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H U M A N R I G H T S WATCH HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA On August 5-6, 2014, United States President Barack Obama will host the first-ever US-Africa Leaders Summit. “Human Rights in Africa” summarizes human rights conditions in 24 countries in Africa up to November 2013. It reflects extensive investigative work undertaken by Human Rights Watch research staff working in close partnership with African human rights activists. Among other trends, this report highlights the increasing threat faced by independent media and civil society organizations in a number of African countries and the US government’s inconsistent human rights policy towards Africa. (Cover photo) Kenya: A collective of women, widowed by the 2006-2008 clashes between the insurgent Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) and the Kenyan government, have bonded together to support one another in the aftermath of their husbands’ disappearances and deaths. © 2011 Brent Stirton/Reportage for Human Rights Watch HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA hrw.org Human Rights in Africa Copyright © 2014 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world. We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice. We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable. We challenge governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law. We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org Human Rights in Africa Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 Place Rights Front and Center on the US-Africa Agenda.............................................................. 1 2014 World Report Chapters ............................................................................................... 5 Algeria ...................................................................................................................................... 5 Angola ..................................................................................................................................... 9 Burundi .................................................................................................................................. 13 Central African Republic ......................................................................................................... 17 Côte d’Ivoire ........................................................................................................................... 21 Democratic Republic of Congo ................................................................................................ 25 Egypt ..................................................................................................................................... 29 Equatorial Guinea ................................................................................................................... 35 Eritrea .................................................................................................................................... 39 Ethiopia ................................................................................................................................. 42 Guinea .................................................................................................................................. 46 Kenya ..................................................................................................................................... 50 Liberia .................................................................................................................................... 54 Libya ...................................................................................................................................... 58 Mali ....................................................................................................................................... 64 Morocco/Western Sahara ...................................................................................................... 68 Nigeria ................................................................................................................................... 73 Rwanda .................................................................................................................................. 77 Somalia ................................................................................................................................. 82 South Africa .......................................................................................................................... 86 South Sudan .......................................................................................................................... 91 Sudan .................................................................................................................................... 95 Tunisia .................................................................................................................................. 99 Uganda ................................................................................................................................ 103 Zimbabwe ............................................................................................................................ 106 Introduction Place Rights Front and Center on the US-Africa Agenda By Sarah Margon As he stood before Ghana’s parliament in 2009, President Barack Obama set out some guiding principles to underscore his interests in Africa. “[G]overnments” he said, “that respect the will of their own people, that govern by consent and not coercion, are more prosperous, they are more stable, and more successful than governments that do not.” Similarly, a core pillar of the 2012 US Strategy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa set forth that the United States would “amplify and support voices calling for respect for human rights, rule of law, accountability and transitional justice mechanisms, and independent media.” These words were important; they resonated strongly among African people and an increasingly vibrant civil society. They raised expectations. But a closer look at the administration’s policy toward Africa shows a disappointing reluctance to integrate human rights within a larger foreign policy framework. Notably, while President Obama has unveiled specific initiatives to strengthen US development work on the continent and connect it to core national security objectives, he has not done the same for human rights and the rule of law. Without a larger vision that makes respect for human rights a central pillar of US foreign policy, alongside more traditional national security objectives, the administration’s public condemnation of abuses and calls for alleged human rights violators to be held to account lack broader impact. The US also sends mixed messages when its aid allocations appear to disregard human rights concerns, as has been the case for security assistance packages to Chad, Kenya, and South Sudan and development aid to Rwanda and Ethiopia. When the US has made human rights a priority in its African diplomacy, it has had a positive impact on wider policy goals and has been well received by many Africans. Take, for example, the administration’s call for the Democratic Republic of Congo to implement Bosco Ntaganda’s ICC arrest warrant and then its role helping transfer him to The Hague when he surrendered at the US embassy in neighboring Rwanda or the State Department’s decision to provide financial support to the Senegalese court that will try former Chadian 1 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | JULY 2014 dictator Hissène Habré. These specific actions show that when the US leverages its influence, it is able to both promote accountability and bolster the rule of law. There are other key instances in which the US has injected human rights into its Africa policy, including efforts to limit threats to civilians by the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), support for a UN peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic, and a commitment to maintain strong targeted sanctions on key Zimbabwe officials amid a crackdown on activists that impedes the work of independent actors and weakens government effectiveness. In other cases, however, the US commitment to human rights and the rule of law remains understated, giving the impression that governments have a free pass to continue their “business as usual” without consequence. At least a dozen authoritarian governments across the continent are threatening independent media and nongovernmental organizations, including the LGBT community, both through individual attacks and legislation that limits their ability to function. The trend appears to be worsening and the US has had no coordinated and clear response – condemning some publicly, some privately, and some not at all. Often the response is slow and fails to articulate
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