Introduction: the Paradoxes of an Enduring Monarchy 1

Notes

Introduction: The Paradoxes of an Enduring Monarchy 1. The episode is reported in Anthony Parsons, They Say the Lion: Britain’s Legacy to the Arabs, A Personal Memoir (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), p. 43. Parson’s Jordanian friend sounds very much like Wasfi al-Tall, a prime minister who cast a long shadow over Jordanian politics from 1959–1971 and looms large in the penul- timate chapter of this book. Insofar as this is a work of historical revision (as I hope will become clearer in chapter 2), it is apt that al-Tall should appear in its first paragraph, for his career is itself the subject of an ongoing revisal that chimes with the approach adopted here. The conclusion of his Israeli biographer, Asher Susser, in On Both Banks of Jordan: A Political Biography of Wasfi Al- Tall (London: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 172, that al-Tall was “the exem- plary representative of the Jordanian Entity and the Trans-Jordanian political elite” has been challenged by the evidence of a number of his contemporaries. Leading members of the left leaning Jordanian National Movement (JNM), including Hamad al-Farhan, Munif al- Razzaz, Jamal al-Sha‘ir and Ya‘qub Zayyadin have portrayed al-Tall as a politician who shared the JNM’s basic aims and social agenda, but differed on Jordan’s stance towards Nasser and its relationship with Hashemite Iraq. A younger generation of leftists has anointed al-Tall as the “canonical” figure of an oppositionist Trans-Jordanian nationalism, as well as the architect of a “Nasserist assabiyah state” geared to dirigiste development policies and socio-political strategies biased towards Jordan’s rural masses, c.f. Nahidh Hattar, “Surat al- Urdunn fi al-Wijdan al-Sha‘bi: Ashbah Wasfi al-Tall,” in his Yasari Urduni ‘ala Jabhatayn (Beirut: Dar al-Farabi, 2009), pp. 134–138. (The idea that al-Tall attempted reforms that amounted to a local ana- logue of Nasserist populism was first mooted by Muwaffaq Mahadin in a talk at the Fuhays Festival in 1997). Zayyadin, for decades “the celebrated head of the underground Jordanian Communist Party”, is among those who now defend al-Tall’s role in the 1970–1971 internal war with the Palestinian guerrillas, arguing that it was the PLO that “destroyed the relationship between Palestinians and Jordanians,” 140 Notes

Joseph Massad, Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp. 268–269. Whatever the truth of the latter claim, it is certainly the case that the testimony of many of those involved in the conflict, including such figures as Ibrahim Bakr, Khalid al-Hasan, and Munib al-Masri, throws considerable doubt on the idea that al-Tall “co-engineered Black September” (Massad, Colonial Effects, p. 245) in order to eliminate the PLO from Jordan. For revisionist views of al-Tall’s relationship to the Palestine question, and his role in the September 1970 conflict and its aftermath, see the following: Paul Lalor, “Who Killed Wasfi al-Tall?” Unpublished manuscript, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, summer 1988, pp. 8–10; Alan Hart, ‘Arafat: Terrorist or Peace Maker (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1984), pp. 339–346; and Adnan Abu Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1999), pp. 188–189. Usama Hasan ‘Ayish- Salih, “Wasfi al-Tall: I’adat Qira’ah,” M.A. Dissertation, University of Jordan, 1998, is now the most comprehensive study of al-Tall’s politics, and of his first and last terms in office in particular. 2. Parsons, They Say the Lion, pp. 42–47. 3. For another example of British pessimism about Hashemite Jordan by one of Parson’s contemporaries, see James Morris, The Hashemite Kings (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), p. 13. U.S. equivalents include Charles D. Cremeans, The Arabs and the World (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1963), pp. 102–103; Emil Lengyel, The Changing Middle East (New York: John Day, 1960), p. 216. 4. Elizabeth Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East 1914–1956 (London: Methuen, 1963), pp. 189–190, 207–209. 5. Parsons, They Say the Lion,p.34. 6. Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arabic Radicalism, Jordan 1955–1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 7. The term is taken from Lawrence Axelrod, “Tribesmen in Uniform. The Demise of the Fedayeen in Jordan,” The Muslim World,Vol.68 (January, 1978), pp. 25–45. By the time Axerod’s article appeared, the idea that Hussein’s Sharifian origins guaranteed the unquestioning loyalty of a “Bedouin” or “tribal” army had for long been a staple of the “conventional wisdom” fed to diplomats, journalists and aid workers posted to Amman. See for example Richard Nyrop, Handbook of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Washington D.C.: The American University, 1974), p. 145. Kamal Salibi supplies a lucid overview of the dynastic history on which such claims are based in The Modern History of Jordan (London: Tauris, 1993), pp. 50–65. A copy of the Hashemites’ official family tree is reproduced in Ahmad Salamah, al- Hashimiyyun wa Falsafat al-Hukm (Amman: Markaz al-Faris, 1990). Notes 141

8. The best account of this struggle remains Malcolm Kerr’s The Arab Cold War. Gamal Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals 1958–1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). 9. See Asher Susser, Jordan. Case Study of a Pivotal State, Policy Paper No. 53 (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for New East Policy, 2000), pp. 1–2. 10. The focus on the person of Hussein has been fed by a shelf-full of royal biographies and autobiographies. Together with the memoirs of “king’s men” such as Hazza‘ al-Majali’s Mudhakkarati (Amman: no publisher, 1960), their contents, and those of Hussein’s own Uneasy Lies the Head (London: Heineman, 1962); and Mihnati ka-malik (Jordan: al-Sharikah al-‘Arabiyya li al-Tiba‘a wa al-Nashr, 1978), are recycled in academic form in such places as Majid Khadduri’s chapter on the “Hashemi House” in his Arab Personal- ities in Politics (Washington D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1981), pp. 73–121. The most widely cited of the biographies of Hussein published in the West are Peter Snow, Hussein (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1972); James Lunt, Hussein of Jordan. A Political Biography (London: Macmillan, 1989); and more recently Roland Dallas, King Hussein:A Life on the Edge (London: Proﬁle Books, 1998). Mention must also be made of the recent work by the well-connected journal- ist Randa Habib, Hussein and ‘Abdullah. Inside the Jordanian Royal Family (London: al-Saqi Books, 2010). All these works are now likely to be superseded in academic circles by Nigel Ashton, King Hussein a Political Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), which is based on access to the king’s personal ﬁles as well as exhaustive archival research; and Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace (London: Penguin Books, 2007), which draws on the testimony of palace insiders to provide what is now the most complete account of Hussein’s covert relationship with the Jewish state. For a more measured discussion of the relationship between Hussein’s personal qualities and the survival of his regime, see Uriel Dann, King Hussein’s Strategy of Survival, Policy Paper No. 29 (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East, 1992); and Nahidh Hattar’s al-Malik Husayn bi-Qalam Yasari Urduni (Amman: Azminah lil- Nashr wa al-Tawzi’, 2003). Hattar’s brief work is the only one of these accounts that gives any attention to the societal context of Hussein’s career. It draws on articles written for the Lebanese press in response to the king’s death, and to Muhammad Hasanayn Heykal’s dismis- sive attitude to Jordan and Jordanian society in his own obituary of the Jordanian monarch, “Shakhsiyyat al-Mailik Husayn. Dururat al-Fihm Qabl al-Hukm wa lakinn ila Mata?” Wijhat Nathar (April 1999), pp. 4–15. 11. The quotations are taken from Dann’s King Hussein and the Chal- lenge of Arab Radicalism, pp. 164, 166. However, Dann’s own work marks an important exception to this neglect, as does that of Asher 142 Notes

Susser (notably in chapters 1–2 of his Jordan, op. cit); Lawrence Tal (in his Politics, the Military and National Security in Jordan, 1954– 1967, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); and Bassel F. Salloukh (in his “State Strength, Permeability and Foreign Policy Behavior: Jordan in Theoretical Perspective,” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 39–65). 12. As Eugene Rogan points out, “[t]he social history of Transjordan, the histories and politics of Bedouin, cultivators and townspeople, are only now being written.” Cf. Eugene Rogan and Tariq Tell editors, Village, Steppe and State. The Social Origins of Modern Jordan (London: Tauris, 1994), p. xix. 13. Malcolm Yapp, The Near East Since the First World War (London: Longman, 1991), p. 291; Laurie Brand, “Al-Muhajirin wa-l Ansar: Hashemite Strategies for Managing Communal Identity in Jordan,” in Leonard Binder, editor, Ethnic Conflict and International Poli- tics in the Middle East (Gainesville: Florida University Press, 1999), pp. 282–283. 14. Rex Brynen, “Palestine and the Arab State System: Permeability, State Consolidation and the Intifada” Canadian Journal of Polit- ical Science, Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 615–619; Peter Gubser, Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events (Boul- der: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 15–18. It should be noted however, that despite their numbers, Palestinians in contemporary Jordan has remained remarkably quiescent. According to Joseph Massad, “Producing the Palestinian Other: Jordan and the Palestinians,” in Roger Heacock editor, Terres et Espaces en Palestine: Flux et Resis- tances des Identitaires (Beirut: Institut Francais de Proche Orient, 2008), p. 289, “as Palestinians, they have not staged any revolts against Jordan, not even during the 1970 Civil War or its aftermath. Virtually all the internal military threats to the regime came from Transjordanian elements within the military. The more recent popular uprisings [after 1989] took place in southern almost exclu- sively Transjordanian cities with no Palestinian Jordanian participation whatsoever.” 15. Aaron David Miller, “Jordan and the Arab Israeli Conflict: The Hashemite Predicament,” Orbis (Winter 1986), p. 796. 16. Malik Mufti, Sovereign Creations. Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 21. 17. Hussein’s Israeli admirers have turned even the debacle in 1967 into evidence of the king’s Machiavellian determination to stay in power, in effect accepting Hussein’s own contention that the West Bank was sacrificed in order to preserve the rest of the Kingdom. This argument was made most clearly by the King in a short letter in al-Ra’i newspaper on the thirty second anniversary of the June war in 1989–the text is reproduced in Salamah, al-Hashimiyyun was Falsafat al-Hukm, Notes 143

pp. 153–155. It is taken to an almost absurd extreme by Alexander Bligh, who maintains that “Hussein and the Hashemite Kingdom were the true victors of the [1967] armed conflict,” The Political Legacy of King Hussein (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2002), pp. 48–64. In his view, Hussein’s maneuvers in late May and early June 1967 aimed to goad “Israel into assailing the West Bank” in order to “rid [Jordan] of the disloyal Palestinian population of the West Bank and ...lead his arch enemy, Nasser of Egypt into a strategic trap.” Bligh and his ilk are only able to sustain his viewpoint by neglecting the obvious connection between defeat in June 1967 and internal war three years later in September 1970. Furthermore, they assume that the military (and indeed the other structures of the regime) remained unaffected by the experience of defeat. This is of course highly unlikely, not least because the June war led to Jordan’s loss of Jerusalem with all its religious and symbolic importance, and drove more “disloyal” Palestinian refugees across the Jordan River. 18. Although small, it is nonetheless a subfield that has flourished in recent years. Two books by “Jordanists,” Eugene Rogan’s Fron- tiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan 1851– 1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Shryock’s Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination, have won the Mid- dle Eastern Studies Association’s prestigious Hourani Prize. Lisa Anderson’s examination of the relationship between Middle Eastern studies and (American) political science cites Marc Lynch’s State Interests and Public Spheres. The International Politics of Jordan’s Iden- tity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), and Massad’s Colonial Effects, as having drawn on dissertations “that exhibit both exceptional area expertise and substantial theoretical ambition.” See her “Politics in the Middle East. Opportunities and Limits in the Quest for Theory” in Mark Tessler editor, Area Studies and Social Sci- ence: Strategies for Understanding Middle East Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 9. 19. While a new generation of social historians (whose work is discussed more fully in Chapter 1) has led the way here, important contributions have also been made by scholars working on the making of Jordanian identity and anthropologists interested in the persistence of tribalism on the East Bank. Notable works include Massad’s Colonial Effects; Andrew Shryock’s Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagina- tion and Linda L. Layne, Home and Homeland: The Dialogics of Tribal and National Identities in Jordan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). At the same time, political scientists have made innova- tive studies of the political economy underpinning Jordan’s security policies, and have begun to analyze the institutions that cemented the “survival strategies” undertaken by Hussein at different conjunc- tures of his reign. For an example of the former, see Laurie A. Brand, 144 Notes

Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations: the Political Economy of Alliance Mak- ing (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); for the latter, cf. Russell E. Lucas, Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan: Domestic Responses to External Challenges, 1988–2001 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005). 20. In particular, “traditional” Third World monarchies would be unable to surmount the “king’s dilemma” posed by the demands of modernization in the middle of rapid social change, c.f. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 177. For an application of the concept of the Kings’ Dilemma to the Middle East, see Michael Hudson, Arab Politics. The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 166–168. Robert Satloff deploys the notion in his Troubles on the East Bank: Challenges to the Domestic Stability of Jordan (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1986) to illustrate the difficulty of keeping Jordan’s Islamists aligned with the regime in the 1980s. Muhanna Bani Hasan, al-Tahdith wa al-Istiqrar al-Siyasi fi al-Urdunn (Amman: al-Dar al-’Arabiyya li al-Tiba’a wa al-Nashr, 1989) argues (as is discussed more fully later in the chapter) that Huntington’s dilemma was overcome thanks to a successful development policy and the monarchy’s close connection to the East Bank tribes. 21. For examples of the new literature on Middle Eastern kingships, see Joseph Kostiner editor, Middle Eastern Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity (Boulder, CO: Lynn Riener, 2000); Michael Herbst, All in the Family: Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999); F.Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Oil States, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Books 1994; Lisa Anderson, “Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in theMiddleEast”Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 1 (1991), pp. 1–15. The approach has influenced Malik Mufti’s discussion of the onset of of political reform in Jordan in 1989; see his “Elite Bar- gains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1 (1999), pp. 100–129. For an excellent review of this literature, see Russell E. Lucas, “Monarchical Author- itarianism: Survival and Political Liberalization in a Middle Eastern Regime Type,’ International Journal of Middle East Studies,Vol.36 (2004), pp. 103–119. 22. The former are loosely defined as the Bedouin and fallahin—to adopt the local terminology for the village-dwelling cultivators and spectrum of “nomadic” and “semi nomadic” pastoralists—who formed the vast majority of southeast Syria’s population in Ottoman times, and whose descendants staff the bureaucracy and dominate most ranks of the armed forces in contemporary Jordan. However, the Notes 145

line dividing the two groups, and the boundary between them and the settlers (aghrab or strangers in local idiom) who arrived after 1851, was never a hard and fast one although it loomed large in the imagination of the “nativist” nationalists who contested Manda- tory rule in the 1920s and 1930s. A key reason why the arguments of this book must as yet be viewed as “partial,” is that in focusing on these East Bankers (a result of my overriding concern with the social forces that underpinned the resilience of monarchy until 1971), it sets out a version of Jordanian history that by and large under- plays the role of the incoming Palestinians (and indeed Damascenes, Iraqis and Hijazi refugees) in the making of contemporary Jordan, and largely neglects the relationship between the regime and those of its subjects who were of Palestinian origin. Jamie Allinson’s recently completed doctorate goes a long way towards repairing this gap, albeit for a more limited historical period—c.f. his “The Social Origin of Alliances: Uneven and Combined Development and the Case of Jordan 1955–1957,” Ph.D. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2012. 23. Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (London: Macmillan, 1958), pp. 303–304, 307–309, 319–323; Naseer Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1972), p. 187; Schirin H. Fathi, Jordan—An Invented Nation? Tribe-State Dynamics and the For- mation of National Identity (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1994), pp. 113–124. 24. For the persistence of the notion of the mosaic, see Richard F. Nyrop, Area Handbook Series: Jordan: A Country Study (Washington D.C.: The American University, 1980), pp. 60–76. 25. According to this schematization of Max Weber, a traditional society was one in which social roles were not clearly defined (“role dif- fuseness” versus “role specificity”). It was marked by social ties that were “particularistic” in the sense of being based on links to particular persons—and most often kith and kin; by birth (“ascription”) rather than education or ability being the criteria for holding employment or office; and by emotion (“affectivity”) rather than objectivity (“neutrality”) governing interaction between its members. A modern society was defined in diametrically opposite terms, and social change—modernization—was conceptualized in terms of movement from one pole to the other. Cf. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (London: Tavistock), pp. 58–57. 26. Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development, pp. 74–75. 27. Peter Gubser, Politics and Change in Al-Karak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 130–135. 28. Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development, pp. 36–39, 73–74. 29. P. J. Vatikiots, Politics and the Military in Jordan. A Study of the Arab Legion 1921–57 (London: Frank Cass, 1967), pp. 47–49. 146 Notes

30. Talal Asad, “Two European Images of Non-European Rule,” p. 105, of his Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter (London: Ithaca Press, 1973). 31. Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development, p. 187. Aruri’s view was given textbook endorsement by Michael Hudson who argues that “[n]owhere are the dilemmas of Arab legitimacy more apparent than in Jordan .. [where] every positive legitimizing asset casts a shadow of negativism,” Arab Politics, p. 210. It is worth noting that despite this deficit of legitimacy, many of the Palestinians in Jordan have in practice accommodated to life under Hashemite rule after 1980. According to Massad, “East Bank Palestinian-Jordanians are content to be both Palestinian and Jordanian, wherein they realize that their Palestinian identity is thoroughly inflected by its development in the national context of Jordan.” These Jordanians of Palestinian origins “vehemently reject ...attempts to de-Palestinize [sic.] them by an exclusivist Jordanian nationalism,” while at the same time assimilat- ing to Trans-Jordanian norms by adopting the accents, cuisine and “tribal” methods of the East Bankers, and enthusiastically supporting Jordan’s national football team. C.f. his “Producing the Palestinian Other,” pp. 289–290. 32. Asad, “Two Images,” p. 106. 33. Hudson, Arab Politics, pp. 209, 218. 34. Ibid., p. 217. 35. Muhanna Bani Hasan, Al-Tahdith wa al- ‘Istiqrar al-siyasi fi al- ‘urdunn, pp. 180–195. 36. Hudson, Arab Politics, p. 215. 37. Hudson from a position broadly sympathetic to radical Pan-Arabism and the PLO, and Bani Hasan from one supportive of Jordanian nationalism and Hashemite rule. 38. This characterization appears the most accurate description for the period between 1930 and 1970, when the vast majority of the loyalist East Bankers that are the focus of this book were village dwelling cultivators. It seems more satisfactory than such prevalent formulations as “the East Bank tribes (also commonly referred to as Transjordanians or Bedouin),” Risa Brookes “Political-Military Rela- tions and the Stability of Arab Regimes” Adelphi Paper 324 (Oxford: Oxford University Press/IISS, 1998), p. 15. Bedouin identities and “tribal” (more usually clan based or asha’iriyya) loyalties persist until the present day on the East Bank, and play an important role in channeling state patronage and organizing patron client networks and social support groups. However the terms no longer correspond to a distinctive group with a nomadic lifestyle or livelihood, nor to unitary and corporate political units bound by blood ties (whether real or invented). The great majority of Jordanians who identified themselves as Bedouin had been settled in villages by the end of the 1950s Notes 147

(Chapter 2 will argue that they had in any case always mixed farming and herding). All of Jordan’s major tribal confederations had submitted to the authority of the central state by the early 1930s; by the end of the decade most of the communal property that formed the economic basis of these tribal groupings had been privatized (as is explained more fully in chapters 5–7). 39. Hudson, Arab Politics, p. 218. 40. Ibid., pp. 217–218; Hasan, Al-Tahdith wa al- ‘Istiqrar al-siyasi fi al- ‘urdunn, p. 194. 41. An important exception is Joseph Massad’s Colonial Effects. Massad addresses the ways in which the military was productive of a particular kind of Jordanian identity; by contrast, the present work is concerned with the more material aspects of its impact, as well as those of other aspects of state-formation/state-building such as land tenure reform or the transformation of the desert frontiers into fixed international borders. 42. The term is taken from Samuel Finer, The Man on Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 2. 43. Michael Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan (Leiden: Brill 2000), p. 5. 44. Haim Gerber, The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1987), pp. 154–160. 45. Hanna Batatu, The Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi Revolutions. Some Observations on their Underlying Causes and Social Character (Washington D.C.: The Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies Georgetown University, 1984), pp. 4–12. 46. This notion of peasantization is adapted from Lisa Anderson, The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830–1980 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 28–30, 278–279. Although the terms tribesman and peasant are used quite loosely in the following pages, the argument in practice adopts Anderson’s definition of peasants as those who accept the demands of a central state or its local representatives (however grudgingly), while tribesmen are those who escape or successfully reject these impositions, whether they take the form of taxation (and the processes of land registration or population enumeration that go with it), labor levies, or military conscription. 47. Following Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, p. 326, these groups are defined as “a small band of friends or members of [a] tribe, ethnic group, religious sect or home region” that “social actors retreat into or invent ...[to] protect themselves [or] promote their interests” by means of mutual support or shared obligations. In Trans-Jordan, security groups were assembled from kin ordered “solidarity networks” that emerged (as is explained more fully in chapter 2) from the “micro-politics of class struggle” 148 Notes

in the villages and nomadic encampments of south-east Syria, and through the “optimizing” strategies pursued by the Bedouin and fellahin as a means of coping with the uncertainties of the local environment. It should be stressed that the salience of these “sectional” or “segmentary” organizations does not imply the absence of class inequalities. Nor does it mean that Trans-Jordan did not develop a “ruling class” in the sense of an economically defined stratum that was able to monopolize wealth and social power within the boundaries set by the Hashemite state. Instead, it is argued that even in the presence of pronounced inequalities in the distribution of economic resources, “class struggle remained latent.” Subaltern groups were confined to localized arenas and were “organizationally outflanked” by a more cohesive, “extensively” organized ruling group. This asymmetry in organization ensured that “conflict was predominantly ‘horizontal’ rather than ‘vertical’-peasants [and in Trans-Jordan, pastoralists] were more likely to be mobilized by their local superiors in clan, tribal, patron-client, village and other organizations,” c.f. Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Volume I: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 24–25; The Sources of Social Power, Volume II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 6–7. 48. For a state-centric view of Jordan’s political sociology and political economy, see Laurie A. Brand, “In the Beginning was the State,” in Augustus Richard Norton, Civil Society in the Middle East (Leiden: Brill, 1995), pp. 64–83. The salience of the state as an employer, and the large percentage of GDP that came under its control, led one Jordanian leftist to term Jordan “the society of the state”—Walid Hamarneh, “Al-urdunn ...mujtama‘ al-dawla,” Al Urdunn al-Jadid, Vol. 2, No. 3/4 (Spring-Summer 1985), pp. 106–120. Wealth and scale (at least relative to the local economy) gave the Hasehmite state great economic power and patronage, allowing Jordan’s rulers to “cage. subordinate, latent classes inside [their] own power organization[s],” mann, sources of social power Vol I op. cit. entrenching the sectional, segmentary groups inherited from the agrarian past. 49. Ghassan Salameh editor, Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World (London: Tauris, 1994), p. 9. 50. Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (London: Faber and Faber 1991), p. 448; The argument is woven into a general expla- nation of the stability of Arab regimes ranging from Saddam’s Iraq; Syria under Hafez al-Asad to contemporary Saudi Arabia by Malise Ruthven in his “Afterword” (pp. 459–472) to the 2000 reprint of Hourani’s book. 51. Ghassan Salameh, “Strong and Weak States. A Qualified Return to the Muqaddimah,” in Giacomo Luciani editor, The Arab State (London: Notes 149

Routledge, 1990), p. 32. Salameh makes clear that the concept of iltiham has affinities with Gramsci’s concept of iltiham hegemony rather than the Weberian theory of legitimate domination. 52. Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 449. 53. The latter term is taken from Hanna Batatu, “Political Power and Social Structure in Syria and Iraq,” in Samih K. Farsoun editor, Arab Society (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 38, who defines it as the “broad elements in the country that have an economic stake in the regime.” 54. Mann contrasts the “infrastructural power” of the state, “the institutional power of a central state to penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions,” with its “despotic power,” its ability to act arbitrarily (often coercively) against its subjects without “routine negotiation with civil society groups.” While he identifies a broad linkage between the on-set of capitalist modernity and the growth of infrastructural power, Mann’s also argues that the nature of political power becomes more complex because of the growth and diversification of state institutions. The boundaries between state and society were blurred once the former ceased to be “a small private place and elite with its own rationality” (as it had been when a Janus faced instrument for war and tax extraction under feudal or absolutist rule). The state now transformed into a complex structure “con- tain[ing] multiple institutions and tentacles sprawling from the center through its territories, sometimes even through trans-national space,” and “Balkanized,” dissolving into a welter of “competing departments and factions,” even as the complex history of state formation (which in Mann’s account had important geopolitical as well as domestic aspects) precipitated different (at times rival) power networks in the diverse functional “crystallizations” that emerged during the transition to capitalist modernity. C.f. Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results,” in his States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1988), pp. 7, 9–11, 29; Sources of Social Power, Volume II, pp. 59–61. 55. Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 32. It should be stressed that it is only Migdal’s notion of social control that is being adopted here, not his positivist view of power or his unitary model of the state (one he has in any case long since abandoned). With the growth of state structures, Mann points out that it is no longer possible to speak of unitary ruling groups (or “state managers” in Migdal’s usage) imposing their preferences on society: “the power of the modern state principally concerns not state elites exercising power over society but a tightening state-society relation, caging social relations over the national rather 150 Notes

than the local-regional or the transnational terrain,” (Mann, Sources of Social Power, Volume II, pp. 59–61). Within a context marked by the penetration of a sprawling state structure by different power networks, the probability of state policies being bent to the interests of different groups, and even of their being subverted through “foul up,” is always present. This possibility is amplified because with the growth of its infrastructural power, the central state also imposed conceptual grids geared to its own purposes on ecologically diverse geographies, caging variegated, often recalcitrant, populations with uniform rules and regulations ill suited to local conditions. For the unintended, often destructive, consequences of this process of “state simplification,” see James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Conditions Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 56. For a review of the way such pacts intertwine with successful populist state-building in the radical Arab republics (and in Syria in particular), see Steve Heydemann, “Social Pacts and the Persistance of Authoritarianism in the Middle East,” in Oliver Schlumberger editor, Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 21–34; Authoritarianism in Syria. Institutions and Social Conflict 1946–1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 12–29. 57. A similar argument on a militarized “sociopolitical contract” has also been made in Ghassan Salameh, al-Mujtama‘ wa al-Dawlah fi al- Mashriq al-’Arabi (Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1999), p. 157. Focusing on the years after 1974, Anne Marie Baylouny, “Mil- itarizing Welfare: Neo-liberalism and Jordanian Policy,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Spring 2008), pp. 277–296, has suggested that military employment and its attendant social benefits provided the central plank of an East Bank-oriented “welfare regime” that underpinned Hashemite authoritarianism. 58. By focusing on endowment mapping as a complex, historically conditioned process that determines “how people come to have their initial endowments,” the discussion here attempts to fill the lacuna indentified by Robert Brenner in his discussion of Mann’s view of pre-capitalist society: the fact that “Mann leaves paradoxically under- theorized the issue of the economic reproduction of the economic agents that operate the autonomous [social power] organizations that for him constitute society, let alone the processes of economic appropriation via property rights, property differentials and class exploitation underpinned by force that figure so centrally in classical, and not just Marxist historical sociology.” By emphasizing how the acquisition of endowments is closely connected with the structure of social power within a society, and with the actions of the “political communities” that enforce the prevailing social property Notes 151

rights, the discussion also opens the way to a consideration of how the organizational and institutional changes that accompany modern state formation and the spread of capitalism transform “endowment mapping.” These large socio-historical developments change the rules of access to resources—the process of “enfranchisement” that determines “legitimate effective command” over endowments and therefore entitlements. C.f. Robert Brenner, “From Theory to His- tory: the European Dynamic or Feudalism to Capitalism?” in John A. Hall and Ralph Schroeder editors, An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 203; Melissa Leach, Robin Mearns and Ian Scoones, “Environmental Entitlements: A Framework for Understanding the Institutional Dynamics of Environmental Change,” IDS Discussion Paper, No. 359 (Institute of Development Studies: March, 1997), pp. 16–17; Arjun Appadurai, “How Moral Is South Asia’s Econ- omy?” Asian Studies, Vol. XLIII (May 1984), pp. 481–483; Rehman Sobhan, “The Politics of Hunger and Entitlement,” pp. 79–113 of Dreze and Sen, The Political Economy of Hunger (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) and Anthony Bebbington, “Capitals and Capabilities,” World Development, Vol. 27 (1999), pp. 2021–2044. 59. Vatikiots’ Politics and the Military in Jordan,p.6.

