Border Crossings in Times of War

Eloff de Visser, Lieneke [email protected] PhD candidate, Free University of Amsterdam (VU)

Lieneke Eloff de Visser

Abstract

The Eastern Caprivi in the north of Namibia forms the easternmost tip of the Caprivi Zipfel. At its widest, the area measures about 200 km east to west, and 80 km north to south. From the capital town Katima Mulilo it is an easy drive to any of four international borders with Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana. These borders were drawn in the early twentieth century as a formal separation between German, British and Portuguese colonial possessions. For the next sixty years, the borders remained permeable and people and goods easily crossed between territories. This changed dramatically with the onset of the Namibian war for liberation. To the South African authorities, the Caprivi Zipfel became a line of defence that was meant to bar SWAPO insurgents from entering Namibia and potential recruits from leaving, and served as a base for cross-border operations. From 1966 onwards the Eastern Caprivi became a militarized region where physical control over the territory’s boundaries was enforced by constant military patrols. Movement on and across the Zambezi and Chobe river borders was banned, while the Namibian - Zambian land border was denuded of all vegetation to allow ease of supervision. Moreover, even the internal Kwando river border between the Eastern and Western Caprivi was closed, so that to all intents and purposes the Eastern Caprivi was under full lockdown. This paper examines how the Eastern Caprivi population responded to these changes.

Scholars in the field of borderland studies have convincingly argued against the notion that colonial borders were imposed on hapless Africans. Similarly, conflict studies show that insurgencies are not merely fought out over the heads of a submissive population. Instead, local actors may find it expedient to collaborate with the dominant force, but simultaneously they may find ways to resist through acts of sabotage, subversion or avoidance. Moreover, within the space of the central conflict local actors may actively exploit opportunities to assert their supremacy over rivals, or to gain exclusive access to valuable resources like arable land or hunting and fishing grounds. In the Eastern Caprivi agency indeed resided with the people who sought and managed to circumvent or exploit restrictions on border crossings. They did so for a variety of reasons that rested on livelihood or security needs, or that were ideologically, politically or economically inspired. Thus, instead of being passive victims, local individuals and groups of the Eastern Caprivi creatively contested and escaped the confines of colonial hegemony and military occupation.

Introduction

The Eastern Caprivi has a long history of foreign occupation. From the 17th century the area has been invaded, ruled or administered by the Lozi, the Makololo, Germany, Britain and South Africa.1 The yoke of foreign rule was in some ways counter-balanced by the benefits of life at the periphery of the empire, allowing a certain freedom in interpreting the decrees emanating from the faraway centre of power. A case in point are the borders that enclose the Eastern Caprivi. Drawn in the early twentieth century as a formal separation between German and British colonial possessions, they remained permeable and people and goods freely crossed the international boundaries. However, the region’s relative autonomy was interrupted during the Namibian war for liberation from 1966 to 1989, when the South African state asserted itself at its periphery by introducing extensive administrative and military control. As part of the counterinsurgency war against the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), cross-border movement was prohibited and compliance was enforced by military patrols. To the Eastern Caprivi people, borders became barriers and places of danger.

This paper examines how the Eastern Caprivi population were affected by and responded to these changes. When an occupying force successfully introduces security regulations such as the closing of borders, it implies a significant power disparity between the dominant force and the subordinate population. Indeed, in the face of the overwhelming South African military presence, open rebellion was not an option to the Eastern Caprivi people. In addition, the South African forces were well aware of the cardinal rule of counterinsurgency, that is to win the hearts and minds of the population upon whom insurgents rely for recruits, hiding places, food and other resources. The SADF2 therefore put extensive effort into socio- economic development by bringing health and education benefits and food security to a region that had been a neglected backwater during most of South Africa’s rule.3 On the face of it, these measures seemed successful and from a military viewpoint the Eastern Caprivi was a pacified region by 1979.4 Successive military commanders of the region perceived the attitude of the population toward the South African authorities as ranging from neutral to friendly and cooperative.5 However, a lack of overt resistance does not equate a positive

