Issue Brief February 18, 2021

The Next Generation Problem: The Ups and Downs of ’s Ban Johannes Nordin

After months of pending legal challenges, Sweden proceeded with the long-delayed -frequency auctions in January this year, finally allowing Swedish telecom providers to continue the 5G-rollout; however, still without partnerships with Chinese 5G-equipment provider Huawei Technologies, which remains banned from Swedish networks on national security grounds. The ban was upheld in court on February 09 and has now put on an open collision course with Beijing, which has threatened retaliation against Swedish businesses in China. In completely excluding Huawei, Sweden has, atypically, joined ranks with the U.S., the UK, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia, willingly or not getting pulled into the fray of the Sino-American rivalry. On the sidelines of a play involving government officials, national intelligence services, Swedish industry, telecom providers, Brussels, Washington, and Beijing, other European states are now keenly observing the Swedish experience with interest. Will Beijing make a discouraging example of Stockholm, or will the latter call bluff? Whatever the final answer may be, it is sure to set a precedent. To this end, this Issue Brief aims to explore Sweden’s experience thus far and outline the possible implications for the future.

A Year in Review: guidelines and coordination – a toolbox– leaving practical enforcement to the member states, stopping In January 2020, the short of the all-out pre-emptive ban called for by the presented the EU’s common cybersecurity approach U.S. for 5G networks, entitled the “EU Toolbox.” The toolbox sets some common standards and calls Not being behind the curb, Sweden updated the for legal measures allowing for the “restriction of Electronic Communications Act the very same involvement of suppliers based on their risk profile,” month, adding provisions that allow the Post and with risk calculated from both technological and Telecom Authority (PTS) to withhold the sale of strategic perspectives.1 However, as the naming radiocommunications licenses on national security convention implies, the EU approach offers only grounds.2 The Swedish government, historically

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a forerunner in implementing new wireless decision.9 However, the decision also stocked anger communication standards, had already in 2018 in Beijing. Both the Chinese Foreign Ministry and signed a letter of intent with other Nordic countries the Chinese ambassador pushed back forcefully on to develop an integrated 5G-region and had been allegations that Huawei would be unsafe, making taking anticipatory measures for some time.3 As the veiled threats that there would “undoubtedly” be revised law was introduced, Minister of Digitalization consequences for Swedish businesses operating in Anders Ygeman clarified it “would not be directed China.10 While Sweden makes up a relatively small at any specific operator, provider, or nation.”4 Yet, share of Huawei’s global operations, the ban has the things would take a turn in the following months. potential to set a precedent for other EU countries to follow, either successfully defying Beijing, rallying others to follow, or deterring if it comes at too high Huawei soon found an a cost.

unexpected ally in Ericsson, Swedish industry quickly took note, and Huawei one of its main competitors. soon found an unexpected ally in Ericsson, one of its main competitors. In the subsequent months, In March, the Swedish Security Service (SÄPO) Ericsson’s CEO, Börje Ekholm, personally lobbied highlighted Beijing, alongside Moscow, as Sweden’s Anna Hallberg, Minister for Foreign Trade and largest cybersecurity threat in its 2019 Yearbook, Nordic Affairs, to reverse PTS’ decision. Ekholm citing extensive signals intelligence and theft of cited risks of blowback in China and the critical intellectual property and research.5 Acting on these 5G rollout delays, which could undermine Swedish concerns in July, SÄPO, PTS, and the Armed Forces long-term competitiveness in the tech sector.11 The began a joint investigation into Swedish telecom Swedish market makes up a relatively small part of providers’ 5G-plans, aiming to determine whether Ericsson’s global operations and is dwarfed by the they presented risks to national security.6 Three vast Chinese market, which already today makes months later, on October 20, PTS announced the up thirteen percent of Ericsson’s total revenue, a accepted applicants for the 5G-frequency auctions share only set to grow in the years ahead.12 Indeed, scheduled for early November. The announcement Ericsson’s full-year report for 2020 highlighted how included the requirement that all telecom providers the third quarter saw the highest gross margin levels would be barred from using equipment from vendors since 2006, pointing out the Chinese 5G-rollout as Huawei and ZTE, likewise setting a timeline for a key driver in growing sales.13 Ericsson is notably when all existing equipment would have to be the only non-Chinese company to have won 5G removed from current -networks.7 contracts with all three major telecom operators in China, landing a double-digit share of a massive 5G The surprise announcement, released just a month tender in 2020 that saw Finnish walk home ahead of the scheduled auctions, caught both emptyhanded.14 , chairman of Huawei and the telecom providers off-guard. Investor AB, Sweden’s largest conglomerate holding Huawei immediately appealed PTS’ decision, citing company, has for similar reasons come to Huawei’s procedural misconduct as the agency had neglected defense but refused to comment on the security to notify and hear Huawei’s argument, requesting aspects of PTS’ decision.15 the decision to be halted until the case had been resolved.8 Similarly, several telecom providers urged Only days before the scheduled 5G auctions, the the auctions to be postponed, noting the billions of Administrative Court of Appeals granted Huawei’s investments (SEK) at stake, complaining that they request to temporarily freeze the decision barring had not been notified earlier. The telecom provider Huawei equipment, citing the irrecuperable “Three” notably joined Huawei in appealing PTS’ economic damage inflicted if the PTS’ decision

