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PRESIDENT REAGAN's CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM Defense Monitor in Brief President Reagan Has Proposed a $4.2 Billion, Seven Year Civil Defense Program to Support U.S

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PRESIDENT REAGAN's CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM Defense Monitor in Brief President Reagan Has Proposed a $4.2 Billion, Seven Year Civil Defense Program to Support U.S r- The Center far Mene hlornatiOn Supportea Strong defense but opposes exces- sive expenditures or forces. It believes mat strong social- economic ansi potftical sttudures contribute equally to nations security and are essential to fte strength -and wetiare of our country. - B @ 1982 C DEFENSE INFORMATION-WASHINGTON -'0 Vol. XI, Number 5 1982 PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM Defense Monitor in Brief President Reagan has proposed a $4.2 Billion, seven year civil defense program to support U.S. plans to fight, survive and win a nuclear war. Ultimate costs of the program could be over $10 Billion. The Reagan Administration's civil defense program is intended to demonstrate that the U.S. is prepared to fight and survive nuclear war. Civil defense is assumed to be a necessary complement to U.S. nuclear warfighting forces. An extensive civil defense program attempts to make nuclear war plans credible to the Soviets and acceptable to Americans. The program is designed to relocate two-thirds of the population, construct blast shelters for essential workers, and protect a significant portion of industrial machinery. A major effort is underway to protect thousands of senior government officials and i 1 provide for the continuity of normal government functions in the event of nuclear war. Today with U.S.-Soviet relations blast shelters has been consistently destruction of both societies and that at their worst point in twenty years, rejected as too costly. A number of each government holds the other so- the Reagan Administration has pro- fallout shelter programs have been ciety hostage. posed a massive, multi-Billion dollar proposed but have never been sus- Key figures of the present Admin- civil defense program. This program tained. Almost all previous Adminis- istration find the situation of mutual represents a dramatic change from tration budget requests have been vulnerability intolerable and con- past civil defense efforts in scope and cut, sometimes over ninety per cent. sider it immoral. Richard Pipes, a top purpose. member of the National Security In principle, civil defense is a Reagan's Rationale Council staff, has recently said that worthy goal. Protecting life and a na- Reagan's civil defense proposal is a the Administration no longer accepts tion's resource are the highest re- natural complement to the nuclear the concept of mutual assured de- sponsibilities ofgovernment. But the warfighting strategy of the United struction. All agree that living under reality of the nuclear age is that, in States. A recent defense document practice, civil defense measures can approved by Secretary of Defense be easily overcome by the vast num- Weinberger states that, "The United Definition bers and destructive power of nuclear States nuclear capabilities must pre- vail evenunder the condition of a pro- "All those activities and measures weapons. Further, civil defense pm- designed or undertaken to: a. grams do not exist apart from each longed war." The Reagan Admin- minimize the efTects upon the civil- side's perceptions of the other. Prepa- istration appears convinced that ian population caused or which rations to survive a nuclear war in nuclearwars can be fought and "won" would be caused by an enemy attack the United States and the Soviet and is making detailed preparations upon the United States: b. deal with the immediate emergency conditions Union will stimulate fears that in- in the hope that the leadership, eco- which would be created by any such crease the likelihood of nuclear war. nomic infrastructure and some por- attack: and c. effectuate emergencv Since 1950 the U.S. has went $2.6 tion of the population can survive. repairs to. or the emergency restora- Billion on civil defense. In general, Reagan's proposed civil defense pro- tion of'. vital utilities and facilities past programs have been met with gram reflects the Administration's destroyed by any such attack." public apathy and Congressional rejection of the possibility that a nu- Department of Defense skepticism. A system of nationwide clear warcould result in the mutual I PAGE2 CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION The Reagan Civil Defense Program The .5 major parts of the Adminiatration's Severe weather conditions will hamper Problems: civil detente program are: shelter construction. rn Warning time may be ind~cientto im- Food. water and sanitation equipment pkement plans. 