1 Flint, ‘State-Building in Central Southern Africa’, 394. 2 South African Defence Force. 3 Eloff de Visser, Winning the Hearts and Minds, 18. 4 Geldenhuys, Die wat Gewen het, 90. 5 Interviews held with Gen Minnaar Fourie, Gen AK de Jager, Gen Gert Opperman and Gen Johan Saayman, former SADF commanders of the Eastern Caprivi, during March 2011, South Africa. 2 attitude. Moreover, imposed rules are seldom entirely water-tight. As explained by James Scott, outward compliance may conceal ‘strategies of the weak’, that is the ways in which subordinate people resist a dominant force through acts of sabotage, subversion and avoidance.6 Similarly, Peter Skalnik argues that when people are unable to confront state power directly, they may develop coping strategies that rely on quiet resistance, adaptation, accommodation and, when it proves profitable, collaboration. Furthermore, a subdued population may ‘select’ elements from the foreign development packet, which may gradually be incorporated into their own political and social culture.7

Although colonial history provides ample evidence of ‘strategies of the weak’, many studies have privileged the manipulations of state and colonial rule over the agency of subordinates.8 However, more recently researchers in Borderland Studies have argued against the notion that colonial borders were imposed on hapless Africans. In fact, as Paul Nugent points out, frequently the delineation of international boundaries irreversibly ended old hierarchies and created opportunities for politically aspiring new elites. Moreover, local authorities, rather than opposing colonial rule, attempted to maximize benefits by enlisting colonial institutions as arbitrator in local struggles for dominance over people and land.9 Similarly, in the field of Conflict Studies, Stathys Kalyvas points to a danger of portraying violence in civil wars as being externally imposed on unsuspecting, and therefore innocent civilians. He argues that at the peripheries, or the local level, a conflict may be more about pre-existing local disputes than about issues that concern the central parties in the struggle. Thus, local actors are by no means passive or invisible, but may successfully pursue personal ambitions by manipulating the central actors to promote their attempts to assert supremacy over rivals, or to gain exclusive access to valuable resources like arable land or hunting and fishing grounds.10

This paper aims to elaborate on the theme of African agency. The focus of the first chapter is on the Eastern Caprivi region before its borders were closed during the Namibian war for liberation. The second chapter discusses the strategic function of the Eastern Caprivi in South African security considerations. It outlines the region’s extensive militarisation leading to radically limited cross-border access. The third chapter deals with reasons and ways that people of the Caprivi circumvented or exploited such restrictions. The final chapter discusses the multiplicity of meanings that infused the border concept during the conflict.

6 Scott, Domination and the arts of resistance, 188. 7 Skalník, Outwitting the state, 13. 8 McClendon Thomas, ‘Coercion and Conversation’, 53. 9 Nugent, ‘Arbitrary Lines’, 47-51. 10 Kalyvas, ‘The Ontology of ‘Political Violence’’, 480-482. 3

Early Boundaries

The rivers that enclose much of the Eastern Caprivi have functioned as natural boundaries since pre-colonial times, when the region fell under the rule of the Lozi kingdom that had its headquarters in what is now western Zambia. For instance, Sipopa, the Lozi ruler from 1864 to 1878, appointed and sent Mamili Simataa Kabende to take up residence at Linyanti in the Eastern Caprivi, where the like-named river formed the southern perimeter of the Lozi domain. More than a visible boundary marker to the Lozi territory, the river also provided an obstacle to potential invaders, and indeed the Mamili’s responsibility was to guard the kingdom against invasion by the Matabele.11 A story survives of a party of Matabele warriors coming up from the south who, because they could not swim, had to depend on local knowledge and cooperation to safely find their way through the maze of channels and islands. Having negotiated transport to the northern bank, the Matabele were tricked by the local boatman. He rowed them to an island from where he made his escape and left the Matabele to starve to death.12

In a similar manner the Zambezi river functioned as a safety barrier in the north-eastern part of the Eastern Caprivi. Having acquired the Eastern Caprivi as part of her colonial possessions, Germany sent Captain Streitwolf to take control of the region in 1908. The ruler of the Lozi, King Litia, having heard rumours of German atrocities against the Herero and Nama peoples, took the precaution of evacuating the people under his jurisdiction across the Zambezi to Barotseland, and all their cattle with them, so that Captain Streitwolf found the area almost deserted.13 Streitwolf, hoping to convince the people to return, decreed that in the Eastern Caprivi they would be exempt from the hut tax that was imposed in Barotseland.14 And so the river took on an added function: a demarcation line between two kingdoms where different rules applied.