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would turn out inaccurate.16 The verdict effectively in Sweden have all contributed to record low levels forced the postponement of the auctions into of public trust in China – in fact, the lowest degree 2021. Yet, the ruling was soon overturned only a of trust in all of Europe at only 15 percent. While month later by a superior Administrative Court, most recognize China’s growing importance for which cited the greater weight of Sweden’s public the economy and as an essential partner in solving interest vis-á-vis Huawei as a corporate entity in not critical global challenges, like climate change, delaying the critical 5G-rollout.17 It further noted less than 20 percent support cooperation on 5G.25 how Huawei, either way, was not a direct party to This dynamic has undoubtedly played a role in the 5G-auctions. With that, Huawei had emptied Stockholm’s uncharacteristically tough stance on its legal remedies within the court system, and the China compared to the rest of Europe. attempt to appeal to the Highest Administrative Court was denied. Huawei now had to wait for a ruling on the main lawsuit concerned with the Excessive restrictions PTS’s decision itself. However, company leadership on Chinese business in appealed unsuccessfully to the Swedish government in an open letter, urging it to step in and reverse the Europe can also trigger decision, warning they may be forced to take the case reciprocal barriers for for international arbitration as a last resort, citing the Sino-Swedish Investor Agreement of 1982.18 European companies.

PTS held the auctions on January 19, worth 2.3 Sweden’s Lone Stance bn SEK.19 Whereas carriers Telia and state-owned Teracom AB had never used Huawei equipment in Sweden has undoubtedly taken the strongest the first place, and Telenor announced they position on 5G-networks among the Nordic had now chosen Ericsson over Huawei for their countries. Whereas Sweden has followed the lead of joint 5G-venture, leaving Three as the only one still the U.S.-UK-led Anglosphere, its Nordic Neighbors hoping to use Huawei in its networks. Minister of have more in common with countries in continental Digitalization Ygeman underscored the great need Europe, where heavyweights like Germany, France, not to delay auctions any further.20 After the auctions, and Italy have all taken more cautious stances. Their Beijing’s Ministry of Commerce Spokesperson, independent investigations have been unable to find Gao Feng, urged Sweden to “immediately correct any alarming backdoors in Huawei equipment,26 in the mistake,” which violates WTO rules under the contrast to equipment made by U.S.-based Cisco disguise of “national security,” adding that China (Berlin has yet to forget the Obama administration’s will respond with “all necessary measures.”21 With wiretapping of Angela Merkel).27 Moreover, security the Huawei ban upheld in court on February 09, concerns aside, Huawei equipment is considerably it remains to be seen what form the measures will cheaper than the competition. Telecom carriers with take.22 substantial Huawei partnerships, such as Deutsche Telecom, would see significant losses and year-long Beijing’s Wolf Warrior diplomacy and the threats of delays in their 5G rollouts under a complete ban.28 economic pressure are unlikely to improve Huawei’s public relations in Sweden;23 to the contrary, it Excessive restrictions on Chinese business in Europe heightens public awareness of perceived links can also trigger reciprocal barriers for European between Huawei and Beijing. Sino-Swedish rows companies. This factor plays a vital role in many over imprisoned book publisher Gui Minhai, “sharp countries’ decision-making processes across the EU, power” exercises in the Swedish media landscape,24 not the least for Merkel and German Industry.29 and alleged spying activities on Tibetan Communities Without irrefutable proof of Huawei’s misconduct,

