technological and institutional innovation. Meeting water needs may provide a powerful incentive for cooperation if development is pursued multilaterally. And mutually beneficial outcomes for all stakeholders can proceed from shared agendas.

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In the pursuit of multiple social, economic, and environmental objectives where water is a limiting resource, land and development pressures exert constraints on the decision-set available for water policy. The spatial location of land with respect to available water and with respect to multiple water demands, coupled with the type of development (for agriculture, human habitation and urbanization, cultural and heritage assets, and ecosystem services) creates a complex landscape of multiple claims and conflicts, options for their resolution, and potential pitfalls. Climate is a common driver of water scarcity across both the Southwestern North America and the Western Asian regions. Inter-tropical convergence zone processes limit atmospheric moisture and precipitation, while incident solar radiation and high temperatures result in elevated potential evapotranspiration (ET). The seasonality and amount of precipitation differ between the two regions (and within each region, it is based largely on elevation) as shown in Figure 1. The winter-dominated precipitation in Israel and Palestine means greater surface runoff and groundwater recharge during this season when ET is low (Aliewi, this volume). Precipitation is concentrated in the mountains of Palestine, leaving the large urban coastal centers (Tel Aviv and Gaza) to rely on water transfers and aquifers suffering from areas of increasing salinity. By comparison, Arizona receives less precipitation in total (particularly the central and southern portions where the population centers of Phoenix and Tucson are located), plus it is timed primarily in the summer monsoon when ET is high, resulting in lower physical water availability (Garfin et al., 2007). Based on dual rationales of inadequate local sources of water and competing claims over more distant strategic supplies, Arizona and Israel have constructed ambitious long-distance water conveyance projects. The Central Arizona Project (CAP) transports Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:36 12 October 2016

Figure 1 Average precipitation and temperature for Arizona and Israel/Palestine. (Note: maps at same scale to provide comparative perspective on land areas.)

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1.5 million acre-feet (MAF), equivalent to 1,850 million cubic meters (MCM), of Colo- rado River water annually to urban and agricultural users, and Native American communities in central and southern Arizona (see also Kupel, this volume). In 1963, as a result of decades of negotiation, political activity, and litigation the Lower Colorado River Basin’s 7.5MAF (9,260 MCM) share of the river’s water was finally allocated: 4.4 MAF (5,430 MCM) annually to California. 2.8 MAF (3,450 MCM) to Arizona, and 0.3 MAF (370 MCM) to Nevada. A 1944 treaty between the United States and Mexico to share surface waters along their entire border required 1.5 MAF (1,850 MCM) annually be delivered to Mexico on the Colorado River. Arizona is thus sub- jected to significant competition for water. More recently, extended hydrological monitoring records and tree-ring reconstructions of paleoclimatic conditions indicate that the estimate of average annual supply used to calculate the Upper and Lower Basins’ allocations of 7.5 MAF each together with Mexico’s 1.5 MAF, totaling 16.5 MAF (20,350 MCM) annually, may have been accurate in 1922 when the compact was signed, but is significantly higher than the longer-term average flow of 13.5 MAF (16,650 MCM). The completion of Israel’s National Water Carrier (NWC) in 1964 meant a dras- tic modification of the drainage network of the region. It diverts 100–500 MCM (81–405 thousand acre-feet) annually, according to the supply and demand situation, from Lake Tiberius to southern and western Israel and supplies large urban centers along the Mediterranean coast and one of the most intensive and modern agricultural sectors in the world. The CAP and the NWC are classic examples of critical infrastructure, on which human water demands and uses depend and around which water management and policy discourse is centered. In both cases, imported surface water may offset groundwater use through conjunctive management in specific locations; however, reducing groundwater dependence by using surface water is mediated by access. In other words, CAP and NWC surface water supplies are concentrated both spatially and in social and political terms. Although the NWC is operated to conjunctively manage surface- and groundwater, and CAP surface supplies may permit “groundwater savings” and even be used for direct recharge and recovery, there remain users in both regions that exclusively rely on groundwater. In Arizona, this is compounded by the particular configuration of Active Management Areas (AMAs), created after the 1980 Groundwater Management Act, which itself was the quid pro quo for federal political and financial support for the CAP. Land development without CAP access and for communities outside the AMAs is heavily concentrated on groundwater. Most of Palestine relies on wadis (intermittent streams) and the eastern Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:36 12 October 2016 aquifer of the West Bank (Abu-Madi, 2010). This aquifer is viewed by Israel in strategic terms to further secure its water supply.

POPULATION, CONSTRUCTED LANDSCAPE AND AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS

Access, control, and management of water are fundamentally about land development. In this respect, the two regions show some marked contrasts. From a crude population density perspective, Arizona (with 22 people/km2) faces none of the same pressures as Israel (329 people/km2) or Palestine (732 people/km2). These figures belie somewhat the spatial densities of concentrated urban development (e.g.,

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Maricopa, Pinal, and Pima counties in Arizona have a combined density of 87 people/km2) and the patchwork of public and private lands, each of which presents a distinct set of opportunities and challenges to developers. Urban development, its form (“sprawl,” “subdivisions,” and “settlements”), and water relations with adjoining undeveloped areas are critical factors in the distribution, use, and reuse of water in both regions. In Israel and Palestine, large-scale urban development along the Mediterranean coast (Tel Aviv and Gaza), where only brackish groundwater can be found, has been one of the main engines of water transfer and development. Population and Israeli agricultural settlements in Palestine – together with the recent construction of the “security wall” (Trottier, 2007) – also define a specific geography of water endowments and use. Successive in and out immigration has a bearing on water use and policy. Large-scale displacements of population from and to Israel and Palestine (1948, 1967 and in the 1990s) have shaped the geography of water in the region. Population growth in Arizona has occurred in central and southern parts of the state. While the popular, media-portrayed view is that growth pressures result from illegal migration from Mexico, the influx of “retirees” from other parts of the United States and in-state demographic growth are the main drivers of expanding populations. Development and jobs on the Mexican side of the border, together with the U.S. border wall, have the effect of concentrating border populations on the southern side in Mexico. In Israel, Palestine, and Arizona, much of the water currently used for urban growth was originally developed and managed for agriculture. Population patterns clearly match the main agro-ecological and agricultural production zones of Israel and Palestine (Figure 2). Agriculture has always featured prominently in Israel’s society and economy and continues to significantly influence water resources decision-making. In the pre-1948 period, as well as in the early state years, most of the development of water resources was geared towards the benefit of the collective agricultural sector, which was seen as the main state-building activity (Feitelson, 2005). Israel still displays today a food security rhetoric – a shift from the earlier food sufficiency discourse – though this hardly reflects the reality of the sector characterized by massive imports (87% of all cereals consumed in the country in 1999 according to Postel, 1999) and exports (mostly flowers, ornamental plants, seeds, vegetables and fruits; Shuval, 2004) (Kartin, 2000). Israel hence remains a major importer of virtual water; its agricultural sector Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:36 12 October 2016 contributes to less than 2% of its Gross Domestic Product and employs 26,000 foreign laborers (Kartin, 2000; GOI, 2009). Agricultural expansion has long been used as a way to exert control over a disputed territory and the agricultural policy of Israel constitutes a major challenge to water negotiation and (re-)allocation in the region (Kartin, 2000). For example, Feitelson (2005) indicates that one of the main impediments to an agreement on groundwater – on which Israeli agriculture relies heavily, notably in West Bank settlements and the Araba desert – is Israeli power structure, and particularly the power of small cohesive agricultural interest groups. Today, cooperative communities such as kibbutzim (with a strong ideological dimension; also engaged in industry) and Moshavim (involving cooperative management but private ownership) still account for the greater part of all agricultural water use (Lindholm, 1995). Their strong political organization plays an

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Population trends in Israel and Palestine 1800 12000 Israel (density) 1600 10000 Israel (pop) 1400 Palestine (density) 8000 Palestine (pop) 1200 1000 6000 800 4000 600 400 2000

Population (Thousands) Population 200 0 0 Population density (1nh. sq km) density (1nh. Population 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Source: Population Division of the Department of Eco- Source: Google Maps KMZ. nomic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secre- tariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision (medium variant figure); available at: http://esa.un.org/ unpp (accessed July 19, 2010).

7,000,000 7,000,000 Note: Population scale Maricopa Yavapai Apache is 1/10th that of Maricopa, Pima Mohave Gila Pima, and Pinal Counties 6,000,000 6,000,000 Yuma Santa Cruz Pinal Cochise Graham Coconino La Paz 5,000,000 5,000,000 Navajo Greentee

4,000,000 4,000,000

3,000,000 3,000,000

2,000,000 2,000,000

1,000,000 1,000,000

0 0 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031

Figure 2 Spatial and temporal distribution of population in Israel, Palestine, and Arizona.

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:36 12 October 2016 obvious and important role in influencing the mode and levels of water allocation (Lithwick, 2000). This does not mean that cooperative communities are homogeneous. Kartin (2000), citing the State Comptroller report (1987), for example, states that 26% of the family farms in cooperative villages use 60% of the land and water allocation to produce 70% of total agricultural value and quantity. In the interven- ing years, the ideological bent has changed and, while many kibbutzims retain the name, they operate more on an individual basis while continuing to share collective resources such as water. In Palestine, the agricultural sector contributes significantly to the economy. Agri- culture remains mainly rainfed (field crops, olive orchards) with irrigation around wells, springs and along side-wadis (see Trottier, 1999 for a description of traditional water management practices in upland areas of the West Bank) and attempts at

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diversification and intensification (flowers, strawberries, and processed high quality olive oil). The Palestinian agricultural sector is strongly tied to Israel, which supplies most goods imported by Palestine. Traditional crop-livestock systems remain a reality in both Israel and Palestine. In Israel, the Bedouin population is estimated at 170,000 – mostly located in the Negev region. They cultivate nearly one fifth of the 100,000 ha of wheat and significantly contribute to the livestock economy of the country, although their social and political status remains a tense issue in Israel (Swir- ski and Hasson, 2006). Israel has a dynamic and intensive livestock sector (producing about 20% of the total agricultural value of the country) while Palestine is nearly self-sufficient in poultry products but imports more than half of its red meat and dairy needs – mainly from Israel. Despite Palestinian dependence on agriculture, only 14% of Palestinian agricultural land is irrigated. On the other hand, 70% of Israeli and Jewish-settlement agricultural land is watered, even though agriculture accounts for less than 2% of Israeli GDP. Table 1 summarizes existing data comparing agriculture in both regions. An important contrast between irrigation in Arizona and Israel, in particular, is the adoption of drip, sprinkler, and other water-saving technologies. Approximately

Table 1 A comparative analysis of the agricultural sector: Arizona, Israel, Palestine.

Palestine (West Bank Arizona# Israel† and Gaza)γ

Share of GDP 1.7% 12% (irrig ag) Share of labor force (2008 Az) 7.9% rural 1.7 % (72,000) 12% (117,000; irrig ag) Share of total export (value) 2.4% 25% Export share (of total agricultural 20% 12% value produced) Share of requirement locally 70% 51% produced (value) Agricultural area Excluding pasture/range 711,168 ac 453,190 ac (ha, 2007 I,P; 2007 Az) 1,205,425 ac (487,800 ha) (287,800 ha) (183,400 ha) Field crops 703,000 ac (284,500 ha) 346,194 ac 119,228 ac (140,100 ha) (48,250 ha)

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:36 12 October 2016 Plantations Fruits & nuts 5,800 ac 191,259 ac 286,642 ac (2,300 ha) (77,400 ha) (116,000 ha) Vegetables 118,000 ac 173,220 ac 46,283 ac (47,800 ha) (70,100 ha) (18,730 ha) Others 22,900,777 ac pasture Not available Not available (9,267,630 ha) Average size (ha) 1,670 ac 7 (cooperatives) NA (very (676 ha) fragmented) Irrigated area 823,300 ac 469,500 ac 61,035 ac (333,200 ha) (190,000 ha) (24,700 ha)

# http://www.ers.usda.gov/statefacts/az.htm; http://www.nass.usda.gov † http://www.mfa.gov.il; http://www1.cbs.gov.il/publications/isr_in_n09e.pdf; GOI, 2009 γ PASSIA (2009; data from 2007), World Bank (2009; Statistical Profile).

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10% of the irrigated area in Arizona uses water-saving irrigation (Frisvold et al., 2007), whereas in Israel, water-saving irrigation accounts for up to 75% of the total irrigated area (http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries/israel/index.stm). See also Negev and Teschner this volume.

LAND AND WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

The water sector in Israel and Palestine Until the 1930s, water management and irrigation practices in Israel and Palestine were based on community arrangements (Feitelson and Fischhendler, 2009). Subse- quently, in the 1930s and 1940s, several regional projects to convey water from the upper Jordan were considered. It is in 1964 that the National Water Carrier (NWC) was completed, connecting all water sources in the country to the Upper Jordan, hence allowing a high flexibility in management (except from the eastern mountain aquifer almost exclusively used in Palestine; see Figure 3 and Table 2). Infrastructure and institutional development came along together. Although couched in scientific and managerial terms, the underlying motivation of such plans was to facilitate the settlements as a basis of a future Jewish State (Feitelson

Hasbani R.

Tyre UNDOF Zone LEBANON Quneitra

Jordan R. Jordan SYRIA Golan Salad Akko Heights a e Lake S Haifa Tiberias n a Tiberias e Yezre’el valley Yarmouk R. n Nazareth a r r e t Beit i d Shean e Hadera M

Netanya Tu l Ajlun Karern The National Water Carrier (Courtesy Lifesource)

National Water Carrier Qalqilya Nablus Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:36 12 October 2016 Rosh Ha’ayir Tel Aviv- West Bank Jaffa

Jordan R. Salt Ramallah Amman Ashdod Jericho Jerusalem JORDAN Ashkelon ISRAEL Herodian 1949 Armistice Line Gaza Hebron 1974 Disengagement Lines Dead Sea Mountain aquifers Gaza Hydrological water divide Strip Negev Secondary systems

Be’er Sheba Arad 0 50 km

Source: PASSIA Traditional Spring (Courtesy ARIJ)

Figure 3 Israel-Palestine water systems.

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Table 2 Water availability and uses in Israel/Palestine (MCM/year).

Total Palestine Israel Water Source Availability withdrawals withdrawals withdrawals

Jordan Basin 790 545 45µ ~500 Upper Jordan 100–500 282§ (100–500) Saline discharge 30α 30 Yarmouk 110α 45 (pre-2004; before the construction of the Whedah dam; this amount is now significantly lower) The 110 MCM/year is physically available, but due to political arrangements and water quality, it may not actually be used. 45 MCM/year is the net volume diverted by Israel from the Yarmouk to Tiberias. This does not account for an additional 25 MCM Israel diverts in winter but releases back to Jordan in summer. Side wadis 70β N.A (West Bank) Western Galilea 86† 140 140@ Mountain 679‡ 986 114λ 872ϕ aquifer (Yarkon) Wells and spring Western aquifer 362 28 592 Northeast aquifer 145 27 147 Eastern aquifers 172 59 133 Coastal Aquifer 390## 477 172 305 Israeli aquifers 333 5 295@ Gaza 57 167 10 Negev-Araba desert 89 32 32 (fossil desert aquifer) Desalination 275# 275 55 (Gaza, planned) 275 Reused wastewater 387* 387 0 387 Untreated wastewater unknown unknown unknown Total 2309 2531 331 ∼2200

Total per capita (2010) 197 216 75 302θ (cubic meter/year) Withdrawal by * sector (%) Agriculture 59–61% 65% 57% Domestic 28–32% 33% 37% Industry 5% 2% 6% Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:36 12 October 2016 Domestic 170 63 275–350 water use (liters/capita/day)

Adapted from Lautze and Kirshen (2009) if not indicated otherwise θ Settlers consume 255–290 m3/yr and 2325 m3/yr in central and south Palestine respectively. δ Philipps et al. (2009). ‡ Shuval (2007); μ Purchased from Mekorot (include groundwater too); λ (World Bank, 2009) α Venot et al. (2009); * GOI (2009); ** National Statistics, Israel; ## World Bank, 2009 # with Hadera plant, opened in December 2009 (capacity 127 Mm3/year) @ Netanyahou (2007); § Yearly average for the 1998–2007 period μ PASSIA, 2009 ϕ Aliewi and Assaf (2007) β Abu Zahra (2001) γ Alalout (2000); † Lithwick (2000) Note: 1 MCM = 810.7 AF

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and Fischhendler, 2009). Water control has always been central to the consolidation of the State of Israel and is epitomized today both by physical and institutional infrastructure. The 1959 water law has – even after the passing of a new law in 2005 – constituted the touchstone of all water decisions. The law nationalized all water in Israel and vested authority over it to a Water Commissioner under the Minister of Agricul- ture. The law was opposed by small and politically weak private farming interests and was largely supported by the large and powerful collective agricultural sector (Feitelson, 2005). The displacement of at least 700,000 Palestinians from Israeli territory after 1948 facilitated the establishment of a centralized authority (Trottier, 1999) that was able to implement a volumetric licensing and pricing system. Recent moves, however, signal a shift towards a less centralized technocratic system; because water issues are becoming more and more complex, the decision making process has become fragmented with issues such as pricing, desalination or wastewater recycling being out of the control of the sole Water Commissioner (Feitelson, 2005). In the West Bank and until 1967, water control was more fragmented with a complex institutional landscape (one water source, one set of rules). Even today, though Israel chiefly controls the licensing process in the West Bank, the institutional geography of water is more diverse than in Israel and the Palestinian Water Authority exerts minimal control on the uses of water (Trottier, 1999). See also Connelly et al. this volume. In this context where water control is at its highest and decision making is disputed, it then comes as no surprise that the region incessantly witnesses controversies around water figures and their meanings. We do not engage here in value judgment but try to focus on reported data of water availability and use (Table 2). The Upper Jordan River provides water to Israel primarily from the Lake Tibe- rias through the NWC that has superimposed a new drainage network and virtually divided the Jordan River basin in two parts. With nearly no flow from Tiberias, the Lower Jordan River chiefly receives water from the Yarmouk southwards of the lake and from side wadis both on the East and West Bank of the valley. Flows reaching the Dead Sea are minimal (275 MCM/year, or 0.223 MAF/year) and largely untapped due to their low quality (Venot et al., 2008). The mountain aquifer contributes to around one half of all renewable freshwater supply to Israel/Palestine. It consists of the Western, Northeastern, and Eastern Aquifer, the latter two contributing to the Lower Jordan River flow through subsurface flows. The Coastal Aquifer stretches along the sea and discharges into the Mediterranean. It contributes about 20% of all Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:36 12 October 2016 renewable freshwater but is dramatically overexploited. Fossil desert aquifers in the Negev and Araba desert are exploited for agricultural purposes (see above). Overexploitation of surface and groundwater is rife in the region. Surface water mostly comes from springs, occasional runoff and Lake Tiberias, with the latter’s water being distributed by the Mekorot state company that also provides 15% of the water used by Palestinians. In the past 10 years the Lake provided between 100 and 500 MCM (0.081–0.405 MAF) of freshwater yearly for conveyance (not including local uses), a very irregular supply predicated upon runoff in the upper basin and seriously dented by the many years of drought experienced in the past 15 years. The abstraction of water in excess of its average supply has caused the lake’s level to come under the –213 m “red line” in 1999–2002 and 2008–2010, prompting fears that the level could drop below the level at which pumping is possible.

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Israeli abstraction from the mountain aquifers that underlie both the West Bank and Israel exceed the “estimated potential” of these aquifers by a factor estimated to be 1.8 (World Bank, 2008) or lower according to the Israel Water Authority. In addition, over-extraction by deep wells coupled with severe drought conditions experienced in both Palestine and Israel during the period 2006–2010, has resulted in falling water tables and the drying up of Palestinians’ shallower wells, especially in the area dependent upon the western aquifer where the drilling of few if any Palestinian wells has been allowed by Israel. The situation is even worse in Gaza, where 95% of water supply comes from the overexploitation of the aquifer at a rate three times the estimated renewable resource, resulting in the intrusion of sea water and prompting the World Bank (2008) to predict that the Gaza Strip may run out of fresh water in a 15-year timeframe. With around 60% of supply coming from aquifers in Israel and 72% in Palestine, the region remains very much an unsustainable groundwater economy. In the winter of 2007–2008, Israel was reported to face an overdraft of 580 MCM (Fischhendler and Heikkila, 2010). Overexploitation of surface and groundwater has come at a high environmental price: shrinking and contamination of the Dead Sea, saltwater intrusion in the coastal zones – notably in the Gaza strip (Lithwick, 2000), high concentration of pollutants in surface water supplies, and soil salinization in the Jordan Valley, etc. The environment is receiving greater attention and its recognition as a legitimate water user was incorporated into the Water Law in 2005, reflecting the increasing power of the environmental lobbies in Israel (Feitelson and Fischhendler, 2009). Overexploitation of surface and groundwater resources, together with ever growing demand, has led Israel to develop alternative water sources. Desalination and wastewater reuse contribute a growing share of Israel’s water resources: 387 MCM (0.314 MAF) of treated wastewater were produced in 2007 and used in agriculture. Treated wastewater has been used increasingly and currently makes 60% of all water supplied to agriculture in Israel (according to Israel’s current water commissioner, in www.greenprophet.com/2010/01/water-security-israeli-water-commission/). While this is a promising alternative to alleviate the pressure on freshwater resources, increased level of irrigation with wastewater has also accelerated the buildup of groundwater salinity (Haruvy et al. 2008). Wastewater use remains marginal in the West Bank (less so in Gaza where treated and untreated wastewater use is common, notably for fodder production) but it has been estimated that it could account for about 10% of the local irrigated agriculture (Shaheen, 2003). Finally, in Israel, use of desalinated Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:36 12 October 2016 water was long opposed by farmers, as they were concerned that desalination would lead to higher water rates. But, during the drought of 1998–99, they saw their allocation curtailed and joined the water managers in calling for desalination (Feitelson 2005). In 2010 desalination plants were producing 275 MCM (0.223 MAF) annually while more plants were being planned. The current pattern of allocation reflects power asymmetries and result in very unequal distribution (Zeitoun et al., 2009; World Bank, 2009). Per capita water withdrawals of Israelis is four times higher than that of Palestinians living in the West Bank who, with their springs and wells drying up, rely increasingly on water purchased from Mekorot (World Bank, 2009). In the West Bank, domestic water availability averages 63 liters per capita per day (lpcd), equivalent to 16.6 gallons per capita per day (gpcd), or even lower. A recent World Bank (2009) document reports

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that, “Per capita domestic supply is very variable and discontinuous, with relatively small improvements since Oslo. Nominal supply rates to a quarter of the connected population are less than 50 lpcd [13.2 gpcd], with some network services providing as little as 10–15 lpcd [2.6–4 gpcd], which is at or below the supply threshold adopted by international humanitarian disaster response agencies to avoid epidemics.” Water governance is deeply affected by regional political circumstances. On the Israeli side, technical management is efficient but economic rationality and environmental considerations are trumped by the importance of water in land development and expansion strategies, the political clout of the agricultural lobby, and the importance of water in bilateral negotiations and regional politics (Kartin, 2000; Fischhendler, 2008). The Israeli water sector is also characterized by problems of transparency, bureaucratic obstruction and infighting, unclear priorities, and lack of separation between regulation and implementation functions (NIC, 2010). Israel’s relatively powerful position in decision-making has also undermined the work of the Joint Water Committee (JWC) established under Article 40 to implement the Oslo Interim Agreement on Water and allow joint resource management and investment. As noted by the World Bank (2009), “The JWC does not function as a “joint” water resource governance institution because of fundamental asymmetries – of power, of capacity, of information, of interests – that prevent the development of a consensual approach to resolving water management conflicts.” On the Palestinian side, lack of investments, capacity and leadership, with water supply being fragmented and involving several hundred separate municipal water departments and local councils, as well as poor coordination between the Palestinian Authority, donors, and NGOs have hindered progress (Gasteyer and Araj, 2009) and sometimes been found to be more of a constraint than water proper (Moriarty et al., 2010).

Water resources in Arizona The critical role played by the CAP (see Figure 4) in meeting Arizona’s water demand, indeed in configuring the spatial patterns of settlement and urbanization as well as the pace of development and urban growth, should not be underestimated. The ability of CAP surface water supplies to limit groundwater overexploitation on the one hand, and controls on groundwater mandated by the Groundwater Management Act (GMA) of 1980 on the other, are the true test of water sustainability in Arizona. Active Management Areas (AMAs), designated under the GMA, contain Arizona’s Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:36 12 October 2016 largest concentrations of population dependent of groundwater. Following the discussion above of Israeli and Palestinian water endowments, access and use, we present in Figure 5 the Arizona Department of Water Resources’ synthesized water budgets for the five AMAs (2001–2005 data from ADWR Water Atlas, 2010). Especially notable are the predominance of the Phoenix AMA in the AMAs’ overall water budget, the large agricultural share of the Pinal AMA’s water use, and the continued dependence on groundwater by the Tucson, Prescott, and Santa Cruz AMAs. After 2005, the Tucson AMA started using a much larger portion of CAP water. Water scarcity, urban densities, and upstream-downstream spatial configurations frame wastewater management challenges. Effluent is the result of, and a contributor to the urban growth engine. It is increasingly seen as a commodity in strategic terms.

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Figure 4 The Central Arizona Project.

Arizona’s effluent is largely used for turf grass (golf courses and public landscap- ing) or power plant cooling water. The relative abundance of CAP water and prior appropriation rights means that Arizona farmers use little treated effluent for irrigation. Riparian corridors downstream of permitted discharge of wastewater treatment plants (Megdal, 2006) represent an important, if somewhat low-volume use of effluent in Arizona. See Kupel, this volume, for discussion of Arizona’s water resource development process. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:36 12 October 2016

PROSPECTIVE VIEW

This chapter is intended as a comparative Arizona–Israel–Palestine overview of water resource availability, trends in dominant uses, drivers of change, and factors expected to maintain status quo conditions. Here we synthesize the most relevant and important observations, many of which are documented and assessed in greater details in other chapters in this volume. Arizona experiences greater aridity and in general more extreme climatic conditions, particularly in the central and southern parts of the state where population and economic activity are concentrated. However, in human population terms, Arizona is relatively well endowed with water resources. Critical to meeting these human

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Eff GW 39% 55%

CAP 1% SW 5%

Industrial 7%

Municipal Agricultural Eff 46% 47% 3%

Eff CAP 4% GW 28% 41%

CAP GW SW 31% 28% 28%

SW 37%

CAP Eff Phoenix AMA (61%) CAP Eff 6% 4% 11% 2% CAP, Eff, SW 2,253,500 af SW 2% 2% GW GW GW 86% 90% 98% CAP Industrial 30% GW Municipal 1% Eff, 70% 3% Industrial 7% 15% CAP Agricultural 32% 25% CAP GW GW 49% 45% 68% Municipal 53% SW Agricultural 6% 96% Tucson AMA (9%) 341,600 af

Industrial 7% Pinal AMA (28%) Eff 1,018,100 af 26% GW Agricultural 66% Eff 58% SW 25% Municipal 8% 35% SW GW GW Ag 10% 65% SW 95% 22% 5% Santa Cruz AMA (1%) Industrial Municipal 22,300 af 72% 6% ALL GW Supply Prescott AMA (1%) 24,000 af Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:36 12 October 2016 Figure 5 Water demand and sources in Arizona’s Active Management Areas.

demands, however, is the Central Arizona Project (CAP). Long-distance conveyance systems of this type have important financial, energy, and sustainability implications. In prospective view, the existence of CAP infrastructure providing water at relatively low rates is an important factor in creating demand (new urban development) that must be met despite uncertainties over future availability of Colorado River water. In general, prevailing notions of “water scarcity” coupled with water allocations under current institutional arrangements in both regions have heightened interest in water reuse and desalination as supply augmentation options.

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In comparative terms, Israel is relatively water constrained, and Palestine severely so – physically, on a per capita basis, and in the context of mutual Israel-Palestine conflict and competition for water. Additionally, differential access to capital, technology, and managerial capacity sharpen the contrast between Israel and Palestine for water resource availability and its management. The “production” and use of water by Israel and Palestine has been virtually stable in the past 15 years at around 2,300 MCM (1.860 MAF). In the face of growing populations, what are then the solutions at hand? Supply augmentation, as usual, sticks out as the less politically stressing despite dubious economic rationality. Israel is massively investing in the recycling (wastewater treatment) and the desalination of water, with the production of desalinized water expected to reach 600 MCM (0.486 MAF) per year in 2014, which is more than 80% of the projected domestic consumption in that year (www.greenprophet. com/2010/01/water-security-israeli-water-commission/). Other supply augmentation projects, more complex and less secure because dependent on regional cooperation, include the transfer of water from Turkey, from the Litani River in Lebanon, and the Red-Dead project. Other policies and demand side management measures include water harvesting, protection of water resources to avoid their degradation, impound- ing flood waters, and controlling demand through pricing policies. Some of these options are discussed in the other chapters in this volume. Arizona’s growth is more extensive, although spatial delimitation of management areas has required consideration of urban-agricultural tradeoffs in water allocation terms. Growth that occurs outside these areas (or is “pushed” there due to weaker regulatory oversight) largely relies on groundwater. The ability of decision-makers in Arizona to keep pace with development-induced demand for water will depend on CAP supplies, which in turn depend on Colorado River water availability. Agriculture, long seen as the source of water for urban growth, will continue to transfer water when land, too, is urbanized. In Israel and Palestine, urban expansion is more complex in the context of power asymmetries. Regardless, land development processes, increasing pressure on agriculture for water resources, and the search for new water supplies (including from reuse and desalination) will continue to drive water management in both regions.

REFERENCES

Abu-Madi, M. (2010). Impacts of energy price changes on the financial viability of agricul- Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:36 12 October 2016 tural groundwater wells in Tulkarm district, Palestine. International Journal of Water 5(3): 205–222. Abu-Zahra, B. (2001). “Water Crisis in Palestine.” Desalination 136: 93–99. Alatout, S. 2000. “Water balances in Palestine: Numbers and political culture in the Middle East.” In Water Balances in the Eastern Mediterranean, eds. D.B. Brooks and O. Meh- met. Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre. http://www.idrc.ca/ openebooks/287–2/ Aliewi, A. and Assaf, K. (2007). Shared Management of Palestinian and Israeli Groundwater Resources: A Critical Analysis, In Shuval, H.; Dweik, H. (Eds), Water Resources in the Mid- dle East, Part I, Pages 17–32. Springer. Arizona Department of Water Resources (ADWR). Active Management Area Planning Area. Volume 8. http://www.azwater.gov/AzDWR/StatewidePlanning/WaterAtlas/ActiveMan- agementAreas/documents/Volume_8_overview_final.pdf Last accessed Sept. 24, 2010.

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Assaf, K. (2009). Managing Palestine’s water budget: providing for present and future needs. C. Lipchin et al. (eds.), The Jordan River and Dead Sea Basin: Cooperation Amid Conflict, 89–109. Chenoweth, J.L. and Wehrmeyer, W. (2006). Scenario Development for 2050 for the Israeli/ Palestinian Water Sector. Population and Environment. 27:245–261. Courcier, R., Venot, J.P. and Molle, F. (2005). “Historical transformations of the lower Jordan river basin (in Jordan): Changes in water use and projections (1950–2025).” In Compre- hensive Assessment Research Report 9. Colombo, Sri Lanka: Comprehensive Assessment Secretariat. Feitelson, E. and Fischhendler, I. (2009). “Spaces of water governance: The case of Israel and its neighbors” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 99(4): 728–745 Feitelson, E. (2005). “Political Economy of Groundwater Exploitation: The Israeli Case”. International Journal of Water Resources Development 21(3): 413–423. Feitelson, E. (2006). “Impediments to the management of shared aquifers: A political economy perspective”. Hydrogeology Journal 14: 319–329. Fischhendler, I. and Heikkila, T. (2010). Does integrated water resources management support institutional change? The case of water policy reform in Israel. Ecology and Society 15(1): 4. [online] URL: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss1/art4/ Fischhendler, I. 2008. Institutional conditions for IWRM: The Israeli case. Ground Water 46, no. 1: 91–102. Fischhendler, I. (2008). “Ambiguity in transboundary environmental dispute resolution: the Israeli Jordanian water agreement.” Journal of Peace Research. International Peace Research Institute 91–109. Fisher F., Huber, A., Amir, I., Arlosoroff, S. Eckstein, Z., Haddadin, M.J., Hanat, S.G., Jarrar, A.M., Toyyousi, A.F., Shamir, U. and Wesseling, H. (2005). Liquid Assets -An Eco- nomic Approach for Water Management and Conflict Resolution the Middle East and Beyond., (Washington DC: Resources for the Future). Frisvold, G. (2009). “Managing agricultural systems in a non-stationary world.” 9th SAHRA Annual Meeting, Tucson, September 23–24, 2009. Frisvold, G., Wilson, P.N., Needham, R. (2007). “Implications of federal farm policy and state regulation on agricultural water use.” In B.G. Colby and K.L. Jacobs (eds.), Arizona Water Policy. RFF Press, Washington, pp. 137–156. GOI (Government of Israel). (2009). Agriculture in Israel. The industry account price index of output and input. 2007–2008. Jerusalem, September 2009. Garfin, G., Crimmins, M.A. and Jacobs, K.L. (2007). “Drought, climate variability, and implications for water supply and management.” In B.G. Colby and K.L. Jacobs (eds.), Arizona Water Policy. RFF Press, Washington, pp. Gasteyer, S. and Araj, T. (2009). Palestinian Community Water Management Capacity: Under- Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:36 12 October 2016 standing the Intersection of Community Cultural, Political, Social, and Natural Capitals’, Community Development 40(2): 199–219. Haruvy, N., Shalhevet, S. and Bachmat, Y. (2008). “A model for integrated water resources management in water-scarce regions: irrigation with wastewater combined with desalination processes.” International Journal of Water 4 (1/2): 25–40. Kartin, A. (2000). “Factors inhibiting structural changes in Israel’s water policy”. Political Geography 19: 97–115. Klein, Micha. (1998). “Water balance of the upper Jordanian River Basin.” Water Interna- tional 23(4): 244–248. Lautze, J. and Kirshen, P. (2009). “Water allocation, climate change, and sustainable water use in Israel/Palestine: the Palestinian position.” Water International 34(2):189–203. Lindholm, H. (1995). “Water and the Arab – Israeli conflict.” In Hydropolitics: conflicts over water as a development constraint, eds. L. Ohlsson. Zed Books, London, UK.