As mentioned, the delineation of formal state boundaries by colonial powers did not impede the traffic of people and goods across the borders between the Eastern Caprivi and Zambia or Botswana. People crossed borders to visit family members and friends, and many Caprivian men found employment on the Zambian side. Trade goods such as maize, fish, cattle and animal skins were transported from the Caprivi across the borders to both Botswana and Zambia, and inhabitants of the Caprivi did their shopping in Zambia, where prices were cheaper and a greater variety of goods were on offer. Furthermore, Caprivian men hunted and fished on both sides of the borders, while Zambians came to cut reeds on

11 Pretorius, The Fwe of the Eastern Caprivi, 30. 12 Interview with the Honorouble Ngambela James Kachana of the Mayeyi Tribal Authority at Sangwali on 4 June 2012; Trollope, ‘Report on the Administration’, 16. 13 Budack, Report of the Commission, 83; Flint, ‘State-Building in Central Southern Africa’, 415. 14 Flint, ‘State-Building in Central Southern Africa’, 415. 4 the Caprivian side.15 In addition, as opportunity or necessity dictated, people migrated across international borders to avoid drought or floods.16 Finally, even after having been separated by an international border for more than sixty years, pre-colonial political relations survived. A telling fact in this respect is that as late as 1961 the Mafwe and Masubiya, the dominant ethnic groups of the Eastern Caprivi, professed their allegiance to the King of Barotseland in Zambia, and in fact initiated attempts to secede from Namibia in order to join the former northern Rhodesia, now Zambia.17

During the lead-up to Namibia’s war for liberation the beginnings of organized resistance in the Eastern Caprivi were inspired not from Windhoek, but from Zambia. The Caprivi African National Union (CANU) aspired to attain self-determination for the Caprivi strip. It was modeled on UNIP, the United National Independence Party under leadership of Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, and adopted its constitution virtually unchanged. Caprivi inhabitants often signed up as members of both CANU and UNIP and crossed the border to attend UNIP meetings in Sesheke and Katima Mulilo (Zambia).18 In 1964 CANU’s founder and president, Brendan Simbwaye, was arrested at a CANU rally in Katima Mulilo on a number of charges, of which the main one was holding an unauthorized meeting. However, it was a lesser charge – leaving the Caprivi without proper travel documents – that anticipated the impending end to unrestricted border crossings. After Simbwaye’s arrest almost the entire CANU leadership went into exile in Zambia, where later that year the party merged with SWAPO.19 In 1966 SWAPO officially announced the start of its armed struggle against South Africa.20

15 Trollope, ‘Report on the Administration’, 20; AMI/HSI Group 3 Box 430, Die Caprivistrook: Strategiese Belang, 1967, 6-8, available at Department of Documentation, SANDF, Pretoria. 16 Interviews with David Lopa Mbeha on 3 June 2012 at Machita village; Siwile Job Muswabile on 24 June 2012 at Sangwali; Anonymous on 7 July 2012 at Katima Mulilo. 17 AMI/HSI Group 3 Box 430, Die Caprivistrook: Strategiese Belang, 9, available at Department of Documentation, SANDF, Pretoria 18 Interview with Silvester Musiwa Ntonda on 11 June 2012 at Masubiya Khuta Headquarters, Bukalo. 19 AMI/HSI Group 3 Box 430, Die Caprivistrook: Strategiese Belang, 1967, 10-11, available at Department of Documentation, SANDF, Pretoria; Brown, Susan, ‘Diplomacy by other Means’, 21. 20 Katjavivi, A History of Resistance, 59. 5

Borderland Changes

The main route from SWAPO’s military headquarters in Dar es Salaam to central Namibia led through Zambia and subsequently the Caprivi Zipfel, and caused grave concern to the South African authorities. In 1967 an assessment was undertaken of the strategic importance of the Eastern Caprivi to the overall security of South Africa. It was considered that the Eastern Caprivi, together with Angola, Rhodesia and Mozambique – then all still under colonial rule – formed an uninterrupted buffer that shielded the Republic of South Africa from hostile African states to the north. The Eastern Caprivi strip also drove a wedge between Botswana, a potentially antagonistic neighbour, and Zambia, an enemy state. It was furthermore speculated that the Eastern Caprivi posed an attractive military target to belligerent enemy states, not only from a strategic point of view, but also for the prestige and propaganda value such an attack would offer. The report advised that due to vast distances and difficult terrain it would require a substantial deployment of troops and materiel to adequately patrol and guard the Caprivi borders against infiltration by enemy guerillas on their way to either central Namibia or South Africa. In the event of a direct attack certainly no less than brigade strength was required to safeguard South Africa’s “Achilles’heel”.21