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many prefer to impose stricter oversight or regulatory – the absence of proffered evidence for Huawei’s caps on market access without singling out Huawei, misconduct. While the mere suspicion concerning thus hesitating to pull the trigger preemptively, as risk to critical systems is arguably enough to justify has been the case in the rest of the Nordic region. certain companies’ exclusion, there is also a line to be drawn somewhere between unrestricted free Last year, Denmark signaled that it would prefer to trade and unchecked invocations of national security use 5G equipment produced in countries considered interests. The Swedish economy has undoubtedly “security allies,” but never outright banned Huawei, felt the impact of politicized trade with the Trump leaving the ultimate decision up to the private era’s tariff regimes. Whether one agrees with them telecom carriers. This careful approach came despite or not, Beijing’s objections are thus predictable, and the fact that Sino-Danish relations were already on the unrepentant way Sweden took its decision may thin ice over revelations that the Chinese ambassador force the hand of China’s increasingly nationalistic had applied economic pressure on the autonomous leadership. In taking a principled stand alone without Faroese government to pick Huawei for its 5G-nets the backing of a unified EU, Stockholm may have in 2019.30 Similarly, Norway left the decision up painted a target on its back. to telecom carriers, restricting access only in core networks.31 Nonetheless, carrier Telenor’s decision The Technical Security vs. to choose Swedish Ericson over Huawei, despite its the Geopolitical Angle close relationship with the latter, still drew Beijing’s ire. Meanwhile, Finland set out security criteria that What are the security concerns with 5G, then? From equally apply to all telecom equipment providers, a purely technical perspective, banning Huawei allowing for bans on national security grounds, but outright makes little sense, as diversification of choosing not to use them preemptively. The ban equipment vendors lowers the overall system risk – if only applies to critical parts of the 5G-network, and a flaw is found, it won’t require the entire system to the government is obligated to reimburse telecom be replaced. Such network and cybersecurity risks are providers for any equipment discarded due to the more effectively targeted with appropriate technical ban.32 regulations,33 such as rules requiring that data be stored on domestic or European servers. However, with the remarkable societal transformation The unrepentant way expected from the advent of 5G and the Internet Sweden took its decision of Things, risks are much higher than ever before. Nearly everything, including the most critical of may force the hand of public functions, will be connected to the same core China’s increasingly system, and all the possible uses of 5G-integration in daily life cannot yet even be fully imagined. nationalistic leadership. Regulators are already playing catch-up.

Sweden’s principled position stands out clearly against Unlike with previous generations of wireless this European backdrop. The Swedish government communications, 5G also blurs the line between has, at least publicly, not been especially proactive core and fringe networks, making it challenging to in efforts to assuage tensions, presumably fed up keep the two separate in any meaningful sense – the with Beijing’s intimidation tactics after years of self- whole system is sensitive.34 Accordingly, excessive restraint. While there is an intrinsic value in asserting technological dependence on a foreign power boundaries and not bowing to coercive pressures, introduces yet another degree of unpredictability to this can, however, come at a cost and is a separate the system, and this is core to the many overtures consideration from the core of Beijing’s objections about Huawei. It illustrates how many security

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concerns are fundamentally geared more towards the ambiguous Chinese legal environment remain. geopolitics than technical security, not wanting to “[I]t is very difficult to completely reject the claims be at the mercy of others, and undemocratic states of Huawei critics that the company is more than with low Rule of Law rankings in particular.35 just a privately run company striving for economic profit.”38 As a result, in a curious twist of fate, American and European champions of free trade and market liberalization have ended up on the back Huawei and ZTE’s foot. Meanwhile, Beijing has spent the last few combined market share years condemning the Trump administration for protectionism, trying to portray itself as an avid of 41 percent dwarfed defender of free trade and joining the world’s largest those of European free trade agreement, RCEP, last year. As EU HR/ VP Josep Borell put in early February this year: Nokia and Ericsson. whereas Western nations had been “the masters of technologies [thus far], others will be the new masters” However, while these concerns only caught a strong in the post-Covid-19 world and the emergent “Asian headwind in 2018, they emerged long before the Century.”36 This new reality is gradually dawning Trump era. U.S. companies were urged not to use upon Brussels, Washington, and their allies, with Huawei networking equipment already in late 2012. many trying to navigate it in different ways. Moreover, since 2013, central federal government departments have been obliged to seek federal The Geopolitical Security Concerns – law enforcement permission for using Chinese From America to Europe vendors.39 These concerns were only heightened in the subsequent years, as the line between private Concerns about Huawei first blew up on the U.S.- companies and the government became vaguer, China Trade War’s sidelines in 2018. Several U.S. accentuated by Beijing’s 2014 Military-Civil Fusion intelligence agencies alleged that Huawei received (MCF) Strategy, and reaching new heights following funding from China’s National Security Commission, Trump’s inauguration. the People’s Liberation Army, and a third branch of the Chinese state intelligence network, hinting In 2017, Beijing introduced a new National that Huawei was not as independent as it claimed Intelligence Law, giving unspecified intelligence – allegations that Huawei pushed back on.37 Since agencies sweeping powers and containing provisions then, irrefutable evidence incriminating Huawei as obligating Chinese persons (read: people and controlled by the Communist Party of China (CPC) organizations in China) to support them in their has yet to emerge. The public discussion continues to efforts.40 In tandem, President Xi Jinping took revolve around suspicions and allegations. personal leadership of the newly created Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Huawei has been quick to underscore that it is Development, further blurring the line between employee-owned and that the workers nominate state and private sectors.41 The leading cause of company leadership without screening any employees concern emerging in some Western countries was: for party membership. Huawei further maintains that can corporations based in China truly be regarded as company leadership is a separate legal entity from the independent from the CPC? Washington certainly Huawei Trade Union Committee, by law a member didn’t think so and added Huawei and ZTE to of the CPC-led All-China Federation of Trade the U.S. Entity List, barring U.S. companies from Unions. Nonetheless, the leadership nomination trading in sensitive technologies with them. The process lacks screening mechanisms to guarantee Trump administration later blacklisted them for U.S. non-interference from the CPC, and concerns over investors by putting them on a list of “Communist