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Lithwick, H. (2000). “Evaluating water balances in Israel.” In Water Balances in the Eastern Mediterranean, eds. D.B. Brooks and O. Mehmet. Ottawa, Canada: International Develop- ment Research Centre. http://www.idrc.ca/openebooks/287–2/ Megdal, Sharon B. (2006). Municipal water reuse in Tucson, Arizona, USA. Paper presented at NATO workshop on water security. Mimi, Z.A. and Sawalhi, B.I. (2003). “A decision tool for allocation the waters of the Jordan River Basin between all riparian parties.” Water Resources Management 17: 447–461. Molle, F., Wester, P. and Hirsh, P. (2007). “River basin development and management.” Water for Food, Water for Life. International Water Management Institute. 585–624. Moriarty, P.B., Batchelor, C.H., Laban, P. and Fahmy, H. (2010). Developing a practical approach to ‘light IWRM’ in the Middle East. Water Alternatives 3(1): 122–136 NIC (National Investigation Committee). (2010). National Investigation Committee On the Sub- ject of the management of the Water Economy in Israel. Committee’s Report. Haifa, Israel. Netanyahu, S. (2007). Water development for Israel: challenges and opportunities. In C. Lip- chin et al. (eds.), Integrated Water Resources Management and Security in the Middle East, 65–72. Springer. PASSIA. (2009). Palestinian facts. http://www.passia.org/index_pfacts.htm Phillips, D.J.H., Jägerskog, A. and Turton, A. (2009). “The Jordan River basin: 3. Options for satisfying the current and future water demand of the five riparians.” Water International 34(2): 170–188. Postel, S. (1999). Pillar of Sand: Can the Irrigation Miracle Last?, WW Norton and Company, New York. Rende, M. (2007). Water Transfer from Turkey to Water-Stressed Countries in the Middle East. In Shuval, H. and Dweik, H. (Eds), Water Resources in the Middle East, Pages 165–174. Springer. SUSMAQ (Sustainable Management of the West Bank and Gaza Strip Aquifers), 2005. Sustain- ability Assessments of Water Sector Management Options for the Palestinian Territories, Report No. SUSMAQ-SUS #60 Vo. 6. Ramallah: Palestinian Water Authority (Palestine) and University of Newcastle upon Tyne (UK). Shaheen, H.Q. (2003). “Wastewater reuse as means to optimize the use of water resources in the West Bank.” Water International 28(2): 201–208. Shalhevet, S. Wastewater reuse in Israel and in the west bank. Shevah, Y. (nd). ICID-Irrigation and Drainage in the World- A Global review- Israel. ICID. Available online at http://www.icid.org/i_d_israel.pdf (accessed August 20th, 2010) Shuval, H. and Dweik, H. (Eds). (2007). Water Resources in the Middle East. Israel-Palestinian Water Issues – From Conflict to Cooperation. Springer-Verlag, Berlin. Shuval, H. (2007). Meeting Vital Human Needs: Equitable Resolution of Conflicts over Shared Water Resources of Israelis and Palestinians. In Shuval, H.; Dweik, H. (Eds), Water Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:36 12 October 2016 Resources in the Middle East, Part I, Pages 1–16. Springer. Shuval, H.I. (2004). “Are the conflicts between Israel and her neighbors over the waters of the Jordan River Basin an obstacle to peace? Israel-Syria as a case study.” Water, Air, and Soil Pollution (123): 605–630. Swirski, S. and Hasson, Y. (2006). Invisible citizens: Israeli government policy towards the Negev Bedouin. Information on Equality and Social Justice in Israel (ADVAI Center). TSG (The Services Group). (2003). USAID PRIZIM Project Sector Report on the Palestinian Agriculture. USAID West Bank and Gaza. Trottier, J. (1999). Hydropolitics in the West Bank and Gaza strip. PASSIA, Jerusalem. Trottier, J. (2007). “A wall, water and power: the Israeli ‘separation fence’” Review of Interna- tional Studies 33: 105–127 Venot, J.P., Molle, F. and Courcier, R. (2008). “Dealing with closed basin: the case of the lower Jor- dan River basin.” International Journal of Water Resources Development 24 (2):257–273.

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Venot, J.P., Molle, F. and Hassan, Y. (2007). “Irrigated agriculture, water pricing, and water savings in the lower Jordan River Basin (in Jordan).” Comprehensive Assessment Research Report 18. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute. Water Resources Research Center (WRRC). (2010). Arizona Water. Map product http:// ag.arizona.edu/azwater/products/watermap/assets/WaterMap2010-web.jpg. Last accessed Sept. 24, 2010. Woodhouse, C.A., Gray, S.T. and Meko, D.M. (2006). “Updated streamflow reconstructions for the Upper Colorado River Basin.” Water Resources Research 42. World Bank. (2008). Palestinian Economic Prospects: Aid, Access and Reform. Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee. World Bank. World Bank. (2009). West Bank and Gaza: assessment of restrictions on Palestinian water sector development. Sector Note, April 2009. World Bank. Zawahri, N.A. and Gerlak, A.K. (2009). “Navigating international river disputes to avert conflict.” International Negotiation 14: 211–227. Zeitoun, M., Messerschmid, C. and Attili, S. (2008). Asymmetric Abstraction and Allocation: The Israeli-Palestinian Water Pumping Record. Groundwater 47(1): 146–160. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:36 12 October 2016

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David Schorr

What is the connection between the property regime under which the law allocates water, and the degree of protection afforded by the law to public, so-called “instream uses,” of water? More concretely, to what extent is it true that a system of water law based on private property tends to impede protection of water-related natural values, while public ownership facilitates such conservation?

PROPERTY RIGHTS IN WATER

An important dimension of property rights in a given resource or asset is the extent to which they are private. Property theory literature typically places great emphasis on the classification of resources as private, common, or public, though it should be noted that these forms of property are merely ideal types; in practice, a wide spectrum of intermediate forms exists, and it is rare to find an asset with characteristics one of these types alone. Nonetheless, as with other resources, property regimes in water can be divided into three general models: private, public and common. (See IUCN 2003; Teclaff and UNDESA 1972; Caponera 1992). Though the commons approach is of great theoretical and practical interest,62 it will not concern us in this paper; the focus here is on the private and public models of water ownership. In legal systems with private property rights in water, an individual can acquire private, definite rights in water. The classic example of such a system is the “prior appropriation” regime of the western United States, including Arizona. (See Anderson and Hill 1975; Dunbar 1983). Under prior appropriation, a system which developed in mid-nineteenth century, a private right to a defined amount of water can be acquired by diverting water from its source to beneficial use.63 Diversion and use invest the appropriator with the perpetual right to this amount or flow, as long as the right is not abandoned. The right of the appropriator to continue receiving the same amount of water, though, is subject to the superior rights of appropriators whose appropriations were made prior to his. In other words, A, the owner of a senior right, has the legal right to insist that B, the holder of a right junior in time to his, cease

62 The riparian-rights system of the common law, as well as many traditional systems of water allocation, are usually considered common-property regimes. See Ostrom 1991; Rose 1990. 63 Most western jurisdictions today also require an administrative permit as a condition for diverting water.

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diverting water, if B’s diversion prevents A from exercising his own right. The name of the doctrine—prior appropriation—reflects the fact that the value of a water right derives not only from the quantity defined, but by its priority in time, since in times of scarcity senior rights take priority over junior ones (Wiel 1911). The right is usuf- ructary, that is, it consists of the right to use a specified amount of water, diverted at a specified location, for a specified purpose. For approximately the last 100 years states have instituted by legislation an administrative system of permits that grandfathered in appropriative rights acquired under the previous systems but requires permits for all surface water diversions. The doctrine of prior appropriation arose in the United States particularly in relatively arid regions (similar in climate and hydrologically to Israel and Palestine), in which stream flow is generally not sufficient to irrigate all potential arable lands, and annual precipitation is highly variable. As a result, many streams are “over-appropriated”—in years of average precipitation junior appropriative rights may provide their owners with no water at all, and in dry years the situation is obviously even more severe. Nonetheless, proposals to change the system to one of more egalitarian or proportional allocation have been consistently rejected by both users and lawyers, as reflecting serious breaches of the constitutional right to property of senior right-holders. This legal regime has often been blamed for the overexploitation of the region’s water resources, the accompanying desiccation of streams, and consequent destruction of aquatic environments and habitats (Reisner and Bates 1990; Shiva 2002; Worster 1985). The argument is that private property leads each individual right-holder to prefer his or her own interest at the expense of the common good, thus leading to environmental degradation. Public values, it would seem, are best protected by public control of the resource. As far as property law goes, the Israeli system of water law seems to lie at the opposite end of the private-public spectrum from prior appropriation. According to the law, all water, from all sources, is the sole property of the state, held for the benefit of the public. Water can of course be allocated to private uses, but such allocations are made by a public authority, not by private appropriation or the market. The ultimate right of ownership in the water resides in the state, and the private rights are created at the administrative level (Teclaff and UNDESA 1972). This distinction has practical significance, preserving state control over water and strengthening its involvement in water allocation. Not only does it allow the state to set the terms Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:35 12 October 2016 of water use more easily than under other property regimes; the fact that water rights are based on administrative permits or licenses, not property rights, generally means that the rights are limited in time. Moreover, the state’s ownership gives it the power to allocate water in accordance with economic and other policy objectives, as opposed to the prior appropriation system, under which water allocations are generally unaffected by government policy. From a nature conservation point of view, the Israeli system would seem to be far superior to the western American one; in fact, it would seem to be as ideal a property regime as possible for water. Yet in practice, as we shall see, public ownership of water has apparently not facilitated protection of instream uses in Israel, where negligible flows in most streams and the destruction of aquatic environments across the land have become the norm. Moreover, it seems that public ownership may be

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aiding and abetting this destruction. To see how, let us examine Israel’s water law on the books and in action.

ISRAELI WATER LAW ON THE BOOKS

On its face, Israel indeed belongs to the large group of states that have adopted the public/administrative form of water ownership.64 Already under the British Mandate all streams, springs, lakes and other standing water were declared the property of the High Commissioner, held in trust for the Government of Pales- tine (Palestine Order in Council, Article 16e 1940), and Israeli legislation further broadened public ownership. Section 1 of the Water Act, 1959, states that “the water sources of the State are public property,” with section 2 giving an extremely wide definition to the term “water sources”: “The springs, streams, rivers, lakes and other flowing and gathered waters, whether surface or subsurface, whether natural or controlled or built, whether flowing or standing permanently or intermittently, including drainage and sewage waters.” As the Israeli Supreme Court described it in the leading Pardes Hanna case, the Water Act “nationalized the water sources and made them state property.” (Pardes Hanna v. Minister of Agri- culture 1964). State ownership finds its expression in the legal restrictions on private rights in water. Extraction and supply of water are permitted only with a license, which the authorities can refuse to give, make conditional, change or cancel. Water Act §§ 23–25, 29.65 The license sets forth the identity of the consumer, and the state can order a permit-holder to supply water to any consumer under any conditions (Zabarei Orli Farm v. State of Israel, 2006; Water Act § 34). The state sets quantities of water to be used, as well as their quality, price, conditions of supply and use, and the right to water is extinguished if there is a change in use (Water Act §§ 21, 112, 6). Water allocations are not transferable, and while transfer of an extraction license was allowed in principle by recent amendment to the law, it is limited in practice.66 Similarly, the state may set the maximum amounts of water to be applied to various uses, as well as set priorities among uses (Water Act § 37). The legal situation, at least as far as statute law goes, is thus clear: water in Israel is owned by the state, which allows private sector use in accordance with the state’s considerations and the conditions it sets. There is no apparent connection between the Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:35 12 October 2016 Israeli system and the private property model. Israeli case law has also tended to stress public ownership of water. In the afore- mentioned Pardes Hanna case, the Supreme Court upheld the state’s right to mix high-quality water from a local aquifer that farmers had previously used with the more saline water of the National Water Carrier, reasoning that the implication of

64 As noted by the U.N. survey, id., 51–52. 65 See also Hatis v. Water Commissioner, 1965 (upholding decision refusing extraction permit). 66 Agricultural Settlement (Limits on Use of Agricultural Land and Water) Act 1967 § 3; Shatzman v. Givat Ada Water Supply Company Ltd. 1975 (water right not assignable); Water Act § 28 (license transferable with notice to Water Authority); Hatis v. Water Commissioner 1965 (license not transferable to new location).

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state ownership of all water in the country is that the consumer has no vested right to receive water from a specific source or of a certain quality. There is no logic in distinguishing between well-watered areas and arid areas, perpetuating their existing conditions. The Water Act is aimed at ameliorating as far as possible the water shortage in the country and bringing about greater balance between the various regions, between those who have, and those who have not. (Pardes Hanna v. Minister of Agriculture 1964). State ownership of water, explained Berenson J., was intended to bring about a situation under which water was allocated to all Israelis on an equal basis: “Thus may the great goal of the Water Act be achieved, that the country’s water sources will serve the needs of all the land’s inhabitants and the development of the entire country” (Id.). In another case the same justice explained that public ownership is the basis of the requirement for a license from the Water Commissioner (today the Director of the Government Water and Sewage Authority) as a condition for production or supply of water (HaHaklai Agricultural Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Shapira 1973). In the relatively recent case of Blum v. Minister of Agriculture, the High Court of Justice rejected the suit of a water user who claimed a right to continue receiving water as he had in the past, with the Court emphasizing public ownership of water. It explained that “water sources are public property (section 1 of the Water Act), and the need to conserve them is derived not only from the principles of good government, but from the protection given to this valuable and limited resource, common to all the citizens of the state” (Blum v. Minister of Agriculture 2002). The decision cited to an influential California case, declaring the superior property right of the public in the state’s waters, even after they had passed, on paper, to private hands (National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine City 1983). Israel’s Water Court, a special tribunal with jurisdiction over certain water cases, tends to base its decisions, too, on public ownership of water. For instance, when rejecting a claim that permits granted under the Water Act are property rights, the court mentioned that permits are tied to circumstances and subject to cancellation (Ben Ezer v. Water Commissioner 2005). Recently, in a well-publicized case concerning a polluting factory, the Water Court ordered the cessation of discharges into the Naa- man River, explaining that “the value of protecting public property and the public’s right to clean water and a pollution-free environment” outweigh the values of private property, freedom of occupation and protection of places of employment (Miloban Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:35 12 October 2016 M.C.P. Ltd. v. Water Commissioner 2006). In the Yarkon River case, as well, the Magistrate Court based its decision to allow a class-action lawsuit on behalf of all the citizens of the state to go forward on the country’s streams being public property (The Greens – Ass’n for Environmental Protection v. Yarkon River Auth. 2005).

ISRAELI WATER LAW IN ACTION

Yet alongside these judicial pronouncements are others which seem to point to a nascent recognition of private rights that are at least what Charles Reich famously referred to as “new property” (Reich 1964). In Water Commissioner v. Perlmutter, for instance, the Supreme Court stated that water sources are dedicated to public needs, even while rul-

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ing that the farmers in the case had the right to continue receiving water as long as they remained on their lands (Water Commissioner v. Perlmutter 1992). In another case the Water Court ruled that while treated sewage is the public’s property, the local authority that carried out the treatment has a “special connection” to it, given expression in legislation allowing it to sell its sewage, and that this special connection supersedes the Water Commissioner’s policies (Local Authorities (Sewage) Act, 1962, § 15; Ayalon Regional Auth. (Sewage, Mosquito Elimination and Waste Removal) v. Water Commis- sioner 2001). Even in the Blum case, which recognized water as the common property of the state’s citizens, the High Court of Justice ruled that under certain circumstances the allocation of water may create “a reliance interest worthy of recognition,” i.e. an interest the derogation of which would entitle the consumer to damages (Blum v. Min- ister of Agriculture 2002). While it can be argued that these judicial dicta do not reflect an intentional policy or a coherent view of the topic, the signs of legal recognition of private rights in water are nonetheless evident. Israeli legislation, too, reflects the fact that water allocations to the agricultural sector function in practice like property rights (or “new property”). Thus even though extraction permits generally allocate water for a single year, the allocations typically renew on an automatic basis, with each permit based on the previous year’s (subject only to across-the-board cuts to the sector) (Water Regulations (Water Use in Rationing Area) 1976; Zabarei Orli Farm v. State of Israel 2006). This is seen by agricultural users as creating a “reliance interest” (the court’s phrase in Blum).67 The basing of rights on priority in time, and the preference given to senior uses and users over new ones, are venerable property institutions. The Water Act also was recently amended to allow free transfers of extraction permits, something that was previously impossible (Water Act § 28). Even though there is no necessary connection between alienability of a right and its definition as a property right or not, this granting of power to permit-holders to transfer rights weakens the state’s control over the water resource and underlines its private nature. Moreover, practice in the water sector indicates a quasi-private-property view of water. Even though the Water Authority is supposed to allocate water among Israel’s farmers, allocation is in fact carried out by the Agriculture Ministry, which effectively represents the farming sector (See Zabarei Orli Farm v. State of Israel 2006). Farmers’ reliance on previous allowances receives constant encouragement by the practice of “compensating” them for “cuts” to their allowances from previous years, as if allowances were private property being expropriated by the state for the general good, not Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:35 12 October 2016 public property for which use permits are granted on an annual basis. The feeling among agriculturists, at least as expressed by their representatives, is that they have a property right in water, plain and simple (Meir 2000). This view finds expression in their insistence that the financial support granted them by the government be called “compensation,” not “subsidies”—the term preferred by the Finance Ministry. More recently, the urban sector has seen in recent years a trend of water privatization and commodification (Ziv 2004).

67 Note that the reliance argument is somewhat circular, as the farmer’s reliance will be worthy of protection only if he was justified in believing that it would be protected. Where the law does not protect his reliance, said reliance is, ex hypothesi, unjustified.

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The privatization trend is evident as well with respect to the fees charged to permit holders. Until the late 1990s there existed a “balancing fund for water charges,” the egalitarian purpose of which was “to minimize the differences between water charges in different regions” (Water Act § 116(a) (repealed 1999)). The fund was financed by balancing fees, inversely related to the extraction costs of each supplier, with the purpose of bringing the price of water in areas with low extraction costs closer to the national average. The fund was used to subsidize suppliers in areas with high production costs, in order to lower the price to the user in those areas. This arrangement was no doubt inefficient from an economic point of view, but the principle was clear: as water belongs to the state, there is no justification for users in one area to benefit from the low extraction costs in their area while others need to pay more for their water. Water, as a publicly owned good, should be supplied to citizens on an equal basis. The scheme, however, was cancelled in 1999, the balancing fund and fees were replaced with a standard extraction charge, and the attempt to equalize conditions and prices in different regions was abandoned (Water Act §§ 116–120). It should be noted that state ownership presents no theoretical barrier to the recognition of private use rights; in other property relationships, such as that between a lessor and lessee, or between dominant and servient estates, property rights in an asset are divided among two or more parties. Yet we still can attempt an overall characterization of the Israeli system: Is it a regime of public ownership, with private rights pursuant to administrative permits, or is it primarily a system of private rights, with all that this entails from both the legal and the rhetorical points of view? The answer would seem to be that water in Israel has not yet completely lost its public character, but that on the crude but still useful public-private axis of property rights, it is moving in the direction of private property. More precisely, it might be said that the creeping privatization of Israeli water resources has been facilitated by privatization’s supposed antithesis, public ownership. The considerations motivating water policy are generally not related to the public good, but rather those that advance the agenda of a particular sector, agriculture (Feitelson 2005; Menahem 1998). Thus water is officially owned by the state, but the authorities entrusted with its allocation do as they wish—or more precisely, as the farmers wish. And the farmers wish for the water to be managed as if it were their private property: with preference given to agriculturalists in both allocation and pricing, even when they use the water for non-agricultural purposes. The results for Israel’s freshwater sources and environments have been disastrous. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:35 12 October 2016 Nearly all the streams, including the Jordan below the Sea of Galilee, have been dried up (due to falling water tables or surface diversions) or function as sewage canals, with resulting great damage to flora and fauna (Adam 2000). The level of the Dead Sea is dropping precipitously, as is that of the Sea of Galilee. Falling water tables in the Coastal Aquifer are leading to saltwater incursions. This environmental failure of public ownership is unsurprising from a theoretical point of view. For decades scholars of public administration have warned of “agency capture,” a phenomenon that accompanies nearly every administrative body, and public choice scholars have offered an explanatory theory. (Wiley Jr. 1986; Donahue 2005; Becker 1985; Elekund, Jr. and Tollison 2001; Macey 1998; Olson 1965). One need not accept all the elements of the theory that sees the state as responsive primarily to special interests, nor its normative conclusions, in order

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to nonetheless recognize in practice many of the negative phenomena predicted by capture theory, and there is perhaps no better example than Israeli water management. Even if one believes (as I do) that true public control would lead to better results than those we have today, one must admit that the current situation, in which public ownership is actually camouflage for private appropriation in practice, is undesirable. Below I argue that, paradoxical as it may seem, a regime of true private property, in which the law explicitly recognizes private rights in water, could provide better protection to public rights.

AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE FAILURE OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP: EIN GEDI

An illustration of this dynamic can be seen in the case of Ein Gedi, the famous Judean Desert oasis. Beyond its historic and cultural significance (from Biblical and Roman times), and its popularity for tourism and recreation among the beautiful landscapes and impressive archaeological remains, the site is important for its unique ecosystem: The combination of the hot, dry climate and location in the Syrian-African Rift, typical of the Dead Sea area, with the fresh water of the springs cascading down the desert slopes, has created a habitat attractive not only to flora and fauna endemic to the region, such as the ibex and the hyrax, but also those typical of tropical environments, for which Ein Gedi marks the northern boundary of their distribution. The unique ecology of the area is absolutely dependent on the waters of the Ein Gedi oasis. Since its founding in the 1950s, the Ein Gedi Kibbutz has been diverting large quantities of water from the springs for its own uses. Over time, the continued diversions caused significant desiccation of the flora in the David and Arugot Streams, and hit particularly hard the vegetation fed by the “Ein Gedi Spring” on the slope between these two streams, overlooking the remains of an ancient synagogue. In recent years the kibbutz has moved the diversion location in Arugot further downstream, restoring the natural flow within the nature reserve, and a similar move is due to take place in the David Stream. Yet the kibbutz continues to take 40% of the waters of Ein Gedi Spring for its bottling operation (Ein Gedi mineral water is the most popular brand in Israel), alongside continued diversions for other uses. The ecological harm, including the drying up of rare tropical tree species, has therefore remained unabated. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:35 12 October 2016 And the situation is likely to worsen, as the kibbutz plans increased pumping in order to increase production at the bottling plant. Many of the kibbutz’s critics base their arguments on public ownership of the spring water. In their view, the diversion by the kibbutz of publicly owned water from a place of special natural beauty is unacceptable, particularly when the diversion’s purpose is a commercial activity such as mineral water sales. The kibbutz, on the other hand, insists on its right to take water from local water sources for whatever use it sees fit. In the past the kibbutz used the water allocated by the state for agriculture, and now it wishes to use it for other, more profitable uses, as any property owner may do with his property. Perhaps ironically, it is the kibbutz’s position that has received support from the government. Official support reached its zenith in 2007, when the Nature and

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National Parks Protection Authority attempted to sign a water use agreement with the kibbutz. The document recognized the kibbutz’s right to decide on its own how to consume “its share” of the water, free from intervention of the Authority. When two Members of Knesset pointed out in a letter to the Authority that the agreement was seemingly in derogation of section 6 of the Water Act, which states that the right to use water is always connected to a specific use (Melchior 2007), the Author- ity responded, instructively for our purposes: “Experience has shown,” wrote its Chief Scientist, “that the agreement is in accord with customary norms with regard to water in Israel. Such a division of water is the practice in many cases… If the norm were different, it is possible that there would be no need for this agreement” (Shakdi 2007). Water privatization is so much a legal fact that at least some arms of the government see it necessary to negotiate with private users in order to obtain water for public use, and the Water Act, which clearly establishes public ownership of water, is seen as something of a dead letter. To sum up, the Water Act states that water in Israel is public property—ownership which should give the state, by way of the permits and allocations granted under the law, control over water uses. In practice, though, permit holders, particularly in the agricultural sector, act as if the water was their own, and the legal rights granted them seem more and more like private property. Public values, particularly those associated with nature conservation and other instream uses, are given short shrift in this system supposedly based on public property. Recently the Israeli Water Act was amended to add to the list of approved purposes of water use the purpose of “conservation and restoration of natural and scenic values, including springs, streams and aquatic habitats” (Water Act § 6(6), added in 2004).68 Technically speaking, it seems that from a practical and legal point of view this amendment was unnecessary, as water had been allocated to nature preservation even before the statutory amendment. The fact that the legislature saw a need to explicitly enumerate conservation as an approved use shows that the idea that the water authorities are obligated primarily to advance the public interest has become a foreign one. At least now, with the law’s amendment, there can be no doubt that the government has the authority to allocate water to nature. The question is what will happen if it does not exercise this authority, or exercises it at a suboptimal level—can nature or an important ecological site acquire water rights for itself, thereby forcing the state to act? Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:35 12 October 2016

PUBLIC VALUES IN A PRIVATE-PROPERTY REGIME

Paradoxically, the prior appropriation system of the western United States, the archetypical private-property regime of water law, may allow for better protection of instream uses, including environmental uses. Two property-law doctrines have afforded some protection of nature in prior appropriation states; one allows ecological

68 The other purposes to which water may be allocated are domestic uses; agriculture; industry; commerce and services; and public services, (Water Act § 6). It should be noted that there is still no mention in the Act of uses related to recreation, though it could be argued that these would be included under “public services.”

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considerations to trump private water rights, while the other effectively grants private rights to the public.69 Unlike public ownership of the resource in Israel, both empower citizens to force the government to act to protect instream uses.

The public trust doctrine The first avenue for protecting the public interest in water is the public trust doctrine. According to the doctrine, which operates as an exception to the ranking of property rights according to seniority, certain rights of the public always enjoy priority. The state, according to the doctrine, holds its waters in trust for the public. Its trustee status means that it cannot do anything – including transferring title to private hands – in a manner that harms the trust. In other words, private, appropriative rights in water, acquired from the public domain, will always be subject to certain public interests that the trust is supposed to protect. The trust is a powerful, quasi-constitutional instrument; not only does it subject administrative decisions regarding the property to judicial review, it can prevent even the legislature from alienating trust property free of trust obligations. The Arizona Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have taken the lead on this front in recent years, striking down repeated attempts by the state legislature to weaken the trust doctrine’s application in the state as unconstitutional (San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Super. Ct. 1999; Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Ill. 1892; Long Sault Development Co. v. Kennedy 1914; In re Wailola O Molokai, Inc. 2004). This doctrine, with its roots in the common law and Roman law, for years found its main expression in protection of the state’s rights in the seabed. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, American law extended its reach to other water bodies, as well.70 In the second half of the twentieth century it was further extended in some states, especially in the West, subjecting private property in water to environmental considerations and allowing the public access to otherwise private water sources for recreational purposes. (National Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty. 1983; Southern Idaho; Fish & Game Ass’n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc. 1974; Montana Coali- tion for Stream Access v. Curran 1984; State v. Red River Valley Co. 1945; Day v. Armstrong 1961; Marks v. Whitney 1971; United Plainsmen v. N. Dak. St. Water Conservency 1976; Sax 1970). The doctrine reached its zenith in the famous Mono Lake case, handed down by the California Supreme Court in 1983 (National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine City 1983). The case involved a petition by an environmental group against Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:35 12 October 2016 the continued diversion by Los Angeles of five streams in the northern part of the state for the purpose of municipal water supply. The diversions, which had begun (with proper approvals) back in 1940, caused a significant drop in the level of Mono Lake, harming not only scenic values, but also the delicate ecological makeup of the lake, a major nesting ground for birds, as well as habitat for species on which they feed.

69 Other legal norms apply as well, including the federal Endangered Species Act’s prohibition on “taking” of endangered species (Sax 2000), but the focus of this paper is on property law. 70 In the nineteenth century American law applied the doctrine to “navigable” waters, and in recent years the term “navigable” has been extended in some states to include and water body capable of public use. See Ausness 1986; Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass’n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 1974; Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran 1984.

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The state Supreme Court ruled, in a groundbreaking decision, that the public trust doctrine requires the state to take into consideration the public’s right to the ecological integrity of a water body. Private parties may acquire rights in the state’s water, ruled the court, by they do so subject to the trust, and the trust remains in force even after the water rights have passed into private hands. This analysis leads to two conclusions: First, that the authorities are entitled to protect public interests in water, even when such protection interferes with longstanding private rights (and without a duty to compensate); second, that the state is obligated to act to protect trust interests, in accordance with its fiduciary duties as trustee for the public. The advantage of the public trust, as opposed to public ownership in the Israeli model, lies in the substantive rights held by the public, as opposed to the state. While the state is in any case obligated to represent the various interests of the public, in Israeli public law its decisions typically benefit from a presumption of validity, as long as they do not exceed some zone of reasonableness. The trust doctrine, on the other hand, vests the public with the power to insist on a higher level of concern for the public weal by the state, and the latter is obligated to justify its actions with regard to trust property. Practically, this means a heightened level of judicial scrutiny with respect to trust property: Rather than striking down decisions only when they exceed the wide bounds of reasonableness, as in the Israeli case, in states with a strong version of the public trust doctrine the state must prove to the court that its actions were indeed consistent with the interests of the public (see Waiola 2004 at 685, and sources there cited).

The reserved rights doctrine In the United States water law is left primarily to the states. As explained above, in the western states it is based on private property rights acquired through appropriation and use, under the “first come, first served” principle. Yet in this paradigmatic system of private rights, state and public uses such as navigation, fishing, and ecological conservation can gain the protection of private property. Just as a farmer or a factory can acquire a water right through diversion and use, the state may appropriate a water right for the public, and preserve the natural flow of a stream by filing notice of its “appropriation” of this right (Blumm 1992; Boyd 2003). Moreover, if the state fails to act, the federal government can claim water rights for certain natural areas, such as National Parks and National Forests, through the Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:35 12 October 2016 Reserved Rights Doctrine. This doctrine holds that when Congress set aside those lands for retention under federal ownership, it also reserved the water rights necessary to carry out the goals of the land reservation, such as nature preservation and recreation. The leading case is Cappaert v. United States (1976), in which the U.S. Supreme Court applied the doctrine of “implied reservation” to nature conservation. In this case a small Nevada lake known as Devil’s Hole had been declared part of Death Valley National Monument, partly in order to protect a species of fish endemic to the lake. Some years later local farmers had begun pumping water from wells on their lands. When it became clear that the pumping was causing the water level in the lake to sink, thereby endangering its fish, the federal government sued the farmers, asking the court to prohibit the pumping. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s injunction against the pumping, ruling that the government was entitled

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to a water right in the amount necessary to advance the purposes of the reserve, and more importantly—that the priority of this right was dated to the day of the Monu- ment’s declaration. As a result, the government’s water right was senior to those of the farmers, even though the farmers had acquired their rights through the procedure laid out by Nevada law, while the federal authorities had never invoked the water- appropriation procedure. The court explained that when the government reserves land for a specific purpose, such as nature conservation, it impliedly also reserves the water rights necessary to advance this purpose. The “implied reservation” doctrine not only allows the federal government to assure an appropriate supply of water to nature, it may even require it to do so. A recent example was the decision of a federal district court, which prohibited the federal government from relinquishing priority water rights—acquired by implied reservation for a national park—in favor of private users in the area. The court based its decision in part on a general prohibition on administrative agencies divesting themselves of government property without legislative sanction. (High Country Citizen’s Alliance v. Norton 2006). The implied reservation doctrine has been applied in American law in other contexts as well. For instance, it was held that the statute creating the Rocky Mountain National Park impliedly reserved all its water for the benefit of its ecosystems (United States v. Denver 1982), and that the declaration of the Black Canyon of the Gunnison as a national monument reserved the waters necessary to “conserve and maintain in an unimpaired condition the scenic, aesthetic, natural, and historic objects of the monument, as well as the wildlife therein, in order that the monument might provide a source of recreation and enjoyment for all generations of citizens of the United States” (in re: The Application for Water Rights of United States of America 2004).

A caveat Unfortunately, while the appropriation system in theory allows the public to acquire private rights to protect nature and other instream uses, legislatures have rather arbi- trarily limited its ability to do so. In Arizona, for instance, while private parties and NGOs may appropriate water for instream purposes, only organs of the state may transfer water from existing consumptive uses to instream ones. (Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 45–152, 45–172; Boyd 2003). This means that environmental groups and citizens may be unable in many cases to protect flows critical for sustaining aquatic species Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:35 12 October 2016 and flow-dependent habitat. Colorado law goes even further; only its Water Conser- vation Board is empowered to hold rights to instream flows (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92- 102(3); Boyd 2003), thereby shutting out private conservation efforts completely. So while in theory the private-property system of prior appropriation allows the public to protect instream uses by means of property rights, in practice legislatures have made this difficult.

CONCLUSION

My conclusion, first of all, is that public ownership of water resources is not necessarily a recipe for protection of ecological and other public values. Even in a seem-

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ingly pure-public water regime such as Israel’s, private interests have succeeded in capturing institutions and processes and turning them to their private benefit. The private-property system of the western United States actually does a better job in many respects of protecting instream uses, because the public can sometimes invoke property law to protect its vital interests. On the other hand, as my caveat at the end of the last section indicates, the political forces that have led to a capture of public property institutions in Israel are seemingly paralleled by forces that have tilted the private-property playing field in the U.S. West against nature conservation. So private property is no panacea either. The ultimate conclusion, then, seems to be that the public/private property distinction is of little significance if protection of instream uses is the goal. Both public and private property may be used for public-regarding purposes or turned to advancing private interest exclusively. Lawyers, scholars, and policymakers should focus not on the form the law takes, but on the actual use that is made of it by interest groups and actors, and tailor legal norms and policies to the circumstances of each area and legal system.

REFERENCES

Adam, R. (2000) Government failure and public indifference: A portrait of water pollution in Israel. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law & Policy, 11, 257. Agricultural Settlement Act, 1967. Anderson, T.L. & Hill, P.J. (1975) The evolution of property rights: A study of the American west. Journal of Law and Economics, 18, 163. Ausness, R. (1986) Water rights, the public trust doctrine, and the protection of instream uses. University of Illinois Law Review, 407. Ayalon Regional Auth. v. Water Commissioner, Misc.App. 103/01, P.M. 5750(2) 273 (2001). Becker, G.S. (1985) Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs. Journal of Public Economics, 28, 329. Ben Ezer v. Water Commissioner, App.Comm. 105/02 (2005). Ben-Meir, M. (2000) The farmers right to water. Water and Irrigation, 408/5 [Hebrew]. Blum v. Minister of Agriculture, H.C. 1773/01, P.D. 56(3) 320 (2002). Blumm, M.C. (1992) Unconventional waters: The quiet revolution in federal and tribal minimum streamflows. Ecology Law Quarterly, 19, 445. Boyd, J.A. (2003) Hip deep: A survey of state instream flow law from the Rocky Mountains to Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:35 12 October 2016 the Pacific Ocean, Natural Resources Journal, 43, 1151. Caponera, D.A. (1992) Principles of Water Law and Administration: National and International. Taylor & Francis. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976). Colorado Revised Statutes. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961). Donahue, D.L. (2005) Western grazing: The capture of grass, ground and government. Environmental Law, 35, 721. Dunbar, R.G. (1983) Forging New Rights in Western Waters. University of Nebraska Press. Elekund Jr., R.B. & Tollison, R.D. (2001) The Interest-Group Theory of Government. In Shughart II, W.F. & Razzolini, L. (Eds.) The Elgar Companion to Public Choice. Edward Elgar Publishing.

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Feitelson, E. (2005) Political Economy of Groundwater Exploitation: The Israeli Case. Water Resources Development, 21, 413. Greens—Ass’n for Environmental Protection v. Yarkon River Auth., Civ.Cl. (Mag. T.A.) 119663/01 paras. 6–7 (2005). HaHaklai Agricultural Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Shapira, Civ.App. 726/72, P.D. 27(2) 589 (1973). Hatis v. Water Commissioner, Civ.App. 293/65, P.D. 19(4) 71 (1965). High Country Citizens’ Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (Dist. Colo. 2006). Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). International Union for Conservation of Nature. (2003) Trading in water: Defining property rights. www.iucn.org/themes/law/pdfdocu-ments/WaterLawSeries-Issue_8.pdf. Local Authorities Act, 1962. Long Sault Development Co. v. Kennedy, 105 N.E. 849 (N.Y. 1914). Macey, J.R. (1998) Public Choice and the Law. In Newman, P. (Ed.) New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. Palgrave Macmillan. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971). Melchior, M.D. & Khenin to E. Amitai. Personal Communication. July 3, 2007 [Hebrew]. Menahem, G. (1998) Policy paradigms, policy networks and water policy in Israel. Journal of Public Policy, 18, 283. Miloban M.C.P. Ltd. v. Water Commissioner, Misc.Mot. 427/06 (2006). Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984). National Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine City., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press. Ostrom, E. (1991) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press. Palestine Order in Council, Article 16e, O.G. 1940, supp. 2, 666. Pardes Hanna Local Council v. Minister of Agriculture, H.C. 221/64, P.D. 18(4) 533 (1964). Reich, C.A. (1964) The new property. The Yale Law Journal, 73, 733. Reisner, M. & Bates, S.F. (1990) Overtapped Oasis: Reform or Revolution for Western Water. Island Press. Rose, C.M. (1990) Energy and efficiency in the realignment of common-law water rights. Journal of Legal Studies, 19, 261. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Super. Ct., 972 P.2d 179 (Ariz. 1999). Sax, J.L. (1970) The public trust doctrine in natural resource law: Effective judicial intervention. Michigan Law Review, 68, 471. Sax, J.L. (2000) Environmental law at the turn of the century: A reportorial fragment of contemporary history. California Law Review, 88, 2375. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:35 12 October 2016 Shakdi, Y. Personal Communication to Eli Amitai. March 15, 2007 [Hebrew]. Shatzman v. Givat Ada Water Supply Company Ltd., Civ.App. 410/75, P.D. 30(1) 330 (1975). Shiva, V. (2002) Water Wars: Privatization, Pollution and Profit. South End Press. Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass’n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295 (Idaho 1974). State v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421 (N.M. 1945). Teclaff, L.A. & United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (1972) Abstraction and Use of Water: A Comparison of Legal Regimes. United Nations. The Application for Water Rights of United States of America, 101 P.3d 1072 (Colo. 2004). United Plainsmen v. N. Dak. St. Water Conservancy, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N. Dak. 1976). United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982). Waiola O Molokai, Inc., 83 P.3d 664 (Haw. 2004). Water Act 1959.