Chapter 1 1. Together with their reliance on the synchronic models of segmentary anthropology, the inﬂuence of modernization theory has ensured that even such ﬁne local studies as Peter Gubser’s Politics and Change in Al-Karak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973); or those based on Richard T. Antoun’s lifelong engagement with the village of Kufr al-Ma’ in al-Kura—Arab Village: A Social-Structural Study of a Transjordanian Peasant Community (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), Low-Key Politics: Local-level leadership and change in the Middle East (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979); Muslim Preacher in the Modern World: a Jordanian Case Study in Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 1989); and Documenting Transnational Migration: Jordanian Men Working and Studying in Europe, Asia and North America. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005) fail to address these issues. 2. The neglect of oppositionist tendencies among East Bankers seems particularly unfortunate in the light of the last two decades of Hashemite rule, when East Bankers emerged as the most obdurate opponents of the peace treaty signed with Israel at Wadi Arabah in 1994, and the East Bank heartlands of the south and northeast, including largely Trans-Jordanian towns like Ma‘an, al-Karak, and 152 Notes

al-Tafilah, have been the sites of the most important outbreaks of protest against governmental policy. 3. Eugene Royan and Taiq Tell editors, Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan, (London: Tauris, 1994), pp. xix, xxii. For a recent survey of the European travelogues, see Rauf Sa‘d Abujaber and Felicity Cobbing, Beyond the River: Ottoman Trans jordan in original photographs, (London: Stacey 2005), pp. 14–42. For the mandatory officials, see Frederick G. Peake, A History of Transjordan and Its Tribes (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1958); John Bagot Glubb, The Story of the Arab Legion (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948). As far as the rural and tribal grassroots of Trans-Jordanian society are concerned, these works are considerably more informative than the trilogy completed by Britain’s other long-serving pro-consul in Amman, Alec Kirkbride, see his ACrackle of Thorns (London: John Murray, 1956); An Awakening (London: University Press of Arabia, 1971), and From the Wings: Amman Mem- oirs 1947–1951 (London: Frank Cass, 1976). Significantly enough, the only comprehensive account of Trans-Jordan’s economy before 1948, Konikoff’s Transjordan: An Economic Survey (Jerusalem: Eco- nomic Research Institute of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1946), was published under Zionist auspices. 4. For overviews of the period see P. M. Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Cres- cent, 1516–1922: A Political Study (London: Wiedenfield, 1966); Jane Hathaway, The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule (London: Longman, 2008). Eugene Rogan provides a vivid description of the battle of Marj Dabiq in The Arabs: A History (New York: Basic Books, 2009), pp.13–18. 5. Munib Al-Madi and Sulayman Musa, Tarikh al-’urdunn fi al-qarnn al-‘ashriin, 1900–1959 (Amman: Maktabat Al-Muhtasib, 1959), pp. 6–7; ‘Ali Mahafza, Tarikh Al-Urdunn Al-Mu’asr: ‘Ahd Al-‘imara, 1921–1946 (Amman: Jordan University Press, 1973), pp. 7–8. That these authors’ Hashemite and Arabist prejudices are to blame for their lack of interest in the Ottoman background of modern Jordan, is clear from a comparison with the literature on the Mamluk period that has been produced by Youssef Ghawanmeh and his students: “The orientation of most of the monographs reflects a proud nationalism and strong sense of local identity ...opening with a geographical survey ...and following with chapters devoted to such topics as trade, class structure,” c.f. Bethany J. Walker, Jordan in the Late Middle Ages: Transformation of the Mamluk Frontier (Chicago: Middle East Documentation Center, 2011), pp.16–17. 6. Kamal Salibi, “Middle Eastern Parallels: Syria-Iraq-Arabia in Ottoman Times,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.15, (January 1979), p. 70. 7. The classic description of this process, Norman Lewis’s “The Frontier of Settlement in Syria 1800–1950,” International Affairs,Vol.31 Notes 153

(1955), pp. 48–60, marks an important exception to the general historical neglect of Ottoman Jordan. Although it discusses the Syrian interior as whole, it gives ample coverage to that part that would evolve into Trans-Jordan, and factors into the discussion the strategies and social practices of the inhabitants of the “transitional zone” between desert and sown in the Syria southeast. See also his Nomads and Settlers in Syria and Jordan 1800–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 8. Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), p. 28. While lucid and well argued, Salibi’s work lacks the scholarly depth or insight that marked his studies of Lebanese history; for a thorough critique see Sa‘ad Abu Diyyah, Safahat Mattwiyyah min Tarikh al-Urdunn, Hawadith and Mawadhi‘ Mutafarriqah min Tarikh al-Urdunn fi al-Qarn al-Madhi wa al-Hadhir (Amman: Dar al-Bashir, 1998), pp.332–447. 9. For a conventional Jordanian view of the revolt, see Sulayman al-Musa’s al-Husayn ibn ‘Ali wa al-thawra al-’arabiyyah al-kubra (Amman: Dar al-Furqan, 1989). See also Musa’s T. E. Lawrence. An Arab View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966). 10. Maan Abu Nowar, The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Oxford: Ithaca, 1989), p. 247. 11. Suleiman Musa, “The Rise of Arab Nationalism and the Emergence of Transjordan,” in William Haddad and William L. Ochsenwald editors, Nationalism in a Non-national State. The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), pp. 239–265. The quotations are from p. 251. Cf. also Musa’s Ta’sis al-‘imara al-‘urduniyya 1921–1925. Dirasa watha’iqiyya (Amman: al-Matba’a al-‘urduniyya, 1971); and the recent collection of Musa’s work on the subject published as Cameos. Jordan and Arab Nation- alism (Amman: Ministry of Culture, 1997). Musa’s wider history of the “Arab Movement,” al-Haraka al-’arabiyya. Sirat al-marhala al-‘ula lil nahda al-’arabiyya al-haditha (Beirut: Dar al Nahar, 1970) is also relevant here, as is the third volume of Amin Sa‘id’s trilogy on the Arab Revolt, al-Thawra al-‘arabiyya al kubra tarikh mufassal jami’ lil qadiyya al-‘arabiyya fil rub’ qarn: Volume Three: Imarat sharq al-urdunn wa qadhiyyat filistin wa suqut al-dawla al-hashimiyya wa thawrat al-sham, Cairo: Madbuli, no date. 12. See his al-Haraka al-’arabiyyah. pp. 635–667. 13. These arguments are spelt out in detail in Sulayman Musa’s Ta’sis al-‘imara al-‘urduniyya 1921–25. Significantly, its political message was considered important enough for the prime minister at the time of its first printing, Wasfi al-Tall, to pen a foreword to the first edition. 14. Notably that of al-Musa who is (in spite of having little more than a primary education) by some distance the most prolific writer on contemporary Jordanian history. See in particular his 154 Notes

magisterial two-volume survey of Jordan’s history in the twentieth century (the first co-authored with Munib Madi) Tarikh al-’urdunn fi al-qarn al-’ishrin, 1900–1959 (Amman: Maktabat al-Muhtasib, 1959); Tarikh al urdunn fi al-qarn il ‘ishrin 1958–1995, Volume II (Amman: Maktabat al-Muhtasib, 1995). For Musa’s own account of his life and work c.f. his Thamanun: Rihlat al-Ayyam wa al-A‘wam (Beirut: al-Mu’assasah al-‘Arabiyyah li al-Dirasat wa al-Nashir, 2002); Khutuwat ‘ala al-Tariq: Sirat Qalam, Tajribat Katib (Beirut: al- Mu’assasah al-‘Arabiyyah li al-Dirasat wa al-Nashir, 2003). 15. See Sulayman al-Musa, Imarat sharqiyy al-’urdunn: Nash’atuha wa tatawwuruha fi rub‘ qarn, 1921–1946 (Amman: Manshurat lajnat tarikh al-’urdunn, 1990); ‘Ali Mahafza, Tarikh al-urdunn al mu’assir: ‘ahd al-‘imara, 1921–1946 (Amman: Jordan University Press, 1973); ‘Ali Mahafza, Al-‘Ilaqat al’-urduniyya al baritaniyya min ta’sis al imara hatta ilgha’ al mu‘ahada (1921–1957) (Beirut: Dar al Nahar, 1972). Even on its own terms, Mahafaza’s book has now been largely superceded for the post 1948 period by Suhayla Sulayman al-Shalabi, Al-‘Ilaqat al-’urduniyya al baritaniyya (1951–1967) (Beirut: Markaz dirasat al-wihdah al-’arabiyyah, 2006). 16. In particular, examples of radical or oppositionist tendencies among the East Bankers, and the tensions that developed at times between the Amir and his people, are underplayed. This has occurred despite the existence of an oral tradition rich with stories of local recalcitrance and spirited defiance, and in spite of the fact that most Jordanians have viewed the Mandate years through the poetic lens of Mustafa Wahbi al-Tall (‘Arar). The latter’s poems (collected in various editions of al-Tall’s diwan ‘Ashiyyat wadi al-Yabis) are permeated by a hostility to authority and a disdain for the centers of power in Amman, and have ensured that al-Tall has for long been adopted as a symbol of proto-nationalist resistance by the Jordanian left (as for example in Ghalib Halasah’s seminal “Sha‘ir fi al-ma‘rakah” Majallat al-adab, no. 4, 1957, pp. 42–48). For what is still the best overview of al-Tall’s career, see al-Badawi al-Mulatham (Ya’qub al-’Awdat) ‘Arar Sha‘ir al-urdunn (Beirut: Dar al-Qalam, 1980). 17. Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 18. Elsewhere, she argues that “Abdullah used the rhetoric of Arab nationalism to legitimize his position within Transjordan and to jus- tify his ambitions beyond his borders. But he failed to distance himself sufficiently from Great Britain to give his rhetorical position reality,” (quoted from her “A Passage to Independence. King Abdullah and Transjordan 1921–1951,” in Edward Ingram editor, National and International Politics in the Middle East. Essays in Honour of Elie Kedourie (London: Frank Cass, 1986), p. 187). Wilson is also skeptical of the nationalist credentials of the Hashemites and the Arab Revolt as a whole—see Wilson’s “The Hashemites, the Arab Notes 155

Revolt and Arab Nationalism,” in Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih and Reeva S. Simon editors, The Origins of Arab Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 204–224. This aligns her viewpoint with such anti-Hashemite works as Anis al-Sayigh’s al-Hashimiyyun wa al-thawra al-‘arabiyya al-kubra, (Beirut: Dar al-Tali‘a, 1966). 19. Wilson, “A Passage to Independence,” p. 188. 20. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, p. 58. 21. Ibid., p. 90. 22. Ibid., p. 102. 23. A topic examined in more detail by Wilson’s research associate during her work in the Israeli National Archives, Sulayman al-Bashir; see his Judhur al-wissaya al-’urduniyya. Dirasa fi watha’iq al-arshif al-suhyuni (Beirut: Dar al-Farabi, 1982). 24. For a brief account of these policies, see Tariq Tall, “The Poli- tics of Rural Policy in East Jordan, 1920–1989,” in Martha Mundy and Basim Musallam editors, The Transformation of Nomadic Society in the Arab East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 92–95. 25. Significantly enough, given the slant of the present work, Wilson is too acute a historian not to be aware of the limitations of her view of Trans-Jordan for explaining the resilience of Hashemite rule after 1951: “But, if Transjordan’s socio-economic structure helps to explain ‘Abdullah’s political actions and his dependency on Great Britain, it begs one final question: how did Transjordan manage to survive the ebb of Great Britain’s power in the Middle East after the Second World War?” (quoted from Wilson, “A Passage to Independence,” pp. 188–189). 26. Those most relevant to the history of Jordan include the following: Ilan Pappe, Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–51 (Oxford: Macmillan Press, 1988); Ilan Pappe, The Making of the Arab/Israeli Conflict, 1947–1951 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994); Uri Bar-Joseph, The Best of Enemies. Israel and Transjordan in the War of 1948 (London: Frank Cass, 1987); Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: King ‘Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); Avi Shlaim, The Politics of Partition. King ‘Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 27. A “political anomaly and geographical nonsense,” it was “a very insub- stantial principality for so ambitious a prince,” Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, pp. 31–32. 28. See in particular Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, pp. 100–104, 135–139. 29. Avi Shlaim, “Israel and the Arab Coalition in 1948,” in Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim editors, The War for Palestine. Rewriting the History of 1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 85. 156 Notes

30. It is worth noting, however, that several points in Shlaim’s account of ‘Abdullah’s “Collusion” have come under challenge from other Israeli scholars. For example, it is argued that his account of the meeting with Bevin relies upon John Bagot Glubb’s recollection of the meeting (which he attended along with Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, then prime minister of Jordan) written down a decade later. Using more contemporary accounts drawn from the Foreign Office files, however, Ephraim Karsh maintains that in fact Bevin gave no encouragement to Trans-Jordan’s plans to partition Palestine. He argues further that ‘Abdullah and Golda Meir failed to reach any practical agreement at their secret meeting in Amman on the eve of the outbreak of the 1948 war, cf. Ephraim Karsh, Fabricating Israeli History: The “New Historians” (London: Frank Cass, 1997). For other Israeli critiques of the revisionist account, see Itamar Rabinovich, The Road Not Taken. Early Arab Israeli Negotiations (New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 1991), pp. 111–167; Avraham Sela, “Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 War: Myth, Historiography and Reality” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (October 1992), pp. 623–688; Yoav Gelber, Israeli-Jordanian Dialogue, 1948–1953. Cooperation, Conspiracy or Collusion? (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2004). 31. For an overview, see Avi Shlaim, “The Debate About 1948,” Interna- tional Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27 (1995), pp. 287–304. 32. See in particular Ron Pundik, The Struggle for Sovereignty: Rela- tions between Great Britain and Transjordan 1946–1951 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994); Joseph Nevo, King ‘Abdullah and Palestine: A Territorial Ambition (London: Macmillan, 1996); Yoav Gelber, Jewish-Transjordanian Relations, 1921–1948 (London: Frank Cass, 1997); Benny Morris, The Road to Jerusalem. Glubb Pasha, Palestine and the Jews (London: I.B.Tauris, 2003). Gelber’s Israeli-Jordanian Dialogue, takes the story of Israeli-Jordanian relations beyond the assassination of ‘Abdullah in July 1951 and into the era of King Talal and the first years of King Hussein’s reign. Given the weakness or absence of the monarch for most of this time, this allows an examination of the role of other members of the East Bank establishment, notably Fawzi al-Mulqi and Samir al-Rifa‘i, in the politics of collusion, and of the means by which the Jordanian elite and its British backers attempted to deal with Israeli aggression on the West Bank frontier. The latter topic is dealt with exhaustively in Benny Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, 1948–1956 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 33. An exception is Eugene Rogan, “Jordan and 1948: The Per- sistence of an Official History,” in Rogan and Shlaim editors, The War for Palestine. Rewriting the History of 1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 104–124, who relies in particular on the memoirs of ‘Abdullah al-Tall, Karithat Falastin: Mudhakkarat ‘Abdullah al-Tall Battall Ma‘rakat al-Quds, Volume Notes 157

I (Cairo: No Publisher, 1959). However, while Rogan is aware of the pressures that al-Tall was under when writing his memoirs in Nasser’s Egypt, he fails to take account of the shift in the way al-Tall presented his attitude towards ‘Abdullah after his return from exile in Egypt in 1967. In a letter written to Taysir Dhubyan he argued that ‘Abdullah acted with courage and wisdom, attempting to “save what could be saved” of Palestine in 1948, c.f. Taysir Dhubyan, Al-malik ‘Abdullah kama araftah, (Amman: al-Matba‘a al-Wataniyyah, 1967), p.14. In his written answers to A.M. Goichon’s queries (dated 1969) al-Tall maintains that: “Documents published in my book of 1959 do not prove that King Abdallah is a traitor. They show his policy toward the problem, his special thinking and ideas. Time proved later on that he was doing his best to save as much as he could of Palestine.” Jordanie Reelle, Vol. II (Paris: G.P. Maisonneuve and Larosse, 1972), p. 1322. 34. P. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion (London: Frank Cass, 1967), pp. 99–108. 35. Robert Satloff, From ‘Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 9–10. 36. Satloff, From ‘Abdullah to Hussein, p. 10. 37. See especially Ilan Pappe’s “Jordan between Hashemite and Palestinian Identity,” in Joseph Nevo and Ilan Pappe editors, Jordan in the Middle East 1948–1988. The Making of a Pivotal State (London: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 61–94. Pappe’s complete neglect of the “indigenous” Trans-Jordanians is doubly ironic given his current position as one of the avatars of the new “post-Zionist” school of Israeli historiography. Here his approach is marked by the advocacy of a research strategy that recovers the history of such subaltern groups as peasants, workers, and women, and ultimately aims at a “social history” of the Arab-Israeli conﬂict. See Pappe’s “Introduction: New Historical Orientations in the Research on the Palestine Question,” in Ilan Pappe editor, The Israel\Palestine Question. Rewriting Histories (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 1–3. 38. The exclusive focus on the Palestinian elements of the opposition in Israeli circles is to a large extent due to the inﬂuence of the work of Clinton Baily (which has in part found its way into print in his Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge 1948–1983: A Political History (Boul- der: Westview, 1984), pp. 8–11), and of histories like Amnon Cohen’s Political Parties in the West Bank Under the Jordanian Regime, 1949– 1967 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), and Avi Plascov’s The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan 1948–1957 (London: Frank Cass, 1981).The latter works drew on the archives abandoned by the Jordanian mukhabarat on the West Bank after the June War. None of these Israeli scholars have chosen to consider the fact that these documents necessarily preserved a partial view of the pre-1967 opposition 158 Notes

and that findings based on their use could not be extrapolated to the East Bank. 39. For the cohesion of Hashemite Jordan c.f. Uriel Dann, “The Hashemite Monarchy 1948–88. The Constant and the Chang- ing,” in Nevo and Pappe, Jordan in the Middle East 1948–1988, pp. 15–25. The main works of this genre include Uriel Dann’s own King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism; Asher Susser’s On Both Banks of the Jordan: A Political Biography of Wasfi al-Tall (London: Frank Cass, 1994), and Robert Satloff’s From ‘Abdullah to Hussein. 40. Susser, On Both Banks of the Jordan, pp. 2–3. Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, p. 166, depicts the (alleged) political quiescence of Hussein’s subjects in quasi-Orientalist terms (although he excepts the “Bedouin” and the Palestinian refugees from this judgment): “Throughout the settled population of the Jordan ...there is a tradition of passive obedience. The government— meaning the King—is expected to govern, and if the government meets certain expectations, if it is Muslim, if it shows reasonable respect for the subjects privacy, if it is not unbearably rapacious and above all if it is self reliant, then the people will not be a congenial breeding ground for radicalism and subversion.” 41. For the notion of the (Trans) Jordanian elite, see Dann’s “Regime and Opposition in Jordan Since 1949,” in Menahem Milson editor, Soci- ety and Political Structure in the Arab World (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), pp. 145–182. Shmuel Bar has recently reexamined this grouping in “The Jordanian Elite—Change and Continuity,” in Asher Susser and Aryeh Shmuelevitz editors, The Hashemites in the Modern World. Essays in Honour of the Late Professor Uriel Dann (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 221–228. Historical studies that make use of Dann’s framework, or the allied notion of the “King’s men,” include Dann’s own King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism; Asher Susser’s On Both Banks of Jordan; and Robert Satloff’s From ‘Abdullah to Hussein. 42. Examples of this genre in Arabic include Hani al-Hawrani’s pioneering al-Tarkib al-Iqtissadiyy al-Ijtima‘i li Sharq al-Urdunn (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1978); and Muwaffaq Mahadin’s Tatawwur ‘ilaqat al-intaj wa al-harakat al-fallahiyya fi al-rif al-‘urduni (Beirut: Dar al-Katib, 1981) After establishing al-Urdunn al-Jadid research center, Hawrani organized a major conference on the social history of Jordan, publishing its contents as Dirasat fi tarikh al-urdunn al- ijtima‘i (Amman: Greater Amman Municipality, 2003). By then, the writing of social history in Jordan had advanced considerably due to the regional studies directed by “Jordan’s leading Ottomanist,” (Walker, Jordan in the Late Middle Ages, p.16), Muhammad ‘Adnan al-Bakhit . See the latter’s co-publication with ‘Alayyan ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Jaludi Qada’ ‘Ajlun fi ‘Asr al-Tanzimat al-‘Uthmaniyya (Amman: Notes 159

Manshurat Lajnat Tarikh Bilad al-Sham, 1994); Mohammad Salim al- Tarawnah, Tarikh Mantiqat al-Balqa’ wa Ma‘an wa al-Karak, 1864– 1918 (Amman: Matabi’ al-Dustour al-Tijariyyah, 1992); ‘Alayyan al-Jaludi Qada’ ‘Ajlun Dirasat tarikhiyyah 1864–1918 (Amman: sil- silat al-kitab al-’um fi tarikh al-’urdunn, 1994); George Farid Tarif, al-Salt wa Jiwariha Khilal al-Fatrah, 1864–1921 (Amman: Business Bank Publications, 1994); Hind Ghassan Abu al-Sha‘ar, ’Irbid wa Jiwariha (Nahiyat Bany ‘Ubayd) 1850–1928 (Amman: Business Bank Publications, 1996); Nawfan Raja al-Humud al-Sawariyyah, Amman wa Jiwariha Khilal al-Fatrah 1281 A.H./1864 A.D. -1921 (Amman: Business Bank Publications, 1995). Al-Bakhit, has collected his studies of East Bank history in Dirasat fi Tarikh Bilad al-Sham (al-Urdunn) (Amman: Greater Amman Municipality, 2005), as has his student Hind Ghassan Abu al-Sha‘ar, Dirasat fi Tarikh al-Urdunn al-Ijtima‘i wa al-Iqtissadi 1894–1938 (Amman: Greater Amman Municipality), 2005. Abu al-Sha‘ar has also produced a synthetic overview of the social history of Ottoman Southeast Syria, Tarikh sharqiyy al-urdunn fi al-‘ahd al-‘uthmani, 922 A.H.-1337 A.H./1516 A.D.-1918 A.D. (Amman: Al-Lajnah al-‘Ulya li Kitabat Tarikh al-Urdunn, 2001), and published an intellectual portrait of Bakhit. Based as it is on an M.A. thesis completed under Bakhit (albeit expanded into a doctorate in Oxford), Raouf Sa’d Abu Jaber’s Pioneers Over Jordan: The Frontier of Settlement in Jordan, 1850–1914 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989), can also be assigned to this school, and there is also Ahmad S. Shuqayrat, Tarikh al-’Idarah al-‘Uthmaniyyah fi Sharq al-’Urdunn, 1864–1918 (Amman: Ala’ for Printing and Design, 1992); and Jihad al-Muhaysin, Al-Qabilat wa al-Dawlat fi Sharq al-Urdunn (Amman: Ahli Bank Publications, 2003). 43. Here the canon includes Eugene Rogan’s account of the extension of the “frontiers” of the Ottoman state in South-eastern Syria after 1851; Martha Mundy’s micro-histories of land and society in ‘Ajlun; Philip Robin’s analysis of the consolidation of state power in Trans-Jordan under the Mandate; Vartan Amadouny’s and Mustapha Hamarneh’s surveys of colonial development policy from the perspectives of, respectively, imperial history and dependency theory; Michael Fischbach’s studies of British and Jordanian land policy; Abla Amawi’s history of the rise of Amman’s merchant class ; Paul Kingston’s studies of early development planning and policy; and Betty Anderson’s history of the rise of the oppositional “Jordanian National Movement” in the 1950s. Most of these authors’ work was collected in Rogan and Tell editors, Village, Steppe and State, and Tariq Tell editor, The Resilience of Hashemite Rule. Politics and the State in Jordan, 1946–67 (Beirut: Cahier de CERMOC no.25, 2001). These collections of articles can now be supplemented by a number of monographs, including: Eugene Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Trans-Jordan 1850–1921 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 160 Notes