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Chinese Military Companies” in 2020.42 reversal on allowing Huawei. They could no longer be confident the UK would “be able to guarantee the The Trump administration, which gradually awoke security of future Huawei 5G equipment affected by to the importance of cutting-edge technology, the change in the US foreign direct product rules.”50 realized the U.S. had no serious competitor in the 5G For the UK, the long-term instability stemming from market, where Chinese companies reigned supreme. the U.S.-Chinese rivalry certainly played a role. Even In 2020, growing with the rapidly expanding Chinese though Washington’s threat of ending -sharing market, Huawei and ZTE’s combined market share turned out to be empty when the UK initially of 41 percent dwarfed those of European Nokia and allowed Huawei to have up to a 35 percent market Ericsson, the second and third largest suppliers, at 16 share in non-core networks,51 London refused to take and 14 percent, respectively.43 U.S. Attorney General any risks.52 While unknown to what extent, Swedish William Barr even flaunted the idea of acquiring a officials have surely faced similar considerations. majority stake in one of the Nordic companies, Notably, the Biden administration has not signaled though this was never a seriously tabled proposal.44 any upcoming policy changes concerning “untrusted Accordingly, there are both legitimate security vendors, including Huawei.”53 However, it is likely concerns at stake and underlying political motives. to focus more on building Huawei-alternatives than Trump’s whack-a-mole-style approach on individual Chinese companies.54 Beijing has likely been painted into a corner where Conclusion – Implications for Sino- Swedish Relations it feels forced to respond. It remains unclear to what extent China will push As a result, the U.S. lobbied Western allies vigorously back now that the Huawei ban has been upheld in not to use Chinese-made equipment in their court. Beijing has made some empty threats in the 5G-networks, warning of an end to U.S. intelligence- past, for example, following the 2018 row over the sharing should they refuse. Secretary of State Mike Stockholm police’s treatment of Chinese tourists – an Pompeo made headlines, saying, “if you have instance of overdramatized “porcelain diplomacy.”55 Huawei in your networks, you cannot count on U.S. Yet, this time much more is at stake, as Sweden’s support.”45 The efforts resulted in the 2019 Prague exclusion of Huawei, in a worst-case scenario (from Proposals, a non-binding cybersecurity framework, a Chinese perspective), could precipitate a domino first signed by officials from 32 countries, the U.S., effect across Europe. There are thus some tangible the EU, and NATO.46 Moreover, nine EU countries concerns under the aggressive rhetoric from China. in Eastern Europe have signed bilateral MoUs with Therefore, Beijing has likely been painted into a the U.S., pledging to rigorously vet and keep out corner where it feels forced to respond, seemingly “non-trusted” suppliers.47 Meanwhile, France has in an economic version of “the Commitment Trap” ordered its telecom providers to phase out Huawei dilemma.56 Should the threats be hollow, others equipment by 2028.48 Still, efforts to get Europe could be incentivized to follow Sweden’s lead. on board with an all-out ban have been largely However, an overreaction could also risk further unsuccessful, resulting in the EU Toolbox guidelines damage to Beijing’s already poor public image in the instead. EU, alienating more member states in the long-term.