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Water Commissioner v. Perlmutter, Civ.App. 535/89, P.D. 46(5) 695 (1992). Water Regulations, 1976. Wiel, S.C. (1911) Water Rights in the Western States. Bancroft-Whitney Co. Wiley Jr., J.S. (1986) A capture theory of antitrust federalism. Harvard Law Review, 99, 713. Worster, D. (1985) Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West. Oxford University Press. Zabarei Orli Farm v. State of Israel, Civ.Cl. (Dist. Jer.) 6166/04 (2006). Ziv, N. (2004) Poverty, closing gaps and equality: The case of the right to water. Law and Government, 7, 945 [Hebrew]. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:35 12 October 2016

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Kristina Donnelly, Neda Zawahri and Clive Lipchin

INTRODUCTION

The human use of and relationship with water has increased in complexity over the course of history. While early populations considered only their need for drinking, sanitation, and subsistence based agriculture, modern society has varied use considerably, expanding to commercial-scale agriculture, modern hygiene, energy production, general industry, and more. This change in use has fundamentally altered the human relationship with water, making its management far more intricate. Part of that intricacy includes (and has always included) the innate human fasci- nation with water that is often coupled with notions of G-d and the Universe. Early religious teachings incorporated ideas regarding four fundamental elements, water being one. Nature was sacred; something to be respected and protected. The idea of nature was also used in teachings about human behavior and relationship with the divine. As modern religions grew out of these early beginnings, many modern doctrines have incorporated these same concepts into their teachings. Water holds a particularly interesting and important position in both Judaism and Islam. These two religions, born of similar beginnings but fundamentally different in practice and doctrine, currently find many of their followers at odds over their shared water resources, despite its use by both sides as a metaphor for divinity, goodness, blessing, and purity. In both Israel and Palestine, one significant question regarding water management is how to achieve sustainable use, given the political, economic, and spiritual realms of both societies. While both Israel and Palestine rely on the same water sources and must, therefore, together face future scarcity, the reasons for that scarcity differ. Existing state policies in Israel provide little incentive to conserve. Despite its minimal contribution to the Israeli economy, the agricultural sector continues to consume a significant portion of the domestic water supply because of its influence on the policymaking process. On the other hand, effective water resources management in Pales- tine is constantly challenged by lack of public control over the resource, conflict with Israel, and a fragmented donor community. This chapter will discuss how Israel and Palestine have dealt with the issue of scarcity by implementing conservation strategies. It will also consider some new strategies that can be implemented both jointly and separately in the future to enable increased conservation.

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JUDAIC AND ISLAMIC PERCEPTIONS ON WATER USE AND CONSERVATION

In the beginning… Water is the essential element sustaining life on planet earth, and so it is frequently used in religious texts as metaphor for creation. In 25:54 of the Holy Qur’an, the text says that G-d “created from water a human being.” This idea is repeated in 21:30, which goes further to say that every living creature was created from water. The Hebrew Bible, on the other hand, uses water as a metaphor for creation, rather than the source of life. In Prophets, the text notes that G-d is the “spring of living water” (Jeremiah 2:13, 17:13). Thus, G-d, rather than creating life from water, is the source of life-giving water. In either case, water is seen as the substance that makes life possible, and the single step between human beings and the divine.

The spirit of G-d hovered over the face of the waters… The holy texts and teachings of Islam and Judaism also have direct connections to water. The word for Islamic laws – Shari’ah – means “the path that leads to a source of water.” The Torah – the foundational texts in Judaism – is often symbolized as water. Most notably, one of the ancient rabbinical commentaries on the Hebrew Scriptures utilizes Isaiah 55:1 (“all who thirst, come for water,”) as a metaphor for Torah, and this metaphor has been repeated in other religious study guides and texts. Because of its divine characteristics, water has evolved to be an important element in religious rituals, especially those dealing with purification. Ritualized acts of cleaning oneself as a means for purification before a prayer or a sacred act are know as wudu and the ablutions in Islam and Judaism, respectively. These requirements are founded on the idea of water’s sacred nature.

And G-d said: “Behold, I have given you...” In the Hebrew Bible, G-d provides water for the people. In Prophets, water is described as springing forth from G-d’s temple, watering the land of Israel (Ezekiel 47:1–12). Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:37 12 October 2016 Prophets also notes that water will be provided to those who are in need of it (Isaiah 41:17–18). Rain is seen as both a punishment for wrongdoing (Genesis 6–8, 1 Kings 17:1, Jeremiah 14:1–6 and Haggai 1:10–11), as during the flood of Noah, and a blessing for the righteous (Exodus 17:6, Numbers 20:8), as delivered when Moses struck the rock. Passages related specifically to the land of Israel, and the promise by G-d to provide for the Jews, are relevant even today. “For waters will break forth in the wilderness and streams in the Arabah. The burning sand will become a pool, the thirsty ground bubbling springs… I give waters in the wilderness, rivers in the desert, to give drink to my people, my chosen (Isaiah 35:6–7 and 43:20).” The holy promise to water the desert would become an important part of the historical narrative in Israel.

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Water is also noted in several places in the Qur’an as being specifically provided by G-d to the earth (23:53, 43:11, 77:27). Very often, the text specifically notes that water is provided for human use. A good example is 23:18–19, which states, “And We have sent down rain from the sky in a measured amount and settled it in the earth. And indeed, We are Able to take it away. And We brought forth for you thereby gardens of palm trees and grapevines in which for you are abundant fruits and 3 from which you eat.” Not only is the rain provided by G-d, it is provided to bring forth food suitable for human consumption. There are many more examples in the Qur’an of this divine provision of water for human needs, more specifically, the need for food (7:57, 13:17, 25:48–49, 32:27, 39:21).

And G-d said unto them: “Let man have dominion...” Religious texts are used to guide human behavior, including behavior towards the natural environment. In general, the Qur’an cautions against wasting resources, though it does not necessarily mention water explicitly (7:31, 6:141). The laws related to wudu include requirements that each step not be performed more than three times in one day, and, if water is not available, suitable substitutes and alternative rituals can and should be used (4:43). In particular, the hadiths contain descriptions of what is and is not permissible when it comes to the treatment of water resources. Most notably for water quality, the hadiths prohibit urinating or defecating in a water source (Al-Sheikh, 1996). The concept of harim, which is an area around a water source where human activity is not allowed, evolved from this prohibition (Gilli, 2004). This religious law speaks to the divine nature of water and the sacredness of environmental protection and sanitation. Compared to these Islamic laws, Shari’ah law contains two fundamental statements about a human’s right to water – the first is that of shafa, literally, the “right to thirst,” giving everyone a right to quench their thirst. The second is that of shirb, which gives every person the right to irrigate their field. Cultivating dry land is an act that will be rewarded by G-d, especially if it is in the service of the community. One of the hadiths – narrations about the Prophet Muhammad that discuss religious laws – notes that all Muslims share the grass, water and fire (Abu-Dawood, 3470). Another hadith states that the Prophet decreed, “no one can refuse surplus water without sinning against Allah and against man (Mishkat Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:37 12 October 2016 al Masabih).” The hadiths go on to say that those who have excess water and deny it to others in need will be ignored on the Day of Resurrection. In terms of rules regarding ownership of resources, it is believed that water belongs to the community. Only by providing labor to move the water does one establish ownership (Gilli, 2004). Compared to these Islamic laws, Jewish teachings have much less to say about water rights and management of water sources. In some ways, Israel’s water law runs directly counter to Islamic teaching on community ownership, sharing, and pollution prevention. While it should not be suggested that this has necessarily been a factor in the present conflict over water sources in the Middle East, it is a cultural difference worth noting. Ideally, it is hoped that religious laws and institutions can be utilized to address issues of water management in the region.

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WATER POLICY AND CONSERVATION IN ISRAEL

Israel is not a country facing daily water shortages. While it is true that existing sources are limited and becoming more scarce, the taps do not periodically run dry, as they frequently do in many other, similar regions. Water consistently flows to the population. The reality of the limitations of finite resources can be lost on a society that does not experience scarcity. While a reliable water supply is certainly commendable, it offers little incentive to conserve and can promote overuse. In general, the most common mechanisms implemented to induce conservation are government policies, changes in pricing schemes, and educational campaigns. Other authors in this volume address pricing (Kislev; Megdal) and water management policies (Alatout), and so this chapter will minimize discussion of these methods. The major water law, regulation, and development projects in Israel were created and implemented in the late 1950’s. At the time (and until today) the Israeli narrative was that that agriculture forms the basis of both nation and state building, and, as such, should be subsidized by the government. This idea can be seen in the 1959 Water Law, which abolishes private ownership of water and makes all water resources in the country public, to be owned and managed by the State. It was also the role of the State to regulate water consumption as well as discover and develop new sources of water, all for the benefit of the agricultural sector. These principles meant that government positions and agencies entrusted with water management responsibilities were either blatantly agrarian, or filled with people who had a distinctly agrarian interest. Administratively, up until the mid 1990’s, water resources were managed by the Ministry of Agriculture, who was given authority over formulating and implementing water policy. The Minister of Agriculture was responsible for recommending candidates for the Water Commissioner position, and members of the Knesset Water Committee and the National Water Council have historically been affiliated with the agricultural sector. This meant that agrarian interests decided – both ideologically and politically – how this scarce resource would be utilized (Menachem, 1999). Today, nearly 40 percent of freshwater consumption and over 50 percent of total water consumption71 in Israel is allocated to agriculture, while its contribution to the national Gross Domestic Product is only 1–2 percent (Friends of the Earth Mid- dle East, 2010a). Around 20 percent of the total land of Israel is under cultivation, Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:37 12 October 2016 producing almost 70 percent of the country’s total food consumption (in monetary, not caloric, units). Although food security is considered very important to the Jewish state, it must be remembered that non-food crops (such as flowers and cotton) as well as export crops (which account for nearly 20 percent of total agricultural production) do not contribute to food security (Fedler, 2002). The 1990’s and early 2000’s were marked by a shift in water management in Israel, initiated by several official reports on water shortages and the public outcry that resulted (Menachem, 1999). The Office of the Water Commissioner was placed under the new Ministry of Infrastructures, which was also charged with long-term

71 The latter figure includes grey water, which is mainly used for outdoor irrigation.

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national water planning (Menachem, 1999; Shuval, 1999). However, the main result of this report has been, rather than a change in policy, a constant and steady clamor for the development of large-scale desalination facilities.

CONSERVATION STRATEGIES

Conservation technologies to reduce water use for agriculture are not new. In the late 1950’s, an Israeli named Simcha Blass made modifications to drip irrigation technologies, creating a highly efficient system that is still widely used today, and Israel continues to pioneer technological developments to improve agricultural water use. In addition, outdoor irrigation is increasingly utilizing grey water and treated wastewater as a substitute for freshwater. Government conservation policies focusing on the agricultural sector have been largely ineffective and in some cases counter-productive. Farmers are not permitted to alter their quotas without prior government notice and approval, preventing adaptation to changing conditions and promoting the status quo. Government policy will also cut a farmer’s allocation in future years if the entire allotment is not utilized, thereby preventing conservation (Plaut, 2000). The idealization of the agriculture sector in the national narrative has meant policymakers are keen to focus instead on promoting conservation in the domestic sector. However, the effectiveness of price increases as a means for conservation is limited due to the already high price of water and the low elasticity of demand. It is also a very unpopular move politically, making policymakers wary of resorting to it. Therefore, a focus on education as an incentive for conservation is likely to be most effective. One study showed that willingness to conserve by the domestic sector in Israel’s residential sector is higher when the government implements conservation programs while augmenting supply, but is lower when the price is increased (Heiman, 2002). Educational programs are also used to encourage conservation in the domestic sector. The most effective advertising campaigns are those that deliver a high sense of personal responsibility and involvement, and demonstrate the consequences of overuse (Heiman, 2002). There have been a number of educational campaigns over the years focused on water use in the residential sector. In 2009, Israel had been experiencing its worst drought in several decades (IRIN News, 2009), and the government utilized a rather blunt slogan to deliver their message to the people: “Israel is drying up

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:37 12 October 2016 (Senyor, 2009).” The campaign included the use of celebrities as spokespersons as well as competitions for and giveaways of water-saving devices (Shechnik, 2009; Senyor, 2009). The campaign worked in tandem with new local policies; for example, Tel Aviv reduced its use of water for decorative, municipal gardening and increased the enforcement of existing regulations on watering private, decorative gardens (Senyor, 2009). As noted previously, today the most popular response to scarcity is not conservation, but technology; most notably desalination (De Châtel, 2004). Although investment in and use of desalinated water is not new in Israel (Menachem, 1999), it is certainly expanding, with new projects proposed and developed every year. Israel produces around 5 percent of the world’s desalinated water (Mekorot, 2010), and has the capacity to produce almost a third of the total domestic consumption from brackish and sea water desalinated in nearly 30 facilities around the country (water-technology.

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net, 2009). Plans for new facilities would increase this percentage to nearly two-thirds (Kessel and Klochendler, 2010).

LOCAL WATER RESOURCES AND CONSERVATION IN PALESTINE

In its attempt to provide water to over three million people, the Palestinian Authority confronts freshwater quality and quantity problems, along with substantial challenges in effectively managing existing resources. For their freshwater supplies, the Pales- tinians depend on groundwater, springs, rainwater harvesting, and – per the 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement with Israel – the purchasing of water from Mekorot, Israel’s National Water Company. Of these various supplies, the primary source of freshwater is the Coastal Aquifer for the Gaza Strip and the Mountain Aquifer system for the West Bank. Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank confront one of the most severe freshwater deficits in the world (World Bank, 2007). In the West Bank, Palestinians have access to between 113 and 138 MCM/yr from the mountain aquifer system (World Bank, 2009). An additional 6.6 MCM/yr is collected in cisterns and around 40 MCM/yr is purchased from Mekorot (Abu-Safieh, 2002; Guttman, 2004). To meet ever-increasing demand for freshwater, the Palestinians withdraw 153 MCM/yr from the Gaza Strip’s Coastal Aquifer – with 60 MCM/yr for domestic consumption and 90 MCM/yr for agricultural use (El-Madhoun, 2004; Weinthal et al., 2005). To get a better understanding of what this means for individuals, it is useful to consider how much water is available per person. In the West Bank, average per capita water supply is about 97 liters per capita per day (lpcd). However, there is a wide range of accessibility; some towns provide residents with 123 lpcd, while residents of other towns have access to 46 lpcd. Moreover, some have estimated that after accounting for losses in the water network system, many connected households actually consume about 20 lpcd, which is much less than the 100 lpcd recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) for optimal water supply (World Bank, 2009). Residents of the Gaza Strip, who live in one of the most densely populated regions of the world, have access to 152 lpcd from the water distribution network, but true consumption is 60 percent of the supply levels because of significant network loss (ibid). Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:37 12 October 2016 To access groundwater, West Bank Palestinians depend on wells that were predominantly constructed during the Jordanian mandate (1948–1967). Today, abstraction rates and construction of new wells are regulated by Israel, which tends to impose strict limitations on both activities (Abut-Madi, 2009). Since 1999, water withdrawals per person from the West Bank mountain aquifer have actually been declining because of falling water tables and restrictions on the construction of new wells. At the signing of the Oslo II accords, Palestinians were consuming 118 MCM/yr from the mountain aquifer. By 2007, this consumption had decreased to 113 MCM/yr, while the Palestinian population had grown by 50 percent (World Bank, 2009). As a result, Palestinians confront a general water deficit. In the Gaza Strip, the water deficit ranges from 30 to 50 MCM/yr, while in the West Bank it is 70 MCM/yr (Abu-Safieh, 2002).

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Farmers and cooperatives own the majority of the wells currently in the West Bank. Water abstracted by farmers is used to irrigate their own land, while the remaining is sold to other farmers or to households for drinking water. As with many developing nations throughout the world, agriculture is the greatest consumer of Palestinian water resources, using 65 to 70 percent of the total water budget, while the domestic and industrial sectors use around 30 percent (Abu-Madi, 2009). Although it contributes 12 percent to the GDP, farming provides the main source of income for 25 percent of the Palestinian population and it is the third largest employer. More Palestinians have turned to farming as job opportunities in Israel became harder to come by because the security barriers, checkpoints, and other travel restrictions prevent Palestinians from accessing jobs (Abu-Madi, 2009; World Bank, 2009). Several factors interact to challenge the Palestinian Authority’s capacity to meet existing and future demands for water; these include high population growth rates, deterioration of existing supplies, and conflict and tension with Israel. High population growth rates are aggravating the scarcity of freshwater. The West Bank Palestin- ian population faces a 2.5 percent annual population growth rate, while in the Gaza Strip the population growth rate is 3.8 percent, which will double the population in less than 20 years (UNRWA, 2010). Tensions and conflicts with Israel challenge household capacity to secure sufficient water. In fact, the closures, restrictions on movements, check points, curfews, and separation wall have contributed to an overall decline in water consumption among Palestinians (World Bank, 2009). In the Gaza Strip, closures resulted in significant deterioration of the water distribution network because of the inability to secure spare parts, fuel, and chlorine as well as other chemicals needed to treat water. Another contributing factor has been the Palestinian Authority’s failure to transfer funds to Gaza to sustain the water utility. As a result, network services have decreased to 50 percent of households and there has been a rapid deterioration in the network system (World Bank, 2009). Households that are not connected to a network system rely mostly on purchasing water at relatively high prices from tankers or collecting rainwater (World Bank, 2009). Under normal circumstances these households pay four to five times the municipal rate for water. Thus, poor unconnected households expend approximately half their income on water. In addition, the price charged by water tankers increases in response to Israeli restriction on movement because of the challenges such restriction imposes on accessing water, which can mean a 60 to 300 percent increase in cost Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:37 12 October 2016 (WaSH MP, 2006; World Bank, 2009). Existing water supplies are being contaminated by over-abstraction of groundwater, inadequate and insufficient wastewater treatment facilities, and poor waste disposal. Due to over-abstraction of the Coastal Aquifer, Gaza’s only source of water has become too contaminated for human and agricultural use. The aquifer’s available yield is estimated at 91 MCM/yr, while the withdrawal rate is 153 MCM/yr (El-Modhoun, 2004). This over-extraction has resulted in salt water intrusion from the sea, which increased the salinity levels of the aquifer to exceed all international standards (Weinthal et al., 2005). The salinization process has resulted in chloride content of the aquifer’s water to exceed 1000 mg/L, which is much higher than the 250 mg/L recommended by the WHO for drinking water standards (Ibid, p. 655).

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Lack of sufficient wastewater treatment facilities and the high consumption of pesticides and fertilizers by farmers has contributed to the rapid deterioration of the aquifer’s water quality. Of the seven wastewater treatment plants available to Palestin- ians, three are located in the Gaza Strip. These three facilities are overloaded and two operate only intermittently. About 70 percent of Palestinians in Gaza are connected to a sewage network of some kind, either a wastewater treatment plant, cesspits, or borehole. However, these facilities fail to protect the populace from untreated effluents, since 70 to 80 percent of the produced wastewater is discharged without treatment into the environment, contributing to the spread of waterborne diseases (Alfarra and Lubad, 2004). The sewage system situation in the West Bank is even worse; only 31 percent of the households are connected to a network. Of the only four towns in the West Bank with sewage treatment facilities, all have poor quality effluents that contribute to environmental contamination (World Bank, 2009). Another source of contamination of freshwater supplies derives from the intermediate distribution system that delivers household water. Although an excellent technique for water rationing, because it permits municipalities to distribute water to households anywhere from a few hours a day to a few days per week, the distribution system pollutes otherwise potable water (Zawahri, Sowers, and Weinthal, 2010). When pipes are not in use, the unpressurized system can allow for bacterial growth and infiltration by non-potable water. Once pipes are back in use, this contamination will travel to households in the Gaza Strip and West Bank (Haddad, 2004; World Bank, 2007). Lacking alternative sources of water, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip continue to consume water that is high in salinity, nitrate, boron, fluoride, and chloride, which yield significant health risks – such as, methemoglobinemia in infants, renal failure, stomach cancer, and other waterborne diseases (El-Modhoun, 2004; Alfarra and Lubad, 2004). The water crisis is so severe in the Gaza Strip that scientists have concluded that the Coastal Aquifer is no longer capable of meeting the water needs of Palestinians (Weinthal et al., 2005; World Bank, 2009). Due to several factors, including poorly managed septic tanks, springs in the West Bank tend to be contaminated with Coliform bacteria, which make the water unsuitable for direct human consumption (Naji, 2002). Water tankers that service unconnected households often carry water contaminated with high levels of faecal coliforms. Poor water quality in the West Bank contributes to the spread of waterborne diseases, which have become a major problem for the Palestinian population. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:37 12 October 2016 Although it is extremely difficult to locate accurate data on waterborne diseases because many incidents go unreported, estimates suggest that the health costs are about 0.4 percent of GDP in the West Bank (World Bank, 2007). For Gaza, the WHO estimated that 26 percent of all diseases are connected to poor water quality (World Bank, 2009). Despite the low water consumption rate among Palestinians, there is potential for conservation in the farming sector, especially through wastewater re-use for irrigation, protection against illegal wells, and reparation of the water distribution system. As the largest consumer of the domestic water budget, the agricultural sector can assist in water conservation by improving the efficiency of irrigation and crop selection. The use of modern irrigation techniques, such as drip irrigation, can help conserve

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substantial quantities of water. Alternatively, the selection of crops that have a high tol- erance for salt and require less water can also help conserve water in this sector. Some have estimated that the incorporation of technology and improved cropping practices can save between 30 and 50 percent of agricultural water use (Al-Dadah, 2001). Others have suggested that if this sector improves its efficiency of irrigation by only 40 percent, it can save 11 MCM/yr of water (Friends of the Earth Middle East, 2010a). Palestinian farmers use potable water to irrigate their lands, but incorporating treated wastewater will help conserve freshwater supplies and protect the environment and human security. However, current wastewater treatment facilities in the West Bank and Gaza strip are insufficient in treating their effluent, and they are also endangering human security and the local ecosystem, along with threatening the quality of remaining freshwater supplies (World Bank, 2009; Friends of the Earth Middle East, 2010a). Because the existing wastewater treatment facilities are ineffective, the agricultural sector does not currently use any treated wastewater. Once farmers can be assured that the treated wastewater meets WHO standards, the water can be redirected to the agricultural sector for irrigation use. It is estimated that usable treated wastewater can total 55 MCM/yr by 2020 (Al-Dadah, 2001). A transition to utilizing treated wastewater in the agricultural sector to irrigate crops means that the Palestinians can save about 39 MCM/yr of freshwater (Friends of the Earth Middle East, 2010a). This saved freshwater can be redirected to meet household needs in compliance with WHO recommendations. Other benefits of using treated wastewater include lowering the outbreaks of waterborne diseases and protecting aquifers from contamination and over abstraction (Al-Dadah, 2001). Treated wastewater can also be used to recharge aquifers. The Palestinian population has developed its own coping strategies to survive the difficulties that it confronts in accessing and securing sufficient quantities of potable water. In their desperate search for water, some are taking the initiative to drill their own unlicensed private wells. Unfortunately, these unlicensed wells have contributed to the unsustainable over-abstraction of the Coastal Aquifer. The Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) has attempted to identify and meter these unlicensed wells (Al-Da- dah, 2001). Unlike the successful Israeli construction of relatively large desalinization plants, the Palestinian Authority is focusing on small scale desalinization (El Sheikh, 2004). In the Gaza Strip, there are around 40 small-scale private desalinization plants whose water is sold in the market, and some 20,000 household desalinization plants. Gaza’s water util- Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:37 12 October 2016 ity operates four desalinization plants. Unfortunately, the minerals removed during the desalinization process are not replaced prior to consumption (World Bank, 2009). Approximately 84 percent of Palestinian households in the West Bank are connected to a network system, while 98 percent of the households in Gaza are connected. Although the Palestinians have an impressive percentage of their population connected to a household water network delivery system, poor maintenance, and conflict has meant that these networks are plagued by leakages and theft. It is estimated that anywhere from 40 to 50 percent of the water that enters the network is actually lost prior to arrival at the household. Thus, a substantial quantity of water can be saved through leak and theft detection along with repair in the water conveyance system. The PWA has made improvements in the network system, but, as noted earlier, the recent conflicts have resulted in major setbacks (Al-Dadah, 2001; World Bank, 2009).

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WATER POLICY AND CONSERVATION IN PALESTINE

To govern Palestinian water resources, Presidential Decree No. 5/1995 established the Palestinian Water Authority in 1995, which gave the PWA power to manage domestic water resources, implement water policy, monitor water projects and coordinate the activities of various stakeholders (Husseini, 2004). In 2002, the Palestine Water Law No.3/2002 was introduced to regulate the water sector. It formalized the PWA’s authority and declared all Palestinian water resources public property. The law also aimed to protect existing resources from contamination. Despite the promulgation of the Water Law, the PWA lacks the capacity to govern effectively in part because its authority is challenged by better equipped well-owning families, donors, and Israel (Trottier, 1999). Because the Palestinian Authority still lacks complete autonomy from Israel it has been hampered in its efforts to develop and regulate its water resources. Implementation of water project depends to a large extent on Israeli cooperation. In addition, the donor community, which is fragmented, highly political, and competitive (Zeitoun et al., 2005), has implemented very few of the project it recommends (World Bank, 2009). Although the PWA confronts numerous challenges in attempting to manage the domestic water resources, options remain for the conservation of freshwater resources. Some water savings are possible through public awareness campaigns that educate society about water conservation methods and means by which they can protect water resources from contamination. Since religion exerts a significant influence on Middle Easterners, drawing on religion has been an effective tool in encouraging households to conserve water (Atallah, Khan, and Malkawi, 1999; Gilli, 2006). As documented earlier in this chapter, water holds an important position in Islam and it is often used as a metaphor for divinity, goodness, blessings and purity. The objective of education campaigns has been to convey the message that water conservation is a religious obligation. The most effective channel to deliver these mes- sages and achieve compliance with water conservation is the use of mosques, Friday prayer, and imams to educate the populace. Palestinian imams attend special training sessions where they are educated about water conservation activities (Gilli, 2006). Whether it is non-governmental organizations, donors, or the Palestinian government, all have used religious symbolism in education campaigns, which proved to be effective in altering consumer behavior. Religious symbolism is used in newspaper articles, television advertising, and posters or stickers (Gilli, 2006). For example, a Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:37 12 October 2016 Palestinian NGO has named its water conservation campaign “Zam Zam” like the water spring in Mecca. Similarly the WHO has drawn on Hadiths by the Prophet to educate the public on water conservation (ibid).

DEVELOPING A JOINT WATER CONSERVATION STRATEGY FOR ISRAEL AND PALESTINE

One of the issues with implementing some sort of joint water conservation strategy is the difference in use between Israel and Palestine. Israel controls all water resources in the region and Palestinian use is inadequate for human needs and economic development (World Bank, 2009). However, the implementation of joint conservation

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strategies in Israel and Palestine can seek to accommodate, and even take advantage of, these differences. As a first priority, a joint conservation strategy should raise awareness of the seriousness of the shared water situation and the opportunities available. Public education campaigns are essential to engaging the public on the changes in their behavior that can protect scarce water resources. The public can be involved in designing and implementing conservation strategies. A joint fact-finding project related to the potential for new demand management strategies could be very useful to both sides. Moreover, these kinds of activities can, in Israel, help improve public understanding of the differences in access. The utilization of Islamic teachings and religious leaders to promote conservation is not a new idea in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Atallah et al. (1999) stress three reasons for the potential success of conservation campaigns that come from Islamic sources: Islam’s strong influence in the region, the stress Islam already places on water conservation and protection, and the existing effectiveness of Islamic communication channels in generally raising public awareness about issues. This last point is particularly important, as it underscores the way in which important conservation information should be delivered in Muslim communities. Not only should the religious center serve as the focal point for dissemination, all three points suggest that conservation strategies should incorporate Islamic concepts in order to more effectively reach the population. As was seen in the first section, Islam already offers a strong environmental foundation, especially in regards to water. The national representative for Islamic teachings should be involved in any strategy, as the issuance of an official, Islamic prohibition (haraam) on wasting water would carry more weight with the population (Atallah, Khan, and Malkawi, 1999). Some potential also exists in the Jewish community to use religious teachings to induce conservation. As the practice of Judaism in Israel varies considerably, each technique has the potential to reach some groups, but not others. For example, mes- sages delivered by rabbis on the need for conservation might only reach Jews who attend synagogue regularly. However, Judaism in Israel touches many aspects of life outside the synagogue, and so other Jewish organizations and groups could be utilized to spread the message. For example, Jewish holidays, observed by even the most secu- lar in Israel, could be used to stage a conservation campaign. Tu B’Shevat – the Jewish equivalent of Arbor Day where trees are planted – has been taken up by environmental organizations as a means for promoting environmental awareness. As the holiday Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:37 12 October 2016 is also considered agrarian, a campaign could also be held encouraging awareness and change in agricultural water management. Although Judaism does not have the same legal requirement for conservation as does Islam, opportunities still exist to promote a conservation message through religious metaphors, events, and community groups. Although the political situation in the region is a divisive one on many fronts, potential solutions to the water problem do not have to be another. Friends of the Earth Middle East has estimated that implementing currently feasible demand management policy options could, per year, save somewhere between 248 and 627 MCM in Israel and 46 MCM in Palestine (2010a). This is an opportunity despite the political, social, and economic difficulties. Strategies should seek to unite these two populations around both their common ancestry and shared resource. Indeed, moving forward to solve this problem will necessitate collaboration as the use of the resource by one

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side has an immediate and unavoidable effect on the other. The common background between Jews and Muslims could be used to serve the dual function of promoting environmental awareness while encouraging opportunities for religious understanding.

REFERENCES

Abu-Madi, M. (2009). Farm-level perspective regarding irrigation water prices in the Tulkarm district, Palestine. Agricultural Water Management 96: 1344–50. Abu-Safieh, Y. (2002). Water Resources, Protection and Management in Palestine. In: Zereini F, Wolfgang J, editors. Water in the Middle East and in North Africa. Berlin: Springer. pp. 87–99. Al-Dadah, J. (2001). Water Demand Management and Conservation Methods in Palestine. In: The Joint WHO/UNEP First Regional Conference on Water Demand Management, Conservation and Pollution Control; 2001 Oct 7–10; Amman. Available from: http:// www.emro.who.int/ceha/pdf/proceedings33-water%20demand%20in%20Palestine.pdf. Accessed 2010 December 15. Alfarra A. and Lubad S. (2004). Health Effect Due to Poor Wastewater Treatments in Gaza Strip. In: Water for Life in the Middle East, The 2nd Israeli-Palestinian-International Con- ference; 2004 Oct 10–14; Turkey. IPCRI [online]. Available from: www.ipcri.org/watconf/ papers. Accessed 2010 January 2. Al-Sheikh, A.F. (1996). Water and Sanitation in Islam. In: The Right Path to Health- Health Education through Religion. Alexandria: World Health Organization. Arlosoroff, S. (2004). Water Demand Management – A Strategy to Deal with Water Scarcity, Israel: A Case Study. In: Water for Life in the Middle East, The 2nd Israeli-Palestinian- International Conference; 2004 Oct 10–14; Turkey. IPCRI [online]. Available from: www. ipcri.org/watconf/papers. Accessed 2011 January 2. Arlosoroff, S. (2006). Overcoming Water Scarcity in Israel. Water and Wastewater Interna- tional Oct-Nov: 27–30. Atallah, S., Ali Khan, M. and Malkawi, M. (1999). Water Conservation through Islamic Pub- lic awareness in the Eastern Mediterranean Region. Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal 5(4): 785–797. Ben Gurion, D. (1955 Jan 17). The Importance of the Negev Speech. Between Quotation Marks (in Hebrew). Available from: http://www.pitgam.net/quote/5278/1/. Accessed 2011 January 11. Bergstein, R. (2009 December 3). Political Drama over Water Prices in Israel: An Update on the Drought Tax. Green Prophet. Available from: http://www.greenprophet.com/2009/12/ update-on-israeli-drought-tax/. Accessed on 2010 Dec 20. Brooks, D. and Trottier, J. (2010). Confronting water in an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:37 12 October 2016 Journal of Hydrology 382: 103–114. 16 Brooks, D. and Wolfe, S. (2004). Water Demand Management as Governance: Lessons from the Middle East and South Africa. In: Water for Life in the Middle East, The 2nd Israeli- Palestinian-International Conference; 2004 Oct 10–14; Turkey. IPCRI [online]. Available from: www.ipcri.org/watconf/ papers. Accessed 2011 January 2. De Châtel, F. (2004). Perceptions of Water in the Middle East: the Role of Religion, Politics and Technology in Concealing the Growing Water Scarcity In: Water for Life in the Middle East, The 2nd Israeli-Palestinian-International Conference; 2004 Oct 10–14; Turkey. IPCRI [online]. Available from: www.ipcri.org/watconf/papers. Accessed 2011 January 2. El-Madhoun, F. (2004). Drinking Water Quality: Evaluation of Chloride and Nitrate Concen- tration of Wells Supplies Gaza Governorates (1990–2002)- Palestine. In: Water for Life in the Middle East, The 2nd Israeli-Palestinian-International Conference; 2004 Oct 10–14; Turkey. IPCRI [online]. Available from: www.ipcri.org/watconf/papers. Accessed 2011 January 2.

