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Global Encryption, Cloud & Cyber Export Controls EARN CLE CREDITS September 10–11, 2020 (Pacific Daylight Time) Virtual Conference 10th Annual Advanced Forum on GLOBAL ENCRYPTION, CLOUD & CYBER EXPORT CONTROLS The Premier Event for the Global Trade Controls Professionals to Stay Compliant with the Changing Regulations Keynote Speakers: What’s New for 2020: • Navigating the enforcement landscape and increased use of the entity list Honorable Nazak Nikakhtar Assistant Secretary for Industry and • Impact of TikTok and We Chat on Citizen Privacy Analysis, International Trade Administration • Military end use restrictions on mass market encryption and software U.S. Department of Commerce • Discussing the impact of new, emerging and foundational technologies regulations Deborah Curtis Chief Counsel for Industry and Security • Anticipating Wassenaar changes to overcome cybersecurity challenges U.S. Department of Commerce • How to manage your compliance program after COVID-19 • Assessing the impact of human rights guidelines to combat overuse of cyber-surveillance products and services Benchmark with Senior Industry Leaders from: • Cisco Systems • Hitachi • Spirent Gain Country Specific Guidance: • Cyxtera • McAfee Communications • • Latest developments in CHINA’s encryption and cyber laws • Dell • Microsoft Qualcomm • • • Ericsson • Oracle Verizon Focus on ASIA export controls – INDIA, JAPAN, KOREA and HONG KONG • Google • Siemens • EUROPEAN UNION Dual-Use trade controls update • Encryption requirements and export controls laws in GERMANY Supporting Sponsor: Associate Sponsors: a C5 Group Company Register Now | AmericanConference.com/Encryption | 888 224 2480 Business Information in a Global Context COMMENT-DOTS quote-leftBest conference for legal, technical, operational encryption, cybersecurity issues and best practices. quote-right Senior Manager, Global Export Trade, Cisco The Only Conference that Focuses on Global Regulatory Developments quote-leftAppreciated the workshops in Encryption, Cloud Computing and and the depth of information along with the topics covered. quote-right Export Controls Trade Control Specialist, The Boeing Company The 10th Edition of Global Encryption, Cloud & Cyber Export Controls Virtual Conference is an exclusive gathering for senior executives and trade compliance professionals to quote-leftI found all the material to be keep abreast of changing export control regimes across the relevant and it was covered in just globe. This is the only event that brings together industry and about enough depth to keep the government experts from around the world to discuss the audience engaged. quote-right latest changes and developments in this dynamic environment. Global Trade Compliance Specialist, Hitachi Vantara 5 Top Reasons to Attend \ RECEIVE comprehensive guidance from senior quote-left Government Officials The combination of topics and speakers resulted in a \ LEARN practical compliance strategies from the experts dynamic exchange of information and industry leaders and opinions. quote-right \ PARTICIPATE in our intensive workshops and learn how Trade Compliance Manager, Nutanix to build and implement a robust and up-to-date internal compliance program \ ENGAGE in interactive discussions about key issues and emerging industry trends \ NETWORK among your colleagues, peers and prospective clients REGISTER today to reserve your place to receive the most Supported by: current guidance to help your organization navigate the latest regulatory guidelines. Please ask about our generous group discounts. 2 Join the Conversation @ACI_IntTrade #ACIEncryption | International Trade Pre-Conference Workshops • Wednesday, September 9, 2020 (Pacific Daylight Time) 9:00-12:30 B: 1.30-5:00 A Fundamentals of U.S. Encryption Rules: Update on Legal B Cloud Computing 101: A Comprehensive Guide and Compliance Issues and the Key Components of an to Export Controls, Compliance Issues and More Effective Compliance Program Dan Fisher-Owens Anne Marie Griffin Jocelyn Brown Tammie Rostant Partner Director Regulatory Affairs Senior Manager Global Export Global Trade Compliance Berliner Corcoran & Rowe Microsoft Worldwide Tax Cisco Systems Manager (San Francisco, CA) & Trade (Redmond, WA) (San Francisco, CA) McAfee (Plano, TX) This working group provides a comprehensive review of export Marwa Hassoun compliance obligations in the cloud. Experts will review the export controls and sanctions approach to cloud computing in the U.S. and Partner several other countries. This workshop is ideal for export controls, Arent Fox (Los Angeles, CA) engineering and technology professionals seeking clarity on how to dovetail export controls and the cloud. Topics include: This session is designed both for attendees new to encryption controls and for those who would like an