Press, 1999); Michael R. Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan (Leiden: Brill, 2000); Betty S. Anderson, Nationalist Voices in Jordan, The Street and the State (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005); Yoav Alon, The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007); as well as Martha Mundy and Richard Saumarez-Smith, Governing Property. Law, Administration and Pro- ductioninOttomanSyria(London: I.B. Tauris, 2007). Philip Robins, has drawn on this work to produce an overview of Jordanian history in the modern era that largely supersedes that of Kamal Salibi; c.f. his A History of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 44. Mahmoud ‘Ubaydat, for many years exiled in Damascus, has been a particularly prolific author in this regard, focusing on the links between the anti-colonial struggle in Trans-Jordan and Syria. See his Sirat al-Shahid Kayid al-Miflih al-‘Ubaydat. Awwal Shahid Urduni ‘ala Turab Falastin (Athens: Dar Bashar, no date given); Sirat al-Munadhill ‘Ali Khulqi al-Sharayrah, 1868–1960 (Amman: no publisher mentioned, 1993); Ahmad Muraywid, 1886–1926: Qa’id thawrat al-Jawlan wa Junub Lubnan wa Sharq-al-Urdunn (London: Riyad al-Rayyes, 1997); al-Dawr al-Urduni fi al-Nidal al-‘Arabi al- Suri, 1908–1946: al Nidal al-Mushtarak (Amman: al-Ahliyya, 1997); Sirat al-Sha‘ir al-Munadhil Mustapha Wahbi al Tall 1897–1949 (Amman: Ministry of Culture, 1996); al-Mujahid Khalaf Muhammad al-Tall, 1890–1942, Amman: al-Dustur, 2003. Notice must also be taken however of Muhammad ‘Abd al-Qadir Kharaysat, al- Urduniyyun wa al-Qadhaya al Wataniyyah wa al- Qawmiiya: Dirasa fil al-Mawqif al-Sha‘bi al-Urduni, 1918–1939 (Amman: Amman University Press, 1992) and Issam Muhammad al-sa‘di, al-Harakah al-watl-aniyya al-’urdu-niyya 1921–1946, (Amman: Azminah 2011). 45. See Linda L. Layne, Home and Homeland: The Dialogics of National Identity in Jordan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Andrew Shryock. Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagina- tion: Oral History and Textual Authority in Tribal Jordan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 46. Ya‘qub Zayadin, al-Bidayat: Sirah Thatiyyah ...’Arba‘un Sanah fi al- Haraka al-Wattaniyyah al-’Urduniyyah (Beirut: Dar Ibn Khaldun, 1980); Jamal al-Sha‘ir, Siyasi Yatathakkar: Tajribah fi al-‘Amal al- Siyasi (London: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 1987); Khamsun ‘Aman wa Nayf (Amman: Maktabat al Ra’i, 1994); Dafatir al-‘Umr: Awraq min Rihlat al-Hayat wa al-Siyasah (Amman: Dar Sindibad, 2002); ‘Abd al-Rahman Shuqayr, Min Qassiyun ...ila Rabbat ‘Ammun: Rihlat al- ‘Umr (Amman: Kitab al-Urdun al-Jadid, 1991); Munif al-Razzaz, Rasa’il ila Awladi. Awraq Ghayr Manshurah (Amman: Kitab al- Urdunn al-Jadid, 1995). For assessments of the value of these memoirs as sources for the historian, see the essays in part III of Hawrani’s Dirasat fi tarikh al-urdunn al-ijtima‘i. Notes 161

Chapter 2 1. The term “gunpowder empire” is taken from William H. McNeill’s global history of coercive social power, The Pursuit of Power: Tech- nology, Armed Force and Society since A.D.1000 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982). For its application to the empires of the early modern Middle East, see John A. Hall and John G. Ikenberry, The State (Stanford: Open University Press, 1989), p. 33; John A. Hall, Powers and Liberties. The Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1986), p. 109. These polities, most notably the Ottoman, used firearms to curb the power of “imperial nomads” and pacify (if not directly control) their tribal peripheries. 2. The characterization of Ottoman Syria as “tributary” ultimately derives from the work of Samir Amin, who designates the mode of production underlying all societies whose productive forces have developed beyond those of primitive communism, but are not yet transformed into central or peripheral capitalism, as a “tributary mode” (c.f. Samir Amin, The Arab Nation: Nationalism and Class Struggles, London: Zed Press, 1983. p. 47). Amin’s initial formula- tion was in fact highly enigmatic, and referred to an “Asiatic mode of production, which I call ‘tributary’ [that ] is very close to the feudal mode of production,” (Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment, New York: Monthly Review, Vol. 1, 1974, p. 140). With various qualifications, the small, oft-persecuted band of Jordanians influenced by Marxist ideas, have identified Ottoman Trans-Jordan as feudal (even when something close to the tributary label is used through the idea of an “Eastern Feudalism,” as in Muwaffaq Mahadin, Tattawwur ‘Ilaqat al- ’Intaj wa al- Harakat al- Fallahiyya fi al- Rif al- ’Urduni (Beirut: Dar al-Katib, 1981), p. 6). Influenced by translated Soviet works such as Nikiferov’s al-Sharq wa al-Tarikh al-‘Alami (Beirut: Dar Ibn Khaldun, 1986); and Irina Similianskia, al-Buna al-Iqtissadiyya wa al- Ijtimma‘iyya fi al-Mashriq al-‘Arabi -‘ala Masharif al-‘Asr al-Hhadith (Beirut: Dar al-Farabi, 1989), they place the feudal mode in a five rung ladder of evolution towards capitalism (and in the future communism). A spare definition is adopted, in which feudal relations are identified with the coercive extraction of the agrarian surplus from the direct producers. The latter feature stems from the fact that pre-capitalist agricultural producers are in immediate control of the means of production, and can therefore reproduce themselves independently of the ruling class of landlords. As a result tax, tribute or rent must all be exacted by political or military means, in Marx’s words “surplus labour for the nominal owner of the land can only be extorted by other than economic pressure, whatever the form assumed may be,” c.f. Karl Marx, Capital, Volume III (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), p. 791. This quotation argues for the equivalence of tax and rent, and therefore 162 Notes

for the existence of a single mode of production throughout the pre- capitalist world, whether the label used is tributary or feudal. There is a danger here that a multitude of very different societies ranging from “the emirates of Northern Nigeria to France in 1789, from the tendencies visible in Aztec society on the eve of the Spanish con- quest to Tsarist Russia in the nineteenth century,” will be lumped together as a single agrarian type, c.f. Eric Hobsbawm “Introduction” to Karl Marx on Pre-Capitalist Formations (London: Lawrence and Wishart 1969). The approach below adopts a less dogmatic historical materialism, one that appears in more recent work on tributary social formations and the allied notion of a Tributary State (c.f. Eric.E.Wolf,Europe and the People without History, Berkeley: Uni- versity of California Press, 1982. pp. 79–100); Halil Berktay, “The Feudalism Debate: The Turkish End—Is ‘Tax versus Rent‘ Neces- sarily the Product and the Sign of Modal Difference?” Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 14 (1987), pp. 291–333; John F. Haldon. “The Ottoman State and the Question of State Autonomy: Comparative Perspectives,” in Halil Berktay and Suraiya Faroqhi, New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History, London: Frank Cass, 1992, pp. 50–77; Haldon, State Theory, State Autonomy and the Pre-modern State (London: Verso, 1992), and from Simon Bromley’s use of the notion of a Tributary State or social formation to analyze pre-capitalist polities such as the Ottoman Empire, c.f. his Rethinking Middle East Politics: Economic Interests and Institutions (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), pp. 214–217. Tax and rent are still treated as equivalent, once again because they are extracted by coercive force. However instead of a single, linear path of historical change, multiple routes of transformation are envisaged. They vary because of such factors as the political organization of the landlord class (in particular whether it is centralized along patrimonial or “prebendal” lines or decentralized in feudal fashion); the cohesion of the “political communities” that enforce social property rights; and the coherence and solidarity of village communes. In other words, the approach accepts Talal Asad’s argument that there “is no key to the secret of pre-capitalist societies,” and that they “cannot be understood by isolating one a priori principle.” Instead, the trick is to “try and identify that combination of elements (environmental, demographic, social, cultural, etc.) in the past of a given population that can explain a particular outcome,” c.f. his “Are there Histories of Peoples without Europe? A Review Arti- cle,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 29 (July 1987), p. 603. 3. Or at least those of his latter-day interpreters—notably Ernest Gellner in Muslim Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Yves Lacoste, Ibn Khaldun: The Beginning of History and the Birth of the Third World (London: Verso, 1984)—who have used Notes 163

his writings to interpret (respectively) “tribal” or pre-capitalist society in the Middle East. In a personal communication, Malik Mufti has pointed out that much of Ibn Khaldun’s work in fact deals with urban civilization, and his use here takes heed of the warnings con- tained in Aziz al-Azmeh’s Ibn Khaldun in Modern Scholarship: A Study in Orientalism (London: Third World Centre, 1981) on the pitfalls of using his writings to analyze the rural structures of the modern Middle East. Notice is also taken of cogent critiques of Gellner’s quasi-Weberian interpretation, in particular Talal Asad, “The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam,” Occasional Paper Series (Centre for Con- temporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1986); and Sami Zubeida, “Is there a Muslim Society? Ernest Gellner’s Sociology of Islam,” Economy and Society, Vol. 24 (1995), pp. 151–188. 4. For the salience of pastoralism in the agrarian political economy of the region, and of nomads as a social force in Middle Eastern history, see Nikki R. Keddie, “Is There a Middle East?” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 4 (1973), p. 257 and Nikki R. Keddie, “Pre-Capitalist Structures in the Middle East,” Journal of Arab Affairs, No. 2 (1982), pp. 199–204. For attempts to integrate pastoral nomadism into historical materialist analyses of the region, c.f. Bryan Turner, “Social Structure of Middle East Societies,” in his Capitalism and Class in the Middle East: Theories of Social Change and Economic Development (London: Heinemann, 1984), pp. 213–214; Nazih N. Ayyubi. Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London: Tauris, 1995), pp. 48–49. The argument that follows also gives attention, however, to Talal Asad’s demon- stration that the military power of the nomadic Bedouin has often been exaggerated by Orientalist scholarship. Pastoral nomads should be seen as part of the prevailing pre-capitalist formation—tributary or otherwise—rather than as forming a separate mode, not least because their elites are integrated into the ruling class structure, c.f. his “The Bedouin as a Military Force: Notes on some Aspects of Power Rela- tions between Nomads and Sedentaries in Historical Perspective,” in Cynthia Nelson, editor, The Desert and the Sown: Nomads in the Wider Society (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1973), pp. 63–71. 5. In elaborating Samir Amin’s notion of a tributary mode, Eric Wolf posits a “continuum of power distributions,” and a spectrum of tributary polities bounded by two “polar situations.” In one, “power is concentrated strongly in the hands of a ruling elite standing at the apex of the system”; in the other “power is held by local overlords and the rule at the apex is weak and fragile,” (Wolf, Europe and the People without History, p. 80). However in the arid and mountainous peripheries of the Ottoman Empire, the particularities of the tributary form were not simply a function of the constellation of military-political power at the pinnacles of the social formation. They also resulted 164 Notes

from the effective decentralization of political power enforced by the limitations of pre-modern logistics, and from the way the agrarian surplus, as well as the contending political communities that contested it, were conditioned by the “slow moving” forces of geography and environment across the longue duree. In parallel with the military and logistical limits to state power that are emphasized by Michael Mann, state managers also faced economic constraints imposed by the small size and uncertain nature of the available surplus—and therefore of the collectable tax revenues. For more on such fiscal limits to state-building in agrarian or transitional societies c.f. Margaret Levi, “The Predatory Theory of Rule,” Politics and Society, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1981), pp. 431–465; Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988); and, from a sociologically and historically richer, if also Europe centered perspective, Charles Tilly, Capital, Coercion and European States (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). Additional political constraints were imposed on the political power of Tribu- tary center elites by the fact that the social solidarities that developed to cope with an uncertain agricultural environment generated cohesive communities of armed tribesmen, rather than isolated villages of fractious peasants. 6. Eugene Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Trans-Jordan1850–1921 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 21. 7. Norman Lewis, Nomads and Settlers in Syria and Jordan, 1800–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 8. Rogan, Frontiers, p. 9.The first chapter of Rogan’s book comprises a quite brilliant description of the frontier order in Trans-Jordan in the first half of the nineteenth century—one on which I have lent heavily in the account below. 9. Richard T. Antoun, Arab Village: A Social-Structural Study of a TransJordanian Peasant Community (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1972), pp. 36–40, 44–49; Peter Gubser, Politics and Change in Al-Karak Jordan: A Study of a Small Arab Town and Its District (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 40–47; William Lancaster, The Ruwalla Bedouin Today (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 24–34, 151–161; Andrew Shyrock, “History and Historiography among the Balqa’ Tribes of Jordan,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1993, pp. 21–23, 144–145. 10. Eugene Rogan, “Incorporating the Periphery: The Ottoman Exten- sion of Direct Rule Over South-eastern Syria (Trans-Jordan), 1867– 1914,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1991, p. 11. 11. The term is taken from Marcel Fafchamps, “Solidarity Networks in Preindustrial Society: Rational Peasants with a Moral Econ- omy,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 41 (1992), Notes 165

pp. 147–174. Whereas Fafchamps generates his “networks of trust” from a thin rational, individualistic logic derived from the theory of repeated games, the approach here adds in a more structural and soci- ological dimension. This takes the form of a “micro-politics of class struggle,” a politics of everyday resistance whose weapons include the social sanctions enforced by rumor and reputation, low level sabotage and theft. C.f. James C. Scott, “The Moral Economy as an Argument and a Fight,” in Adrian Randall and Andrew Charlesworth editors, Moral Economy and Popular Protest. Crowds, Conﬂict and Authority (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000), pp. 189–191. 12. Rogan, Frontiers, p. 23. 13. Mustafa B. Hamarneh, “Social and Economic Transformation of Trans-Jordan, 1921–1946,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown Univer- sity, 1985, p. 50; Rogan, “Incorporating the Periphery,” pp. 25–26. 14. A partial list of payments of the surrah to the Bedouin during the sixteenth century is shown in table 2.1 of Tariq Tell, “Bedouin Fallah and State: The Social Origins of Hashemite Rule in Jordan,” Ph.D. Oxford University, 2000.. For the administrative arrangements entailed by the need to ensure the safe passage of the Hajj procession, see Karl K. Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus 1708–1758 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 151–162, 167–176. 15. Rogan, Frontiers, p. 21. 16. Ibid. 17. Burkhardt’s assessment is typical: “The oppressions of the government on one side, and those of the Bedouins on the other, have reduced the Fellah [sic.] of the Haouran [sic.] to a state little better than that of the wandering Arab. Few individuals die in the same village where they are born. Families are continually moving from one place to another. This continued wandering is one of the principal reasons why no village in the Haouran has either orchard or fruit trees, or gardens for the growth of vegetables. Shall we sow for strangers? Was the answer of a Fellah to whom I spoke on the subject, and who by the word strangers meant both the succeeding inhabitants, and the Arabs who visit the Haouran in the spring and summer.” John Lewis Burckhardt, Travels in Syria and the Holy Land (London: Darf Publishers, 1992), p. 299. 18. In the absence of any overall census or meaningful survey of the population of the East Bank before the 1940s, we have no way of knowing the exact size of the various tribal groups. For a systematic survey of the population data that can be gleaned from the Ottoman sources— albeit organized by district as well as tribe, see Hind Abu al-Sha’ar, Tarikh Sharq al-Urdunn ﬁ al-’Ahd al-’Uthmani, 922 A.H-1337 A.H/1516 A.D-1918 A.D, Amman: Al-Lajna al-’Ulya li Kitabat Tarikh al-Urdunn 2001, pp. 51–110. 19. A view popularized by such sources as John Bagot Glubb’s The Story of the Arab Legion (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948), chapter 1. 166 Notes

20. The case for a multi-resource Bedouin economy stretching across the centuries is made in Felicity and William Lancaster, People, Land and Water in the Arab Middle East: Environments and Landscapes in the Bilad al-Sham (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999), in particular chapter 5. For a programming model outlining the risk, avoiding logic of this strategy and evidence from the contemporary Sahel of the basic complementarity of pastoral production and farming, see Rogier van den Brink et al., “The Economics of Cain and Abel: Agro-pastoral Property Rights in the Sahel,” Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3 (February 1995), pp. 373–399. 21. Rogan, Frotiers, pp. 24–35. 22. Rogan, Frontiers, pp. 24–35. 23. Martha Mundy describes ‘Ajlun as an area of “peasant right, mediated by local regional leadership, until the second half of the nineteenth century,” cf. her “Village Authority and the Legal Order of Property (the Southern Hawran 1876–1922),” p. 67 of Roger Owen editor, New Perspectives on Property and Land in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); F. G. Peake, A History of Transjordan and Its Tribes (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1958), pp. 143–165, 178–182; Rogan, Frontiers. 24. For a detailed description and mapping of these alliances, drawing on ﬁeldwork in the late 1960s and on the memoirs of ‘Awdah al-Qusus from the 1920s, see Gubser, Politics and Change in Al-Karak, pp. 50–59. 25. Ruks ibn Za’id al-’Uzayzi, Nimr al-‘Adwan Sha‘ir al-Hubb wa Al-Wafa’: Hayatuh wa Shi‘ruh (Amman: al-Rabi‘an, 1997), pp. 24–25. A local saying indicates that the real source of the ‘Adwan’s power was not lost on the local tribesmen who commented that “al Fi‘l li al_Jahran was al-Sitt li al-‘Adwan” (the deed is the Jahran’s and the glory the ‘Adwan’s]. For an engaging discussion of popular memories of the ‘Adwan’s power in the Balqa’,’ and of the conﬂicts engendered by the “genealogical imagination” still at large among ‘Abbadi and ‘Adwani tribesmen today, see Andrew Shyrock, Nation- alism and the Genealogical Imagination: Oral History and Textual Authority in Tribal Jordan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 26. Rogan, Frontiers, p. 26. 27. Ibid., pp. 33–34. 28. Rogan, “Incorporating the Periphery,” pp. 33–34. 29. Maps outlining the nomadic cycles of the Trans-Jordan Bedouin and the tribal territories of the East Bank are to be found in Rogan and Tell, Village Steppe and State. Geoffrey Nugent and Nicolas Sanchez, “Tribes, Chiefs and Trans-Humants: A Comparative Institu- tional Analysis,” Economic Development and Cultural Change,Vol.42 (1993), pp. 151–188, provide a cogent argument, drawn from the Notes 167

Neo-Classical Political Economy of ASARS (the arid, semi arid rain fed semi tropics), that demonstrates the importance of both cohesive tribal organization and influential shaykhs for managing the migrations of nomads including the Ruwalla. 30. These claims are supported by the testimony of less partisan historians: In the mountainous south and west of ‘Ajlun, “high mountains and deep valleys put limits on the movement of Bedouin horsemen,” and “local leaders ruled their communes with full autonomy.” In fact shaykhly clans like the ‘Ubaydat and the Shraydah drew wealth and power to rival that of the Bedouin chiefs from their control of tax collection and well watered farm land. Further south, Burkhardt considered the Karakiyyah to be “the complete masters of the district of Kerak [sic.] and to have great influence over the affairs of the Belqa [sic.].” Rogan, Frontiers, pp. 25–30. 31. Ibid., p. 8. 32. Gubser, Politics and Change in Al-Karak Jordan, pp. 69, 180–181. 33. Scott captures the pressures of survival of impoverished rural actors graphically by means of Tawney’s metaphor characterizing the position of the rural population in China as “that of a man standing permanently up to his neck in water so that even a ripple might drown him.” See . Scott, “The Moral Economy as an Argument and a Fight,” pp. 189–191. 34. James C. Scott The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 1–11; Michael Lipton, “Game against Nature,” in John Hariss editor, Rural Development (London: Hutchinson, 1982), pp. 258–268. 35. Scott, Moral Economy of the Peasant,p.7. 36. Rogan, Frontiers, p. 185. 37. The benefits conferred by the latter practice and its associated forms of tillage are described by Carol Palmer, “Recon- structing and Interpreting Ancient Crop Management Practices: Ethnobotanical Investigations into Traditional Dryland Farming in Northern Jordan,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Sheffield, University of Sheffield Press, 1994, pp. 49–52. 38. For a contemporary ethnographic account of this method, see Palmer op.cit. An historical account of similar practices in the course of the agricultural cycle at the Yadudah estate in al-Balqa’ is given in Raouf Sa’d Abu Jaber, Pioneers Over Jordan: The Frontier of Settle- ment in Jordan, 1850–1914 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989), pp. 46–51. For an agronomist’s analysis of such strategies in the contemporary Jordanian dry farming sector, see J. I. Stewart, “Mediterranean- Type Climate, Wheat Production and Response Farming,” in C. E. Whitman et al. editors, Soil, Water and Crop/Livestock Management Systems for Rainfed Agriculture in the Near East Region (Washington D.C.: USAID, 1986), pp. 6, 10–11, 15. 168 Notes

39. Patron–client ties survive in the form of the ubiquitous wasta that Jordanians still resort to today. For an account of wasta in a rural setting during the early 1970s, see Amina Farrag, “The Wasta among Jordanian Villagers,” in Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury editors, Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies (London: Duckworth 1977), pp. 225–238. 40. Rogan, Frontiers, pp. 38–41. 41. The “traditional” sharecropping arrangements in which the tenant receives one quarter of the crop are reported by Antoun, Arab Village, p. 35; and Gubser, Politics and Change in Al-Karak Jordan, p. 69, for al-Kura and al-Karak, respectively. More complex arrangements and a more active tenant are apparent in the partnerships forged between landlord and farmer at al-Yadudah, or on the estates of the Bani Sakhr in the late nineteenth century. For an account of agricultural partnerships at this time, see Jaber, Pioneers Over Jordan, pp. 86–92. 42. For an anthropologist’s account of notions of territory among the Huwaytat, see Riccardo Bocco, “Etat et Tribus Bedouines en Jordanie, 1920–1990,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Institut D’Etudes Politiques de Paris, 1996, pp. 61–71. The treatment of land in contemporary Bedouin customary law is outlined in Muhammad Abu Hassan, Turath al-Badu al-Qadha’i. Nathariyyan wa ‘Amaliyyan (Amman: Department of Arts and Culture, 1987), pp. 398–405. 43. Antoun, Arab Village, p. 24. Drawing on evidence from the northern Hawran, Birgit Schaebler argues that in “rain fed frontier areas [that] featured deﬁnite tribal traits,” common land practices “may have been designed to forge the community over petty clan interest,” and counter “the strong tendencies to division and factionalism that are inherent in tribal ...structures.” C.f. her “Practicing Musha‘: Common Lands and the Common Good in Southern Syria under the Ottomans and the French,” in Owen editor, New Perspectives on Property and Land in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 289. 44. The argument here draws on Ya’acov Firestone’s work on musha‘a in Palestine; see “Land Equalisation and Factor Scarcities: Holding Size and the Burden of Impositions in Imperial Central Russia and the Late Ottoman Levant,” Journal of Economic History, Vol. XLI (Decem- ber 1981), pp. 813–833 and “ ‘The Land-Equalizing Musha‘ Village: A Reassessment,” in Gad G. Gilbar editor, Ottoman Palestine, 1800– 1914: Studies in Economic and \Social History (Leiden: Brill, 1990), pp. 91–129. Information on the distribution of land through the zukur and faddan systems in late nineteenth-century ‘Ajlun is to be found in Martha Mundy “Village Traditions and Individual Title: Musha‘ and Ottoman Land Registration in ‘ Ajlun District,” in Rogan and Tell, Village, Steppe and State, p. 69, although she argues that the complexities of the system on the ground were such that they cannot Notes 169

be captured by Firestone’s duality. The recent literature on musha‘a and its applicability to Ottoman Trans-Jordan is surveyed in Michael Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan (Leiden: Brill 2000), pp. 38–42, while Mundy’s “La Propriete Dit Musha‘ en Syrie: Une Note Analytique a propos la Travaux de Ya’akov Firestone,” Revue de Monde Musulman et de la Mediterrannee, Vol. 79–80 (1996), pp. 267–281, offers a thorough assessment of Firestone’s work. 45. The unequal relations and the tribute that was extracted as a result are captured graphically by a saying still remembered by the Balqawiyyah in what is now eastern Amman: “li ibn Adwan thaniyyah wa ‘ukkah mamliyya” (Ibn ‘Adwan’s [annual] share is a two year old [sheep or goat] and a full water carrier [one filled with gee or butter]. 46. Antoun, Arab Village,p.35. 47. The extended entitlements approach in particular is geared to debunk- ing the idea that “communities can be treated as static, relatively homogenous entities,” ones integrated by common tribal values (an idea dear to functional anthropology) and in “harmonious equi- librium” with their environment (as in 1950s economic anthropology and cultural ecology). C.f. Melissa Leach, Robin Mearns and Ian Scoones, “Environmental Entitlements: A Framework for Under- standing the Institutional Dynamics of Environmental Change,” IDS Discussion Paper, no.359 (Institute of Development Studies: March 1997), p. 10; Louise Tilly, “Food Entitlement, Famine and Conflict,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (Autumn 1983), pp. 333–349. 48. Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 2, 45–51; “Rights and Capabilities,” in Sen, Values, Resources and Development (Oxford: Blackwell 1984), p. 497. Command over entitlements, in turn, enhances an agent’s “capabilities,” a substantive freedom that stems from what people can do with the resources and attributes at their disposal. 49. Ibid. The notion of “unruly social practices” including ones sanc- tioned by popular social practice rather than the prevailing laws and legal norms is taken from Charles Gore, “Entitlement Relations and Unruly Social Practices: A Comment on the work of Amartya Sen,” Vol.29 (1993), pp. 429–460. 50. Jeremy Swift, “Why Are Rural People Vulnerable to Famine?” Insti- tute of Development Studies Bulletin (1987), pp. 9–13. 51. For a fuller delineation of these terms see the introductory chapter. 52. The processes of entitlement and endowment mapping are contin- gent on particular institutional arrangements—and change when the latter are transformed. While the this “institutional focus” adds “a dynamic historical perspective over different time scales,” the definition of institutions used here departs from the “tautologous and 170 Notes

functionalist” Transaction Cost approach of Neo-Classical political economy. It takes seriously the role of power relations in creating and structuring institutions, and sees them as not only as embedded “rules of the game,” but as “rules in use,” that are changed constantly (albeit at times very slowly as a result of path dependencies and the dead weight of the past) by actors operating within the framework of informal as well as formal organizations. C.f. Leach, Mearns and Scoones, “Environmental Entitlements: A Framework for Understanding the Institutional Dynamics of Environmental Change,” pp. 26–27. For the notion of “fuzzy entitlements see Stephen Devereux, “Fuzzy Entitlements and Common Property Resources: Struggles over Rights to Communal Land in Namibia,” IDS Working Paper, no.44 (Insti- tute of Development Studies: November 1996), pp. 2–14. For earlier arguments that entitlement theory must incorporate diverse institutional arrangements, including communal or customary forms of property, see Getachew Woldemeskel, “Famine and the Two Faces of Entitlement: A Comment on Sen,” World Development, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1990), pp. 492–493; and Daniel Bromley, Economic Interests and Institutions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 43, 78–79.