By the late sixties SWAPO incursions into the Eastern Caprivi became bolder and more frequent. SWAPO’s strategy was based on classic guerilla doctrine, using Zambia as a base from which to infiltrate the local population and to conduct hit and run assaults.22 Most took place in close proximity to the northern borders of the region, allowing for easy escape back into Zambia. In response, the South African Police introduced specialized units. The Security Police recruited informants on both sides of the border, while Counterinsurgency Units established forts and tent camps at strategic points along the border and at river crossings to Zambia and Botswana.23 From these bases the borders were patrolled on foot and by vehicle. The South African army and air force were brought in to support with foot and aerial patrols, especially after SWAPO starting using land-mine tactics and launched a surprise assault on a border police base.24 In 1974 the SADF formally took over responsibility for security in northern Namibia and built still more bases.25 In addition, along the land border running westward from Katima Mulilo to the Kwando river, the so-called ‘cutline’ was established. This was a 100 metre wide strip of land, denuded of all vegetation by the use of herbicides and defoliants. Besides showing up tracks of passing SWAPO fighters, it was a visual demarcation of the exact border between Zambia and Namibia.26

21 AMI/HSI Group 3 Box 430, Die Caprivistrook: Strategiese Belang, 12-13, available at Department of Documentation, SANDF, Pretoria 22 Brown, ‘Diplomacy by other Means’, 21; Katjavivi, A History of Resistance, 84-5. 23 Interview with Sakkie Bosman, former SAP-V, on 8 August 2012 at Cape Town. 24 Interview with Deon Visser, former SADF, on 1 March 2011 at Saldanha; SGK Katima Mulilo, Box 3 Vol 4, War Diary, 1973, available at Department of Documentation, SANDF, Pretoria. 25 Interviews with Deon Visser, former SADF, on 1 March 2011 at Saldanha; and with Minnaar Fourie, former SADF commander of the Eastern Caprivi, on 4 March 2011 at Chapman’s Peak. 26 Email correspondence with Anton Uys, former SAP-V, dated 30 October 2012. 6

With increased militarization the internal border between the Eastern and Western Caprivi was also closed in order to prevent the crossing of SWAPO members travelling between central Namibia and Zambia by way of the Caprivi strip. The area to the west of the Kwando river became a no-go zone for the Eastern Caprivi people when military camps like Fort Doppies and Fort St Michel were established and the territory was reserved for the sole use of Special Forces units.27 A permit had to be obtained from the military authorities in order to travel through the Western Caprivi towards Namibia proper, and had to be produced at the checkpoint at Kongola bridge.28 For all practical purposes, the Eastern Caprivi was therefore under full lockdown.

If the foremost function of the militarize border region was to keep SWAPO fighters out, a second objective was to keep those intent on joining SWAPO in. During early years of the conflict a large number of young people from the Caprivi left for SWAPO training camps up north, and the South African military were keenly aware of their critical importance to SWAPO infiltration attempts, since Caprivian recruits were familiar with hidden crossing places and safe routes through the territory. They also knew where to find sympathetic local inhabitants who could be counted on to provide shelter and food.29 However, in spite of police and military patrols, a second wave of recruits left in 1976.30

At the north-eastern periphery of South African control, virtually a finger jutting into Africa, the Eastern Caprivi’s third function was as a forward base for offensive action against enemy insurgent organizations and hostile states. Operation Brush (Bush Reconaissance Unit Signal HQ) was established as a secret listening post where radio networks across Africa were monitored, and if necessary, jammed.31 In addition, the Eastern Caprivi served as a base for military operations into Zambia. For instance, after the SWAPO mortar and rocket attack on Katima Mulilo in August 1978, South Africa retaliated with Operation Safraan in March 1979, with the objective to destroy all SWAPO bases in south-west Zambia.32

The measures undertaken by the South African forces to maintain control of the border region were mostly directed at external enemies, and not explicitly at the indigenous population. However, they had an enormous effect on local people’s lives, as the next chapter will show.