The heads of Swedish SÄPO and MUST (the Military Because the PTS agency’s regulatory decisions are Intelligence and Security Service) have insisted that not within the Swedish Government’s purview, U.S. pressures played no role in their final decision unlike in the UK legal system, the Swedish ban is to single out Huawei and ZTE.49 However, officials likely to stand unchanged. That could prove costly. in the UK have been frank about their U-turn While unknown to what extent, some diplomatic

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efforts to express understanding and assuage tensions could go some way in saving Beijing face, potentially dampening calls to avenge hurt Chinese pride. About ISDP

The Institute for Security and Development Policy is a Stockholm-based independent and non-profit research and Authors - Johannes Nordin is a Junior Research Fellow at policy institute. The Institute is dedicated to expanding un- ISDP’s Asia Program. He holds a BA in Political Science and derstanding of international affairs, particularly the inter- Economics, and recently completed his Master of Science in relationship between the issue areas of conflict, security and development. The Institute’s primary areas of geographic International and European Relations at Linköping University, focus are Asia and Europe’s neighborhood. following an internship at ISDP’s Korea Center in 2019. www.isdp.eu The opinions expressed in this Issue Brief do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for Security and Development Policy or its sponsors.

© The Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2020. This Issue Brief can be freely reproduced provided that ISDP is informed.

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Endnotes

1. European Commission, (2020), “Secure 5G networks: Questions and Answers on the EU toolbox,” January 29, 2020, (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_20_127 ; accessed 20 January 2021). 2. SFS 2003:389, Lag (2003:389) om elektronisk kommunikation, (https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/ svensk-forfattningssamling/lag-2003389-om-elektronisk-kommunikation_sfs-2003-389; accessed 20 January 2021). 3. Nordic Co-operation, (2018), “Letter of Intent: Development of 5G in the Nordic region,” May 23, 2018, (https://www. norden.org/sv/node/20391; accessed 20 January 2021). 4. Strandberg, Hans, (2021), ”Mobiloperatörerna slåss om 5G – men Huaweibråket kan ändra allt,” Dagens Nyheter, January 16, 2021, (https://www.dn.se/ekonomi/mobiloperatorerna-slass-om-5g-men-huaweibraket-kan-andra-allt/; accessed 20 Janu- ary 2021). 5. Swedish Security Service, (2020), “Swedish Security Service 2019 Yearbook,” (https://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/en/swedish- security-service/about-us/press-room/swedish-security-service-2019-yearbook.html; accessed 20 January 2021). 6. Larsson, Linus, (2020), ” Säpo granskar svenskt 5G-bygge – operatörer riskerar underkännas,” Dagens Nyheter, July 26, 2020, (https://www.dn.se/nyheter/sapo-granskar-svenskt-5g-bygge-operatorer-riskerar-underkannas/; accessed 20 January 2021). 7. The Swedish Post and Telecom Authority, (2020), “Godkännande av sökande samt tillkommande villkor i auktion av frekvensbanden 3,5 GHz och 2,3 GHz,” October 20, 2020, (https://www.pts.se/globalassets/startpage/dokument/legala-do- kument/beslut/2020/radio/godkannande-35/beslut-godkanda-budgivare-och-tillkommande-villkor.pdf; accessed 20 January 2021). 8. The Swedish Post and Telecom Authority, (2020), “PTS beslut angående 5G-auktion har överklagats,” November 6, 2020, (https://www.pts.se/sv/nyheter/radio/2020/pts-beslut-angaende-5g-auktion-har-overklagats/; accessed 20 January 2021). 9. Strandberg, Hans, (2021), “Mobiloperatörerna slåss om 5G – men Huaweibråket kan ändra allt,” Dagens Nyheter, January 16, 2021, (https://www.dn.se/ekonomi/mobiloperatorerna-slass-om-5g-men-huaweibraket-kan-andra-allt/; accessed 20 Janu- ary 2021). 10. Andersson, Maja, (2020), “Kina hotar med motaktion efter 5G-beslutet,” Dagens Nyheter, October 21, 2020, (https:// www.dn.se/ekonomi/kina-hotar-med-motaktion-efter-5g-beslutet/; accessed 20 January 2021); Jingxi, Mo, (2020), “China ‘strongly dissatisfied’ with Sweden’s 5G decision,” China Daily, October 22, 2020, (http://www.chinadaily.com. cn/a/202010/22/WS5f90bd6da31024ad0ba80209.html; accessed 20 January 2021). 11. Fröberg, Jonas., and Larsson, Linus, (2021), ” Sms avslöjar: Ericssons vd pressade regeringen att rädda Huawei,” Dagens Nyheter, January 6, 2021, (https://www.dn.se/ekonomi/sms-avslojar-ericssons-vd-pressade-regeringen-att-radda-huawei/; accessed 20 January 2021); Strandberg, Hans, (2020), “Ericssons vd varnar för att Sverige halkar efter: ”Riktigt allvarligt,” Dagens Nyheter, March 24, 2020, (https://www.dn.se/ekonomi/ericssons-vd-varnar-for-att-sverige-halkar-efter-riktigt-allva- rligt/; accessed 20 January 2021). 12. The Economist, (2021), “Will Sweden’s Huawei ban harm Sino-Swedish business?,” January 30, 2021, (https://www.econo- mist.com/business/2021/01/30/will-swedens-huawei-ban-harm-sino-swedish-business; accessed 6 February 2021). 13. Ericsson., (2020), “Fourth quarter and full-year report 2020,” January 29, 2021, (https://www.ericsson.com/490812/assets/ local/investors/documents/financial-reports-and-filings/interim-reports-archive/2020/12month20-en.pdf/; accessed 6 Febru- ary 2021). 14. PR Newswire., (2020), “Nokia fails to secure 5G contracts in China due to technical issues,” May 10, 2020, (https://www. bloomberg.com/press-releases/2020-05-10/nokia-fails-to-secure-5g-contracts-in-china-due-to-technical-issues/; accessed 20 January 2021). 15. Strandberg, Hans., and Turesson, Roger, (2020), “Jacob Wallenberg: ‘Att stoppa Huawei är absolut inte bra’,” Dagens Nyheter,