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El- Sheikh, R. (2004). Regulatory challenges of Palestinian strategies on distribution of desalinated water. Desalination 165: 83–88. Faruqui, N. (2000). Wastewater Treatment Reuse for Food and Water Security. Interna- tional Development Research Centre. Available from: http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/19579/1/ 116121.pdf. Accessed 2011 January 11. Fedler, J. (2002 December). Focus on Israel: Israel’s Agriculture in the 21 st Century. Israel Min- istry of Foreign Affairs. Available from: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/ Economy/ Focus+on+Israel-+Israel-s+Agriculture+in+the+21 st.htm. Accessed: 2010 Sep- tember 11. Friends of the Earth Middle East. (2010a). Towards a Living Jordan River: An Economic Analysis of Policy Options for Water Conservation in Jordan, Israel and Palestine. May. Available from: http://foeme.org/uploads/publications_publ118_1.pdf. Accessed: 2010 October 8. Friends of the Earth Middle East. (2010b). An Economic Analysis of Policy Options for Water Conservation in Israel. July. Available from: http://foeme.org/ uploads/12863581851∼%5E$%5E∼JR_Economic_Analysis_of_Policy_Options_for_ Water_Conservation_in_Israel_ENGLISH_August_2010.pdf. Accessed: 2010 October 13. Gilli, F. (2004). Islam, Water Conservation and Public Awareness Campaigns. In: Water for Life in the Middle East, The 2nd Israeli-Palestinian-International Conference; 2004 Oct 10–14; Turkey. IPCRI [online]. Available from: www.ipcri.org/watconf/papers. Accessed 2011 January 2. Guttman, J. (2004). Educated Water Management Under Hydrological Stress in the West Bank. In: Water for Life in the Middle East, The 2nd Israeli-Palestinian-International Conference; 2004 Oct 10–14; Turkey. IPCRI [online]. Available from: www.ipcri.org/watconf/papers. Accessed 2011 January 2. 17. Haddad, M. (2004). Politics and Water Management: A Palestinian Perspective. In: Water for Life in the Middle East, The 2nd Israeli-Palestinian-International Conference; 2004 Oct 10–14; Turkey. IPCRI [online]. Available from: www.ipcri.org/watconf/papers. Accessed 2011 January 2. Heiman, A. (2002). The Use of Advertising to Encourage Water Conservation: Theory and Empirical Evidence. Journal of Contemporary Water Research and Education 121: (79–86). Husseini, H. (2004). The Palestinian Water Authority: Developments and Challenges Involving the Legal Framework and Capacity of the PWA. In: Water for Life in the Middle East, The 2nd Israeli-Palestinian-International Conference; 2004 Oct 10–14; Turkey. IPCRI [online]. Available from: www.ipcri.org/watconf/papers. Accessed 2011 January 2. Joffe-Walt, B. (2009 November 16). Israel Ends Drought Tax but Raises Water Prices. The Media Line. Available from: http://www.jewishjournal.com/israel/article/israel_ends_ Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:37 12 October 2016 drought_tax_but_ raises_water_prices_20091115/. Accessed on: 2010 November 20. Kessel, J. and Klochendler, P. (2010 June 3). Israel Builds New Desalination Plant, But Pales- tinians Are Still Denied an Adequate Water Supply. AlterNet. Available from: http://www. alternet.org/world/ 147076/israel_builds_new_desalination_plant,_but_palestinians_are_ still_denied_an_adequate_water_supply. Accessed 2010 October 6. Mekorot. Activities: Desalination. Merkorot. Available from: http://www.mni.gov.il/mni/ en-US/Water/Desalination/. Accessed on: 2010 October 6. Menachem, G. (1999). Water Policy in Israel: Policy Paradigms, Policy Networks and Public Policy. Public Policy Program and Department of Sociology and Anthropology. Discussion Paper No. 1–99, Tel Aviv University. Naji, F. (2002). Water Resources Management in Palestine: Political, technical and financial obstacles. In: Zereini F, Wolfgang J, editors. Water in the Middle East and in North Africa. Berlin: Springer. pp. 239–50.

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Plaut, S. (2000). Water Policy in Israel. Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, Division for Economic Policy Research. Policy Studies No. 47. July. Senyor, E. (2010 February 22). Tel Aviv launches water saving campaign. Ynet News. Availa- ble from: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3675380,00.html. Accessed on: 2010 October 7. Shechnik, R. (2010 February 24). Bar Refaeli joins water-saving campaign. Ynet News. Avail- able from: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles. Accessed on: 2010 October 7. Shuval, H. (1999). Sustainable Water Development under Conditions of Scarcity: Israel as a Case Study. In: Marchisio S, Tamburelli G, Pecoraro L, editors. Sustainable Development and Management of 18 Water Resources: a Legal Framework for the Mediterranean. Rome: Institute for Legal Studies on the International Community. pp. 196–223. Stolow, J. (1997). Utopia and Geopolitics in Theodor Herzl's Altneuland. Utopian Studies (8.1): 55–76. Trottier, J. (1999). Hydropolitics in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Jerusalem: Palestinian Aca- demic Society for the Study of International Affairs. UNICEF. (2007). Palestinian Cope with Water Scarcity in Gaza. Available on: http://www. unicef.org/infobycountry/oPt_39197.html Accessed on: 12 January 2011. UNRWA. (2010). West Bank and Gaza Strip Population Census of 2007. Briefing paper. January. Waldoks, E.Z. (2010 July 1). Water prices rise as Kinneret drops. The Jerusalem Post [serial online]. Available on: http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=180111. Accessed on 2010 October 7. Wash, M.P. (2006). Continued Israeli Assult on Palestinian Water, Sanitation and Hygiene During the Intifada. Phg.ord. Available on: http://www.phg.org/data/files/monitoringpubs/ yearly/water_for_life_05.pdf. Accessed on: 2010 November 20. Water-technology.net. (2010). Ashkelon Desalination Plant Seawater Reverse Osmosis (SWRO) Plant, Israel. Water-technology.net. Available on: http://www.water-technology. net/projects/israel/. Accessed on: 2010 October 7. Weinthal, E., Vengosh, A., Marei, A., Gutierrez, A. and Kloppmann, W. (2005). The Water Crisis in the Gaza Strip: Prospects for Resolution. Ground Water 43(5): 653–660. World Bank. (2007). Making the Most of Water Scarcity: Accountability for Better Water Man- agement Results in the Middle East and North Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. (2009). The Assessment of Restrictions on Palestinian Water Sector Development. Washington, DC: World Bank. Zawahri, N., Sowers, J. and Weinthal, E. (2010). Assessing Progress towards Meeting the Mil- lennium Development Goals for Water and Sanitation in the Middle East and North Africa, Manuscript under review. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:37 12 October 2016 Zeitoun, M. (2008). Power and Water in the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris. Zeitoun, M., Messerschmid, C. and Attili, S. (2009). Asymmetric Abstraction and Allocation: The Israeli-Palestinian Water Pumping Record. Ground Water 47(1): 146–160.

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IIHESHAE0_Book.indbHESHAE0_Book.indb 165165 111/20/20121/20/2012 1:15:111:15:11 PMPM Chapter 11 Implications of climate change in Palestine

Amjad Aliewi, P.E. O’Connell and Mohammed N. Almasri

INTRODUCTION

Climate change presents a unique threat to the global environment of the whole world. Scientific evidence now clearly indicates that the earth’s climate is rapidly changing mainly as a result of increases in greenhouse gases caused by human activities. Human activities are changing the composition of the atmosphere and its properties. Many human activities are affecting the climate through increasing emissions of heat trap- ping gases, greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrogen, and sulfur oxides). Increased fossil energy use, agricultural activity and deforestation leads to an increase in the level of atmospheric greenhouse gases, which trap a portion of the radiation from earth. As it is known, the increasing of the earth’s surface temperature is leading to increased weather variability, a rise in sea level, the spread of diseases, and enhanced air pollution. Extreme weather events such as drought, less precipitation, less recharge to aquifers, more runoff and a series of biodiversity alterations are expected to be caused by global warming. Many species in the world are expected to become extinct, which is not a new phenomenon. Global warming is also likely to lead to an increase in the number of infectious diseases and respiratory illnesses. It will also raise the risk and severity of flooding, and reduce the availability of clean drinking water to millions of people. As a part of the Middle East region, our natural environment will not be only affected by climate change, but it will also have a great effect on the political and socio-economic environments. The Middle East, including Palestine, is considered to be one of the world’s most water-stressed regions (IPCC 2008). The issue of climate change has predicted to make the limited Palestinian water resources scarcer and thus this will contribute to an even greater water stress in the region. In Palestine, there are many deficiencies and shortcomings regarding climate change assessment and a corresponding impact analysis. For instance, there is a lack of information and research concerning the potential existence of climate change patterns. The outcomes of the climate change models (i.e. the global circulation models) for the area are not well analyzed, comprehended, and verified. In addition, the concentrations of greenhouse emissions are not assessed since monitoring stations and monitoring programs do not exist as of this date. Human activities in Palestine that contribute to the greenhouses emissions are mainly due to transportation and electricity generation. However, there is an environmental concern that gas emissions will increase as Palestine, like any other

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developing country, follows in the footsteps of other industrialized countries in their dependency on oil as the main source of energy. Charcoal is hardly used any more as a source of energy for winter heating and cooking. Solar energy also has limited utilization despite the fact that it is commonly used for heating water for domestic use. Generally, Palestine is facing a critical situation concerning the achievement of sustainable water and environmental conservation and development. Several constraints have contributed to the continuous deterioration of the environmental systems thus, rendering development initiatives difficult to achieve. On the top of these constraints are the increasing pressure on the natural resources due to the accelerated population growth, growing Palestinian urbanization requirements and the expansion of the Israeli settlements and military infrastructure, the restricted access to water and other natural resources, the limited sovereignty over land use, absence of environment-friendly regulations, and the substantial imbalance between developmental plans and conservation of environmental resources. The production and use of energy are the major sources of pollution with regard to greenhouse gases worldwide. Today, Palestine imports its primary energy requirements from Israel and the cost of these imports compared to the standard of living is significantly high. Demand for energy consumption is progressively increasing as the population grows and residential and industrial use expands. Thus, efforts have to be directed towards finding ways and means to conserve and convert energy to less greenhouse gases. This paper highlights and assesses the rainfall variability (spatially and tempo- rally) as a potential indicator of the existence of a climate change pattern in Palestine in an attempt to establish evidence about climate change, particularly if there is an evidence that rainfall is decreasing over time. In addition, the paper draws attention to the implications of rainfall variability on Palestinian water resources and the agriculture sector. The paper concludes with underlining the needed mitigation measures and adaptation strategies against the impacts of climate change.

THE FEAR OF CLIMATE CHANGE IMPLICATIONS IN PALESTINE

The fear of the implications of climate change in Palestine, a country that is consid- Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:38 12 October 2016 ered a “rainfall semi-scarce country”, is that the expected climate change may lead to less rainfall and thus less recharge to the aquifers which are the main source of water in Palestine. As a result of the expected climate change, the springs in the West Bank will issue later and their yield will be reduced. Some of West Bank springs have dried up, such as Al-Fara spring and Al-Auja spring. However, these two springs dried up also due to additional reasons, such as drilling wells near these springs, and therefore it is difficult to claim that climate change is the sole reason. In addition, an increase in the intensity and distribution of rainfall will lead to an increase in the frequency of floods and the amount of winter runoff and changes in distribution. Intensification of rainfall will be responsible for soil erosion, leaching of agriculture chemicals and runoff of urban wastes and nutrients into water bodies. Extreme precipitation events (e.g., heavy rainfall and storms) may lead to less

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recharge to groundwater because much of the precipitation is lost as runoff. This situation is very much encountered in the eastern slopes (watersheds) of the West Bank where flash floods occur. This situation is much exacerbated since there are no hydraulic infrastructures that exist to harvest the runoff. As for the rise in temperature, this will lead to an increase in evaporation. Droughts result in declining water levels not only because of reduction in rainfall, but also due to increased evaporation and a reduction in infiltration that may accompany the development of dry top soils. If heavy rainfall events occur, then there will be an increased risk of floods. The vegetation in the semi-arid and arid parts of Palestine significantly reduces the per- meability of the underlying soil. The projected reduced precipitation processes will expand the dryness of the top soil and this will increase the potential of desertification. The increased runoff from open areas will generate more frequent and more powerful flash floods that, besides damage to infrastructures and life, will lead to an increased water loss, either to the Mediterranean or to the Dead Sea. The increased runoff, coupled with sea level rise and increased rain intensity, may cause flooding leading to the creation of swamps. A decrease in the hydraulic slope between drainage systems and sea level reduces the efficiency of water transfer and increases the probability of flooding. This may result in a relatively high vulnerability to projected increases in rain intensity and surface runoff. All the above implications will add a pressure on water resources since this leads to a reduction in the available water supply, more droughts and more demand on water. As for the environmental systems, deterioration in water quality will take place due to high concentration of agriculture chemicals in lower flows. Demand for energy consumption increases as the population grows and residential and industrial use expands which means more greenhouse gases. As for the coastal system in Gaza, the lowering of water levels in the Coastal Aquifer of Gaza (as a result of less rainfall and recharge) coupled with the rise of sea level will lead to more saltwater intrusion and thus complicate the freshwater availability in Gaza. The less rainfall and delayed spring water flows will lead to a reduction in rain-fed and spring-fed agriculture production. The climate change implications will also lead to negative impacts on livestock and herders due to weak and short growth seasons of pastures and rangeland and due to limited production of dry and fresh fodders in irrigated agriculture as reported by MoA (2009). Finally, the wildlife and biodiversity systems will be affected since some species may become extinct. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:38 12 October 2016

RAINFALL IN PALESTINE – A GENERAL BACKGROUND

Palestine (see Figure 1) is comprised of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It has a Medi- terranean-type climate. The presence of mountains (up to 1022 m above sea level) in the west of Palestine affects the behavior of low pressure areas resulting in westerlies which force moist air upwards causing precipitation on the ridges of the mountains. The steep gradient of the Jordan Valley produces a “lee” effect which greatly reduces the quantity of rainfall in the Jordan Rift Valley (Hussarry, Najjar and Aliewi 1995). The West Bank lies over the Mountain aquifer. The Mountain aquifer is divided into the eastern aquifer, the northeastern aquifer, and the western aquifer as depicted

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LEBANON

Haifa Lake Tiberias (Kinneret)

Northern Aquifer Tulkarm

WEST BANK

Tel Aviv-Yalo Western Aquifer J Eastern O Aquifer R D A N Jerusalem (AI Quds)

Coastel Aquifer

Gaza Dead Sea

GAZA

N EGYPT Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:38 12 October 2016 0 30 km

Figure 1 Regional location of Palestine (including West Bank and Gaza Strip) along with the main aquifer basins; the mountain aquifer and the Coastal Aquifer (UNEP 2003).

in Figure 1 The eastern aquifer and part of the northeastern aquifer flows east towards the Jordan River. The western aquifer and another part of the northeastern aquifer flows westerly towards the Mediterranean Sea (Scarpa 1994). A recent map of rainfall for the year 2008 is presented in Figure 2, which shows that rainfall ranges in the West Bank from 100 mm in the Dead Sea area, 700 mm in the north, 500–600 mm in the western slopes, and 150–450 mm in the eastern slopes.

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Average Annual Rainfall in the West Bank

West Bank and Gaza Boundary Beisan Main City Jenin Average Annaul Rainfall mm 700 - 800 600 - 700 Tulkarm 500 - 600 400 - 500 300 - 400 200 - 300 Nablus 120 - 200 Qalqiliya

15 - 200 Mediterranean Sea N 048Kilometers Tel Aviv Yafa Jordan River Jordan Al Lid

Ar Ramiah Ramallah Ariha (Jericho) Al Quds (Jerusalem)

Bethlehem

Jabaliyah Dead Sea Al Khalil Gaza (Hebron)

Deirel Balah

Khan Yunus

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:38 12 October 2016 Rafah

Figure 2 2008–2009 Rainfall distribution in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (MoA 2009).

Also, rainfall is higher in the northern and central parts of West Bank where the contribution of Khamasini depressions to the annual rainfall becomes considerably; more than it is in the southern and eastern parts. In the Gaza Strip, rainfall ranges from 200–300 mm in the southern parts, reaching up to 400–500 mm in the north. Rainfall is limited to the winter and spring months from October to May. During the period of April to June, hot Khamasini winds from the south may occur. Rainfall

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in the West Bank varies greatly from east to west and from south to north according to topography. The number of rainy days is limited and rarely exceeds 60 days a year (Hussary, Najjar and Aliewi 1995). It is known that Climate Change is the change in the magnitude of a single climate parameter such as temperature. In this context the question that is frequently being asked, “Is it really confirmed in Palestine that some areas are shifting to colder, wetter, cloudier, and windier conditions and other areas are shifting to the opposite direction?!!”. Irrespective of the causes of any climate change, it is clear this change must be included in any robust scenarios for future assessments of groundwater recharge and water resource availability. This is because a country like Palestine is strongly dependent on rainfall for both water supply and food security. If drought were to happen for three consecutive years, then there would be no sufficient amounts of water to supply people for domestic use, nor there enough water to irrigate crops. And therefore there would be no food security for Palestinians which would then negatively impacts the socio-economic conditions.

ASSESSMENT OF RAINFALL VARIABILITY IN PALESTINE

General background The only exhaustive work that took place on rainfall variation and climate change in Palestine with respect to water resources and land use impacts was through the project entitled “Sustainable Management of the West Bank and Gaza Aquifers, SUSMAQ, 1999–2005”. SUSMAQ was a partnership between the Palestinian Water Authority and Newcastle University and was funded by the United Kingdom Govern- ment’s Department for International Development (DfID). In this project, many issues related to rainfall and climate change for Palestine were researched, such as rainfall variability and change in the West Bank (SUSMAQ 2003), stochastic space-time modeling of West Bank rainfall for present and future climates (SUSMAQ 2005a), and development and application of a regional climate model for assessing the impacts of land use and climate changes (SUSMAQ 2005b). The following sections highlight the main findings regarding rainfall variability in the West Bank. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:38 12 October 2016

General observations With respect to rainfall variability, the research under the SUSMAQ project pointed out that the rainfall regime of the West Bank has been shown to be highly variable in a number of respects, as follows: (i) much of the rainfall occurs in intense rain storms (for instance, see Figure 3 and Figure 4); (ii) spatial patterns exist caused by topography, distance from the coast and latitude; (iii) spatial variability is very high, caused by topography as well as small, intense, convective rain storms, so correlation falls off rapidly with distance; (iv) and inter-annual variability of rainfall is high – the long term mean is not a good guide to expected rainfall amounts over decadal periods. Back to Figure 3 and Figure 4 which were developed for the City of Nablus, Palestine,

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1300 1200 1100 1000 900 800 700

Rainfall (mm) 600 500 400 300 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Time (years)

Figure 3 Annual rainfall in Nablus for the period 1975–2005.

30 Number of rainy days

20 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Time (years)

Figure 4 Number of Rainy days in the same period, 1975–2005. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:38 12 October 2016

for the period from 1975 to 2005, the minimum and maximum numbers of rainy days per year are 23 and 46 days, respectively with an average of 39 days per year. It can be inferred that the rainfall amount per a rainy day is increasing while the frequency of rainy days is decreasing. This ‘spotty’, variable nature of rainfall means that estimating groundwater recharge cannot accurately rely on rainfall inputs which have been averaged either in space (e.g. over a large region) or in time (e.g. over a period of a month or year). Aquifer recharge itself varies considerably in space, and will therefore interact with the spatial variability of rainfall. The generation of runoff in semi-arid regions is highly non-linear. During low- intensity long-duration rainfall, groundwater recharge will occur directly following

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infiltration, after allowing for evaporation losses. However, if wadi flow is generated by high-intensity short duration rainfall, this will re-distribute water to downstream areas, so that recharge will occur at different rates and in different locations. There is also interaction between the spatial variability of rainfall and localized epikarst recharge areas. It is therefore essential that the inputs to recharge estimation correctly represent the intensity and spatial coverage of rainfall events so that recharge and runoff processes are properly represented. Recharge estimation in Palestine, therefore, remains a complex issue. Significant changes in the annual and seasonal rainfall and intensity have occurred throughout the West Bank in the period 1961–2000. These have occurred particularly over the period 1981–2000 when decreases in annual rainfall and increases in intensity are apparent. There is significant evidence of trends in rainfall amount and intensity, notably a downward trend in rainfall amount in the last decade. There are also consistent predictions from global climate models (GCMs) of decreases in future rainfall amounts and possible changes in intensity. These changes are forecast to occur over the next twenty to thirty years and so must be included in any planning scenarios for sustainable management of the Palestinian aquifers. There are unresolved issues concerning the causes of observed changes in rainfall in the region, with suggested mechanisms including the feedback of irrigated agriculture in the south on increased evaporation and rainfall. Major changes in the economy and agricultural practices of the region are likely, and if such changes impact on the rainfall regime, then their effects must be included in any assessment of future water resources.

Extreme events The hydrological year 1991/1992 was the wettest year recorded over the century, with annual mean precipitation above 200% in most areas and amount of aquifer recharge about 300% due to 3 large snow storms. This caused water levels in aquifers to return to the levels of 1950’s in many places. In 1995 and 1998 khamasin events (hot, dry cyclone) occurred in May-June and in September-October, respectively causing severe forest fire in the West Bank Moun- tains and severe agricultural damage. In 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 there were two consecutive years of extreme drought and the longest drought ever recorded in the Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:38 12 October 2016 south (leading to widespread mortality of trees). In the year 2000, the heaviest snow- fall took place in the Negev desert.

Spatial and temporal rainfall trends The rainfall trends of the north and the south of the West Bank for the three decades of 1961–1970, 1971–1980 and 1981–1990 are depicted in Figure 5. This figure shows that the north exhibits more rainfall than the south. In addition, Figure 5 shows that there is a decreasing trend when considering the seasonal pattern of rainfall over the three decades. As for the trends in annual rainfall for the period from 1961–1998, Figure 6 shows for selected stations in the West Bank that there is a departure of annual rainfall from

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150 North South 120

60 61–70 71–80 81–90

Monthly Average (mm) 30

0 Jan Jan Jan Oct Nov Dec Feb Mar Apr May Oct Nov Dec Feb Mar Apr May Oct Nov Dec Feb Mar Apr May

Figure 5 The monthly pattern of rainfall over the 1961–1970, 1971–1980, and 1981–1990 decades.

the overall mean rainfall. For most of the cases, an increase can be observed from 1960 up to around 1980, and a downward trend is noticeable for the decades since 1980. However, there are some cases, such as Dair Debwan, with a downward trend in the early decades and an upward trend in recent years. Analyses of the most complete records are shown as cumulative departures from the mean in Figure 7. Apparently, there is a considerable variability in the trend sig- nals. The behavior of an upward trend followed by a downward trend is seen in the blocks to the south of the region and the far north. However, the opposite behaviour (downward followed by upward) may be seen in the blocks in the centre and north of the region. Some of these blocks are also more internally coherent than others, for example the southernmost and northernmost. The seasonal pattern of rainfall in the West Bank is depicted in Figure 8. Obvi- ously, the rainfall in the West Bank has a marked seasonality, with the annual total falling in the months from October to May and the wettest months being December and January. It is also noticed from Figure 8 that over the decades 1961–1970, 1971– 1980 and 1981–1990 that there is an increase in the rainfall of the months February Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:38 12 October 2016 and March. There is a noticeable trend that rainfall is increasing in the middle of the winter and a decreasing trend at the early and late months of the period October to May. The same is noticed for the proportion of wet days as can be seen in Figure 9. It is apparent from the analyses described above that there is a considerable noise obscuring any trends in rainfall amount and intensity, especially when considered on a single station basis in isolation. Equally, if the data is aggregated across the whole West Bank to counteract this problem, then any spatially coherent signal may be lost. A spatial analysis of trends was therefore performed, with the aim of identifying and visualising any regions within the West Bank subject to change over recent decades. Firstly, the percentage trend was calculated for each station for the period from 1961 to 1990. This shows that there is no coherent trend of any spatial extent within the West Bank over the period 1961–1990. In contrast to these decades, a major and spatially

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2 1500 1 Jerusalem Jerusalem

1200 1 0.5

900 0 0 DEV CDM 600

-1 Rainfall (mm) Annual -0.5 300

-2 0 -1.0 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996

2 600 1.5 Tamnam Primary School Tamnam Primary School 1.0 1 400 0.5 0 DEV CDM 0.0 200 -1 -0.5 Annual Rainfall (mm) Annual -2 0 -1.0 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986

2 1500 1.0 ‘Atarah ‘Atarah 1200 1 0.5 900 0 0.0 CDM 600 DEV -1 300 -0.5 Annual Rainfall (mm) Annual -2 0 -1.0 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996

2 1500 1.0 ‘Bait Dajan Dair Debwan 1 1200 0.5 900 0 0.0 DEV CDM 600 -1 -0.5 300 Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:38 12 October 2016 Annual Rainfall (mm) Annual -2 0 -1.0 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986

2 1500 1.5 Dair Debwan Dair Debwan 1 1200 1.0 0 900 0.5 -1 DEV CDM 600 0.0 -2 300 -0.5

-3 Rainfall (mm) Annual -4 0 -1.0 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986

Figure 6 Annual trend for rainfall data in the West Bank for different stations for the period between 1961 to 1998.

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2 1500 1.0 Ya’bad School Ya’bad School 1 1200 0.5 900 0 0.0 DEV CDM 600 -1 300 -0.5 Annual Rainfall (mm) Annual -2 0 -1.0 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986

2 1500 1.5 Qaffeen Boys School Qaffeen Boys School 1200 1.0 1 900 0.5 0 DEV CDM 600 0.0 -1 300 -0.5 Annual Rainfall (mm) Annual -2 0 -1.0 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986

Figure 6 (Continued).

coherent negative trend is seen in the period 1981–1990 (see figure 6). This is again consistent with the individual station analyses, and is widespread across the West Bank.

Rainfall predictions for Palestine The future climate predictions for the West Bank for the period from 2021 to 2050 were derived from the output of the HadCM3; the Hadley Centre (UK) coupled Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Model (AOGCM). This model was one of the major models used in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Third Assessment Report in 2001. The output from HadCM3 is averaged across grid- squares of 300 km − 300 km in size with a time step of 30 minutes. There are limitations that must be borne in mind when considering the predictions Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:38 12 October 2016 of the model. Rainfall output is indicative only. The location of the HadCM3 grid squares is shown in Figure 12, where the centers of four grid squares covering the region have been marked. It can be seen that none of the four grid squares overlies the West Bank adequately, so an interpolated position, point 5 has been marked. Figure 13 shows the average monthly rainfall for each of the four grid squares from HadCM3 while Figure 14 depicts the average monthly rainfall as interpolated for point 5 that corresponds to the West Bank. Each panel shows the model control climatology (1961–1990) and prediction for 2021–2050. The bottom panel additionally shows the observed rainfall for a 0.5 degree box covering the West Bank (CRU global rainfall climatology) for comparison. Considering firstly the control climatology, it is clear that the HadCM3 poorly represents both the monthly cycle of rainfall and the overall annual total. Three of

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JEENSAFUT SCHOOL 1 ‘AZZUN SCHOOL DAIR ISTYAH ‘AQRABAH SCHOOL BIDYA SECONDARY 0 SCHOOL CDM

−1

−2 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986

1 JEENSAFUT SCHOOL ‘AZZUN SCHOOL DAIR ISTYAH ‘AQRABAH SCHOOL 0 BIDYA SECONDARY SCHOOL CDM

−1 Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:38 12 October 2016

−2 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986

Figure 7 Cumulative departure from the mean (CDM).

the four nearby grid squares underestimate the annual rainfall significantly, with only grid-square 3 (centered over Cyprus) coming near to the observed total. However, grid-square 3 exhibits a second (summer) wet season, not present in the West Bank. Grid-square 4 shows the seasonality most similar to the observed, but with a much lower annual total. Data interpolated from the four grid boxes to a central

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150 61–70 71–80 81–90 100 91–98

Sumprp (mm) 50

0 Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May

Figure 8 Monthly mean rainfall for the four recent decades.

40 61–70 71–80 30 81–90 91–98

20 PW (%)

0 Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:38 12 October 2016 Figure 9 The proportion of wet days for the four recent decades.

representative position (point 5) have a similar annual total to the observed, but with different seasonality. Most of these inadequacies can be attributed to the failure of the HadCM3 to represent topography at the scales which influence rainfall in the West Bank. The orographic influence on rainfall that is believed to be strong is completely absent from HadCM3. In view of the poor representation of the observed climatology, any climate change impact assessment using these data directly must acknowledge the very low confidence to be assigned to it. Bearing in mind the low confidence in the GCM, the usual approach is followed here of taking information only on relative changes in rainfall from the GCM and

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40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000 160000 180000 200000 Border line N 200000 AT 61 90 180000 –20 – –3.5

160000 –3.5 – –2.5 –2.5 – –1.5

140000 –1.5 – –0.5 –0.5 – 0.5

120000 0.5 – 1.5 1.5 – 2.5 100000 2.5 – 3.5

100000 120000 140000 160000 180000 200000 3.5 – 20

40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000 160000 180000 200000

40 0 40 80 Kilometers

Figure 10 Annual trend observed for the period from 1961 to 1990.

40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000 160000 180000 200000 Border line N 200000 AT 61 90 180000 –20 – –3.5

160000 –3.5 – –2.5 –2.5 – –1.5

140000 –1.5 – –0.5 –0.5 – 0.5

120000 0.5 – 1.5 1.5 – 2.5 100000 2.5 – 3.5 100000 120000 140000 160000 180000 200000 3.5 – 20

40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000 160000 180000 200000

40 0 40 80 Kilometers Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:38 12 October 2016

Figure 11 Annual trend observed for the period from 1981 to 1990.

applying these to the observed rainfall totals. It can be seen from Figure 15 that there are some significant decreases in winter rainfall predicted for 2021–2050. Overall, the model predicts significant decreases in winter rainfall over the region. These results are taken from a model with a coarse grid size which does not adequately represent the physiography of the region and the resultant spatial distribution of rainfall. However, despite the lack of confidence associated with the model predictions, it is clear that the magnitude of the predicted changes is sufficient for severe impacts on rainfall and recharge in the region to be likely.

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3 4

N 1 2

400 0 400 Kilometers

Figure 12 The nearest GCM grid squares in the study region.

80 80 Point 1 GCM 61–90 Point 2 GCM 61–90 70 Lon = 33.75; Lat = 30.0 GCM 21–50 70 Lon = 33.75; Lat = 30.0 GCM 21–50

60 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

Average Rainfall (mm) Average 20 Rainfall (mm) Average 20

10 10

0 0 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

80 80 Point 3 GCM 61–90 Point 4 GCM 61–90 70 Lon = 33.75; Lat = 32.5 GCM 21–50 70 Lon = 37.5; Lat = 32.5 GCM 21–50

60 60

50 50

40 40

30 30 Average Rainfall (mm) Average 20 Rainfall (mm) Average 20 Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:38 12 October 2016 10 10

0 0 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Figure 13 The output of HadCM3 for the four squares covering the region along with the observed rainfall values 17.

Although not shown here, the model predicts rises of mean annual temperature of around 3°C by the 2050s. This will increase potential evapotranspiration (PE) by some 15% or so, although the effects on actual evapotranspiration (AE) are more difficult to estimate without using a hydrological model accounting for soil moisture more accurately than the GCM land surface scheme.

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200 180 GCM 61–90 GCM 21–50 160 Observer 140 120 100 80 60 Average Rainfall (mm) Average 40 20 0 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Figure 14 The output of HadCM3 for the fifth interpolated point (point 5) along with the observed rainfall values.

Figure 15 Observed annual rainfall for the period 1961–1990 and predicted annual rainfall for the period 2021–2050. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:38 12 October 2016 IMPLICATIONS OF RAINFALL VARIABILITY, MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION MEASURES

Implications Since Palestinian cities and villages are witnessing an accelerated urbanization and a pronounced population growth, climate change will additionally exacerbate the deteriorating situation in terms of water shortage and availability. The hydrologic cycle for both surface water and groundwater is largely affected by atmospheric temperature and radiation. The change in climate in this regard impacts rainfall distribution in time and space (i.e. intensities, extreme events, and seasonality)

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and this in turn dictates runoff and groundwater recharge. Increase in runoff especially under intense events of rainfall leads to the occurrence of flash floods that ultimately leads to potential damage to properties and death causalities as the case in the eastern areas of the West Bank. Another hydrologic parameter is evapotranspiration where its increase due to the increase in temperature will lead to an increase in crop water requirements, increase in soil salinization, an enhancement of desertification, and a decrease in agricultural productivity. Rain-fed agriculture is important in many localities in the West Bank and thus the change in rainfall amount and timing will largely affect this important sector and negatively impact the farmers’ socio-economic conditions. Water use, specifically for irrigation, depends largely on the temperature and rainfall. Water availability for agriculture from the shallow groundwater wells and aquifers will be highly affected by the seasonal variability in rainfall. Groundwater resources in Palestine are likely to be affected in two main aspects. In the first aspect, groundwater recharge is likely to decline due to the increase in the rainfall intensity accompanied with the decrease in the number of rainy days and the subsequent increase in the runoff. In the second aspect and depending on the first one, mobilization of contamination in the groundwater systems will take place and thus areas that are far from pollution sources may witness groundwater quality deterioration. An indicator of the sensitivity of groundwater resources to the impact of climate change is the variation of the potentiometric head over time. However, this variation should be very well understood to rule out any role of man-made utilization such as pumpage that surpasses the recharge or the artificial impacts from land use development such as urbanization (Petheram et al. 2001; Chen et al. 2002). Obviously, the above in turn affects the amount of water available for withdrawal and use. This apparently affects the environmental systems and the socio-economic conditions.

Mitigation measures There is a possibility that Palestine will face negative impacts of climate change on water resources in the coming future. It is therefore important to be able to cope with current climate conditions suitably. However, for this to happen, mitigation measures should be developed by all the relevant parties and later promoted at the national level. Of the mitigation measures of interest are the promotion of water Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:38 12 October 2016 harvesting at micro (i.e. rooftop) and macro (i.e. watershed) scales, the improvement of drainage systems such that flood consequences are mitigated, the endorsement of groundwater artificial recharge schemes, and the close supervision of urbanization such that urbanization will not affect sensitive aquifer recharge areas as well as spring catchment areas. Another mitigation measure that can be practically implemented is forest preservation programs. Forests should be preserved since the vegetation cover maintains to a great deal of extent soil moisture that impedes runoff generation. Additional mitigation measures that can be considered in Palestine and recognized worldwide include energy conservation and efficiency and the use of renewable energy resources such as solar energy, wind energy, and biomass.

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Adaptation measures Since mitigation measures will lessen the negative impacts of climate change, accompanied adaptive measures should be introduced and recommended as well. Water conservation and saving practices ought to be encouraged at the national level. In addition, the use of treated wastewater in agriculture will definitely scale down the stress on groundwater resources. The potential rise in the sea level will deepen the on-going seawater intrusion in the Gaza Coastal Aquifer and adaptation measures will imply the fine tuning of groundwater pumpage to match in general the recharge. This inevitably will necessitate the abandonment of the random and unlicensed wells in the Gaza Strip and thus alternative supplemental sources ought to be considered such as conveying water from the north of the West Bank to the Gaza Strip through the southern part of the West Bank. One last important issue to consider in this regard is the role of raising the public awareness: Generally, the public lacks the awareness on the impact of human activities on climate change. At the domestic level, there is scarcity of information regarding the use of certain cost effective and energy efficient specifications of appliances and machines. Also, people have narrow access of information on possible renewable energy applications.

CONCLUSIONS

There have been significant declining trends in rainfall occurrences, amounts, and intensities, in Palestine for the past decade. Predictions of HadCM3 for the West Bank indicate significant reductions in rainfall and increases in evapotranspiration. How- ever, downscaling of HadCM3 results is necessary to achieve a better accuracy. The current water resources management practices in Palestine may not be flexible enough to cope with the potential change and variability in temperature and rainfall. An important step in this regard implies a better and good understanding of the potential changes in climate for the country and a better integration of information among the different stakeholders and authorities who will be in charge of the management of water resources. In this regard, integrated water resources management (IWRM) provides an important conceptual framework that can be utilized to achieve effective adaptation

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:38 12 October 2016 measures for water resources, environmental systems, and socio-economic conditions against climate change impacts. In addition, the importance of IWRM comes from the ability to explore the effectiveness of mitigation and adaptation measures across the different yet dependent water-using sectors since this entails a variety of criteria and attributes that need to be considered concurrently. It is thus anticipated that a policy formulation program should be initiated at the national level and across all the water using sectors to design mitigation procedures and actions that can lead to a reduction in the impact of climate change and the severity of the corresponding adaptation measures.