27 Breytenbach, Eden’s Exiles, 57. 28 Interview with Induna George Manu and Eitis Mukobela on 17 July 2012 at Kongola; Sector 70 Group 4 Box 33, Oos/Wes Caprivi/Kwando rivier problem, 1987, available at Department of Documentation, SANDF, Pretoria; 13 Subarea Box 220, 23 May 1974, available at Department of Documentation, SANDF, Pretoria. 29 Du Toit, Oos Caprivi, 10. 30 Du Toit, Oos Caprivi, 10,16. Interview with Barend van der Westhuizen on 10 March 2011 at Alldays. 31 Interviews with Minnaar Fourie, former SADF, on 4 March 2011 at Chapman’s Peak; Jas Fourie, former SADF, on 11 March 2011 at Ellisras; Sakkie Bosman, former SAP-V, on 8 August 2012 at Cape Town. 32 Sector 70, Group 3, Box 162, Safraan – Rekstok, 1979, available at Department of Documentation, SANDF, Pretoria. 7

Responses

Over time the local population’s freedom to cross the borders became severely curtailed. It became a risky enterprise because of hidden landmines, or one might be mistaken for a SWAPO insurgent. It was safest to cross the border at night, but there was the danger of running into a patrol and at times people literally crawled across. At river borders one had to listen for patrol boats, and a makorro (dugout canoe) was needed to get across, although in a desperate situation bundles of reeds could be tied into a makeshift raft. In the dark there was the added risk of encounters with hippo or crocodiles. Even owning a makorro could cause problems; if the police suspected that it was used for secret transports they might decide to destroy it. Actually getting caught on the river brought enormous trouble. Interrogations involved beatings and threats of worse punishment, so that people gave up information on fellow villagers or were coerced into becoming police informers.33

Although borders had become danger zones, the people of the Caprivi continued to cross them for a variety of reasons. As mentioned, going into exile to join SWAPO was one. Recruitment took various forms. After SWAPO and CANU merged there were regular radio broadcasts from Zambia calling on the people of the Caprivi to join the struggle.34 Visiting SWAPO activists, local teachers and senior students that were CANU or SWAPO members, mobilized young people at secret meetings and at schools. They requested support for their mission to end South African dominance, invited youngsters to join them, and sometimes promised that volunteers would be sent to study in Zambia or Tanzania.35 In the late 60s SWAPO’s appeal was further strengthened because repressive police action against CANU supporters contributed to a militant attitude among the population.36

Those who elected to join SWAPO received instructions on when and where to meet, and were then taken secretly across the border. Youngsters were forbidden to tell their parents about their plans. Parents that were consulted realized the dangers involved and did indeed attempt to stop their children from leaving. Undoubtedly their fears were justified, since many of those who left were never seen again.37 For young recruits however, joining the struggle was also a rite of passage to adulthood. Some of those who stayed behind faced ridicule for lacking courage or not being a ‘real man’, and would feel impelled to offer justifications, for instance having the care for an elderly or sick family member.38

33 Interviews with with Beaven Munali on 16 May 2012 and Anonymous on 7 July 2012 at Katima Mulilo. 34 Interview with Boniface Libanda on 5 July 2012 at Choi. 35 Interviews with the Honourable Chief Boniface Shufu on 8 June 2012 at the Royal Palace, Sangwali; Boniface Libanda on 5 July 2012 at Choi; Tokkie Nienaber (former SAP-V) on 4 August at Pretoria. 36 Interview with Boniface Libanda on 5 July 2012 at Choi. 37 Interviews with Leonard Musutela and Jeremiah Munanzi on 6 June 2012 at Sangwali; Mrs Sarah Mweti Mukono and Silvester Musiwa Ntonda on 11 June 2012 at Bukalo; Samson Mbanga Ntonda and Anonymous at Bukalo on 13 June 2012; Francis Nombano Keleso on 18 July 2012 at Kongola. 38 Interviews with Anonymous on 16 May 2012 at Katima Mulilo; Elias Muzamai Samashazi on 24 June 2012 at Sangwali; Bagrey Mazungu on 25 June 2012 at Katima Mulilo. 8