in-depth refresher before the more • A complete review of BIS, DDTC, and OFAC rules on cloud computing, advanced discussions of the main program. Take part in this practical including advisory opinions and interactive working group as experts discuss the current state of • Impact and implications: DDTC’s new update related to encrypted U.S. Encryption Controls—with a focus on building and maintaining technical data and software strong protocols to ensure compliance. Topics include: • How U.S. export control rules intersect with DoD cybersecurity rules • What is symmetrical and asymmetrical encryption? • Tailoring cloud computing policies to the needs of your specific • Technical details of the history and current state of encryption technology and existing business processes • Nuances of U.S. Export Control laws for encryption technologies, cloud • Controlling cloud access, internally and externally: Third parties, computing, and cyber export controls affiliates, vendors and customers • Cloud computing risk assessments: How to identify and mitigate » What is an encryption item and how does the EAR treat them weaknesses in your existing control plan differently? » The De Minimis Rule for encryption items About us: » Publicly available encryption software and technology • Summary of recent regulatory changes and impact on legacy classifications/controls • Licensing and License Exceptions The C5 Group, comprising American Conference Institute, The Canadian Institute and C5 » License Exception ENC in Europe, is a leading global events and business intelligence company. » When you need an encryption licensing arrangement (ELA) vs. For over 30 years, C5 Group has provided the opportunities that bring together business an individual license? leaders, professionals and international experts from around the world to learn, meet, network and make the contacts that create the opportunities. • Strategies and best practices for developing and maintaining an Our conferences and related products connect the power of people with the power of effective export compliance program with respect to encryption items information, a powerful combination for business growth and success. Vice Presidents, Directors and Managers of: • Export/Import Compliance • Security • International Trade • Export Administration • Export Policy • Compliance • Export/Import Controls • Export Licensing • Government Affairs Corporate Counsel: Who Will • Import/Export Compliance • Counsel • Counsel • International Trade • Trade and Regulatory You Meet? Private practice attorneys and consultants practising in: • Export Controls • Corporate Compliance & • E-Commerce • International Trade • Governance Chief Technology Officers • Engineers a C5 Group Company Register Now | AmericanConference.com/Encryption | 888 224 2480 Business Information in a Global Context 11:15 Understanding the Enforcement 2:15 Landscape: When Criminal Prosecutions, Asia Focus: Hong Kong, Japan and India Main Conference Day 1 Civil and Administrative Proceeding, Thursday, September 10, 2020 and Sanctions Intersect with Trade Jay Gullish (Pacific Daylight Time) Negotiations, What Must You Do? Senior Director, Digital Economy, Media, and Entertainment, U.S.-India Business Council, Matt Bell U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Washington, DC) Senior Managing Director, Practice Leader Export Controls & Sanctions Rohit Jain 9:00 FTI Consulting (Houston, TX) Partner Co-Chairs’ Opening Remarks Josephine Aiello LeBeau Economic Laws Practice (India) Partner Magnus Nordeus Wilson Sonsini (Washington, DC) • The relationship between METI, CISTEC and Group Head of Trade Compliance the export community in Japan • Business risks of dealing with Huawei Ericsson (Sweden) • Japanese parameter sheets – What are they, • Why the Huawei entity listing is not ‘ZTE and why are they important? Roszel Thomsen Redux’ from a U.S. perspective? • Japan’s enhanced controls on exports of three Partner • How the arrest of Huawei’s CFO in Canada Thomsen & Burke (Baltimore, MD) changes the calculus and industry’s response? semiconductor materials, including hydrogen fluoride, to South Korea and removal of South • What is the view of the entity list and unreliable Korea from its list of trusted trade partners supplier list from a Chinese perspective? 9:15 KEYNOTE ADDRESS qualified for preferential treatment in export Export Control Reform Act • Huawei’s temporary general license – procedures – background and implications success or failure? Implementation: Emerging and • India’s SCOMET regulations and new Intra- • Enforcement risks for non-US companies Foundational Technologies Company Transfer exemption – problems solved, and problems remaining Deborah Curtis 12:00 Chief Counsel for Industry 3:00 Decoding China’s New Encryption and and Security
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