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REFERENCES

Chen, M., Xie, P., and Janowiak, J.E. (2002). Global land precipitation: a 50- yr monthly analysis based on gauge observations. J. Hydrometeorol., 3, 249–266. Hussary, S., Najjar, T. and Aliewi, A.S. (1995). Analysis of Secondary Source Rainfall Data from the Northern West Bank. Report No.: WARMP/TEC/J/07. Newcastle University (UK) and Palestinian Hydrology Group. MoA. (2009). Rainfall Seasonal Report- 2008–2009. Ministry of Agriculture, Palestine. Petheram, C., Walker, G., Grayson, R., Thierfelder, T. & Zhang, L. (2001). Towards a framework for predicting impacts of land- use on recharge. Aust. J. Soil Res., 40, 397–417. Scarpa, D. (1994). Eastward groundwater flow from the Mountain Aquifer. Water and Peace in the Middle East. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam. SUSMAQ. (2003). Rainfall Variability and Change in the West Bank. Newcastle University and the Palestinian Water Authority. Report number SUSMAQ-RAIN#13V1.0. SUSMAQ. (2005a). Stochastic Space-Time Modeling of West Bank Rainfall for Present and Future Climates. Newcastle University and the Palestinian Water Authority. Report No. SUSMAQ – RAIN #42 V4.1 SUSMAQ. (2005b). Development and Application of a Regional Climate Model for Assessing the Impacts of Land use and Climate changes. Newcastle University and the Palestinian Water Authority. Report number SUSMAQ-RAIN # 44V2.1 UNEP. (2003). Desk study on the Environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:38 12 October 2016

IIHESHAE0_Book.indbHESHAE0_Book.indb 185185 111/20/20121/20/2012 1:15:391:15:39 PMPM Chapter 13 Challenges of transboundary wastewater management for Palestinian communities along the Green Line – The Israeli- Palestinian border72

Rashed Al-Sa`ed and Ahmad M. Al-Hindi

ABSTRACT: The annual discharges of municipal wastewater across the Green Line (the Israeli-Palestinian “borders”) are increasing; thus a bi-national conflict exists with political, environmental, and economical dimensions. This is a challenge calling for an urgent need for effective transboundary cooperation aiming at public health and environmental protection. Based on the review of selective international and national literature, data analysis of accessible local reports and technical site visits, we demonstrate how complex transboundary wastewater management is throughout the world and on the Green Line or Israeli-Palestinian “borders” specifically. The Israeli water policy reflected by the current unilateral interventions have proved ineffective in addressing regional management of transboundary wastewater problems. This paper provides an overview of the current status of sanitation services coverage in Palestinian communities and discusses the immense challenges behind achieving sustainable wastewater treatment facilities. An example of transboundary wastewater management is presented to advance discussions on Jad Hanna wastewater treatment plant serving Palestinian communities, a recent peace building sanitation project along the Israeli-Palestinian “border”. This paper underlines effectiveness, equality, trust, transparency, benefits sharing and responsibilities as key elements of sustainable transboundary wastewater treatment management. A transboundary cooperation along the Green Line (which currently is being seen as the Israeli-Palestinian borders) to promote affordable sanitation and reuse facilities is achievable if a number of legal, political, socio-economical and environmental questions are fairly resolved. Keywords: Environmental protection, effluent reuse, Green Line, transbounday wastewater, wastewater treatment

INTRODUCTION

The increased population growth rate and rapid expansion of industrial and commercial sites (exacerbated by periodic annual drought periods) has caused an increased

72 For clarification of the word ‘borders’, it must be noted at the outset that the Green Line is the former Israeli–Jordanian border and widely considered the ‘border’ between Israel and the Palestinian territory. Israel is the only country in the world that does not define its borders.

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gap between water supply-demand balance, where treated wastewater as an alternative non-conventional water source can help bridge the imbalance. Due to the Israeli occupation in 1967, the Palestinian people have limited access to their land and water resources and are dependent on Israel’s prior permissions and foreign donations to establish their water and wastewater treatment facilities. According to the World Bank (WB, 2009) about 35 percent of the Palestinian population has access to adequate sanitation services. The use of cesspits and the discharge of raw sewage over land and into wadis (seasonal dry streams) and the delay in project implementation contribute to serious public health and environmental risks, reduce availability of limited water resources, as aquifers are polluted by wastewater, and reduce effective treated effluent use in agricultural irrigation (Tagar et al., 2004; Isaak et al., 2004; Kramer, 2008). At present, the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) has 8 large urban wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) including almost 300 onsite treatment plants. These wastewater treatment facilities serve mainly urban communities covering an approximately 1.5 million population equivalent (PE), where the current total population of the OPT is slightly more than 3 million. The technology type applied for treatment processes is relatively conventional and primarily using an activated sludge system with its process modifications (aerated lagoons, hybrid aerobic-trickling filter and oxidation ponds). Figure 1 illustrates the potential impacts of inadequate wastewater management on public health, and the receiving environment (soil, surface water and groundwater). For water decision makers and urban development planners, provision of sustainable wastewater treatment facilities and reuse schemes is an emergent challenge and becomes an increasingly complex, controversial, and expensive challenge to improve the current situation and cope with the rapid expansion of Palestinian urban communities. Limited access to available groundwater sources as cheaper and reliable water supplies are overexploited as a result of the Israeli water policy, thus use of reclaimed

Mediterranean Coastal Zone/Small Streams: recreation; ecosystem drinking water (Desalination)

Soil Pollution (Salinization: Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 excess pesticides usuage)

Groundwater Pollution (water quality degradation)

Potential Impacts of inadequate Public Health & Community Development

wastewater management in Palestine (Water borne diseases & Economical losses)

Figure 1 Major impacts of ineffective management of transboundary wastewater in Palestine.

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water, brackish and sea water desalination might play a key role. In addition, transboundary management of urban wastewater discharges through viable mechanisms such as recharge and recovery and regional cooperation on major infrastructure needs will become increasingly important. In order to understand the main challenges behind ineffective and inadequate wastewater management in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), this study explores the case of Palestinian transboundary urban wastewater discharges from the West Bank across the Green Line (into Israel), where most of the Palestinian urban communities are situated upstream and are characterized by acute settings of asymmetry and political variability (Fischhendler, 2007; Cohen et al., 2008; Hareuveni, 2009; Schalimtzek and Fischhendler, 2009). The study begins its review of the subject by considering the current status of wastewater management in Palestinian urban communities and the constraining factors behind enhancing the progress of establishing sustainable wastewater treatment facilities. The past and present Israeli water policies that affect sustainable wastewater management in Palestine are then presented and discussed. Tulkarem-Emek Hefer, as a local case study, is presented and discussed, where the polluter pays principle (PPP) has been opted for as a political tool. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are made pertinent to appropriate and effective joint cooperation for future intervention to promote transboundary wastewater management at the defined Israeli-Palestinian borders of the future.

CURRENT STATUS OF WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT IN PALESTINIAN URBAN AND RURAL COMMUNITIES

Most of the existing wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) in Palestine do not function very well, with effluent quality exceeding the prescribed national effluent standards. This may simply be due to overloading, but it can often be the result of the various factors associated with improper physical design, faulty construction and insufficient system maintenance (Al-Sa`ed, 2005; Al-Sa`ed, 2007). Table 1 summarizes

Table 1 Historical development of sanitation service coverage under various regimes (Israeli occupation period and under the Palestinian Authority rule).

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 Population Responsible party served Years %/Year

Israel (1948–2008) Sewerage networks 95% 60 1.6 Centralized WWTPS 90% 60 1.5 OPT-WB (1967–1995) Sewerage networks 20% 28 0.7 Centralized WWTPS 5% 28 0.2 Mekorot (Istraeli Water Company): 1937 Israeli Water Law: 1957 Palestinian Authority (1995–2008) Sewerage networks +20% 13 1.5 Centralized WWTPS +76% 13 5.8 Pal. Water Authority (PWA): 1995 Palestinian Water Law (2002)

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the historical development of wastewater management (sewerage collection and treatment) under various epochs; during the Israeli occupation (1967–1995) and under the rule of the Palestinian Authority. As a comparison, the sanitation development in Israel for the period between 1948 and 2008 is presented as a reference. It is clear that the wastewater management in the OPT was fully neglected during the Israeli occupation period, where only 20% of the total population were served centrally by sewer networks and only 5% of collected sewage experienced physical and partial biological treatment. The neglect of Israel to provide access to safe sanitation services and the adverse impacts associated with this decision by Israel were recently explored by the World Bank report (WB, 2009). The negative impacts on surface water bodies and annual degradation in groundwater quality were documented recently (Cohen et al., 2008; Hareuveni, 2009). During periods of peace and stability conditions, the PWA was able to erect only one urban sewage works in Al-Bireh city, with pre-conditions that the nearby Israeli settlements must be connected to the sewage treatment facility. The wastewater management in the Israeli settlements is not within the scope of this paper, however, it must be noted that despite their connection to Palestinian sewage works, they refused to share in the capital investment costs or even to pay the wastewater tariff. In viewing

Table 2 Palestinian efforts made to erect, upgrade and rehabilitate wastewater treatment plants.

Capita Served Capita WW Treatment Activity District (#) (%) (#) (m3/d) System Year Status Type

Al-Bireh 50,000 85.8 42,900 4,719 Extended 2000 Operational Upgraded aeration 2008 Ramallah 35,000 74.6 26,110 2,872 Aerated 1973 Overloaded Rehabilitated Lagoons 2003 Nablus 150,000 82.9 124,350 14,300 Extended 2000 Tendering 09 New WWTP/ aeration 2020 Hebron 257,000 82.1 210,997 24,265 Conventional 2001 Pending Hold on ASS Tulkarm 93,000 68.3 63,519 6,352 Aerated 1975 Pending Upgraded Lagoons 2000

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 Saifit 25,000 65.6 16,400 1,394 Planned ASS 2000 Pending No funding Qalqilia 20,000 70.5 14,100 1,199 No WWTP Pending No funding Jenin 52,000 66.5 34,580 3,458 Aerated 1972 Pending Upgraded Lagoons 1994 Beit Lahia 299,000 68.5 204,845 16,341 Aerated 1979 Overloaded Lagoons Gaza city 545,000 79.0 430,550 48,243 Parallel 1977 Overloaded Upgraded TFs/EA /86/98 Rafah 184,000 95.3 175,335 20,000 Aerated 1978 Overloaded Upgraded Lagoons 2008 Bethlehem 84000 91.2 76,608 8,810 No WWTP Non Jerusalem (E) 115000 80.8 92,920 10,686 No WWTP Non Khan 120000 75 90,000 10,350 No WWTP Non Yunis Total PE 1,710,000 1,513,214 175,580

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this scenario and its associated problems, there are three main strategies, which the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) applied in order to promote wide sanitation services coverage and enhance the performance of current wastewater treatment facilities to comply with national prescribed effluent quality standards, i.e. (a) new erection, (b) retrofitting and (c) upgrading WWT schemes. Table 2 illustrates the efforts made by the PWA to plan, upgrade and rehabilitate the existing WTPs for municipal wastewater treatment in Palestine. In all the efforts, emphasis was made to integrated pollution control in the upgrading schemes, in which all aspects such as effluent quality standard, sludge disposal, level of technology, ease of upgrading, odor control, land availability, maintenance, cost-effective and other non-financial factors have been considered. Table 2 shows that 40% (1.5 million) of the total urban population in the OPT have access to central sewer networks, however, only 48% of the total annual collected wastewater is being partially treated (secondary treatment) in owned Palestin- ian sewage works, whereas more than 30% of the annually collected sewage is being treated within Israel. Under the Status column in the Table, it is obvious that the current sewage works are either overloaded or under the ‘waiting game’ for Israeli final approval. It is worth to mention, if a WWTP proposal is technically approved by the JWC, this does not automatically mean direct implementation. The final approval must obey the “military” orders granted by the “Civil” Administration, which takes years to receive – exceeding 10 years for Nablus and Hebron, as examples.

MANAGEMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY WASTEWATER DISCHARGES

Wastewater management in urban communities along the Israeli-Palestinian “border” In arid and semi-arid regions, wastewater is now seen as a key component of the water cycle that can be treated and reused for a variety of non-potable uses. Treated effluent (water) can be used to water parks, for agricultural purposes, to revitalize heavily polluted streams and, in general, this will conserve the limited quantities of drinking water available, using the treated/reclaimed effluent for many uses originally served by potable water. Figure 2 presents an overview of the location of wastewater flowing in three

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 small transboundary wadis (streams) that are used as case studies, including illus- trating the the locations of the Green Line and the Mountain Aquifer boundary. About 20% of the total population served by central sewer networks reside in urban communities having transboundary wastewater discharge into Israel. Among the fifteen major streams (rivers) in Israel, only five streams originate in the West Bank: Wadi Mugata (Jenin district), Wadi Zaimer (Nablus-Tulkarm districts), Wadi Zhor (Qalqilia district), Wadi An-Nar (Hebron district) and Wadi Mahbas (Ramallah district). More than 30% of annual collected urban wastewater (73.7 mcm/year) from Palestinian communities are being treated in Israeli wastewater treatment plants (Table 3). The treated effluent is further reclaimed for various applications within Israel, mainly for unrestricted agricultural irrigation and water for nature purposes (river rehabilitation and landscape recreation). It is essential to point out that the

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Figure 2 Location of Palestinian WWTPs and receiving surface water bodies. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016

Palestinian Authority has no share in the economical and environmental benefits from the treated or reclaimed effluent that is of Palestinian origin. Schalimtzek and Fischhendler (2009) investigated the feasibility of the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) as a cost sharing tool for the treatment of Palestinian transboundary wastewater from the West Bank that crosses the Green Line to Israel. They found that, under conflict conditions with strong political and economic asymmetries, Israel opted for the extreme form of the PPP. Lack of a transparent political framework and pressure applied by many Israeli internal actors in the environmental decision making process have led to disagreement between the Palestinian and Israeli sides as to a feasible cost-sharing system. Table 4 illustrates how Israel`s application of the

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PPP did not achieve environmentally sound solutions pertaining to transboundary wastewater management, where superior environmental alternatives were practiced deviating from the PPP and utilizing dominating regional conflict and asymmetrical conditions. Perhaps the most objective and complete analysis of the Israeli cost sharing policy was made by Schalimtzek and Fischhendler (2009), who illustrated the ineffectiveness of the oft-noted of PPP`s suitability as follows (Table 4):

Table 3 Summary of transboundary wastewater treatment from Palestinian communities.

Total PE WB &GS (PE) 3,761,646 Annual WW collected 73.70 mem Urban PE served (PE) 1,513,214 40 (%) Annual treated WW 59.5 mcm Daily sewage collected (m3) 175,580 Potential WW reuse 81 (%) Daily WW treated (m3) 141,743 81 (%) 33% of WW treated/used in Israel (20 mcm/y)

Table 4 Impacts of asymmetry and political conflict on transboundary wastewater management options on the Israeli-Palestinian borders (modified after Schalimtzek and Fischhendler, 2009).

Effect on suggested/ Background conditions adopted solutions

International Politics Escalating conflict Peace process halted Unilateral solutions and JWC stop endorsed meeting Israeli insistence on PA wastewater treatment and delayed process approval Higher emphasis Israeli insistence on PPP on ‘high politics’ leading to adoption of extreme PPP Reclaimed water used by Israel alone Deteriorating Location of wastewater security conditions projects inside Israel, no approval for PW projects Internal Politics Pressure for solution by Israeli settlements/ Project first paid by

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 local agencies local authorities and next activation of offset mechanism Economic No emphasis on economies of scale Separate plants proposed or implemented Environmental Acute need to prevent pollution Emergency projects with high treatment standards/partly CAPEX cut form Palestinian taxations collected by Israel Inferior downstream solutions (upstream in Wadi An-Nar-Kidron)

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CURRENT PRACTICES OF EFFLUENT DISPOSAL INTO RECEIVING WATER ENVIRONMENT

Regional water treaties between Israeli and Palestinian sides Alon (2007) explored transboundary stream restoration and wastewater treatment standards among five main Israeli/Palestinian transboundary water challenges and analyzed the actual capability of current Israeli laws and regulatory tools to resolve them. Among the main Israeli water pollution control laws and orders are the followings:

– Water Law (1959, 1971, 2002, 2004, 2008), – Water Commissioner Orders: – Clean Up, Allowing, and Stopping Orders related to water pollution, – Water Council, – Water Drilling Control Law, Drainage and Flood Control Law, – Streams and Springs Authorities Law, – Local Authorities Sewage Law, – the Public Health Ordinance, and a – Licensing of Businesses Law.

The 1992 Sewage Effluents Standards (Public Health Ordinance) were set without scientific evidence and are based on European standards assuming a considerable degree of dilution in receiving surface water bodies. The standards unfortunately did not take into consideration the site specific vulnerability of groundwater and the existing water quality of many streams, i.e., that most of these streams have seasonal water flows, if any, or are comprised entirely of wastewater. With almost 95% sewerage coverage, Israel utilizes annually about 300 mcm (75% of treated effluent) in agricultural irrigation and has the status of a “world leader” in reclaimed effluent reuse. The present “20/30” rule for biochemical oxygen demand/total suspended solids (BOD/ TSS), set for effluent discharge into receiving waters and reuse for agricultural irrigation, was effective in health risk reduction. However, Gabbay (2002) reported that the recommendations made by the Israeli “Inbar” inter-ministerial committee entailed efforts to update the current effluent disposal standards. For comparison, Table 5 lists selected major parameters highlighting the huge variations between Israeli and

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 Palestinian Standards for Effluent Disposal for agricultural irrigation and discharge into surface water bodies. The Israeli stringent effluent quality standards are forced upon the Palestinians (MoU 2003) where the 20/30 rule is required from the Palestinian operators during the first phase of implementation of any new wastewater treatment facility. However, the WWTPs effluent shall comply with stringent level of standards (10/10) during the second phase of implementation, given a period of five years as a construction phase to erect an advanced filtration stage. This is evident from the approval protocol for Tulkarm and Nablus-West WWTPs (MoU, 2008). The debate over the adequacy of the standards remains controversial as even the less stringent “Inbar Standards” remain debatable, due to the huge financial burdens associated with their implementation and the objections to their adoption by the Ministries of Finance and Interior.

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Table 5 Israeli and Palestinian standards for effluent disposal in various applications.

Israeli Standards 2002 Palestinian Standards 2002

Unrestricted Unrestricted Parameter Unit Irrigation Rivers Irrigation Rivers

BOD mg/l 10 10 20 – TSS mg/l 10 10 30 – COD mg/l 100 70 – 200 Ammonia-N mg/l 20 1.5 50 5 Total-N mg/l 20 10 – – mg/l 5 0.2 30 5 Total-P/PO4-P mg/l – – 500 1000 SO4 Chloride mg/l 250 400 500 – Sodium mg/l 150 200 200 – Fecal coliforms CFU/100 ml 10 200 <200 <1000 Boron mg/l 0.4 – 0.7 2 Hydrocarbons mg/l – 1 0.002 1 Anionic detergents mg/l 2 0.5 15 25 Total Oil mg/l – 1 5 10 pH [–] 6.5–8.5 7–8.5 6–9 6–9 Dissolved oxygen mg/l <0.5 <3 >0.5 >1

At present, the current valid 20–30 standard is still valid as the level of treatment required for wastewater treatment in Israel. However, before Israel can begin to force new stringent effluent standards on the Palestinian wastewater management facilities, it must first enact those on its own treatment facilities (Feitelson and Levy, 2006; Alon, 2007).

TULKARM-NABLUS/EMEK HEFER REGIONAL COUNCIL – A CASE ON TRANSBOUNDARY WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT

There is a lack of scientifically based knowledge on the significant environmental

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 impacts posed by the discharge of raw wastewater from upstream Palestinian communities and the possible adverse impacts on the performance of Yad Hanna wastewater treatment plant (YHWWTP). This fact poses a real challenge due to cultural differences within the Palestinian-Israeli “border” region and the varying powers and responsibilities among local council, and governmental agencies from both countries. To overcome this challenge, there will be the development of an Environmental Man- agement System (EMS) for YHWWTP, where an initial environmental assessment of the discharge of raw sewage from Palestinian urban areas including industrial facilities along Wadi Zaimer shall be initiated. The IEA shall aim at identifying environmental issues and the significant environmental aspects (SEAs). SEAs are those aspects that can have significant impacts (positive or negative) on the receiving environment. Given the scope and breadth of activities at the JHWWTP, the SEA identification

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process shall reveal a range of environmental aspects from Palestinian communities over which it has little or no control. Since the JHWWTP receives wastewater from Palestinian urban areas, some SEAs identified would be the ones that are not realisti- cally in the WWTP’s control, but rather those that it could only influence (Figure 3). According to Schalimtzek and Fischhendler (2009), the Israeli government opted in January 2003 for the application of the offset mechanism to wastewater treatment, similar to those applied to the health and water sectors. Based on this Israeli unilateral action, the construction and O&M costs of the downstream solution of Wadi Zaimer (Alexander river) and Wadi An-Nar-Hebron emergency projects were deducted from Palestinian money held by Israel.

Regional wastewater agreements between Israeli and Palestinian sides A similar case on EMS development is the Nogales International Wastewater Treat- ment Plant (NIWTP) where management of the real and potential transboundary environmental impacts from Mexico formed a challenge. The NIWTP was able not only to influence but control the treatment of sewage from Mexico that has been found to contain industrial and infectious waste. The EMS teams focused on the inputs of its processes and found proper methods to work with the upstream entities across the USA-Mexico border to manage the SEAs and minimize the pollution loads at the source, through cleaner production application (Jobin and Peña (2006). One specific challenge for the YHWWTP is working to meet the Israeli effluent discharge permit for restricted irrigation use and for discharge into the Alexander River, a surface water body. Of particular concern is the total suspended solids (TSS), ammonium and high oil/grease content of the influent coming from the Tulkarem

Eastern Tulkarm Pre- Tulkarm PS Reservoir Treatment Units Yad Hanna WWTP (Emek Hefer/Israel) in Israel Nablus West Municipal WW Effluent reuse

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 Wadi Zaimer Flow PS

Industrial regional sewer (stone pretreatment 5 mcm Storage Capacity: and tchina factories + olive mills wastewater) (Planned) Parial efluent discharge to Alexander River (Water for Nature) Palestine (PA) Israel (Green Line)

Separation Wall [Planned, not yet practiced!] To irrigation in the Palastinian Authority

Figure 3 Tulkarm-Nablus/Emek Hefer council a case on transboundary wastewater treatment.

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city and Wadi Zaimer. Because of the strict Israeli regulatory issues (10/10; mg/L TSS and BOD, respectively) and the potential for contaminating the underlying aquifer, treated effluent became a significant aspect. Even though the effluent poses an overall positive environmental impact on the riparian habitat of the Alexander River by providing regular annual flow (water for nature) for what would otherwise be a dry and seasonal small stream bed, the effluent has appeared to limit populations of some wildlife, including invertebrates and fish. Figure 4 illustrates the annual operational expenditures (OPEX) for the operation, maintenance and repair (around $4 Million; period 2004–2008) of JHWWTP established by the Palestinian tax money, deducted by Israel. The Palestinian Author- ity refused all receipts sent by the Israeli Water and Sewerage Authority for many reasons. The Israeli official authorities’ financial claims are not supported by signed bilateral agreements and they lack legal requirements (Alon, 2007). The establishment of JHWWTP, paid with Palestinian taxes of $5 millions, was a unilateral Israeli action characterized as an emergent solution, while currently claimed as “status quo”, forcing the Palestinian side to pay for annual wastewater quantities that lack any scientific or professional status. A bi-national agreement on transboundary wastewater management based on watershed basin and mutual benefits for both sides and based on an international framework might resolve the current political conflict. This is a major challenge to solve fairly, where Israel has deducted more than $34 million over the past 14 years (1994–2008). This deduction is made from the reimbursements allotted to the Palestinian Authority paid as custom/trade taxes and collected by Israel at all import/export points controlled it controls Installment of advanced pre-treatment units (flocculation/coagulation) to reduce high organic and inorganic pollution loads of the influent are associated with high annual capital and running costs exceeding 40% of the total CAOPEX. However, a root cause of the effluent not meeting Israeli strict water quality standards is the lack of upstream pretreatment programs and the rapid increase in land use for both industrial

1,200

1,000

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 800

600

400

Thousend US$/year 200

0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Year

Figure 4 Annual OPEX exempted from Palestinian tax captured by Israel.

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and residential purposes. As a measure to solve this problem, the YHWWTP shall use every possible communication channel to provide environmental public awareness campaigns to the local Palestinian communities. Promotion of small family-owned industrial sites in pretreatment programs to reduce the harmful industrial discharges at the source along Wadi Zaimer course is another possible mean. Jobin and Peña (2006) reported that effective implementation of the NIWTP’s EMS hinges upon the plant’s ability to manage the SEAs that it has influence over, which presents challenges for the plant. Under the EMS framework, the NIWTP must work towards minimizing its environmental impact through programs that increase bi-national cooperation, stakeholder engagement, and best practices to implement its environmental management programs.

ISRAELI WATER POLICY TOWARDS TRANSBOUNDARY WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT

Environmental policy would then make the environmental standards obligatory for all members of a society. The duty of environmental economists has predominantly been seen as studying the most efficient and cheapest way to achieve targets set by others. To this end, Israel’s environmental policy pertaining to sanitation services in general and to transboundary wastewater management, in particular, has chosen the following economic efficiency criterion:

– a given target or output has to be achieved by a minimum input and minimum costs.

However, this principle is only useful in cases where clear environmental rules and guidelines can be defined. It is often not possible to determine exactly which interventions into nature are environmentally sound. The relationships between ecological and economic systems from the local up to the global level are too complex to set proper standards for many pollutants. Additionally, the aim of Israeli-environmental policy lacks adapting economic behavior to principles of ecological system development. Instead of trying to determine exact levels of pollution where they are not suitable, environmental policy should aim at giving continuous incentives to encourage this kind of adaptation for precautionary Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 reasons. The level of a continuous incentive depends on the political will to change the present “economic behavior” and it is based solely on long-term economic aims. The short-term aim is always an intermediary one; in fact it is subject to the level of the incentive one can agree upon. Thinking in terms of economic efficiency criteria with a given permanent incentive, the Financial Ministry tried to reach the maximum financial output. The focus is not on specific environmental targets that have to be sustainably achieved, but rather on a specific ideological-based development target that will change the economic patterns of local development. In this manner, the performance of economic adaptation is maximized without considering the ecological principles in the upstream riparian areas where downstream environmental problems arise from economic activities at both sides. In addition, the Israeli environmental policies and management regimes along the Green Line were different and never took

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the Palestinian social and economic system to facilitate regional acceptance into considerations (Feitelson and Levi 2006). Figure 5 depicts schematically the current Israeli water policy with acting influential official institutions and the various tools applied of a variable nature to develop wastewater management infrastructures. The associated adverse impacts pertain to economical and community development. Applying the principle of control, check and isolate (CCI), Israel has succeeded in the past and recently in applying resistance, inflexibility causing burdens on the PA, and NGOs, and donors, thus preventing enhanced provision of access to and erection of adequate sanitation services in the OPT. To this end, Israel succeeded in claiming that the PA is not willing or makes no effort to prevent any harm to water resources. Policy approaches favoring environmental standards based on current knowledge and technology equally are of little help: either the knowledge of complex interactions in natural systems is missing to exactly determine precise standards, or past and continuing processes, often time-delayed, make them obsolete. Chronic and pervasive environmental problems call for an enhancement of environmental policy that encompasses a process orientation while considering ecological principles of system development (Ring, 1997).

Current Israeli Israeli Participating Institutions/Tools Water Policy - Finance - Israeli Stellements - Environmental Associations - Agriculture Local - Regional Councils NGOS - NJF Agencies - Environment - Housing Communities

GovernamentaI - Civil Administration

Green Line Green Control Check Isolate (Laws: Millitary Orders) (MoU 03; Article 40) (Separation Wall:

Urban Wsewage Urban Wsewage into Disintegration) TOOLS Transport ALL Palestinian Transport

Short & Long Term Outputs Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 Lack of political choice/forced to treat Palestinian sewage Israel unilateral actions: erect own WWTPs to treat Palestinian WW Palestian Authority pays CAPEX & OPEX of WWTPS in IL Israel solved local pressure & financies

JWC: Approves Palestinian WWTPs proposal Civil Administration: Delays implementation

Palestian Authority uncapable/not willing to do establish WWTFs

Figure 5 Israeli water policy and transboundary wastewater from Palestinian communities.

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TRANSBOUNDARY COOPERATION FOR SUSTAINABLE TRANSBOUNDARY WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT

Israel has solid human and financial resources but it is surrounded by great threats of variable nature, among of which is the dispute on water and wastewater issues with neighboring countries: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. This core threat can be solved through viable partnerships and fair cooperative agreements. The outcomes of research and cooperative initiatives will not only provide practical technical solutions to critical wastewater management challenges, but shall also ensure a secure and safe livelihood for all nations, a prerequisite for a any given bi-national treaty governing transboundary wastewater management (Zeitoun, 2008). The use of natural water resources has been the subject of many fruitful joint initiatives with neighboring countries worldwide (Europe and USA). Transboundary projects enabled efficient management of water courses, improvement of the quality of lakes and rivers, the development of tourism and the preservation of biodiversity. Based on the experience made over six years of transboundary cooperation, Marc- zin (2007) reported that transboundary facilities were established for dialogue and cooperation, where obstacles have been transformed into opportunities for exchange and joint management of natural resources for the well-being of the local population. However, transboundary cooperation between Israel and Palestine requires national and regional multi-functional management of the land and water bodies through well coordinated institutions. Throughout history, it has been learnt that maintaining har- monious relationships with its neighbors is a prerequisite for the economic, social, environmental and cultural development of focus countries. Caponera (1992) and Tal (2007) have written much about water law and administration but there are still many unanswered questions. Here is the challenge for international law and water lawyers – to study and develop the legal instruments which will enable nations to carry out such difficult and often harsh water management policies which involve reallocation of water and may involve complex legal issues of ownership and compensation (Shuval, 1999). Establishing transboundary dialogue and mutual trust after 42 years of Israeli military occupation and associated conflicts and enabling local actors to manage shared natural resources in a sustainable way should be the main tasks of any planned regional project. Preventive policy based dialogue has to be promoted aiming Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 at involvement of border towns whose cooperation is a key prerequisite for tackling resource management issues in a transboundary context. Groundwork is needed to be laid so that such a process involving many smaller-scale pilot projects can become sustainable and contribute to achieving the longer-term goal of the project: the sustainable management of shared natural resources. In addition to dialogue between and among countries and communities on the two sides of the border, the integration of local communities into national processes is crucial. Efforts shall be made to enhance cooperation between local and national level institutions, and to include cross-border sites into national strategic documents and processes related to the protection of the receiving environment and revitalization of heavily polluted wadis and streams. The nature of the project might be unique in the region, thus there are no neighboring countries from which to learn or build

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on gained experience. Hence, the project’s methodology shall be kept as open and flexible as possible and tailored to the specific needs and circumstances of each site. Table 6 which summarizes the most important elements of the project methodology is presented as follows: The expected outputs from transboundary cooperation are the following:

• Establish communication among water and sewerage institutions on both sides; • Enhance operational cross-border cooperation and promote participatory processes; • Support transboundary cooperation by official cross-border agreements; • Conserve shared natural ecosystems through new transboundary cooperation; • Local communities share benefits from concrete cross-border initiatives and products; • Ensure joint management of transboundary WWT facilities via multi-stakeholder dialogue; • Countries of focus make progress towards political stability and economical development.

To improve capacities of local stakeholders, several strategies can be suggested, including:

• Disseminating knowledge and increasing the understanding of natural and cultural values through topic-oriented training for local stakeholder groups; • Developing site-specific solutions to address nature conservation problems together with affected stakeholders and with the application of their traditional knowledge; • Providing information on alternative approaches to the use of natural resources: linking nature conservation with agriculture and rural tourism; • Assisting local players in developing their initiatives into concrete projects and in raising additional funds for their implementation;

Table 6 Important elements of methodological approach of transboundary cooperation.

Relying on an international Unify communities around a joint vision Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 cooperation framework Treating the project as an Empowering local actors to become leaders open-ended process Fostering local participation by Allowing stakeholders to take action and learn from their own engaging as many relevant results stakeholders Identifying priorities locally – Promoting a positive regional image through transboundary working with proposals promotional activities made by local stakeholders Establishing permanent trans- Ensuring transparency through a systematic approach to boundary bodies to engage communication stakeholders in planning of activities and maintaining cross-border dialogue

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• Establishing links between organizations dealing with conservation and management to facilitate experience exchange and knowledge transfer across borders and among project sites; • Strengthening the capacities of local and national decision makers to develop and implement action plans for the management of protected areas and natural resources; and • Upgrade local Master of Science programs on water and sanitation issues, training of trainers, with focus on building capacity and retaining knowledge and expertise on the local level that could be further disseminated to entire communities.

In addition to local stakeholders training, most of the project activities entail capacity building aspects. Stakeholders were not only exposed to new knowledge but also received opportunities to apply this in concrete situations. This allowed them to learn about innovative approaches and their possible application in the community.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A thorough analysis of the current Israeli water and environmental policies revealed that the flow path of wastewater irrespective of its origin – a Palestinian community or an Israeli settlement within the West Bank – is being systematically changed through the watershed or river basin. These policies aimed at altering the utilization of treated effluent to a higher-value use in agricultural sector, and increasing the output per unit of water consumptively used, thereby exploiting the raw wastewater that is not use- fully recycled within the basin of its origin, reducing the degradation in water and soil quality and minimizing public health hazards. We believe that development of a solid bi-national cooperation on transboundary wastewater management would achieve effective public health and environmental protection with additional treated water for all. With cooperation, people on both sides of the Green Line or “borders” of the future can benefit and live and prosper separately. Establishing an international border water commission, like the one created in 1889 between USA and Mexico border, can help in resolving transboundary wastewater issues on the Israeli-Palestinian “borders”. The international border water commission shall diplomatically resolve transboundary wastewater management and associated infrastructure issues. Of equal importance, all related technical issues shall be tackled in Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 a way that benefits the social, environmental and economic welfare of all people on the two sides of the boundary and will improve relationships between the two countries. Ongoing land and resource confiscation, isolation and restrictions on freedom of movement have created conditions of severe economic hardship for Palestinians. Dur- ing the last years, many regional projects and partnership initiatives were established to strengthen, legitimize, and institute the presence of the Israeli occupation in Pales- tine. However, the ‘joint’ Israeli-Palestinian projects do not foster cooperation for sustainable growth, but rather maintain Israeli control over the development of both the Palestinian water and sanitation sectors. The Israeli military and civil administrations are key actors over core Palestinian development activities pertaining to free access of goods and movement, as well as provision of safe drinking water, adequate sanitation and electricity. International financial aid and investment in the water and sanitation

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sector is being controlled by the Israeli military administration. The major goal of any future regional cooperation and partnership shall be based on effective, fair, equitable dialogue in order to establish sustainable wastewater management infrastructures.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The financial support, provided by the German Agency for Cooperation (GTZ), for the first author during his activity as Technical Advisor for the Palestinian Water Authority is highly appreciated.

REFERENCES

Aickin, R. (1987). The polluter pays principle, the theory of enterprise liability and the concept of insurability. Chemistry and Industry 22, 785–788. Almog, R. (2007). Kidron’s wastewater treatment plans and their environmental implications. Background report for the German-Israeli-Palestinian research project: From conflict to collective action: institutional change and management options to govern transboundary watercourses. Al-Sa’ed, R. (2005). Obstacles and chances to cut pollution load discharges from the urban Palestine. Water International 30(4), 538–544. Al-Sa’ed, R. (2007). Sustainability of natural and mechanized aerated ponds for domestic and municipal wastewater treatment in Palestine. Water International 32(2), 310–324. Caponera, D.A. (1992). Principles of Water Law and Administration. National and Interna- tional -Balkema, Amsterdam. Cohen, A., Sever, Y., Tzipori, A. & Fiman, D. (2008). West Bank Streams Monitoring-Stream Pollution Evaluation Based on Sampling during the Year 2007. Published report of the Environmental Unit, Israel Nature and National Parks Protection Authority, August 2008. Available at: (Accessed 10.07.2009). Gabbay, S. (2002). The Environment in Israel. Israel Ministry of Environment, Jerusalem. Israel. Hareuveni, E. (2009). Foul Play: Neglect of Wastewater Treatment in the West Bank. Final report by B’Tselem, Israel. Jobin, J.C. & Peña, C. (2006). EMS development at Nogales International Wastewater Treat- ment Plant: Managing environmental aspects beyond borders. Proceedings of the Water Environment Foundation, WEFTEC 2006, pp. 2478–2492(15). Kramer, A. (2008). Regional water cooperation and peace building in the Middle East. Final Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 Report of the Initiative for Peace Building. Available at: www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu (accessed on 02.05.09). Feitelson, E. & Levy, N. (2006). The environmental aspects of reterritorialization: Environ- mental facets of Israeli-Arab agreements. Political Geography 25(4), 459–477. Fischhendler, I. (2007). Unilateral environmentalism: wastewater treatment along the Israeli- Palestinian border. Proceedings of Amsterdam Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, 24–26 May 2007. Isaac, J., Rishmawi, K. & Safar, A. (2004). The impact of Israel’s unilateral actions on the Palestinian Environment. Jerusalem: Applied Research Institute. Available at http://www. arij.org. Accessed 09.06.2009. Marczin, O. (2007). Trans-Boundary Cooperation Through the Management of Shared Natu- ral Resources: Experience and lessons from six years of work in three pilot areas. Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC), Szentendre, Hungary.