Those people who knew the border landscape and river crossings well found that they were sought out by SWAPO and CANU to lend their valuable assistance. This sometimes came at very great personal cost, as was the case with Anderson Sisuka Munali, who transported SWAPO recruits up the Kwando river to Zambia, until he was caught and sent to Pretoria. The interrogation and torture he underwent left him a broken man.39 Those who supported the struggle from inside the Eastern Caprivi through their special knowledge of the border zones became well respected in their communities. Knowledge of borders and safe crossing routes also offered a source of income since the South African Police paid informers to report on visitors that arrived from the other side.40 Furthermore, both SWAPO and ANC insurgents needed escorts across borders and onward through the region, and had money to pay for their services. Sometimes local guides even benefited twice, as was the case when ANC cadres Flag Boshielo and three companions paid a boatman to bring them across the Zambezi and take them through to Botswana. After a dispute about payment, the local guide betrayed them to the South African Police, who paid him for his services.41

Having braved the crossing, new recruits presented themselves at the nearest Zambian police station. Unfortunately for them, radio operators of the Zambian National Defence Force (ZNDF) reported on their names and even ID numbers. These transmissions were intercepted by the BRUSH listening post, so that the South African police usually knew exactly who had crossed into Zambia.42 From there on security police would keep an eye on the recruit’s family, in case he returned and sought shelter with them. Parents and siblings were harassed and interrogated on a regular basis. A mother of two boys who had crossed to Zambia tells how her third son, who had no plans to join SWAPO at first, became so terrified of the interrogations and convinced that the police would someday kill him, that he saw no other option but to run away and join SWAPO too.43 Others joined SWAPO because they were known CANU members, another guarantee of frequent visits and unwanted attention by the South African security forces.44 Thus, people did not only join SWAPO for ideological reasons, but also because it seemed a safer option than staying in the Caprivi.

Although the main focus of South African patrols was the interception of passing SWAPO fighters, the next best thing was finding those who supported them. SWAPO insurgents frequented a crossing-point in the northwestern corner of the region, where Angola, Zambia and the Eastern and Western Caprivi meet. It was called Terr’s Corner by South African policemen.45 The insurgents received food and shelter in the villages, and were guided

39 Interview with Beaven Munali, the son of Anderson Sisuka Munali, on 16 May 2012 at Katima Mulilo. 40 Interview with Anonymous on 7 July 2012 at Katima Mulilo. 41 Interview with Sakkie Bosman (former SAP-V) on 8 August 2012 at Cape Town. 42 Interview with Sakkie Bosman (former SAP-V) on 8 August 2012 at Cape Town. 43 Interview with Mrs Sarah Mweti Mukono on 11 June 2012 at Bukalo. 44 Interview with Silvester Musiwa Ntonda on 11 June 2012 at Bukalo. 45 Short for ‘Terrorist’s Corner’. Du Toit, Oos-Caprivi, 11. 9 across the borders by local sympathizers.46 Consequently the area was heavily patrolled and the villages were subject to frequent searches, often on the basis of information supplied by local collaborators. The police would arrive at night, surround a village with their vehicles and switch on the headlights, while a helicopter hovered and shone a search light inside the kraal. Young and old were summoned from their beds while policemen and their dogs searched every hut, digging up floors and overturning pots and bags of food. Outside the villagers were interrogated about visitors and CANU sympathizers.47 The more people professed to know nothing, the more the police would press them and accuse them of offering food and shelter to passing SWAPO fighters.48 Before leaving, the police would warn villagers against joining SWAPO. They also took a head count and threatened to return periodically to check if everyone was accounted for.49 Living in constant terror of police action took its toll and villagers started looking across the border to Zambia for safety.