1. CRISIS RELOCATION must be available in the shelters for Many industries, such as chemical and tn the event of rising tensions or indica- many days or weeks. nuclear power plants, cannot be shut tiotkr of a Soviet evacuation, relocate 150 BLAST SHELTERS down or dismantled. million Americana from 400 probable Ul. Even if machines survive. resources target cireu to the countryside. Provide shelters for 4 million "aasential" nded for production, such as energy Roblema: workers at their workplaces to protect and raw materials, may be scarce or Evacuation requires at least a week- against the direct effects of nuclear nonexistent. occur weapons (blaat, heat, initial radiation). - The nuclear attack must not too Targeted areas may not be safe to work early or too late. From the countryside, workers would in for months or years  device mu+tnottarget relocation areas. commute bo keep key industries operating. .Adequate food and supplies must reach Problem*: relocation areas. Program will cost many Billions of dol- V. CONTINUITYOF Peopie muit cooperate and not panic. Lars. GOVERNMENT  Particular categories of people such as Workers may refuse to participate. Provide thousands of government officials prisoners, the old and the sick pose spe- m Four million workers may not be snffi- with facilities and duplicate records to cial ditTicultiefl. cient to carry on economic production. carry out essential functions in order to - Even hardened shelters are vulnerable insure thesurvival 0ftheU.S. government. I[. FALLOUT PROTECTION to attack.. Protect presidential successors in the event Provide the entire population with pmec- the President is killed in an attack. tion from radioactive fallout. Construct [V. INDUSTRIAL Problems:~ tens of million;?ofshelters before orduring PROTECTION~ ~ Plan* (iriicriilrate on F,xix:utiv*t hmnch a nuclear attack. Dcvclnp plans 1.0 protect industry from nu- bureaucrats and functions; only a few Problems: clear attack. During a crisis, essential Lcgialative and Judicial branch otliciali .Availablecfinscmction materials maybe workers wwld djsmantle. disperse and inadequate, bury machinery or. phase*. Aftvran atlack, Even hardenG fanlr.ii^ are vulnerable Competency in building effective shel- workers would emerge from shelter, re- todirect-almck and'Jielocationsarepre- ters may be lacking. cover machmp-y mil re^l/trt pnxl~ction. suinnlily known tarheSoviets. the shadow of nuclear holocaust has comes, they will be told how to sur- Reagan's plans change this concept caused fear and anxiety. But rather vive it. Sold to the American people significantly. than go to the source of the problem, as something prudent, responsible this Administration is trying to rem- and humanitarian, the Reagan Ad- The Reagan Plan edy what it regards as a loss of will ministration's civil defense plans are A civil defense policy change was and resolve. Eugene Rostow, the in fact an effort to mobilize the aoci- formally announced in March 1982 rector of the Arms Control and Dis- ety and make nuclear troops out of through the release of President armament Agency, has said, "The the citizenry. Civil defense is now Reagan's National Security Decision magnitude and momentum of the considered a weapon and an integral Directive (NSDD)-26. This policy Soviet arms buildup has wearied part of U.S. nuclear strategy. change received little attention but people to the point of accommodation, goes far beyond PD-41 by expanding isolationism and capitulation. Presidential Directive-41 substantially the scope and impor- It's this fear of nuclear war, this fear The Carter Administration, re- tance of the U.S. civil defense pro- we can't restore a second strike capa- sponding to claim of a civil defense gram. bility, that makes men want to pur- "gap", laid the framework for the en- NSDD-26 represents a commit- sue the absolutely defeatist, suicidal hanced civil defense program. Presi- ment to a national policy of nuclear policies of disengagement and dent Carter authorized new civil war survival. It takes U.S. nuclear isolationism." defense policy in the form of Presi- warfighting plans a significant step According to this notion, it is de- dential Directive (PD)-41 in 1978 further by declaring that civil de- sirable to lessen the American (recently declassified) and reorga- feme now "complements" U.S. re- people's horror of nuclear war by pre- nized the U.S. civil defense bureau- liance on strategic nuclear forces. paring them to survive it. With a cracy through the establishment of Unlike PD-41, the Directive calls for fearless population and a massive the Federal Emergency Manage- the "survival of a substantial portion nuclear weapons buildup, we can ment Agency (FEMA) in 1979. Con- ofthe Americanpeople in theevent of once again intimidate the Soviets gress subsequently endorsed PD-41. a nuclear attack." and maneuver for geopolitical ad- inanamendment to the Federal Civil The decision was made to fund a vantage. Civil defense is envisioned Defense Act of 1950. PD-41 stated major, multi-year civil defense pro- as a major element in this effort. that an improved civil defense pro- gram in spite of reservations ex- Each citizen will be made a nuclear gram would not change the U.S. pol- pressed by the Chairman of the Joint soldier. rather than a nuclear hos- icy of relying on strategic nuclear Chiefs of Staff and the Office of Man- tage. They will not be frightened of forces as the major factor in main- agement and Budget because the nuclear war because, when the time taining deterrence.
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