Chapter 3 1. Michael Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 211. 2. The question of the compatibility of the two undertakings (Sykes– Picot and Husayn–MacMahon) has long exercised historians but need not detain us here: The most balanced assessments (Ernest C. Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973) p. 115; Albert Hourani, “The Arab Awakening Forty Years Later,” in Albert Hourani, The Emergence of the Modern Middle East (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 209–212) conclude that a pledge of Arab independence was given, but that it was compatible with Britain’s undertakings to the French. Under the pressure of events, both the Sharif and Britain chose to defer their differences until the post-war settlement, the contours of which were impossible to predict in 1916. The question of Zionism and of the morality of Balfour’s 1917 under- taking to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine had not yet arisen. In any case, “the Hashemites did not oppose it strongly after Britain withdrew its support for them in Syria” (Hourani, “The Arab Awakening,” p. 211). 3. Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry, translated by Peter Slugglett and Marion Farouk Sluglett (London: Macmillan, 1971); pp. 88–90 Anis al-Sayigh, Al-hashimiyyun wa al-thawrah al-’arabiyyah al-kubra (Beirut: Dar al-Tali’a, 1966). Notes 171

4. Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, pp. 47–53. 5. Rashid Khalidi, “Arab Nationalism: Historical Problems in the Lit- erature” American Historical Review, Volume 96 (December 1991), p. 1372. 6. Mary Wilson, “The Hashemites, the Arab Revolt and Arab National- ism,” in Rashid Khalidi et al., editors, The Origins of Arab Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 205. 7. Hourani, “The Arab Awakening,” p. 206. 8. I have set out a similar view of the Arab Revolt as a whole in “Guns, Grain and Gold: War, Scarcity and the Origins of Transjordan” in Steve Heydemann editor, War and Social Change in the Modern Middle East, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. For the broader impact of famine on wartime Syria, see Linda Schatkowski- Schilcher, “The Famine of 1915–1919 in Greater Syria,” in John Spagnolo editor, Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Per- spective: Essays in Honour of Albert Hourani (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1996), p. 230, fn. 10. 9. For the argument that the Arab Movement was more a chieftaincy than a modern national movement, cf. Joseph Kostiner, “The Hashemite ‘Tribal Confederacy’ of the Arab Revolt, 1916–1917,” in Edward Ingram editor, National and International Politics in the Middle East, Essays in Honor of Elie Kedourie (London: Frank Cass, 1986), p. 107. C.f. also Eliezer Tauber, The Emergence of the Arab Movements (London: Frank Cass, 1993), pp. 62–68, 78–79, 122–134; idem. The Arab Movements in World War I (London: Frank Cass, 1993), pp. 117–121. 10. Eugene L. Rogan, “Bringing the State Back: The Limits of Ottoman Rule in Transjordan, 1840–1910,” in Eugene L. Rogan and Tariq Tell editors, Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan (London: British Academic Press, 1994), pp. 34–45; Eugene Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Trans-Jordan1850–1921 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 44–55. 11. Martha Mundy has pointed out that “direct Ottoman administration was reimposed at the height of the expansion of the international grain market of Syria” cf. her “Village Authority and the Legal Order of Property (the Southern Hawran 1876–1922),” p. 67 of Roger Owen editor, New Perspectives on Property and Land in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). For this market more generally see Charles Issawi, The Fertile Crescent 1800–1914: A Documentary Economic History (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 270. 12. Mustafa B. Hamarneh, “Social and Economic Transformation of Transjordan (1921–1946),” Georgetown University, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 1985. 172 Notes

13. For the growth of the landed estates of the richer merchants and Bedouins, Cf. Eugene L. Rogan, “Incorporating the Periphery: The Ottoman Extension of Direct Rule over South-eastern Syria (Transjordan), 1867–1914,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1991, pp. 190, 216–229, 332–333, 339–346. 14. Issawi, The Fertile Crescent 1800–1914, p. 313. For statistics on the growth in grain output in the districts of al-Balqa’ and al-Karak and in the Hawran (including ‘Ajlun) after the imposition of direct Ottoman rule, see tables 3.1 and 3.2 in Tariq Tell, “Bedouin Fallah and State: the Social Origins of Hashemite Rule in Jordan,” Ph.D. Oxford University, 2000. 15. Rogan, Frontiers, pp. 68, 82–92; Michael Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 37–49, 54–63. 16. Rogan, “Money-lending and Capital Flows from Nablus, Damascus and Jerusalem to the Qada’ of al-Salt in the Last Decades of the Ottoman Rule.” Paper prepared for the conference on The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th Century, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, July 1989. 17. Rogan, “Incorporating the Periphery”, p. 96. 18. Raouf Sa‘d Abu Jaber, Pioneers Over Jordan: The Frontier of Settlement in Jordan, 1850–1914 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989), pp. 169–175, 221–225, 228–230. 19. Issawi, The Fertile Crescent 1800–1914, pp. 330–331. Martha Mundy maintains that in ‘Ajlun the timing of Ottoman land registration (tatwib), and the vicissitudes of the international grain market con- spired to keep land in the hands of the fellahin: “with the opening of the Suez canal ...cheaper grain became available to Western Europe from India and North America. And so it happened that in Qadha’ ‘Ajlun tapu registration coincided more or less with a decline in prices for the export market for Syrian grain. This fact meant that the interest of urbanites in the acquisition of title to land in this distant rural area never deepened to challenge widespread peasant right to land,” c.f. “Village Authority and the Legal Order of Property (the Southern Hawran 1876–1922),” pp. 67–68. 20. The fact “cultivators [had their] own logic of differentiating by types of land and these continued to operate side-by-side Ottoman cat- egories even after tatwib,” (Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan, p. 49) has been increasingly recognized as a result of the work of Martha Mundy and Richard Saumarez-Smith. Cf. Martha Mundy, “Shareholders and the State: Representing the Village in the Late 19th Century Land Registers of the Southern Hawran,” in T. Philipp editor, The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th Centuries The Common and the Speciﬁc in the Historical Experience (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992); and Martha Mundy and Richard Saumarez-Smith, Governing Property. Law, Administration and Production in Ottoman Notes 173

Syria. London: I.B. Tauris, 2007, part III, which illustrate the work- ings of a hybrid system through micro-histories of land registration in both the plains and hilly areas of ‘Ajlun. 21. Rogan, “Incorporating the Periphery”, pp. 153, 188–190. 22. William L. Ochsenwald, “Opposition to Political Centralisation in South Jordan and the Hijaz” Muslim World, Vol. 63, No. 14 (October 1973), p. 119. 23. Hasan Kayyali, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 72–78; Rogan, Frontiers, pp. 191–193. 24. Sa‘ad Abu Diyyah, Safahat Mattwiyyah min Tarikh al-Urdunn, Hawadith wa Mawadhi‘ Mutafarriqah min Tarikh al-Urdunn ﬁ al-Qarn al-Madhi wa al-Hadhir (Amman: Dar al-Bashir, 1998), pp. 91–97; Kayyali, Arabs and Young Turks, pp. 109–110; Rogan, “Incorporating the Periphery,” pp. 178–188. 25. On the linkage between the Karak revolt and the nationalist circles in Damascus see Rogan, Frontiers; Abu Diyyah, Safahat Mattwiyyah min Tarikh al-Urdunn, pp. 99–103. Additional links with urban politics have been uncovered by Kayyali: The 1908 election in al- Karak had been won by Qadr al-Majali, paramount shaykh of the district; however, Qadr was prevented from taking up his post because of his illiteracy. His kinsman Tawﬁq was put forward in his stead, but his candidacy was only accepted by the authorities after the intercession of the Arabist deputies (Kayyali, Arabs and Young Turks, 1997, p. 66). For excerpts from the Damascene newspa- pers, see al-Muqtabas: 21 Muharram 1329/ 22 January 1911 and idem. “A-hamla al-hawraniyyah” al Muqtabas: 2 Safar/2 February 1911. Both are reproduced in Muhammad Ghathyan al-Tarawnah, Madhi al-Karak wa hadiruh (Mu’ta: Manshurat Jami‘t Mu’ta, 1994), pp. 45–47. 26. Rogan, Frontiers, p. 201. This has led some historians to interpret the al-Karak revolt in nationalist terms, or to see in it a precur- sor of the Arab Revolt see Ochsenwald, “Opposition to Political Centralisation”, p. 304. 27. Cf. P. Khouri, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism. The Poli- tics of Damascus 1860–1920 (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 93–95. 28. Rogan, “Incorporating the Periphery”, p. 188. 29. For the amnesty for al-Karak’s rebels and the restoration of the Majali, see Rogan, Frontiers, pp. 213–214; Kayyali, Arabs and Young Turks, p. 110. 30. Awdah al-Qusus, “Muthakkarat ‘Awdah Al-Qusus (1877–1943) wa thawrat al-karak (1910),” Unpublished Manuscript, p. 104. 31. Ibid., p. 104. 32. St. Antony’s College. The Private Papers Collection, Arab Bulletin numbers 66, 84. 174 Notes

33. Schatkowski-Schilcher, “The Famine of 1915–1919,” pp. 234–235, 241–242. 34. Cf. Jeremy Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorised Biography of T.E. Lawrence (Aylesbury: Minerva Press, 1990), pp. 412–415. 35. St. Antony’s College. The Private Papers Collection, Arab Bulletin numbers 45, 46. 36. Robin Bidwell, Arabian Personalities of the Early Twentieth Century (Melksham: Archive Editions, 1986), pp. 106, 114–115. 37. Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia, pp. 396–375, 416–417. 38. Munib al-Madi and Sulayman Musa, Tarikh al-urdunn ﬁ al- qarn al-‘ishrin, 1900–1959 (Amman, Maktabat al Muhtasib, 1959), pp. 52–53. 39. St. Antony’s College. The Private Papers Collection, Arab Bulletin number 64. 40. Ibid., Arab Bulletin numbers 73, 75. 41. Bidwell, Arabian Personalities, p. 154. 42. Matthew Hughes, “The Trans-Jordan Raids: Linking Up with the Arabs, March-May 1918,” Unpublished Manuscript, King’s College, University of London, 1995, pp. 20–24. 43. St. Antony’s College. The Private Papers Collection, Arab Bulletin number 71. 44. Bidwell, Arabian Personalities, p. 100; St. Antony’s College. The Private Papers Collection, Arab Bulletin numbers 92, 97. 45. Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia, p. 528. 46. Bidwell, Arabian Personalities. 47. W. Kazziha, The Social History of Southern Syria (Trans-Jordan) in the Nineteenth Century (Beirut: Arab University of Beirut Publications, 1972). 48. Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia, p. 415. 49. Al-Qusus, “Muthakharat Awda al-Qusus,” pp. 109–110. 50. Ibid.,” pp. 113–114; St. Antony’s College. The Private Papers Col- lection, Arab Bulletin number 88. 51. Sulayman Musa, “The Rise of Arab Nationalism and the Emergence of Trans-Jordan,” in W.Oschenwald and W. Haddad editors, Nation- alism in a Non-National State: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), p. 250; Kazziha, The Social History of Southern Syria, p. 27. 52. Munib al-Madi and Sulayman Musa, Tarikh al-urdunn, pp. 55, 76–77. 53. Kazziha, The Social History of Southern Syria, p. 28. 54. Hughes, “The Trans-Jordan Raids.” 55. Munib al-Madi and Sulayman Musa, Tarikh al-urdunn, pp. 53–56. 56. Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia, pp. 414, 1071. 57. Al-Qusus, “Mudhakharat Awda al-Qusus,” pp. 128–129; St. Antony’s College. The Private Papers Collection, Arab Bulletin number 88. Notes 175

58. Ibid., Al-Qusus, “Mudhakharat Awda al-Qusus.” 59. Quoted in Bidwell, Arabian Personalities, p. 114. 60. Similarly, it was argued that on the other side of the Syrian Desert the ‘Amarat would not join the Revolt “until our frontier on both Euphrates and Tigris is far enough northwards to control the Amarat markets” (ibid.). St. Antony’s College. The Private Papers Collection, Arab Bulletin number 71. 61. Schatkowski-Schilcher, “The Famine of 1915–1919.” 62. Al-Qusus, “Mudhakharat Awda al-Qusus”. 63. Salih Mustafa al-Tall, Kul Shay’ li al-Talib Milhim Wahbi al-Tall. Muthakkarat Salih Mustafa al-Tall (1951), p. 40. 64. The term is taken from James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Every- day Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), p. XVI. 65. St. Antony’s College. The Private Papers Collection, Arab Bulletin number 91. 66. Kazziha, The Social History of Southern Syria,p.33. 67. P. Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism, p. 82; Khayriyyah Qasimiyyah, Al-hukumah al-‘arabiyyah ﬁ dimashq, 1918–1920 (Beirut: al-Mu’assasah al-‘Arabiyyah lil dirasat wa al-Nashir, 1982), pp. 218–225, 231–233.

Chapter 4 1. British interests in Arabia centered around the protection of allies in Kuwait and the lower Gulf; secure communications across the region—and in particular the safety of the new desert air routes linking the Mediterranean, the Gulf, and ultimately India; and the safety of the annual pilgrimages to the holy cities of the Hijaz. For the evolution of imperial interests in Arabia after the war cf. Clive Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia 1925–1939: The Imperial Oasis (London: Frank Cass, 1983), pp. 11, 29. The contrasting views of the (A.T.) “Wilsonians” associated with the Government of India who favored direct colonial rule in Mesopotamia and the (T.E.) “Lawrentians” who favored an indirect role have been re-examined by Timothy J. Paris in “British Middle East Policy-Making After First World War: the Lawrentian and Wilsonian Schools,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 41 (July 1998), pp. 773–793. For the latter indirect rule was to be part of a “Sharifian solution” that fulfilled wartime promises to grant Arab independence under Hashemite rule, and Paris’s Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule, 1920–25: the Sherifian Solution (London: Frank Cass, 2003) is now the most comprehensive study of this policy. Britain’s growing disenchantment with Hussayn ibn ‘Ali is traced on pp. 251–268. 2. Peake Papers: Biographical Fragments. 176 Notes

3. W. Kazziha, The Social History of Southern Syria (TransJordan), pp. 34–35; Sulayman Musa, “The Rise of Arab Nationalism and the Emergence of Transjordan,” in William Haddad and William L. Ochsenwald editors, Nationalism in a Non-National State. The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), p. 252. 4. F. G. Peake, “Trans Jordan,” Royal Central Asian Society Journal, Vol. 10 (1939), p. 378. Muhammad Ubaydat has used biographies of some of the key Hawrani participants in such action—rural notables and men with a background in the Ottoman military or Istiqlalist politics—to weave such instances of armed resistance in to a narrative of a Hawran wide anti-colonial revolt—“Thawrat al-Jawlan” that spilt over into southern Lebanon. See his Sirat al-shahid Kayid al-Muﬂih al-‘Ubaydat. Awwal shahid urduni ‘ala turab Falastin (Athens: Dar Bashar, no date given), pp. 115–155; Sirat al-munadhill ‘Ali Khulqi al-Sharari, 1868–1960 (Amman: no publisher mentioned, 1993), pp. 44–74; Ahmad Muraywid, 1886–1926: Qa’id thawrat al-Jawlan wa junub Lubnan wa Sharq-al-Urdunn (London: Riyad al-Rayyes, 1997), pp. 217–230, 240–260; al-Mujahid Khalaf Muhammad al- Tall, 1890–1942 (Amman: al-Dustur, 2003), pp. 57–73. 5. Matthew Hughes, “The Battle of Megido & The Fall of Damascus, 19 September-3 October 1918,” Unpublished Manuscript, King’s College University, London, December, 1995, p. 233. 6. B. Wasserstein, The British in Palestine (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 73–89. 7. The railway itself marked the so-called Meinertzhagen Line, which Chaim Weizman wanted as the eastern frontier of Palestine. Aaron S. Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World; The Cairo Conference of 1921 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1971), pp. 205–208. The most thorough airing of Zionist claims to Trans- Jordan appears in one of the earliest dissertations to be completed on the country, Nahum Zackai’s “Trans-Jordan, 1914–1939,” Ph.D. Northwestern Unversity, 1944. Weizman’s claim that “Trans-Jordan was part and parcel of Palestine” until 1921 (p. 40) is comprehen- sively rebutted by Andrew Kanya-Forstner, who shows that the British always thought of the region as on that would remain under Arab control, cf. “Was Jordan Palestine?” Middle East Focus, Vol. 8, No. 6 (1986), pp. 14–18. 8. Henry Diab, “Ta’sis Imarat Sharq Al-Urdunn,” Shu’un Falastiniyya, No. 50/51 (November 1975), p. 271. 9. Jeremy Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorised Biography of T.E. Lawrence (London: Minerva, 1990), pp. 205–207; Diab, “Ta’sis Imarat Sharq Al-’Urdunn,” p. 271. 10. Eyewitness accounts of the al-Salt meeting report that Samuel tried to tempt the gathering by promising supplies of sugar and rice, Awdah Notes 177

al-Qusus, “Mudhakarat ‘Awdah al-Qusus (1877–1943) wa thawrat al-karak (1910),” Unpublished Manuscript, No Date, p. 134. How- ever, the assembled notables remained unenthusiastic until Samuel agreed to pardon two fugitives from the Palestine government, ‘Aref al ‘Aref and a youthful Haj Amin Hussaini, who had attended under the protection of Rafayfan Majali and Sultan al ‘Adwan (Maan Abu Nowar, The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Volume I: The Creation and Development of Transjordan 1920–29 (Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1989), p. 25). 11. Munib al-Madi and Sulayman Musa, Tarikh al-’urdunn ﬁ al- qarnn al-‘ishrin 1900–1959 (Amman: Maktabat Al-Muhtasab, 1959), pp. 103–104. 12. Ibid., pp. 104–109; Mahmud ‘Ubaydat, Ahmad Murawid 1880– 1926, pp. 225–230. 13. Al-Madi and Musa, Tarikh al-’urdunn, pp. 109–114; Mustafa B. Hamarneh, “Social and Economic Transformation of Trans-Jordan (1921–1946),” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown Uni- versity, 1985. Jordanian historians hold that these essentially tribal rivalries may have been encouraged by Somerset, who “seemed to excel in the ...craft of ‘divide et impera’.” (Nowar, The History of the Hashemite Kingdom, p. 31; also Hamarneh, “Social and Economic Transformation of Trans-Jordan,” p. 110). Against this must be set Somerset’s own papers, which at times show him working to unify ‘Ajlun with the other districts to the south. Thus, a letter to his father dated January 28, 1921 (in the St. Antony’s College Private Papers Collection: Somerset Papers) speaks of a meeting in Jarash “a week ago ...where we had an unsuccessful meeting to try and combine al-Salt and ‘Ajlun.” 14. Musa, “The Rise of Arab Nationalism and the Emergence of Transjordan,” p. 253. 15. Al-Madi and Musa, Tarikh al-urdunn, p. 115. 16. Hamarneh, “Social and Economic Transformation,” pp. 108–109. 17. Uriel Dann, Studies in the History of Trans Jordan, 1920–1914: The Making of a State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 21. 18. Ibid., pp. 21–25. 19.MajorC.S.Jarvis,Arab Command: The Biography of Lieutenant Colonel F.G. Peake Pasha (London: Hutchinson Publishers, 1948), pp. 69–70. 20. Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia 1925–1939, p. 23; Randall Baker, King Hussein and the Kingdom of the Hijaz (Cambridge: The Oleander Press, 1979), pp. 191–203; Joshua Teitelbaum, The Rise and Fall of the Hashemite Kingdom of Arabia (London: Hurst, 2001), pp. 152–182. 21. For a recent overview of the Khurma dispute, see Joseph Kostiner, “Prologue of Hashemite Downfall. A New Look at the Khurmah 178 Notes

Dispute,” in Asher Susser and Aryeh Shmuelevitz editors, The Hashemites in the Modern World. Essays in Honour of the Late Professor Uriel Dann (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 47–64. 22. Joseph Kostiner, The Making of Saudi Arabia,1916–1936. From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 31; Joshua Teitelbaum, The Hashemite Kingdom of Arabia, pp. 261–265. ‘Abdullah’s role in the battle of Turaba is set out in Mary Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 36–38. 23. Baker, King Hussein and the Kingdom of the Hijaz, p. 174. 24. Kazziha, “The Political Evolution of Transjordan,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3 (1979), pp. 342–343; The strength of Arabist sentiment in Amman was made clear during the visit of the King Crane Commission in June 1919, when “nineteen delegations, about two hundred persons in all” expressed almost unanimous support for an independent Syria. Cf. Harry N. Howard, The King Crane Commis- sion.AnAmericanInquiryintheMiddleEast(Beirut: Khayats, 1963), p. 112. 25. Kazziha, “The Political Evolution of Transjordan”; cf. al-Madi and Musa, Tarikh al-’urdunn, pp. l34–136, for his proclamation against the French. 26. Mary Wilson, “A Passage to Independence. King ‘Abdullah and Transjordan 1921–1951,” in Edward Ingram editor, National and International Politics in the Middle East. Essays in Honour of Elie Kedourie (London: Frank Cass, 1986), p. 190. 27. Mary Wilson,“King ‘Abdullah of Jordan: A Political Biography,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Oxford University 1984, p. 103. 28. P. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920–45 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 105–106. 29. Diab “Ta’sis Imarat Sharq Al-Urdunn,” p. 275. 30. Musa, “The Rise of Arab Nationalism,” pp. 256–257; Hamarneh, “Social and Economic Transformation of Trans-Jordan,” pp. 117–118. 31. Diab, “Ta’sis Imarat Sharq Al-Urdunn,” p. 288. 32. Hamarneh, “Social and Economic Transformation,” p. 119; also Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World; The Cairo Conference of 1921 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1971), pp. 99–102. 33. Hamarneh, “Social and Economic Transformation,” p. 121. 34. Sulayman Musa, Imarat sharqiyy al-’urdunn: Nash’ataha wa tatawwuruha ﬁ rub‘ qarn, 1921–1946 (Amman: Lajnat tarikh al- ’urdunn, 1990), pp. 94–104. 35. Quoted by Hamarneh, “Social and Economic Transformation,” p. 118. 36. Ibid. Notes 179

37. Musa, “The Rise of Arab Nationalism,” p. 256. 38. M. E. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East 1792–1923 (London: Longman, 1987), pp. 334–337; Paris’s Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule, pp. 164–172. 39. Klieman, Foundations of British Policy, pp. 12–31, cf. Musa, “The Rise of Arab Nationalism,” pp. 119–120. 40. Ibid., p. 117. 41. Ibid., pp. 12–31, cf. Musa, “The Rise of Arab Nationalism,” p. 116. 42. Wilson, “A Passage to Independence,” p. 191. 43. K. Zirakli, ‘Aman Fi Amman (Damascus: No Publisher, 1925), pp. 110–112. 44. Ibid., p. 51. 45. Jarvis, Arab Command, p. 107. 46. Hamarneh, “Social and Economic Transformation,” pp. 125–126. 47. H. St. John Philby, “Transjordan,” Royal Central Asian Society Jour- nal, Vol. 11 (1924), p. 305; on British estimates, the collection rate was also higher, the sum of collected in 1922–1923 was twice that collected in 1912. Cf. Michael R. Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p. 72. 48. P. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan (London: Frank Cass, 1967), p. 76; Abbas Murad, Al-Dawr al-Siyasi li al-Jaysh al-’urduni (Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1973), pp. 17–18. 49. Zirakli, ‘Aman Fi Amman, pp. 117–119. 50. Hamarneh, “Social and Economic Transformation,” p. 126. 51. Ibid., p. 128. 52. Al-Madi and Musa, Tarikh al-’urdunn, p. 165. 53. Zirakli, ‘Aman Fi Amman, pp. 187–189. For a full account of the Gourand incident, see Mahmud ‘Ubaydat, Ahmad Muraywid 1880– 1926, pp. 245–260. 54. Klieman, Foundations of British Policy. 55. Peake, “Trans Jordan,” p. 385. 56. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, p. 103. 57. Ibid., pp. 118–119; Zirakli, ‘Aman Fi Amman, pp. 189–191. 58. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, pp. 118–119. 59. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate, p. 119. 60. Kazziha, “The Political Evolution of Trans Jordan,” pp. 239–257, 250; Dann, Studies in the History of Trans Jordan, pp. 37–41. 61. For a detailed account of Lawrence’s, visit see Uriel Dann, “T.E. Lawrence in Amman,” Abr Nahraim, Vol. 13 (1972), p. 43. 62. Although ironically enough a ﬁrm advocate of alliance with Ibn Sa‘ud since a wartime meeting with the Wahhabi leader. In the sardonic words of one member of the Arab Bureau, the “Indian” view of Arabia in this instance amounted to the assertion “that there is no Emir but Ibn Sa’ud and (H. St. John) Philby is his proxy,” quoted in Kostiner, The Making of Saudi Arabia, p. 33. 180 Notes