During the late 1960s, groups of people and entire villages fled from the northwestern area of the Eastern Caprivi for Imusho, a Zambian village where SWAPO had established a base. It seems to have been the death of Maxwell Kulibabika that triggered the exodus. Kulibabika was a CANU member who worked as a driver for Wenela, an organization that contracted local men for work on the South African mines. Since Kulibabika’s job included transporting the miners from Katima Mulilo to their rural villages, he was well placed to transport SWAPO insurgents through the region. The South African Police found out about his clandestine activities, possibly through an informer, and he was arrested. What happened next remains unclear, but eventually the police brought his body back to Kongola, where it was dumped unceremoniously in a shallow grave while the villagers looked on from a distance. It was probably due to this event that people living in the area became so afraid that they risked the crossing to Zambia.50 It took a harrowing day and night of running. Babies were carried in arms and toddlers on the back, while small children had to run with their mothers. There are stories of babies born along the way, and of women subsequently having miscarriages or giving birth to a stillborn child.51 Upon arrival in Imusho the danger was not over, especially if refugees arrived alone with no-one to vouch for them. SWAPO leaders had become suspicious about informers that worked for the South African side and the refugees could

46 Group interview with the Mayeyi Kuta on 23 May 2012 at Mayeyi Headquarters, Sangwali. Interviews with Anonymous on 16 May 2012 at Katima Mulilo; Induna George Manu and Eitis Mukobela on 17 July 2012 at Kongola. 47 Group interview on 9 July 2012 at Kongola. Interviews with Progress Liswaniso on 12 July 2012 at Kongola; Induna George Manu and Eitis Mukobela on 17 July 2012 at Kongola; Francis Nombano Keleso on 18 July 2012 at Masida. 48 Group interview on 9 July 2012 at Kongola. 49 Interview with Induna George Manu and Eitis Mukobela on 17 July 2012 at Kongola. 50 Group interview on 9 July 2012 at Kongola. Interviews with Mrs Nashaho Sishwama on 9 July 2012 at Kongola; Induna George Manu and Eitis Mukobela on 17 July 2012 at Kongola, and Mrs Chibotu on 18 July 2012 at Masida. 51 Interviews with Mrs Nashaho Sishwama on 9 July at Kongola; Induna George Manu and Eitis Mukobela on 17 July 2012 at Kongola; Mrs Chibotu on 18 July 2012 at Masida. 10 not always count on a friendly welcome. 52 Furthermore, life in exile was endangered by South African military raids into Zambia, usually follow-up operations after SWAPO attacks. On several occasions Imusho was bombed and because both SWAPO and the South Africans had mined the area, further civilian casualties occurred. Finally, with the influx of refugees at Imusho, famine threatened and people periodically had to risk border crossings in order to collect food from the Eastern Caprivi.53

For the people living on the Kwando river, hunting or fishing on its western side had always been a way of supplementing the diet in times of scarcity, and this did not change during the war. As mentioned earlier, this internal border was closed during the war, and the Western Caprivi became a no-go zone reserved for SADF Special Forces units. Initially, police and army patrols hardly bothered those who trespassed to hunt or fish, and even assisted the villagers by shooting problem animals, like elephants that destroyed crops. Many officers liked to hunt for trophies, and would give the meat to nearby villages.54 However, relations deteriorated when Jan Breytenbach, an avid conservationist, became commander of Fort Doppies in the Western Caprivi. Whether people hunted for the pot, for trophies or for profit from ivory, they were all poachers to him. He single-mindedly pursued anyone caught hunting in the Western Caprivi, and when he found that legal proceedings against trespassers resulted in no more than a slap on the wrist, he took matters in his own hands.55 Hunters from the Eastern Caprivi lived in fear of him, not just because of his explosive temper, but because he would wreck a hunter’s financial prospects by destroying his weapon and makorro. Apart from having to contend with Jan Breytenbach, local hunters also ran the risk that their gunshots would alert passing patrols who would come to investigate and might mistake them for SWAPO insurgents. Crossing the maze of islands and reeds to the Western Caprivi thus had to be done in total silence and by secret routes.56

Although to most people borders represented unwarranted restrictions that needed to be circumvented, local Caprivi authorities also adopted border making as a strategy to promote their own political and economic interests. In the early eighties Mafwe leaders attempted to establish an official internal border that would give them control over a large part of the territory. They proposed to have the border running from north to south and, clearly inspired by the cutline the South Africans had created along the Zambian land border, called for a bulldozer to clear a wide strip of vegetation as visual demarcation line.57 The plan was