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December 28, 2020, (https://www.dn.se/ekonomi/jacob-wallenberg-att-stoppa-huawei-ar-absolut-inte-bra/; accessed 20 Janu- ary 2021). 16. Förvaltningsrätten i Stockholm, (2020), “Förvaltningsrätten inhiberar villkor om Huawei Mål: 24231-20,” November 9, 2020, (https://www.domstol.se/nyheter/2020/11/forvaltningsratten-inhiberar-villkor-om-huawei/; accessed 20 January 2021). 17. Kammarrätten i Stockholm RK 2020:2, (2020), “Mål 7432-20,” December 16, 2020, (https://www.domstol.se/globalassets/ episerver-forms/domstol/migrationsoverdomstolen/7432-20.pdf; accessed 20 January 2021); Strandberg, Hans, (2020), “Ja- cob Wallenberg: ‘Rätten går på PTS linje i Huaweibråk’,” Dagens Nyheter, December 16, 2020, (https://www.dn.se/ekonomi/ ratten-gar-pa-pts-linje-i-huaweibrak/; accessed 20 January 2021). 18. Svenska Dagbladet, (2021), “Huawei överväger stämma Sverige,” January 5, 2021, (https://www.svd.se/huawei-overvager- stamma-sverige/; accessed 20 January 2021). 19. The Swedish Post and Telecom Authority, (2021), “Auktionerna i 3,5 GHz- och 2,3 GHz-banden är avslutade,” January 19, 2021, (https://www.pts.se/sv/nyheter/pressmeddelanden/2021/auktionerna-i-35-ghz--och-23-ghz-banden-ar-avslutade/; ac- cessed 20 January 2021). 20. Strandberg, Hans, (2021), “Ygeman om 5G-auktionen: ‘Går inte att vänta på att alla rättsprocesser är klara’,” Dagens Nyheter, January 19, 2020, (https://www.dn.se/ekonomi/ygeman-om-5g-auktionen-gar-inte-att-vanta-pa-att-alla-rattsprocesser-ar- klara/; accessed 20 January 2021). 21. Lau, Stuart, (2021), “Sweden faces Chinese blowback over Huawei ban,” Politico, January 21, 2021, (https://www.politico. eu/article/sweden-faces-chinese-blowback-over-huawei-ban/; accessed 20 January 2021). 22. Dagens Nyheter, (2021), “Huaweis protest mot 5g-förbud avslås,” February 9, 2021, (https://www.dn.se/ekonomi/huaweis- protest-mot-5g-forbud-avslas/; accessed 10 February 2021). 23. Syed, Abdul. R., (2020), “Wolf warriors: A brand new force of Chinese diplomats,” Modern Diplomacy, July 14, 2020, (htt- ps://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/07/14/wolf-warriors-a-brand-new-force-of-chinese-diplomats/; accessed 20 January 2021). 24. Olson, Jojje., (2019), “China Tries to Put Sweden on Ice,” The Diplomat, December 30, 2019, (https://thediplomat. com/2019/12/china-tries-to-put-sweden-on-ice/; accessed 20 January 2021). 25. Jerdén, Björn., and Rühlig, Tim, (2020), “Misstron mot Kina i Sverige ökar och är störst i Europa,” November 24, 2020, (https://www.dn.se/debatt/misstron-mot-kina-i-sverige-okar-och-ar-storst-i-europa/; accessed 20 January 2021). 26. Flinley, Klint, (2019), “Huawei Still Has Friends in Europe, Despite US Warnings,” Wired, April 25, 2019, (https://www. wired.com/story/huawei-friends-europe-despite-us-warnings/; accessed 20 January 2021). Stubbs, Jack., Chee, Foo Yun, (2019), “Britain managing Huawei risks, has no evidence of spying: official,” Reuters, February 20, 2019, (https://www.reu- ters.com/article/us-huawei-europe-britain-idUSKCN1Q91PM/; accessed 20 January 2021). 27. Armasu, Lucian, (2018), “Backdoors Keep Appearing In Cisco’s Routers,” July 19, 2018, (https://www.tomshardware.com/ news/cisco-backdoor-hardcoded-accounts-software,37480.html; accessed 20 January 2021). 28. Cerulus, Laurens., (2020), “How US restrictions drove and Huawei closer together,” Politico, July 6, 2020, (https://www.politico.eu/article/deutsche-telekom-huawei-us-security-measures//; accessed 20 January 2021). 29. Bennhold, Katrin., and Ewing, Jack, (2020), “In Huawei Battle, China Threatens Germany ‘Where It Hurts’: Automakers,” January 16, 2020, (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/16/world/europe/huawei-germany-china-5g-automakers.html; ac- cessed 20 January 2021). 30. Kruse, Simon., and Carl, Oscar Scott, (2019), “En træfning i en skyggekrig er kommet til syne på Færøerne: Hvad havde den kinesiske topdiplomat med i tasken?,” Berlingske, December 8, 2019, (https://www.berlingske.dk/internationalt/en-traefning- i-en-skyggekrig-er-kommet-til-syne-paa-faeroeerne-hvad; accessed 20 January 2021); Kruse, Simon., and Winther, Leon, (2019), “Banned recording reveals China ambassador threatened Faroese leader at secret meeting,” Berlingske, December 10,