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MoU, (2003 & 2007). Memorandum of understanding signed between the Israeli-Palestinian sides: The case Deir Sharaf WWTP. PWA projects. Ring, I. (1997). Evolutionary strategies in environmental policy. Ecological Economics 23, 237–249. Schalimtzek, A. & Fischhendler, I. (2009). Dividing the cost-burden of environmental services: The case of the Israeli-Palestinian wastewater regime. Environmental Politics 18(4), 612–632. Tagar, Z., Keinan, T. & Bromberg, G. (2004). A seeping time bomb: pollution of the Mountain Aquifer by sewage. Friends of Earth Middle East (FoEME), Tel Aviv, Israel. Tal, A. (2007). New trends in Israel’s water legislation and implications for cooperative transboundary management. Security and Transboundary Water Management, (C. Lipchin, E. Pallant, Ed.) Springer, 2007. Tal, A. (2005). Insuring the Effectiveness of Catalytic Converters to Prevent Air Pollution from Transportation in Israel. The Center for Environmental Policy Studies Series no. 20, The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, Jerusalem, http://www.jiis.org.il World Bank (2009). West Bank and Gaza assessment of restrictions on Palestinian water sector development. Sector Note Report No. 47657-GZ. Washington DC: The World Bank. Zeitoun, M. (2008). Power and Water in the Middle East: The Hidden Politics of the Palestin- ian-Israeli Water Conflict. London, UK: L.B. Tauris. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016

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Alon Tal

ISRAEL’S EXPERIENCE WITH WASTEWATER REUSE: RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

Israel recycles over eighty percent of its sewage and the treated effluents provide local agriculture with over half of its water supply. This is the result of a consistent national policy that was initiated in the 1950s and which remains unprecedented internationally. Some jurisdictions such as Spain and South Australia have begun to expand their utilization wastewater relatively recently, but at present still recycle less than a quarter of the domestic sewage produced. The scope of Israel’s effluent recycling is generally hailed as a notable environmental achievement. In a region of water scarcity, presumably wastewater reuse both solved the sanitation/health conundrum posed by mounting municipal sewage collection and allowed for a steady growth in agricultural yields, not withstanding the climate-change induced drop in precipitation and relentless growth in population. When initial studies were conducted to evaluate the health impact, there were no signs that wastewater reuse posed any problems to either local human health, hydrology. (Fattal, 1981) It seemed like a classic “win-win-win” technological triumph. But some twenty years ago the first signs of trouble began to surface. A number of indicators and studies suggested that all was not well in the land of milk, honey and recycled effluents and the unforgiving law of “unintended ecological consequences” had begun to set in. This chapter considers Israel’s experience in wastewater reuse. It begins with a brief review of the incipient stages of wastewater treatment and recycling during the 1950s along with the initial standards and regulatory framework for reducing its environmental impacts. It then considers a series of studies and findings that over time identified numerous problematic implications associated with Israel’s aggressive sewage recycling program. It concludes with a summary of recent wastewater treatment standards, remainng policy challenges for overcoming water reuse and suggestions for future research in the field. Because of its small size and long-term, ambitious efforts in wastewater management, Israel’s experience is unique. Present local conditions can be seen as a “fast forward” of the hydrological reality that other countries and regions who today are

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pursuing similar paths may soon face. As such, the Israeli wastewater reuse story is one that needs to be told and considered internationally.

THE MIXED BLESSINGS OF WASTEWATER REUSE

As the young state of Israel sought to expand agriculture dramatically, despite its modest natural rainfall, a variety of new water sources were considered. Clouds were seeded (Gabbay, 1994), desalination was assessed and water imports contemplated. None offered a sufficiently meaningful, reliable or cost-effective solution. Sewage, on the other hand was a far more promising source of water. Officials at Israel’s Ministry of Health probably deserve most of the credit for Israel’s decision to transform sewage from a health hazard into a valuable natural resource. When Israel was established, central sewage systems were rare; even urban areas primarily relied on septic tanks and localized treatment schemes (Tal, 2001). This trend continued for the initial period of statehood when only one wastewater facility was constructed in the first thirty new urban settlements established (Mari- nov, 1993). But as the population grew and the carrying capacity proved inadequate to absorb the increasing quantities of sewage discharges, Israel’s sanitation problem spilled out into the public realm: streams became putrid, mosquito infestation was unbearable, beaches were closed, drinking water frequently suffered from bacterial contamination and associated disease outbreaks were not infrequent (Shuval, 1967). In 1958, the Ministry of Health began requiring chlorination of drinking water, but this did not get at the root of the growing sewage problem. Aaron Amrami, director of the Ministry’s sanitation department during the 1950s found willing partners among Israel’s farmers. Many farming communities had already set up small, ad hoc wastewater irrigation projects in order to overcome their limited water allocations or access to water sources (Shuval, 1980). Farmers also saw benefits associated with potentially reduced fertilizer requirements, due to the high levels of nutrients in the irrigation waters (Avnimelech, 1993). Most of all, they couldn’t argue with the significantly higher yields found in fields irrigated with effluents (Shuval, 1962). So they grew used to the smell and embraced the new source of irrigation water. By 1956, a National Masterplan was put forward for irrigation by TAHAL, the recently formed agency for water planning. It called for 150 million cubic meters of Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 wastewater for reuse in Israel (Wachs, 1971). The plan was soon put into action: by 1962 over 50 projects brought treated effluent from Israeli cities to the nation’s farms. Within a decade the number had more than doubled so that by 1972, 20% of urban sewage was recycled (Tal, 2002). In 1972, based on a World Bank grant, Israel began to build a major, regional treatment facility for the greater Tel Aviv “Dan Association of Cities”. The wastewater from Israel’s largest urban area was soon entirely recycled after being injected into an aquifer for temporary filtration and soil aquifer treatment (SAT). By the mid-1970s, Israel could already boast the world’s most sophisticated and ambitious program. Given, Israel’s asymmetrical seasonal rainfall, storage capacity proved to be a problem. During the 1990s, the Jewish National Fund, a public corporation spent hundreds of millions of dollars in establishing a broad, national network

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of over a one hundred reservoirs to hold the effluents during the rainy season to allow for optimal distribution (Tal, 2006). As the years went on, the percentage of sewage recycled steadily grew. In 2009, the total amount of wastewater recycled nationally reached over 500 million cubic meters – more than three times the projections of the original Tahal Plan, with 100% reuse objectives no longer sounding delusional (Israel Ministry of Environment, 2009). Water managers at the Ministry of Health were hardly unaware of effluent recycling’s potential health impacts. As early as 1953, bacteria and pathogens, along with the high salinity concentrations, were the target of the world’s first recommended wastewater reuse standards. (Shuval, 1962-b). Cognizant of the enormous gap between the standards and the actual levels of treatment available – which at the time were limited to primary treatment (separation), Ministry of Health regulators recommended limitations on the kinds of crops that could be used: effluents was only to provide irrigation for cotton, fodder and produce that was not consumed raw. During the 1970s, a Hebrew University team undertook an epidemiological study among 81 agricultural communities that utilized wastewater and were quick to declare effluent irrigation to be perfectly safe. (Fattal, 1981). In retrospect, the celebration was premature.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WASTEWATER REUSE

Israel’s great national experiment with wastewater reuse continues to this day, but more soberly. The potential consequences and concerns are increasingly well recognized – even if not fully addressed. Table 1 offers a list of basic environmental problems divided by impact on humans and plants and soils:

Bacteria and pathogens The most basic environmental health risk associated with wastewater reuse involves the direct exposure of humans to the pathogens and bacteria arising from human excrement. It took many years for Israel to make a transition to irrigation systems Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 Table 1 Wastewater Reuse: Health, Environmental and Agricultural Impacts.

Public Health/Environmental Hazards

• Pathogens/Bacteria • Organic pollutants • Chlorides • Toxic compounds (heavy metals, organochlorines, etc.) • Endocrine Disruptors (biologically active compounds) • Plants and Soil Hazards High Salinity • Sodification of soil (SAR) • Excess Boron • Excess Nitrogen and Phosphorus

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that largely avert these hazards. But before it did, as the systematic dissemination of sewage water grew during the 1960s, gastrointestinal disease expanded accordingly – with 6% of all hospitalizations linked to stomach illnesses. (Cohen, 1971) Vegetables were singled out as the key route of exposure. A major cholera epidemic in Jerusalem in 1970 (Gerichter, 1971) and subsequently in Gaza (Imre, 1971) were perhaps the most widely publicized “downside” of the period’s general enthusiasm for irrigation with effluents. After hearings in the Knesset, Israel’s Parliament realized the country had a problem and amended the relevant law. The Ministry of Health was empowered to set formal standards for wastewater irrigation. But these were not published until 1981 (Public Health Principles, 1981), and it would take years before compliance levels became acceptable. Adequacy of wastewater treatment: Today, to a large extent, Israel has succeeded in reducing the acute risks associated with direct exposure of pathogenic and bacterial contaminants in wastewater to the end-users in farm operations. Here drip irrigation has made an important contribution, as it reduces the airborne dissemination of these bacteria through sprinkler systems as was common in the past. Upgraded treatment infrastructure, means that concentrations of bacteria in treated effluents has improved, as have general sanitation and packaging practices for local produce. While general water contamination is beyond the scope of the present discussion, it is worth noting that sewage treatment levels still are often not sufficient to reduce the direct impact on receiving streams and eutrophication along with general contamination of surface waters remain commonplace. (Asaf, 2007). Wastewater is invariably high in salinity and nutrients. While surely not the sole ground water pollution source, wide spread effluent recycling has contributed to the steady decline in the potability of aquifers, particularly in the sandy aquifer along Israel’s coastline. During the early 1990s, the Chief Scientist in the Ministry of the Environment proposed regulations (accompanied by a detailed map identifying sensitive carstic and sandy hydrological zones) where wastewater reuse should be banned. But the Ministry of Agriculture was not supportive and the policy was never implemented. (Tal, 2002), and so the groundwater contamination problem grew worse. Figure 1 shows the historic increase in the aquifer’s average concentration of nutrients and salinity. But conventional pollutants like chlorine and nitrates were only the “tip of the iceberg”. By the late 1980s, water quality analysis pointed to the inadequacy of existing sewage recycling practices. Leah Muszkot, an analytical chemist based at the Ministry of Agriculture’s Volcani Institute took water samples from wells located Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 beneath fields that had been irrigated with wastewater. Her publications drew attention to high concentrations of industrial solvents whose source could not be traced to the surrounding rural areas, but rather to the wastewater which had been used for irrigation and then percolated into the groundwater below (Muszkat, 1988, Muszkat, 1990, Muszkat, 1993). Muzkot’s findings highlighted the flawed dynamics of local wastewater treatment: regulatory demands for pretreatment among Israeli industrial manufacturers were minimal and even these were poorly enforced. Because of this, municipal waste treatment facilities received sewage with chemicals that conventional primary and secondary processes are unable to break down. None of these were listed among the conventional pollutant standards that wastewater had to meet prior to reycling. As a result, effluent reuse systematically spread high concentrations of industrial chemicals across agricul-

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70 220

200 65

180 60 )

160 /I g m (mg/I) 55 (

– 3

140 – Cl NO 50 120

45 Chloride 100 Nitrate 40 80 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 year

Figure 1 Nitrates and Chlorides Concentrations in the Coastal Aquifer 1970–2005. (Source: Israel Hydrological Service.).

tural regions. Eventually these percolated into groundwater, manifested in the presence of measurable levels of toluene, benzene and other substances in well water. Controlling boron in effluents: Not only were industrial chemical health hazards identified as a problem in Israel’s wastewater during this period. Farmers also noticed that many plant leaves were suffering when irrigated with the municipal effluents. Eventually, the damage was associated with high Boron concentrations (Pettygrove, G.S. 1985). Boron at the time was a conventional compound in most household detergents in Israel, and indeed poses no human health concerns. As a result, there were no sewage treatment standards for the element. Recycling, however, changed its harmless status. While in trace quantities it is an essential mineral for plant growth, when Boron concentrations become too high it can become toxic to leaves. Secondary treatment at wastewater treatment plants reduced organic load and removed most pathogens, but it did not reduce concentrations of boron (Ben-Gal, 2006). Fortunately, this unan- Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 ticipated environmental side effect of wastewater reuse was easily remedied from a regulatory perspective. In 1994, the Ministry of Environment enacted new regulations designed to reduce the salinity of sewage. These include limits on ion exchangers, controlling the use of salt in slaughterhouses (in the koshering process), discharge of brine to sewers. But they also included the phase-in of new controls on formulation of domestic and industrial detergents, dramatically reducing allowable boron concentrations in detergents (Weber, 2002). Figure 2 shows the subsequent dramatic drop in Boron concentrations that occured after the policy was implemented in 1999. The salinity conundrum: Professor Dan Zaslavsky is an unlikely environmental campaigner and zealous advocate for reforming Israel’s present dependence on effluent irrigation. As a former chief scientist at the Ministry of Energy and later,

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0.7 250 0.65

0.58 0.6 211 200 184 0.5 0.5 0.41 148 150 Tones B/y 0.4 0.36

112 0.3 93 100 Sewage (mg/L B) 0.2 0.17

50 0.1 14

0 0 19961999 2000 2002 2003 2008

Figure 2 Impact of New Israel Standard for Boron in detergents, on water. (Source: Israel Ministry of Environmental Protection).

National Water Commissioner, he was ostensibly the “consummate establishment” inside expert. But his professional background and areas of interest are far more diverse than a typical civil engineering professor and the steady decline in water quality gave him no rest. When Zaslavksy began to speak out vociferously about what he viewed as the folly of public policies in wastewater management, it resonated far more than the usual green critique. Zaslvasky’s traced the country’s present orientation on the subject to 1978 when Israel signed the UN sponsored “Barcelona Convention for Protection of the Mediter- ranean Sea”. Among the convention protocols was a strict prohibition on discharge Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 of wastewater into the Sea. The logical corollary was development of a default bias towards land based disposal for wastewater. Zaslavsky argued that the ill-considered, national obsession with effluent irrigation was born of this dynamic (Zaslavksy, 2004). As a soil physics expert, Zaslavksy reckoned that the environmental price of embracing effluent irrigation was far greater – and more irreversible than had previously acknowledged. Beyond the direct damage to plants from the salty waters and soils, the sodium compounds catalyzed ion exchange in the clay fraction of the soil leaving it permanently changed. The dispersion of the wastewater clogged the ground and stymied aeration, with the resulting surface crust damaging seed sprouting, soil aeration and irrigation. He also assailed the ubiquitous coli bacteria, that could be found more or less, wherever recycled wastewater was found in the irrigation stream.

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Diseases and micro-organisms in the water, Zaslavsky argued, pass from the soil to the roots through plant stems all the way to the fruit. Salmonella was an example of one such biological contaminant. Moreover, he argued that the holding reservoirs bred mosquitoes, increasing the risk of West Nile fever. Professor Zaslvasky built his arguments beyond hydrology, and included an economic price tag for what he believed to be fool-hardy public policy. Wastewater storage for summer use led to a 20% loss of water to evaporation, which constituted a cost. The system also required heavy filtration and chlorination expenses to prevent clogging in the irrigation system. The leaching of salts out of the soil had to be under- taken at increasingly great depths in order to leach effluent salinity out of root zone. Eventually, these solutes would have to be removed from the ground water and this would involve considerable costs – which he estimated would be roughly 70 cents per cubic meter higher than present, narrow market prices. When Zaslvsky crunched the numbers in a full-cost, environmental, accounting, they showed that a cubic meter of sewage (based on 2007 dollars) would be as much as 1.5–2.5 dollars/m3 – roughly three times the going price for desalinating a comparable quantity of sea water. Efflu- ent irrigation, economically did not seem to make sense. Endocrine disruptors and antibiotics: Zaslavsky also argued that the constant flow of treated wastewater would lead to hazardous concentrations of biologically active substances in groundwater, but had little data on which to base such assertions. But this would change. In May 2009, a research team at Hadassah Hospital’s Medical Center presented alarming figures about the condition of sperm among Israeli males. (Har-Nir, 2009). The group reported that the between the ten-year period between 1994–1999 and 2004–2008, a 40% drop in sperm concentrations could be observed among Israeli donors. (Average sperm dropped from a concentration of 106 ± 25 million spermato- zoa/cc with 79% ± 4.5% motility to 67 ± 15 million/cc with 68% ± 4% motile sperm (Haimov-Kochman 2012).) These numbers had very real implications: Some 2/3 s of Israeli males who sought to serve as sperm donors were rejected for not meeting local fertility standards. If present trends continue to 2020 – the average Israeli man would be characterized as being “reproductively impaired” according to present WHO criteria. While the Hadassah research team could not offer an empirically proven cause for the phenomenon, researchers privately voiced suspicions that the drop was the result of endocrine disrupting chemicals in the water – substances with hormone like properties which they assumed had been transported via irrigated effluents. The effect of endocrine disruptors on a variety of physiological functions had first been brought to Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 world attention in the late 1990s through the publication of the best selling Our Sto- len Future (Colborn 1997). The authors documented dozens of cases of reproductive and sexual dysfunction in ecological systems exposed to endocrines as well as worry- ing trends in humans, such as the rise in premature pubescence, that they attributed to this diverse family of endocrine disrupting chemicals. Now, a decade later, a number of water quality experts in Israel informally expressed their intuitive suspicions about the source of the sperm count figures. Wastewater containing residual hormones from the dairy and meat industry, flushed birth control pills and other endocrine disrupting chemicals were starting to wreak havoc on the country’s reproductive systems. Such an assertion found confirmation in the growing list of antibiotics measured in ground water lying below fields with a history of wastewater reuse. For example, Tel Aviv University hydrochemist, Dr. Dror Avisar and his research team. found

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relatively high concentrations of the antibiotic sulfamethoxazole (SMX) in the water table region, in two monitoring wells. The antibiotics proved to be highly persistent, with detection taking place in the unsaturated zone after a transport period of roughly 16 years. The authors pointed out that more than 90% of the metabolized and unme- tabolized excreted antibiotics can be detected in wastewater treatment plants. Even state-of-the-art tertiary treatments for wastewater treatment are not designed to effectively disable their activity. Tracing the biological contaminants to irrigation practices that began in the 1960s, the authors’ conclusion was straight forward: recharge of effluents into aquifers and irrigation with sewage effluents over the replenishment area of aquifers leads to groundwater contamination by antibiotics. (Avisar, 2009-a). Other antibiotics and their degradation products were identified in other surveys (Lamm, 2009). The implications for producing new strains of antibiotic resistant bacteria should be of serious concern (Chee-Sanford, 2001).

NEW EFFLUENT REUSE STANDARDS

By the end of the twentieth century it was apparent that Israeli success in reaching such exceptional levels of wastewater reuse had produced environmental problems that needed to be addressed. The existing standards for wastewater treatment were extremely simple and lenient, based on a so-called “20/30” level of treatment (20 mg/l Biochemical Oxygen Demand – BOD; 30 mg/l Total Suspended Solids – TSS) that was no longer appropriate. The required performance standard was roughly analogous to secondary treatment technologies. These were probably sufficient for discharge into European rivers, given the high levels of dilution. (Tal, 2006). But for a country with largely ephemeral streams and ubiquitous wastewater reuse, they were clearly not up to the task. Tightening and expanding the standards, it was thought, would generate effluents that could then be permitted for irrigating any crop. The upgrade it was thought would save scarce fresh water supplies for the growing domestic sector while preserving the extent of crop range currently in cultivation. (Tal, 2005). An inter-ministerial committee was formed headed by then-Deputy Director of the Ministry of Environment, Yossi Inbar. The negotiations over the standard were protracted but in 2002 a new standard for wastewater reuse was proposed. It was designed to be dichotomous with maximum levels set for irrigation, and a separate standard set for discharge into streams. The irrigation standards were based on consid- Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 erations of soil, flora, hydrological and public health. Standards for effluents released into stream standards were based on ecological carrying capacity. After considerable debate, in 2005 Israel’s government adopted the new treatment guidelines and began the slow process of upgrading sewage infrastructure. (Lawhon, 2006). The primary objective of the new standards is to allow all of the country’s treated wastewater to be safely used for unrestricted irrigation, without posing risk to crops, soils or water resources. For example, the standard replaces the 20/30 standard with a 10/10 BOD/TSS requirement. It also contains standards for boron and salinity. Heavy metals are to be removed at the source. Nutrient removal is to increase in areas of hydrological sensitivity. The proposed standard will probably take another ten years to fully phase in, at an estimated expense of 220 million dollars (Israel Ministry of Environment, 2005). Table 2 offers a parameter-specific list of the new standard, divided according to the levels required for “unrestricted irrigation” versus “stream discharges”.

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Table 2 Proposed maximum levels in effluent reuse for unrestricted irrigation and discharge to rivers.

Parameter Unrestricted Streams Parameter Unrestricted Streams

Conductivity 1.4 dS/m Arsenic 0.1 mg/l 0.1 mg/l BOD 10 mg/l 10 mg/l Barium 50 mg/l TSS 10 mg/l 10 mg/l Mercury 0.002 mg/l 0.0005 mg/l COD 100 mg/l 70 mg/l Chromium 0.1 mg/l 0.05 mg/l Ammonia 20 mg/l 1.5 mg/l Nickel 0.2 mg/l 0.05 mg/l Total nitrogen 25 mg/l 10 mg/l Selenium 0.02 mg/l Total 5 mg/l 1.0 mg/l Lead 0.1 mg/l 0.008 mg/l phosphorus Chloride 250 mg/l 400 mg/l Cadmium 0.01 mg/l 0.005 mg/l Fluoride 2 mg/l Zinc 2 mg/l 0.2 mg/l Sodium 150 mg/l 200 mg/l Iron 2 mg/l Fecal Coliform 10 per 100 ml 200 p 100 ml Copper 0.2 mg/l 0.02 mg/l Dissolved < 0.5 mg/l < 3 mg/l Manganese 0.2 mg/l oxygen pH 6.5–8.5 7.0–8.5 Aluminum 5 mg/l Hydrocarbons 1 mg/l Molybdenum 0.01 mg/l Residual 1 mg/l 0.05 mg/l Vanadium 0.1 mg/l chlorine Anionic 2 mg/l 0.5 mg/l Beryllium 0.1 mg/l detergent Total oil 1 mg/l Cobalt 0.05 mg/l SAR 5 mmol/|L 0.5 Lithium 2.5 mg/l Boron 0.4 mg/l Cyanide 0.1 mg/l 0.005 mg/l

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The sustainability of Israel’s present policies regarding wastewater reuse remains a matter of controversy. Many claim that the new, toughened “Inbar” treatment criteria are not sufficient. For example, even if there was full compliance with the standard (which may take decades to attain, if ever) it would still leave the problem of emerging contaminants such as endocrine disruptors, antibiotics and trace metals unaddressed. Zaslavsky remains highly critical of the new standards, calling for nothing less Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 than pushing sewage through reverse osmosis treatment in order for it to reach drinking water quality. He points to the ultimate contribution of even Inbar-level effluents to the ever worsening soil and water salinity. If municipal effluents were “desalinized”, they could be safely added to the reservoir of national water resources without limiting the water’s ultimate usage. The estimated 30 cents/ m3 for treatment, presumably would be more cost-effective than the inordinate expense (and dubious outcome) associated with aquifer restoration once contamination by salinity and other pollutants leads to the decommissioning of wells. The process today is also cheap enough so that most farmers could purchase desalinized effluents at full-price and still make a profit from their produce. But desalinization is not without its own environmental consequences. The expenses (environmental and economic) associated with the higher energy requirements (and green house gases) may not be sufficiently internalized in his calculation, nor the cumulative impact of the brine discharge on marine ecology.

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There is no denying that the recent drop in Israel’s annual precipitation, coupled with the steady rise in population and living standards, means that water has become scarcer than ever in the Middle East. Given its substantial contribution to the country’s hydrological balance, it is hard to imagine Israeli water managers giving up on the prodigious supply of sewage effluents. But, future damages may come to match, or even exceed the past environmental and agricultural price that has been paid for Israel’s experiment in effluent irrigation. Intensified research must provide cost-effective treatment strategies for removing the biologically active compounds in the wastewater. Effluents’ inevitably high chloride levels and salinity remain a major threat to long-term agricultural productivity. While drought and salt resistant crops are constantly being developed, at some point, plant scientists will not be able to keep up with the steady degradation in soil and water quality. In short, living in the long-term with sewage recycling will not only demand an investment in treatment infrastructure but also in research. Given Israel’s long history of effluent recycling, there is no better place to begin the critical challenge of finding ways to overcome the many obstacles to safe and sustainable wastewater reuse.

REFERENCES

Asaf, L., Negaoker, Neta Tal, A.L. & Jonathan Al Khateeb, N. (2007). “Transboundary Stream Restoration in Israel and the Palestinian Authority”, “, Integrated Water Resources Man- agement and Security in the Middle East,(C. Lipchin, E. Pallant, Ed.) Springer, 285–295. Avisar, D., Lester, Y. & Ronen, D. (2009-a). “Sulfamethoxazole Contamination of a Deep Phreatic Aquifer”, Science of the Total Environment 407, 4278–4282. Avisar, D., Levin G. & Gozlan, I. (2009-b). The processes affecting oxytetracycline contamination of groundwater in a phreatic aquifer underlying industrial fish ponds in Israel. Environ- mental Earth Sciences Vol. 59, No. 4, pp. 939–945. Avnimelech, Y. (1993). “Irrigation with Sewage Effluents: The Israeli Experience,” Environ- mental Science and Technology, Vol. 27, No. 7, 1279. Ben-Gal, A., Tel-Tsur, N. & Tal, A. (2006) “The Sustainability of Arid Agriculture: Trends and Challenges”, Annals of the Arid Zone 45(2): 1–31. Chee-Sanford, J.C., Aminov, R.I, Krapac, I.J., Garrigues-Jeanjean, N. & Mackie, R.I. (2001). Occurrence and diversity of tetracycline resistance genes in lagoons and groundwater underlying two swine production facilities. Applied Environmental Microbiology, 67(4):1494–502.

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 Cohen, J., et. al. (1971). “The Endemicity of Gastrointestinal Infections,” Jerusalem, Ministry of Health, Public Health, p. 3. Colborn, T., Dunamsky, D. & Meyers, J.P. (1997). Our Stolen Future: Are We Threatening Our Fertility, Intelligence, and Survival? – A Scientific Detective Story, New York, Penguin. Fattal, B. & Shuval, H. “Historical Prospective Epidemiological Study of Wastewater Utiliza- tion in Kibbutzim in Israel, 1974–77,’ Developments in Arid Zone Ecology and Environ- mental Quality, (Ed. Hillel Shuval) Philadelphia, PA. Balaban ISS, 1981, pp. 333–343. Gabbay, S. The Environment in Israel, 1994, Jerusalem, Ministry of Environment, p. 21 Gerichter, B. & Cahan, D. (1971). “Laboratory Investigations During the Cholera Outbreak in Jerusalem and Gaza, 1970, p. 26–35.T.A. Schwartz, “The Jerusalem Cholera Outbreak, The Course of the Epidemiological Investigation, “Public Health, 13. Haimov-Kochman, R., Har-Nir, R., Ein-Mor, E., Ben-Shoshan, V., Greenfield, C., Eldar, I., Bdolah, Y. & Hurwitz, A. (2012). “Is the quality of donated semen deteriorating? Findings

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from a 15 year longitudinal analysis of weekly sperm samples,” The Israel Medical Association Journal, 14(6): 372–377. Har-Nir, R., Ben-Shoshan, V., Greenfield, C., Eldar, I., Bdolah, Y.H. & Arye Haimov-Kochman, R. (2009). “Declining Quality Of Donated Semen – A 10 Years Historical Comparative Cohort” Unpublished manuscript, May 12, 2009. Imre, Z., et. al. (1971). “The Cholera Outbreak With Vibrio Cholerae in the Gaza Area in 1970, Public Health, 39–40. Israel Ministry of the Environment. (2005). Wastewater treatment plants. Israel Ministry of Environment website: http://www.sviva.gov.il/ Israel Secondary Regulations 1981, (Kovetz Takanot) 1357, 718. Lamm, A., Mayer, A., Gozlan, I. & Avisar, D. (2009). “Detection of Amoxicillin- Diketopi- perazine-2″, 5″ in Wastewater Samples”, Journal of. Environmental. Science and. Health, Part A. vol.44, No.14. 1512–1514. Lawhon, P., Schwartz, M. (2006). Linking environmental and economic sustainability in establishing standards for wastewater re-use in Israel, Water Science Technology 53(9), 203–212. Marinov, U. (1993). “How Israel Handles the Environment and Development,” Environmental Science and Technology, vol. 27, No. 7, 1253. Muszkat, L., et al. (1993). “Penetration of pesticides and industrial organics into the depth of soil and groundwater. Arch Insect” Biochem Physiol 1993; 22:487–99. Muszkot, L. (1988). “First Results of Research that Examined Ground Water Point to Pollu- tion by Hazardous Organic Materials,” Biosphera, , October, 15. Muszkot, L., et al. (1990). “Large Scale Contamination of Deep Groundwaters by Organic Pollutants,” Advances in Mass Spectrometry, 11B, p. 1628. Pettygrove, G.S. & Asano, T. (1985). Irrigation with Reclaimed Municipal Wastewater. Lewis Publishers, Chelsea, Mi. 518Public Health Principles. Shuval, H. (1962) “Public Health Aspects of Waste Water Utilization in Israel, Proceedings of the 17th Industrial Wastes Conference, Purdue University, 651–652. Shuval, H. (1962b). “Waste Water Utilization in Israel,” Proceedings of an International Semi- nar on Soil and Water Utilization, South Dakota, Brookings, 1962, p. 40 Shuval, H. (1980). “Quality Management Aspects of Wastewater Reuse in Israel,” Water Qual- ity Management Under Conditions of Scarcity, Israel as a Case Study, (Hillel Shuval, Ed.) New York, Academic Press. Shuval, H. “The Problem of Sewage and Waste Discharges in Israel, “ Lecture to Sanitary Engineers, February 2, 1967, Tzrifin, Israel. Tal, A. (2002). Pollution in a Promised Land – An Environmental History of Israel, Berkeley, California, University of California Press. Tal, A. (2006). “Seeking Sustainability: Israel’s Evolving Water Management Strategy”, Sci- ence,. 313, August 25, 2006, 1081–1084. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:39 12 October 2016 Tal, A. Ben-Gal, A., Lawhon, P. & Rassass, D. (2005). Sustainable Water Management in the Drylands: Recent Israeli Experience, Jerusalem, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October. Wachs, A. (1971). “The Outlook for Wastewater Utilization in Israel,” Developments in Water Quality Research, (Shuval Ed.) Ann Arbor Mich. Ann Arbor Science Publishers, 109–111. Weber, B. & Juanico, M. (2002). “Salt reduction in municipal sewage allocated for reuse: the outcome of a new policy in Israel”,. Israel Ministry of Environment website, http://www. sviva.gov.il/Enviroment/Static/Binaries/Articals/baruch_web_1.pdf Zaslavsky, D., Guhteh, R. & Sahar, A. (2004). Policies for Utilizing Sewage in Israel – Sew- age Treatment for Effluent Irrigation or Desalinating Effluents to Drinking Water Quality, Haifa, Technion.

IIHESHAE0_Book.indbHESHAE0_Book.indb 231231 111/20/20121/20/2012 1:15:501:15:50 PMPM Chapter 17 Sea water desalination in Israel: Planning, coping with difficulties, and economic aspects of long-term risks

Abraham Tenne

PAST, CURRENT AND FUTURE SEA WATER DESALINATION

In 1999, the Israeli government initiated a long-term, large scale SWRO (Sea Water Reverse Osmosis) desalination program. The program is designed to provide for the growing demands on Israel’s scarce water resources, and to mitigate the drought conditions that have characterized most years since the mid-1990’s. Since the initiation of the desalination program, there have been several changes in government decisions regarding the targeted annual quantity of desalinated water to be produced (Figure 1). These changes in target-production volumes were influenced by short-term changes in the history of inter-annual rainfall, and by changes in national consumption rates. The initial target capacity of 50 million cubic meters (MCM) per year was re-set in 2002, to 400 MCM/year. This target was reduced in 2003 to 230 MCM/year in response to an unprecedented large amount of rainfall in 2002. In July 2007, subsequent to several drought years, the targeted production- capacity was re-set to 505 MCM/year, to be reached by the year 2013. Additional drought conditions led to a further increase in target capacity in 2008, to 750 MCM/ year to be reached by the year 2020. From the 750 MCM, 600 MCM will be provided as quickly as possible. Construction of the first large-scale (116 MCM/year) desalination facility was initiated in 2002 by private companies that won the government’s public tenders for construction, maintenance, and operation of the facility. Subsequent desalination facilities all follow the same fundamental procedures of public tendering and bids by the private sector for the construction and operation of each facility. Israel’s long-term large-scale reverse-osmosis sea water desalination program began contributing potable water to the national water grid in 2005. Three large-scale seawater desalination facilities and some smaller brackish water desalination facilities currently (2010) provide 320 MCM of Israel’s potable water requirements (to all sectors). This volume is equivalent to approximately 42% of the current domestic water requirements. Desalinated production capacity is expected to increase to 577 MCM/ year; and 750 MCM/year by the respective years 2014; and 2020 (Figure 2). Israel’s desalination facilities are essential to sustainable potable water supplies in the State, since they supplement the severely limited natural resources to a level that meets existing national potable water demands. Desalinated supplies will allow Israel to close the gap between national water supply and demand by 2014, and to

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800

700

600

500

400

300

200 Production-targets (MCM/yr) 100

0 50 200 400 360 320 230 505 750 Aug 3 Apr 18 Mar 20 Oct 27 Jan 6 Sep 12 July 1 June 1 2000 2001 2002 2002 2003 2006 2007 2008 Decision-dates

Figure 1 Government targets for annual desalination production capacity.

realize plans to maintain this sustainable consumption-state in the upcoming decades. According to targets outlined in the Water Authority’s Master Plan for Water Sec- tor Development for the period from 2010 to 2050, by the years 2015, 2025, and 2050 respectively, the construction of additional desalination facilities are expected to increase desalinated supplies to approximately 22.5%, 28.5%, and 41% of all national potable water demands (62.5%, 70%, and 100% of the domestic water demands). Any supplementary desalinated water that becomes available during these years will be used to aid in replenishing Israel’s natural water systems. The national planning program for desalination (TAMA) is in the process of expansion of the national seawater desalination sites. The current planning scheme (TAMA 34/B/2) has set aside sites for the production of 750 MCM/year of desalinated water. In addition, a new planning scheme has been initiated (TAMA 34/B/2/2), with the goal to increase total annual production of desalinated water to 1.75 billion cubic meters (BCM/year) by 2040. During the coming months, the national desalination and Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:40 12 October 2016 water conveyance system will be under review in order to finalize details of the planned desalination facilities and upgrades to the national pipe-conveyance grid. This series of projects is valued at over 10 billion shekels, to be used over the coming decade.