63. E. Monroe, Philby of Arabia (London: Faber and Faber, l973), pp. 116–117. 64. Gary Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia. Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa‘ud (London: Frank Cass, 1976), pp. 190–192. 65. Kostiner, Making of Saudi Arabia, pp. 93–94. 66. Monroe, Philby of Arabia, p. 125; Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, p. 101. 67. Kostiner, The Making of Saudi Arabia, pp. 52–55. 68. Dann, “T.E. Lawrence in Amman.” 69. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, pp. 122–123. 70. For the process that led to this fictional status see Musa, “The Rise of Arab Nationalism,” p. 261; Dann, “The Independence of 1922–23,” in Studies in the History of Trans Jordan, 1984, pp. 47–48. 71. Musa, Imarat sharqiyy al-’urdunn, pp. 142–146. 72. The contemptuous term given ‘Abdullah’s methods of governing by Britain’s “men on the spot.” See Toby Dodge, “An Arabian Prince, British Gentlemen, and the Tribes East of the Jordan River,” Occa- sional Paper 13, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, May 1994, pp. 33–34, for the contrast between them and the Weberian “rational-legal” model aspired to by British officialdom. 73. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, pp. 131–132; Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan, p. 72. 74. Philby, “Transjordan,” p. 306. For a more detailed account of the ‘Adwan movement, see in particular the important reconsideration by Sulayman Musa, “Harakat hilf al-balqa’: thawra am harakat islah? Aylul 1923” Al-Ra’i Newspaper, September 4–6, 1997, reprinted in his Dirasat fi tarikh al-urdunn al-hadith (Amman: Ministry of Cul- ture, 1999), pp. 142–189. This is drawn on by Yoav Alon for what is now the most comprehensive treatment of the ‘Adwan uprising “The Balqa’ Revolt: Tribes and Early State-building in Trans-Jordan,” Die Welt des Islam, Vol. 46 (2006), pp. 7–42. ‘Abdullah Muttlaq ‘Awadh al-‘Assaf provides a “native” history of “al-thawra al-Majidiyya” in “Majid al-‘Adwan (1898–1946): Masiratih was dawruh fi al-hayat al-siyasiyyah al-‘urduniyyah,” M.A. Dissertation, Jordan University 2002, pp. 58–74. 75. The tax increase was, moreover, felt most strongly in al-Balqa’, where the incidence of taxation per head more than doubled as compared to late Ottoman times. For an early appreciation of the central role of heavy taxation in precipitating the ‘Adwan movement and the uprising in Kurah two years before, see Muwafaq Mahaddin, Tatawwur ‘ilaqat al-intaj wa al-harakat al-fallahiyyah fi al-rif al- ‘urduni (Beirut: Dar al-Katib, 1981), pp. 174–176. The ‘Adwan movement brought immediate results on the tax front as “the government decided to cancel any taxes from 1918–1920 that were owed Notes 181

to the government except amounts owed to mulatizims and owed by multazims to the government,” Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan,p.72. 76. These pioneering “nativist” nationalists not only believed that the Istiqlalists ...“represented a foreign elite who dominated ...the bureaucracy ...to the exclusion of the native people of the land,” but made a direct connection between ‘Abdullah’s patrimonial methods and the presence of the Istiqlal. The impact of their agitation on popular opinion was such that according to Eugene Rogan, “Trans-Jordanians ...responded by refusing to pay taxes to an alien government that was seen to be squandering their country’s limited funds.” Cf. his The Arabs: A History (New York: Basic Books, 2009), pp. 184–185. For earlier interpretations of the movement in Jordanian nationalist terms, see Ya’qub al-‘Awdat (Al Badawi al- mulaththam): ‘Arar sha‘ir al-’Urdunn (Amman: no publisher mentioned, 1958), pp. 288–289; Nahid Hattar, Fi al-qadiyyah al-’urduniyya al-‘arabiyya: majmu ‘at watha’iq siyasiyyah, 1929 (Amman: Al- Dar al-‘Arabiyyah Li al tawazi’ wa Al- Nasher 1985), pp. 33–35. 77. Madi and Musa, Tarikh al-’urdunn, p. 312. Istiqlalists such as Ahmad Muraywid who were committed to armed struggle against the French may well have been at odds with the more moderate of their comrades who sought compromise with Britain. They were certainly regarded in a different light by the Trans-Jordanian nationalists. Mustafa Wahbi al-Tall named his third son after Muraywid. His ﬁfth was also named in honor of a militant Istiqlalist, Sa‘id Ammun, who was also (like Muraywid) killed during the Great Syrian Revolt. 78. Musa, “Harakt hilf al-balqa’,” p. 150. 79. Al-Madi and Musa, Tarikh al-’urdunn, p. 214. 80. Ibid. 81. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, pp. 131–132. 82. For contrasting accounts of the rift between the two men, see Monroe, Philby of Arabia, pp. 128–135; and Dodge, “An Arabian Prince,” pp. 18–19. 83. Benjamin Shwadran. Jordan: A State of Tension (New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959), p. l54; Baker, King Hussein and the Kingdom of the Hijaz, pp. 201–202, 222–228. 84. Baker, King Hussein and the Kingdom of the Hijaz, pp. 219–222. For a comprehensive discussion of the “question of Aqaba” at this time, see Leatherdale. Britain and Saudi Arabia, 1925–1939, pp. 38–50. 85. Joseph Kostiner, “Britain and the Northern Frontier,” p. 42, argues convincingly that the need to circumscribe the activities of al-Dawish and the Mutayr Ikhwan lay behind Ibn Sa‘ud’s courtship of the northern ‘Anaza and the attempt to drive a territorial wedge into Syria. Ibn Sa‘ud hoped that gaining access to western Iraq via a corridor between 182 Notes

Iraq and Trans-Jordan might inhibit any pro-Hashemite collaboration against him. Furthermore, this territorial advantage would ensure his control over the Syrian Desert and would aid in outﬂanking the new Mutayri refugees as well as earlier dissidents from Shammar. 86. Nuri’s shifts of allegiance are charted in Philip Khoury. “The Tribal Sheikh, French Tribal Policy, and the Nationalist Movement in Syria Between Two World Wars.” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1982), pp. 180–93. 87. Great Britain, Public Record Ofﬁce, CO831\13\11. 88. Dodge, “An Arabian Prince,” p. 19. 89. Uriel Dann, “The Political Confrontation of Summer 1924 in Trans Jordan.” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (May 1976), pp. 89–91, 159–168. 90. According to Maan Abu Nuwar, “In Amman, Sabri al-Tabba’, Hasan al-Shurbaji, ‘Ali Budair and Qasim al-Am‘ari collected contributions of money, food supplies and weapons and ammunition and Shaikh Hadithah al-Khuraishah [sic.] assisted by Jaddu’, ‘Anbur and Salim al- Khuraishah carried supplies from ‘Amman to Muwaqqar and across the desert to Azraq and Jabal al-Duruz,” History of the Hashemite Kingdom, pp. 196–197. 91. Riccardo Bocco, “Etat et Tribus Bedouines en Jordanie 1920–1990,” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, pp. 117–122; Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, pp. 170–182, 227–230. 92. The new frontiers neglected both local conceptions of territory in the form of tribal dirahs and Islamic forms that following Wahhabi practice saw in the payment of zakat to a given ruler an acknowledgment of sovereignty. Bocco, “Etat et Tribus Bedouines en Jordanie 1920–1990,” pp. 112–116. Bocco draws here on John Wilkinson’s conceptualization of British map-making in the Arabian desert. See John Wilkinson, “Territoires des Tribus Nomades et Delimitation Frontalieres en Arabie,” in R. Bocco, R. Jaubert, and F. Metral editors, Steppes d’Arabie, Pasteurs Agriculteurs et Commercants: Le Developpement de Zones Seches (Presses Universitaires De France, Paris: Cahier de IUED, Geneve, 1993), pp. 102–134. See also John Wilkinson, Arabian Frontiers: The Story of Britain’s Boundary Drawing in the Desert (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991). 93. Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, pp. 228–229; For the implications of ceding the Wadi Al-Sirhan, see George Antonious, “A Memoran- dum on the Eastern Frontier of TransJordan” 1925, in the Clayton Papers, Sudan Archive, University of Durham. Antonious acted as assistant to Clayton at the Hadda negotiations. 94. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan, pp. 99–100; Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia, 1925–1939. Notes 183

95. Bocco, “Etat et Tribus Bedouines en Jordanie 1920–1990,” pp. 327–330; Riccardo Bocco and Tariq Tell, “Pax Britannica in the Steppe,” in Tariq Tell and Eugene Rogan editors, Village Steppe and State. The Social Origins of Modern Jordan (London: British Academic Press, 1994), pp. 114–118; Nowar, The History of the Hashemite King- dom of Jordan. Volume II: The Development of Transjordan 1929–39 (Amman: Jordan Press Foundation, 1997), pp. 65–95; Yoav Alon, The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), pp. 84–92.

Chapter 5 1. Lawrence Tal, Politics, the Military and National Security in Jordan, 1954–1967 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2002), pp. 2–3. The Ottoman antecedents of the Trans-Jordanian state have been set out succinctly by Eugene Rogan in the epilogue to his Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 253–255. Rogan argues that “Abdullah and the British were not starting with a clean slate ...the laying of an infrastructure, the encouraging of an economically productive base, the introduction of a legal and bureaucratic order, and a history of popular acceptance of direct rule ... laid the foundations of statecraft to the east of the Jordan river.” 2. Hani Hawrani, Al- Tarkib al- ’iqtissadi al- ’ijtma‘i li sharq al- ’urdunn: Muqadimat al- tattawwur al- mushawwah, 1921–1950 (Beirut: Palestine Research Centre Books, 1978), p. 127. 3. Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power. Volume I: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 278. 4. Uriel Dann, “The Political Confrontation of Summer 1924 in Trans- Jordan,” in his Studies in the History of Trans Jordan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 81–91. 5. A partial list of these ofﬁcials is given in Tariq Tell, “Bedouin, Fallah and State, The Social Origins of Hashemite Rule in Jordan,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Oxford University, 2000, tables 5.2, 5.3, pp. 177–178. The exception was the cabinet headed by a Hijazi, ‘Abdullah Sarraj, once the Hanbali mufti of Mecca, who had arrived as a member of Amir ‘Abdullah’s retinue. For a full list of the various cabinet members during the Mandate years, see ‘Ali Mahafza, Tarikh al-urdunn al- mu’asir. ‘Ahd al-’imarah, 1921–1946 (Amman: no publisher, 1973), pp. 196–201. 6. A detailed account of administration and administrative law under the Mandate is given in Muhammad Ahmad Salah, al-‘Idara ﬁ ‘imarat sharq al-urdunn 1921–1946 (Irbid: Mallahi Press, 1984). 184 Notes

7. W. B. Tripe, “Report on the Administration of Transjordan,” Tripe Papers, Private Papers Collection, St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, p. 16. 8. Philip J. Robins, “The Consolidation of Hashemite Power in Jordan, 1921–1946,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Exeter, October 1988, calls this group an “external elite” in contrast to the “sharifian elite” composed of ‘Abdullah’s followers and the Istiqlal that held sway until 1924. He argues that “seeds of a British-backed elite com- prising both British and Arab personnel, can be traced back to the very establishment of the state.” However, it was only after the Istiqlal had been eliminated that it was possible “for the British to usher into important positions personnel who would owe complete loyalty to them,” p. 197. 9. Mahafza, Tarikh al-urdunn al-mu’asir, pp. 196–201. 10. The figures for the state employees are from Benjamin Shwadran, Jordan: A State of Tension (New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959), p. 186; Maan Abu Nowar, The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Volume II: The Development of Transjordan 1929–39 (Amman: Jordan Press Foundation, 1997), p. 62, provides a similar picture for 1936 and 1939 Figures giving the numbers of the Caucasian minorities in Trans-Jordan’s population can be found in Naval Intelligence Division, Palestine and Trans-Jordan, Geographical Handbooks Series, 1943, p. 465; and in A. Konikoff, Transjordan: An Economic Survey (Economic Research Institute of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Jerusalem, 1946), pp. 17–18. The most comprehensive survey of the Mandatory bureaucratic elite now available is Hani al-Hawrani, “al-Dawlah wa tashakkul al-nukhab fi sharqiyy al-urdunn al-intidabiyyah,” pp. 143–194 of his edited work, Dirasat fi tarikh al-urdunn al-ijtima‘I (Amman: Greater Amman Municipality, 2003). 11. See Shwadran, Jordan: A State of Tension, p. 175; and Philip Robins, A History of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 36–38; for brief discussions of the constitutional/administrative arrangements that resulted from the “Organic Law” of 1928. One index of the predominance of the executive is its leading role in initiating legislation, as illustrated in table 5.3, Tariq Tell, “Bedouin, Fallah and State,” p. 179. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the inertia of the Legislative Council led to its condemnation as inactive and unrep- resentative by the Party of the Transjordan National Congress. See ‘Isam Muhammad Mahmud al Sa‘idi, “Al-Harakah al-wataniyyah al- ‘urduniyya 1921–1946,” Ph. D. Dissertation, St. Joseph’s University, Beirut, 1991, pp. 111, 286–288. 12.MajorC.S.Jarvis,Arab Command: The Biography of Lieutenant Colonel F.G. Peake Pasha (London: Hutchinson Publishers, 1948), pp. 68–71. Notes 185

13. P. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan (London: Frank Cass, 1967), pp. 58–60; Glubb, A Study of the Arab Legion 1921–1957 (London: Frank Cass & Co, 1967), p. 64. 14. The origins of the “first generation” (al-ra‘il al-awwal)ofArab Legion Officers are set out in Tariq Tell “Bedouin, Fallah and State,” table 5.5, p. 181. 15. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan, pp. 69–73. 16. For the decision-making process as it played out in the High Com- mission in Jerusalem, see Jeffrey Rudd, “Origins of the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1990), pp. 161–184; David Omissi’s, Air Power and Colonial Control. The Royal Airforce, 1919–1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), discusses Air Control as an industrial era “tentacle of empire,” touching on the Trans-Jordanian case on pp. 68–69. 17. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan, Appendix 1. 18. Riccardo Bocco, “Etat et Tribus Bedouines en Jordanie 1920– 1990. Le Huwaytat: Territore, Changement Economique, Identite Politique,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Institut d’Etudes Politques de Paris, 1996, pp. 122–131. 19. For the historical legal-institutional evolution of this policy, see Riccardo Bocco and Tariq Tell, “Pax Britannica in the Steppe,” in Tell and Eugene Rogan editors, Village Steppe and State. The Social Origins of Modern Jordan (London: British Academic Press, 1994), pp. 116–119; idem., “La politique mandataire a l’égard des tribus de la steppe en Jordanie,” Maghreb-Machrek (January 1995), pp. 26–47. 20. The term is taken from Samuel Rolbant’s pamphlet, Hirelings of the Desert. Trans-Jordan and the Arab Legion (London: Amal Publica- tions, 1948). 21. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan, pp. 64, 76. Also ‘Abbas Murad, Al-dawr al-siyasi li al-jaysh al-’urduni, 1921–1973 (Beirut: Palestine Research Centre, 1973), pp. 35, 39. 22. For a brief review of the Mandate finances, see Tripe, “Report on the Administration of Transjordan,” p. 22. The British Resident Henry Cox was himself placed “under a tight financial regime” as a result of the Colonial Office’s belief “that in the years between 1921 and 1924 there was insufficient financial accountability in Transjordan.” Expenditures over L.P.100 (until 1930, L.P.50) had to be approved by the High Commissioner in Jerusalem, and “cash limits were fixed so that beyond an aggregate sum of L.P.2000, any new item of expenditure would have to be met from within the existing budget.” The O’Donnel commission sent out from the Treasury in 1930 recommended yet more cuts to social expenditures—this despite its members admission that “there was little scope for economies to be made.” Budget constraints were not relaxed until the replacement of Cox by Kirkbride in 1939. Cf. Vartan Amadouny, “Infrastructural 186 Notes

Development Under the British Mandate,” in Eugene Rogan and Tariq Tell editors, Village, Steppe and State: the Social Origins of Mod- ern Jordan (London: British Academic Press, 1994), p. 157. Detailed figures on Trans-Jordan’s public finances are set out in Tell, “Bedouin, Fallah and State,” tables 5.4 and 5.5, pp. 185–186. 23. Amadouny argues that despite meager resources, “Trans-Jordan managed to operate a relatively efficient health system.” Considerable progress was made in combating diseases such as malaria and tuber- culosis, and “both the government and the non-government sectors did much to bring organized professional health care to the people.” Education followed a “similar profile” although the lack of adequate tertiary education meant that “it was common for pupils ...to attend schools outside Trans-Jordan.” Cf. “Infrastructural Development Under the British Mandate,” pp. 153–159. 24. Konikoff, Transjordan-An Economic Survey, p. 94. Hawrani, Al- Tarkib al- ’iqtissady al- ’ijitma’y li sharq al-’urdunn, p. 127. 25. Given their early salience in the bureaucracy and the military elite, it is worth noticing that 85 percent of the Circassian minority lived in the Amman area and gained from the concentration of (educational and health) services that accompanied Amman’s growth. The leaders of the community in particular, who held the well-watered land along the “sayl” (flowing water) in what is now central Amman, must have benefited from the rise in property values that accompanied the town’s growth. 26. Hawrani, Al- Tarkib al- ’iqtissady al- ’ijitma’y li sharq al-’urdunn, p. 69. The changing distribution of the population is shown in Tell, “Bedouin, Fallah and State,” table 5.7, p. 187. The redistribution of the urban population was also a function of the shift in the axes of trade and communications brought by British rule, from one running north-south linking Syria and the Hijaz to an east-west orientation that joined Haifa and Baghdad. Irbid was an obvious beneficiary of this shift (although the growth of the town was at first constrained by its inadequate water supplies) and Ma‘an an equally clear loser. Together with the disruption of the pilgrimage trade as a result of the destruction visited on the Hijaz Railway during World War I, this led to a net emigration from the town and the formation of Ma‘ani “harat” (quarters) all along the train line as far north as al-Mafraq. 27. Konikoff, Transjordan: An Economic Survey, p. 65. 28. Hawrani, Al- Tarkib al- ’iqtisadi al- ’ijtma‘i li sharq al-’urdunn, pp. 105, 168. 29. For the influx of merchants to Amman, see Abla Amawi, “The Consol- idation of the Merchant Class in Transjordan during the Second World War,” in Rogan and Tell editors, Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan (London: Tauris, 1994), pp. 164–167. See also Abla Amawi, “State and Class in TransJordan: A Study of Notes 187

State Autonomy,” Vol. I, Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, December 1992, pp. 389–396. The most comprehensive source of information on this stratrum now available is the “special appnendix” to Ra’uf Abu Jaber’s Tarikh sharqiyy al-urdunn wa iqtissaduh khilal al-qarn al-tasi ‘ashar wa munatassaf al-‘ishrin (Amman: Ward Books, 2009). 30. For these factional conflicts, see Robins, “The Consolidation of Hashemite Power,” p. 298. The politics of Amman’s Chamber of Commerce, which intermediated the merchants’ relations with ‘Abdullah and the Mandatory authorities are described in Amawi, State and Class in Transjordan, pp. 400–413. 31. Vartan Amadouni, “Infrastructural Development Under the British Mandate,” in Rogan and Tell editors, Village, Steppe and State, pp 89–90, 102–103. 32. A Memorandum on the Eastern Frontier of Transjordan by George Antonious. University of Durham: The Sudan Archive, Clayton Papers, 1925. 33. PRO, CO 733/133/8: Cox to Chief Secretary, Government Offices, Jerusalem. 34. For a full report of the survey and its results, see Norman MacLennan, “General Health Conditions of Certain Bedouin Tribes in Trans- Jordan,” Transactions of the Royal Society for Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, Vol. 29, No. 23 (November 1935), pp. 227–248. 35. St. Antony’s College, Private Papers Collection, Glubb Papers: John Bagot Glubb, “A Monthly Report on the Administration of the Deserts of Trans-Jordan for the Months of February 1932 and June 1934” (Henceforward “Glubb’s Reports”). 36. Robins, History of Jordan, p. 39; Issam Muhammed al-Sa‘di, al- Haraka al-Wattaniyya al-Urduniyya, 1921–46 (Amman: Azminah, 2011), pp. 282–285. A further “driver” of the Congress movement may have been the hardship in the towms caused by the 1927 earth- quake and the inflationary pressures that followed the introduction of the Palestinian pound as Trans-Jordan’s currency in 1928, cf. Nahum Zackai, “Trans-Jordan, 1914–1939,” Ph.D. Northwestern Unversity, (1944 ), p. 301. The term “nativist” is taken from Joseph Massad, “Identifying the Nation: The Juridical and Military Bases of Jordanian National Identity,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University 1998, pp. 38–42. 37. Massad, “Identifying the Nation,” p. 41. For the high politics of the Rutenberg conession see Sarah Reguer, “Rutenberg and the Jordan River: a Revolution in Hydroelectricity,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1994), pp. 691–729. 38. The membership of the first Transjordan National Congress, and the leaders of the ECNC, are set out in Tell, “Bedouin, Fallah and State,” tables 5.9 and 5.8. 188 Notes

39. Al-Bashir, Juthur al-wisaya al-urduniyya, p. 8; Yoav Gelber, Jewish Transjordanian Relations 1921–1948 (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 37–53. 40. Al-Sa‘di, al-Haraka al-Wattaniyya al-Urduniyya, pp. 225–266. 41. Ibid., pp. 267–275; Massad, “Identifying the Nation,” p. 44. 42. Muhammad ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Kharaysat. al-Urduniyyun wa al- qadhaya al-wataniya wa al-qawmiyyah: dirasat ﬁ al-mawqif al- sha’by al-’urduny, 1918–1939 (Amman: University of Jordan, 1992), pp. 57–60. 43. The quotations in the last paragraph are taken from Betty Anderson, Nationalist Voices in Jordan. The Street and the State (Austin: Texas University Press, 2005), pp. 46–47. Anderson draws on Richard Loring. Taylor who stresses the importance of poetry in a largely illiterate society like Trans-Jordan as “probably the major cultural vehicle for formulating cultural identity in response to historical events”; see Mustafa’s Journey. Verse of Arar Poet of Jordan (Irbid: Yarmouk University, 1988), p. 2. Al-Tall’s relationship to the Trans- Jordanian opposition is set out in Subhi Abu Ghanimah’s preface to Ya‘qub al-‘Awdat (al-Badawi al-mulaththam)‘Arar Sha‘ir al- Urdunn (Amman: no publisher, 1958), pp. 7–10; his political writings from the early 1930s have been collected by Muhammad Ka‘wash in Awraq Arar al-siyasiyyah. Watha’iq Mustafa Wahbi al-Tall (Amman: no publisher mentioned, 1980s). 44. The documentary literature surrounding the Congress movement has been collected by Nahidh Hattar, Fi al-qadiyyah al-’urduniyya al- arabiyya: majmu‘at watha’iq siyasiyyah (Amman: al-Dar al-‘arabiyya li al-tawzi’ wa al-nasher, 1986). See also ‘Ali Mahafza, Al Fikr al-siyasi si. ﬁ al-urdunn. Wath’iq wa Nusus, 1916–1946, Volume II (Amman: Markaz al-kutub al-’urduni, 1990). The spillover of the ideas of the Congress opposition into the politics of the Legislative Council in the early 1930s is show in the account of its debates given in Abu Nowar, The Development of Transjordan 1929–39, pp. 96–106. 45. Jarvis, Arab Command,p.60.

Chapter 6 1. Mustafa B. Hamarneh, “Social and Economic Transformation of Trans-Jordan, 1921–1946”, Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown Univer- sity, 1985, pp. 150–152, 210–212. 2. Ibid., pp. 174–188. idem, “Siyasat al-intidab al-baritani al- ’iqtissadiyyah ﬁ al-urdunn, 1932–1946,” in Mustafa Hamarneh editor, Al-iqtissad al-urduni: al-mushkilat wa al-afaq (Amman: Jordan Centre for Strategic Studies, 1994), pp. 11–51. 3. For a thorough critique of Hamarneh’s use of both theoretical material and historical sources, see Vartan Amadouni, “Notes on the Notes 189

Application of Dependency Theory to Trans Jordan”, Unpublished Manuscript, Department of Geography, University of Southampton, 1990. 4. Vartan Amadouni, “Infrastructural Development under the British Mandate,” in Eugene Rogan and Tariq Tell editors, Village, Steppe and State. The Social Origins of Modern Jordan (London: Tauris, 1994), pp. 128–129. Amadouni draws on Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Volume I: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 146–153. 5. David Omissi’s, Air Power and Colonial Control. The Royal Airforce, 1919–1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), discusses Air Control as an industrial era “tentacle of empire,” touching on the Trans-Jordanian case on pp. 68–69. 6. St. Antony’s College, Private Papers Collection, Glubb Papers, John Bagot Glubb, “A Monthly Report on the Administration of the Deserts of Transjordan for the Month of November 1934.” See also Yoav Alon, The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), pp. 91–95. 7. St. Antony’s Collection: Glubb papers, Monthly Reports on the Administration of the Deserts of Transjordan, May 1933. 8. Riccardo Bocco and Tariq Tell, “Pax Britannica in the Steppe,” in Tariq Tell and Eugene Rogan editors, Village Steppe and State. The Social Origins of Modern Jordan (London: British Academic Press, 1994), pp. 118–119; Alon, The Making of Jordan, pp. 95–96. 9. John Bagot Glubb, The Story of the Arab Legion (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948), pp. 201–223. 10. For the Ibn Rifada affair and its consequences, see Sa‘ad Abu Diyyah, Lurd al-sahra’. Dirasat awraq al-dhabit al-baritani john bagot glubb, 1920–1956 (Amman: Dar al-Bashir, 2009), pp. 97–111; Joseph Kost- iner, The Making of Saudi Arabia. From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 165–166;Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 101. Bocco and Tell, Pax Britannica, p. 119. 11. St. Antony’s Collection: Glubb’s Reports for June and August 1933, January 1940. For the operation of the Bedouin Control Board courts, see St. Antony’s Collection: Glubb Papers: A Note on the Principles and Administration of Tribal Law. 12. According to Glubb it was difﬁcult to “see how the occupants of these ﬁfty tents can long keep alive. If they could sell all the camels which they now possess they might subsist for a year, but would then be faced with starvation.” See CO831\11\1 Glubb, “A Memorandum on the Situation,” p. 112. 13. Estimates from the International Institute of Agriculture indicate that the total numbers of camels in Trans-Jordan fell from 27,600 in 190 Notes

1931 to 2,300 by 1936. Cf. Nahum Zackai, “Trans-Jordan, 1914– 1939,” Ph.D. Northwestern Unversity (1944), p. 259. Table 5.1 on p. 197 of Tariq Tell, “Bedouin Fallah and State. The Social Origins of Hashemite Rule,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Oxford University, 2000, shows the fall in total livestock numbers in Trans-Jordan during this difficult decade. Livestock figures culled from the local traditions of the Sirhan furnish a “native” view of of the Bedouins’ plight: in 1880 they claimed to possess 11,500 camels, 19,000 sheep, and 1,100 horses. By 1939 the figures were respectively 3,000, 380, and 24. 14. Glubb Papers, Monthly Report, March 1933. 15. Eiliahu Epstein, “The Bedouin of Transjordan: Their Social and Eco- nomic Problems,” Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society,Vol.25 (1938), pp. 229–230. 16. Glubb Papers, “A Note on the Wadi Sirhan Question.” 17. For an overview of this “colonialism as fine art” cf. Alon, The Making of Jordan, pp. 96–103. 18. St. Antony’s Collection: Glubb papers, Monthly Reports on the Administration of the Deserts of Transjordan, December 1930. 19. Ibid., June 1932. 20. Ibid., July 1933; October 1932. 21. Ibid., May 1935. 22. St. Antony’s Collection: Glubb papers, Monthly Reports on the Administration of the Deserts of Transjordan, August\September \November \1934. Glubb’s control of the process of relief work in the Desert area was complete: orders issued to to a subcontractor working on the Haifa-Baghdad road in 1932 stipulate that he use only those men sent by Glubb, and for a wage and duration that he decideds (St. Antony’s Collection: Glubb Papers: A note to al Umari dated January 1935). 23. St. Antony’s Collection: Glubb papers, Monthly Reports on the Administration of the Deserts of Transjordan, June 1934. 24. Ibid., July 1933. 25. Ibid., April 1934. 26. St. Antony’s Collection: Glubb’s Report for December 1938. 27. Ibid. 28. Allon, Making of Jordan, p. 115; Wilson, Abdullah, Britain, pp. 119–120. 29. For an account of the Umm al-‘Amad congress, see Muhammad ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Kharaysat. al-Urduniyyun wa al-qadhaya al-wataniya wa al-qawmiyyah: dirasat fi al-mawqif al-sha‘biyy al-’urduniyy, 1918– 1939 (Amman: University of Jordan, 1992), pp. 185–187. 30. Wilson, ‘Abdullah Britain, p. 125; Benny Morris, The Road to Jerusalem. Glubb Pasha, Palestine and the Jews (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), pp. 51–55. Notes 191

31. Eliahu Epstein, “Correspondence: The Economic Situation of Trans- Jordan Tribes,” Royal Central Asian Society Journal, Vol. 26 (1939), pp. 177–185. 32. John B. Glubb, “The Economic Situation of the Trans-Jordan Tribes,” Royal Central Asian Journal, Vol. 25 (July 1938), p. 499. 33. According to Glubb, by the late 1930s, traders were making use of the police posts as resting places or even as a means of improving the efﬁciency of their trade. The forts were places where “merchants can send out private telegrams from police posts far out in the desert and ask the market price of livestock, communicate with their partners in the cities or order taxies to come out to meet them.” Glubb, “The Economic Situation of the Trans-Jordan Tribes,” p. 454. 34. Ibid., pp. 449–459. 35. Glubb, “The Economic Situation,” p. 452. 36. In addition to these exchange or state based entitlements, Glubb worked directly to create what A.K. Sen calls “capabilities” (in particular the ability to be healthy and literate and therefore gain more substantive freedom) among the Bedouin. The desert forts built to house and support the Desert Patrol became centers for basic literacy classes for the recruits, and Glubb went on build schools for soldiers and Bedouin in al-Azraq, Bayir and Mudawwara. Progress was such that by 1939 Glubb could report with satisfaction that all cleri- cal and mechanical work in the desert area was carried out by “pure Bedouin hands.” A network of moveable clinics was established under the Desert Mobile Medical Unit in 1937. During the following two years over 25,000 patients received treatment, including for tuber- culosis or for inoculation against smallpox. Cf. Allon, The Making of Jordan, pp. 133–136.