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2019, (https://www.berlingske.dk/internationalt/banned-recording-reveals-china-ambassador-threatened-faroese-leader; ac- cessed 20 January 2021). 31. O’Dwyer, Gerard, (2020), “Norway leaves door open to Huawei,” Computer Weekly, September 30, 2020, (https://www. computerweekly.com/news/252489795/Norway-leaves-door-open-to-Huawei; accessed 20 January 2021). 32. Kauranen, Anne., and Mukherjee, Supantha, (2020), “UPDATE 1-Finland approves law to ban telecoms gear on security grounds,” Reuters, December 7, 2020, (https://www.reuters.com/article/finland-5g/update-1-finland-approves-law-to-ban- telecoms-gear-on-security-grounds-idINL1N2IN1O4; accessed 20 January 2021). 33. Rühlig, Tim, (2020), “Who Controls Huawei? Implications for Europe,” May 2020, p.19f, UI Paper No. 5, (https://www. ui.se/english/publications/ui-publications/2020/who-controls-huawei-implications-for-europe/; accessed 20 January 2021). 34. Ibid. p.6. 35. World Justice Project, (2020), “WJP Rule of Law Index 2019,” IBSN (online version): 978-0-9964094-1-4, (https://world- justiceproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2019; accessed 20 January 2021). 36. Simon, Frédéric., (2021), “Borrell justifies his ‘controversial’ visit to Moscow,” Euractiv, February 2, 2021, (https://www. euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/borrell-justifies-his-controversial-visit-to-moscow/; accessed 5 February 2021). 37. Musil, Steven, (2019), “CIA reportedly says Huawei funded by Chinese state security,” CNET, April 21, 2019, (https://www. cnet.com/news/cia-reportedly-says-huawei-funded-by-chinese-state-security/; accessed 20 January 2021). 38. Rühlig, Tim, (2020), “Who Controls Huawei? Implications for Europe,” May 2020, UI Paper No. 5, p.15f, (https://www. ui.se/english/publications/ui-publications/2020/who-controls-huawei-implications-for-europe/; accessed 20 January 2021). 39. Greene, Jay., and Tibken, Shara, (2012), ” Lawmakers to U.S. companies: Don’t buy Huawei, ZTE,” CNET, October 8, 2012, (https://www.cnet.com/news/lawmakers-to-u-s-companies-dont-buy-huawei-/; accessed 20 January 2021). 40. Girard, Bonnie, (2019), “The Real Danger of China’s National Intelligence Law,” The Diplomat, February 23, 2019, (https:// thediplomat.com/2019/02/the-real-danger-of-chinas-national-intelligence-law/; accessed 20 January 2021). 41. Barr, William, (2020), “Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers the Keynote Address at the Department of Justice’s China Initiative Conference,” The United States Department of Justice, February 6, 2020, (https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attor- ney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-keynote-address-department-justices-china; accessed 20 January 2021). 42. Moore, Mark., (2020), “Pentagon releases list of 20 companies linked to Chinese military,” June 25, 2020, (https://nypost. com/2020/06/25/pentagon-releases-list-of-companies-linked-to-chinese-military/; accessed 20 January 2021). 43. https://www.delloro.com/key-takeaways-telecommunication-equipment-market-1q20-to-3q20/ 44. Greene, Jay., and Tibken, Shara, (2020), “Really? Is the White House Proposing to Buy Ericsson or Nokia” The New York Times, February 7, 2020, (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/business/dealbook/bill-barr-huawei-nokia-ericsson.html; accessed 20 January 2021). 45. Williams-Grut, Oscar, (2020), “US warns UK over ‘momentous’ Huawei decision,” Yahoo! Finance UK, January 27, 2020, (https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/mike-pompeo-huawei-uk-decision-5g-093200945.html; accessed 20 January 2021). 46. Prague 5G Security Conference, (2019), “The Prague Proposals: The Chairman Statement on cyber security of communica- tion networks in a globally digitalized world,” May 3, 2019, (https://www.vlada.cz/assets/media-centrum/aktualne/PRG_pro- posals_SP_1.pdf; accessed 20 January 2021). 47. Cerulus, Laurens., (2020), ” US adds Slovenia to its anti-Huawei coalition of the willing,” Politico, August 13, 2020, (https:// www.politico.eu/article/us-adds-slovenia-to-its-anti-huawei-friendship-group/; accessed 20 January 2021). 48. Cerulus, Laurens., (2021), “France: New plant won’t change Huawei 5G phase-out,” Politico, January 28, 2021, (https:// www.politico.eu/article/huawei-5g-france-new-plant-wont-change-phase-out/; accessed 20 January 2021). 49. Fröberg, Jonas., and Larsson, Linus, (2021), ” Så pekade Sverige ut Huawei som en spionorganisation,” Dagens Nyheter, Janu-