Desalination of brackish water In Israel, several smaller desalination facilities desalinate brackish water from groundwater wells, rather than sea water (Figure 3). Such facilities exist in Eilat, the Arava, and the southern coastal plain of the Carmel. Total production of desalinated water from brackish sources is currently 30 MCM/year, and planned production is expected to reach 60 MCM/year, and 80–90 MCM/year by the years 2013 and 2020, respectively.

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a) 160 140 30 120 11 100 80 42 60 119 15 150 40 120 20 45 45

Annual production (MCM/yr) 0 Ashkelon Palmachm Hadera Brackish Sorek (2005) BOT (2007) BOO (2009) BOT Sites (2013) BOT

2010: 329 MCM/yr 2014: 577 MCM/yr

b) 750 ) 577 MCM/yr ( 399 349 344 329 roduction p 160 145 130 100 Annual 36 0 2... 2... 2... 2... 2... 2... 2... 2... 2... 2... 2... 2... Year Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:40 12 October 2016 Figure 2 Sea water desalination a) in each desalination facility in 2010 and 2014, and b) nationally, from 2004–2020.

SPECIFICATIONS OF EXISTING AND PLANNED DESALINATION FACILITIES

Ashkelon Desalination Plant • At the time of construction, this plant was the biggest RO plant in the world. • Among the most economical operating expenses for any desalination facility in the world.

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70 65 63.2 60.7 60 55 50 45 40 35 28.8 28.8 30 MCM/Y 25 18.4 20 15 10 5 0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Year

Gat 10 Granot Lahat Kziot Magan Hatpla Atlit Naaman-Kurdani Maayan Zvi Magan Mekorot Magarey Asher Total

Figure 3 Brackish water desalination program.

• Constructed and in operation by VID Desalination Company Ltd group. • Located south of the city of Ashkelon, in southern Israel. • A BOT project (Build, Operate & Transfer) for approximately 25 years. • Construction initiated in 2003; water supply initiated on August 2005; fully operational in December 2005. • Production capacity was 100 MCM/year in 2005; 105 MCM/year in 2007; 111 MCM/year in 2008; 114 MCM/year in 2009; and approximately 120 MCM/year in 2010. • In May 2010 the plant reached a total supply to date (across all operational years) of 500 MCM.

Palmachim Desalination Plant Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:40 12 October 2016 • Located north of Kibbutz Palmachim, in the central part of Israel. • A BOO project (Build, Owned & Operate) for 25 years. • The owner is Via Maris Desalination Ltd. • Construction started in May 2005. Water supply started in May 2007. • Production capacity was initially 30 MCM/year • Subsequent to an expansion in April 2010, production capacity of the plant is approximately 45 MCM/year.

Hadera Desalination Plant • Located west of the city of Hadera, north of the Hadera stream, in north-central Israel.

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Figure 4 Ashkelon Desalination Plant.

• A BOT project (Build, Operate & Transfer) for 25 years. • Construction began in June 2007. Water supply began in December 2009. • Production capacity was initially 100 MCM/year. • Subsequent to the expansion of the facility by the end of this year (2010) (Figure 6), the plant will provide approximately 127 MCM/year.

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:40 12 October 2016 To date, the Hadera Plant is the largest SWRO in the world in operation.

Ashdod Desalination Plant (yet to be finalized) • The plant will be located in the industrial zone of Ashdod, in south-central Israel. • The project will be executed by Mekorot Initiating and Development Ltd., which received a concession for construction and operation of the facility from the Israeli government. • Construction is forecast to be initiated at the end of 2010. • The production capacity will be 100 MCM/year. • Water production at full capacity is forecast for the end of 2013.

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Figure 5 Palmachim Desalination Plant.

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Figure 6 Hadera Desalination Plant.

Soreq Desalination Plant • The plant will be located south-west of the city of Rishon Letzion, north of the Soreq stream, in north-central Israel. • A BOT project (Build, Operate & Transfer) for 25 years. • The agreement with SDL group for the BOT project was signed in mid-January 2010. • The production capacity will be 150 MCM/year. • Water production at full capacity is forecasted to the end of 2013. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:40 12 October 2016 The enlargement of existing desalination plants A tender process was initiated in early 2009 to expand existing desalination facilities (Ashkelon, Palmahim, Hadera) by an additional 60 MCM/year per facility. These expan- sions have either been completed, or are scheduled for completion by the end of 2010.

ENERGY AND COST-EFFICIENCY OF SEA WATER DESALINATION

Numerous policy-based, technological, mechanical, architectural, and managerial factors contribute to making Israel’s large-scale desalination facilities among the most

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energy-efficient and cost-efficient in the world (Figure 7). Currently, the national average energetic and financial cost of production per cubic meter of desalinating water in Israel is respectively, 3.5 kilowatt hours and US 65¢. The most recent tender was priced at US 52¢ for the Sorek facility (150 MCM/year). The Israeli government tailors its tenders and the associated bidding system in a way that maximizes energy and cost efficiency in the construction and operation of these large-scale desalination plants. Energy-conservation is promoted in the following ways:

• The cost of production per cubic meter is of key importance in winning a tender bid. Thus, the reverse osmosis method of desalination wins tender bids, rather than alternative technologies, since this reduces production-costs. The reverse osmosis method of desalination involves separation of the salt molecules from the water by use of special-purpose membranes. Reverse osmosis is now a well-known technology for desalination, with a notable advantage of low operating expenses relative to the alternative thermal desalination systems. Relatively low energy-requirements in reverse osmosis systems are responsible for low operating expenses. • Scores on the bidding system favor natural gas power generation rather than

coal generators. Natural gas power generation produces only 20% of the CO2 emissions generated by coal power-plants. Natural gas power generation is also approximately 7 to 8% cheaper than the energy provided by the national (coal- driven) power system. This savings reduces the cost of producing the desalinated water, thereby raising the bid-score further (since cheaper water scores higher). • Builders of the desalination facility are permitted to build a power plant that not only provides power to the desalination facility, but also provides additional energy that can be sold to the national power grid, at a profit to the builders. This allows further reductions in the costs of the desalinated water-product (thereby increasing the bid-score further).

Two examples of the many other important factors responsible for the energy and cost-efficiency of Israel’s large-scale desalination facilities are:

• Efficient technological energy-recovery systems that re-use energy in the midst of the desalination process. • A government policy for dividing all risks between the private companies that

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:40 12 October 2016 receive the tender, and the government. For example, the take-or-pay policy ensures that the government will pay for the agreed-upon volume of water that is supplied by the desalination facility each year, even if less than that volume is actually required or used.

The above figure illustrates a cost-comparison among international large-scale seawater reverse osmosis (SWRO) desalination plants that have been built between 1997 and 2010. Costs shown are bid prices. (The plant are ordered from left to right by price-quote date). Israeli desalination facilities are shown in open bars, and facilities from other countries are shown by closed bars. Annual production volumes are indicated within square-brackets on the x-axis, in millions of cubic meters. It should be noted, however, that the Water Desalination Report recommends extreme caution when reviewing total water costs. “The project scope, energy costs, subsidies,

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$1.20

$1.10

$1.00

$0.90 3

$0.80 $ US/m $0.70

$0.60

$0.50

$0.40

Trinidad [39] Algeria [33] Algeria [165] Algeria [33] Algeria [66] Australia [46] Tenes, Sorek, Israel [150] Larnaca Cyprus [18] Hamma Algeria [66]Skikda, Perth, Hadera, Israel [127] Ashkelon, Israel [108]Beni Saf, Algeria [66]Palmachim, Israel [30] Lymassol, CyprusMactaa, [13] Point Lisas, Oued Sebt, Tampa Bay, FL (Rehab) [31] Dhekelia, Cyprus (Orig) [13] Dhekelia, Cyprus (Rehab) [13]

Figure 7 Exceptional cost efficiency of Israel’s desalination facilities.

currency exchange rates, interest rates, contract terms and other commercial considerations may vary wildly between projects or bidders” (Tom Pankratz, editor, Water Desalination Report 46(41) 25, October 2010).

COPING WITH DIFFICULTIES AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF LONG-TERM RISKS

Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:40 12 October 2016 Numerous challenges are associated with the construction and operation of desalination facilities, and the nature of these challenges have changed over time. Initially, budgetary constraints and opposition from the agricultural lobby were the biggest challenges. Current challenges are as follows:

Necessity and pricing of desalination The challenge of convincing consumers that:

• Investing in sustainable water consumption is necessary. • Desalination is an appropriate and efficient tool for achieving sustainable water consumption. • The costs of desalination are necessary.

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These themes are very significant for future development of the water sector. They ultimately provide a budgetary source for short and long-term (several decades) planning and implementation of the future water sector.

Land-use for desalination There is a belief among some “Green” organizations and NGO’s of all kinds that the national water shortage is temporary and that in the future, Israel will receive all of the required water quantities without the need for water desalination. These organizations therefore argue that protection of nature and the coastal land is a higher priority than providing desalinated water. The need for desalinated water provisions is certainly a necessity currently, and in the future. Nevertheless, the protection of nature is also a very important consideration. Achieving a balance between the nation’s water requirements and the desire to protect open coastal spaces is a very difficult challenge. It significantly delays the time required to secure statutory permits for the future construction of desalination facilities.

Meeting requirements of the ministry of environmental protection Communications cover several issues such as:

• Determining the location for outflows of effluent (high-salinity water) to the sea. • Setting parameters for effluent water quality. • Setting quality parameters for outflows from brackish-water desalination facilities. • Setting quality parameters for desalination systems that are used for well-water purification from the aquifers (this includes nitrate elimination). • Setting the research requirements for each of the desalination facilities.

The time required to address all of these issues is lengthy, and leads to delays in obtaining statutory permissions for the construction of each facility.

Shortages of coastal properties Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:40 12 October 2016 A shortage of coastal properties exists, due to coastal real estate development plans, and to land-occupation by the Ministry of Defense. Formulation of agreements with the Ministry of Defense for the construction of desalination facilities are feasible, but add long delays in obtaining statutory permits.

Meeting requirements of the ministry of health The requirements of the Ministry of Health are extensive and time intensive, and include updates to drinking water quality regulations. These updates require concomitant adjustments to the desalinated water supplies.

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The Ministry of Health also requires “protection radiuses” around desalination facilities, which can be impediments, particularly to the development of inland brackish water desalination facilities.

Obtaining agreements for pipe-transport Pipelines are required, to connect the desalination facilities to the national pipe-conveyance grid. These connecting pipelines typically pass over privately owned land. Agreements to allow the pipe system to cross private land must be made with each of the respective land-owners. This is the most difficult and time-consuming procedure involved in the construction of the connecting pipeline.

Lengthy construction time Planning and construction of the desalination facility itself is an enormous, time-consuming endeavor. The key elements from start to finish are: completion of the tender process, obtaining all of the statutory permits, and construction of the desalination facility and the water transport infrastructure. Approximately five to seven years are required to complete this entire process, from the time that a governmental decision is made to construct a new desalination facility, to initiating supply of desalinated water to the national grid.

CONCLUDING STATEMENTS

The planning, construction, and long-term operation of desalination facilities involve daily challenges, decision-making processes, and creative innovations that maximize the efficiency of each new (and always unique) facility. Israel’s continuing success in overcoming each new challenge is the key to achieving sustainable national water use with independent national water resources. This has been the goal of the water sector since the founding of the State of Israel. Success in implementing Israel’s long-term desalination construction plan is important for enhancing the growth and prosperity of the State of Israel. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:40 12 October 2016

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Robert G. Varady, Susanna Eden and Sharon B. Megdal

This volume derives from an ambitious premise: that a coherent and useful set of information and analyses can emerge from a set of chapters treating an analogous set of issues in two similarly situated but distant and distinctive regions of the world. In the course of 17 chapters presented in five sections, the work challenges the reader to absorb innumerable facts, appreciate contrasting sociocultural norms and practices, and digest sometimes-contradictory findings. Throughout the course of the workshop, assembling of essays, and editing process, the editors have believed that, in spite of the differences, a unified message might emerge. Any such message, we expected, would be based on the commonalities presented by having to manage scarce water resources in the face of growing demand, competing sectors, political and policy differences, aging and expanding infrastructure, scarce capital, and sometimes contentious transboundary conditions. In concluding this volume the editors would like to highlight the most useful lessons drawn from examination water resources management in our two regions. One such lesson emerges clearly from the notion of shared waters: It is essential to find and implement solutions that meet the needs of neighboring societies. Fulfilling this imperative is made particularly difficult when the transboundary disparities are notable, as is the case in both regions. In this context, it becomes important to ensure that all parties, including some not traditionally considered stakeholders, be included in discussions. Institutions that promote inclusiveness can arrive at solution that otherwise may seem unattainable. A second take-away message concerns the significance of science. Decisionmakers are of course quick to credit the place of politics in achieving transboundary solutions, but as this volume attempts to demonstrate, science also plays a key role. Research and analysis that contribute to a better understanding of the implications of alternative approaches to problem-solving may not produce whole solutions. Nevertheless, they provide critical foundation for dialogues focused on achieving workable resolutions to significant water management challenges. Water resources management is an enterprise in which competing interests, with sometimes-opposing aims, often propose rival solutions to resource challenges. In such an environment, the collected chapters interrogate the value of science – both biophysical/engineering and social/behavioral. Throughout this volume science is proposed as a catalyst for rapprochement through examining questions and finding solutions in common. While science can be used to support hardened positions with opposing arguments, the editors for this volume have endeavored to avoid political

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bias and provide independent analyses. We aim to promote a concept known as ‘science-diplomacy’ as a means to avoid and resolve conflict. The diversity of authors and their perspectives attests to the value of science in encouraging as well as informing constructive dialogue to resolve water management challenges, particularly involving shared waters. A third insight that emerges from the chapters of this book concerns the adoption of innovative technologies in water resources. Necessity – or the perception of necessity – is said to be the mother of invention. Clearly, water scarcity conditions and the concomitant need to develop diversified portfolios of water resources have led to innovation and adoption of emerging technologies. Among these are new means to enhance conservation, increase water reuse, and develop desalination capacity in both regions. From our above observations, the allure to generalize would seem compelling. But we cannot overstate the importance of temporal and spatial context in determining whether a particular technology can succeed. The relevance and indispensability of context is thus a fourth conclusion we offer the reader. Accordingly, factors such as geographical setting and scale, climatic conditions, history, social and cultural values, demography, political systems, economic incentives, institutional capacity, legal structure, and civil society are thoroughly examined and considered in this volume. Our fifth and final conclusion is cited by many of the authors: the indispensabity of including multidisciplinary perspective. Taken together, the social sciences – economics, geography, history, political science, law, and policy studies – and the biophysical sciences and engineering permit recognition of patterns in behavior, development, and policy that are not visible through the lens of a single discipline. Such inclusivity is of absolute necessity in today’s debates on alternative water resource management strategies. The value and uses of multidisciplinary science in policy is a consistent theme in this volume. It should be unsurprising in a book of this kind that an overarching conclusion should be that comparing distant regions facing common problems via multiple disciplines offers insights not available through single-place, monodisciplinary studies. As the chapters amply illustrate, productive learning can and did take place among scholars from differing perspectives, and between researchers and practitioners. The interactions underscore another important lesson learned, namely the value of building professional relationships and trust. Interactions associated with the workshop, as well as those following it, have laid the foundation for further collaborative efforts. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:40 12 October 2016 We believe the interactions represented in this volume offer a new, more complete understanding of, and avenues for surmounting shared water management challenges. To the extent that such approaches can help overcome disagreements and even disputes, this type of science-diplomacy holds promise for many conflicted, water-scarce areas of the world.

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Samer Alatout is an associate professor at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He has a dual appointment in the Department of Community and Environmental Soci- ology and the Nelson Institute for Environmental Studies. He is a member of the Graduate Program of Sociology and Community and Environmental Sociology. He is also affiliated with the Department of Geography; Center for Culture, History, and Environment; and the Holtz Center for Science and Technology Studies. He published extensively on water history and politics in Palestine and Israel, as well as on theories of power as related to environmental politics. Recently, he turned attention to environmental politics in border regions, including those of Israel/Palestine and U.S./Mexico. Amjad Aliewi is the Director-General of House of Water and Environment (Pal- estine). The main focus of the activities of Dr. Aliewi is the field of groundwater resources, development, management and planning also, the management of Coastal aquifers and Saline inland aquifers. He is a civil engineer with MSc (water resources engineering) and PhD degrees in groundwater flow and pollution modeling including saline water simulations in inland and Coastal Aquifers. He is an expert in groundwater wells: design, construction, maintenance and putting into operation. He led a number of international projects about the development and management of the Palestinian water sector. His teaching at Newcastle University and Birzeit Univer- sity includes MSc and BSc courses in groundwater engineering and water resources management including IWRM. The House of Water and Environment (HWE) is a not-for-profit organization that works in research and development projects as well as capacity building in the field of Water and Environment. Ahmad M. Al-Hindi is Director General of National Water Council Unit at the Palestinian Water Authority. He also serves as co-chairman of the pricing sub-Com- mittee of the Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water Committee, His work focuses inter alia on the development and reform of the institutional set-up of the Palestinian Water Sector. In 2009 he served as a member of the Jerusalem Water Undertaking Board of Directors, and a member of the Water Experts in the Arab Water Ministries Council. Mr. Hindi holds B.S, Degree in accounting from Aleepo University and professional Diploma in public management from Bir Zeit University. Rashed Al-Sa`ed, Associate Professor of Sanitary and Environmental Engineer- ing, is currently a senior lecturer and research scholar at Birzeit University in wastewater engineering and environmental management. He is co-founder of the Institute of Environmental and Water Studies, and headed two M.Sc. programs in water and environmental engineering sciences. Al-Sa`ed published extensively on wastewater

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engineering, environmental pollution, wastewater policy and management. He is a certified engineer and technical adviser for national and international agencies on strategic wastewater issues, EIA studies and waste management. Al-Sa`ed obtained his Dr.-Eng. (1987) in Civil Engineering from Braunschweig Technical University, and B.Sc./M.Sc. degrees in environmental biology from the University of Jordan. Jenna Cleveland is a graduate student at the University of Arizona in the M.S. Planning program, and is also pursuing a Graduate Certificate in Water Policy. She works at the Water Resources Research Center, where she provides research assistance on a grant to create a decision-support tool to help utilities and managers assess the adoption of water harvesting as an adaptation to climate change. As an under- graduate student, Jenna attended Roanoke College in Virginia and graduated summa cum laude with a B.A. in History and a B.A. in Religion. Kristina Donnelly is a Research Associate with the Pacific Institute’s Water Pro- gram. Her research interests include: social, economic and policy implications for water conservation, and water policy and environmental justice in the Middle East. Ms. Donnelly received a M.S. in Natural Resources and Environment from the Univer- sity of Michigan and a B.S. in Mathematics from American University. During graduate school, Ms. Donnelly worked on several research projects, including analyzing economic development strategies for water sustainability in Jordan. She was chosen as the 2008/09 Sea Grant Fellow with the Great Lakes Commission in Michigan, before moving to Israel to work as a researcher with the Center for Transboundary Water Management at the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies. Her work focused on conducting and implementing transboundary water research, projects, and educational opportunities between Israelis, Jordanians, Palestinians and other nationalities. Gabriel Eckstein is a professor of law at Texas Wesleyan University where he specializes in water and environmental law and policy at both the US and international levels. He directs the Internet-based International Water Law Project, and sits on the executive boards of the International Association for Water Law and the International Water Resources Association.Professor Eckstein holds LL.M. and JD degrees from American University’s Washington College of Law, M.S. in International Affairs from Florida State University, and a B.S. in Geology from Kent State University. Susanna Eden is Assistant Director of the Water Resources Research Center, Uni- versity of Arizona. She worked internationally as North American coordinator for the UNESCO IHP HELP (Hydrology for Environment, Life and Policy) Program. Her research centers on policy and decision making in water resources and the use of sci- Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:41 12 October 2016 entific information by stakeholders and decision makers. She holds a Ph.D. in Water Resources Administration from the University of Arizona. After completing his doctoral degree at Stanford University in 1998, Dr. Wendell Ela joined the faculty in Chemical and Environmental Engineering at The University of Arizona. He is co-author of one of the most widely used texts in environmental engineering in the United States, Introduction to Environmental Engineering and Science. He specializes in water treatment process engineering. Much of his current research focuses on developing inland desalination technologies and treatment trains that minimize water loss, energy use, and the environmental impact of treatment residuals. He has a particular interest in integrating renewable energy technologies into treatment processes with the aim of developing appropriate, affordable, and sustainable safe water supplies for small, rural communities.

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Itay Fischhendler serves as the Head of the Environmental Planning and Policy program at the Hebrew University Jerusalem. His research interests focus on environmental conflict resolution; natural resources management and governance and decision making under conditions of political and environmental uncertainties. He is a leading scholar on transboundary water institutions and Middle East water issues. He has published numerous articles in climate change, conflict resolution, peace studies, geography, ecological economics, and water journals. Gregg Garfin is Assistant Professor and Assistant Specialist in Climate Science, Pol- icy and Natural Resources in the University of Arizona’s School of Natural Resources and the Environment. He also serves as Deputy Director for Science Translation and outreach in the University of Arizona’s Institute of the Environment. Through building sustained partnerships with resource managers, he aims to make climate research, model output, and information more useful and usable to decision makers. In 2007, he received the Climate Science Service Award from the California Department of Water Resources. In 1998, he obtained his Ph.D. in Geosciences, from the University of Arizona; his B.S. and M.S. degrees are from the University of Massachusetts. Yoav Kislev is Professor Emeritus at the Department of Agricultural Economics and Management of the Hebrew University, Rehovot Campus. He has worked in the field of agricultural economics including, planning, the economics of technology and agricultural research, farm size and growth, and succession in the family farms. In the water area he worked on the demand for water, management of ground water extraction, water allocation and prices, policy and public participation. He also served on the National Investigation Committee on the management of the water economy in Israel. He published more than fifty articles, chapter, and working papers on water issues, both in English and in Hebrew. Yoav Kislev received his Ph.D. in 1965 in economics from the University of Chicago and B.Sc. and M.Sc. in agricultural economics from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Doug Kupel has worked for the City of Phoenix since 1988, where he conducts environmental research and advises City management on water policy. The University of Arizona Press published his book Fuel for Growth: Water and Arizona’s Urban Envi- ronment in 2003. He has conducted broad research in the area of water history, and has written extensively on the water resources of Arizona Indian tribes and municipalities. He maintains an active membership in several professional organizations in the fields of archaeology and history, including registration as a professional archaeologist. Kupel received his doctoral degree in history from Arizona State University. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:41 12 October 2016 Jorge Lara Alvarez is a graduate student of the Economics Department at the Uni- versity of Oxford. His research focuses in particular on environmental policy evaluation, risk and poverty, and intra-household allocation. He previously worked at the Congressional Budget Office of Mexico, at the Ministry of Social Development of the Federal Mexican Government, and as Research Assistant at The University of Arizona Water Resources Research Center. Lara Alvarez holds an M.S. degree in Agricultural and Resource Economics from The University of Arizona. Clive Lipchin serves as director of the Arava Institute’s Center for Transbound- ary Water Management, where he research projects, workshops and conferences that focus on transboundary water and environmental problems facing Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. He is also a member of the Arava Institute faculty where he teaches courses in sustainable development, water management, scientific research

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methodology and environmental policy. His specialty is in water resources management and policy. Currently, Clive is coordinating the TransBasin – Transbound- ary Water Basin Management Project, funded by the International Research Staff Exchange Scheme of the European Union, which brings together researchers from Europe and the Middle East to study conflict and cooperation in river basin management. Clive received his PhD from the University of Michigan’s School of Natural Resources and Environment. Jamie McEvoy is a Ph.D. candidate in the School of Geography and Develop- ment at the University of Arizona. She is currently conducting field research in Baja California Sur for her dissertation on desalination and development in the region. Her research is funded by a National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Improve- ment grant and a Fulbright-García Robles award. From 2008 to 2011, McEvoy worked as a research associate at the Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy on projects addressing issues of climate, water and growth in northwestern Mexico and southwestern United States, including the (potential) use of desalination technology in these regions. McEvoy has also conducted research on desalination technology in southeastern Spain. Sharon B. Megdal is Director of The University of Arizona Water Resources Research Center and C.W. and Modene Neely Endowed Professor in the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences. She also serves as Director the University of Arizona Water Sustainability Program. Her work focuses on state, regional and transboundary water resources management and policy. She places particular emphasis on how to achieve desired policy objectives in terms of institutional structures and possible changes to them. In 2010, she was named Distinguished Outreach Professor by the University of Arizona and she serves as an elected member of the Central Arizona Project Board of Directors. Sharon B. Megdal holds a Ph.D. degree in Economics from Princeton University. François Molle is Director of Research at the Institut de Recherche pour le Dével- oppement (IRD), France. He as 27 years of experience working on issues of water management, water governance and water policies. He is currently seconded to the International Water Management Institute and based in Cairo, where he develops research activities in the Middle-East and North-Africa region. He has authored 200 publications, including 80 journal articles, book chapters, and edited volumes. He serves as an editorial board member for several journals and is co-editor of Water Alternatives (www.water-alternatives.org). François Molle graduated from Ecole Pol- Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:41 12 October 2016 ytechnique, France, holds a Ph.D from the University of Montpellier and teaches in several Master programmes in the field of Geography. Maya Negev is the Head of Environmental Policy, Hartog School of Government and Policy, Tel Aviv University. Her research focuses on environmental health governance and inter-sectoral environmental policy. Her PhD, at Ben Gurion University of the Negev, focused on a multicultural approach to environmental policy and on health impact assessment. Roberto Salmón Castelo, Mexican Commissioner, for the International Bound- ary and Water Commission (Comisión Internacional de Limites y Aguas, CILA), has a wide range of experience in hydraulic projects. He was Northwest Regional Man- ager of the National Water Commission (CONAGUA) from 2002 to 2006 and from then until 2008 he served as General Manager of the Northwest Basin Unit based in

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Hermosillo, Sonora. He also served as Treasurer of the University of Sonora, as well as Administrative Chairman of the Department of Business Administration of the same university. Additionally, Mr. Salmón Castelo was Planning and Special Projects Director for the Sonora Center for Research and Development in Natural Resources and has remained a partner in a variety of companies that carry out basin management projects and environmental studies. He has a Bachelor of Science in Agriculture from the University of Arizona, where he also received a Master of Science degree in the same field. Additionally, he is doing advanced studies in Water Resource Adminis- tration at the University of Arizona and is currently a candidate for a doctoral degree there. David Schorr is director of Tel Aviv University’s Law and Environment Program and senior lecturer in the Faculty of Law. He research focuses on the history of water law and environmental law in the United States, Israel, and the British Empire, as well as on current problems in Israel environmental law. He earned his doctorate in law and an M.A. in history at Yale, and bachelors degrees in history and law at Columbia and Hebrew University respectively. Christopher Scott is associate research professor at the University of Arizona’s Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, associate professor in the School of Geog- raphy & Development, and adjunct professor of hydrology and water resources, soil water and environmental science, arid lands studies, and Latin American studies. He has spent two decades living and working in India, Nepal, Mexico, and Honduras. His scholarship focuses on climate adaptation, the water-energy nexus, groundwater irrigation, transboundary waters, and water reuse. Scott obtained his Ph.D. (1998) and M.S. (1991) – both in hydrology from Cornell University – and B.S. and B.A. (1985) from Swarthmore College. Karen L. Smith is an adjunct professor at Arizona State University and a research fellow for the Grand Canyon Institute. She worked previously as Deputy Director of the Arizona Department of Water Resources, as Director of the Water Quality Division at the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality, and at the Salt River Project, a major electric and water provider for the metropolitan Phoenix area. Her work centers on water sustainability and public policy development, and the history of the Southwest United States. She is the author of numerous works on water resources in Arizona, including The Magnificent Experiment: Building the Salt River Reclama- tion Project, Arizona at the Crossroads: Water Scarcity or Water Sustainability, and is currently at work on a book on water policies that shaped the Southwest. Karen L. Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:41 12 October 2016 Smith holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of California, Santa Barbara. Alon Tal is presently a visiting professor in the Center for Conservation Biology at Stanford University on leave from the Blaustein Institutes for Desert Research at Ben Gurion University’s. Dr. Tal was the founding director of Adam Teva V’din, the Israel Union for Environmental Defense from 1990–1997, a leading public interest law group and was chairman of Life and Environment, an umbrella group for eighty environmental organizations in Israel from 1998–2003. In 1996, Dr. Tal founded the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, a graduate studies center in which Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian students join environmentalists from around the world in an advanced interdisciplinary research program. His latest book, All the Trees of the Forest, Israel’s Woodlands from the Bible to the Present is forthcoming from Yale University Press.

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Abraham Tenne worked for many years in the chemical industry and in the water sector as project manager and general management. Since 2005 he has been working for the Israeli Water Authority as Head of desalination Division and Chairman of the WDA (water desalination administration). The Water Authority is the governmental authority regulating the water sector and including all water and waste water issues in Israel. Tenne holds a B.Sc. in Chemical Engineering. Naama Teschner is a research postgraduate at the School of Geography, the Uni- versity of Leeds, United Kingdom. Her PhD focuses on the interplay of policy, technology andÂ environmental concerns in the Israeli water-energy nexus. Robert G. Varady is deputy director of the University of Arizona’s Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, research professor of environmental policy and of arid lands studies, and adjunct professor of hydrology and water resources. Varady has written extensively on transboundary environmental policy, and on global water initiatives and international water governance. He is a former president of the Inter- national Water History Association. Varady obtained his Ph.D. in 1981 in modern history from the University of Arizona, and B.S. and M.S. degrees in mathematics from the City College of New York and Polytechnic Institute of NYU, respectively. Jean-Philippe Venot holds a PhD in Human Geography from the University of Nanterre, France. He is currently Researcher with Wageningen University in The Netherlands, and previously was Researcher with the International Water Manage- ment Institute(IWMI), based in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. His research focuses on the social and political dimensions of irrigation and water policies in the Arab World, sub-Saharan Africa, south and South-east Asia. Aaron Wolf is professor of geography in the College of Earth, Ocean, and Atmos- pheric Sciences at Oregon State University. His research and teaching focus is on the interaction between water science and water policy, particularly as related to conflict prevention and resolution. He has acted as consultant to the US Department of State, the US Agency for International Development, the World Bank, and several governments on various aspects of transboundary water resources and dispute resolution. He is author of Hydropolitics Along the Jordan River: The Impact of Scarce Water Resources on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, (United Nations University Press, 1995), and a co-author of Core and Periphery: A Comprehensive Approach to Middle Eastern Water, (Oxford Uni- versity Press, 1997), Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Resolution, (United Nations University Press, 2000), and Managing and Transforming Water Conflicts (Cambridge University Press, 2009). Wolf, a trained mediator/facilitator, directs the Program in Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:41 12 October 2016 Water Conflict Management and Transformation, through which he has offered workshops, facilitations, and mediation in basins throughout the world He coordinates the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, an electronic compendium of case studies of water conflicts and conflict resolution, international treaties, national compacts, and indigenous methods of water dispute resolution (www.transboundarywaters.orst. edu), and is a co-director of the Universities Partnership on Transboundary Waters. Neda Zawahri, (Ph.D. Political Science, University of Virginia), is an Associ- ate Professor in the Political Science Department at Cleveland State University. Her research focuses on how states manage their shared water resources to facilitate cooperation and avert conflict. She has worked, studied, and conducted field research throughout the Middle East and South Asia. Dr. Zawahri has published many articles on the subject and she received several fellowships and awards. She has also co-edited three special issues on the topic.