Chapter 7 1. Mustafa B. Hamarneh, “Social and Economic Transformation of Transjordan (1921–1946),” Georgetown University, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 1985, pp. 210–212. 2. Ibid.; Philip J. Robins, “The Consolidation of Hashemite Power in Jordan, 1921–1946,” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Exeter, October 1988, pp. 263, 274. 3. The latter included Amir ‘Abdullah himself, who received 67,000 dunums in Zawr al-Kattar, Ghawr al-Kabd, and al-Hummar; as well as prominent shaykhs from the Fayiz, the ‘Adwan and the Karakiyyah, Robins, “The Consolidation of Hashemite Power in Jordan, 1921– 1946,” pp. 259–261, 281. For a textbook view that draws explicitly on this source, see Nazih I. Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995), p. 114. 192 Notes

4. Michael R. Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p. 180. For the Jewish Agency’s “Trans-Jordan option” cf. Kenneth Stein, The Land Question in Palestine, 1917– 1939 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), pp. 192–199. 5. See Kamil Mahmud al-Khillah, al-Tatawwur al-siyasi li-sharq al- ’Urdunn March 1921-March 1948 (Tripoli: Al-munsha’a al-‘Aamah li al-nashir wa al-tawzi’ wa al-’i‘lan, 1983), pp. 293–297; ‘Ali Mahafzah, al-Fikr al-siyasi fi al-‘urdunn munthu qiyam al thawra al ‘arabiyya al kubra wa hatta nihayat ‘ahd al Imara, 1916–1946, Volume I (Amman: Markaz al Kutub al Urduni, 1990), pp. 223–235. 6. Non-Jewish Zionists (notably Lawrence Oliphant) and publicists of the Jewish Agency exaggerated the potential for large-scale agricultural settlement in Trans-Jordan. The typical argument drew an unfavorable contrast between agricultural wealth and prosperity in classical times and its apparent ruin under the Ottomans. The impli- cation was, as Chaim Weizmann argued in 1921, that the “vast unpopulated land,” east of the Jordan, could absorb 60,000–70,000 people (Jewish settlers or displaced fellahin) from Palestine; Vartan Amadouni, “Infrastructural Development Under the British Man- date,” in Eugene Rogan and Tariq Tell editors, Village, Steppe and State (London: British Academic Press, 1994), p. 132. Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan, pp. 184–186; St. Antony’s College. Private Papers Collection. British Middle East Office Papers: Michael Ionides, Report on the Water Resources of Transjordan and their Devel- opment (London: Crown Agents for the Colonies for the Government of Transjordan, 1938). 7. Hamarneh, “Social and Economic Transformation,” p. 180. 8. Robins, “The Consolidation of Hashemite Power in Jordan, 1921– 1946,” pp. 267–273. 9. Amadouni, “Infrastructural Development Under the British Man- date,” pp. 135–137. 10. For the Bani Hasan’s plight in the mid-1930s, see ‘Abd al-Qadir Kharaysat. Al-urduniyyun wa al-qadhaya al-wataniyya wa al-qawmiyya: dirasat fi al-mawqif al-sha‘biyy al-’urduniyy, 1992, pp. 61–63; Omar Munif Razzaz, “Law, Urban Land Tenure, and Property Disputes in Contested Settlements: The Case of Jordan,” Ph.D. Dissertation: Harvard University, 1991, pp. 97–99. 11. John Bagot Glubb, “The Economic Situation of the Trans-Jordan Tribes,” Royal Central Asian Society Journal, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1938), p. 456. 12. John Bagot Glubb, The Story of the Arab Legion (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948). 13. W. G. Elphinstone, “The Future of the Bedouin of Northern Arabia,” International Affairs, Vol. 21 (1945), pp. 370–375. Notes 193

14. Michael Ionides, “Jordan Valley: Irrigation in Transjordan,” Engineer- ing (September 1946), pp. 241–242. 15. Vartan Amadouni, “The British Role in the Development of an Infras- tructure in Transjordan,” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Southampton, 1993, p. 99. 16. Amadouni, “Infrastructural Development Under the British Man- date.” 17. Hamarneh, “Social and Economic Transformation of Trans-Jordan, 1921–1946.” 18. According to Mary Wilson, “In general, Britain’s aim was to discour- age the formation of large estates as had occurred in Iraq and to create a stable class of small and medium-sized peasant landowners,” cf. Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 98. 19. Walpole, a subsequent director of the Department of Lands and Sur- veys, described farming under musha‘a as “more in the nature of a mining operation than the practice of good husbandry; the cultivator during his occupation took as much out of the soil as he could and put nothing back.” G. F. Walpole, “Land Problems in Transjordan”, Royal Central Asian Journal, Vol. 35 (January 1948), p. 55. Walpole’s views were shared by most of colonial officialdom, including the advi- sory committee of the Colonial Development Fund, which held that the breakup of musha‘a was “an essential pre-requisite” to agricultural development in Trans-Jordan. Cf. Hamarneh (“Social and Economic Transformation”), p. 170; and Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan,p.85. 20. The logic and practice of British Land Policy is set out most fully in Michael Fischbach, “State, Society and Land in ‘Ajlun (Northern Transjordan), 1850–1950. Vol. 1,” Unpublished Ph.D. Disserta- tion, Georgetown University, 1992, pp. 244–253. For an overview by a Jordanian Land Department Official (Muhammad Isma‘il al- ‘Attiyyat), see “Tarikh al-masaha wa al-aradhi fi al-’urdunn,” Risalat al-‘urdunn, No. 10 (April 1960), pp. 7–13. 21. Fischbach, “State, Society and Land in ‘Ajlun (Northern Transjordan),” pp. 254–263; and Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan, pp. 84–86. 22. Michael Fischbach, “British Land Policy in Transjordan,” in Eugene Rogan and Tariq Tell editors, Village, Steppe and State, pp. 91–92. Fischbach, “State, Society and Land in ‘Ajlun (Northern Transjordan),” pp. 270–273; Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan, pp. 86–95. Land was valued on the basis of prices (for wheat and grapes) for 1929–1931, when the impact of the Great Depression had lowered price levels worldwide. 23. Fischbach, “State, Society and Land in ‘Ajlun (Northern Transjordan),” p. 280. 194 Notes

24. Ibid., pp. 281–282. The success of the British in eventually pushing through the law, exploiting the quota of officials in the Legisla- tive Council and divisions between the main body of legislators and the respresetatives of al-Karak (Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan, pp. 96–97) highlights the ultimate autonomy of the Mandatory state and the limited ability of ‘Abdullah or his allies among the local shaykhs to deflect it from its aims. For an alter- native view that stresses the efficacy of resistance by the shaykhly elite—albeit on issues of lesser significance, see Yoav Allon’s articles: “Tribal Shaykhs and the Limits of British Imperial Rule in Jordan, 1920–1946,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,Vol.32 (January 2004), pp. 69–92; “The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process: Mandatory Trans-Jordan 1921–46, Inter- national Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 37 (January 2005), pp. 213–240. 25. For a summary of such measures during the Mandate years, see Tariq Tell, “Bedouin, Fallah and State: The Social Origins of Hashemite Rule in Jordan,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Oxford University, 2000, table 6.1. 26. Fischbach, “State, Society and Land in ‘Ajlun (Northern Transjordan),” pp. 283–285. 27. G. F. Walpole, “Land Problems in Transjordan,” Royal Central Asian Journal, Vol. 35 (January 1948), pp. 19–20, 53; Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan, pp. 32–34. 28. Konikoff, Trans-Jordan: An Economic Survey (Jerusalem: Economic Research Institute of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1946), p. 88. 29. Fischbach, “State, Society and Land in ‘Ajlun (Northern Transjordan),” p. 285. 30. Robins, “The Consolidation of Hashemite Power” (see Tell, “Bedouin, Fallah and State,” table 6.3, which shows the years settlement began in different parts of Trans-Jordan). 31. For descriptions of the nature and process of settlement operations by Land Department Officials, see Muhammad Isma‘il (al-‘Attiyyat), “Settlement Operations and Survey in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, with a Brief Note on Property Before and After Settlement,” Unpublished Report, Amman, 1955, and Walpole, “Land Settlement in TransJordan,” pp. 155–173. Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan, pp. 170–171, documents the consensual and collaborative basis of land settlement. 32. Walpole, “Land Problems in TransJordan,” pp. 52–65. See also G. F. Walpole, “Land Settlement in Transjordan,” in the Proceedings of the Conference on Middle East Agricultural Development,(Cairo: Middle East Supply Centre, 1944). 33. Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan, p. 145. An example of the deleterious effects of the loss of these public goods became Notes 195

apparent in the 1930s, when “in their zeal to utilise every square cen- timeter of their new land cultivators in former musha‘a villages began ploughing up the erosion banks and wind breakers which had pro- tected the top soil from eroding due to heavy rains or blowing away during windstorms,” Fischbach, “State, Society and Land in ‘Ajlun (Northern Transjordan),” p. 361. In the open plains around Irbid, the way was opened for the steady loss of the region’s fertile topsoils. 34. Walpole, “Land Problems in Trans-Jordan,” p. 59; Fischbach, “State, Society and Land in ‘Ajlun (Northern Transjordan),” pp. 362–363. Fears were also raised that “certain large areas have changed ownership, the cultivators selling out to wealthy merchants,” cf.: Rashed (Bey) Zok, “The Effect of Land Settlement on Agriculture,” in Pro- ceedings of the Conference, p. 181. As the discussion later in the text indicates, land transfers from cultivators seem to have been the exception rather than the rule. 35. For the importance of the existence of space to organize when formenting rebellion in peasant communities, see Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 115–116; Skocpol, “Reflections on Recent Scholarship about Social Revolutions and How to Study Them,” in Social Revolutions in the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 324–325. For an application of Skocpol’s argument about the importance of “tactical autonomy” to an Islamic context, see Haim Gerber, Islam, Guerilla War and Revolution: A Study in Compara- tive Social History (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1988), p. 17. Significantly enough, Gerber argues that the Judean hills, where Mandatory land reform proceeded much more slowly than on the East Bank, was most “suitable for guerrilla campaigns” in the form of anti-urban, peasant lead bands,” p. 166. 36. Konikoff, Transjordan: An Economic Survey, p. 35; Walpole, “Land Problems in Trans-Jordan,” pp. 54–55; Fischbach, “British Land Pol- icy in Transjordan,” in Eugene Rogan and Tariq Tell editors, Village, Steppe and State, pp. 99–102; Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan, pp. 121, argues that the setting aside by the state of land as woodlands “generated the most fierce opposition encountered by the entire program.” 37. Walpole, “Land Problems in Trans-Jordan,” p. 61. Mahlul land was land that had been abandoned by its cultivators and annexed to the state domain, Konikoff, Transjordan: An Economic Survey, p. 39. 38. Chizik, “The Political Parties in Trans-Jordan,” Royal Central Asian Journal, Vol. 12 (April 1935), p. 97. For the origins of the conference, see ‘Isam Muhammad Mahmud al Sa-idi, Ph.D Disserta- tion, St. Joseph’s University, Beriut, “Al-Harakah al-wataniyyah al- ‘urduniyya 1921–1946,” p. 125; and Sulayman Musa, Imarat Sharq 196 Notes

al-urdunn: Nasha’atuha wa tatawwuruhu fi rub‘qarn 1921–1946 (Amman: Lajnat Tarikh Al-’Urdunn, 1990), pp. 238–240. 39. G. Baer, “Land Tenure in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” Land Economics, Vol. 33, No. 3 (August 1957), p. 190. In ‘ Ajlun 69.6 percent of men owned some land in the villages around Irbid, and 79.8 percent in Jarash and Jabal ‘Ajlun. Fischbach, “State Society and Land in ‘Ajlun (Northern Transjordan),” p. 393. 40. Konikoff, Transjordan: An Economic Survey, p. 39. 41. Fischbach, “State Society and Land in ‘Ajlun (Northern Transjordan),” pp. 385–391. Fischbach concludes that “ ‘Ajlun ...remained a society of small cultivators linked together through kinship and headed by shaykhs,” p. 437. For more detailed figures on the distribution of land ownership, see Tell, “Bedouin, Fallah and State,” table 6.4. 42. P. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan (London: Frank Cass, 1967), p. 76. The rapid growth of the Legion necessitated changes in the personnel and the nature of the officer corps, and the need for minimum educational requirements in some posts led to the recruitment of some townsmen or village notables. How- ever, the British continued to prefer the promotion of Bedouin non-commissioned officers, and the fact that the Legion was now under Glubb’s command ensured that tribesmen (whether fellahin or Bedouin) now formed the bulk of the rank and file. The extent to which Trans-Jordanians were integrated into the army during the 1940s is shown by the rather macabre sample of the Legion War Dead in 1948. Fallahin from ‘Ajlun are the largest single group. See Tell, “Bedouin, Fallah and State,” tables 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 for the shifting make-up of the Legion. The expansion of the Legion during the 1940s and the number of local officers is shown in table 7.15. In addition to the relaxation of budget constraints on military employment, money was made available to improve roads on the borders with Syria and Palestine, as well to develop the port of Aqaba. Cf. Amadouni, “Infrastructural Development Under the British Man- date,” in Eugene Rogan and Tariq Tell editors, Village, Steppe and State, p. 158. 43. Abbas Murad, Al-Dawr al-Siyasi li al-Jaysh al-’Urduni (Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1973), pp. 35, 39. 44. CO831/58/2 Report by the British Resident on the Political Situa- tion in Trans-Jordan for September 1941. 45. For Glubb’s own description of the Arab Legion’s Campaigns in Iraq and Syria, see Glubb, The Story of the Arab Legion (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948), pp. 267–279. 46. The rise in prices is shown in Tell, “Bedouin, Fallah and State,” table 6.8. For wartime demands in general, see the discussion in Abla Amawi, “State and Class in Trans Jordan: A Study of State Autonomy, Notes 197

Vol. I,” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, December 1992, pp. 430–439. 47. For the growth of a migrant labor system involving circular migration to the Palestinian coastal cities, see Ian James Seccombe, “International Migration for Employment and Domestic Labour Market Development: The Jordanian Experience,” Ph.D. Disserta- tion, University of Durham, 1983, pp. 54–64. 48. Ibid., p. 185. Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan, pp. 141–145. In “State, Society and Land in ‘Ajlun (Northern Transjordan),” pp. 408–409 Fischbach, estimates that between 1937 and 1945 “registered mortgages throughout Transjordan increased by 460 percent even though these were by and large bountiful years.” Informal loans by money lenders no doubt raised the actual farm debt manifold. 49. The most prominent members of this stratum dominated the Amman Chamber of Commerce. Significantly enough, all but one of the latter’s members was born outside Trans-Jordan. See Table 6.9 of Tariq Tell “Bedouin, Fallah and State”. 50. For the growth of the merchant’s power, see Abla Amawi, “The Con- solidation of the Merchant Class in Transjordan During the Second World War,” in Eugene Rogan and Tariq Tell editors, Village, Steppe and State, 1994, pp. 175–184. 51. PRO:FO371/68849; Fischbach, State, Society and Land in Jordan, p. 163. 52. Whatever the benefits conferred by soaring prices on merchants and cultivators, inflation and wartime rationing brought hardship to the mass of the urban population. It is certainly the case that the war years are portrayed as a time of need in autobiographical novels such as ‘Abd al-Rahman Munif’s Sirat Madinah. Amman fi al-’arba‘inat (Beirut: Dar al Faris, 1994). It is possible to speculate that these hardships fed a new generation of oppositionist members of Trans-Jordan’s as yet minuscule intelligentsia, who drew their inspi- ration from veteran activists clustered around Subhi Abu Ghanimah in Damascus. See Betty Anderson, Nationalist Voices in Jordan. The Street and the State (Austin: Texas University Press, 2005), pp. 73–74. 53. James Lunt, Glubb Pasha: A Biography (London: Harvill Press, 1984), p. 119. 54. R. S. Porter, “An Economic Survey of Jordan,” Unpublished Report, British Middle East Office Papers, 1945, pp. 14–22; Hani al-Hawrani Al-tarkib al-iqtissadi a’ijtima‘iyy li sharq al-urdunn (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1978), pp. 178–179. 55. Avery-Jones, “Nutrition of the Transjordan Bedouin”; Appendix to John Bagot Glubb, Monthly Reports on the Administration of the Deserts of Transjordan, St. Antony’s College, Private Papers Collection, March 1940. 198 Notes

Chapter 8 1. Sir John Troutbeck as quoted by William Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945–51: Arab Nationalism, The United States and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 345; Ron Pundik, The Struggle for Sovereignty: Relations Between Great Britain and Transjordan 1946–1951 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994). 2. For the personnel of this elite until the early 1970s, see the lists com- piled by Marius Haas, Husseins Konigreich: Jordaniens Stellung im Nahen Osten (Munchen: Tuduv Buch, 1975), pp. 574–605. 3. Anan Ameri, “Socioeconomic Development in Jordan (1950–1980). An Application of Dependency Theory,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Wayne State University 1981, p. 314. 4. Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 148. 5. Munib al-Madi and Sulayman Musa, Tarikh al-’urdunn fi al-qarnn al-‘ishrin, 1900–1959 (Amman: Maktabat Al-Muhtasib, 1959). 6. Wilson, King ‘Abdullah, pp. 152–153. 7. While actively seeking unity between the two Hashemite kingdoms, ‘Abdullah was, until the last years of his life, reluctant to defer to his nephew ‘Abd al-’Ilah, and sought a bond that would keep himself, as the most senior living member of the Hashemite dynasty, at the head of the new union. 8. For the evolution of British policy on this issue, see Ilan Pappe, Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–51 (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1988), pp. 9–16; “Sir Alec Kirkbride and the Making of Greater Transjordan,” Asian and African Studies, Vol. 23 (1989), pp. 43–70. 9. Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: King ‘Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 100–104, 135–139. Cf. however Avraham Sela, “Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 War: Myth, Historiography and Reality,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (October 1992), pp. 623–688, who argues that war and what was effectively an ethnic cleansing (although he does not use the term) of the Palestinians so enflamed Arab and Trans-Jordanian that collusion with the Jews was no longer a feasible option for the King by the spring of 1948. 10. Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, passim. 11. Munib al-Madi and Sulayman Musa, Tarikh al-urdunn, pp. 533–546. For a more recent account of the Jericho Congress and its pre- decessors, see also Joseph Nevo, King ‘Abdullah and Palestine: A Territorial Ambition (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 166–171. 12. P. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan (London: Frank Cass, 1967), pp. 99–108. Al-Tall was also among those implicated by the British in ‘Abdullah’s assassination (S.G.T. “King ‘Abdullah’s Notes 199

Assassins,” The World Today, October 1951, pp. 411–419) although he himself always denied the charges, and seems to have been believed by King Hussein as early as 1955 when they met in Cairo, Peter Snow, Hussein (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1972), p. 32. 13. Snow, Hussein, p. 38. The regiment was commanded by Habis al- Majali, the victor of the battle for Latrun, eldest son of the most influential shaykh of al-Karak and the longest serving Trans-Jordanian officer in the Legion. Amman’s political folklore has portrayed al-Majali as motivated by a romantic attachment to Nayif’s sister, Maqbulah; however, he may also have been acting on ‘Abdullah’s wishes as recorded on the eve of his death, cf. Nigel Ashton, King Hussein a Political Life (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 24. 14. Robert B Satloff, From ‘Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Tran- sition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 36–44; R. A. Harrison, “Succession and Power in Jordan 1951–1953,” MA Dissertation, London University, 1988, pp. 28–32, 34. 15. For a contemporary overview of the economic difficulties brought about by 1948 cf. James Baster, “The Economic Problems of Jordan,” International Affairs, Vol. 31 (January 1955), pp. 26–35. 16. For the parallel growth of the dependence of the Palestinian fallahin on wage work, and their transformation into an “incipient proletariat” cf. see for example Rachelle Taqqu, “Peasants into Workmen: Inter- nal Labour Migration and the Palestinian Village Community under the Mandate,” in Joel Migdal editor, Palestinian Society and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 185–211. 17. R. S. Porter, “An Economic Survey of Jordan,” Unpublished Report, British Middle East Office Papers, 1945, p. 15. 18. The Jordanian dinar replaced the Palestinian pound at parity after the unification of the two banks; one mils was equal to one fils and to one thousandth of a dinar, Porter, “Economic Survey.” 19. The escalation of indebtedness after 1950 is shown in table 7.4 of Tariq Tell, “Bedouin Fallah and State. The Social Origins of Hashemite Rule,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Oxford University, 2000. 20. The combination of economic pressures and the political legacy of the 1948 war is brought out clearly in Tahir al-‘Adwan’s autobiographical novel, Ha’it al-Sufsaf. A tale of rural poverty, alienation from the land and the breakdown of tribal ties, it reaches its climax when the family, which forms its central cast of characters, is driven from the land and meets a group of fleeing refugees. “You had Jews,” Fatimah, the novel’s protagonist tells the Palestinians, “but we had moneylenders.” Significantly enough, al-‘Adwan himself became a Ba‘athist activist and like many of his kinsmen sympathized with Fateh’s strategy of armed liberation in the aftermath of the 1967 war. 21. Yusef A. Sayigh, “Economic Implications of UNRWA Operations in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon,” MA Dissertation, Department of Economics, American University of Beirut, 1952, pp. 47–50. 200 Notes

22. Even in the midst of the construction boom caused by Palestinian resettlement in Amman, a World Bank mission in 1955 estimated the rate of unemployment at 16.5 percent of the labor force, with another 11 percent of workers only partially employed, Peter Lieftinck et al., The Economic Development of Jordan (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 157. 23. Porter, “Economic Survey,” p. 17. According to one Jordanian estimate, only 471,000 dunums of the 800,000 owned by the 111 border villages remained on the Jordanian side. Given an estimated population of 119,150 in these villages, this implied an average of some 25 dunums per family of five as opposed to the 95 dunums thought necessary for sustaining such families. See Avi Plascov, “The Palestinians of Jordan’s Border,” in Roger Owen editor, Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Cen- turies (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1982), pp. 203–241. For a contemporary account that links the border problems with the work of the Arab Legion, see Godfrey Lias, Glubb’s Legion (London: Evans, 1956), pp. 206–207. 24. Benny Morris, Israel’s Border Wars 1946–1956 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 36–37, 70–74, 244–225. 25. It was only in October 1954—after seven lesser raids had followed the Qibya attack–that the British began to plan “how they would fulfill their commitments to Jordan should the situation get out of hand”– that is, escalate into an Israeli invasion of the West Bank. By January 1956 this had culminated in a blueprint for “Operation Cordage,” a combination of air attacks and naval blockade aimed at forcing an Israeli retreat from the West Bank in six months, cf. Eric Grove, “Who to fight in 1956, Egypt or Israel? Operation Musketeer versus Oper- ation Cordage,” in Simon C. Smith editor, Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and Its Aftermath (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 79–77. 26. Nationalist (“watani”) opinion in the officer corps was provoked further by the stories of Jordanian “collusion” with the Israelis, which found their way into print in the Egyptian press before the publication of ‘Abdullah al-Tall’s memoirs of his role in the 1948 war, ‘Abdullah al-Tall, Karithat Falastin: muthakkarat ‘Abdullah al-Tall (Cairo: No Publisher, 1959). Family tradition recounts that al-Tall himself orchestrated a clandestine group from his Egyptian exile; its leader in Jordan was Mahmud al-Musa al-‘Ubaydat, his deputy during the battle for Jerusalem. On this account, the group played a key role in the conspiracy fomented by Sadiq al-Shara‘, deputy Chief of the General Staff, in 1959. 27. Lunt, Imperial Sunset Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century, (London: Mac-Donald, 1981), p. 82. 28. Hyder Aqil Abidi, Jordan: A Political Study 1948–1957 (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965), pp. 191–212; Betty Anderson, Nationalist Voices in Jordan (Austin: Texas University Press, 2006). Notes 201