52 Interview with Induna George Manu and Eitis Mukobela on 17 July 2012 at Kongola. 53 Interviews with Fabian Kaka Mwanambwe on 6 June 2012 at Sangwali; Induna Musiya Edward Ngenda on 17 July 2012 at Mayuni headquarters, Choi; Murphy, Information Sharing Workshop, 14. 54 Interview with Induna Likezo Mapulanga and Charles Kulumbana on 12 July 2012 at Mapulanga village. 55 Breytenbach, Eden’s Exiles, 204-222. 56 Interviews with Leonard Musutela and Jeremiah Munanzi on 6 June 2012 at Sangwali; Induna Likezo Mapulanga and Charles Kulumbana on 12 July 2012 at Mapulanga village; Induna George Manu and Eitis Mukobela on 17 July 2012 at Kongola. 57 Letter from Chief R.M. Mamili to the Budack Commission, dated 23 February 1982, Katima Mulilo, Appendix 20 in Budack, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 119. 11 vigorously opposed by the Masubya people, the other dominant tribe of the region, who argued that there was no need for such a boundary, since by rights the Masubya were the rulers of the entire Eastern Caprivi. The Budack commission into the boundary dispute, after having heard testimony from both sides, as well as members of the South African administration, observed that the evidence implied that the real issue at stake was not the proposed boundary, but a longstanding rivalry between the Mafwe and Masubiya people, the legitimacy of their respective Chiefs, and a dispute over rights based on first occupancy.58

58 Budack, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 10. 12

Discussion

Although the borders that circumvent the Eastern Caprivi were virtually closed off during the conflict between South Africa and SWAPO, local people nevertheless continued to cross. However, whereas before the war the border was an imaginary line that was crossed unthinkingly, during the conflict borders and border crossings took on new meaning and import. Indeed, borders had become dangerous places, and one needed good reasons to cross them. A number of these reasons were identified and they show that the border represented more than just a place of danger, while crossing the border represented more than a foolhardy and perilous enterprise.

People crossed the border to join SWAPO, because they wanted to be part of the struggle. To them crossing represented an act of resistance, of heroism even, since it was an act against the overwhelming power of the South African ruler. Closely related are those who supported the struggle by guiding SWAPO fighters or recruits across rivers and borders, and as we have seen, their resistance work earned them respect and stature in the community. Young men also joined SWAPO in a spirit of adventure, or because it was a way of proving one’s courage, and the crossing thus represented a passage to adulthood. Others joined because they were promised an education, and for them crossing may have represented improved life chances. At the same time, to those parents who were left to fear for their children’s lives, the border surely represented grief and loss.

People also crossed to go into exile. They were harassed by police for having relatives that had joined SWAPO, or for being a CANU member or sympathizer. Police security sweeps generated fear in rural villages, especially those located close to the borders, and many deemed it safer to become a refugee in a neighbouring country, especially Zambia, than to stay in the Eastern Caprivi. To them the border crossing, while dangerous in itself, represented a passage to safety.

People crossed borders to go hunting and fishing, especially in times of scarcity. They also used their specialized knowledge of the rivers to act as paid guides to those who needed to cross in secret. Others supplemented their income by working as paid informers who reported on border activity to the South African forces. In all these cases the borders represented economic opportunity through access to income and food.

Lastly, Mafwe leaders adopted the concept of borders or border making as a way of controlling people’s freedom of movement that could be exploited to gain dominance in the region. Thus to them borders and border making represented political opportunity.

It seems reasonable to assume that the people of the Eastern Caprivi undertook the hazardous border crossings because their misgivings were overcome by more urgent considerations, such as deep-felt grievances against South African rule, fear for their lives, the need for food and such. At the same time we see evidence of opportunism and political maneuvering. Thus the borders of the Eastern Caprivi, previously unnoticed and

13 unremarkable, took on a multiplicity of meanings during the Namibian war for liberation. Not surprisingly, many of these meanings are not directly related to the conflict that gave rise to the changes in border access. At the same time those meanings were magnified by the context of war and its attendant dangers. After all, while clandestine border crossings in times of peace may result in a fine or even imprisonment, during times of war they may result in death. In this highly charged context the people of the region sought and managed to resist, subvert, avoid and exploit regulations that were imposed by the powerful South African forces. At the same time the South African authorities perceived them as being docile and cooperative. Borders and border crossings in war situations thus amplify manifestations of human agency at a time when, of necessity, there must appear to be none at all.

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