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ary 19, 2021, (https://www.dn.se/ekonomi/sa-pekade-sverige-ut-huawei-som-en-spionorganisation/; accessed 20 January 2021). 50. Collins, Katie, (2020), ”Huawei and China-US tensions: Where do we go from here?,” CNET, July 21, 2020, (https:// www.cnet.com/news/huawei-and-china-us-tensions-where-do-we-go-from-here/; accessed 20 January 2021). 51. Salama, Vivian, (2020), ”US won’t change intelligence sharing policy with UK despite Huawei decision,” CNN, Febru- ary 14, 2020, (https://edition.cnn.com/2020/02/14/politics/us-uk-intelligence-sharing/index.html; accessed 20 January 2021). 52. Porter, Jon, (2020), “UK bans Huawei from 5G networks, with total removal by 2027,” The Verge, July 14, 2020, (https://www.theverge.com/2020/7/14/21322880/uk-bans-huawei-5g-network-infrastructure-trump-administration- pressure; accessed 20 January 2021). 53. Reuters Staff, (2021), “White House vows to protect U.S. telecoms network from Huawei security threat,” Reuters, Janu- ary 27, 2021, (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-huawei-security-idUSKBN29W2HV; accessed 10 February 2021). 54. Cerulus, Laurens., (2020), “How Biden could galvanize the world against Huawei,” December 2, 2020, (https://www. politico.eu/article/how-joe-biden-could-galvanize-the-world-against-huawei/; accessed 20 January 2021). 55. Bandurski, David., (2018), ”China’s new diplomacy in Europe has a name: broken porcelain,” The Guardian, October 17, 2018, (https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/17/china-new-diplomacy-broken-porcelain-sweden; accessed 20 January 2021). 56. Sagan, Scott. D., (2000), “The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring, 2000), pp. 85-115.

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