29. For an orthodox account of the overthrow of the Baghdad Pact and its consequences, see Michael Oren, “A Winter of Discontent: Britain’s Crisis in Jordan,” International Journal of Middle East Studies (Spring 1990), volume 22, pp. 171–184. For Glubb’s view of the crisis and its consequences, see Uriel Dann, “Glubb and the Politicisation of the Arab Legion: An Annotated Document,” Asian and African Studies (1987), pp. 213–215, volume 21. The popular upheaval is traced in detail by Hani Hawrani and Salim al-Tarawnah, “Hakatha saqat hilf baghdad fi ‘amman,” Al Urdunn al-Jadid (Spring-Summer 1985), pp. 113–153; and ‘Waqa’i‘ al-intifada al-lati asqatat hilf Baghdad. Waqa’i ‘ al-‘intifada yawman bi yawm,’ ibid., pp. 154–160. 30. For the notion of “Inqilab al-malik,” and an account of Glubb’s ouster, see ‘Abbas Murad, Al-Dawr al-Siyasi, pp. 88–96. 31. Mahmud al-Ma‘aytah, “Ba‘dh al-mulahathat hawl harakat ta‘rib al- jaysh al-’urduni,” Unpublished manuscript, Amman 1998, pp. 6–7. For Bahjat al-Talhuni’s rival view, one that claims all of the credit for King Hussein, see Sa‘ad Abu Diyyah, Lurd al-sahra’. Dirasat awraq al-dhabit al-baritani john bagot glubb, 1920–1956 (Amman: Dar al- Bashir, 2009), pp. 229–233. 32. Not least the British Chiefs of Staff who for a time continued to pre- pare for Operation Cordage in tandem with plans for the assault on the Suez Canal. Scott Lucas has argued that the Qalqilya raid fur- nishes the key to Eden’s decision to resolve the Suez Crisis by military means, cf. his Divided We Stand: Britain the U.S. and the Suez Crisis (London: McMillan, 1991), p. 233. 33. For Hussein’s successful search for a new foreign patron, see Douglas Little, “A Puppet in Search of a Puppeteer? The United States, King Hussein and Jordan 1953–70,” The International History Review (August 1995), pp. 522–528. The evolution of U.S. aid to the regime until the early 1970s is detailed in Stephen S. Kaplan, “United States Aid and Regime Maintenance in Jordan, 1957–1973,” Public Policy (Spring 1972), pp. 189–217; for figures showing the surge in US aid from 19956–58 see Sa‘ad Abu Diyyah, Al-urdunn fi al-watha’iq al-‘uthmaniyyah wa al-baritaniyyah wa al-‘arabiyyah. Dirasat nushi- rat fi al-sahafah al-’urduniyyah (Amman: Ministry of Culture, 2011). 34. Satloff, From ‘Abdullah to Hussein, pp. 170–172. The personal- ized nature of Hussein’s security services became apparent to Jack O’Connell, CIA station chief in Amman 1964–71, and the King’s Washington attorney after his retirement, on his first visit to Amman in 1958: “Jordan did not have an intelligence service and the king was his own intelligence chief in fact if not in name. He recruited and ran agents clandestinely on his own, mostly in the military, with funds from the palace purse,” cf. King’s Counsel. A Memoir of War, Espionage and Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Norton, 2011), p. 4. 35. Jordan’s strategic importance for British planners was enhanced by the barrier interposed by the formation of Israel to movement from 202 Notes

the Suez Canal bases into the Fertile Crescent. This engendered a “Levant-Iraq” based defensive strategy to which the Legion could contribute a division or more that would be permanently in theater, and less costly–in both financial and political terms–to maintain than equivalent Western troops. See Michael Cohen, Fighting World War Three from the Middle East. Allied Contingency Plans (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 302–303. 36. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military, pp. 7, 81. 37. Ibid., p. 137; Paul Kingston, “Failing to Tip the Balance: For- eign Aid and Economic Reform in Jordan, 1958–67,” Unpublished Manuscript, University of Toronto, 1999, p. 2. It is unclear from the sources how much of the growth was a function of the integration of the largely Palestinian National Guard into the main body of the army during the Nabulsi interlude. The numbers of Palestinians in the army are generally agreed to have been at their peak in the mid-1960s. In the course of his struggle with Shuqayri’s PLO, King Hussein went so far as to claim that 60 percent of the Jordanian Army was Palestinian cf. Lawrence Tal, Politics, the Military and National Security in Jordan, 1954–1967 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 106. 38. In contrast to the 1930s, the impact of the drought was greatest West of the Hijaz railway and fell most heavily on Palestinian refugees of nomadic origin. Muraywid al-Tall recalls that in 1959 handouts were needed to prevent the starvation of Bedouin refugees from the Beersheba district who had settled in the vicinity of al-Karak. 39. For the growth of army employment in such a Bedouin settlement as al-Muwaqqar, see Joseph M. Hiatt, “State Formation and the Encap- sulation of Nomads: Local Change and Continuity among Recently Sedentarized Bedouin in Jordan,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1989, p. 124. 40. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military, pp. 79–80. 41. Richard T. Antoun, Arab Village: A Social-Structural Study of a Transjordanian Peasant Community (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1972), pp. 27–36. Military entitlements were enhanced by the growth of the Royal Medical Services from modest wartime beginnings in 1948 cf. Brigitte Curmi, “Jordanie; les Medicins Militaires Precurseurs de la Modernite Scientifique,” Maghreb/Machrek (October-December 1994), pp. 52–53; and by the expansion of the educational wing of the Legion begun by Glubb to impart basic literacy to Bedouion recruits in the 1930s cf. Sa‘ad Aby Diyyah and ‘Abd al-Majid Mahdi, Al-Jaysh al-Urduni wa Diblomasiyyat al-Sahra’: Dirasah fi Nash’atihi wa Tatawwur Dawr al-Thaqafa al-‘Askariyyah, Amman: al-Matabi‘ al-‘Askariyyah, 1987. 42. By the mid-1960s, Jordan had “the highest force levels in the Arab world” with 23 of every 1,000 of its citizens in military service as Notes 203

compared to 14 in manufacturing, cf. Lawrence Tal, “Jordan,” in Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim editors, The Cold War and the Middle East (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 107. 43. T. N. Bromage, “Jordan,” Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society (1962), p. 21. Nigel Bromage bases these observations on his service in the Arab Legion from 1947–55 , his stint as Assistant Defence Attaché in the British embassy in Amman until 1961, and his work with the Saudi National Guard for nearly three decades after that date. Cf. Nigel Bromage A Soldier in Arabia. A British Military Memoir from Jordan to Saudi Arabia, (London: The Radcliffe Press, 2012). 44. The degree to which alleged plotters such as ‘Ali abu Nuwwar, Sadiq al-Shara‘, Radhi al-‘Abdullah al-Khasawnah, or Nathir al-Rashid were re-integrated into the regime in later years is perhaps the clearest indi- cation that self-interest as much as ideology was the motive of many military conspirators. The latter two both acceded to the direction of the Mukhabarat. Al-Shara‘ served as a minister and even Abu Nuwwar ended his days a senator having also been briefly appointed as a special advisor to the King in 1970. For a discussion of the co-optation of once dissident army officers, see Abbas Murad, Al-Dawr al-Siyasi, pp. 114–117. 45. The most comprehensive account of the military conspiracies of the second half of the 1950s is Sulayman Musa’s unpublished manuscript (written in 1993 with additional material added in 1995) Harakat al-dubbatt fi al-urdunn (I would like to thank Nahidh Hattar for bringing it to my attention). For other perspectives hostile and sympathetic to the regime, see Abbas Murad, Al-Dawr al-Siyasi, 1973, pp. 101–110; Munib al-Madi and Sulayman Musa, Tarikh al-urdunn, pp. 669–675. Sulayman Musa, Tarikh al-urdunn fi al qarn al-‘ishrin 1958–1995 (Amman: Maktabat al-Muhtasib, 1995), pp. 19–24, 31–35. Doubt has been cast on the most famous of these plots, the 1957 “Zarqa’ incident” ever since queries were first aired by Erkine Childers’ The Road to Suez: a Study of Western-Arab Relations, (London: MacGibbon and Key, 1962), pp. 397–401. Tal, Politics, the Military, pp. 45–49 tries to reconcile the conflicting accounts of the 1957 coup using declassified Anglo-American documents, as does Joseph Massad using the memoirs of Abu Nuwwar and Shahir Abu Shahut, cf. his “Identifying the Nation; The Juridical and Military Bases of Jordan’s National Identity,” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1998, pp. 283–292. 46. Tal, Politics, the Military, pp. 29–30 identifies four military factions after the departure of Glubb, led respectively by Abu Nuwwar; by Sadiq al-Shara‘; by ‘Ali al-Hiyari and by the Sharif Nassir ibn Jamil. However, Tal mistakenly identifies al-Hiyari as a native of Irbid when he in fact hailed from one of the most numerous clans in al-Salt and fell from power at the same time as Abu Nuwwar. As the King’s 204 Notes

maternal uncle, commander of the Royal Guard and on the evidence of many Palace insiders the regime strongman during this period, the Sharif Nassir was more likely to have acted as an arbiter among the competing factions, perhaps drawing an inner core of support from the network of “mercenary” Bedouin Glubb had recruited from such “supra-Jordanian” tribal confederations as the Shammar and the ‘Anaza. Peter Snow reports that King Hussein allowed his uncle “an ambitious soldier with the popular appeal of a buccaneer to form his own private army of Bedouin to protect the royal palace.” This “Royal guard started as a battalion and soon swelled to a brigade equipped with the best weapons and armoured vehicles Sherif (sic.)Nasser could lay his hands on,” Snow, Hussein, p. 95). 47. Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism Jordan 1955–1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 116. See also Tal, Politics, the Military, pp. 71–72, 80. On the logic set out in the previous note, the confrontations stemmed from factional rivalry between southerners from al-Karak and the Bani Sakhr Bedouin. It sits uneasily with Vatikiotis’ hadari-badu conspirator- loyalist model but is intelligible in the light of the vested interest associated with rival “security groups” or the patronage networks clustered around Habis al-Majali and ‘Akif al-Fayiz. 48. Kingston, “Failing to Tip the Balance,” pp. 4, 9. 49. The last paragraph draws on Kingston, “Failing to Tip the Bal- ance,” p. 2. 50. Kingston, “Failing to Tip the Balance,” p. 6. 51. Philip Robins, A History of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 2004), pp. 107–114. For the text of the White Paper, see Wasfi al-Tall, Kitabat fi al-qadaya al-‘arabiyyah (Amman: Dar Al Liwa’, 1980), pp. 108–126. 52. This draws on the testimony of Tariq al-Masarwah, who served on the committees that oversaw these work projects. 53. British ambassador Henniker-Major, as quoted by Kingston, “Failing to Tip the Balance,” p. 11. 54. Both of these crises have been examined in terms of their high politics and particulary their military components. In November 1962 the commander of the Jordanian Air Force, Sahil Hamzah, and a number of senior officers defected to Egypt in protest at Jordan’s policy on Yemen. In the estimate of the CIA, the unity demonstrations were accompanied by another coup conspiracy involving a Bedouin officer, Mashur Haditha al-Jazi, a member of the chief lineage of the Huwaytat, cf. Ashton, King Hussein, pp. 92–94. For more on the high politics of the crisis see Zaki Shalom, The Super- powers, Israel and the Future of Jordan 1960–63. The Perils of the Pro-Nasser Policy (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1999), chapters 4–7; Abraham Ben-Zvi, The Origins of the Amercian-Israeli Alliance: the Jordanian Factor (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 34–74; and Notes 205

Ronen Yitzhak, “The Formation and Development of the Jordanian Air Force: 1948–67,” Middle Eastern Studies (September 2004), p. 165. All of these studies neglect a crucial internal aspect of the 1963 crisis: it was the only recorded instance of Jordan’s parliament withholding confidence from a prime minister chosen by Hussein—in this case Samir al-Rifa‘i, a veteran member of the ‘External Elite’ and the founder of Jordan’s most successful political dynasty. The downfall of Rifa‘i was almost certainly orchestrated by Wasfi al-Tall, who drew on his own following in parliament and the supporters of the JNM. King Hussein’s reaction showed clearly the limits of the Palace’s tol- erance for liberal reform: parliament was dissolved, the ring leaders of the anti Rifa‘i motion imprisoned and rigged elections held under the auspices of a cabinet headed by the King’s uncle Husayn ibn Nasser. Cf. Faysal Anwar al-Sa‘ad al-Bataynah, Fursan al-dimuqrattiyyah fi al-urdunn (Amman: no publisher mentioned, 2000), pp. 119–213; Kamel Abu Jaber, “The Legislature of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: A Study in Political Development,” Muslim World,Vol.59 (July-October 1969), pp. 220–250. 55. In the latter sphere, al-Tall’s fraught relationship with Nasser had proved a particular burden to Hussein as the Arab Cold War cooled with the convening of the first Arab summit in 1964, cf. Asher Susser, On Both Banks of Jordan: A Political Biography of Wasfi Al- Tall (London: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 59–70; Dann. King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, pp. 136–139 for the high politics of the period as they impinged on al-Tall’s cabinets. 56. For a Palace insider’s description of Jordanian decision-making during the June War, see Samir Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 108–141. O’Connell’s King’s Counsel p. 51 adds the startling revelation that King Hussein went to war knowing that the Israeli airforce had already attacked Egyptian airfields and that “the CIA’s estimate [was] that the Israelis [could] defeat all the Arab armies in one week.” Al-Tall’s caustic view of the decision to go to war and its conduct are to be found in his contribu- tion to Vick Vance and Pierre Louier, al-Malik Husayn. Harbana Ma‘ Israel (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1968), pp. 106–110. By August 1967 his advocacy of armed resistance had taken the form of a comprehensive plan for armed struggle, submitted to King Hussein, that would integrate the feda’iyyin into the structures of the Jordanian army and transform the East Bank into a society able to fight a national liberation war. Cf. Paul Lalor, “Who Killed Wasfi al-Tall?” Unpublished manuscript, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, summer 1988, pp. 8–10; Susser, On Both Banks of Jordan, pp. 123–132. 57. Yazid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for a State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949–1993 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 177–184, 243–246. 206 Notes

58. For an overview of Jordan’s economic difficulties after the war, see D. R. Campbell, “Jordan: The Economics of Survival,” International Journal (Autumn 1968), pp. 109–121. The economic downturn proved to be a short one, and was rapidly reversed by an inflow of Arab aid after the Khartoum summit. However, rural competition for resources had a more enduring effects, fueling East Bank hostility to the Palestinians—and support for the army—after the eruption of civil war in 1970, see J. F. S. Phillips, “Annual Review for 1970” FO17/71411 99616, p. 6. 59. For the revival of the Jordanian National Movement in its new guise, see Musa Tarikh al-’urdunn fi al-qarn al-‘ishrin, Volume II, p. 359; Jamal al-Sha‘ir describes a key moment in this process in his memoirs—the signature of a National Pact under the auspices of the Professional Associations in a meeting that restored Sulayman al-Nabulsi to the leadership of the JNM. The assembled opposition- ists were surprised by the arrival of King Hussein, who proceeded to donate generously to the meeting. Cf. Siyasi yatathakkar: tajribah fi al-‘amal al-siyasi (London: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 1987), p. 222. 60. By contrast to his close ties to the men of the JNM, al-Tall’s links to the Palestinian generation of 1967 were with George Habash and George Haddad of the PFLP, who had by then embarked on a revo- lutionary path that he abjured, seeing in the monarchy a necessary guarantor of stability. His closest ties were with the lawyer Yahya Hammouda ousted by ‘Arafat from the leadership of the PLO in 1969. Between al-Tall and the “Gazan” leadership of al-Fatah, by contrast, there was only recrimination and mutual mistrust, a legacy of the latter’s participation in attempts to “embroil” the Arab confrontation states in a war with Israel in the runup to June 1967. This policy of tawrit precipitated the Israeli raid on Sammu‘ that sounded the death knell of al-Tall’s second government, cf. Moshe Shemesh, “ ‘The IDF Raid on Samu’: The Turning Point in Jordan’s Relations with Israel and the West Bank Palestinians,” Israel Studies (Spring 2002), pp. 148–156. 61. Yazid Sayigh, Armed Struggle, p. 244. 62. Despite the salience of East Bankers in the ensuring struggle with the PLO, the conflict did not revolve along purely communal lines. Any- thing up to one-third of the armed forces may have been Palestinian, but defections to the PLO (depending on which account is believed) reached at most a few thousand, with the British ambassador Phillips (“Annual Review for 1970”), giving a low estimate of less than 1 percent of army personnel. Both the Palestinian middle class and the business elite (with well publicised exceptions such Arab Bank chairman ‘Abd al-Hamid Shuman who joined the Palestine National Council) remained conflicted about the guerrillas. For more on the divisions among the Palestinians at this time, cf. Yazid Sayigh, Al-’urdunn wa Notes 207

al-falastinyyun (London: Riad El Rayyes Books, 1987), pp. 43–44 and Paul Lalor, “Black September/White September: Contrasting Views of Jordan’s relations with the PLO,” Paper presented to the Colloque Internationale en Politique et Etat en Jordanie, Institut de Monde Arabe, Paris, 24–25 June, 1997, pp. 20–22. 63. For a contemporary journalistic account of the decline of relations between the regime and the PLO, see John K Cooley, Green March, Black September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs (London: Frank Cass, 1973). Diametrically opposite allocations of the blame for this souring of relations are to be found in the Jordanian Government’s unpublished al-‘Amal al-Fida’i wa al-Nitham alUrduni (almost certainly penned by ‘Adnan Abu ‘Awdah, a major in the Mukhabarat who rose to the position of Minster of Information in the course of the September confrontation) and in Nabil Sha’ath et al., Al- Muqawamah al-Falastiniyyah wa al-Nitham al-’Urduni (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1971). 64. The role of pressure from the army is emphasized by many of the key East Bank participants in the confrontation. The U.S. military attaché was informed by members of the Royal Guard that “the army told the king he must act or the army would act on its own,” adding that on the eve of the crisis, “King Hussein was not the resolute and determined leader often described by later accounts,” Norvell De Atkine, “Amman 1970: A Memoir,” Middle East Review of Interna- tional Affairs (December 2002), p. 78. This casts doubt on the view that in delaying confrontation with the PLO, Hussein was simply giving the “guerrillas as many opportunities to discredit themselves as much as possible before moving to a final confrontation,” Robins, History of Jordan, p. 131. 65. J. F. S. Phillips, “Annual Review for 1970”, p. 2. 66. This view of perceptions of the regime’s prospects draws on conver- sations with retired British and U.S. intelligence officers in Jordan at the time. It is worth adding that it was by no means a view accepted by many in the Jordanian elite who were more fearful of Arab intervention—by Syria and by Iraqi troops amounting to 17,000 men and 200 tanks already stationed in Jordan—than the PLO. 67. Including supposedly inherently “loyal Bedouin,” such as the commander of the second division, Bahajat al-Muhaysin (a native of Tafila) and the Chief of the General Staff, Mashur Haditha al-Jazi; for more on defections from the inner sanctums of the regime, see Nahthir Rashid, Muthakkarati: Hisab al-saraya wa hisab al-qaraya,(Beirut: Dar al-Saqi, 2006), pp. 171–177. Rashid was unexpectedly promoted to Lieutenant General and appointed head of the Mukhabarat on the eve of the September conflict. 68. The estimate for the social reach of military employment is from al-Yasari Urduni, Ba ‘d Qadhaya al-Sira ‘al-Ijtima‘i fi al-Urdunn, 208 Notes

(Haifa: no publisher mentioned, 1972), p. 71. The role of the military was clearly pivotal in both initiating and deciding the conflict, but although Ashton’s assertion that “the fact remains that the victory on the battlefield was won by Hussein’s own troops” is broadly justified (Hussein of Jordan, p. 155), account must also be taken of the complex international diplomacy sparked by the Syrian invasion of Jordan on September 18. We have as yet only one account of the regional dynamics of the September conflict that examines both the role of intra elite divisions in Damascus and the threat of Israeli military action as a deterrence to further Syrian involvement: Paul Lalor. “Black September 1970: The Palestinian Resistance in Jordan, 1967– 1971,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Oxford, 1992, pp, 261–270. By contrast the Israeli role has been widely discussed, most recently by Ashton and Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 329–333. 69. The congresses were held under the auspices of tribal shaykhs such as Nayif al-Kharayshah (Bani Sakhr), Mijhim al-‘Adwan and Faysal al-Jazi and in the tribal hinterlands: Um al-Rummanah (March 1970); al-Muwaqqar (March); Suwaylih (August); al-Husayniyyah (September—when meetings were also held in al-Ramtha and the Karaki village of Idr). For an accounts of these “Jordanian Con- gresses,” see Sulayman Musa, Tarikh al-urdunn fi al qarn al-’ishrin, Volume II, pp. 368–371. 70. Al-Tall’s advocacy of a renewed PLO presence on the East Bank has been extensively documented by means of interviews with contemporaries by Usama Hasan ‘Ayish-Salih, “Wasfi al-Tall: I‘adat Qira’ah,” M.A. Dissertation, University of Jordan, 1998, pp. 165–190. 71. For more on al-Tall’s plans, see Lalor, “Who Killed Wasfi al-Tall,” and al-Tall’s own Kitabat, pp. 150–155, 179–181, 169–179, 245–251. For a critical analysis that sees the Jordanian National Union’s emergence as a symptom of tensions within the ruling coalition, and views al-Tall’s project as representing the interests of the lower, populist inclined ranks of the “bureaucratic bourgeoisie,” see Hani al-Hawrani, “Al-Ittihad al-watani wa al-shakl al-rahin lil-sultah fi al-urdunn” Shu’un Falastiniyya (October 1972), pp. 49–68. 72. Both the published constitution of the party and a draft for al-ittihad al-watani al-ta’awani, penned by al-Tall and communist fellow trav- eler Ibrahim al-Habashnah (a minister in al-Tall’s last cabinet at the time), envisaged an elected leadership and an economic base for the party in rural co-operatives. For the process by which the Mukhabarat and the Palace managed the appointment of regime clients to the party, see Hawrani, “al-Ittihad al-Watani,” p. 56. 73. A sentiment no doubt encouraged by the careful obfuscation of statistics on the number of Palestinians in Jordan. Until the early 1980s, Notes 209

ofﬁcial spokesmen assented to the assertion of foreign observers that East Bankers were heavily outnumbered in their own homeland cf. Valerie Yorke, “Jordan Is Not Palestine: The Demographic Factor,” Middle East International (April 16, 1988), pp. 16–17. 74. This outbreak led to the formation of a Ministry of Supply and a regime of price controls and state-run shops that supplied consumer goods to military personnel and civil servants at preferential prices, Curmi, “Jordanie.”

Conclusion: The Moral Economy of Hashemite Rule in Jordan 1. Anthony Parsons, They Say the Lion: Britain’s Legacy to the Arabs, A Per- sonal Memoir (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), p. 46. It should be said that many of Parson’s contemporaries would have found his portrait of Jordan in 1971 too rosy, not least because so many accounts of the conflict with the PLO highlight its bloody and divisive legacy. Sources that are sympathetic to the PLO still speak of the “two week fighting in September [1970]” as having “killed thousands and destroyed large sections of Jordanian cities.” On this view, the Palestinians’ suffering continued after the armed conflict died down, as “in the wake of the civil war, the new civilian government of Wasfi al-Tall embarked on a massive purge of the bureaucracy and the military ridding them of any supporters of the guerillas.” Cf. Joseph Massad, Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan (New York: Columbia Univer- sity Press, 2001), pp. 244–246. Massad seems to endorse PLO estimates putting the “death toll” from the September fighting at between “7000 and 20,000 people some of whom were buried in mass graves by the Jordanian army.” He dismisses the lower totals (“1500–2000”) given by the Jordanian government—although these are given greater credence by more measured assessments of the September conflict, notably those of Paul Lalor, c.f. his “Black September/White Septem- ber: Contrasting Views of Jordan’s relations with the PLO,” Paper presented to the Colloque Internationale en Politique et Etat en Jordanie, Institut de Monde Arabe, Paris, 24–25 June, 1997, pp. 20–22; and Lalor’s, “Black September 1970: The Palestinian Resistance in Jordan, 1967–1971,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Oxford, 1992 pp. 273–276; 284– 291. For our own purposes, accounts of a “Black September” that opened up a chasm between Hussein’s Trans-Jordanian subjects and those of Palestinian origin can be reconciled with Parson’s more rose tinted view if it is argued that his remarks applied to the regime’s supporters—in particular its Trans-Jordanian rural base, rather than to the population as a whole. Among East Bankers in particular, the euphoria of victory over the PLO (one in which almost every rural household shared given the high ratios of military service in the villages) 210 Notes

was accentuated by a series of popular mobilizations—most notably during the 1971 independence day celebrations—that almost invari- ably turned into demonstrations of mass support for Wasﬁ al-Tall. Together with widespread support among the Trans-Jordanian intelligentsia (as well as a fair number of Palestinians with roots in the JNM) for al-Tall’s project for a “Carthaginian” liberation strategy, this has ensured that 1970–71 still lives on in popular memory as “sanat Wasﬁ,” one of the few times in King Hussein’s long reign when he was faced with a real check on his power, and perhaps the only time when his grip on the massed Trans-Jordanian soldiery that was the foundation of his rule was incomplete. Index

Note: The letter ‘n’ followed by the locator refers to notes in the text. ‘Abaydat clan, 31 Abu Tayih, ‘Awdah, 48 ‘Abd al-Hamid II, 45, 46, 103 al-‘Adwan, Majid, 18 Abdullah I al-‘Adwan, Nimr, 32 Arab-Israeli war, 20–1, 22 al-‘Adwan, Sultan, 18 Arab Revolt, 17, 59–61, 62, 134 ‘Adwan Revolt, 18, 32–3, 49, 51, arrival in Trans-Jordan, 17, 19 58, 67–9, 74, 80, 82, 107, assassination of, 22, 114, 117, 166n25, 180n74, 180n75 156n32, 198–9n12 Ali, Kurd, 44 attitudes toward, 6, 60, 81–2, Allenby, George, 49, 52, 53 156–7n33 Amman, 1, 2, 3, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, authority of, 19, 65, 67, 71, 23, 43, 49, 51, 54, 56, 57, 58, 194n24, 198 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, biography, 19–20 67–8, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 77–8, dependence on Britain, 18, 19, 79, 80, 81, 84, 85, 88, 89, 101, 20, 21, 59, 61, 62, 64, 67, 107, 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 115, 134–5, 154–5n18, 116, 117, 119, 122, 126, 127, 155n25 131, 134, 135, 136, 137, intrigues in the Hijaz, 3, 69–71, 140n7, 152n3, 156n30, 76 159–60n43, 169n45, 178n24, Jewish Agency and, 20–2, 156n30 182n90, 186n25, 199n13, Jewish land leases, 81 199–200n22, 201n34 Legislative Councils and, 74–5 ‘Ammun, Sa‘id, 181n77 local revolts against, 67–8, 88–9 Anglo-Trans-Jordanian treaty relations with Istiqlal, 62, 63, 67 (1928), 20, 71, 80, 119, 135 succession of, 117 Arab Cold War, 120, 124, 132 Syria and, 62, 70, 113 Arab-Israeli conﬂict, 3, 4, 5, 20, UN partition plan and, 21 116, 132, 157n37 West Bank occupation, 113–14, Arab-Israeli War, 2, 5, 20–2, 116 113–14, 120–1 Abramson, Albert, 64, 65 Arab Legion Abu al-Huda, Tawﬁq, 117 administration of water bores, 98 Abu al-Huda al-Sayyadi, Hasan anticolonial sentiment within, 117 Khalid, 68, 74 Arab-Israeli war, 113, 116 Abu Nuwwar, ‘Ali, 121, 203–4n44 Bedouin recruitment, 13, 90 Abu Shahut, Shahir, 126 dismissal of Glubb, 119–20 212 Index