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absorptive capacity of Palestine, 79 aquifer recharge, 44, 173, 174, 183; see also Active Management Areas, 37, 106–109, groundwater recharge; recharge 135, 143, 145; see also AMAs Arab, 7, 8, 58–60, 80, 136, 140, 141 actual evapotranspiration (AE), 181 arid, 120, 133, 169, 207, 242, 252 adaptation, 155, 184, 189, 196, 197, 214 aridity, 1–3, 133, 144 adaptation strategies, 168, 195, 196, 198, 247 Arizona, 1–4, 12, 21–32, 35–47, 91, Advanced Water Treatment Facility, 105–115, 119, 129, 133–146, 187, 252–254; see also AWTF 188, 194, 235–244, 247–258 agency capture, 124 Arizona Canal, 23, 29 Agricultural Improvement and Power Arizona Corporation Commission; ACC, District, 24 105, 110, 111 agricultural irrigation, 2, 25, 36, 43, 138, Arizona Department of Water Resources; 142, 204, 207, 210, 211; see also irrigation ADWR, 37, 105, 106, 108, 143, 248; agriculture, 2, 7, 10–12, 21, 22, 24, 37, 91, see also Department of Water Resources; 93, 101, 102, 136, 138, 140, 142, 146, DWR 154, 155, 157, 169, 183; see also farming Arizona-Israeli-Palestinian Water Agua Fria, 32 Management and Policy Workshop, 87 Al-Auja spring, 168 Arizona-Mexico border, 35–47 Al-Fara spring, 168 Arizona-Mexico desalination projects, All-American Canal, 26, 27 45, 248 allocation, 10–12, 17, 38, 56, 57, 62–64, Arizona water budget, 143, 235, 236, 69, 70, 96–98, 121, 123, 142 250, 258 Altneuland, 7 Arizona Water Settlements Act, 25 AMAs, 37, 106–109, 135, 143, 145; Ashdod Desalination Plant, 267 see also Active Management Areas Assured Water Supply, 106, 108, 109, 235, Ambos Nogales, 41, 43, 44 240, 241; see also AWS Amman, Jordan, 58, 59, 65, 92, 139 asymmetrical conditions, 69, 209 Annex II, 60, 64 Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation antibiotics, 227, 228 Model, 177, 190; see also AOGCM AOGCM, 177, 190; see also Atmosphere- AWS, 106, 108, 109, 235, 240, 241; Ocean General Circulation Model see also Assured Water Supply appropriation, 22, 23, 29, 30, 53, 54, 119, AWTF, 252–254; see also Advanced Water 120, 126, 128, 129 Treatment Facility aquifer, 2, 12, 16, 17, 41–44, 68, 102, 108, 135, 142, 157, 158, 169, 170, backwash, 43, 254 173, 224, 237 Bartlett Dam, 24 Aquifer, Coastal, 4, 7, 9, 59, 91, 99, 100, basin-wide institutions, 54, 56, 69 124, 140, 141, 156–158, 169, 170, 184, BECC, 39, 43, 44; see also Border 225, 277; see also Coastal Aquifer Environment Cooperation Commission aquifer, Mountain, 7, 9, 16, 59, 64, 91, 141, Beer Sheva, 91, 92 142, 156, 169, 170; see also Mountain BEIF, 39, 42, 44; see also Border aquifer Environment Infrastructure Fund

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Ben-Gurion, David, 8, 83 CEC, 243, 253; see also Contaminants of beneficial use, 23, 42, 119 Emerging Concern beneficiary party, 66, 69 CEC, 39; see also Commission for benefit-cost equation, 44 Environmental Cooperation Berlin Rules on Water Resources, 2004; Centerra Well, 254 Berlin Rules, 53, 56–58 Central Arizona Project, 25, 30–32, 108, binational, 38–42, 248, 256–258 134, 135, 144, 145 Biochemical Oxygen Demand, 210, 211, Chihuahuan Desert, 35 213, 228, 229; see also BOD Ciénega de Santa Clara; Ciénega, 46, 256; biofouling, 253, 254 see also Santa Clara wetland Bisbee, Arizona, USA, 36, 42, 43 CILA, 4, 38–41, 43, 44, 218, 248, 256; see Black River, 25 also Comisión Internacional de Limites y Blass, Simcha, 7, 8, 81–83, 155 Aguas; International Boundary and Water block-rate tariffs, 103 Commission; IBWC block rates, 101–104, 112 Clifton-Morenci, Arizona, USA, 25 Blum v. Minister of Agriculture, 122, 123 climate, 125, 134, 167, 177, 187 BOD, 210, 211, 213, 228, 229; see also climate change, 167–184, 187–197 Biochemical Oxygen Demand climate model projections, 190–194 border, 2, 3, 35–47, 59, 136, 203–218, 221 climate variability, 187, 188, 191, 192, 195 Border Environment Cooperation Climatic Research Unit, 177; see also CRU Commission, 39, 44; see also BECC Coastal Aquifer, 4, 7, 9, 59, 91, 99, 100, Border Environment Infrastructure Fund, 124, 140, 141, 156–158, 169, 170, 184, 39, 42, 44; see also BEIF 225; see also Aquifer, Coastal Border Environmental Cooperation Coastal Plain, 59 Agreement, 38 Coliform bacteria, 158 bottom-up approach, 37, 69 Colorado River compact, 30; see also Boulder Canyon Project Act, 31, 32 compact brackish groundwater resources, 248, 250, Colorado River, 1, 2, 22, 25–27, 30–32, 37, 251, 253 40, 42, 43, 45–47, 109, 135, 145, 146, brackish water, 13, 45, 46, 48, 247, 248, 188, 193, 194, 235, 237, 250–252, 255, 255, 258, 264, 266 257, 258; see also Río Colorado brine, 14, 15, 229, 247, 253–255, 258 Colorado River Storage Project, 31; British Mandate; British Mandate of see also CRSP Palestine, 7, 77–79, 81, 82, 121; see also Comisión Estatal del Agua, 38, 248; Mandate see also CEA Buckeye, Arizona, USA, 248, 254, 255 Comisión Internacional de Limites y Aguas; Buckeye Irrigation Company, 255 CILA, 38 Bureau of Reclamation; BOR, 7, 23, 27, Comisión Nacional del Agua; CONAGUA, 30–32, 36, 37, 45, 46, 248, 254, 255, 37, 38 257, 258; see also Reclamation; U.S. Commission for Environmental Bureau of Reclamation Cooperation, 39; see also CEC Commissioner, 11, 94, 95, 110, 121 Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:42 12 October 2016 Cairo Agreement, 64 common pool resources, 93 California Limitation Act, 31 common property, 97, 119, 123; see also California, USA, 1, 25, 27, 30–32, 41, 45, property, common 122, 135, 187–189, 192, 194, 195, 236, compact, 30–32, 45, 235 239, 247–250, 255–257 conflict, 55, 57, 59, 67, 69, 70, 82, 146, Camp David, 70 153, 157, 159, 208, 209 Cananea, Mexico, 36 Consejos de Cuenca; consejos, 38 CAP, 2, 22, 25, 30–32, 47, 108–110, 134, conservation, 119, 126, 128, 151–162 135, 143–146, 235, 237, 247, 248, 255, contaminants, 12, 224, 227–229, 243, 258; see also Central Arizona Project 247, 254 Capital Expenditures; CAPEX, 209, 215 Contaminants of Emerging Concern, 243, Cappaert v. United States, 128 253; see also CEC CEA, 38, 248; see also Comisión Estatal del contamination, 38, 43, 44, 142, 158, 160, Agua 183, 222, 224

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Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses drought, 13, 42, 46, 62, 141, 142, 155, 167, of International Water Courses, 55, 57; 169, 172, 174, 188, 189, 194, 195, 230, see also UN Watercourse Convention; 239, 263 Watercourse Convention drought tax, 11 Coolidge Dam, 26 cooperation, 2, 7, 31, 39–42, 48, 53, 55, ecological values, 126, 127; see also 58–60, 62, 66, 68, 216–218 instream uses coordinated structure, 58 ecosystem, 17, 41, 44, 125, 129, 189, cost, 46, 97, 98, 100–104, 110, 114, 240, 190, 243 269–271 ecosystem services, 134 cost-efficiency, desalination, 269–271 education, 155, 160, 161, 244 cost of production, desalination, 270 efficiency, 13, 96, 214, 269–271 Council of the Water Authority, 95, 103 effluent, 12, 42–44, 102, 143, 144, 207, Cragin, C.C., 25 210–213, 223–225, 228, 229, 237, creative terminology, 69 238, 272 crop-livestock system, 138 effluent reuse, 228, 229 CRSP, 31, 32; see also Colorado River Eilat, 13, 264 Storage Project Ein Gedi; Ein Gedi Spring, 125, 126 CRU, 177 El Niño-Southern Oscillation, ENSO, 188, cultural asset, 134 191–193, 195 cultural embeddedness, 86 El Paso, 40, 45 cultural water demand, 106, 107 EMS, 211, 212, 214; see also Environmental customary law, 54, 55, 66, 70 Management System endocrine disruptors, 223, 227 Dair Debwan, 175, 176 environmental health, 16, 203, 204, Dan Region Reclamation Project, 12 223, 236 Dead Sea, 2, 14–16, 54, 59, 60, 64–68, 92, environmental impact, 15, 47, 211–214, 124, 125, 139, 141, 142, 169–171 221, 223, 249 Declaration of Principles, 64; Environmental Management System, 211, see also DOP 212, 214; see also EMS Deer Valley Water Treatment Plant, 30 Environmental Protection Agency; EPA, 37, demand-side management, 17, 18 39, 42, 44, 243 Department for International Development, Equalization Fund, 102 172; see also DfID Eshkol, Levi, 7 Department of Water Resources; DWR, estimated potential, 142 37, 47, 105, 143, 248; see also estuarine ecosystems, 39, 47 Arizona Department of Water eutrophication, 224 Resources; ADWR evapotranspiration; ET, 134, 181, 183, 193, desalination, 4, 13, 14, 17, 45, 47, 142, 194, 197 198, 204, 222, 247–258, 263–273 externalities, 17, 56 desertification, 169, 183 extraction levies, 102 development, 7–17, 21, 36, 37, 56, 57, 93, extreme events, 174 Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:42 12 October 2016 108, 109, 113, 133–146, 154, 160–162, 205, 206 farming, 11, 36, 123, 141, 157, 158, 222 DfID, 172; see also Department for flat rate, 111 International Development flocculation, 213 Dinosaur National Monument, 31, 32 flood, 4, 23, 30, 168, 169, 183, 189, 193 diplomacy, 38, 276 flow protection, 3 diversion, 9, 15, 22, 25, 36, 46, 59, 80–83, food security, 136, 154, 172 109, 110, 119, 125, 127 Fort Huachuca, 36, 41 DOP, 64; see also Declaration of Principles Fort McDowell, 28 Douglas, Arizona, USA, 36, 43 Fort Yuma Indian Reservation, 25 drainage basin, 56 fouling, 253, 254 drinking water, 8, 9, 38, 41, 43, 44, 112, freshwater, 3, 11, 12, 60, 93, 101, 102, 124, 151, 157, 218, 222, 237 141, 154–156, 158, 159 drip irrigation, 138, 155, 158, 224 freshwater availability, 169

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Galilee, 7–9, 14, 15, 62, 91, 92, 124 HadCM3, 177, 179, 181, 182, 184 GAO, 84, 85; see also General Agricultural Hadera Desalination Plant, 266, 267, 269 Ordinance, 1950 halophyte, 258 Gardiner, John J., 27 Hamas, 16 Gaza, 1, 4, 15–17, 67, 91, 92, 138, 140, Haraway, Donna, 86, 87 142, 157–159, 169–171, 206, 224 hard-path planning, 249 Gaza coastal aquifer, 4, 140, 156–158, 169, Harquahala Valley, 32 170, 184 Hashemite Kingdom, 65 Gaza Strip, 59, 60, 64, 139, 142, 156–159, Hayden, Carl, 26 171, 184 Hays, James, 80 GCM, 174, 179–182, 190–192, 195; see Hebrew Bible, 152 also Global Climate Model Helsinki Rules, 1966, 53, 56–58 GDP, 35, 136, 138, 154, 157, 158; see also heritage asset, 134 Gross Domestic Product Hermosillo, Mexico, 37, 38 General Agricultural Ordinance, 1950, 84, Herzl, Theodor, 7 85; see also GAO Hohokam, 21 Geneva, 63, 65 Hoover Dam, 31 German Agency for Cooperation, 219; Horse Mesa Dam, 24 see also GTZ House Committee on Interior and Insular Gila Bend, Arizona, USA, 253–255, 258 Affairs, United States, 31 Gila Gravity Main Canal, 26, 27 Hudson Reservoir Company, 22 Gila Project, 25–27 human habitation, 134 Gila River, 24–26, 251, 252, 254, 255 hydraulic paradigm, 249 Gila River Indian Reservation, 24, 26 hydrologic modeling, 108 Gila River Indian Water Rights Settlement, 25 IBC, 38; see also International Boundary Glen Canyon Dam, 31, 32, 45 Commission Global Climate Model, 174, 179–182, IBWC, 4, 38–41, 43, 44, 248, 256; 190–192, 195; see also GCM see also; International Boundary Goodyear, Arizona, USA, 248, and Water Commission; CILA; 253–255, 258 Comisión Internacional de Limites governance, 37–39, 77, 83–86, 143 y Aguas Government of Palestine, 121 IDE Technologies, 13 Governmental Authority for Water and IHP, 278; see also International Sewage, 95 Hydrological Programme Granite Reef Dam, 23, 24 ILA, 53, 55, 56, 58; see also International Green Line, 16, 203–219 Law Association Greenhouse Gas; GHG, 14, 167–169, ILC, 53, 56; see also International Law 190–193, 195 Commission grey water, 18, 154, 155 Imperial Dam, 26, 27, 45, 47, 248, 257 Gross Domestic Product, 35, 136, 154; implied reservation, 128, 129 see also GDP INA, 106, 107; see also Irrigation Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:42 12 October 2016 groundwater, 2, 16, 24, 27, 28, 36, 37, 106, Nonexpansion Area 108, 135, 136, 142, 173, 183, 235, 236, Inbar Committee, 12, 13 247, 248, 250–255, 257 increasing block rate, 101, 111–112 Groundwater Management Act, 37, 105, infrastructure/s, 7–17, 21–32, 154, 169, 106, 108, 115, 135, 143, 252; see also 215, 219, 240–242, 249, 250 GMA institution/s, 8–10, 35–47, 54, 84, 93–96 groundwater pollution, 10, 12, 204, 224 instream flows, 119–129 groundwater recharge, 134, 172, 173, instream uses, 119–129 183, 187, 189, 194, 252, 253; see also Integrated Water Resource Management, aquifer recharge; recharge 184, 249; see also IWRM GTZ, 219; see also German Agency for intensities, 168, 169, 173, 174 Cooperation Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Gulf of Aqaba, 13, 15 Change; IPCC, 177, 187, 190–192 Gulf of California, 248, 250, 256, 257 Interim Water Agreement, 54; see also Gypsum, 15 Oslo II, 1995

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Interior and Environmental Protection Jordan River, 1, 8, 15, 58–60, 62, 64, 80, Committee, 12, 13 81, 83, 133, 141, 170, 171 international border water commission, 218 Jordanians, 60–63, 65 International Boundary and Water Commis- JRV, 60, 169; see also Jordan Rift Valley sion, 4, 38–41, 43, 44, 248, 256; see also JSET, 64, 65; see also Joint Supervision and IBWC; CILA; Comisión Internacional de Enforcement Team Limites y Aguas Judaism, 3, 151, 152, 161 International Hydrological Programme, 278; JWC, 16, 62, 64, 65, 143, 207, 215; see also see also IHP Joint Water Commission International Law Association, 53, 55, 56, 58; see also ILA Katz-Oz, Abraham, 64 International Law Commission, 53, 56; Khamasini depressions, 171 see also ILC Khamasini winds, 171 International Outfall Interceptor, 43, 44; kibbutz; communal village, 102, 125, 126 see also IOI kibbutzim, 136, 137 international water law, 54–58 King Abdullah Channel, 59 International WWTP, 43, 44; see also Kinneret, 62, 64, 100–102, 170 Nogales International Wastewater Kislev, Yoav, 91–104 Treatment Plant; NIWTP; NIWWTP Knesset Water Committee, 154 Internationally Shared Aquifer Resources Kyoto, 66 Management, ISARM, 41 Intifada, 16 La Paz Agreement, 38, 39 IOI, 43, 44; see also International Outfall Laguna Diversion Dam; Laguna Dam, Interceptor 25, 26 irrigation, 12, 16, 26, 28, 31, 36, 37, Lake Havasu, 32 40, 43, 107, 138, 139, 155, 158, 159, Lake Kinneret, 62, 66, 91, 100–102; see 210, 211, 222, 224, 226–229, 236, also Lake Tiberius; Sea of Galilee 237, 252 Lake Pleasant Water Treatment plant, 30 Irrigation Nonexpansion Area, 106, 107; Lake Powell, 32, 45 see also INA Lake Tiberius, 135; see also Lake Kinneret; Islam, 3, 152, 153, 160, 161 Sea of Galilee Islamic laws, 152, 153; see also Shari’ah LCRB, 31, 32, 135, 193; see also Lower Israel, 1–4, 7–17, 35, 54, 58–68, 75–85, Colorado River Basin; Lower Basin 91–104, 115, 119–129, 133–146, LCRMSCP, 46; see also Lower Colorado 151–162, 203–218, 221–229, 263–273 River Multi-Species Conservation Program Israeli Ministry of Regional Cooperation, 65 Leatherwood, R.N., 27 Israeli State, 77, 81, 84, 86 Lebanon, 9, 58, 66, 92, 146, 216 Israeli Supreme Court, 121 Lee Ferry, 30 Israeli Water Act, 126 Lewis Prison Water Treatment Facility; IWRM, 184, 249; see also Integrated Water LPWTF, 253, 255 Resource Management Litani River, 146 Los Alisos, 44 Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:42 12 October 2016 Jewish identity, 77–85 Los Alisos Basin, 44 Jewish immigration, 78–81 Los Angeles, California, USA, 127, 250 Jewish National Home, 78 Lowdermilk, Walter, 7, 80, 82 Johannesburg, 66 Lower Colorado River Basin; Lower Basin, joint management, 40, 53, 54, 57, 58, 64 31, 32, 135, 193; see also LCRB joint structure, 58, 65 Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Joint Supervision and Enforcement Team, Conservation Program, 46; see also 64, 65 LCRMSCP Joint Water Commission, 16, 62, 64, 65, 143, 207, 209, 215; see also JWC Madrid conference, 60, 63 Joint Water Committee, 62, 64, 65, 143, Madrid Declaration on the International 207, 209, 215 Regulation regarding the Use of Jordan, 3, 10, 11, 15, 35, 54, 57–63, 65–68, International Watercourses for Purposes 92, 124, 139, 140, 260 other than Navigation; Madrid Jordan Rift Valley, 60, 169; see also JRV Declaration, 58

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Mamlakhtiyut, 83, 84 nanofiltration, 253 Mandate, 7, 77–82, 121; see also British national income, 96 Mandate; British Mandate of Palestine National Reclamation Act, 22; see also Mandate Palestine, 77, 78 Reclamation Act Mapai, 83 National Water Carrier; National Carrier; Marana Desalination Pilot Facility; National Water Project, 8, 9, 15, 58, 83, MDPF, 257 91, 92, 121, 122, 135, 139, 141; see also Marginal Cost, 98, 99; see also MC NWC; Water Carrier market allocation, 97 National Water Council, 154 Master Plan for Water Sector Native Americans, 2, 24, 26 Development, 264 Nature and National Parks Protection Maximum Containment Levels; MCLs, 237 Authority, 205, 206 MC, 98, 99; see also Marginal Cost Navajo Generating Station, 32 McCann, Tom, 248, 256 Nazareth, 91, 92 McDowell Indian Reservation, 28 needs-based, 57 Mediterranean, 2, 14, 16, 91, 135, 136, Negev, 3, 82, 138 141, 169, 170, 188, 189 Negev Desert, 7, 8, 12, 59, 80, 81, 83, Mediterranean Sea-Dead Sea Canal, 59 85, 174 Mekorot; Mekorot water company, 7, 8, negotiations, 39, 47, 57, 60, 62–68 13, 79, 81, 84, 93, 94, 100–104, 141, Nevada, 31, 32, 47, 128, 129, 135, 156, 205 194, 257 membrane processes, 252, 255 new property, 122, 123 Mexico, 1, 3, 4, 21, 31, 35–47, 135, 136, New Waddell Dam, 32 187–189, 193, 194, 212, 218, 235, 248, nitrification-denitrification, 252 256, 257 Nogales, Arizona, USA, 36, 41, 238 mined water, 99 Nogales International Wastewater Ministry of Agriculture, Israeli, 81, 84, Treatment Plant; NIWTP; NIWWTP, 43, 154, 224 44, 212, 214, 238; see also International Ministry of Finance, Israeli, 13 WWTP Ministry of Health, Israeli, 222–224, Nogales, Mexico, 37, 43, 44 272, 273 Nogales Wash, 43, 44 Ministry of Water and Energy, Israeli, 8 non-stationary, 194 Mono Lake, 127 Nongovernmental Organization; NGO, Mono Lake case, 127 14, 40, 129, 143, 215, 272 Mormon Flat Dam, 24 North American Development Bank, 39, 42, moshav, 102 44; see also NADB; NADBank moshavim, 136 North American Free Trade Agreement, 37, Mountain aquifer, 9, 16, 59, 64, 91, 141, 39; see also NAFTA 142, 169, 170; see also aquifer, Nutrients, 12, 168, 222, 224, 228, 253 Mountain NWC, 8, 9, 15, 58, 83, 91, 92, 121, 122, Muhammad, 153 135, 139, 141; see also National Water multidisciplinary, 196, 276 Carrier; National Carrier; National Water Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:42 12 October 2016 municipal, 3, 4, 16, 22, 24, 27–30, 37, 38, Project; Water Carrier 94, 95, 101, 103–108, 155, 203, 224, 229, 250, 252, 257 Occupied Palestinian Territory, 204–207, Muslim, 153, 161, 163 215; see also OPT Office of Indian Affairs, United States, Naaman River, 122 24–26 Nablus, Palestine, 92, 139, 171–173, 206, Office of the Water Commissioner, 207, 211–214 84, 154, 155 Naco, Arizona, USA, 42, 43 open canal, 7, 9 NADB; NADBank, 39, 42, 44; see also Operation Expenditures; OPEX, 213, 215 North American Development Bank opportunity cost, 97, 98 NAFTA, 37, 39; see also North American OPT, 204–207, 215; see also Occupied Pal- Free Trade Agreement estinian Territory naïve-realist, 76 Osborn, Sidney, 31

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Oslo agreement, 16, 70 private property, 119–129 Oslo I Accord, 1993, 60 private utilities, 22, 28, 109, 110, 113 Oslo II, 1995, 54, 60, 65, 156; see also privatization, 8, 13, 23, 27–29, 100, 101, interim water agreement 110, 112–114, 119, 123, 124, 126 outflows, desalination, 272 production capacity, desalination, 263, 264, over-abstraction, 157, 159 266, 267, 269 over-appropriated, 120 property, 57, 97, 119–129, 272 overexploitation, 120, 141–143 property, common, 97, 119, 123; see also ownership, 22, 35, 64, 119–122, 124–126; common property see also property property, new, 23, 122; see also new oxidation ponds, 204 property property regimes, 119, 126–129 PA, 2, 3, 11, 15–17, 54, 95, 143, 156, 157, property, state, 121 159, 160, 205–208, 212, 213, 215, 279; protection radiuses, 273 see also Palestinian Authority public choice, 124 Palestine: Land of Promise, 80 Public Committee of Water Management, 8 Palestine Water Law No.3, 2002, 160 public health, 42, 204, 218, 223, 243 Palestinian, 1–4, 15–17, 58–60, 63–68, public opinion on reclaimed water, 238 78, 79, 81, 133–146, 156–160, 182, public property, 97, 113, 119, 121–123, 203–218, 221 126–129, 160 Palestinian Authority, 2, 3, 11, 15–17, 54, public trust doctrine, 127, 128 95, 143, 156, 157, 159, 160, 205–208, Puerto Peñasco, Sonora, Mexico, 45, 47, 212, 213, 215, 279; see also PA 248, 257; see also Rocky Point Palestinian Territories, 1, 3 PWA, 17, 141, 159, 160, 172, 205–207; see Palestinian Water Authority, 17, 141, 159, also Palestinian Water Authority; Water 160, 172, 205–207; see also PWA; Water Authority Authority Palestinian water situation, 15–17 quality parameters, 13, 237, 272 Palmachim Desalination Plant, 266, 268 Qur’an, 152, 153 Pardes Hanna case, 121 Parker, James W., 27 rain-fed agriculture, 183 pastures, 169 rainfall, 1, 44, 82, 168–184, 263 peace conduit, 15, 66 rainfall, annual, 1, 171, 173–178, 182 Phelps-Dodge, 25 rainfall intensities, 168, 169, 172, 174, 183 Phoenix, Arizona, 1, 21, 23, 27–30, 32, rainfall seasonality, 174, 175, 183, 222, 223 109, 111, 143, 235, 238, 242, 247, rainfall variability, 168, 172–184 250, 254 rangelands, 169 pipelines, 8, 28, 108, 240, 257, 273 rate setting, 110 policymaking, 75–87 RCM, 172, 191; see also Regional Climate Polluter Pays Principle; PPP, 205, 208, 209 Model population, 1, 2, 12, 35–37, 43, 135–139, Reagan-de la Madrid Accord, 38 157, 204, 205, 236, 242, 250, 257 reasonable and equitable, 63, 64, 66, 69 Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:42 12 October 2016 population density, 1, 135, 137 recharge, 43, 44, 93, 173, 174, 183, 189, potable water, 38, 44, 58, 158, 159, 207, 193, 228, 252, 253; see also groundwater 239, 240, 242, 250, 251, 254, 258, recharge 263, 264 reclaimed water, 43, 109, 236–244, 253 potential evapotranspiration (PE), 134, 181 reclaimed water infrastructure, 10, 12, 241 power asymmetries, 68–70, 133, 142 reclaimed water policy, 236–239 pragmatism, 64 reclaimed water pricing, 241, 242 precipitation, 1, 4, 7, 15, 91, 120, 134, 168, Reclamation, 12, 13, 23–25, 36, 46, 240; 169, 188–194 see also Bureau of Reclamation; BOR; Presidential Decree No. 5/1995, 160 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation price, 9, 97–104, 109–115, 157, 242, 270 reclamation pricing, 3, 91–104, 105–115, 154, 241, 271 Reclamation Act, 22, 23, 25; see also prior appropriation, 22, 23, 29, 30, 119, National Reclamation Act 120, 126, 129, 144 Reclamation Service, 23, 26

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recycled water, 100, 236–241, 244 San Pedro River, 36, 43 Red Line, 8, 141 San Pedro River aquifer, 41 Red Sea, 15, 16 San Pedro River National Conservation Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance; Red Area, 41, 43 Sea-Dead Sea Canal; Red-Dead Canal; Santa Clara wetland, 46; see also Ciénega de Red-Dead Project; Red-Dead, 14, 15, Santa Clara; Ciénega 65–67, 69, 146 Santa Cruz River, 21, 28, 36, 43, 44, Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance study, 238, 242 60, 67 Santa Cruz River Valley aquifer, 41 Regional Climate Model, 172, 191; see also Santa Cruz Water Company, 111 RCM Santa Fe Railroad, 27 regional joint institutions, 66 SAR, 223, 229, 253; see also Sodium regulation, 8–10, 85, 93–96, 105, 106, 154 adsorption ratio Reich, Charles, 122 SAT, 12, 222; see also Soil Aquifer Treatment reliance interest, 123 scarcity, 7, 13, 15, 16, 75–79, 81–85, 97, religion, 78, 151–153, 160, 161 114, 115, 133, 143, 151, 239, 241 Rentería Sánchez, Heriberto, 257 scarcity cost, 98–100 reserved rights doctrine, 128, 129 scarcity value, 97, 98 reuse, 4, 42–44, 140, 221–229, 238–240 Science Applications International Reverse Osmosis; RO, 13, 46, 229, Corporation, 42; see also SAIC 252–256, 258, 265, 270 science diplomacy, 276 rightful allocation, 62, 69 scientific objectivity, 86 Río Bravo, 38, 40, 42; see also Rio Grande Scottsdale, Arizona, USA, 251, 252–254, 258 River; Rio Grande Scottsdale Water Campus, 251, 252, 253 Río Colorado, 37; see also Colorado River Sea of Cortes, 1 Rio Grande River; Rio Grande, 35, 38, 40, Sea of Galilee, 8, 9, 14, 15, 62, 91, 124; 42; see also Río Bravo see also Lake Tiberius; Lake Kinneret Río Mayo, 36 sea water desalination; seawater Río Sonora, 36 desalination, 13, 47, 100, 205, 248, Río Yaqui, 36 257, 263–273 riparian, 15, 44, 54, 57, 59, 62, 64, 66, 69, seasonal pattern, 175 144, 238, 255 seasonal rate, 111–112 Rocky Point, 45; see also Puerto Peñasco, seasonality, 134, 175, 178, 179 Sonora, Mexico security wall, 136 Roosevelt Dam, 22–24, 26; see also semi-arid; semiarid, 17, 35, 75, 169, 173, Theodore Roosevelt Dam 187–189, 191–193, 195, 197, 207 Roosevelt, Theodore, 22 settlements, 7, 8, 16, 25, 36, 78–81, 136 Rotenberg, Pinchas, 7 sewage, 12, 16, 38, 42–44, 94, 101, 123, 158, 206, 207, 221–228, 240 safe yield, 99, 106, 108 shafa, 153 SAIC, 42; see also Science Applications Shafdan, 12 International Corporation shared basin, 62 Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:42 12 October 2016 salinity, 14, 45, 134, 142, 157, 158, shared structure, 64 223–227, 247, 250–252, 254 Shari’ah, 152, 153; see also Salt River, 24–26, 36, 247, 250, 254, 255 Islamic laws Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian shirb, 153 Reservation, 24 silviculture, 236, 237 Salt River Project, 22–25, 29, 30, 109, 248; sinkholes, 15 see also SRP situated knowledge, 86, 87 Salt River Valley, 23, 24, 28, 29 sodium adsorption ratio, 223, 229, 253; Salt River Valley Water Users Association, see also SAR 23, 24, 235 soft-path planning, 249 Salton Sea, 30 Soil Aquifer Treatment, 12, 222; San Carlos Project, 25, 26 see also SAT San Francisco Peaks, 27 Sonora, Mexico, 35–39, 41–45, 188, San Luis Río Colorado, Mexico, 37, 43 248, 257

IIHESHAE0_Book.indbHESHAE0_Book.indb 290290 111/20/20121/20/2012 1:16:031:16:03 PMPM Index 291

Sonoran Desert, 35, 235 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 21 Soreq Desalination Plant, 269 Treaty of Peace, 1994, 54 South Canal, 23 Treaty of Peace Israel and Jordan, 1994, Southwest, United States, 3, 36, 42, 188, 54, 60 189, 193 TSS, 211–213, 228, 229; see also Total southwestern United States, 134, Suspended Solids 187–189, 192 Tucson, Arizona, USA, 1, 27–29, 32, 36, sovereignty, 55, 56, 64, 66, 69, 81, 168 143, 242, 247, 250 Special Report on Emissions Scenarios; Turkey, 146 SRES, 190, 191, 192, 195 SRP, 22–25, 29, 30, 109, 248; see also Salt Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, River Project 280–282 stakeholders, 17, 40–42, 133, 160, 217, 218 UN, 55, 56, 226; see also United Nations Stewart Mountain Dam, 24 UN Watercourse Convention, 55; see also stored and developed water, 23 Convention on the Non-Navigational streamflow, 43, 189, 193, 194 Uses of International Water Courses; subsidization, 103–114 Watercourse Convention subsidy, 242 uncertainty, 13, 57, 75–85, 194, 195 supply augmentation, 145, 146 Union Hills Water Treatment Plant, 30 surface channel, 56 United Nations, 55, 56, 226; see also UN surface runoff, 134, 169 United Nations Educational, Scientific sustainability, 37, 96, 229, 235–244, 252 and Cultural Organization; UNESCO, Sustainable Management of the West Bank 41, 278 and Gaza Aquifers; SUSMAQ, 172 United States, 1–4, 23, 24, 26, 35–48, 105, Syria, 9, 15, 35, 58–60, 66, 92, 216 109, 110, 119–129, 136, 187–189, 248, Syrian-African Rift, 125 250, 256; see also U.S. United States-México Transboundary TAAP, 41, 48; see also Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act, 41 Aquifer Assessment Program Unity Dam, 59 Taba Agreement, Oslo II, 64 University of Arizona, 42, 238, 243, 258 Tahal Water Company; Tahal, 82 Upper Basin, 31 TAMA, 264 Upper Colorado River Basin; UCRB, 31, TDS, 210, 247, 250, 253–255, 258; see also 192, 193; see also Upper Basin Total Dissolved Solids Upper San Pedro Partnership, 37, 41 technology, 13, 14, 45, 47, 204, 248, urban development, 135, 136, 145, 249, 257 204, 249 Tel Aviv, Israel, 93, 102, 134, 136, 155, 222 urbanization, 37, 91, 134, 143, Tempe, Arizona, USA, 27 182, 183 temperature, 134, 169, 172, 182, 183, U.S., 1–4, 23, 24, 26, 35–48, 105, 109, 110, 189–194 119–129, 136, 187–189, 248, 250, 256; Terms of Reference, 65–67; see also TOR see also United States Theodore Roosevelt Dam, 22–24, 26; see U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 7, 37, 45, 248, Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:42 12 October 2016 also Roosevelt Dam 254, 255, 258; see also Bureau of thermal processes, 252 Reclamation; BOR; Reclamation top-down approach, 70 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 37, TOR, 65–67; see also Terms of Reference 39, 42, 44, 243; see also Environmental Total Dissolved Solids, 210, 247, 250, Protection Agency; EPA 253–255, 258; see also TDS U.S. Geological Survey; USGS, 41 Total Suspended Solids, 211–213, 228, 229; U.S. Mining Act, 36 see also TSS U.S. State Department, 65 transboundary, 35–47, 54–56, 58, 203–218, U.S. Supreme Court, 32, 128 221–229 USAID, 65 Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Program, 41, 48; see also TAAP vadose zone, 252, 253 transparency, 143, 208, 249 value of the marginal product; VMP, 96, 97 treaty, 38, 54, 57, 62 Verde River, 24, 25, 28, 29, 106, 194, 237

IIHESHAE0_Book.indbHESHAE0_Book.indb 291291 111/20/20121/20/2012 1:16:031:16:03 PMPM 292 Index

Verde Water Treatment plant, 29 Water Infrastructure Finance Authority, vulnerability, 15, 169, 188, 189, 210 39, 110–112; see also WIFA water institutions, 37–39, 56, 82 wadi, 135, 137, 141, 174, 204, 207 Water Law, 8–10, 17, 54–58, 84, 85, 94, Wadi Zaimer, 207, 211–214 95, 121–125, 141, 154, 210 wastewater, 12, 42–44, 48, 94, 142, water prices, 9, 97–104, 109–115, 157, 157–159, 203–218, 221–229, 236–243, 242, 270 250–254 water pricing, 3, 91–104, 105–115, 154, wastewater management, 203–218, 241, 271 221–229 water pricing as incentive, 114–115, 242 wastewater reclamation; waste-water water quality, 9, 13, 17, 38, 43–45, 75, 96, reclamation, 12, 13, 253 105, 153, 156, 158, 159, 189, 224, 237, wastewater reuse, 4, 12, 13, 42–44, 140, 244, 247, 250, 255 142, 207, 221–229, 235 water quantity, 38, 46, 75, 96–100, 120, wastewater treatment, 28, 42, 43, 158, 159, 156, 159, 255 204–207, 209–212, 224, 237, 238, 240, water resources, 2, 8–10, 16, 21, 27, 35–47, 241, 243, 250–253 56, 64, 67, 79, 80, 87, 136, 139–144, Wastewater Treatment Facility; Wastewater 154, 156–159, 160, 183, 204, 216, Treatment Plant, 42–44, 144, 158, 204, 235–244, 250, 251 205, 207, 208, 210, 212, 215, 225; Water Resources Research Center, 41 see also WWTF; WWTP water-saving irrigation, 139 water abundance, 78–80, 86 water scarcity, 7, 15, 16, 35, 75–77, 81–85, Water Act, 121–124, 126 98–100, 114, 115, 143, 145, 197, 221, water agreement draft, 2000, 70 239, 241, 258, 276 Water Authority, 8, 14, 17, 94–96, 102, water treatment, 29, 30, 43, 252–254 103, 264; see also Palestinian Water Watercourse Convention, 55, 57, 58; Authority; PWA see also Convention on the water availability, 10, 76, 84, 140, 183 Non-Navigational Uses of water banking, 197 International Water Courses; Water Carrier, 9, 58, 83, 121, 135, 139; UN Watercourse Convention; see also National Water Carrier; NWC; watershed, 25, 37–39, 48, 55, 56, 68, 169, National Carrier; National (water) 183, 193, 213 Carrier; National Water Project Watts, Sylvester, 27 Water Commission, 8, 10, 38, 67, 94 WDA, 282; see also Water Desalination Water Commissioner, 11, 84, 85, 94, 95, Administration 122, 141, 154, 210 Weitzman, Haim, 7 Water Commissioner v. Perlmutter, 122, 123 Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and water conflicts, 57, 67, 69, 82, 146, Drainage District; Wellton-Mohawk, 153, 157 26, 45, 46, 255, 256; see also water conservation, 17, 18, 111, WMIDD 151–162, 184 West Bank; WB, 1, 16, 17, 59, 60, 64, Water Conservation Board, 129 136, 138, 140–142, 156–159, 168–172, Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:42 12 October 2016 water consumer, 102 174–179, 183 Water Court, Israeli, 122, 123 Whitewater Draw, 43 water demand, 11, 106, 107, 114, 134, 135, WHO, 156–160, 227; see also World 143, 145, 189, 240, 249, 250, 264 Health Organization Water Department, 81, 84 Wiener, Aaron, 81–83 Water Desalination Administration, 282; WIFA, 39, 110–112; see also Water see also WDA Infrastructure Finance Authority Water Desalination Report, 270, 271 Wilmer, Mark, 32 water development, 7–17, 21, 36, 37, 56, WMIDD, 26, 45, 46, 255, 256; see also 57, 93, 108, 133–146, 154, 160–162, Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage 205, 206 District; Wellton-Mohawk water governance, 37–39, 83–85, 143 World Bank, 15, 56, 65, 66, 222 water infrastructure, 7–17, 21–32, World Bank Technical Assistance 240–242, 249 Mission, 65

IIHESHAE0_Book.indbHESHAE0_Book.indb 292292 111/20/20121/20/2012 1:16:031:16:03 PMPM Index 293

World Health Organization, 156–160, 227; YHWWTP, 211, 212, 214; see also Yad see also WHO Hanna Wastewater Treatment Plant World Summit on Sustainable Yishuv, 7 Development, 66 Yizrael Valley, 7 World War Two, 21, 22, 25, 27–29 Yuma County Water Users WWTF; WWTP, 42–44, 144, 158, 204, Association, 25 205, 207, 208, 210, 212, 215, 225; Yuma Desalting Plant; YDP, 47, 253, see also Wastewater Treatment Facility; 255, 256 Wastewater Treatment Plant Yuma Main Canal, 26 Yuma Mesa, 26 Yad Hanna Wastewater Treatment Plant, Yuma Project, 25, 26 211, 212, 214; see also YHWWTP Yarkon River, 8 Zarchin, Alexsander, 13 Yarkon River case, 122 zero-sum, 55 Yarkon–Negev pipeline, 8, 92 Zionist, 7, 8, 10, 77–79, 81, 82 Yarmouk, 15, 59, 60, 62, 140, 141 Zionist movement, 59 YDP, 47, 253, 255, 256; see also Yuma Desalting Plant Downloaded by [Columbia University] at 14:42 12 October 2016

IIHESHAE0_Book.indbHESHAE0_Book.indb 293293 111/20/20121/20/2012 1:16:031:16:03 PMPM