Duquesne University Duquesne Scholarship Collection Electronic Theses and Dissertations Spring 2010 A Study of Plato's Cratylus Geoffrey Scott aB gwell Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd Recommended Citation Bagwell, G. (2010). A Study of Plato's Cratylus (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/ etd/259 This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A STUDY OF PLATO’S CRATYLUS A Dissertation Submitted to the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts Duquesne University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Geoffrey Bagwell May 2010 A STUDY OF PLATO’S CRATYLUS By Geoffrey Bagwell Approved April 6, 2010 _________________________________ ____________________________________ Ronald M. Polansky, Ph.D. Patrick L. Miller, Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy Assistant Professor of Philosophy Director Committee Member _________________________________ ____________________________________ L. Michael Harrington, Ph.D. James Swindal, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Philosophy Associate Professor of Philosophy Committee Member Department Chair __________________________________ Christopher Duncan, Ph.D. Dean, The McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts iii ABSTRACT A STUDY OF PLATO’S CRATYLUS By Geoffrey Bagwell May 2010 Dissertation supervised by Ronald M. Polansky, Ph.D. In the last century, philosophers turned their attention to language. One place they have looked for clues about its nature is Plato’s Cratylus, which considers whether names are naturally or conventionally correct. The dialogue is a source of annoyance to many commentators because it does not take a clear position on the central question. At times, it argues that language is conventional, and, at other times, defends the view that language is natural. This lack of commitment has led to a long-standing dispute over the outcome of the dialogue. I argue that the Cratylus provides no clear resolution to this problem because it presupposes certain unexamined metaphysical commitments about the nature of reality, which are in need of thorough investigation. iv DEDICATION For Jenny and Lucy v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Introduction......................................................................................................................... 2 Part One: That it is ............................................................................................................12 1: Conventionalism (383a4–385e3).............................................................................. 13 2: Truth and Falsehood (385b2–d1).............................................................................. 28 3: A Craft of Naming (385e3–390e3)........................................................................... 37 Part Two: What it is .......................................................................................................... 60 4: Poetry and Inspiration (391a–397a).......................................................................... 61 5: An Examination of Names (397a2–421c1) .............................................................. 91 6: Imitation (421c2–427c9)......................................................................................... 110 Part Three: Why it is....................................................................................................... 134 7: Quality Control (427c9–435c9).............................................................................. 135 8: Education (435c9–440d4)....................................................................................... 161 9: Hermogenes’ Name (440d4–e7)............................................................................. 180 Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 190 vi Οὔθ ἐκνῦ ἀιιὰ ηνῦ ιόγνπ ἀθνύζαληαο ὁκνινγεῖλ ζνθόλ ἐζηὶλ ἑλ πάληα εἶλαη -Heraclitus 1 Introduction Plato‘s Cratylus is a source of constant irritation for commentators. The etymologies that occupy more than half of the dialogue are the principal causes of this because they appear to serve no purpose, except to tickle Plato‘s bizarre sense of humor. For this reason, most commentators have concentrated on the beginning and the end of the dialogue (see especially Robinson 1955, Kretzmann 1971, Fine 1977, Schofield 1982, Williams 1982, and Mackenzie 1986). The Cratylus opens with Socrates trying to arbitrate a dispute between Hermogenes and Cratylus over the correctness of names (ὀλόκαηνο ὀξζόηεηα, 383a–391a), and closes with Socrates suggesting an alternative to Cratylus‘ view that learning about names is the best way to learn about nature (438a–440e).1 The relationship, however, between these disputes is murky, and few commentators have tried to clarify it because they ignore the etymologies (cf. Ackrill 1997, 34).2 Yet such neglect 1 Commentators largely agree ―name‖ should translate ὄλνκα. They disagree about what ὀλόκαηα are. A few commentators think ὀλόκαηα are ―predicates‖ (Sachs 1878, 63–4; Luce 1969, 222–3; Lorenz and Mittelstrass 1967, 4). Others restrict it to nouns (Robinson 1955, 101–3; Fine 1977, n. 14; Annas 1982, n. 26). I follow Ketchum 1979, 147, who argues that the meaning of ὄλνκα expands and contracts over the course of the dialogue. However, Ketchum believes that Socrates‘ use of ὄλνκα in his discussion with Hermogenes is incompatible with his use of it in his discussion with Cratylus. I suggest that the meaning of ὄλνκα is gradually refined in the course of the dialogue (cf. 391b3). This refinement suggests that Socrates and Hermogenes broadly construed the meaning of ὄλνκα and try to clarify it. This is most evident in Socrates‘ etymological demonstration, where ὄλνκα comes to mean something like ―predicate‖ (see Luce 1969, 222–3). 2 It may be that there is no relationship between the opening and closing disputes. Instead, they may be two separate issues. If so, a different though similar problem would arise: it would become unclear why these disputes should appear in the same dialogue. 2 prevents them from learning how Socrates settles the dispute over the correctness of names. Given their prominence in the Cratylus, the etymologies must play some part in Socrates‘ arbitration of the dispute between Hermogenes and Cratylus over the correctness of names. What role, then, do they play? Several commentators have recently studied the etymologies in an effort to discern their purpose (See Sedley 2003, Barney 2001, and Baxter 1992. For a summary and criticism of these interpretations, see Thomas 2007. For criticism specific to Sedley, see Verlinsky 2003, 75). Timothy Baxter 1992, §4, argues that the etymologies are meant to condemn the practice of etymology used by various pre-Socratics, sophists and poets. He thinks that the etymologies ―attack a wide variety of targets because [Plato] is battling against what he sees as a culture-wide mistaken belief in the power of names.‖ His long list of targets includes figures like Protagoras and Prodicus, whom Socrates mentions (385e–d; 383b; Cf. Weingartner 1970, 24). The chief success of Baxter‘s claim is that it explains the length of the analysis. Socrates examines so many names because there are so many sophists, poets, and naturalists who overvalue the importance of names (Baxter 1992, 87). David Sedley offers us an entirely different kind of interpretation. He disagrees fundamentally with the premise that the etymologies are a parody. Instead, they represent an ―exegetically‖ correct attempt to establish a science of etymology (2003, 28–30). Such etymologies would enable a person to learn about names. According to Sedley, however, the etymologies are not ―philosophically‖ correct. If they were, they would enable a person to learn about the things named. The fact that the etymologies are ―exegetically,‖ but not ―philosophically‖ correct means that they enable a person to learn about names, 3 but not about the things named. This argument fits nicely with Socrates‘ attack on the view that learning about names is the best way to learn about nature (435d ff.). Nevertheless, it is unclear how the claim that the examination is ―exegetically‖ correct fits with the overall argument of the dialogue. Sedley does not try to show how this ―exegetically‖ correct examination of names fits into the Cratylus as a whole. Instead, he builds a case for his interpretation by examining Socrates‘ analysis of names in other dialogues to show that they confirm his view (cf. 2003, 25–51). This approach may be enough to justify the claim that Plato takes etymology seriously enough to develop it into a science but it is not enough to explain what such a science might do for the Cratylus. Barney‘s interpretation is the only one that tries to explain the role of the etymologies in terms of Socrates‘ arbitration of the dispute between Cratylus and Hermogenes.3 She agrees with Baxter that the intention behind the etymologies is to parody the practices of individuals who overvalue names. She, however, disagrees that the etymologies target anyone who overvalues names. She argues that the etymologies are a ―rational reconstruction,‖ ―an inspiration episode,‖ and an ―agonistic‖ display of Cratylus‘