Arab Legion—continued Bataynah clan, 31 economic dependence on, 84, Bedouin. See also Desert Patrol 136 agro-pastoralism, 90–3 expansion of, 13, 108–9, 114–15, alliance treaties, 32, 33–4 120–1, 137, 196n42 and Bedouin Law, 32 financial support from Britain, 73, communal ownership systems, 74, 110, 116 35–7 Glubb’s command of, 6, 82, 85, customary law, 31–2 115 diversification of agriculture/crop political unrest within, 22, production, 99 192n12, 196n45, 200n23, domination of, 28, 29–30, 33 201n29, 203n43 economic conditions, 86, 90–3, promotes Bedouin farming, 96, 112, 121 99–100 entitlements to, 37–8, 39, 111, purges Istiqlalist officers, 68 112, 115, 132, 191n36 recruits tribesmen, 13, 75, 77 Hashemite Contract and, 13 security for British installations, as heterogeneous group, 30, 107–8 144–5n22 socialization of Bedouins, 6, 136 hospitality, 35 social origins of, 16 and land tax reform, 104–5, 109, support of Hashemite rule, 112, 136–7 114 local order of, 13, 14, 25, 29, UN partition plan and, 21 56–9 Arab Legion Account, 120 loyalty to Hashemites, 4, 7, 8, 9, Arab Radicalism, 4, 5, 7, 137, 93, 120, 121, 140n7 141n11, 158n39, 158n40, military power of, 163n4 158n41, 204n47, 205n55 nomadic cycles of, 165n17, ‘Arafat, Yasir, 2, 125, 128, 206n60 166–7n29 Aruri, Naseer, 6–7, 22 and Ottoman patronage, 35, ‘assabiyyah, 10, 11, 13, 14, 36, 107, 36–7, 45 137, 139n1 payment of surrah to, 29, 33, 87 al-Atrash, Sultan, 64 and population divisions, 30 al-‘Azzam clan, 31 pressure from Ibn Sa‘ud, 85, 87, 88 Baghdad Pact of 1955, 2, 8, 119, protection of pilgrims, 28–9, 32, 201n29 46 Bakr, Ibrahim, 139–40n1 public works employment, 87–8 Bani Hamideh, 88 renewal of tribalism, 58 Bani Juhmah, 31 resources lost to Ibn Sa‘ud, 86 Bani Kananah, 31, 57 rural development, 78–80 Bani Sakhr, 32, 33, 43, 45, 48, security groups, 10, 11, 28, 34–5, 49–50, 51–2, 57–8, 66, 67, 69, 38, 39, 136, 147–8n47, 76, 79, 86, 87–8, 89, 91, 107, 189n12, 204n47 109, 168n41, 204n47, 208n69 security provided by, 33, 107, Batatu, Hanna, 9, 149n53 108–9 Index 213

settlement of, 44, 98–9, 99, Circassians, 50, 57, 75, 76, 186n25 146–7n38 Clayton, Gilbert, 70–1, 79, 92 sharecropping practices, 35–6 Colonial Development Fund, 98 shaykhly houses, 31–2 commercialization, 43–4 tax payments to Ibn Sa‘ud, 92 Committee of Union and Progress Bevin, Ernest, 21, 116, 156n30 (CUP, the “Young Turks”), 46, Black September, 4, 128, 139–40n1, 50 208n68, 209–10n1 Cox, Henry, 70, 103 Britain ‘Abdullah and, 18, 19, 20, 21, Dann, Uriel, 22–3 60–1, 62, 68–7, 183n1 Department of Development, 100 anitcolonial nationalism, 56, 88, Desert Patrol, 6, 71, 76–7, 84, 87, 113 88, 89–90, 93, 107, 108, 109, Arab Legion formed, 6, 13 112, 136, 191n36 control in the steppe, 70, 71, Dowson, Ernest, 102 84–5 drought, 35, 48, 78, 79–80, 95, 98, Desert Patrol and, 76 99–100, 168n43, 202n38 end of mandate, 115, 119 dryland farming, 96, 105 establishes Emirate, 19 economy mandate rule, 134–5, 136 agriculture, 38, 77, 90–1, 101, mandatory rule, 6, 20, 40, 41, 42, 189–90n13 55, 56, 57, 60, 66, 73, 74–5, foreign aid, 114 84, 113, 114, 135, 137, grain, 37, 38, 43, 45, 48, 52, 53, 185–6n22, 194n24 91, 96, 99, 108, 109 military cutbacks, 76 harvest failure, 48 military suppression of ‘Adwan, integration of markets, 91 67–9 mercantile wealth, 136 Operation Cordage, 200n25, oil, 145 201n32 peasant indebtedness, 109 overhaul of Colonial Office, 61–2 post-World War II, 111, 137 presence in Middle East, 2, 3, rapid growth of, 114 175n1 rents, 10, 122, 161–2n2 subsidies, 59, 65, 67, 73, 77, 82, rural development, 95–6, 109, 83, 100, 110, 116 110–11, 136, 137 support of Faysal, 61 security groups, 10, 11, 34, 38–9, UN partition plan and, 116 136, 147–8n47 Zionist settlement position, 60, shortages, 42, 48, 91, 109, 134 118 stabilization of, 86, 90, 92 Brunton, C. Dunbar, 58, 75 unemployment, 117–18 al-Budayri, Kamil, 66 urban development, 74, 95, 110 wartime rationing, 197n52 Cairo Conference, 62 education, 6, 8, 11, 47, 77, 82, 100, Cemal Pasha, 48, 50, 51 145n25 Christians, 31, 44, 50, 57 Eisenhower Doctrine, 120, 138 Churchill, Winston, 62, 64, 65 employment, public works, 87–8, 96 214 Index endowments, 13, 38, 100, Desert Control and, 71, 76 150–1n58, 169–70n52 Desert Patrol, 6, 71, 76–7, 84, entitlements, 12–13, 13, 37–8, 39, 87, 88, 89–90, 93, 107, 108, 79–80, 93, 111, 112, 115, 132, 109, 112, 136, 191n36 136, 169–70n52, 169n47, dismissal of, 119–20, 121, 122, 191n36 138, 203–4n46 Epstein, Eliahu, 90, 100 encourages agro-pastrolalism, Evans-Prichard, E. E., 28 90–3, 95, 97–100, 111, 189n12 fallahin, 29, 30, 31, 35, 42, 44, 52, humane imperialism, 82, 84, 87 64, 77, 82, 104–5, 106, 107, influence of, 135 111, 132, 136, 137, 196 recruitment of Bedouin, 86, 87, famine, 84–5, 86 90 Farayhat clan, 31 stabilizes steppe frontiers, 85, 87, al-Farhan, Hamad, 128, 139–40n1 111 al-Faruqi, Sami Pasha, 46 strategy for West Bank, 118 al-Fatah, 125, 126, 128, 206n60 al-Fayiz, Fawwaz, 50 suspicious of urban elite, 82 al-Fayiz, Mashhur, 48 writings of, 16, 84, 156n30 al-Fayiz, Mithqal, 50, 58, 61, 63, Gouraud, Henri, 54, 63, 64 67, 68, 71, 89, 122 Great Arab Revolt al-Fayiz, Talal, 48 ‘Amarat refusal to join, 175n60 Faysal Ibn al-Husayn Aqaba campaign, 47, 48–9, 51–2, ‘Abdullah and, 18 53, 54 al-Balqa’ campaign, 48, 49–50, al-Balqa’ campaign, 49–50, 51 51 Bani Sakhr, 51–2 allocation of Iraq, 61, 62 Bedouin support, 42, 48, 50, arrival in Damascus, 16, 17, 47, 52–3 54 Christian sympathizers, 50 British support of, 61 Circassian support for Ottomans, reign of, 17, 54, 57, 58 50 rule of, 56–7, 61, 65 climate conditions, 52 Wajh meetings, 47 Damascus campaign, 50, 54 France, 19, 41, 42, 54, 55, 57, 60, Damascus governance, 54 63, 65, 161–2n2 deserters, 52 Free Officers, 118, 119, 120, 121, food shortages, 42, 47–8, 52, 53 124, 126 French presence, 54 Gerber, Haim, 9–10, 23–5 Hashemite leadership of, 41, 42 Gerber Thesis, 10, 24 Hijaz railway, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 Ghawarnah, 37 historic view of, 41–2 Ghawr, 33, 37, 44, 81, 97, 98, 100, lack of national movement, 42, 53 101, 191n3 Ma‘an campaign, 49, 51, 52, 54, Glubb, John Bagot 56, 59–60 command of Arab Legion, 16, Megiddo campaign, 53–4 108, 115, 137, 196n42 origins of, 17–18 Index 215

Ottoman influence over tribes, refugees and, 22 49–50 social change, 6 supplies and logistics, 50, 52, stereotypes of, 15–16 53–4 estrangement from Arab League, support for, 50–1 116–17 Trans-Jordan raids, 49 General Intelligence Agency, 120 tribal collaboration, 48, 51 independence of, 115 Great Palestinian Revolt, 20, 93, June 1967 war, 124 137 nationalism, 119 Great Syrian Revolt, 70, 76, 135, policy on Yemen, 204–5n54 181n77 populism, 128–9 guerrilla campaigns, 60, 89, 124, strategic importance of, 23, 125, 126–7, 128, 139–40n1, 202n35 195, 206–7n62, 207n64, U.S. aid to, 120–1, 122 207n66 West Bank loss, 125, 142–3n17 West Bank unification, 115, Habashnah, Ibrahim al-, 128 116–17 Hadda agreement, 79, 86, 92 Hashemite rule Haddad, George, 206n60 and Arab nationalism, 41–2 Ha’il, 65 Bedouin support of, 53, 120, al-Hamid, Abd, 103 132, 140n7 Hananu, Ibrahim, 60, 64 cohesion of elite, 6, 13, 23, al-Harithi, ‘Ali, 61 158n40 Hasan, Muhanna Bani, 7–8 and colonial reform, 135 al-Hasan, Khalid, 139–40n1 consolidation of power, 25, 108 Hashemite Compact, 12–14, 112, corruption of, 123, 124 114–15, 132–3, 137 East Bank support of, 4, 22 Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan enthusiasm for, 53, 109 bicameral parliament, 115 and Jewish state, 170n2 British influence in, 115 loss of Hijaz, 4 civil war, 24, 126–7, 137–8, loss of Iraq, 4, 10 142n14 military support of, 2, 7, 9–10, constitution of, 119 23, 120, 150n57, 208n68 East Bank and modernization, 4–5 cohesion of, 137–8 Palestinian acceptance within, development of, 132–3 146n31 guerrilla warfare, 126, as patriarchal oligarchy, 6 139–40n1 resilience of, 1, 2–5, 12, 14, 15, Jewish settlement in, 20 23, 25, 114–15, 131–2, occupation of, 125–6 155n25 October War (1973), 128–9 rivalry with Ibn Sa‘ud, 56, 70, oppositionist tendencies, 134 151–2n2, 154n16 social control, 9, 12, 13, 84, 115, PLO and, 206–7n62 132, 149–50n55 population of, 5–6 social origins of, 25 216 Index

Hashemite rule—continued royal patronage networks, 123 subsidy distribution by, 92 Royal secret police and, 119–20, threat from Ikhwan raids, 55–6 201n34, 203–4n44, 207n64 uprisings against, 18 settlement with Israel, 128–9 and wealth, 148n48 statecraft of, 2, 4, 7, 14, 138 health care, 186n23 succession of, 117 al-Hiyari, ‘Ali, 119, 203–4n44 uprisings against, 24 Hizb al-Sha‘ab, 80 waning support for, 128 Hourani, Albert, 9, 10, 11 Huwaytat, 32, 33, 47, 48, 50, 53, Hudson, Michael, 7, 8, 144n20, 66, 71, 76, 79, 86, 87–8, 91, 146n37 168n42, 204–5n54 hunger, 35, 37, 44, 48, 53, 97, 112, 134, 136, 202n38 Ibn Jazi, 32 al-Husayni, Hajj Amin, 21 Ibn Khaldun, 9, 11, 27, 42, Husayn ibn ‘Ali, 41, 42, 49, 68–9, 162–3n3 107 Ibn Rashid, 65 Hussein of Jordan Ibn Rifada, 85 absolute monarch, 3, 8 Ibn Sa‘ud authority of, 8–9 access to Iraq, 181–2n85 biographies of, 141n10 annexation of al-Jawf, 65, 66 challenges to, 14, 24 Bedouin and, 86, 92 charisma of, 7, 9 British support of, 55 civil war and, 126–7 dispute over Aqaba, 115 conflict with Wasfi al-Tall, 125, fall of Ha’il, 65 126 Hadda agreement and, 79, 84 consolidation of power, 14, 122, invasion of Hijaz, 3, 69–71, 76 123, 143–4n19 Mecca and, 116 coup attempts against, 122, opinions of, 179–80n62 203n44, 203n45 Palestinian support of, 66 courage of, 2, 4 pressure on Bedouin, 85, 86 exalted lineage of, 14 rivalry with ‘Abdullah, 56 Jewish state and, 140n7 sanctions raid into Iraq, 65–6 Jordanian National Movement threat to Hashemite rule, 134, 135 and, 24 Turaba campaign, 59 legitimacy of, 7–9 Wadi al-Sirhan concession, 98 loss of West Bank, 142–3n17 Ibn Zayd, Shakir, 63, 85 negotiations during Arab Cold Ikhwan, 55–6, 67, 70, 76, 85, 86, War, 2 92, 93, 135 October war (1973), 128–9 iltiham, 10, 11, 13, 137 opinion of, 207n64 Ionides, Michael, 97, 100 patronage for, 201n33 Iraq, 2, 4, 8, 9, 10, 19, 23, 41, 55, popularity of, 3, 7 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 65, 69, 70, predictions of demise, 1, 2 76, 77, 79, 96, 99, 109, 112, religious aura, 9 113, 114, 115, 117, 119, 123, resilience of, 2, 5, 23 135, 136, 138 Index 217 irrigation, 100–1 Konikoff, A., 108 Israel, 3, 4, 13, 20, 21, 22, 23, 113, al-Kura uprising, 18, 20, 63, 67, 76, 116, 118, 120, 124, 125, 127, 134 128, 129, 142–3n17, 151–2n2, 156n32, 157–8n38 labor shortages, 109 Istiqlal, 18, 19, 54, 57, 60, 62–5, land settlement, 101–2, 105–8 67, 68, 181n76, 181n77 land tax reform, 101–5, 134, 193n18, 193n19, 194–5n33 al-Jam‘ani, Dhafi, 126 land tenure reform, 9, 10, 24, 44, Jewish Agency, 20–2, 90, 96–7, 101, 136–7, 147n46, 172n19 156n30 Lawrence, T. E., 48, 50, 51, 61, 62, Jordanian Communist Party, 114, 65, 66, 92 139–40n1 League of Nations Permanent Jordanian National Movement Mandate Commission, 75 (JNM), 24, 118–19, 119, 120, Legislative Councils, 74–5, 103, 124, 126, 128, 139–40n1, 110, 115, 184n11 159–60n43, 206n56, 206n59, Lerner, Daniel, 5, 22 209–10n1 Lipton, Michael, 34 Jordanian National Union, 128 Lugard, Frederick, 75 Jordan National Party, 89 June 1967 war, 2, 4, 14, 22, 125, MacMahon, Henry, 41 131, 138, 142–3n17, al-Majali, ‘Atif, 125 157–8n38, 205n56, 206n60 al-Majali, Habis, 122, 125, 199n13 al-Majali, Hazza‘, 8, 122, 124, 138, al-Karak, 17, 29, 31, 37, 43, 44, 140n7 45–7, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 57, al-Majali, Qadr, 46, 51, 173n25 58, 67, 79, 101, 103, 118, 122, al-Majali, Rafayfan, 51, 63 134, 151–2n2, 168n41, Mann, Michael, 12, 74, 84, 173n25 147–8n47, 149n54, al-Karakiyyah, 33, 47, 167n30, 149–50n55, 163–4n5 191n3 al-Masri, Munib, 139–40n1 al-Karak revolt, 46–7, 52, 67, 134, McDonnel Commission, 79, 86 135, 173n25, 173n26, 173n29, Meir, Golda, 155–6n30 194n24, 199n13, 202n38, merchant class, 24, 43, 45–6, 47, 204n47 64, 74, 78, 89, 91, 108, 110, Kazziha, W., 59 114, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, Kemal, Mustafa, 60, 69 159–60n43 Khasawna clan, 31, 44 Middle East Supply Centre (MESC), Khayr, Sa‘id, 58, 61, 68 110 Khulqi, ‘Ali, 60, 63, 68 Migdal, Joel, 12, 149–50n55 al-Kilani, Muhammad Rasul, military. See also Arab Legion; 127 Desert Patrol King Crane Commission, 178n24 benefits of service, 121–2 Kirkbride, Alec, 58, 110, 114, 116, cohesion of, 8–9 117, 135, 152n3, 185n22, external subsidies for, 123, 138 198n8 as Jordanian identity, 147n41 218 Index military. See also Arab Legion; Ottoman rule Desert Patrol—continued and Arab Revolt, 49–50, 134 under Mandate Rule, 75–7 expanded administration, 45–6 Mobile Force, 75–6 limited historical records of, Palestinian recruits, 202n37 16–17 support of Hashemites, 2, 7, loyal settlers, 42–3, 44 9–10, 23, 120, 150n57, Ottoman Land Law (1858), 44 208n68 payments of surrah, 29, 32, 38, military Keynesianism, 74, 77, 95, 46, 87, 92, 165n14 111 protection of pilgrims, 28–9 al-Mi‘radh, 31, 58 reforms, 14, 73, 134 Mitchell, Andrew, 102 taxation, 43, 44–5 modernization theory, 15–16, 22, use of local rule, 13, 27–9, 45, 46 25, 151n1 Ottoman Tanzimat, 13, 17, 39, Moore, Barrington, 9 42–3, 46, 47 Muhammad, 9 Mukhabarat (secret police), 7, 120, Palestine 124, 127, 128, 157n38, ‘Abdullah and, 19, 63 203n44, 207n63, 208n72 annexation of, 21 al-Mulqi, Fawzi, 156n32 Arab-Israeli conflict, 113, 116 Muraywid, Ahmad, 57, 60, 63, 64, British hostility toward, 66 181n77 employment in, 96, 109, 121, 137 Musa, Sulayman, 17–18 establishment of Jewish state, 66, Musha‘a, 35, 36, 38, 95, 101, 102, 170n2 105–7, 106, 112, 133 Faysal and, 61 al-Nabulsi, Sulayman, 119, 206n59 invasion of, 116 nahiyats, 31 land title reform, 102, 105, 108 al-Najdawi, Salih, 68 Mandatory rule in, 59, 67 Nasser, Gamal Abdel opposition to ‘Abdullah in, 65 challenge to Hashemite rule, 14, prosperity of, 110 124, 156–7n33 revolt in, 88–9, 90, 93 domination of Arab politics, 1, 2, support of Ibn Sa‘ud, 66 118, 119, 125 White Paper, 124 Free Officers and, 120 Zionist settlement in, 60, 66 PLO and, 207n66 Palestine Electricity Company, 96 radicalism of, 2 Palestine Liberation Organization West Bank and, 142–3n17 (PLO), 2, 3, 8, 14, 23, 125–6, Nassir ibn Jamil, 203–4n44, 203n44 126–7, 137, 139–40n1, National Co-operative Union, 128 146n37, 206n60, 207n66, Nusayrat clan, 31 209–10n1 Palestine Question, 16, 120, Occupied Enemy Territory 139–40n1, 157n37 Administrations (OETAs), 54, Palestinian National Guard, 202n37 56, 57 Palestinian question, 3, 16, 21, 114, Ottoman Empire, 27, 47 120, 128, 139–40n1, 157n37 Index 219

Palestinian Revolt (1936–1939), 20, during Ottoman rule, 42–3 93, 137 Palestinian, 137, 158n40, Pan-Arabism, 1, 15, 23, 119, 126, 202n38, 142–3n17 146n37 unemployment, 117, 121, 126 Parsons, Anthony, 1, 5, 131, 138, rents, 10, 122, 161–2n2 139–40n1, 209–10n1 al-Rifa‘i, Samir, 122, 156n32, Party of the Executive Committee of 204–5n54 the National Congress al-Rikabi, Ali Rida, 64–5, 68, 70, 74 (ECNC), 81, 82 Rogan, Eugene, 35, 156–7n33, Party of the Trans-Jordan National 159–60n43 Congress, 184n11 rural development, 96–101 patronage, 10, 12, 35, 36–7, 45, rural populism, 81–2 114, 120, 121–2, 123, 133, rural poverty 146–7n38, 148n48, 201n33 1948 War, 199n20 Peake, Frederick, 16, 59, 63, 64, 66, rural reform, 136 67, 68, 75, 76, 82, 152n3, al-Rusan, Mahmud, 121, 126 166n23, 175n2, 177n19, al-Rusan clan, 43 179n55, 184n12 Rutenberg, Pinhas, 80, 97 peasantization, 10, 147n46 Rutenberg concession, 96, 98 Peel Partition Plan (1973), 20, 100 Ruwalla, 32–3, 48, 49, 50, 52, 65, Philby, St. John, 65, 68, 179–80n62 84–5, 166–7n29 Plan Tariq, 125 poverty, 19, 29, 34, 80, 98, 118, Salibi, Kamal, 16–17, 140n7 199n20 Salim, Fu’ad, 63, 64 property rights reform, 95, 105 al-Salt, 22, 29, 30, 31, 43, 44, 46, al-Qusus, ‘Awdah, 47, 52, 68 49, 50, 56, 57, 58, 61, 67, 77, 78, 117, 119, 122, 172n16, raids 176–7n10, 177n13, 203–4n46 Bedouin, 29, 57, 58, 59, 76, 87 al-Saltiyyah, 31 eliminated by Desert Patrol, 84, Samuel, Herbert, 57, 58, 60, 64, 65, 87, 90–1, 100 134, 176–7n10 Hashemite encouragement of, 66 Sandeman, George, 87 Ikhwan, 55, 65–6 al-Saru, 31 Israel, 120 Saudi-Hashemite conflict, 59, 70–1 Saudi, 69, 71, 76, 79, 84, 86, 95 Scott, James, 34, 35, 52, 104 Trans-Jordan, 49, 50, 51 segmental groupings, 10 use of subsidies to deter, 87 Sen, Amartya, 37 al-Ramtha, 31, 58, 208n69 al-Sha‘alan, Nawwaf, 48, 49 Raslan, Mazhar, 58, 64, 68 al-Sha‘alan, Nuri, 48, 49, 50–1 al-Razzaz, Munif, 128, 139–40n1 al-Sha‘ir, Jamal, 139–40n1, 206n59 refugees al-Sha‘ir, Kamal, 128 inflow of, 3, 22, 117–18, 121, al-Shami, Sa‘ id Khayr, 67 122, 125, 137, 181–2n85, al-Shara‘, Sadiq, 121, 122, 199n20 203–4n44 opposition to, 27 al-Sharaydah, Klayb, 18, 67 220 Index al-Sharayrah, ‘Ali Khulqi, 57 Trans-Jordan. See also East Bank sharecropping, 34, 35, 37, 44, agriculture settlement, 192n6 168n41 as backward tribal state, 19–20 al-Shawbak, 31, 32, 49 budget of, 73–4 Shlaim, Avi, 20, 21 climate, 29 al-Shraydah clan, 31, 63, 167n30 closure of desert frontier, 95 al-Sirhan, 33, 48, 66, 79, 85, 86, 87, collapse of local governments, 189–90n13 134 Skocpol, Theda, 9, 195n35 colonial control of, 67–9, 73 Somerset, FitzRoy, 57 consolidation of, 108–11 Swift, Jeremy, 38 currency, 48, 78, 109, 187n36 Sykes - Picot agreement, 50–1, 54, evolution of, 16–18, 56 55 fiscal administration of, 73–4, 77, Syria, 5, 8, 10, 14, 16–17, 19, 20, 135 21, 23, 28, 35, 39, 41, 42, 45, growth of towns, 77–8 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 58, indebtedness of, 111–12 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 73, Jewish state and, 21–3, 198n9 76, 78, 91, 96, 99, 101, 108, local archives of, 24 109, 112, 113, 114, 116, 119, Mandate of, 6, 11, 14, 24, 55, 133, 136 59, 71 nationalism, 62, 81–2, 113, al-Tabba‘, Sabri, 182n90 152n5, 154–5n18, 160n44, al-Tafilah, 46, 89, 151–2n2 181n77, 200n26 Talal, 117, 156n32 Ottoman influence on, 28–30 al-Talhouni, Bahjat, 123, 126 patriarchal oligarchy, 6 al-Tall, ‘Abdullah, 22, 117, political geography of, 3–4, 19, 156–7n33 21, 83 al-Tall, Mustafa Wahbi (‘Arar), 68, separation from Palestine, 64–6, 81, 154n16, 181n77 176n7 al-Tall, Salih Mustafa, 52 standstill society, 83–4, 95 al-Tall, Wasfi, 8, 123–4, 125, 127–8, as strategic buffer, 44, 56, 66, 129, 137, 138, 139–40n1, 70–1, 83 198–9n12, 209–10n1 topography of, 29–30 taxation as transitional zone, 152–3n7 burden of, 109 tribal population of, 28–9, 31–3, collection of, 43, 59, 161–2n2, 34, 36 163–4n5 Um Qays treaty, 57–8, 60 Hadda agreement, 79 Trans-Jordan Frontier Force, 76, 90 increases in, 180–1n75 Trans-Jordan National Congresses reforms, 88, 95, 96 (TJNCS), 18, 20, 74, 80, 89, resistance to, 18 135 war funding, 63 tribal confederations, 33–4 during wartime, 109 Tribal Control Board, 71, 85 Thawrat al-Jawlan, 57, 160n44, Tribal Control Laws (1936), 99 176n4 tribalism, 24, 28–30, 58, 143–4n19 Index 221 tribal movements, 32–3 assaults on, 120 Tulay‘, Rashid, 63–4 June War (1967), 157–8n38 loss of, 2, 125, 137, 142–3n17 ‘Ubaydat, Mahmoud, 160n44 Operation Cordage, 200n25, al-‘Ubaydat, Kayid, 57, 160n44, 201n32 176n4 opposition to, 15 Um Qays meeting, 57–8, 60 refugees, 117–18 unemployment, 117–18, 121, 137, tribal groupings among, 200n22 165n18 Unified Arab Command, 124 Wilson, A. N., 61 United Arab Kingdom, 129 Wilson, Mary, 19–20 United States, 114, 120–1, 138, World War I, 2, 16, 17, 28, 41, 42, 201n33 45, 47–8, 55, 91 urbanization, 8, 95, 186n26 World War II, 11, 37, 73, ‘Utum clan, 31 76, 77, 84, 93, 95, 108, 110, 111, 113, 115, 122, Vatikiotis, P., 76 136, 137 von Papen, Fritz, 49 al-Wustiyya, 31, 58

Wadi al-Sirhan, 28, 33, 45, 48, 51, Yapp, Malcolm, 3 66, 70, 78, 79, 85, 86, 98, 99, Yemen, 4, 124, 204–5n54 135, 182n93 Wadi Musa, 31, 53 al-Zabn, ‘Akkash, 122 Wahhabism, 59, 66 Zayyadin, Ya‘qub, 139–40n1 West Bank Zein al Sharaf, 123 annexation of, 2, 6, 113–14, 115, Zu‘aytar, Akram, 124 132 Zu‘biyya, 31